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Political Science Seminar
Room 1004
Arts III Building
Friday 6 August 1982
11:00 a.m.

'Non-Dependent Development Policies: An
Evaluation of Theory and Practice With
Particular Reference to Tanzania 1967-78'

This paper is part of a larger research project. The research project in its entirety, and in its general theoretical thrust, seeks to interrogate the assumptions of dependency theorization as well as those strategies or policies which have been prescribed or instituted in order to curb dependency.

The illustrating case chosen for this project is Tanzania in the period 1967 to 1978. The reason for this choice, among others, is that policy attempts at curbing Tanzania's dependency emerged coherently and officially only from the year 1967 with the announcement of the Arusha Declaration policy document, while the 1978 'cut-off' corresponds to the end of a period of relative economic tranquility in the country.

The basic question asked throughout the research will be seeking to find out the extent to which Tanzanian intentions vis-a-vis dependency have been carried out. A related question will seek to find out whether the specifically Tanzanian non-dependent development policies (or any like policies elsewhere) can actually eliminate dependency. This latter question entails the researcher's intervention in the existing theoretic discourse on dependency, and, as a result of such intervention, the researcher's own initial conceptualization of dependency.

The mode of evaluation at the level of general theory therefore requires the formulation of a particular conceptualization of dependency and non-dependency strategy to serve as a 'standard' against which the Tanzanian one is posited. The other level of evaluation which should form the kernel of the research project is the positing of Tanzanian philosophical, theoretic and policy statements of a non-dependency nature against which implementation in the form of structures, institutions, and projects are measured, i.e., an evaluation of practice based on the logic of Tanzania's own policies.

In evaluating the practice of the Tanzanian Leadership according to the logic of its own policies, the Arusha Declaration undoubtedly carries more weight as a policy document as we briefly try to show in this paper. Thus one of the logical things to do is to let the declaration serve as the standard which measures all subsequent structures, institutions and projects. But since other policy documents both pre- and post-Arusha may be more specific and explicit on the subject of dependency, the other way to go about it is to organize all the relevant pre-1978 policy documents into a system of non-dependency policies to serve as the standard.

My inclination is toward a third alternative, which starts from an admittedly debatable view that even a philosophico-theoretic treatise can be defined as a general policy against which a more 'concretized' policy is measured, and that it is possible to evaluate to a certain degree the extent of implementation of a policy by looking at a subsequent policy. The reason for this inclination is that generally speaking a line of thought which takes the meaning of policy beyond what is pronounced to be policy as such to include the philosophico-theoretic mood around it has a greater likelihood of capturing the comprehensive meaning. An understanding of certain philosophical and theoretic treatises preceding Arusha becomes necessary to the understanding of the Declaration itself, and, with a limited aim in mind, those treatises in their own right can supplement the Arusha Declaration as a standard for measuring post-1967 practice. Similarly a generally worded policy like the Arusha Declaration can be set as a standard to evaluate another general but more explicit statement such as the Five-Year Development Plans. This alternative may further appear to be useful for example when one considers that some policies continually get re-stated and elaborated while the actual projects which they envisage may never have been carried out, at least not yet, perhaps due to a major bottleneck such as lack of finance. In a case like this policy can not be said to have been successfully implemented, but the only attempt to put it into practice in the circumstances can be indicated. Of course this measurement of one policy against another can not exhaust the issue of practice as against intention, and should cover only a small though logically necessary part of the research project. The primary indicators of practice must remain the structures, institutions and projects carried out in relation to the intention.

The present paper does not deal with the evaluation of dependency and non-dependency strategy at the level of general theory, and therefore there is

virtually no attempt to interrogate the assumptions of either dependency as a theory or those of the Tanzanian non-dependency development policies. The intention is to do that in another paper. What is being done here is largely a summarized documentation of the features of Tanzanian dependency as well as that of non-dependency thinking which together gave birth to the Arusha Declaration in 1967. (The documentation of Post-Arusha policies is barely touched upon in this paper, partly because the logic of my own present system of study has not yet permitted a more profound delving into the material in that period, and largely because there would seem to be a paucity of such material in my present location of study.) Towards the end of this paper there is an attempt to indicate the central questions of the envisaged empirical research on Tanzania as well as a brief indication of how other people have tried to answer some of these questions in projects which were not necessarily similar to mine.

Background to the attempts to shift away from dependency.

