ON THE QUESTION OF THE YOUTH AND CURRENT IDEOLOGIES IN THE AZANIAN QUESTION:

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The Chairperson, ladies and gentlemen: I believe you all know that the general theme of the Convention is "The Future of Africa - economic, social and political perspectives." I shall in this paper restrict my analysis to the situation in Southern Africa, and in particular, Azania. My paper will address itself to the roles of the youth in Azania and the extent to which they influence the future of South Africa, i.e. both in theory and practice, paying close attention to their historic roles within the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Black Consciousness Movement in Azania (BCM), and Azanian People's Organization.

I particularly chose the above topic because I came to observe that many people outside South Africa are either ignorant of, misinformed or simply have failed to appreciate the efforts of the youth in the Azanian struggle. This tendency to disregard the genuine efforts of the Azanian youth and those of the larger oppressed Azanian masses is most prevalent among sympathisers of the Racist Pretoria Regime in their daily activities as politicians, academics, reporters or members of the general public. Whether deliberated or not, in the final analysis the role of the struggling Azanian youth has been, more often than not, misconceived, misconstrued and misrepresented. I shall in my presentation, devote special attention to some of these misconceptions, misrepresentations and misinformation as I believe they have far-reaching repercussions on the lives of the oppressed Azanian black masses. These tendencies frustrate the efforts and aspirations of the oppressed, exploited and nationally dispossessed people of Azania in their just struggle for freedom and independence. It brutalizes the already brutalized souls of the Azanian black masses who have, since the advent of colonialism more than three hundred and twenty years ago, been excluded from the political life of the country, from possessing land, from living in an area of their choice, and the elementary right of working, eating and sleeping in a place of one's choice.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would be failing in my introduction if I did not pin-point out that there are many progressive people who have, beyond any reasonable doubt, supported the cause of freedom and independence morally, materially, diplomatically and otherwise. I am thus deeply indebted to those

who have, in their daily lives, contributed positively to our cause. However, my paper is aimed at obliterating some of the erroneous ideas, approach and anslyses of the role of the youth in their shaping the future of Azania, and Africa at large.

In the last twenty years the Azanian people and the world saw a complete change on the emphasis and methods used by the Azanian people in the process of liberation. The youth and their influence came in as a driving force, to an extent that in 1976, during the Soweto Riots, for the first time in the history of Azania, children were in the forefront of the struggle. The youth have organized themselves into units that must destroy the racist machinery. In schools and universities youth organizations such as the South African Students Movement (SASM), the South African Students Organization (SASO), the Student Representative Councils (SRCs) and other Black Consciousness movements were among the most active youth organizations. To black masses "Soweto" has become another crucial landmark in the history of resistance in South Africa. For, on the 16th of June 1976, the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) organized a positive campaign against the most hated Bantu Education. The world today knows that the racist Government of J.B. Vorster opposed the campaign by unleashing reactionary violence on the oppressed and nationally disposessed children of Azania. On that day a peacefull demonstration was fired upon by South African Police, killing hundreds of children in Soweto and throughout the country in the days to follow.

Indeed the story of Soweto does appear in the editorials of most newspapers and large volumes of history. It has been told to and listened to by many ears. However many of these editorials especially from white-owned newspapers in many Western countries who sympathise with the South African Government, tend to be (and still are) vague, lacking clarity and understanding of the issues involved, and to a large extent appearing as casual as if reporting about the changing weather conditions. Very little effort has been made to bring out the reality of the situation in its detailed and comprehensive context. The racist Government also, faced with a crises of this magnitude, used all its might to suppress the riot and to reduce its impact by claiming that it is faced with a bunch of school kids and criminals who simply derive pleasure in committing arson. No mention was ever made that the parents and the majority of the

blacks supported the students campaign without any reservation. At no other time in Azania did the parents and workers show their solidarity to students than during the Soweto Riots, as demonstrated by their willingness to stay away from work when the students demanded such. To retrace back to my line of argument, the reality of the situation is that the students campaign was two-fold,; first against Bantu Education and second, against the national dispossession of the Black people of South Africa as a whole.

Firstly, Bantu Education: This is a brand of education designed by white politicians to perpetuate inferiority complex among the blacks, as well as making them educated slaves. The architect of this notorious brand of education was Dr Hendrick Verwoerd, who introduced it in 1963. This education reduces the role of black children to that of being a passive recipient, an adapted neing, resembling the most weakest form of self-defence. An education which disables them to participate in the creative dimension of their lives or to intervene in reality in order to change it. Under Bantu education, the black child looses the ability to make choices of his own and becomes subject to the choices of the oppressors. His decisions are prescribed externally. By absorbing this external authority interjected into his or her being, the black child developes a consciousness which "houses" oppression, and this inturn creates what we often call a slave mentality, and at worst results into "AUNT AND UNCLE TOMS" tendencies. The youth and the black people in Azania reject Bantu Education because in its curricula and syllabi is just one facet of the oppressive regime's armouring, to maintain its position in society. They reject its propaganda value whereby facts of history are twisted to implant the idea that Azania was born in 1652 when Jan van Riebieeck landed at the Cape, whereas excavators have age-long proved that the iron Blackmen and the Khoisan people (Hottentots and the Bushmen) have lived side by side hundreds of years before any white person set foot on South Africa. The youth, because they dare challenge the existing curricula are branded as radicals, non-conformists and communists by the Racist Regime and its sympathisers. These kids simply want to build, for Azania in future, a type of education based on cultural harmony and understanding, human dignity and mutual respect. They seek a total eradication of a type of education underwhich the history, traditions, values and norms of the blacks are given such minimal attention so as to

invoke that these are the traditions, history and norms of an inferior and backward people; whereas those of whites are given such prominence as to invoke that they represent the height of human civilization throughout the ages.

