85-14

AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
OF AUSTRALIA AND THE PACIFIC

Eight Annual Conference
24-26th August, 1985

Burgmann College
Australian National University

# The Role of Western Intelligence Services in Nation Building: Africa, 1952-1984

ROY PATEMAN, Visiting Scholar
Hoover Institution Stanford

DRAFT NOT FOR CITATION

# Subverting Africa: The Role of Western Intelligence Agencies in Nation Building

**Roy Pateman**

> "It's all been a very useful exercise in nation building" - US State Department Official Congo 1960.

## The United States of America

Of all the numerous Intelligence services that have made such a happy hunting ground of Africa, more is known about the CIA than any other organisation. Consequently, this paper draws heavily on literature and sources relating, in the main to the CIA. I also deal in some depth with Israeli, French, South African and British activities, but virtually ignore Soviet, Chinese, Arab, African and other agencies. I would not deny that the latter merit the closest scrutiny, but am also aware, that although a study of western intelligence agencies is fraught with more than the normal scholarly frustations, academically respectable sources on Soviet and Third World intelligence operations are even more hard to find. However, it is clear that the Soviets have been very active in Africa and I hope to attempt preliminary work on this subject at a later date.

In this paper I shall be particularly concerned with Covert Activities. Covert action has been defined as :" any clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments, persons, events, or organizations in support of United States' foreign policy" [1]. Of the many activities of the CIA, few create more interest- or generate more paranoia- than covert actions. It has been estimated that CIA covert activities fall into the following broad areas. 32% consist of electoral support for pro-American parties over most of the developing and developed world. 29% is devoted to influencing the media in these countries and upon propaganda activities. 23% is concerned with para military assistance- such as the training of counter insurgency groups and secret armies, and the provision of arms and equipment. The residual 16% is for "other" activities [2]. The Intelligence

---

[1]. US Congress Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1976) Foreign and Military Intelligence Book 1, Washington D.C. p.141.

[2]. Intelligence Report, Mar 1976, p.10.

community is virtually unanimous in its belief that the separation of intelligence gathering from covert action would be disastrous [3]. The decision , whether or not covert actions are undertaken, depends ultimately upon choices made in Washington; depending upon personalities and patronage, spheres of activity contract and expand, to some extent independently of the overall importance of any area.

Most of the CIA's covert actions are routinely approved by the CIA Directorate of Operations, but bigger actions require the approval of a security overlord. For example, the Angolan operation of 1975-76 was under the control of the 40 Committee with Henry Kissinger in the Chair [4].

The CIA is a very large organisation; for example it has been estimated that it operates one of the largest airline services in the world [5]. It is also possibly the largest "news" organisation in the world, with a budget as large as Reuters, UPI and AP combined [6].

It has also been claimed, that irrespective of the resources at its disposal, the CIA has a particularly poor track record in predicting events, and has never been able to overthrow an African government [7]. Other scholars, journalists and activists present the view that the CIA is all powerful, pervasive and evil. It is very difficult to arrive at a balanced assessment of the role of covert action, particularly as all writers on intelligence must be treated cautiously, doubly so if they have been practitioners of the art of intelligence. However, one can guess that up to two-thirds of CIA career officers are engaged in covert activities.

Whatever one's view of the reach and power of the CIA, it must be admitted that it has evolved from its original role as an intelligence gatherer, confined to foreign activities, into an agency for para-military operations, involved in a wide range of interference in the domestic affairs of foreign governments. This change of role was helped by the fact that

---

3. Africa Research Group (n.d.) Intelligence and Foreign Policy: The CIA's Global Strategy, Cambridge, Mass., p8.

4. Intelligence Report, Feb 1976, p.7.

5. Marchetti V. & Marks J.D. (1974) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Alfred A.Knopf, New York, p. 143.

6. Gervasi S. (1979-80) 'CIA Covert Propaganda Capability', Covert Action Information Bulletin, 7, pp. 18-20.

7. Oudes B. (1974) 'The CIA and Africa', Africa Report, 19, 4, pp. 49-52.

the CIA Act of 1949 provided that: "funds may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds" [8]. The CIA has been a vital funding conduit for the US Executive, protected with the mantle of "internal security". It has been able to assist the USA in pursuing its political, military and economic objectives, and has rarely been subject to rigorous Congressional oversight.

The developing world presents greater opportunities for covert intelligence action than does the industrialised world. President Kennedy established diplomatic missions in every newly independent African country and made some interesting choices of Ambassadors, ranging more widely than the usual career or political appointments. Every embassy had CIA officers assigned to it. The senior CIA officer- or Chief of Station (COS)- is usually located within the embassy compound, often under the cover of the Political Section- for ease of administrative control [9].

The USA has sent thousands of military advisers to African countries in Military Mission Advisory Groups- ideal cover for CIA operatives. Once an officer is in position he can make contact with the many African military officers who have attended leadership training courses in the USA and who still are enchanted with the American way of life. Many American trained officers attempt to overthrow governments and some succeed [10].

Until 1982, it was relatively easy to identify CIA officers through embassy listings; detailed biographies of many hundreds of officers were published by magazines such as Covert Action and Counterspy. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, effectively ended this practice with provisions of three years jail and $15,000 fine for the unauthorised disclosure of an agent's identity. I will not therefore disclose any agent's names unless their cover has already been broken.

The CIA has grown enormously in size and scope since its establishment; however, it is clear that it is not always the most appropriate way in which the USA can safeguard what it sees as its vital interests. No less a person than Kermit Roosevelt, the man responsible for restoring the Shah of Iran

---

[8]. Fisher L. (1975) Presidential Spending Power, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.214.

[9]. Marks J. (1978) 'How to Spot a Spook', Agee P. and Wolf L. (eds.) Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe, Lyle Stuart. Secaucus, New Jersey, p. 30.