(a) The socio-economic situation up to 1967.¹

At the time of its decolonization from England, Tanzania (then Tanganyika) was a typical case of underdevelopment, which in general terms is a reference to a country's comparative lack of industrial forces of production both human and non-human inspite of its having been completely drawn into the orbit of, and subordinated by, world-wide capitalism. In addition the country was an example of dependency, which is a reference not only to a country's overwhelming reliance on forces outside its geographical borders for investment, provision of commodities, manpower and even general policy formulation, but more importantly a reference to a country's inability to locally provide crucial capital, to industrialise, to harmonize sectors of social production, to relate local production with local demand, and to relate the apparent local demand with actual local needs.² Dependency, so much part of underdevelopment, is in simple terms a country's inability to control and direct its entire socio-economic situation, and Tanzania, like so many other 'Third World' countries, did not have such control inspite of decolonization. The following are indications of the country's underdevelopment.

At decolonization in 1961 the country's G.D.P. was f193.5 m. and the income per head f18.25 for a population 96% of whom 'lived' on land

and died at 35 years of age on average. The contribution of the industrial sector to G.D.P. was only 10%, with only 22,000 people employed in manufacture.³ [Tanzania's population then was about 9 m. while today it is close to 19 m.] But with G.D.P. amounting to only f 193.5 m. this 10% contribution by the industrial sector can only tell us, in the words of Tanzanian planners, that 'at independence Tanzania was virtually without industry'.

"Most manufactured goods were imported; even by comparison with her East African neighbours, Tanzania's industry was woefully underdeveloped."⁴

England alone accounted for 34% of Tanzania's export trade and provided 29% of imports into Tanzania.⁵

In 1964 the Tanzanian government expected foreign sources to finance 78% of its Central Government expenditure as well as 52% of its investment expenditure.⁶ In the absence of an overall picture of foreign ownership of capital and industry country-wide, these figures can not fully illustrate Tanzania's dependency, but they are an indication.

The structure of industry in particular, and of the economy in general, was one of urban-biased investments (including the still embryonic import-substituting industrialization) especially towards what in dependency literature may be termed the peripheral centre, usually the capital city, in this case Dar-es-Salaam. The structure was further characterized by high capitalization disparities between 'pockets' of land for large scale farming and mineral extraction on the one hand, and areas of petty commodity production on the other. This inevitably was accompanied by 'income' disparities resulting further in an unproportionate sharing of 'supply' and 'demand' relative to needs. As in any underdeveloped and dependent situation, the larger part of the country's resources were directed into a 'supply' catering for the 'demand' of an extremely small social grouping in the 'high income' sector while the basic needs of the majority of the population such as proper food, clothing, housing, water-system, education and health-care remained unfulfilled.

At decolonization Tanzania retained colonially established governmental structures, and, with only 26.1% of senior and middle level

technocrats (including civil servants) being Tanzanian, policies did not question but in fact encouraged the continuation of expatriate high level manpower.⁷

The period leading to 1967 was one in which the Tanzanian leadership's uneasiness with the underdeveloped and dependency situation we have described began to form. There were many concrete instances spurring this uneasiness including the following.

In relation to the implementation of even as modest a programme as the First Five Year Development Plan (1965-69) it became clear that the relative lack of high level manpower was an important problem which could not be solved through an expatriate manpower in-flow.⁸ Government and government officers needed to be re-oriented away from rigid authority-and rules enforcement towards the concept of leadership in development. The government needed to have not only more resources at its disposal but also ~~more control~~ over resources in the country, and this especially after its experience in this period of having had to try a desperate last-minute marshalling of funds from local sources in order to raise the local share of the investment budget from 48% to 70% because the expected foreign funding was not forthcoming.⁹ While the 'income' gap was widening, the import bill was rising and export earnings dwindling because of the heavy reliance on one foreign-exchange-earning crop, sisal, which was now badly hit by a low world price.⁹ It must have been becoming clear even then that if something was going to be done about co-ordinating national resources, diverting them towards the most needy and generally having a locally controlled economy there was going to be not only substantial government intervention but some form of radical restructuring too. This realisation was further concretized during 1965 when Tanzania appeared to emerge as one of the leading supporters of struggles for decolonization, especially in Southern Africa, and a proponent of an independent foreign policy. The political stand brought the country to bitter rows with England, U.S.A., and West Germany resulting in a suspension of German aid worth more than D.M. 85,000 and an English freezing of a f7.5m. loan.¹⁰ This prompted the Tanzanian government to try and offset the shortfall in funding by borrowing from financial institutions such as banks and insurances situated within the country.