As I indicated earlier it is important to note that during the Soweto Riots the youth were not protesting against Bantu Education only. Among the banners being carried for example were: "DEATH TO APARTHEID", "WE WANT OUT LAND BACK", "FOREIGN CAPITAL HANDS OFF" and "AWAY WITH BANTUSTANS", to sample a few. This demonstrates, beyond any reasonable doubt that they identify themselves with the majority of the oppressed blacks. Nothing was more reiterative of their resolve to dismantle the whole Racist structure than the speeches they gave during demonstrations. Indeed the Racist Government resorted to shooting, because the youth, like the rest of the oppressed had declared total war against the white-demigod, they were determined to serve an ultimatum on the forces of oppression. They made it known to the world as well that they are against domination by the "white - settler community" that denies blacks any meaningful participation in the administration of their country; against racism that declares black people third class citizens in the country of their birth; against exploitation of the black people by a capital which is concentrated in white hands, and most importantly, against Bantustans and separate development, a policy which allocates 87% of the land to 4½ million whites and only 13% of land to 19 million blacks, and ridiculously enough, of this 13% of land allocated to blacks 50% of it is non-arable, unsuitable for any forms of productivity, infertile and virtually has not minerals. They are against a policy which provides a climate whereby the lives of blacks in Azania are deliberately rendered unstable by forced removals into arid, unproductive land so that they can provide the much needed black migrant labour - a policy which conveniently diverts and condemns blacks to a perpetual dungeon of political oppression, economic exploitation and social humiliation and degradation under paid chiefs like Mphephu, Mangope and Gatcha Buthelezi.

On this issue of Bantustans, I would like to devote attention to media reports in and outside South Africa, and in particular the recent report conducted by sixty-minutes New York team on Sun City, a city in the Boputatswan Homeland. The report in its total analysis gave the South African Government a credit as well as giving the impression that the Bantustan policy is

viable in terms of providing employment to blacks in these labour ghettos. Such reports are indeed a betrayal of the efforts and aspirations of the toiling and suffering Black masses of Azania. It fails to inform its audience that such an employment is a mere drop in the ocean, because today over 70% of adults still have to prostitute their migrant labour in the cities. While the report went at its maximum length to show that international stars parade in these Ghettos, no mention was made to show that the racist and oppressive laws are fully applicable to these so-called "independent states". There is also no mention that these homelands are governed by black stooges who are accountable to their white South African superiors. The various security laws like indefinite detention without trial, arrest under the Riotous Assemblies Act, are strictly enforced in the labour ghettos. For example, recently MR TSHIFHIWA ISAAC MUOFHE, a close acquaintant of mine, and formerly a member of the banned Black Peoples Convention, was murdered by police while in detention for two days in the state of Venda. Boputhatswana homeland, is just another chain of labour reservoirs where black people are held in a state of compulsory unemployment until the white economy wants them. Stripped of their political power, disposessed of their land which is the basis of any economy, and crushed by want and poverty, blacks are forced to sell their labour to white and foreign capital for wages far below the povertyline. Today they work for American, British, Japanese and French companies, and the product of their labour is shipped out to international markets while they themselves do not receive enough to nourish, let alone educate themselves and their families.

Blacks, as a whole, reject Bantustan policy because it reduces them to perpetual beggars in the face of so much wealth. It is the greatest fraud invented by white politicians to strengthen their policy of divide and rule. They reject its emphasis on separate development which tend to connote and entrench the fact that Africans are very different, to an extent that they cannot live together peacefully, even though they lived together peacefully centuries before Jan van Riebieeck first set his foot on Table Bay. The young generation of blacks in Azania, as well as the old, reject this approach for many reasons, none of which are so fundamental as the fact that it is a solution given to blacks by the very people who created the problem. The same people who are guilty of subjugation and oppression of the blacks for more than 330 years, want blacks to believe that they can now design for them the means

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Ladies and gentlemen, it is imperative that I mention the liberatory role of the Youth within the context of armed liberation in Azania. Today the armed struggle in Azania is being spearheaded by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC). The role of the youth within these two liberation movements is self-expressive. On this issue I am forced to dwell a little bit on the historical background. The British Parliament enacted the so-called South Africa ACT, in 1910, an ACT whereby the Union of South Africa was formed to the total exclusion of the majority blacks. From 1910 till 1948 when the National Party won the all whites election, and coined the word Apartheid, Black resistance against the dispossession of Africans in Azania only took a non-violent form, and resistence was mainly by ethnically constituted congresses. The ANC, one of the oldest organizations, confined opposition in the country to petitions and demonstrations. This recourse by the ANC to petitions and/or demonstration by leadership bred unestimable frustration among the youth. The youth wanted concrete action. At the 1949 Bloomfontein Conference, the Youth League of the ANC prepared and presented the famous Programme of ACTION, where the question of self-determination was taken up and unanimously endorsed. However, the then elderly leadership of the ANC could not carry out the provisions of the 1949 Programme of ACTION, and its implementation fell in the hands of the militant youth. The Youth League in persuance of the objectives laid down in the programme of Action adopted at a fully constituted conference tha the historical necessity arose for the establishment of the PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA (PAC), on April 6, 1959 - exactly 307 years after Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape. The PAC, as its cardinal points, first and foremost, reiterated the right of self-determination based on the correct premises that only majority indegenous population can guarantee the freedom and security for all. The PAC introduced the concept of NON-RACIALISM, in place of the MULTI-RACIALISM, in theory and practice. This new outlook indeed owes credit to the youth who laid the foundation for the establishment of P.A.C., it is on this foundation that the PAC today is one of the liberation movements. Within the ANC the youth influence indeed changed the pace and content of the history of resistance. The name Nelson Mandela echoes in the minds of many people today. As an energetic young man filled with revolutionary ferment he pulled the reigns of freedom until he fell prey to racist security police. Thus one can hardly speak of neither the ANC nor PAC without addressing him/herself to revolutionary roles played by the youth from the period 1948 onwards.