[10]. Wolpin M.D. (1972) Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World, D.C.Heath, Lexington, p.95.

to his throne in 1953, wrote: "If we, the CIA, are ever going to try something like this again, we must be absolutely sure that people and the army want what we want. If not you had better give the job to the marines!" [11].

## Israel

Israel's intelligence network also straddles the continent, and by all accounts operates more efficiently than the CIA. Mossad is responsible for foreign intelligence and employs about 1500-2000 career officers; the second largest department of Mossad is responsible for political action and liaison [12].

Israel's motives for devoting so many resources to a sizeable diplomatic and intelligence presence in Africa were straightforward enough. Firstly she wanted to win friendship and support from fellow members of the United Nations. Secondly, she realised that if she did not attempt to cultivate these new nations, the Egyptians or their Soviet supporters most certainly would. Israel also needed cheap African raw materials and markets for her products. Israel sent some very experienced intelligence operatives to Africa. The first ambassador to Ghana, Ehud Avriel was formerly Second in Command of Mossad's office of Intelligence and special missions. Uriel Lubrani was ambassador to Uganda from 1965-68 and later in Ethiopia. The CIA found him "a valuable and cooperative friend" [13].

Israel's experience in Africa was not an entirely happy one, in as far as 31 out of 33 black African nations eventually severed diplomatic ties with her. The major reason for this, was Israel's continued occupation of Arab land and also Israel's growing ties with white ruled South Africa. But if official relations were severed, substantial trade and business links remained ; by the end of 1983, Israel had links with 22 African nations with over 4000 Israelis in official posts. It is inconceivable that Mossad has not used such prominently placed individuals for intelligence operations.

Full links have recently been reestablished with Liberia and Zaire; one of the major factors behind the resumption of ties, being Mossad's willingness

---

[11]. Roosevelt K. (1979) Countercoup: the Struggle for the Control of Iran, McGraw Hill, New York, p. 210.

[12]. Muslim Students Following the line of the Iman (n.d.) Documents from the American Spy Den in Teheran, March 1979- on Israeli Foreign Intelligence and Security Services, Iran Embassy, Beirut, p. 7.

[13]. Muslim Students op cit, p.39.

to share intelligence on Libya's activities and intentions throughout western and northern Africa [14].

## South Africa

South Africa has developed a ruthless and efficient secret service, which operates in much of Africa, Western Europe and the USA. The intelligence services have undergone a number of changes since the formation in the early 60s of Republican Intelligence, a secret wing of the Security Police, with Colonel Van den Bergh as its head. It was replaced by the Bureau of State Security, BOSS, in 1969. BOSS's function was to investigate all matters affecting the security of the state. The South African Official Secrets Act was amended to give seven years jail to anyone disclosing any security matter and to prohibit the giving of any evidence if it was "prejudicial to the interests of the state or public security" [15].

BOSS quickly developed effective cooperation with a number of foreign intelligence organisations, including the CIA, Mossad, MI6 and France's Service de Documentation Exterieure et de contre Espionage, the SDECE. Cooperation is usually on a selective basis and justified, if it comes to light: "in the national interest". Agencies share the services of small time agents such as burglars, standover men and hitmen. They also exchange lists of communists and Soviet sympathisers, for details of exile activities. Individual western intelligence officers, or groups of operatives with personal right wing biases, are also likely to sympathize and cooperate with the racist South African regime [16].

BOSS grew to an organization with over 1000 full time employees and was active in the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi, Zambia, Malagasy Republic, Ghana and Senegal during the early 70s; the period of Vorster's attempted detente with black Africa. BOSS was weakened with the downfall of Vorster and Van den Bergh in 1978; it became the Department of National Security, and later, the National Intelligence Service. P.K.Botha, a former Defence Minister, became Prime Minister , and enhanced the status of Military intelligence in foreign operations.

## France

---

[14]. The Times, Aug 15; 23 1983.

[15]. International Defence and Aid Fund (1971) South Africa: the BOSS Law, Christian Action Publications, London, p.2.

[16]. Barber J. (1983) 'BOSS in Britain', African Affairs, 82, 328, p. 327.

The largest of France's intelligence services is the SDECE, employing 2000 personnel in 7 departments, the seventh being responsible for intelligence and military intervention in Africa. The most controversial intelligence service is Service d'Action, SAC, the Gaullist para police under the control of Jacques Foccart from 1958 until 1974. Foccart had some 20,000 agents and 17 companies under his control [17]. SAC was much restricted under Presidents Pompidou and Mitterand.

French intelligence networks permeate all of Francophone Africa, a reflection of the economic and political dominance that France exerts in her former colonies. France controls over 50% of the modern economy in the major African countries of Gabon, Senegal, Cameroon and Ivory Coast. It has also been said that: "France is the sanctuary for all the reactionary organizations who issue their subversive propaganda against the progressive regimes of Africa" [18].

## United Kingdom

MI 6 is not the largest British intelligence agency- that distinction belongs to Government Communications Head Quarters, which employs tens of thousands of people in the collection, processing and analysis of all signals intelligence. MI6 employs some 1500-2000 personnel, with some 20-25 of them in Africa, coordinating intelligence collection and covert military operations. For counter insurgency operations, Strategic Air Services, SAS, is available [19].

In the remainder of the paper I deal with some of the major instances of intelligence cooperation and also show where agencies have come into conflict with each other. Many more case studies, that form part of a larger study, could have been included.

## The CIA and Israel: an Incestuous Relationship

---

[17]. Kruger H. (1980) The Great Heroin Coup: Drugs, Intelligence and International Fascism, (trans. Meldon J.) Black Rose, Montreal, p.43.

[18]. Afrique-Asie, Jul 12 1976.

[19]. Bloch J. and Fitzgerald P. (1983) British Intelligence and Covert Actions: Africa, Middle East and Europe since 1945, Brandon, Ireland, p.40.