The 'local' lending institutions were all British by ownership and nationality, and the Tanzanian government did not find it easy to obtain credit from them.

(b) The philosophical and theoretic mood up to 1967.

There are people who come close to attributing Tanzania's attempts to shift away from dependency to an early socialist commitment of the Tanzanian leadership, especially of the one individual, President Julius Nyerere. Such is the tendency with Tanzanian official party history as well as with an author like Cranford Pratt.¹¹ If we had had a different project we could debate on the influence of socialist thought and of the individual Julius Nyerere as well as the question whether thoughts rather than material events were primary in crystallizing Tanzania's non-dependent development policies. But purely on the question of the existence of thoughts on non-dependent development policies in the period leading to 1967 there can be no doubt. In speeches and articles in 1963, Nyerere spoke on the theme of the growing gap between the 'rich North' and the 'poor South', was sceptical of aid from the 'North' and saw 'One Africa' or the Federation of East African countries as a possible solution because of the economic and political viability of a larger production unit.¹² He even suggested that the poor countries might be forced into what he called 'isolationism'.¹³ There was also an indication of intentions to alter the internal structure of production.

Responding to the near-monocultural situation of Tanzanian production then built around expatriate sisal estates which were now reluctant to produce due to price doldrums, Nyerere announced government intention to expand production within and beyond large estates, gradually nationalize the sisal industry because it was too important to leave in the hands of foreign large-scale growers, and promote a diversification of export items.¹⁴ Further indicating an intention to divert national resources away from the rather 'luxurious' demand of a small-social grouping in the high income sector, Nyerere spoke against 'aping big countries like America; in the 'limousine lifestyle', and for investing as much as possible to accelerate growth.¹⁵

"With this (small amount of) foreign currency we can either buy things we want to eat or wear now, or we can buy investment goods like machines. For instance, we must choose between buying another car for the President or a tractor for a maize farm. The more we buy of the goods to enjoy, the less we can buy of the goods which produce wealth in the future."¹⁶ [Emphasis added.]

In 1966 Nyerere indicated that Tanzania was now going to try and practice more self-reliance. That was probably the first time that self-reliance as a concept - which has been defined by Tanzanian planners as the mobilization of local resources and the avoidance of dependency on foreign ones - appeared more explicitly in the vocabulary of the Tanzanian leadership.¹⁷

(c) The Arusha Declaration Policy Document of 5 February 1967.

The Arusha Declaration came out of the socio-economic, philosophical and theoretic conditions we have just described. To give us a picture of the importance of the declaration as a policy document, the editors of Nyerere's books have said that 'events in Tanzania after 5 February 1967 (when the declaration was published) can not be understood except in relation to it', and that it 'marked a turning point in Tanzanian politics'.¹⁸ In terms of scope the document covered basically all walks of Tanzanian future life. Its two declared principal themes are Socialism and Self-Reliance. Socialism is intriguingly the better known, so much so that Self-Reliance is usually seen only in relation to it - and very seldom understood as a nationalist concept. The document reiterates a party principle and continual Presidential speech theme that the state has a duty to 'intervene actively in the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well being of all citizens', which requires that the government must 'exercise effective control over the principal means of production and facilitate collective ownership of resources'.¹⁹ The document also exhibits scepticism over industry which was really a disillusionment with foreign-controlled industries not only because it is here that foreign control was most felt but also because foreign investment and foreign aid flowed almost exclusively to the industrial sector - a sector covering no more than 4% of the population.

The Arusha Resolution, which is part V of the Arusha Declaration, responded to a common view about leaders of underdeveloped countries, namely that as a small social grouping they consume far too much of the 'national cake'. A set of conditions commonly known as the leadership Code forbade all salaried people earning above Sh.1,100 per month from what was termed 'private accumulation of wealth.'

