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BEYOND DEPENDENCY AND THE WORLD SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVES : THE NON-CAPITALIST PATH FOR AFRICA RE-VISITED.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this brief paper is to discuss the problems of understanding the development of capitalism in Africa through the dependency and the world systems perspectivesand to propose some factors that should inform a non-capitalist path of development for the Continent.

The deepening contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism and their effects on the underdeveloped countries compel a re-examination of the direction of development of and for the African Continent.

The crisis of the capitalist financial institutions; the United States war machine and the attendant budget deficits funded from bank loans; the rising value of the United States dollar pushing up interest rates that increase the debt burden of debtor countries; the increasing economic and politically motivated protectionist policies of the advanced capitalist countries; the declining prices of African commodities, including oil, together with galloping prices of manufactured products; the increasing east-west tensions and the general shift away from multi-lateralism towards regional and bi-lateral co-operation, are only the most visible of the contradictions in the world system today.

On the surface the crisis appears to be caused by global economic factors, but in essence the root cause lies in the increasing fatal contradictions of capitalism, made worse by the United States economic and military adventurism. Although many United States officials do not admit this in public, Geroge Shultz did admit that "United States budget deficit, the strong dollar and the in-flow of capital from the rest of the world" [1] contribute to the current economic recession in the capitalist world.

The recession, though capitalist, has its worst manifestations on the already fragile economies of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Even (organisation of petroleum exporting countries) OPEC economies are not spared. The demand for OPEC oil is now 16 - 17 million barrels per day (mbd)

as opposed to 30 mbd in 1975. Prices of oil equally pumelled from U.S.$34 per barrel (pb) in 1983 to U.S.$28 pb this year and forecasts by oil experts put the demand for oil at 12 mbd by 1990. [2].

Amidst the recession and its impact on fragile economics, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has become the strongest agent of the United States and the capitalist financial institutions. Almost insensitive to varying economic problems of underdeveloped countries, the IMF is squeezing them with monetarist remedies in spite of the crippling effect of the rise in interest rates on loan and interest repayments. Debtor countries are having to cut back public expenditure and are being asked to shelve their industrial output in order to satisfy the IMF, which has now become an unavoidable middle-monster between the creditors and debtors.

In Latin America, for instance, Brazil is being asked by the IMF to "dismantle part of its industrial sector, particularly in the capital goods area, which is considered 'disproportionately large'". [3]

In Africa, Nigeria was refused a promised U.S.$70 million credit for wheat purchases, and an over U.S. $3 billion loan, until it has yielded to the IMF. Consequently, the public sector (and even the private sector) and the Nigerian people are paying for the appeasement of the IMF. Over one million jobs have been lost between 1983 and 1985, with over 200,000 workers in the public sector affected in 1984 alone. Social services are grinding backwards. The health sector, for instance, got only 1.95% of total budget allocation in 1985 as opposed to 6.43% in 1965 and 5% being the minimum allocation recommended by the World Health Organisation. On the other hand, 44% of the same budget will go to service debts, with an expected rise to 55% in 1986 and 60% in 1987. [4]

Inflation, 23.2% in 1983, galloped to 40% in 1984 and was by early 1985 well over 300%. Factories operate at less than 20% capacity, with over one million jobs now lost. The government is, however, further squeezing revenue from the people with 19 state governments competing to generate more

revenue for the Federal Government through 'creative initiatives'. In Ondo State, the government imposed levies on goats, sewing machines, shops, bill-boards, dirty cars, houses without toilets, churches, mosques, burials, merriments, marriages and other activities, until these measures prompted a women's revolt which eventually forced the withdrawal of some of the levies. [5] The Nigerian response to the IMF 'solution' is replicated in varying degrees across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. The IMF and its masters have now found an easy but highly profitable form of business in the under-developed world. Business is now making more money by trading in money than by job-creating investments.

Capitalist institutions are now taking over U.S.$3.5 billion each year from Nigeria as principal and interest repayments without having to worry about economic, bureaucratic and trade union bottlenecks. [6]

The consequence of this kind of enterprise, Andrew Young has pointed out, is that the whole concept of capitalist productivity is under threat. Capitalism is no more operating on the assumed law of 'supply and demand', regulating the 'free market', but on a law of greed and manipulation in a politicised and profitised market. [7]

This is the context in which the direction of the development of countries in Africa has to be re-assessed. The unproductive capitalist experience in Africa is now facing a more serious challenge with capitalism itself withdrawing from productive investments, and the most fundamental question of the day is, how should African countries respond?