The Central Intelligence Agency's Israeli section is virtually autonomous from the rest of the company, but operates throughout the Middle East and North Africa at the behest of Israeli intelligence. This close relationship is fostered by a shared cultural and racial contempt for Arabs [20].

Much of the credit for this excellent relationship is due to James Jesus Angleton. As a wartime member of O.S.S., Angleton liaised with Hagganah, and for the rest of his working life was devoted to Israel. He was in direct control of Counter Intelligence, which included the Israeli desk [21]. The disadvantage of this very special relationship with Israel is that an independent intelligence view of the area is hardly ever available to Washington.

However, the State Department has on occasions tried to develop an independent position; for example a brief, fruitful relationship with Egypt's President Nasser followed the Free Officers military coup of 1952. This came under some strain during the so called, Lavon Affair of 1954. It is claimed that an Israeli agent working under Angleton, obtained approval for a group of Mossad agents to attack US and other Western installations in Egypt. Israel then attempted to pin for the blame for these attacks on Nasser, and the Mukbarat secret police. Ephraim Evron, a close confidante of Angleton, was a key figure in this camapign. The Israeli agents were caught by Nasser, and the crude plot exposed. Nevertheless, Ephron survived the scandal to become Minister Counsellor in Washington during the Arab- Israeli war of 1967, and later Ambassador to the USA.

Relations between Egypt and the USA worsened further in 1956 when the USA refused (in a most offensive manner) to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam. The underlying reasons for rejection, were objections from Southern Congressmen and their cotton growing constituents, and other Representatives, vulnerable, then as now, to Israeli and Jewish Pressure groups [22].

Nasser became even more entrenched after the success of the nationalisation of the Suez canal and appeared to threaten British and French strategic

---

[20]. Morris R. ( 1977) Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, Harper and Row, New York, p.253.

[21]. Agee P. (1975) Inside the Company: CIA Diary, Stonehill, New York, p. 502.

[22]. Eveland W.C. (1980) Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East, Norton, New York, p. 156.

interests as well as those of Israel and the USA . Through its links with other western intelligence agencies, the CIA was aware of the impending attack on Egypt [23]. The USA could hardly be seen as supporting the old-fashioned Suez gun boat diplomacy; a solution was found -to disclaim all prior knowledge of the attack but to hope privately for its success.

After the Suez debacle, the CIA mounted a number of combined operations with Mossad, aimed at countering Soviet infiltration of the Egyptian intelligence service, and also subsidised Mossad's expanding operations in Africa to the tune of some $80 million per year [24].

The Head of the CIA in 1967, Richard Helms, was :" one of the American Officials most likely to understand Israel's problems" [25]. It has been claimed that the CIA gave Israel approval for the Israeli attacks, as it was concerned over the State Department's plans to pressure Israel into peace negotiations with the Arabs- when Israel was felt to be in a poor negotiating positon [26]. During the course of the six day war, the US spy ship, Liberty, was put out of action, by Israel, to prevent the US government from knowing of Israel's plans to occupy all of Palestine , the Sinai and the Gollan Heights. Angleton, Ephraim and Rostow were all involved in the conspiracy [27].

On Johnson's personal orders, the USA did not retaliate for the attack; it was clear that if the USA punished Israel, Israel would inform the "moderate" Arab states just how thoroughly,the CIA had subverted their security services [28]. From 1967, the US/Israel alliance became ever closer and diplomats, politicians and intelligence agents who were perceived as not

---

[23]. Tully A. (1962) CIA: the Inside Story , Morrow, New York, p.110.

[24]. Eveland op cit, pp. 309, 321.

[25]. Derogy J. and Carmel H. (1979) The Untold History of Israel, Grove, New York, p. 216.

[26]. Pearson A. (1978) Conspiracy of Silence, Quartet, London, p.92.

[27]. Taylor J. (1980) Pearl Harbour II: the True Story of the Sneak Attack by Israel upon the U.S.S. Liberty June 8 1967, Regency, London, p.95.

[28]. Ennes J.M.jnr. (1979) Assault on the Liberty: the True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship, Random House, New York, pp. 213-6.

being totally behind Israel were likely to
be removed from sensitive areas; such as the case of David Nes, deputy COS, Cairo in 1967 [29].

After the war of 1967, US foreign policy seemed to consist of conflicting strands; on the one hand, a generalised desire to cultivate Arab friends, but on the other, unconditional, specific support for whatever Israel did- even though this might annoy the Arab friends.

When Nasser died in 1970, Kissinger saw an opportunity to bring Egypt, the USA and Israel together; he lost little time in cultivating Sadat. In September 1971, channels between the CIA and General Ahmed Ismali, the Egyptian Director of Intelligence, were reopened [30]. The US embassy in Cairo grew in size to become one of its largest establishments, and key intelligence operatives were placed in position; for example, Christopher Thoren, active in the United Nations from 1960-65, then in the State Department until 1969, became President of the American University in Cairo.

However, the CIA remained heavily reliant on Israeli intelligence sources, and was unable to make an independent assessment. In the weeks prior to the October 1973 war, sources in Arab countries alerted the USA (and therefore Israel) of coordinated Arab plans to attack simultaneously in the Sinai and Gollan Heights. As this scenario did not coincide with the preconceived prejudices of intelligence chiefs and policy makers in Washington and Tel Aviv- who stoutly maintained that the Arabs were too afraid of Israeli military might to fight- these reports were ignored [31].

Sadat's psychological victory in 1973 gave him the necessary legitimacy to embark on genuine peace discussions with the Israelis. With the signing of the Camp David Accords a new era of cooperation between the intelligence services of the USA, Egypt and Israel began. This cooperation was not sufficient to prevent Sadat's assassination; it did, however,survive in the reign of Sadat's more pliable successor. The excellent relations that presently exist between Egypt and the USA are a tribute to the pragmatism of a

---

[29]. Copeland M. (1974) Without Cloak or Dagger: the Truth about the New Espionage, Simon and Schuster, New York, p.52.