What the preceding discussion has attempted to do is firstly establish that Tanzania was underdeveloped and dependent at decolonization. Secondly that the leadership then sought to tackle the problem of dependency. This is exemplified, though it does not exhaust the issue, by the quoted philosophical and theoretic treatises of President Julius Nyerere as well as the party document called the Arusha Declaration. It is appropriate to describe much of the thinking and policy making on Tanzanian development after 1967 as a reiteration and an elaboration of both the treatises and the Declaration. We shall not dwell on the post-1967 policies at length here, but we may mention that the importance of those policies for our purpose lies largely in their more definitive character. Certainly the Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of 1st July 1969 - 30th June 1974 appears to base itself quite firmly on the Arusha Declaration while demonstrating slightly more awareness and grasp of issues about dependency than the Declaration does. The Third Plan published in 1977 is an even more coherent statement about its non-dependency strategy which also exhibits greater grasp of dependency at the level of general theory. The component of its strategy which it refers to as the basic industries strategy is quite like the solution to the problem of dependency put forward by the theorist Clive Thomas.²⁰ One of the reasons for the emergence of the advance in Tanzanian conceptualization of dependency may have been simply the graduation into maturity of the philosophical and theoretic mood in the country after 1967. Dependency theorization does involve some measure of what conventional scholarship may term Leftward Third Worldist thinking. Up to the time of the Declaration in Arusha the minute measure of 'Leftward' Third Worldism was more or less exclusive to the political section of the Tanzanian leadership. After 1967 this thinking spread to other sections of society, not least to academia which then made dependency quite a live issue on which to debate. And it can not be doubted that the academic debates on dependency carried out in the early and middle seventies did influence major policy formulations on development, in particular the Third Plan.²¹

Indications of Central Questions in the research:

Having outlined the features of Tanzanian dependency as well as the general thrust of Tanzanian non-dependency policies we must now indicate the questions that we may need to ask for the evaluation task. We must now also present existing views on some of the questions.

(a) National Control of the local economy/nationalisation

Following the argument that one of the factors for the continuation of dependency is the lack of national control over the local economy, theory exists which calls for, among other things, the nationalisation of the 'commanding heights' of the economy. Nationalisation has been a major policy in Tanzania, and the government has been nationalising something almost every year since 1967. Thus some of the questions in this area must be :

- (i) The scope or extent of nationalisation as well as
- (ii) the nature of nationalisation. This is designed to find out whether at the level of theory nationalisation necessarily results in national control. A related question should be:
- (iii) As a concrete question, has nationalisation resulted in national control in Tanzania?

At the beginning of the debate on dependency and nationalisation in Tanzania, Walter Rodney reiterated a point made in studies elsewhere that nationalisation in Third World countries does not necessarily bring about national control. Concerning the Tanzanian case he made a glowing reference to 'convincing and disturbing' evidence confirming this point.²² The evidence he was talking about was from an article by Issa Shivji.²³ The argument by Issa Shivji is that Tanzania nationalisation has not brought national control, and that 'it did not even loosen the grip of the multinational corporations.'²⁴ This is because the nationalised companies become in effect only ordinary public corporation with whom transnationals create various forms of partnership which are extremely beneficial to them. One type of partnership is of course ordinary equity participation. But the most important form of partnership which, according to Shivji, operates in Tanzania is a Management-Service Agreement between a transnational and a public corporation. This

form of partnership itself exists in a variety of ways including General Management Agency Agreement, Marketing and Sales Agreement, Purchasing Agreement, Licensing Agreement and Consultancy Agreement. Due to the agreements a transnational is able to retain a great deal of control over decisions in the public corporation as well as guaranteeing continued technological dependence. Moreover, there is the question of remuneration. Remuneration of the managing agents, which according to Shivji in effect comprises of various ways of effecting 'surplus' outflows, takes the form of commission fees, percentage of net sales or turnover, percentage of profit before or after tax and depreciation, fixed fee, purchase of machinery, equipment, etc., and royalties for patents and trade marks usage.²⁵ Shivji offers no specific figures of the net 'surplus' outflow of capital after nationalisation. He makes this particular argument stand on the premise that the various ways of effecting the 'surplus' outflow through Management-Service contracts exist in the case of nationalised Tanzanian corporations. However, quoting from another author, he states that in 1966 (before nationalisation) Tanzania may have lost over Sh. 25 m. through Management-Agency remuneration alone.²⁶ We can only assume that an equally or more substantial sum was lost in the subsequent years, a factor which Shivji implies can not fail to have an impact on the existing state of dependency.

Apart from interrogating the profundity of the presentation, the validity of Shivji's argument in relation to the period in which he wrote and thereafter needs to be ascertained, hopefully with fairly substantive empirical data.

- (b) Restructuring of the economy: One of the recommendations for non-dependency policies is a re-orientation of the entire production process to make branches of the economy inter-related, to make it relatively more balanced in growth, to make production serve internal demand, and to relate demand to needs. Therefore here one has to describe the basic structure of production that has emerged as well as ask specific questions such as:

- (i) The extent of restructuring of 'supply' to relate to internal 'demand'. Shivji argues with the help of some figures that no such restructuring has taken place.²⁷
- (ii) The extent of the re-orientation of the economy to respond to needs. Again Shivji argues with the help of some figures that no such re-orientation has taken place.²⁸
- (iii) The extent of the efforts towards reducing the disparities between 'high income' and 'low income' 'low growth' and 'high growth' sectors.