THE CAPITALIST ASSESSMENT IN AFRICA

There is a considerable agreement about the effects, and especially the non-effects of the capitalist penetration of Africa, despite its different manifestations. [8] In a very recent lamentation before the World Bank, Claude Ake described the penetration of capitalism in Africa as "singularly unproductive" and complained that the continent endures the "disadvantages

of capitalism without benefitting from its historic role in developing the productive forces". [9] A decade before Ake's complaint, Akeredolu - Ale referred to African capitalists as "drone capitalists ..... not a productive class" [10] and supported Mabogunje in asking, "..... how can they be constrained to produce?" [11] Nnoli lamented their "orientation towards consumption and the distribution of production rather than toward productive investments". [12]

In the same vein Onoge dubbed the African dream to develop capitalism as "bourgeois utopianism" [13] while Onimode contends that the African bourgeoisie has only proved to be "bullwarks of imperialist plunder". [14]

Over two decades ago Frantz Fanon had given the African bourgeoisie a seminal assessment whose continuity is reflected in the few cases cited above. He bears quoting:

> "Neither financiers nor industrial magnates are to be found within the national middle class. The National bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries is not engaged in production, nor invention, nor building, nor labour, it is completely canalised into activities of the intermediary type." [15]

While it can be said that the newly industrialised countries (NIC's) of Asia and Latin America do not exactly fit anymore into Fanon's description, the situation in Africa has witnessed only a few changes. Apart from a few members of the middle class who have used their accumulated wealth to finance single or joint production, building, trade and the like, the majority of the changes have produced only a greater number of rich Africans, but not a rich continent. [16] The continent is still very poor, the poorest in the world, and severely exploited. The United States alone made U.S.$4.8 billion in profits through its transnational corporations between 1978 and 1982, after investing only U.S.$1.8 billion. This shows a 38.9% or three times the rate of profits in the United States of America. [17]

The poverty of the continent is both apparent and real. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa gave six serious problems confronting Africa, in addition to a U.S.$150 billion foreign debt today:

> "Chronic food shortages; pernicious regular droughts; high price of imported fuels; deteriorating foreign trade conditions; rapidly growing foreign debts; and weak, imperfect management of the domestic economy." [18]

The Commission's list seems to have dealt with problems mostly affecting African governments and does not include problems of disease; illiteracy; unemployment; hunger; infantmortality; poor housing and clothing; inadequate infrastructures; inadequate and unhygienic drinking water; exploitation; oppression; and absence of democracy among others, which afflict a greater number of African people. The African predicament has now presented a historic duty to Africanists and African intellectuals and their governments to seek a correct analysis for it in order to be able to effectively overcome it.

THE DEPENDENCY ALIBI

The dependency analysis arose as a direct reaction to the claims of the modernisation school. Consequently, most of its advocates concentrated on refuting the main arguments of modernisation.

Against the modernisation's "trickling down", soother the dependencists argued that what was "trickling down among classes" [19] in the ex-colonies was not development, but underdevelopment. Thus, the birth of the "development of underdevelopment" position in the analysis. [20] Although writers like Shivji, [21] Mamdani, [22] Bangura, [23] Beckman, [24] Tyoden [25] following Wallerstein [26] believe the development of underdevelopment debate to be over with their shared argument that capitalism naturally produces underdevelopment and that the phrase 'development of underdevelopment' is a tautology, such protestations have not sufficiently explained away the

central thrust of the underdevelopment tendency. That central thrust is that the capitalist experience in Africa has not witnessed the development of capitalism in Africa because the productive forces have not been revolutionised along capitalist lines and hence the continent cannot be said to be capitalist.

Issa Shivji however, argues that the assertion that Africa is capitalist is based on the dominance of the capitalist mode of production over other modes [26] while Mamdani concedes that "although the capitalist mode was confined to small pockets within the colonial political economy ..... it was nevertheless the dominant economy" [27] determining the motion of other modes of production and therefore sufficient to characterise the economy as capitalist. Beckman and Tyoden, on the other hand, argue that what the dependenists are complaining about is not the fact of capitalist development, but the "quality" [28] of such development. All are, however, in agreement with Wallerstein that since Africa was integrated into the capitalist world since the 16th century, it is by that fact alone experiencing a capitalist development. Shivji even goes further to make the assertion that the dominance of the capitalist mode of production is reflected by those who hold state power. [29]

There is so much dust raised that one way out would be to find out what exactly is a capitalist mode of production and since all the contending factions do not deny using the concept 'mode of production' in a Marxist sense, it would be useful to go back to Marx for its meaning.

