

The Colonial State in Kenya: Paternalism, Legitimation
and Modernity.

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Most historians of the colonial period in Kenya emphasise the importance of the state; the state is said to ensure the conditions of settler capitalism, to provide the infrastructure of transport, credit and agricultural research, to create by administrative action a supply of African labour and to ensure the interests of settler capital against those of a developing African class of landed capitalists. Yet there is virtually no discussion of the distinctive political features of colonial states, and the economic roles it plays are stressed to the exclusion of questions of the bases of its legitimacy, of its citizenship and authority. It is the contention of this paper that opening up such questions is useful both in terms of what it reveals of the political dimensions of underdevelopment and of the light it can throw on the political modernity or otherwise of many Third World states after independence.

Contemporary radical reflections on colonial Kenya, from within marxist or underdevelopment traditions, reveal this absence of an adequate theory of the colonial state. Both are generally equally instrumentalist - with the major differences being in the descriptions of which class wields the colonial state as its instrument of domination. Hence, for underdevelopment and dependency theory, the colonial state was the transplanted tool of metropolitan capital, as the deputised agent of an absent ruling class. (1) The rather brief dispute over the 'overdeveloped' post-colonial state (which flourished in the mid-1970s) was a refraction of the same position. (2) Here, it was argued that the state inherited at independence was 'overdeveloped' in its administrative and military aspects,

because, acting on behalf of an absent ruling class, it had to exercise domination over all the indigenous classes in the colony. (3)

As a view of politics and the state, this is scarcely different from recent influential marxist work on colonial Kenya, (4) except that here the colonial state represents the interests of implanted settler capital, seen either as the only force of any count, or as the dominant force. Hence the imagery is of a settler state, and the language is resonant of structuralism, where the state is an 'apparatus' which can be 'captured' by dominant class 'fractions'. (5) Both these views share the same problems of reductionism; it is not so much that they discount the importance of the state, but more that the complexity involved is reduced. The subtle causality between economic interest and political practice is rendered unproblematic, the state is regarded as a thing rather than a set of institutionalised practices, and so the varying logics and dynamics informing colonial politics are reduced to those of class interest.

A third approach has been somewhat more productive, if only because it takes as its point of departure the argument that the colonial state has its own distinctive characteristics and cannot be reduced to class interest. (6) For Lonsdale and Berman, colonial Kenya was a contradictory articulation of a settler capitalist with an African peasant mode of production; and the colonial state was called upon to reconcile the irreconcilable. Even if such articulation theories can be shown to be inadequate, (7) at least the approach credits the colonial state with complexity and contradiction; for it had to both ensure capitalist social relations to the settlers, and yet legitimate its rule over

Africans. If the former meant a free market in labour, the latter meant preserving African agriculture and curbing the worst excesses of settler self-interest when these threatened to upset the delicate balance of colonialism. Such dilemmas are then read, for these authors, as crises of legitimation, but in structural-functionalist, rather than Habermasian, terms. The model of the colonial state here is one of instrumentalism tempered by an overseeing rationality, or economic interest cut with a cynical self-legitimation. For example:

What was at issue was the lengths to which the state could go before it was seen to be the settlers' instrument, at the risk of its legitimacy with Africans. The role of even-handed arbiter, of defender of the weaker, African, interest was an ideological position adopted by colonial officials, to make their own position tolerable while also maintaining the relative autonomy of the state. (8)

This rather begrudging recognition of the importance of ideology is a limited advance over more instrumentalist accounts. It still tends to read the state and politics 'upwards' from a contradictory economy, while the ideology of Trusteeship, of the state as defender of African interests, is reduced to a mixture of fraud and guilt. Consequently, the question of legitimation, which for Habermas and others means the self-referencing of norms, here means only function.

To develop such themes of Trusteeship, legitimation and contradiction, it is necessary to turn to an earlier, critical and liberal historiography - which, on colonial Kenya, is a rich vein, articulated from within a broadly liberal-democratic model of politics. (9) This historiography tended to assume that the colonial state was complex, that it was not merely the

instrument of settler interests; they tended to criticise the colonial administration for its refusal to extend political liberties to Africans (particularly McGregor Ross and Norman Leys), they castigated it for its half-hearted support for African agricultural development (for example, Sorrenson and Marjorie Dilley) yet they defended the colonial state against settler attempts to mould colonial politics to their own will.