(c) Restructuring of Agriculture:

- (i) A country 'condemned' to producing and selling agricultural products - which is one way of saying that it is largely a producer of primary products - is often thought to be at the mercy of producers of industrial goods. So, one question here could be the extent of re-orientation of primary production, perhaps towards local industry.
- (ii) Is there any processing done to agricultural products?
- (iii) What is the extent of large-scale agricultural production? In the Arusha Declaration and in another policy document, Socialism and Rural Development, the intention to promote agricultural production is emphatically stated. But more than this, in the latter document there is a statement which has the effect of saying that rural co-operation of the type of collective villages is beneficial because it is a form of large scale farming which is a more productive agricultural method.²⁹
- (iv) Is production in agriculture capable of surviving, say, against natural hazards? What is the extent of efforts in this direction?
- (v) What of the efforts to diversify crop production and other activities in agriculture?

(vi) Extent of the use of science (sometimes called modern agricultural techniques) for a better yield. [Examine in relation to this the debate that some agricultural programmes related to 'modern techniques' become new means of dependency. The debate on fertilizers and trans-national corporations. The debate on hybrid maize tobacco and I.B.R.D.]³⁰

(d) Restructuring of industry: A specific restructuring of industry is clearly indicated by a non-dependent strategy. In Tanzania's Second Five-Year Plan it is recognized that in the long run it is industry which is the basis of economic development. Apparently only 'the foundations of future structural change' were to be laid in the Second Plan while the spelling out of the structural change in industry itself awaited future specific policies.³¹ The structural change, which includes a basic-industry strategy, has been incorporated into the Third Five-Year Plan. Questions which could be asked here relate to:

(i) The inter-relatedness of industries.

(ii) Production of goods for 'mass-consumption' or is it just import-substituting industrialization for its own sake.

(iii) The extent of the establishment of basic industries.

(iv) The extent of the establishment of 'capital goods' industries. Frances Perkins argues with figures that this remains insignificant.³²

(v) Questions b(i) and b(ii) above can be asked for industry too.

(e) Commerce and external trade, Among others, two questions can be asked here:

(i) The extent of Tanzania's efforts on the international scene to have some control, or secure stabilization of prices for its exports.

(ii) How much re-orientation of trade away from industrialized countries to East African, African and Third World countries as some of her policies imply? OR at least how much trading-partner diversification?

(f) Restructuring of Education and Manpower

(i) Extent of indigenization.

(ii) How much bias is there in the educational system toward the pronouncedly all important high level manpower development?

(iii) How much nationalist vis-a-vis dependency orientation:

- of the population in general
- of high level manpower (what about the alleged propensity to award consultancy and projects to expensive outside firms rather than use local manpower?)

(g) Finally, this is primarily a Political Science study which by the very nature of the subject of dependency must be aware of the social whole throughout, and therefore can not leave out the question of social relations, i.e., the relation of social classes to policies and their implementation. This research project should in some way investigate the extent of that relationship and interrogate the existing debate.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term 'socio-economic' is used here in a specialised sense to refer to a total situation of human existence including the political aspect even though what is highlighted may not appear to be that all-inclusive.
2. This understanding of dependency is close to that of many dependency theorists including Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation, The Economics of the Transition to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, N.Y. and London, 1974; and Samir Amin, 'Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model', R.A.P.E., No. 1, August-November 1974, 9-26.
3. See Leslie Stein, 'Transforming the Tanzanian Economy; A Review covering the First Decade of Independence', African Social Research, No. 27, 1979. Stein says that the contribution of industry was 10% at decolonization in 1961 while the Tanzanian planners give the figure of 3.4 % for manufacturing in the years 1960-62. The difference may be in the use of the term 'industry' which here may have been more encompassing than the term 'manufacture'. As approximations, both figures are probably correct. The employment figures are a government estimate. See footnote No.4 below.
4. See Tanzania, Government Printer, Second Five Year Plan For Economic and Social Development 1st July 1969 - 30th June 1974: Vol. 1: General Analysis, Dar-es-Salaam, 1969, p. 59.
5. Leslie Stein, op. cit.
6. J.K. Nyerere, 'To Plan is to Choose', in his Freedom and Development: Uhuru na Maendeleo, A selection from writings and speeches 1968-1973, Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1973, p. 85 (The article 'To Plan is to Choose' originally appeared as an introduction to the Second-Five Year Plan.)
7. See Leslie Stein op. cit., and Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945 - 1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976, pp. 92-93.
8. J.K. Nyerere, op. cit., Also Cranford Pratt, *ibid.*, pp. 105-107.
9. J.K. Nyerere, *ibid.*, Leslie Stein gives the figure for the actual local funding input as 68% rather than 70%. See Leslie Stein, op. cit.
10. Cranford Pratt, pp. 140 & 149.
11. Cranford Pratt, *ibid.*, Chs. 5, 6, 7.