Marx considered as fundamental to a mode of production:-

(i) the extent of the development of material productive forces, including, at least, the means of production-technique, labour power, productivity of labour.

Other characteristics include,

(ii) property relations - ownership of the means of production and labour power,

(iii) control of the actual process of production,

(iv) mode of the appropriation of surplus value (forms of exploitation,

(v) classes and class relations, [30] and

(vi) aim of production.

Although (v) or (iv) are stressed in different contexts, (i) is usually expressed as fundamental. Apart from these characteristics, Marx was categorical that a change in the mode of production requires a revolution in the means of production. [31] It is obvious that these various characteristics have not obtained in Africa in relation to the capitalist mode of production. The confession that capitalism "was confined to small pockets" or is an "enclave economy" [32] and the general admission about the lack of development of productive forces, all indicate the unrootedness of the capitalist mode of production in Africa. Even more shaky is Shivji's assertion that the dominance of the capitalist mode of production is further reflected by the class that holds state power. Suffice it to state that the nature of state power in Africa is one of the most controversial aspects of its development. While some writers somewhat substitute the metropolitan bourgeoisie for the state,[33] others see in it an element of "autonomisation", disposing it to be "independent of the social classes, including the dominant social class". [34] The spate of military coup de tats from left, right and centre, is, at least, one indication of the autonomy of the state from even the more dominant social classes and a further testimony to the fragility of capitalism and the social forces it produces in Africa.

It would appear, therefore, that the claim that Africa is capitalist is based on its linkages with the capitalist world at the level of circulation, but even these linkages are not shown to have produced a corresponding revolution in the means of production of the continent along capitalist lines. Neither Wallerstein nor any of the writers who agree with his analysis produce sufficient evidence to show that Africa's integration into the capitalist world system since the 16th century has led to significant advances in the factors and forces of production.

But Wallerstein, it can be argued, did not have to show such evidence since his task was made simple by reducing the entire world into a kind of capitalist country. By that stroke of simplification sectors of this large country without a significant change in their mode of production acquire their role as victims of capitalism's "pitiless laws". [35] Other than in Wallerstein's sense or when the productive forces do revolutionise, it would not make much meaning to continue the claim of capitalist development in Africa, except, of course, if we use the concept politically to refer to the right of private accumulation and the oppressive and exploitative processes involved in creating the accumulated wealth. The underdevelopment tendency appears justified in insisting that African countries "endure the disadvantages of capitalism without benefitting from its historic role in developing the productive forces". [36]

The other, and perhaps the most conspicuous tendency in the dependency perspective, is the retort to modernisation's claims that underdevelopment in the ex-colonies is caused by internal factors. The retort, which states that the causes of underdevelopment are not internal, but external, and blamed on the western ex-colonial masters, has acquired more political than analytical significance. Part of the political significance is the neglect of the class struggle, of the collusion between the ruling elites of advanced capitalist and ex-colonial countries, and the divorce of underdevelopment from the capitalist process.

Not surprisingly, this has become the most popular and the most enduring tendency among leaders of African and other underdeveloped countries. The philosophy of the now silent New International Economic Order and the institutions it created, was in response to this aspect of the dependency tradition. The leaders of underdeveloped countries are very comfortable with this interpretation of their problems which absolves them of responsibility, placing same on the western countries and consequently minimises the option of the class struggle. Thus dependency, by its error of emphasis, has been expropriated from the anti-imperialists and converted into an alibi for all the ruling class excesses, oppression, irresponsibility and lack of vision in Africa.

THE FATALISM OF THE WORLD SYSTEM'S ANALYSIS.

Like the dependency reaction to modernisation, the world system's analysis seeks to refute the dependency argument that various countries in the world have separate parallel histories. Thus, the claim that:-

> "the modern world comprises a single capitalist economy which has emerged historically since the 16th century and which exists today. It follows from such a premise that national states are not societies that have separate parallel histories, but parts of a whole reflecting the whole ..... to be sure, since different parts of the whole play and have played different roles in the capitalist world economy, they have dramatically different internal socio-economic profiles and hence distinctive politics. But to understand the internal class contradictions and political struggles of a particular state, we must situate it in the world economy". [37]

It does not appear, without further and sufficient justification, that the modern world can be seen as a "single capitalist economy". For in this "modern world" can also be found a group of socialist states whose mode of production is distinct and separate from the capitalist, although historical and trade linkages may exist. Secondly, there are some national states which, though geographically located within the capitalist world economy, operate on economic laws separate from the capitalist.