[30]. Heikal M. (1978) Sphinx and Commisar: the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World, Collins, London, p.239.

[31]. Rositzke H. (1977) The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counter espionage and Covert Action, Readers Digest Press, New York, p.104.

leader who can overlook the CIA's considerable interference in the internal affairs of Egypt. It remains to be seen whether such close ties with the USA can bring economic prosperity and political stability.

## The French Connection.

American intelligence relations with the French have not always been as harmonious as they have been with the Israelis. Much of French Conservative hostility stemmed from uncertainty over the role of the USA during the Generals' revolt against de Gaulle in April 1961. Stories, originating in Moscow and reprinted in the French press, indicated that the CIA would be pleased to see the overthrow of de Gaulle. Firstly, because they saw that, in the end, he would capitulate to the Algerian NLF guerillas, perceived as Communists by the CIA, and secondly, a belief that were de Gaulle out of the way, obstacles to the reintegration of French forces into NATO, and under US control, would be removed [32]. Kirkpatrick, who was Inspector General of the CIA at the time, not only denies any CIA complicity in the plot, but even maintains that President Kennedy offered aid to de Gaulle [33].

However, relations soured further with the Ben Barka scandal of 1965. Mehdi Ben Barka, a prominent Moroccan exile, and organiser of the TriContinental Congress in Havana, was lured to France, where he was killed by French Security. This affair is a murky busines, involving Mossad agents, who were shadowing Ben Barka in exile, General Oufkir, chief of Moroccan Intelligence- who was on the payroll of Robert Wells, CIA COS in Morocco- as well as SDECE and the CIA [34]. The CIA were primarily interested in learning details of the TriContinental movement and were blamed by the French for the failure of the enterprise [35].

---

[32]. Blackstock P.W. (1964) The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, pp.182-4.

[33]. Kirkpatrick L.B.jnr. (1973) The US Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities, Hill and Wang, New York, pp.,166-172.

[34]. Kruger op cit p.63.

[35]. Williams P.M. (1970) Wars, Plots and Scandals in Post-War France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.123.

Events in Gabon- part of the French sphere of influence- show how the French security services effectively freeze out the Americans.

President Kennedy appointed Charles Darlington to be the USA's first ambassador to Gabon in July 1961. There were only two other foreign missions in the capital, Libreville, belonging to France and Taiwan; the Israelis were close by in Brazzaville. Darlington was asked to leave Gabon by President Mba in July 1965, after the failure of a coup, in which, according to the French, the USA was involved. The Ambassador vehemently denied any complicity [36]. That Darlington's youngest son, Christopher, later became a CIA agent and served in Africa is presumably irrelevant.

However, if the coup had succeeded, the new leaders seemed set to swing the country behind the USA, and further the business interests of US Bethlehem Steel at the expense of French commercial interests. Jacques Foccart is regarded as the mastermind behind Mba's rescue. The French ensured that future senior diplomatic posts in Gabon were occupied by men with an intelligence background; for example, SDECE agent, Maurice Robert, became ambassador. Maurice Delaunay also gained considerable intelligence experience whilst ambassador from 1965 until 1972 and again from 1975 until 1979 [37].

Gabon, with it's considerable Uranium and other mineral resources, a permanent garrison of French troops and its pro western orientation, remains an important country for the USA; one of the State Department's most experienced Africanists, McNamarra with seven postings on the continent, ended his career as Ambassador in Libreville. He commented that French intelligence activities gave him headaches [38]. US intelligence operatives also operated in deeper cover, away from the eyes of SDECE. Ashland Oil Co., testified to the Securities and Exchange Commission, that it had received $98,068 from the CIA from 1968-73 to pay the expenses of a CIA operative employed in Gabon [39].

The French also exerted influence in the Malagasy Republic. SDECE had trained the security service who tipped off the Government that the US

---

[36]. Darlington C. and Darlington A. (1971) Africa Betrayed, David Mc Kay, p.167.

[37]. Kruger op cit pp.80-1.

[38]. personal communication Feb 13 1985.

[39]. New York Times, Jul 9 1975.

ambassador, Anthony Marshall, and Jock Halsey, the CIA COS, were working against the interests of Tsiranana - SDECE's favourite. the two Americans were duly expelled [40].

Guinea has been one Francophone country where American intelligence has had some freedom of movement. Guinea voted for Independence from France in 1958 and de Gaulle promptly cut off all aid. One consequence of this severance was the withdrawal of French advisers and a curtailment of the cordial relations that existed between France and Guinea's security services.

Guinea accused the USA of complicity in an invasion of Conakry in 1970. Guinea had given support and base facilities to the PAIGC guerilla movement during it's war of liberation in the colony of Guinea Bissau. The Portuguese secret police, PIDE, financed and organised the invasion. The CIA had excellent relations with PIDE; for example, in 1969, Kermit Roosevelt became the representative of the Portuguese government's public relations company in Washington. However, any direct involvement in the invasion has yet to be proved. According to an anonymous Portuguese army officer, who served for 12 years in Guinea Bissau, the USA were not involved, and apart from recruiting low level agents among the local,Lebanese merchants, were primarily interested in maintaining landing rights in the Cape Verde Islands [41].

However, Diallo Telli, Guinea's Minister of Justice and the First Secretary General of the OAU admitted after interrogation (and torture?) that he had been approached by Kissinger to work for the CIA in 1971 and finally recruited in 1974 through the mediation of Liberia's ambassador to Conakry [42].