There are two themes which emerge consistently within this liberal-democratic historiography; on the one hand, the extensive economic assistance and political favouritism extended to the settler minority at the expense of the African majority, and on the other, the distance that the state maintained between itself and the settlers, indicated by its consistent refusal to grant the settlers their cherished aim of 'self-government' - which in the context, meant minority rule. The colonial state's self-image as having a Trusteeship over African interests, as being the guardian of an African community, was built into and reproduced this distance. It was a distance based on a distrust of settler greed and a perceived need to restrain the settlers from producing a South African 'solution' to the dilemmas of colonial exploitation. (10)

Certainly, the colonial state played a crucial and creative role in establishing and maintaining the conditions of settler and plantation capitalism in Kenya. It supervised the original expropriation of African lands, and then ensured the inavailability of that land against both African and Indian challenges (11); it provided an African labour supply and the infrastructure of transport, marketing and research on which settler export production was dependent. (12) Its support for the settlers reflected both the economic precariousness of their

position and the conviction that the settler presence, as part of the colonial 'civilising mission' must not be allowed to fail.

Equally, it is now well established that the colonial state actively intervened to prevent the development of an African capitalism on the land (13); it regulated the entry of Africans into trade, and was fundamentally uneasy at the sight of African class formation within the 'native reserves'. It acted quite specifically to prevent or stifle individual tenure in land, and consistently refused African demands for the registration of individual titles. (14) But, whilst writers such as Michael Cowen see this action as proof of a state acting on behalf of the settlers, the state's actions appear to have their basis more in its paternalistic ideology. The colonial administration was here attempting to 'protect' Africans from capitalist individualism, an attempt consistent with its self-image of having a duty of guardianship over an idealised African 'organic community.' That this action meshed with the interests of the settlers, in not having competition from African agriculture, neither reduces the potency of the ideological motivation nor reveals that the distance between the settlers and the state had been bridged.

There were constitutional and structural props holding that distance open, for the colonial state was based on a pre-modern, non-democratic model in which a permanent official majority in the Legislative Council ensured that power remained with the Crown. This was as pertinent for the settler minority as for the African majority - as Elspeth Huxley put it in the early 1940s, the settler representatives within the state were "like flies in amber, imprisoned in a permanent and

inflexible majority of government officials." (15) Such a polity, in which military, administrative and legislative powers were fused, without democratic participation, is revealing of the distinctive conditions under which the colonial state was constructed. Unlike the modern western state, unlike the 'parent' state in Britain, where the polity is the result of centuries of contestation, of the development of an autonomous civil society, and of the universalisation of political liberties (16), Kenya colony was a political tabula rasa upon which the colonial administration could write with substantial freedom. That what was written there should have had so few features of a modern state had much to do with the peculiar dilemmas of administering an untenable colonial system.

The settlers nevertheless had plentiful channels of access to political power, both formally and informally. Statistically a mere fraction of the total population, they had a preponderant influence on advisory committees regulating settlement, production and African labour; they in effect ran Nairobi and exercised vociferously their rights of expression through Legco, the press and the Convention of Associations. (17) They had, in addition, the informal access afforded by ties of blood, friendship and class which existed between the upper reaches of the colonial state, the settler leaders and the British aristocracy. Settler leaders were able to mobilise substantial social leverage in both Nairobi and London, and so have their views expressed. (18) Given such links, it is all the more remarkable that the colonial state was not simply the instrument of settler class rule; that it was not requires reference to other logics and constraints which constructed it.

Chief amongst these was the imperial mandate of trusteeship

which, as a variant of the white man's burden, linked imperial legitimation with notions of racial superiority and development. The colonial state held itself to have a responsibility over the welfare and development of indigenous peoples. But there was an ambiguity at the heart of trusteeship, namely whether it was to mean protecting Africans from settler exploitation and self-interest, or protecting Africans against modernity and development as such, which in Kenya, effectively meant 'protecting' African society from itself. If the latter was compounded by indecision, the former was more resolute and was always the basis on which the settlers were refused self-rule. As Churchill put it in his florid prose in 1908:

It will be an ill-day for these native races when their fortunes are removed from the impartial and august administration of the Crown and abandoned to the fierce self-interest of a small white population. (19)

There is a remarkable continuity here with Perham's statement of the same principle some 40 years later, when she argued that in Kenya:

You have a highly abnormal, unbalanced situation. Until it rights itself, the British Government has decided that it must artificially keep the balance by putting its finger on the scales....Crown Colony government entails a good deal of inefficiency in order to prevent even more injustice. (20)

The point here is that to dismiss this as an ideological smokescreen for economic, or even more broadly, imperial interests, is to miss the part this ideology of trusteeship played in the construction of political situations. It very largely determined the way in which the settler demand for self-government

was approached.