Ladies and gentlemen, as I indicated earlier, today both the ANC and PAC are spearheading the armed liberation war in Azania today. Although the impact of guerilla warfare is not yet strongly felt among the majority of whites, the Pretoria Regime has been forced to publicly admit that armed conflicts are escalating. Both the PAC and ANC are recognised by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). However, there has been a tendency by politicians, academics and the media, especially in the West to mislead the world into believing that the African National Congress of Azania (ANC) is the sole and only authentic representative of the oppressed Black people in our country. Those who dare speak of the PAC have always condemned it as being extremely radical, and virtually divided. The so-called moderates indeed derive pride in isolating the PAC as an organization of Black extremists who want to drive the whiteman to the sea - or cannibals who would want to cook a whiteman for supper. Indeed the PAC is being given the same treatment that was given to ZANU in the Zimbabwean Struggle, whereby ZAPU was glorified as the only effective liberation movement. The people of Azania are not blind to these divisive tactics. While the outside world can easily be mislead, the freedom loving Azanian masses and all the progressive people of the world cannot be misguided. They refuse to pay tribute where it is not due. Despite attempts to discredit the (ANC) Youth League which laid the basis for the formation of PAC, today the PAC still remains the custodian of the genuine aspirations of the oppressed, exploited and the nationally dispossessed children of Azania. Exactly eleven months after the PAC came into organizational existence, it launched a campaign that not only shook the very foundations of the Racist colonial Regime, but also drew international attention to the explosive situation in South Africa. This campaign for freedom and independence was launched on the 21st March 1960. On that day the PAC of (Azania), led by Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, organised a positive campaign against the hated pass laws in South Africa. The Racist Government of Hendrick F. Verwoerd opposed the campaign by unleashing reactionary violence on the demonstrators. They fired at the defenceless demonstrators, killing 83 black people and wounding 365 at Langa and Sharpville. This murder of Black men, women and children marked a turning point in the history of Azania. It marked the end of peaceful resistance and a realization that independence for the Black population would come only by the violent overthrow of the Racist state. It marked an end of dialogue. For the first time in Azania, the armed struggle began. Thus Sharpville gave birth to the Armed Struggle.

For the first time also foreign capital fled the country. The Boer Government experienced what they called POQO-MENACE, named after POQO - the then established military wing of the PAC. Damage to the South African economy by the angry black population dealt devastating blows to the whole economy of South Africa. Records show that for the first quarter of 1960 alone capitalization value of shares quoted on the stock exchange dropped by Pounds 600,000,000. In one day alone, on March 30, the total market capitalization was slashed down by Pounds 10,000,000 The South African Bank Reserves sank to its lowest level ever. Had it not been for the United States of America Banks which provided financial aid to the tune of Pounds 100,000,000 to boost the then shattered economy of South Africa, Azania might have been born in the early sixtees to the amazement of everyone.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would be failing in my sacred duty if I did not mention that the SOWETO RIOTS bear the unmistakable stamp of the PAC. The Bethal 18 Secret Trial of 1979, one of the longest political trials in South African History, testifies to this end. It was during this trial which was held in secret and which took more than 150 days of hearing that the verdict of the judge and the evidence compiled by the state appointed Cullie Commission irrefutably pointed to the leading role played by the PAC during the Soweto Uprisings of 1976. The PAC and the Black Consciousness movement of Azania, are the only organisations that have been formerly charged as being directly connected with the Soweto Riots. It is during the Bethal 18 secret trial that the veteran leader of PAC and 15 others were sentenced to Robben Island. POKELA, The current leader of PAC who has recently been released from Robben Island where he spent 13 years - from 1967 to 1980, in his speech to the OAU . . . . indicated that the largest number of people who have served on Robben Island, at one time or another, have been active members of the PAC; the majority of the people tortured to death and those hanged have been active PAC members; two major uprisings that have taken place in the country and involving the masses i.e.- Sharpville (1960) and Soweto 1976 - both had the stamp, plan and initiative of the PAC. It is also an acknowledged fact that these two mass-oriented actions have played the decisive role in awakening the political consciousness of the people inside occupied Azania, on the one hand, and has drawn international public opinion to the plight of our people and our just struggle against fascist colonialism on the other.

Given this objective background, it is rather strange and equally perturbing that an organization whose members have made and continue to make substantial and supreme sacrifices, whose members are languishing in poisons today, whose members are involved in mobilizing the masses in the everyday struggles of the people should receive scarce attention and absolute disregard. This type of mentality must be reversed.

Apart from the PAC, the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania is another organisation whose foundations has been laid by the Youth in Azania. In the past 14 years the BCM has been in the forefront of the struggle against national oppression. Among the ten foundation members of the Black Consciousness Movement are Steve Biko and Pendelani Nefolovhodive. BCM(Azania) arose almost a decade after the country had witnessed the banning of the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Through BCM the Black people of Azania forged ahead to mobilise themselves and to establish, firmly and permanently, the organisational instruments for mass mobilization. Black Consciousness Movement of Azania consists of a string of organisations which constitute the popular instruments for carrying forward the combined effort of all sectors of the Azanian Population towards national emancipation . Among the notable of these organizations were the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students Movement (SASM), the South African Students Organisation (SASO), the National Youth Organization (NAYO), Union of Black Journalists (UBJ), the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU), Music, drama, art and literature Institute (MDALI) and many others. The South African Government from the late sixtees and the seventees have used every method at its disposal to destroy the BCM. They killed several of its most prominant members like Steve Biko, Mapetla Mohapi and Tiro Onkgopetse; they banned and jailed others and finally in 1977 they banned no less than 18 Black Consciousness Organisations. Several members of BCM and the PAC were jointly found guilty of being directly connected with the Soweto uprising and are currently serving long sentences. Today the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) is forging ahead where the banned 18 BCM organisations have stopped.

