CONFERECE PROCEEDINGS

Africa: Moving the Boundaries

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Africa: Moving the Boundaries

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Introduction

To you who live in these extraordinary conflictual times, what language have you created to match its demands? What does “boundary” actually mean for a time such as this?

– Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor

The 2016 conference theme, “Africa: Moving the Boundaries”, was designed to inspire participants to explore how physical, social, creative and conceptual boundaries are being stretched, transcended, re-constructed, re-defined and challenged by a range of historical and contemporary dynamics, forces, and ideas of relevance to Africa. The articles in this volume highlight conference participants’ cognisance of and contribution to these processes. They critically engage issues of migration and the evolution of transnational communities; theories, representations and narratives of African agency; grand projects of regional integration; evolving forms of social and political activism; and responses to critical development and environmental challenges. More importantly, they are a genuine attempt to answer the questions posed by Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor above and in the opening contribution to this volume. Kenny and Griffiths offer responses in their explorations and journey into a post-independence Africa narrated by Owuor in her novel, Dust.

Bondarenko subsequently explores the fractures and tensions within Africa’s sixth region – the African Diaspora. He highlights how differences in the perception, understanding, and significance attached to the Transatlantic Slave Trade by African Americans and African immigrants have resulted in a strained relationship between the two groups. He argues that differences in historic memory play a significant role in determining the nature of inter-group relationships. Shared skin colour is insufficient for the existence of brotherly and sisterly relations. Moreover, it underlies foreign-born blacks’ experiences of racial discrimination in America, contributing to a shared experience of marginalisation with African Americans, as Usacheva highlights. She reveals the tensions in being both an insider and outsider through an investigation of ‘the complexity and ambiguity of the relations between old African-American communities and emerging African communities.’

Echoing Usacheva and Bondarenko’s emphasis on historic memory, Robinson outlines ‘a Gramscian-Marxist framework for the analysis of modern African history.’ He explores how power relations between core and peripheral states have shifted over time. In The ANC and Capital: Aspirations to Hegemony, Hale expands on Robinson’s
background paper, arguing that the African National Congress ‘is operating an unstable hegemonic project through the vehicle of the South African state.’ Promises of post-independence black empowerment are revealed to have faltered as South Africa embraced a Western neoliberal developmental model.

Jakwa subsequently calls for the reconceptualisation of predominant understandings of state instability. She argues for the inherent instability of the nation-state and international system, emphasising the destabilising impact of global processes of policy transfer, diffusion and convergence. For Jakwa, the jurisdictional competition characterising the contemporary rescaling of governance, the colonial legacy of hybrid political regimes, and African leaders’ failure to disavow state sovereignty, are the principal causes of African state instability. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, she further argues that the world is yet to witness a “weak” state and calls for the reconceptualisation of democratisation in Africa.

In *Nuba Mountains: Current Conflict and Implications*, Deldoum provides an assessment of the conflict facing the people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur, in the Sudan. He reveals a Sudan that has been at war with itself for 60 years since achieving independence in 1956. Deldoum argues for the need to move beyond an exclusionary ethno-racialist conception of nationhood and to implement a peace agreement that addresses people’s genuine socio-economic and political grievances. In the short-term, he recommends that regional organisations such as the African Union exert greater pressure on the Khartoum Government to allow the provision of humanitarian aid to people in the aforementioned areas.

Woods subsequently examines and critically engages protracted refugee situations (PRS), with a focus on Somali refugees in Kenya. She argues that PRS present both humanitarian concerns and security challenges for the host state and its immediate region. Host states’ securitisation of refugee issues is argued to lead to and interact with other contextual factors, ‘to propel individuals on the pathway to (non)violent radicalisation’. In the final analysis, Woods argues that, ‘the liminal state in a refugee camp context is the overarching sub-structure that hosts and incubates other contextual conditions that interact in a complex web of sub-systems to precipitate radicalisation.’

Mensah subsequently highlights the importance of effective border management strategies to prevent terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from crossing African borders with ease. He identifies several factors contributing to border porosity in West Africa including lack of clear sub-regional and national border policies, and lack of cooperation and coordination between states and other stakeholders. Mensah offers recommendations for improved border management.

McDougall then draws our attention to the politicisation of seemingly childish, mundane and banal objects like teddy bears. He explores the political origins of the teddy bear and the arrest of an English primary school teacher in Khartoum, Sudan, after allowing her students to name a teddy bear “Muhammad”. McDougall explores the political ramifications of such an act in a post-9/11 world.

Li subsequently explores the role of ethnic favouritism in primary education and overall educational attainment. She reveals that in Kenya, differences ‘in the socio-economic achievements across diverse ethnic groups’ have persisted. Li finds that these disparities ‘are largely due to early exposure to education during the colonial era’. Co-ethnic favouritism is found to principally operate at the district level. Broadly, Li warns against overestimating the role of ethnic favouritism on educational attainment.

Israel then focuses our attention on the impact of global capital on research ethics
governance in South Africa. He argues that the search for new pharmaceutical markets has led companies to look to developing countries. The latter’s ‘lower risks of litigation, low labour costs, pharmacologically naïve participants, weak ethics review and the absence of other regulatory processes’, is attractive. Consequently, he argues, researchers in developing countries are encouraged to implement external regulatory measures. Israel emphasises the need to pursue and implement locally-informed approaches to ethical research.

With this in mind, Higgins immerses us ‘in the stories, experiences and perspectives of African families from refugee backgrounds’ residing in Australia. She challenges universalist conceptions of human rights by prioritising the voices of African families. Broadly, she explores ‘key methodological elements that impact engagement, cultural safety and power in research’.