When the Convention of Associations first met in 1911, it was felt that self-rule was "almost within a hand's reach", (21) but it was to be an aim that receded further with time. In the 1923 White Paper, the prospect of self-government was declared "out of the question within any period of time which need now be taken into consideration." (22) Six years later, with the publication of the Hilton Young Commission report, the idea was swept aside, with the argument that "What the immigrant communities may justly claim is partnership, not control", and the Imperial government was to maintain its control until Africans could take a share in government "equivalent to that of the immigrant communities." (23) As one writer puts it, by 1931 the settlers' struggle for self-rule had been irrevocably lost, and it was clear that "the original idea of developing a new South Africa was from the beginning an unrealizable dream." (24)

Parallel with this dispute over self-rule versus trusteeship was the argument over the relative priority to be given to African and white agricultural development. The two coexisted uneasily, since from the beginning white settlement had been encouraged with assurances that white interests would be paramount. So long as white and African agricultural development were seen as mutually exclusive, they were necessarily contradictory, particularly if the flow of African labour to white farms and plantations was dependent on African agriculture being retarded. The contradiction could then be resolved by the "dual policy" developed in 1924, which argued that there was no contradiction, that there was a complementarity of interests between white and black.

If these questions of self-government and paramountcy of white or black interests were largely 'internal' disputes between the colonial state and the settlers, the third area of controversy - the supply of African labour to white farms - referred the colonial political system to legitimation problems in the imperial centre. In London, at least since the scandal over the Ainsworth circular in 1919, there was a 'Kenya Question' - one which was kept alive by the dedicated work of critics such as McGregor Ross and Norman Leys. The colonial state had early indicated its willingness to ensure the settlers a consistent labour supply, on the principle that labour was as good for the soul as it was for settlers' profits, yet when the Ainsworth circular of 1919 attempted to rationalise the flow of labour and its recruitment, critics in both London and Nairobi were outraged. The circular was withdrawn; the colonial state could not appear to be instituting a system of veiled slavery, and to be placing its resources at the disposal of the settlers. In London, it was **less a question** of whether the circular in fact meant coerced labour (25), than one of its reception in political and public circles. As Diana Wylie commented of later controversies on the 'Kenya Question':

As such a large and vocal body of pro-African opinion had grown in Britain and been focussed on Kenya, several Cabinet officials believed that it would have been political suicide for the Conservative government to surrender the duties of trusteeship in East Africa. (26)

This problem, the central problem of colonial legitimation, was not, however, one of public opinion, for the British public was scarcely interested. (27) It was rather a question of legitimation in Habermas' sense; legitimacy here meaning the

necessity to ensure self-compliance by the state to its own political principles. As Held has put it:

....societies claiming to operate according to the principles of bourgeois democracy depend more on the existence of a widespread belief that the system adheres to the principles of equality, justice and freedom. (28)

The British state, of course, made such claims, and was accordingly sensitive to arguments that such principles were being flouted in its colonial dependencies, as critics such as McGregor Ross and Norman Leys consistently claimed. The point here though is that the colonial state in Kenya never made such claims - it was never argued that the colonial state adhered to the political liberties of bourgeois democracy, but only to principles of a more paternalistic justice. In this sense, the colonial state had both modern and pre-modern faces, referring respectively to London and Kenya; colonialism was not constructed on the modern political ethos of equality, justice and, most crucially, universalised rights, and in this sense it was pre-modern. Yet this in turn meant it was vulnerable to crises of legitimation in the imperial centre, where such principles were expected.

This brings us to the fourth area of colonial political contention - that of African rights and representation. The colonial state had a particularly fractured notion of citizenship, which derived from its structural position as mediator between African and settler. Its unenviable role was to try to organise these two blocs into a coherent, and if possible, harmonious society. Yet if Kenya was to be a 'white man's country', with a huge black majority, then it must be based on a racially segregated economy, as it was. But this meant that it could not be a modern state, in the sense of recognising, and

being bound to, universalised political rights. Instead it was a polity based on Cecil Rhodes' cunning dictum: "Equal rights to all civilised men." (29) The colonial state was in a quandary when it came to citizenship. To extend rights of speech, association and participation in power to settlerdom alone would have been to deliver the polity into their hands; imperial legitimation and the trusteeship made this impossible, whilst a distrust of the ethic of profit made it undesirable. To extend political rights to all of its subjects would have undermined the whole system, since it was based on inequalities derived from racial, rather than class, qualifications. Consequently, if Kenya was to be a "white mans' country", it could not be a modern polity, because of the segregated nature of citizenship.