The BCM, like the PAC, has not been without vulgar attacks from enemies of the Azanian Struggle. BCM has always insisted that the leadership of the oppressed should be restricted only to blacks. For this reason, the BCM has been accused of being racist. The white liberals and their sympathisers have been quick to point out that Black Consciousness is racism in reverse. Ladies and gentlemen, it is ridiculous to accuse a movement that draws its membership from the oppressed people of mixed racial origins of practicing racism. In a society like South Africa with its high socio-economic and politicial stratification, the birth and development of an ideology that tends to unite the oppressed, who are sharing a common experience, is inevitable. Black Consciousness is a national response against domination, exploitation and racial discrimination. Since domination, racism and exploitation are aberrations from normal human behaviour. This extreme dehumanisation and exploitation has created its own antithesis to the point where those on the receiving end must be transformed into a unit that must destroy those aberrations. In simple terms, whites are the oppressor group whilst blacks are the oppressed. Since the thesis is white racism there can be only one valid anti-thesis, i.e. a solid black unit to counter-balance the scale. In other words, Black Consciousness Movement takes the black experience as a source for its starting point. It adopts the view that the hatred of whites by blacks in South Africa is justified as long as whites remain oppressors. For it is ridiculous to hate the stick that hits you but love the man who wields it. It should be noted that BCM does not deny the existence of a tiny group of White South Africans who can identify with a blackmans' struggle. Such whites are indeed a rare species and hard to find. The problem is that most of these so-called progressive whites, in South Africa, have always wanted to enter the black cause only at leadership level. BCM find this hijack of leadership by whites politically perturbing because blacks are doomed to be perpetual junior partners in their struggle, and their roles, thus, tend to be limited to standing at the touch lines in a game in which they should be playing. In most cases this group of whites tend to vacillate between the two worlds - verbalising all complaints of the blacks so beautifully while skillfully extracting what suits them from the exclusive pool of white priviledges.

In oppression Blacks are trapped in a situation from which they cannot escape at any moment, unless there is a complete restructuring of society in Azania. BCM, thus, exhorts Blacks to close their ranks and solidify their unity. It urges them to strive for self-reliance. To use Mbuleto Mzamane 's words: "Our major contention is that it is infinitively better to learn to swim on your own than to rely on self-appointed life-savers, who keep their British and other foreign passports safely tucked away somewhere where no water may ever reach them, and who may be conveniently off-duty or on holiday abroad when you require their assistance." BCM stand is not racist at all. The contention is that the Africans are the only people who because of their material position can be interested in the complete overhaul of the present white-power structure in South Africa. They alone can look at the problem without reservation, because they have nothing to lose but chains that bind them. Seen in this light then BCM is a realization by the Blackman of the need too rally together with his brothers and sisters around the cause of their operation and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to instill in them a newfound pride in themselves, their efforts, their value system, their culture, their religion and their point of view to life.

I will not fail to reveal that some of the critics of BCM are found among the ranks of those dogmatic and blinker-wearing socialists. It should be noted here that I am talking about dogmatic socialists, and not socialists as a whole. In South Africa this group is represented by the White South African Communist Party. Members of this group have always tended to reduce the problem to a level of a simple classical situation of the class struggle, whereby the workers (both black and white workers) should fight against the capitalists. They advocate the rallying and unification of all workers (black and white) under the same banner to confron the capitalist exploiters. This group refuse to accept the fact that in the South African situation racism transcends everything and that it has seriously bled and distorted the classical capitalist class division and related contradictions. Black people tend to see themselves, not in terms of economic classes, but in terms of their experience as an oppressed and exploited group. There is a dire need for people to understand that the South African situation defies normal or classical class orientations. Due to the nature

of Apartheid, class stratification takes a racial form, to an extent that "class" is equivalent to "race". We should also recognize that the Blacks in South Africa are oppressed as a nation first and foremost, and then as a class. The white South African Communist Party fails to realise that no matter how powerful and famous a mathematical formula is, we cannot solve every problem with it. BCM's contention is that it is indeed painful to learn some good and elegant theories and formulas, only to blindly apply them to any situation confronting you. Hence, 'BCM recognises that the national oppression of blacks in South Africa is a direct result of capitalism and imperialism, and thus the struggle is both anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist. However, because of the structural and institutionalised nature of racism in the South African social system, the class struggle continues, and will continue to manifest itself in color terms, and for this reason BCM continue to believe in the mobilising role whereby the black people rally against their common oppression .

Ladies and gentlemen, to put my arguments into perspective and cocise terms, the youth in Azania have, through their roles within the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the Black Consciousness Movemenet and the Azanian People's Organization made giant positive strides towards establishing a just and free future Azania whereby men and women will not be judged by the colour of their skins and the shape of their nose. These efforts by the youth toward a future progressive society should be appreciated. Thus, the media, academics, politicians and concerned people in and outside Azania, should learn to proceed on the only sure and certain process of emphasizing matters that unite us rather than those that divide us, because soon the people of Azania will be saying with biblical simplicity that he who is not for us is against us.

The background knowledge for this paper came from the following sources:

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(2) Ethel Khopung, "The Story of a Dispossessed People", Published by Sharpville Day Association Mbizana, National Printing, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Printers)

(3) "Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe", published by: The PAC Observer Mission to the UN, 211 EAST 43rd Street, Suit 703, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 Ph; (212) 9 6-737

(4) "IKWEZI" A Black Liberation Journal of South African and Southern African Political Analysis, Number 16, March 1981

(5) "Solidarity" - Official organ of the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania, No 4 - October 1980, and No. 5 - First Quarter 1981

(6) Pan Africanist Congress of Azania - (Observer Mission to the United Nations, 211 East 43rd St, Suit 703, New York 24 May 1982.

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"The OAU and Economic Cooperation in Africa: Irresolute Resolutions"

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There is a general consensus that the OAU has enjoyed little success is the promotion of economic cooperation. One of the most distinguished students of the Organization noted, for instance, that

> Compared with the progress made by the OAU on decolonization, and with the success of its international campaign against apartheid, its performance in the economic field has been disappointing.[1]

Despite the proliferation of negative evaluations of its work in this sphere, there has been little attempt to establish a well-defined list of criteria by which the performance of the Organization might be judged.

Clearly, the OAU cannot be blamed for all or even a significant portion of Africa's contemporary economic woes. The origins of these lie predominantly in faulty domestic policies and the workings of an often-hostile international environment; the relative weight assigned to the two causes varying according to the philosophical orientation of the commentator. OAU actions can only make a marginal, yet nonetheless important, contribution to African economic development. How, then, might the work of the OAU best be evaluated? What areas of activity might the Organization reasonably be expected to pursue successfully?