Morocco is almost the only Francophone country in Africa (apart from Zaire , which is a much longer story) where the USA can claim any significant intelligence success. According to the former Director General of the colony of Spanish Sahara, General Vernon Walters, the Deputy Director of the CIA was instrumental in persuading the post-Franco regime to hand

---

[40]. Oudes B. (1974) op cit, p.51.

[41]. Covert Action Information Bulletin, 11, Dec 1980, p.18.

[42]. Africa Contemporary Record 1976-77 (1977 ) Rex Collings, London, pp.B591-2.

over the bulk of its African colony to Morocco [43]. Morocco was duly grateful, and has been an extremely dependable ally; the USA fully support Morocco's war against POLISARIO, and an important NSA facility is situated at Sidi Yahia [44]. Elsewhere, US intelligence has been effectively frozen out of Africa by France.

## Israel/South Africa/USA: Thick as Thieves

Relations between Israel and South Africa date back to 1948, the year which saw both the establishment of Israel as a modern state, and the beginning of the long rule of the National Party of South Africa. Ties became even closer following the October 1973 war, and Begin's election win of 1977.

By 1977, only two black African states, Malawi and Lesotho, had diplomatic relations with Israel; 31 having broken ties since 1967. Israel's reaction to such explicit political rejection was somewhat irrational. The prevalent attitude seems to have been that as Africa had spurned Israel and embraced the PLO, Israel would cultivate the enemies of black Africa. The Conservative governments of Israel and South Africa clearly saw similarities between the threats posed by the PLO and the ANC. They maintained (with no supporting evidence) that several hundred ANC members had been trained by the PLO in Lebanon; and that there were clues to link the two guerilla movements in recent urban attacks in South Africa [45].

It is in Namibia and the homelands where Israel has been most cooperative with South African intelligence. Israel sold South Africa infiltration alarm systems, electronic warning fences for the Namibian border with Angola and night vision apparatus, and has also trained the South Africans in counter insurgency techniques [46]. In Bophutatswana , Brig. Yehuda Gavish is adviser on internal security and Israel has advised on the establishment

---

[43]. Oudes (1984) 'The United States' Year in Africa: Staying the Course',Africa Contemporary Review 1982-83, Africana, New York, p.A144.

[44]. Bamford J. (1982) The Puzzle Palace: a Report on America's Most Secret Agency, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, p.212.

[45]. Southern African Freedom Foundation (1983) Position Papers,6,10, p.3.

[46]. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 1,3, p.8.

of Nahal formations. These units combine military training with agricultural work and have been particularly effective in transforming Israel. This concept of nation building has not however, proved to be very successful when transplanted to Africa : " It proved totally unmanageable within the context of acute regionalism and historic tribal animosities and suspicions" [47]. Moreover, there were claims that Nahal units were involved in the 1966 military coup in Ghana; "a body of 12,000 disciplined people can of course be misused" [48]. Presumably, the Israelis found the leaders of the Bantustans more tractable. The Ciskei also cooperates with the Israelis in security and intelligence matters [49].

Close ties between Israel and South Africa, and between Jews in Israel, South Africa and the USA, were fostered by Eschel Rhoodie,the former Head of South Africa's Department of Information. Of the 180 or so projects set up by Rhoodie- which during the 1978-79 Fiscal Year alone, amounted to nearly $18m- details of some 60 have not been revealed; however, it is suspected that many involve intelligence activities and nuclear cooperation [50].

Such intimate ties with South Africa are not universally popular in Israel. Whilst General Sharon has visited South Africa scores of times since 1967, and other ex-military officers hold key positions in Southern Africa- for example, Joseph Hermalin, ex chief of Shabak- is Ambassador to South Africa, other Israelis can see no advantage in such close ties [51]. Indeed, there seems little visible return from aligning Israel so closely with South Africa, either from reasons of trade, the need to protect the 100,000 Jews in South Africa or on the grounds of strategy [52].

---

[47]. Decalo S. (1976) 'Afro-Israeli Technical Cooperation: Patterns of Setbacks anbd Successes', Curtis M. & Gitelson S.A.(eds.) Israel in the Third World, Transaction Books, New Jersey, p.85.

[48]. Kreinin M.E. (1964) Israel and Africa: A Study in Technical Cooperation, Praeger, New York, p.102.

[49]. The Star, Jan 22 1983.

[50]. Lewin H. (1980) 'More Dirty Tricks', New Internationalist, 87, pp.20-1.

[51]. Beit-Hallahmi J. (1983) 'Israel and South Africa, 1977-82: Business as Usual and More', New Outlook, Mar-Apr, pp.31-5.

[52]. Chazan N (1983) 'The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israeli Foreign Policy towards South Africa', African Affairs,82, 327, pp. 169-99.

The USA has long recognised the importance of South Africa. One of the clearest indications of this was given in the National State Study Memorandum 39 of 1970. Kissinger recommended to Nixon that the South African arms embargo be relaxed; that the question of Namibia be taken out of any bilateral negotiations with South Africa, and that in the "tar baby option", trade with South Africa be given unofficial priority over trade and aid to other independent Southern African states [53]. It has been noted that when NSSM 39 was discussed on December 17th 1969, so transparently pro-white was the CIA presentation : "that it was clear that South African Intelligence material formed the bulk of CIA material used in the briefing" [54].

Links between the American and South African security services were very amicable. BOSS's formation in 1969, followed a great deal of consultation between Angleton and Van Den Bergh [55]. Cooperation has taken diverse forms; for example, the two bodies swopped files on the exiled South African activist, Denis Brutus [56]. It is claimed that the CIA funded the breakaway liberation movement, the PAC, and recruited the African American Labour Centre's Program Officer in South Africa, Nama Mahomo [57]. The AALC was established in 1964, 90% of it's budget derives from the United States government. It acts as an instrument of US foreign policy and business interests and operates in South Africa on South African terms.