Thirdly, and as was observed above, there are also national states in which capitalism has not revolutionised the productive forces, and although related to the capitalist world by history, trade and exploitation cannot be properly termed capitalist. They do possess distinctive cultural and economic peculiarities which necessarily and sufficiently separate them from the capitalist world economy. In fact, some of the contacts between these national states and the present capitalist world pre-date the 16th century

and just as it would be absurd to regard those earlier contacts as sufficiently creating a feudal world system, it is equally absurd to regard the contemporary contacts as sufficiently characterising a capitalist world economy. The insufficiency is partly accounted for by the "dramatically different internal socio-economic profiles and hence distinctive politics", [38] among countries of the modern world. The world system's analysis consequently suffers from the fallacy of the reification of exchange relations. Equally untenable is Samir Amin's conception of an international proletariat and an international bourgeoisie [39] which reduces nations to classes and trivialises the possibility of a socialist transformation from a national framework. The main message of the world system's position is fatalistic, promising national revolutions and transformations on a very remote parallel development in the world. The remoteness of such a global transformation becomes clearly visible with the inclusion of the socialist world, on the same basis with the capitalist, on the agenda of the revolution.

The visualisation of such a scenario cannot but resemble a wild dream. It is not difficult to understand why this method of analysis and the conclusions produced have been viewed as characteristically Trotskyite, counter-revolutionary and an attempt to fight "the red flag with a redder flag". [40] Mahmud Tukur describes this approach to capitalism as,

> "a 'critique' of capitalism not as it exists in any definite, given country, but at the "global" level, a level at which it is becoming more and more safe and harmless to "attach" it; but worse, a 'critique' of socialism as actually practised in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries". [41]

It is the view of this paper that the anti-imperialist tendency of dependency and the world system's analysis do not offer concrete and sufficient analysis for understanding, let alone overcoming, the African predicament.

ON THE 'NON-CAPITALIST' PATH

The preceding discussion on the inability of capitalism to replicate its mode of production in Africa implies a few options for the continent. The first could be to examine the "adjustments" necessary for a revolutionary transformation of the productive forces of the continent along capitalist lines. This option, however, has some fundamental problems. Decades of efforts of adjustment by national governments, regional organisations and even the United Nations Organisation and its various agencies, as well as the I.M.F. and similar economic wizards, have only compounded the crisis of accumulation and poverty on the African continent. The evidence of this crisis is the progressive decline in the indices of growth and development used by these organisations and institutions and available in annual records of the World Bank,Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, and other annual accounts of global or regional development.

Another fundamental problem is the changing nature of capitalist penetration, which, as we have observed earlier, is tending away from productive investments towards the money trade. The debt crisis, the strong dollar, price fluctuations, visionless regimes, which all facilitate this trade in money, are on the increase indicating a long and harder road towards a viable solution. Some of the African regimes have mortgaged their economies to capitalist financial institutions for the next fifty years that there is not much left to mortgage in future attempts to "adjust". The I.M.F. and World Bank which are the leading agents of the "adjustment" programme in Africa are not themselves pleased with their achievements.[42]

The second option for Africa could be that of socialist transformation. But this too is unfeasible, given the relative weakness of the forces and agents (developed through the capitalist process) necessary for such a transformation. In essence, the socialist option is also a capitalist option since there cannot be the first without the second.

A third option could be the 'non-capitalist' path by which is meant the avoidance of the capitalist road to development and consequently the improbability of an immediate socialist alternative. While for Marx and Engels the socialist transition was a single bridge towards communism, the 'non-capitalist' path presents a double bridge, first to socialism and later to a communist society whose peculiar features will be discussed later.

The concept 'non-capitalist development' was first used in the documents of the International Communist Movement to designate a course of development for "newly independent areas" where the people are struggling against poverty and a local bourgeoisie which compromises with imperialism.[43] The inspiration for this course of development was Marx's assertion that his analysis of the course of human development did not imply that all nations were inevitably doomed to experience capitalism's "pitiless laws". Marx and Engels had actually hoped that the Russian Commune, given the necessary favourable external environment,could by-pass capitalism,[44] but this never happened.