A similar argument has been recently put in the context of South Africa; Nolutshungu suggests that it is a constitutive feature of colonial states that they refuse to universalise political rights across racial lines. Race is an overdetermining layer of qualification over the top of class, and consequently a colonial state cannot assert the inclusive equality of all citizens, even in theory. Consequently

The colonial state, more than any other, because of its exclusion of the mass of its subjects from ideal participation in the state and by the terms of its own legitimation vis-à-vis its immediate beneficiaries, lives, in Laski's phrase, under a penumbra of contingent anarchy.

(30)

I will suggest later that this is why the colonial state in Kenya reverts to pre-modern notions of authority and of legitimation, because it cannot claim the 'self-evident' legitimacy of a modern bourgeois polity; for the moment, some

of the limits of universalised rights can be illustrated from colonial Kenya, again from the school of radical liberal critics. It was one of the criticisms made consistently by Norman Leys and McGregor Ross;

Although they were fond of calling themselves socialists, Leys and Ross were chiefly Christians and democrats.... their most fervent energies were directed toward achieving the franchise and the end of the colour bar.(31)

The impartial rule of law, the plurality of interest representation and the system of public rights of speech and association were all, in some measure, denied to Africans. Both Ross and Leys instanced cases of the partiality of the law, where a white who had murdered an African could be fined less than an Indian who had smuggled vinegar. (32) Both critics recognised that without political rights and equality of status before the law, other political reforms were insecure. (33)

There was little notion of rights to self-representation; there was no African representative in the legislature until 1944, when Eliud Mathu was nominated by the governor to represent African interests; prior to this, one or two white nominees represented those interests. (34) Both racism and a pre-modern notion of authority here merged in a system where those deemed too 'uncivilised' to have rights were ruled by those who had deemed themselves to have the right to judge. Equally, there was little notion in Kenya that subjects had formal rights to free speech and association; both were periodically suppressed for Africans. Examples are the 'restriction' of Harry Thuku between 1922 and 1931 and indeed the conditions of his release, (35) and the proscription in 1940 of the Kikuyu Central, the Ukamba Members' and Taita Hills

Associations, as being "dangerous to the good government of the Colony." (36) Consequently, when Kenyatta demanded in London that Africans must be granted civil liberties and be allowed to form associations, it was a demand with resonance in the London political centre, but a language denied in Kenya itself. (37) It may well be, then, as Nolutshungu suggests, that it is a distinguishing feature of a colonial state that it refuses, or is unable, to universalise political rights across racial lines; such a system cannot survive, or at least cannot justify itself, with universalised liberties, but as we have seen, nor could it bring itself to hand over the polity to the settler minority.

How then did the colonial state in Kenya legitimate its rule? D.A. Low, who asked this question, answered with a combination of reasons, ranging from the state's monopoly of coercive powers and the vested interests of indigenous groups, to the use of traditional sources of authority - the latter both in the sense of pre-existing political authorities and a certain level of 'charisma' which was said to attach to colonial officials. (38) Certainly, the colonial state, in its early years, sought out tribal chiefs and created them where there were none. In later years, attempts were made to build up the Local Native Councils and Native Tribunals as the Kenyan version of Indirect Rule and with the intention of containing political aspirations; but the latter could backfire when the Kikuyu bourgeoisie in particular used such institutions to consolidate their own power and expand their land holdings. (39)

The question of 'charisma', though, is revealing. It is, of course, a much-abused term, but does begin to refer us to the

notion of authority to which the colonial state adhered. This was hardly a 'legal' authority in Weber's sense, where the legitimacy of authority is based on the acceptance of rationalised rules governing the elevation to, and use of, authority. Such authority cannot select which voices it will recognise, as the colonial state did, since rationalised rules must be universalised. Instead, colonial authority adhered to principles of legitimation closer to Weber's other categories of traditional and charismatic rule. (40)