Immediately it must be underlined that the OAU was never intended to be a supranational body. From its initial meeting the predominance of national independence over continental unity

has been emphasized.[2] Therefore, in the economic realm as elsewhere, the Organization's success cannot be judged according to the extent to which it has increased the scope and domain of its decision-making authority at the expense of its member states. Neither is the OAU equipped with powers to enforce the implementation of resolutions adopted at its meetings. Rather it must rely on its ability to persuade member states to comply, its capacity for inducing desired behavior being boosted by the legitimacy which it enjoys (and which successful actions on its part can help to create).

Successful promotion of economic cooperation has a number of components. At the very minimum it requires recognition on the part of the organization that a problem exists. It is a sorry commentary on the OAU's activities in this field that this very minimum level of accomplishment frequently appeared to be lacking in the first decade of its existence. Moving beyond the mere recognition of a problem requires the acquisition of problem-solving skills. One dimension of this is the acquisition by the organization of expertise in the issue area under consideration. This would include, for example, the hiring of skilled staff and the acquisition of technical knowledge, and information-gathering activities. Also involved here is institutional learning: the capacity of the organization to benefit from feedback from its past efforts in a given field.

A second dimension relates to the definition of boundaries

between the organization and other international and regional bodies. This includes matters of their respective scope and hierarchy, cooperation among organizations, and initiatives taken in one organization which provoke activity in another.[3] If scarce resources are not to be wasted, and activities duplicated, then a successful resolution of these boundary issues must be achieved.

The third dimension involves the relationship between the Organization and its member states. Components here include:

- Informational Activities: Collection of information on the problems and resources of member states; dissemination of technical information and knowledge acquired by the Organization from other sources; the identification of problems and possible solutions; provision of technical assistance to member states; training of member states' nationals in problem-solving skills; staging of conferences to facilitate communication between member states and relevant transnational organizations.

- Symbolic Activities: establishment of general normative principles to guide behavior; exhorting member states to conform to these principles. Symbolic activities in themselves do not involve an immediate commitment of resources by the member states: norms are frequently couched in such abstract terms that few restraints are placed on member states' conduct.

- Rule-Creating Activities: formulation of specific problem-solving rules. At a minimum this might involve the coordination of government activities in a specific field. A maximalist example would be the creation of conventions which are legally binding on states which ratify them.

- Implementation/Supervisory Activities: follow-up actions to attempt to ensure compliance with established norms and rules. These would include monitoring activities, and various means of inducing compliance, including the application of sanctions against offenders. Since the OAU lacks coercive means, it depends primarily on its persuasive abilities (thus its ability to appeal to the national interest of the member states), and on its ability to embarrass states which do not comply with an accepted norm of behavior (the legitimizing function).[4]

There is generally a logical progression in that each type of activity builds on the successful accomplishment of prior types. Exceptions to this sequence can be envisaged, e.g., it might be possible for an organization to engage in devising norms of behavior without having previously developed technical expertise in the issue area (especially if it is able to exploit the issue-specific resources of its member states). This, however, is unlikely to be practical in the long term as member states become increasingly disenchanted with the gap between rhetoric and performance.

Each type of activity brings the organization closer to achieving the desired outcome on any issue. Desired outcome here is regarded as the policy which the organization's members wish to see pursued. Whether this will actually bring about the intended consequence is another matter (ultimately the organization inevitably will be judged by members and non-members alike on the consequences of its activities). Successful pursuit of supervisory/implementation activities obviously brings the organization closer to the achievement of its goals than the creation of norms of behavior. Thus there is a hierarchy in the activities: an organization may be judged as being more successful the further it ascends the hierarchy (assuming, of course, that activities at all levels are performed satisfactorily).

Having established these criteria for judging the success of the OAU, its record will now be examined. It will then be possible to point to areas where its performance fell short of what might reasonably have been expected from it.

The OAU's Performance

From its foundation, the OAU's activities in the sphere of economic cooperation have been complicated by the existence of a second organization--the Economic Commission for Africa--whose stated goals and organizational mandate are almost identical to those that the OAU set for its own body in this field, the

Economic and Social Commission. In its first decade, therefore, it was not surprising that much of the OAU's effort in the economic field was devoted to boundary activities (after its initial summit meeting rejected proposals that the OAU should leave operational activities in this sphere to the ECA). An uneasy compromise reached in 1965 provided for the two bodies to establish effective cooperation "within their respective spheres of responsibility" but failed to give any clear definition of the division of labor.

In part because of personal antagonisms between the executive heads of the two organizations, conflict continued for the remainder of the decade. It was not until 1969, when the ECA accepted the principle of the political pre-eminence of the OAU, that a significant improvement in relations materialized.[5] Having established its hierarchical position, the OAU appeared content to sit back and allow the UN body to propose most of the initiatives that were taken to promote African economic development.

Observers of both the ECA and the OAU are in agreement that the rivalry between the two organizations has been detrimental for both parties. For the OAU, a number of problems might be identified. Given the scarcity of skilled personnel in Africa, there has been considerable competition with the ECA (especially after the latter instituted a crash program for Africanization) for economists and other technical experts. This has handicapped

OAU efforts to build up its organizational expertise. In addition, member states have been unwilling to devote large sums to develop the economic staff of the OAU when they perceive it to be merely duplicating services received from the UN agency (to which, of course, they contribute a much smaller share of the budget). In terms of organizational capacity, and expertise, the OAU thus lags far behind the ECA.

This has handicapped the OAU in its informational activities. The ECA has been the primary body to which African governments have turned for data, for undertaking studies of specific issues, and for technical assistance. A further barrier to OAU informational activities has been the reaction of member states to the proliferation of meetings resulting from the activities of the two bodies--despite the re-organization of the Economic and Social Commission, meetings called in the early 1970s were repeatedly cancelled owing to the absence of the necessary quorum.

The OAU's lack of technical capacity, and its consequent inability to fulfill the informational role that it set for itself, has left it in a subordinate position in the promotion of the continent's economic cooperation to the ECA, despite its nominal pre-eminence. Were the two organizations to enjoy a good working relationship then this would not necessarily be a major handicap. Certainly, relations between the two bodies improved during the OAU's second decade. They have combined forces

effectively on many occasions to engage in informational activities, particularly in the promotion of conferences which have brought together ministers from the member states and representatives of transnational organizations on a wide range of matters from urbanization to technology transfer (with most of the work being done, and expertise provided, by the ECA). Together they regularly convene meetings of African members of UNCTAD, and of the World Bank and the IMF, in order to forge joint African negotiating positions.