Nevertheless, Lenin's reaction to the Narodniks who exaggerated Marx expectations out of context, was that the newly created Soviet workers' state was an attempt to achieve the transition to socialism, and "not that the present order is a socialist order.....".[45] But even this "attempt", he insisted, was neither theoretically nor practically conceivable without a dictatorship of the working class. Lenin, therefore, as against the Narodniks, saw the primacy of the working class in achieving a non-capitalist transition in the relatively advanced capitalist formation in the Soviet Union. In the more backward colonial world, however, this was not seen as a viable option even if the external situation was to be favourable. The complexity of the colonial world bogged down the 1920 comintern, and could not be sufficiently resolved, in spite of the great concern for a guiding principle. The main problems, Slovo points out, had to do with the fact that:-

(1) The material conditions for socialist transformation and development are created under capitalism which do not have the material base in the colonies.

(2) In the absence of such a material base, special internal and external factors will be required. These factors, however, were only theoretically expected in circumstances where;

a) in a country without a capitalist industrial base but with communal forms of production, a revolutionary upsurge could transform such communalism to socialist collectivisation. But this depended upon successful proletarian revolutions in the advance capitalist countries to create the necessary political motivations and pre-conditions for success,

b) as in the early twenties, the collapse of capitalism in most of the advanced countries was imminent. In such an event there would be little or no resistance to the colonial countries orientation towards socialism,

c) within a single state ruled by the working class, backward feudal or semi-feudal elements can be steered into a socialist economy as happened in Mongolia and Uzbekistan. But these two examples greatly benefitted from their geographical contiguity to Russia. [46]

Lenin had an additional concern. It was whether, in a pre-capitalist country, organs of power will be created with the determination to build socialism, even with the necessary external support. Lenin believed that the problem was very complex and suggested a closer study by future cominterns, thus;

"The Communist International should advance the proposition, with appropriate theoretical grounding, that with the aid of the proletariat of advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage." [47]

Unfortunately, we have not yet had the proposition, "with adequate theoretical grounding" on the issue of colonial and ex-colonial countries by passing capitalism to communism, and we may never have if the concept of communism remains at the end of the linear conception of European history given by Marx. In their concentrated study of capitalist Europe, Marx and Engels were so convinced about the imminence of revolution in those materially advanced capitalist countries, that their concept of the Communist Society carried abundence as a pre-condition. As Armah points out:-

> "The precise location of the mistake is in the assumption that human beings are capable of sharing the fruits of abundance, but incapable of sharing the sacrifices made necessary by scarcity." [48]

Indeed, the pre-condition of "abundance" for the Communist Society was based on the capitalist individualistic ethic inherent in capitalism. It is an ethic that can only be made redundant if there was abundance of essentials. Without capitalist individualism, the pre-condition of abundance would not be necessary and consequently the examination of pre-capitalist societies in which individualism is unimportant need not require abundance as a pre-condition for communist society. For there is really no reason why abundance should make sharing any easier than scarcity does in such societies.

In African culture the individual ethic is not prevalent. A more prevalent conception of human psychology is that the individual may be basic in the restricted biological sense, but at the human plane the basic unit is fundamentally social, and by extension the more human a society aims to be, the more socialist it has to plan to become. [49] In fact, outside western capitalist influences, the rise of the individualist perspective in human affairs in Africa is regarded as a symptom of dehumanization and not a virtue. The greatest dilemma of the African western elite is the isolation it suffers when it asserts its individualism. It is therefore suggested that the concept of communist Africa should be re-defined or understood to include the sharing of abundance or scarcity as a principle of the ultimate organisation of society. If this is achieved, the non-capitalist path for Africa will be less hazy.

However, the examination of the non-capitalist path for Africa might also take into account the discussions of the 1960 World Conference and the general line of the International Communist Movement. Of particular importance is the scientific contribution of the central committee of the Communist Party of China in its letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in which the fundamental contradictions in the contemporary world were identified as;

> " ..... the contradiction between the socialist and the imperial camp; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries; the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism; the contradictions among imperialist countries and among monopoly capitalist groups". [50]

The Chinese document further stated that these contradictions and the struggles to which they give rise, are inter-related and influence each other and warned that "nobody can obliterate any of these fundamental contradictions or subjectively substitute one for all the rest". [51]

THE SPECIFICITY OF THE NON-CAPITALIST PATH FOR AFRICA.