It drew its authority from a traditional basis, as the ideology of trusteeship, with roots in paternalistic and pre-modern authority structures. Its precepts were not the individual political rights of modernity, of an atomised but formally free civil society, but those of the non-democratic representation of interests by an elite; it thus referred more to the rights to power, and the moral duties of such power, implicit in the reciprocal authority structure of feudal social relations. As one District Officer put it: "We were an elite corps of an elite system, created for the benevolent exercise of paternal power." (41) This was a conception of power which recognised community and duty, but not citizenship and rights. Such conceptions, preserved within British public schools and Oxbridge, found a renewed application in a Colonial 'Service' for which notions of a barbarous and primitive Africa buttressed the supremacy of a political order which had long since declined in Britain. (42) Africa was here the category which replaced an upstart British working class, for:

According to the myth which had grown up about the exploits of the British imperial administration, the people of the colonies were governed much better than they could hope to govern themselves, by men who belonged to the elite of a society which had long accepted the

responsibility for governing less fortunate and inferior people. (43)

If this was something of the ethos of colonial administration, it was greatly reinforced by a substantial devolution of power to the local level of District Officers "in the bush". District Officers were able to develop highly personalised and jealously guarded areas of control within the reserves, and thus have a marked impact on the implementation of African development schemes. The obverse of paternalism was a notion of protection; protection from modernity, from economic individualism, from the conflictual nature of capitalist society and from the erosion of the tribal 'organic community'. (44)

This was a theme developed by Sorrenson in the mid-1960s, but largely neglected since; yet it has a significant impact on arguments put by Cowen and others, that the colonial state intervened to prevent the development of an African bourgeoisie accumulating land and putting landless Africans to labour in the production of agricultural commodities. The same phenomenon can be explained without recourse to an instrumental reading of the state as acting at the behest of the settlers. For an African bourgeoisie was precisely what the colonial administration's ethos of paternalism and protection feared, individual tenure in land was precisely what it abhorred, and accumulation of land with consequent landlessness for others was the touchstone for the colonial official of the breakdown of 'community'. Doubtless this was partly a not-unreasonable fear that class differentiation could have explosive political consequences; but it was equally part of the ethos which said that African development to European modernity must be a guided process, which must not be hastened, and which had a moral

and social, as much as economic, dimension.(45) In short, it was an ethos of the conservative reaction to the rise of capitalism.

Berman comments that the thrust of administrative measures in the post-World War II era, the era of the developing agricultural crisis, was reactionary in the exact sense of the term; it attempted to reverse changes which were already taking place. (46) The historical momentum of an indigenous bourgeoisie which Cowen and others have described indicates the extent of those changes in land tenure, class formation and the development of an acquisitive individualism. In attempting to suppress the development of a market in land, the commercialisation of production for exchange and the formation of classes, local colonial officials were attempting to roll back changes which the colonial presence itself had initiated. Their actions frequently only served to focus African dissent on the state itself, the attempts to halt the process of soil erosion being a notable example where a genuine, if piecemeal reform ran both counter to landholding patterns and made the colonial officials vulnerable to suspicions that it was improving the land for European takeover. Other examples were the refusal to allow Africans to grow lucrative cash crops and the regulation of African entry into trade; both measures, which had their own rationales, were simply seen as protecting white or Indian monopolies. So the colonial state created the conditions for a convergence of bourgeois nationalist and populist demands which amongst the Kikuyu fuelled Mau Mau - however much it later became a civil war.

Consequently, to the extent that changes involved in class formation, land accumulation and the development of an

individualist and capitalist rationality were already occurring, and were a measure of the fractured transition to modernity which colonialism itself had generated, the reactionary position of the administration was too late. The colonial state was not, then, simply an instrument of settler class rule; if it suppressed an African capitalism, it did so on the basis of other of its contradictory logics than ensuring settler interests.

NOTES

1. See, for example, E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939. Heinemann, London, 1973, and R.M.A. van Zwanenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya, 1919-1939. E.A.L.B., Nairobi, 1975.
2. See H. Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, 74, 1972; J. Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", in R. Miliband and J. Saville, (eds) The Socialist Register 1974, Merlin, London, 1974; C. Leys, "The 'Overdeveloped' Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation", in Review of African Political Economy, 5, 1976, and Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, Heinemann, London, 1976, esp. chapters 2 and 3.
3. Alavi, op cit, p. 62.
4. See Michael Cowen, "Capital and Peasant Households: A Case of the Central Province, Kenya," mimeo, Nairobi, 1976, "Commodity Production in Kenya's Central Province," in J. Heyer, P. Roberts and G. Williams, (eds) Rural Development in Tropical Africa, Macmillan, London, 1981 and "The British State and Agrarian Accumulation in Kenya", in Martin Fransman, (ed) Industry and Accumulation in Africa, Heinemann, London, 1982; Nicola Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918-77. Heinemann, London, 1980; Gavin Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite Bourgeoisie, 1905-1970. Yale University Press, 1980 and Apollo Njonjo, "The Africanization of the 'White Highlands': A Study in Agrarian Class Struggles in Kenya, 1950-1974." Ph. D., Princeton, 1977.
5. See particularly Njonjo, op cit.
6. J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions: the Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914." Journal of African History, 20, 1979, J. Lonsdale, "State and Peasantry in Colonial Kenya", in R. Samuel (ed) People's History and Socialist Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981 and B. Berman, "Provincial Administration and the Contradictions of Colonialism: 'Development' Policy and Conflict in Kenya, 1945-1952," Paper presented to the Conference on the Political Economy of Colonial Kenya, Cambridge University, 1975.