In terms of boundary activities the OAU's record is mixed. It has established that the work of the ECA will be "constantly guided by decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in economic and social matters", and the record has been that the ECA generally is happy to cooperate with OAU initiatives and respond to requests for information and technical assistance. Although the OAU still lacks the technical capacity to unilaterally undertake significant informational activities, if the ECA's contribution is included then, judged by the number of conferences held over the last decade, the OAU's record is a respectable one.

There are dangers, however, in the OAU leaving the bulk of work in the economic field to the ECA. Economic issues may become viewed as matters of "low politics" and thereby fail to receive attention at the highest political levels. This tendency "to leave economic issues to the ECA" has been obvious on a number of

occasions with unfortunate consequences, e.g., the OAU's principal action in support of demands for a New International Economic Order was to convene a meeting of experts from the ECA, the African Development Bank, and the International Development Fund, thereby shifting the responsibility for the formulation of policy in this key area to the ECA and other African institutions.[6]

Over the full period of its existence, OAU attention to economic matters has been spasmodic. Among the principal factors which have appeared to determine institutional interest in economic affairs have been the extent to which the organization faced divisive political issues, and the condition of African economies. Paradoxically, more attention has been given to economic issues when the Organization has faced intractable political problems. Economic questions have served at times as diversions, and as a source whereby the fragile unity of the Organization can be maintained. This phenomenon was particularly evident during its first decade at the time of the Nigerian civil war, and has re-appeared in recent years with growing political fission.

In general, the Organization has been more successful in fostering economic cooperation among members in their policies vis-a-vis external actors, than in promoting cooperation in pursuit of local solutions to problems. An explanation for this is quite simple: since African states have largely been

demandeurs in international conferences, negotiating a common African position under OAU auspices has placed few constraints on the activities of the member states. One significant exception to this was the negotiations which produced a joint African position for the talks which eventually led to the signature of the first Lome Convention. Here it was necessary to overcome the mutual suspicions that had developed over the years between anglophone and francophone states; the eventual negotiating platform did impose constraints--especially on the francophones in that it demanded an end to the practice of giving reverse preferences to the EEC. This was an instance of the OAU successfully engaging in norm-creating activities. To what extent this success was to the credit of the OAU as an organization or to the role of Nigeria (which felicitously was holding the Chair of the OAU at that time) is open to question. But to some extent this is besides the point: that the talks were held under OAU auspices brought the Organization considerable credit for helping to bridge the anglophone-francophone divide which had long bedevilled intra-African cooperation.[7]

Besides its activities in the informational field, and in coordinating African positions in international fora, the achievements of the OAU in the economic sphere in its first decade had been largely of the symbolic variety. Resolutions were passed proclaiming member states' faith in the efficacy of inter-African cooperation, and urging greater coordination of

policies, promotion of agriculture and labor-intensive industries, the improvement of educational programs, etc.[10] But these resolutions rarely moved beyond the symbolic: they did not commit member states to specific activities, nor constrain them from pursuing others. In other words, there was an almost complete lack of rule-making activity. Similar failure was experienced in the area of supervision and implementation: the Organization simply failed to follow up on the resolutions that were passed at its meetings.

Nor was the Organization prominent in mediating disputes which arose from existing areas of inter-African cooperation. One of the objectives with which the Economic and Social Commission had originally been charged was the creation of a free trade area among African countries. In the post-independence period attempts at regional integration among African states materialized and disappeared with a bemusing and depressing regularity. The OAU role in promoting such activities and in assisting in problem resolution had been minimal (there being no significant OAU intervention, for instance, at the time of the dissolution of the East African Community).

By the middle of its second decade, the plight of many African economies was so desparate that it was impossible for the OAU to continue to disdain the question of how cooperation in intra-continental economic relations might best be pursued. With the benefit of hindsight, it is scarcely credible that the

Executive Secretary of the ECA had expressed optimism at the first meeting of the OAU's Economic and Social Commission in December 1963 regarding the prospects for African states to achieve current levels of European economic development within the next fifty years.[8] In the interim, the majority of African countries had experienced per capita growth rates of less than one percent per year--a performance which deteriorated in the 1970s when negative growth rates were not uncommon. World Bank projections suggest that little improvement can be anticipated, causing the current Executive Secretary of the ECA to warn that the 1960s and 1970s may in the future be regarded as the "golden age" of African economies.[9] As the economic climate deteriorated African governments increasingly looked to the OAU for leadership in the economic field.

Successful negotiation of a common African position in the Lome talks not only produced a more favorable outcome than would otherwise have been the case, but opened the way for a more active OAU role in promoting economic integration on the continent. For the bridging of the anglophone-francophone divide was an essential pre-requisite for the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose formation was strongly supported by both the OAU and the ECA. Success in launching ECOWAS provided the impetus for renewed OAU interest in the second part of the 1970s in intra-African economic cooperation and, in particular, the revival of the idea

of constructing an African common market, for which ECOWAS was to be the model.

Proposals for the OAU to seize the initiative in promoting an African common market came from a somewhat unlikely source--President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, at the 11th Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in December 1977. This longstanding ideal might best be realized, he suggested, by first creating an African energy commission, an African planning institute, an African data bank, and by institutionalizing the conference of ministers responsible for economics, finance and trade. The continent's economic situation was sufficiently serious to warrant a full OAU summit meeting devoted exclusively to economic matters. Mobutu also offered to make available to the rest of Africa the hydroelectic power produced by the new Inga scheme--which in retrospect, given the problems that this extravagant project has encountered, was not an offer that many would find difficult to refuse. The weekly, West Africa, scoffed that the adoption of the common market proposal by the meeting was primarily a political courtesy to the leader of the host state, and predicted that the Heads of State would not treat the issue as a priority.[11] Yet Mobutu was to have the satisfaction of seeing his economic summit proposal come to fruition in Lagos in April 1980.