It is Angola which offers the most interesting case study of joint South African/US operations. Western intelligence involvement in Angola dates back to the early 60s when Kennedy authorised CIA payment to Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA. Israel trained FNLA's security police,

---

[53]. El-Khawas M.A. & Cohen B. (eds.) (1975) The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, pp.66-8.

[54]. Morris R. op cit, p.115.

[55]. Weir A. & Bloch J. (1981) 'The Militarization of BOSS', Covert Action Information Bulletin, 13, p.30.

[56]. Winter G. (1981) Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp.208-10.

[57]. Baskin J. (1982) 'AFL-CIO-AALC-CIA', South African Labour Bulletin, 8,3, p.60.

medical aides and trade unionists [58]. The CIA increased Roberto's retainer following the army coup in Portugal in 1974; in January 1975 he received $300,000 [59]. The coup took the CIA by surprise: Nixon had authorised the closure of the CIA station in Luanda in 1970, and relied, thereafter, for information on either the PIDE, or the South Africans- neither of whom were capable of an objective analysis of black liberation movements.

The USA was determined to prevent the MPLA from gaining control of Angola- site of profitable oil drilling by Gulf Oil [60]. Van den Bergh visited Washington to be briefed on the US's plans by Jim Potts, head of the Africa Division of the CIA. Daniel Chipenda, Vice President of the FNLA, met with Van den Bergh in Windhoek over three days in July 1975 to seal the alliance [61].

From October 1975, 'St. Martin' (William Rourke), a key CIA operative in Kinshasa, held regular meetings with BOSS. On October 20th, a CIA plane landed at Ndjili in Zaire carrying a cargo of arms and supplies. These were transfered to two South African transports for flight to Silva Porto in Southern Angola. They were used by UNITA forces and their South African allies in the war against the MPLA [62].

In late 1975, it became evident that South Africa had invaded Angola and was trying to impose a puppet UNITA regime on the country. African governments,Congress and western media condemned both South Africa and the USA. There certainly was a remarkable convergence of interests between the USA and South Africa. The US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa , William Schaufele, when asked if his government approved of South African involvement said: " It was not approval, so much, as that we

---

[58]. Marcum J. (1978) The Angolan Revolution Vol II: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare (1962-1976), MIT Press, Cambridge, p.35.

[59]. New York Times, Dec 12 1975.

[60]. Johnson R.W. (1977) How Long Will South Africa Survive, Macmillan, London, p.156.

[61]. Ignat'ev O.K. (1977) Secret Weapon in Africa, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.137.

[62]. Stockwell J. (1978) In Search of Enemies: a CIA Story, Norton, New York, p.187.

could understand South Africa's perception of its role" [63]. But Congress became increasingly impatient with the Executive's collusion with South Africa.

The administration therefore used the CIA to fund a large scale, para military, covert operation in Angola and Zaire [64]. Zaire was of crucial importance during the US programme of covert action in Angola. Total US aid to Zaire in Fiscal Year 1975 was only $9.3m, but in the following year it increased to $64.5m . Kissinger admitted to the Senate Appropriations Committee on November 20th 1975 that some of this increase could be construed as an indirect subsidy towards covert actions in Angola [65].

The CIA cooperated with BOSS in recruiting mercenaries to fight with the FNLA, facilitating indefinite leave for officers and enlisted men of US special forces who then went to Angola [66]. CIA pilots flew the artillery spotter planes directing the South African fire [67]. It is possible that Kissinger asked his old friends, the Israelis, to help South Africa out in Angola. It is certain that Israel trained South African combat troops and also Savimbi's UNITA forces in counter insurgency techniques perfected in Gaza and the West Bank [68].

Considerable resources were used in an effort to win the propaganda battle. Staff officers were brought into CIA stations in Lusaka and Kinshasa from late 1975, charged with the task of writing articles extolling the virtues and triumphs of UNITA and FNLA. These articles were placed in local papers and sent on to Europe, Australia and the USA, where journalists, reportedly in the pay of the CIA, used them [69].

---

[63]. X Ray, Jan/Feb 1976..

[64]. Rositzke H. op cit. p.182.

[65]. Intelligence Report, Feb 1976, p.4.

[66]. Winter op cit. p.544.

[67]. Burchett W. & Roebuck D. (1977) The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p.24.

[68]. The Daily Telegraph, Apr 3 1976.

[69]. US Congress Sub Committee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, May 25 1978, Washington D.C., p.17.

However, in spite of all it's efforts, the USA was unable to deliver Angola to the FNLA or UNITA. Congress, following the lead of liberal Senators, Clark and Tunney, passed an amendment freezing funds for covert action in Angola. The invasions collapsed and South Africa withdraw from Angola - temporarily. South Africa exacted it's revenge; funds from the Republic helped to unseat Clark and Tunney in 1978.

Even during Carter's term, relations with South Africa were not particularly hostile. Some US officials were expelled from South Africa for photographing nuclear installations, but the same aircraft was used (with the tacit approval of the South African government) to gather information in Black Africa of potential intelligence significance to both parties [70]. During Carter's presidency a serious breach of the mandatory UN embargo on arms trade with South Africa occured. Dr Bull of the Canadian Space Research Corporation was convicted of exporting artillery shell casings to South Africa, the deal being executed by the CIA [71].

Serious allegations were also made that the CIA arranged for Cuban exiles to meet with South African security agents in Miami and New Jersey. In exchange for lists of left wing Cubans in the USA, the Cubans went on to South Africa in November 1977, and murdered Robert Smit and his wife. Smit had compiled damaging information on currency illegalities in South Africa, which compromised Americans and South Africans in high places [72].