7. See D. Miller and J. Branson, "Review Essay: A Critique of Meillassoux's Anthropology," Thesis Eleven, 9, 1984.
8. Lonsdale and Berman, op cit. p. 504. My emphasis.
9. The writers I have in mind here include George Bennett, Kenya: A Political History, The Colonial Period. O.U.P., London, 1963; Marjorie Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, Frank Cass, London, 1966; Norman Leys, Kenya, Hogarth Press, London, 1924; W. McGregor Ross, Kenya from Within, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1927; M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country: A Study in Government Policy. O.U.P., London, 1967 and Margery Perham in M. Perham and E. Huxley, Race and Politics in Kenya, London, 1961.
10. George Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya", in V. Harlow and E.M. Chilver, (eds) History of East Africa, vol. II, O.U.P., London, 1965.
11. See Sorrenson, Land Reform, op cit. chapter 1.
12. Brett argues this case extensively.
13. See especially Michael Cowen's work.
14. Sorrenson, op cit. p. 32 and passim.
15. Perham and Huxley, op cit. p. 140.
16. J. Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article", New German Critique, 3, 1974 and Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press, Boston, 1980.
17. Perham and Huxley, op cit. pp. 142-3.
18. See G. Wasserman, Politics of Decolonisation: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue, 1960-5. Cambridge University Press, 1976.
19. Quoted from My African Journey in Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya. O.U.P., London, 1968. p. 241.
20. Perham and Huxley, op cit. p. 173.
21. Bennett, "Settlers and Politics..." op cit. p. 283.
22. Dilley, op cit. pp. 57-8
23. Bennett, "Settlers and Politics..." op cit. p. 309.
24. Ibid. p. 332.
25. See for example, R. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu and Maasai from 1900 to 1939. Princeton University Press, 1976. Tignor argues that it did not.
26. D. Wylie, "Confrontation over Kenya: The Colonial Office and its Critics, 1918-1940." Journal of African History, xviii, no. 3, 1977. p. 435-6.
27. Although critics such as McGregor Ross dedicated their books

to a hopefully watchful British public, in 1951 a survey found that 59 per cent of those surveyed could not name a single British colony. See D. Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961. O.U.P., London, 1971.

28. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Hutchinson, London, 1980. p. 291.
29. Quoted in McGregor Ross, op cit. pp. 353-4.
30. S. Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa: Political Considerations. Manchester University Press, 1982. p. 69.
31. Wylie, op cit. p. 431.
32. Ross, op cit. p. 176-9.
33. Wylie, op cit. p. 430.
34. See G. Bennett, "Imperial Paternalism: The Representation of African Interests in the Kenyan Legislative Council," in K. Robinson and F. Madden, Essays in Imperial Government. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963.
35. Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of 'Mau Mau': Nationalism in Kenya, Meridian, New York, 1970. pp. 46-54.
36. Ibid, p. 189.
37. Ibid, p. 138.
38. D.A. Low, "Lion Rampant," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 2, 1963-4.
39. Sorrenson, Land Reform... op cit. pp. 46-7.
40. M. Weber, Economy and Society, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.
41. Quoted in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed), Africa in the Colonial Period. III. The Transfer of Power: The Colonial Administrator in the Age of Decolonisation. University of Oxford Inter-Faculty Committee for African Studies, Oxford, 1979. p. 126.
42. See A.P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power. Macmillan, London, 1959.
43. Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940. Frank Cass, London, 1978. p. 133.
44. See Berman, "Provincial Administration..." op cit. and Kirk-Greene, op cit.
45. Sorrenson, Land Reform... has a good deal of information on these anxieties.
46. Berman, "Provincial Administration..." op cit. p. 11.