Besides the successful lauching of ECOWAS, the other principal factor which encouraged African leaders to return to the issue of

intra-African cooperation was disillusionment with the continent's external economic relations. By the last years of the 1970s it was obvious that the high expectations held in some quarters for progress towards a New International Economic Order were to be frustrated: this was confirmed by the failure of the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation, and the disappointing outcome of negotiations for a Common Fund. Similarly, the results of cooperation with the European Community under the Lome Convention belied the optimism that had been expressed at the time of its signature. Self-reliance became the new catchword, embodied in a resolution passed at the sixteenth session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Liberia in July 1979. This summit adopted the Monrovia "Declaration of Commitment on Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" which, inter alia, called for the ECA and OAU to collaborate in drawing up plans for the implementation of the Declaration to be presented to a special economic summit to be held in Nigeria.[12]

The Lagos Plan

The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, adopted by the special economic summit, is by far the most comprehensive and impressive document on economic matters that the OAU has produced. In its one hundred and thirty pages

the plan presents proposals in such diverse areas as transport and communication, trade and finance, environment and development, the transfer of technology and the development of scientific skills, and the role of women in development. As such, it presents an ideal vehicle through which the strengths and weaknesses of the OAU's activities in promoting economic cooperation can be examined.

On the positive side, the Plan demonstrates the extent to which the OAU and ECA have built up their technical expertise and the success of their informational activities. If the Lagos Plan fails it will not be for want of technical data. Also evident is some organizational learning from the experience of the past two decades: the Plan is encouragingly introspective and recognizes the responsibility of African governments for taking effective action to promote their countries' economic development, rather than relying on improvements in external economic relations.[13] Symbolically, the Plan is important in marking at least a nominal commitment to a new development orientation for Africa's economic planners.

On the other hand, the Plan, and its manner of preparation, reveal a number of familiar weaknesses in the OAU's capacity to promote economic cooperation. First is the still unresolved problem of boundary issues. The continuing uneasy relationship with the ECA was demonstrated clearly when the two secretariats presented alternative drafts of the Lagos Plan to the preparatory

meeting of the Council of Ministers. Communications between the two Organizations, both based in Addis Ababa, deteriorated between the Monrovia and Lagos summits, such that they failed to heed requests that a jointly-prepared plan be presented.

Second is the continuing inability of the OAU to lead its member states beyond symbolic pronouncements in order to engage in rule-making activities. The Lagos Plan is replete with recommendations and exhortations, but is almost totally lacking in commitments. Although the Final Act of Lagos reaffirms the decision taken in Monrovia to establish an African Economic Community by the year 2000, it is extremely vague on the means by which this will be implemented. In the 1980s the states have pledged to strengthen sectoral integration, and promote coordination and harmonisation among existing economic groupings, and in the 1990s to "take steps for further sectoral integration" and "take measures to effect the establishment of an African Common Market". Clearly these resolutions impose few constraints on the activities of member states and thus fall far short of rule-making activities. Their amorphous nature also makes it extraordinarily difficult for the OAU to engage in supervisory and implementation activities--there are virtually no commitments to implement specific policies within a particular time frame.

Whether the OAU will be more successful in its supervisory role than it has in the past remains to be seen.[14] At the symbolic level, one repercussion of the Lagos Plan has been a proposal to

include a new principle in a revised OAU Charter: "unreserved dedication to the aim of achieving political unity and economic integration in Africa".[15] On a more practical level, the OAU has been active (together with the ECA) in promoting an Economic Community of Central African States, the preparatory meetings for which were held in the Spring of 1982.[16] But the lack of specificity in the Lagos Plan is not conducive to a supervisory role which goes beyond reminding members of their symbolic commitments.

What is obviously in need of explanation is the reason why the Lagos Plan took the form that it did. Why were the member states unwilling to move beyond a symbolic commitment? Too frequently, explanations for the failure of African states to engage in effective economic integration have been couched in terms of abstractions such as lack of political will. This, however, fails to advance the debate very far: the factors which underlie the absence of will have themselves to be explained. If the not unreasonable assumption is made that governments act in accordance with what they perceive as rational policy choices, then a lack of "political will" reflects the government's calculation that the proposed activities are not in its and/or the national interest. Lack of support for the OAU's efforts to promote economic cooperation in Africa stems not from a perverse lack of will but from a deep-seated lack of faith in the proposals actually producing the benefits envisaged by their

proponents. There are two dimensions to this problem: one is the nature of the proposals themselves; the second is the ability of the OAU to convince governments of their potential utility--a matter of persuasion through informational and follow-up activties for, as noted above, the OAU lacks powers of compulsion.

Here it is pertinent to ask whether the OAU's proposals for economic cooperation are on the right track. Of the various projects outlined in the Lagos Plan, the most ambitious is for the construction of an African Common Market by the year 2000. Rather than being a necessary or sufficient form of economic cooperation, a strong case can be made that common markets among developing countries are a sure recipe for political conflict and economic disintegration. Africa provides plenty of instances of this tendency, the most dramatic being the break-up of the East African Community. Common markets impose maximal constraints on the autonomy of government policy-making, e.g., in fiscal and monetary policies, yet their benefits for the weaker states in a union are uncertain at best. Whereas the constraints are felt immediately, benefits are realized only in the long term (especially in the African situation where the potential for gain from intra-area trade is small). In many cases the conflict over the intra-union distribution of benefits, especially the location of manufacturing industry, has been so severe that the unions have not survived for a sufficient period for the long-term gains

to be realized.[17]

ECOWAS, which the OAU apparently perceives as a model for other regional schemes (themseves to be used as stepping stones to the African Common Market), has failed to heed the lessons from the multiple failures of integration attempts among LDCs in the last two decades. That it is being projected as a model for other parts of the continent relfects a lack of institutional learning on the part of the OAU. There is nothing in the experience of African common markets which makes them attractive to weaker states in a region. The lack of enthusiasm for recent ECA proposals for a Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa bears witness to this.