It is not an easy task attempting to suggest specifics for the non-capitalist path of development for Africa. The task is made difficult by the various internal and external peculiarities affecting the continent. This exercise is undertaken as a basis for further discussion towards the formulation of a more coherent method for understanding and changing Africa. It is a result of a rejection of the claims and analysis of modernisation, the anti-imperialist tendency of dependency, and the World System's analysis as being incapable of sufficiently accounting for and overcoming the various contradictions adversely affecting African development . The modernisation and the dependency tendency are analytically inadequate since they only deal with the contradictions between imperialism and the oppressed nations. The world systems analysis is also narrow, being only concerned with the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of the capitalist countries.

It is therefore proposed that any analysis of the African situation should take into account the following general characteristics of the countries of Africa:-

(1) The different degrees and extents of their penetration and exploitation by capitalism.

(2) The inability of capitalism to revolutionise their productive forces along capitalist lines and the attendant problems of the worker-peasant alliance as the agent of the non-capitalist transformation.

(3) The struggles of the workers, peasants and their allies against various forms of feudal, capitalist and local oppression and exploitation in most of the countries.

(4) The existence and heightening of the cold war and the potential of its positive role for both the class and anti-imperialist struggles.

(5) The potential role of the positive aspects of culture in generating the inspiration necessary for a non-capitalist path of development.

(6) The all pervasive African cultural disdain for individualism and private property.

(7) The history of the struggles of African people and the appropriate lessons to be learned from them.

The creation of various political and economic frameworks for the countries in Africa should aim at the following broad objectives:-

(1) The organisation of a worker-peasant alliance led by a "re-Africanised" [51] vanguard party.

(2) The rejection of the linear conception of history by which African countries are mostly at the bottom and without separate and distinct identity.

(3) The rejection of economic determinism as inappropriate lessons from Marxism and insufficient in understanding the processes and forces that shape African history and development.

(4) The re-consideration of the concept of communism such that it is divested of the pre-condition of abundance which makes it possible only after the material prosperity of the capitalist stage of development.

(5) The development of a popular culture and of all positive indigenous cultural values.

(6) The development of a national culture based upon the history and achievements of the African struggles.

(7) Constant promotion of the political and moral awareness of the people, (of all social groups), as well as patriotism, of the spirit of sacrifice and devotion to the cause of independence,of justice, and of progress.

(8) The development of technical, technological and scientific culture, compatible with the requirements of progress.

(9) Development, on the basis of a critical assimilation of man's achievements in the domains of science, art, literature etc.

(10) Constant and generalised promotion of feelings of humanism, of solidarity, of respect and disinterested devotion to human beings. [52]

The efforts to achieve this model of a policy, whatever be the name each country chooses to call it, would represent concrete attempts to account for and overcome the malaise of development in Africa. They will also point to certain realities that are not accounted for by existing perspectives on African development.

Whether certain leaderships choose to betray these ideals or not, the ensuing struggles to sustain and develop them will leave Africa the better, in the end.

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38. Ibid.

39. See Katana, E., On Samin Amin in Studies of Developing Countries No. 101. (Budapest: Institute for World Economy, 1979).

40. Tukur, M., Letter to a Colleague, (criticism of a reading list at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria), p.30.

41. Ibid.

42. See, for instance, a World Bank President's remark that " ..... projections by the World Bank's researchers (on sub-Saharan Africa) point to scant growth in per capita income in the majority of the countries of this area in the 1980's. This implies an absolute worsening of circumstances for millions of Africans in the years ahead" in Clausen, A.W., The Challenge of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Public Lecture. (Lagos. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1982).

43. Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties, December, 1980. Published in The African Communist, No. 4, 1961, p.4.

44. See Marx-Engels Selected Works, Vol. 2, p.401.

45. Lenin, quoted in Slovo, J., "A Critical Appraisal of the Non-Capitalist Path and the National Democratic State in Africa" in Utafiti : Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Science, University of Dar es Salaam. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1978, p.249.

46. Slovo, op. cit. p.254.

47. Ibid.

48. Armah, A.K., "Masks and Marx : The Marxist Ethos vis-ā-vis African Revolutionary Theory and Praxis" in Presence Africaine : New bilingual series, No. 131, 3rd Quarterly, 1984, p.46.

49. See Cabral, A., Return to the Source (New York Monthly Review, 1973), p.65.

50. Quoted in Mamdani, M. and Bhagat, H., "Comments on the Political Economy of Imperialism" in Tandon, Y. (ed.), University of Dar es Salaam, Debate on Class, State and Imperialism. (Dar es Salaam. Tanzanian Publishing House, 1982), p.44-45.

51. Ibid.

52. Objectives 5-10 are adopted from Cabral, A., op. cit. p.55.