Since the beginning of Reagan's term of office there has been a further increase in cooperation between the USA and South Africa. On the eve of Reagan's inauguration in 1981, the policy of constructive engagement was initiated. Casey and Allen, CIA Director Designate and National Security Adviser Designate respectively, met with UNITA representatives, as well as with MNR, the anti- Frelimo movement founded and fostered by Rhodesia's CIO and BOSS. Later that year, Savimibi again met with American

---

[70]. Ray E. & Schaap B. (1981) 'The Namibian Solution: the Future of Southern Africa', Covert Action-Information Bulletin, 13, p.5.

[71]. Kunirum O. (1981) Israel, South Africa and Black Africa: a Study of the Politics of Expediency, University Press, Washington DC. pp.54-5.

[72]. Leonard R. (1983) South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa, Lawrence Hill, Westport, p.90.

representatives in Morocco [73].

The USA never recognised the MPLA government in Angola but established diplomatic links with Mozambique, following that country's independence in 1975. A fruitful, relationship between the CIA staff in Maputo and Rhodesian and South African intelligence officers also flourished. American diplomats gathered information on ZANU bases in Mozambique, together with the names and addresses of ANC militants living in Maputo- and passed them on to their Southern African contacts. On January 30th 1981, South African troops raided the ANC houses, killed several civilians and kidnapped others. Subsequently, six US officials including Lundahl,the CIA COS and Ollivier, his deputy, were expelled from Mozambique [74].

The expulsion of the Maputo diplomats coincided with the wining and dining of senior South African military officers in Washington. In September of 1982, Casey paid an official visit to South Africa, the first such by an Intelligence Chief [75]. Ray Cline, former chief of the CIA Intelligence Directorate, is a frequent visitor to South Africa [76]. Van den Bergh also has excellent contacts in the USA, he is a close friend of Vice President Bush - ex CIA chief [77].

There is also some evidence that the CIA were involved with the South Africans in the murder of ANC militant, Ruth First, in Maputo in August 1982. The letter bomb that killed her, had the imprint of the African Bibliographic Centre in Washington DC; this publication is sent to Africa in a diplomatic pouch and mailed locally [78].

The joint South African/USA attempts to destabilise Angola - abetted by the Israelis- are at present showing some signs of success. However, it seems unlikely that South Africa will be able (or willing) to hold on to Namibia for much longer. With the independence of Namibia, the MPLA will be able to deal with UNITA. Neither Constructive Engagement with a

---

[73]. Ray & Schaap, p.9.

[74]. Ray E. (1981) 'Mozambique Smashes Spy Network',Covert Action Information Bulletin, 12, p.24.

[75]. Oudes B. (1984) op cit, p.A148.

[76]. Freemantle B. (1983) CIA, Stein & Day, New York, p.194.

[77]. Leonard op cit, p.127.

[78]. ibid p.178.

Conservative US administration, nor close ties with Israel, will be sufficient to shelter white South Africa from the inevitable- majority rule. It is unlikely that the new rulers will forget the role played by intelligence agents in bolstering minority regimes. But, intelligence agents may draw heart from the fact that the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation survived almost intact from the onset of a black government in Rhodesia.

## In British Africa

Prior to Independence, British intelligence was preeminent in all of its colonies, possessions, dependencies and territories. MI5 was the senior body with the Intelligence Corps and Special Branch playing subsidiary roles. Since independence, British strategy has been to establish high level military and intelligence contacts with indigenous agencies. MI6 have also worked harmoniously with other Western agencies

However, Israel's intelligence links with the East African countries are also significant; these predate independence. Milton Obote, the first Prime Minister of Uganda visited Israel just before independence in 1962. In 1964, Israel established a counter insurgency agency, under the control of F.K. Onama, Minister of the Interior, and assumed all military training from 1966-71 [79]. Israel and the USA developed useful contacts in the labour movement through a series of AFL-CIO (and therefore CIA) backed training courses in Kampala and Tel Aviv [80]. However, Obote began to have serious doubts over the growing Israeli influence in his country and in neigbouring Sudan. The British government also had reasons for wishing for his removal from office.

Amin, who had attended a parachute training course in Israel in 1968, and whilst head of the Army, had visited rebel Anya nya units in the Sudan along with Israeli officers, seemed an ideal choice of leader. As Israeli General, Zamie was head of Uganda's Central Intelligence Organisation, it is obvious that the Israelis knew of Amin's planned coup. Eye witnesses maintain that Israelis flew planes and drove tanks in the military takeover

---

[79]. Jacob A. (1971) 'Israel's Military Aid to Africa', Journal of Modern African Studies, 9,2, pp.177-8.

[80]. Morris G. (1967) CIA and American Labour: the Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy, International Publishers, New York, p.103.

81

Israel also cultivated a military man in Kenya; Mau Mau General Waruhi Itote, was invited to Israel in 1961 , having been released from prison at the request of Kenyatta. He received para-military training and later, became head of Nahal [82]. Kenyan Intelligence also cooperated with Mossad and the British MI6. Bruce MacKenzie, the South African born, Kenyan Minister of Agriculture worked for MI6 since at least 1963. Through his friendship with David Stirling, the founder of the SAS, he facilitated SAS training of Kenya's forces. Ben Gethi, the Commander of the feared counter insurgency GSU, had served with the SAS in Aden [83]. MacKenzie also worked for Mossad and assisted with the Entebbe rescue. As a mark of their appreciation for a "righteous gentile",a Galilean forest is named after him [84].

Israel also cultivates African trade union leaders, realising from their own experience with Histradut, that under colonialism, trade union leaders have control of what may be the only dynamic force in developing nations; they often form the nucleus of future national leadership [85]. Tom Mboya was such a man.

Mboya was a man of outstanding ability, but was assisted to the top of Kenyan and International trade union politics by Israel and the USA. US support for Mboya was predicated on the assumption that he would construct unions and political organisations on the US model- ensuring that Communists did not gain influence [86]. With such support, Mboya experienced little difficulty in his bid to become Chairman of the ICFTU

---

[81]. ITV transcript Apr 5 1971.