This advocacy of salvation through a grand design is consistent with the disdain that African leaders have shown for incremental methods.[18] Yet incrementalism may be not just the best but the only method through which African economic cooperation can be achieved. Rather than the grand design, perhaps the optimal means for promoting economic integration is through limited functional projects: this suggests that the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) rather than ECOWAS should be the model for economic cooperation utilized by the OAU.[19]

6_Final_Evaluation

In its second decade the OAU paid much greater attention to economic matters than in its first. This was not merely because of the political difficulties that it was facing, as some cynics suggest, but as a result of a realization of the enormous economic problems that the continent faces, and the potentially useful leadership role that the OAU might play in promoting economic cooperation. And, during its second decade, there were areas of its activities which must be judged as successful. In general the Organization enjoyed a much improved working relationship with the ECA despite the occasional hiccup as occurred in the formulation of the Lagos Plan. Although the OAU itself has not acquired the technical capabilities that would allow it, acting alone, to play the informational role that its Charter envisaged, this has been successfully undertaken in collaboration with the ECA through the staging of a large number of jointly-sponsored conferences. Coordination of member countries' policies towards extra-continental actors has been a further area in which considerable success has been achieved.

Where the Organization has failed most miserably is in its inability to move beyond symbolic activities to those in the realms of rule-making and enforcement. Symbolically, the Lagos Plan represents an important advance which sets new priorities for the continent. Yet the absence of specific commitments precludes rule-making and supervisory activities on the part of the Organization: without these the whole Lagos Plan becomes an

exercize in cynicism. The current economic situation faced by the continent warrants more than merely a revised catalog of problem areas and priorities.

Could the OAU have been expected to do more? At the outset of this chapter it was argued that the contribution that the OAU can make to African economic development inevitably will be marginal. And certainly the difficulties that it faces in promoting cooperation are formidable, given the variety of ideologies and economic policies being pursued by its member states. Governments might be able to agree on the problems that Africa faces (as was the case with the adoption of the Lagos Plan) but there is little consensus on their solutions. If the problems of fighting apartheid are complicated by the willingness of some states to trade with South Africa, the promotion of intra-African cooperation is made more complex by the willingness of regimes to foster close links with the more palatable devil of international capitalism.

Yet this diversity need not prevent the OAU from doing more than it has to date in promoting economic cooperation. It has complicated its own task by choosing a model of cooperation which is one which commands little faith among the majority of its governments, and which, in the unlikely event of it being implemented, is likely to lead to increased political conflict. Commitment to, and promotion of more gradual integration might bring improved results in this field in the Organization's third decade.

FOOTNOTES

1. Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (London: Julian Friedmann, 1977) p. 176. Similar evaluations are made by Ralph Uwechue in his introduction to Ibid., and by the contributors to Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.), The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives, (New York: Praeger, 1975) especially at pp. 57, 71, 219-20.

2. El-Ayouty, op. cit. p. 4.

3. Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) p. 10.

4. This summary of organizational activities is modified from the list provided in Ibid. Chapter One, and in Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).

5. A detailed account of the conflict between the OAU and the ECA is presented in Berhanykun Andemicael, The OAU and the UN: Relations Between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, (New York: Africana, 1975). See also Andemicael, "OAU Collaboration With the United Nations in Economic and Social Development" in El-Ayouty op. cit. pp. 189-212; and Cervenka op. cit. pp. 177-182.

6. Zdenek Cervenka, "The Organization of African Unity in 1975" in Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1975-6 Volume 8 (London: Rex Collins, 1977) p. A71.

7. Isebill V. Gruhn, "Inching Towards Interdependence: The Lome Convention", International Organization 30, 2 (Spring 1976)

8. Quoted in Michael Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of African Unity, (London: Metheun, 1976) p. 97.

9. Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series April 15-May 14, 1980 p. 5495. For a comprehensive account of Africa's current economic problems see World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for Action, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981).

10. See, for instance, the "Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence" adopted by the African ministerial conference on trade, development and monetary problems, jointly organized by the OAU, ECA, and African Development Bank in May 1973.

11. West Africa 20 December 1976, quoted in Africa Research Bulletin: Economic Financial and Technical Series November 15-December 14, 1976 p. 4087.

12. The text of the Monrovia Declaration is provided in Appendix A.

13. The Plan falls short, however, of explicitly recognizing the contribution of faulty domestic policies to the continent's economic woes. Paragraph 6 of the Preamble, for instance, notes that despite the efforts of its leaders, Africa remains the least developed of continents, victim of exploitation by colonialism and two decades of neo-colonialism. In contrast, President Shagari of Nigeria, in opening the Lagos Conference, asserted that the plight of African economies could no longer be blamed on Africa's colonial past. Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series April 15 - May 14, 1980 p. 5494.

14. The OAU is not alone in its failure to pay attention to the implementation of the resolutions adopted. A similar criticism is made by Isebill Gruhn regarding the ECA. Regionalism Reconsidered: The Economic Commission for Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979) at p. 52.

15. This is one of three new principles proposed by the OAU Charter Review Committee in May 1982. Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series 19, 5 (15 June 1982) p. 6445.

16. Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 19, 3 (April 30, 1982) p. 6364.

17. This would certainly seem to be the experience of the East African Community. See John Ravenhill, "Regional Integration and

Development in Africa: The Case of the East African Community", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics XVII, 3 (November 1979) pp. 227-246.

18. Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, Cal.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975) p. 17.

19. This comparison between ECOWAS and the SADCC is pursued at greater length in John Ravenhill, "The Future of Regionalism in Africa" in Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.) The Future of Regional and Sub-Regional Institutions in Africa (London: Macmillan, 1983).

Cree re Decolon

Low
Sack
Denoon
Bayne
Shineberg
Nelson
Scarr
Pettman?

Tsamenyi
Stewart
Makinda
Mugambwa
Deklin

Howlett
Ifeka
May

Exec

Low
CG
Ifeka
JAB.

Ponwels.
Ravenhill.
Polhemus

Higgott
Pokrant
N-Bray
Collins
Lea
Pking/Paxman
Goldsworthy
Dorward.

Chair

Ifeka am
Tad