12. See J.K. Nyerere, 'East African Federation' published in June 1960, and 'The Policies and Purposes of Pan-Africanism' published in the Yugoslav periodical, International Affairs, in 1963, both articles appearing in Nyerere's Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja 1952-65, O.U.P., Dar-es-Salaam 1966.
13. J.K. Nyerere, 'McDougall Memorial Lecture - F.A.O.', November, 1963, in his Freedom and Unity, *ibid.*
14. J.K. Nyerere, 'Policy for the Sisal Industry', February 1965, in his Freedom and Unity, *ibid.*
15. J.K. Nyerere, 'Frugality', April 1965, in his Freedom and Unity, *ibid.*
16. J.K. Nyerere, 'The Tanzanian Economy', June, 1966, in his Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa 1965-1967, O.U.P., Dar-es-Salaam, 1968, pp. 167-68.
17. The use of the concept of self-reliance in an article by Nyerere can be found in 'The Tanzanian Economy', *ibid.* The definition of self-reliance by Tanzanian planners can be found in the Second Five-Year Plan, vol. 1, *op.cit.*, p. 3.
18. See 'The Arusha Declaration: Socialism and Self-Reliance' included in J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
19. T.A.N.U. creed 'h' and 'j' reproduced as Part One of the Arusha Declaration.
20. See Clive Thomas, *op. cit.*
21. Some of the better known participants in this debate on the local Tanzanian scene include politician Ngombare-Mwiru and academics (the late) Walter Rodney, Henry Mapolu, Issa Shivji, Clive Thomas, John Saul, Lionel Cliffe and Justinian Rweyemamu (later to become Civil Service Head of the Ministry of Development Planning, was responsible for the Third Plan after which he became Economic Adviser to the President). The debates were frequently carried in the journal Maji Maji, but other journals published in Dar-es-Salaam such as the African Review and Utafiti also occasionally carried these debates. Other better known publications associated with the Tanzanian scene which address and document the debates on dependency include Issa G. Shivji, The Silent Class Struggle; Issa G. Shivji, ed, Tourism and Socialist Development, T.P.H., Dar-es-Salaam, 1973; Justinian Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania: A Study of Perverse Capitalist Industrial Development, O.U.P. Nairobi, 1973; Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds, Socialism in Tanzania: Vol. 2. Policies, E.A.P.H., Dar-es-Salaam, 1973.

22. See Walter Rodney 'Some implications of the question of disengagement from imperialism', Maji Maji, 1,1, 1971, 3-8.
23. Issa G. Shivji, 'The Silent Class Struggle', Maji Maji, 1,1, 1971.
24. Shivji has reiterated the argument in subsequent articles. See for example Issa G. Shivji, 'Capitalism Unlimited: Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations', African Review 3,3, 1973, 359-84. Also Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, T.P.H., Dar-es-Salaam, Appendices, p. 165.
25. Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles, ibid pp. 165-173.
26. Here Shivji is quoting from Aart J.M. Van de Laar, 'Foreign Business and Capital-Export from Developing Countries' in L. Cliffe and J. Saul, Socialism in Tanzania, Vol.1: Politics, E.A.P.H., Dar-es-Salaam, 1972.
27. I. Shivji, Class Struggles, op.cit. pp 151-153.
28. I. Shivji, ibid, p. 153-156.
29. See 'Socialism and Rural Development', Sept. 1967, included in Nyerere's Freedom and Socialism, op.cit.
30. See for example Yash Tandon, 'The Social, Economic and Environmental Implications of Maize Technology in Tanzania', mimeo, Dar-es-salaam, 1978.
31. The Second Five-Year Plan, Vol.1, p.59.
32. Frances Perkins, 'Technology Choice, Industrialisation and Development Experiences in Tanzania', mimeo, Canberra, 1981.