[82]. Murray-Brown J. (1972) Kenyatta, Allen & Unwin, London p.310.

[83]. Bloch & Fitzgerald op cit, pp.44-7; p.153.

[84]. Hutton P. & Bloch J. (1979) 'How the West Established Idi Amin and Kept Him There', Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, Ray et al. (eds.), Lyle Stuart, Secaucus, New Jersey, p.177

[85]. Laufer L. (1967) Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York,p.132.

[86]. Lodge G (1962) Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries, Harper and Row, New York, p.100.

area committee for East, Central and Southern Africa [87]. But when independence came to Kenya in 1964, Kenyatta informed the USA that they should stop grooming Mboya- a member after all of a minority tribe. Certainly the Americans were unable to prevent Mboya's murder [88]. Apart from the important field of Labour Relations, the CIA does not appear to have been very influential in Kenya. Ambassador Attwood reports that: "our weekly CIA summary- naturally stamped 'secret'- seldom contained anything we hadn't already seen in The New York Times Sunday news digest" [89]. Attwood makes a particular point that his CIA COS was very much part of his "country team" and not acting like a rouge elephant. It is evident that both men played an important role in keeping Kenya loyal to the USA.

Kenya also remained remarkably loyal to Israel, even though formal diplomatic ties were broken in November 1973. El Al still stops in Nairobi en route to Johannesburg, Solel Boneh is very active in construction work and Israel maintains contacts with leading politicians and businessmen. The political downfall of the most important of these, Charles Njono- former Attorney General- was a major set back to Israel's hopes for a speedy resumption of full diplomatic ties. As was the opening of a PLO office in Nairobi in November 1983, following Kenya's belated recognition of the PLO. However, it is unlikely that Mossad will be discouraged for long.

South African intelligence agents operate covertly in Kenya. During the Entebbe raid there was a degree of cooperation in the field of aerial recconaisance between BOSS and Israel [90]. They are also active in Zambia, as disclosed during the trial in 1974 of Clive Colby and Henning Buitendag [91].

The CIA have also found Zambia a useful base. They funded the establishment of the Nkumbi International College and specialised in the

---

[87]. Morris G. op cit, p.110.

[88]. Schechter D., Ansara M. & Kolodney D. (1979) 'The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer ', Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa, Ray et al (eds), Lyle Stuart, Secaucus, New Jersey , pp.59.

[89]. Attwood W. (1967) The Reds and the Blacks: a Personal Adventure, Harper and Row, New York, p.302.

[90]. Deacon R. (pseudonym) (1977) The Israeli Secret Service, Hamish Hamilton, London, p.283.

[91]. Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75 (1975) p.B330.

penetration of labor unions. Academics and embassy staff acted as conduits for US intelligence to anti-Frelimo groups set up by the Rhodesian and South African governments [92]. In 1982, the US diplomat, Lundahl was declared persona non grata, and the Political First Secretary, John Finney, expelled, as a result of evidence gathered at the trial of a Zambian , Webster Kayi Lumbwe. The CIA had recruited Zambians to examine the possibilty of alternative leadership should South African commandos succeed in assassinating President Kaunda [93].

Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe occupied a pivotal position in intelligence operations in central Africa. The CIA maintained close cooperation with MI6 and South Africa through the medium of the UKUSA intelligence sharing agreements and through the Rhodesian CIO [94]. From 1964, the CIA financed the training by Rhodesian Light Infantry of mercenaries for the Congo.

After considerable domestic and international pressure, involving the workings of the US company, Union Carbide, and its need for Rhodesian Chromite, the US Consulate in Salisbury was closed in 1969 i.e. 4 years after UDI. There is considerable speculation over the sequence of events; but the most likely appears to be that MI6 tipped off the CIO, that Peter Nicholson, a journalist on The Rhodesian Herald, and Trevor Gallaher, a lawyer and member of the executive of the ruling Rhodesia Front Party, were CIA operatives engaged in covert action [95].

The Rhodesians expelled the two men and the USA closed the Consulate, to the satisfaction of the British Government. After the closure, the USA relied upon mercenaries, both as its main source of intelligence, and as the major means by which it tried to influence events in Rhodesia. In 1980, ZANU estimated that there were at least 14,000 white mercenaries in Africa, 2000 of them being Americans [96].

---

[92]. Molteno R. (1979) 'The CIA and Studies in Guerilla Warfare in Southern Africa', Covert Action Information Bulletin, 4, p.19.

[93]. Africa News, Jul 31 1981.

[94]. Szulc T. (1978) The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years, Viking Press, New York, p.224.

[95]. Bloch and Fitzgerald op cit, p. 184.

[96]. Churchill W. (1980) 'US mercenaries in Africa-the Recruitment Network', Africa Today, 27,2, p.46.

With the independence of Zimbabwe, intelligence activity has certainly not abated. Bishop Muzerowa visited Israel in 1983 and called for diplomatic ties with that country. On his return to Zimbabwe, he was arrested and charged with plotting with both South Africa and Israel for the downfall of Premier Mugabe.

The history of intelligence activities in British Africa shows that the US agencies work on the terms of the British trained (and frequently staffed) services. The CIA have been accused of fomenting military coups in Ghana and Nigeria, but the outcome of these have always been acceptable to Britain. Israel can also claim credit for the success of coups in Sierra Leone and Uganda, but once again with the approval of Britain. It seems as if a tacit agreement was reached that the dominant role in post colonial Africa would be played by the Army; the only arguments centring over the most suitable candidate.

Intelligence Services have played a vital role in changing the face of Africa; rather than contributing to nation building, it is difficult to point to a single instance where the average African has benefitted from their machinations. On the contrary, intelligence activities have often seriously warped development, as politicians have frequently given their prime allegiance to a foreign power, rather than work for the good of the country