Lyons’ Reflections on the Dilemmas of Feminist Fieldwork in Africa subsequently reflects on the author’s experiences of ‘conducting research in Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s’. Her research concerned ‘the role of women in Zimbabwe’s anti-colonial liberation struggle.’ As such, Lyons interrogates the question of ‘who can speak for whom?’

Building on these interrogations of the locus of enunciation, and focusing on the experiences of African immigrants living in Queensland, Australia, Udah explores and discusses the impact of the representation of Africans in Australia on settlement outcomes. He argues for a ‘postcolonial outlook that challenges racist assumptions and constructions of Africans.’ Deng then ‘explores the impact of South Sudanese youth experiences of the settlement challenges resulting from acculturation and intergenerational conflicts.’ Jagtenberg follows with an exploration of Afrikaner immigrants’ motivations for emigrating from South Africa to Australia. Despite the continuation of white privilege in post-apartheid South Africa, Jagtenberg highlights that ‘fear of the threat that affirmative action poses to their children’s future’ and ‘reverse discrimination’, informed Afrikaner emigration.

Lucas et al subsequently traces Europeans’ migratory patterns from Zimbabwe. They are interested in understanding both the movements and motivations behind migration as well as the possibility for returning to Zimbabwe in the post-independence period. In contrast to Lucas, Molefe critically engages cultural heritage management practices in post-independence Botswana. She highlights issues and opportunities for heritage management in that country. Ongalo et al then reveal the varied meanings of the word “home”. They highlight the lack of a universal understanding of home through a discussion of Marjorie Oludhe MacGoye’s identity as a British-born Kenyan and Luo wife. Their critical engagement with her novel, Chira, and ‘her engagement with the different appropriations of the Luo dala [home]’, leave us with an appreciation of home’s multi-layered nature.

Access to opportunities often shapes one’s sense of belonging; thus, Adusei-Asante & Awidi explore the educational experiences of African high school students in Perth, Western Australia. They highlight that although there exist ‘a broad range of equity programs and strategies’ targeting students from low socio-economic backgrounds, the number of students from Sub-Saharan Africa undertaking higher education remains low.

The volume closes with four articles engaging health in Africa. Holmes discusses the significance of ‘African indigenous herbal medicine for treatment of “new” diseases, including HIV/AIDS’. She discusses the implications of this for HIV/AIDS treatment. Doh and Adusei-Asante examine ‘the contextual meaning of active ageing based on the
lived experiences of older African people.’ They argue for the need to ‘optimise social interaction by strengthening family systems’. In old age, active, happy and fulfilling lives can only be realised where there exists strong ‘community structures’. Adusei-Asante also explores the continuing popularity of faith healing in Ghana. The practice, he argues, exists alongside Ghana’s National Health and Insurance Scheme. Adusei-Asante recommends ‘public education and a national regulatory framework for controlling dangerous forms of the practice.’ Finally, Adusei-Asante, Doh & Klutsey discuss Ghana’s experience with National Health Insurance, revealing that ‘implementation of universal health coverage is challenging, but possible, if associated blind spots are managed’.

The articles featured in this volume of conference proceedings demonstrate the richness of African Studies in Australasia and the Pacific. Each article has significant policy implications for both Africa and Australia and is an important contribution to increasing dialogue between the two continents in all areas of development and human security.

We thank all those who attended and participated in the 39th annual AFSAAP conference, “Africa: Moving the Boundaries”, for making this volume possible and contributing to the growth of African Studies in our region. We thank our keynote speakers, Wafula Okumu and Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor for challenging us to create an African lexicon for the difficult times we find ourselves in.
AFSAAP 2016
KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Re-imagining a Lexicon for Bridge-makers in a Kardashian World?

Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor

I ask your permission to confine my remarks to generalities on the theme, *Africa: Moving the Boundaries*, while touching on a few questions that also inform my literary quests. To begin, I acknowledge, in the same way you acknowledge the ancestors of this place, that there are infinite ways, experiences and frontiers of Africa and being African, and how essential it is to defang the “one Africa” notion with its boring single note. I state upfront that I do not know Africa. I, however, do have an experience of a few of the facets of this immense geographical space (and idea). It is these that inform this presentation.

This reflection is in three parts: (1) an overview of a world into which African metaphorical boundaries propose to move; (2) a painting in/of a world context of which Africa is a part; (3) an offering of the ghastly Kardashians to provide a sound going; and (4) a brief commentary on some literary impulses that drive my quest and connect with the theme.

The human body and person has been and is the locus of my artistic quest. It is around this that the address is structured as I explore, with you, this imagination of mobile and wandering African boundaries in a world that is suddenly crying out for larger walls and fences: Mexico, USA, Hungary, Israel, the UK, Kenya, visions of new ways of fortressing an already fragmented world with the aim of keeping humans out.

Although the paper’s title refers to the symbolic Kardashians, I put it together before The Donald won the presidency of the US. He would have been the masthead. Allow me to be one of the first to welcome you to our freshly hued orange world— it is the miasma of the era of Trump engulfing us. Mr. Trump, though, also serves as our figurative canary in the mine shaft of history. Interesting days ahead, I promise you. The frontier lines of all things are blurring. President elect Trump is just one element in an awfully seething world for which there are no adequate responses.

Welcome, friends, to a world that has now included “Post-truth” as a word in the Oxford dictionary— *Post-truth*—what does that even mean? Or perhaps that is its point, its meaninglessness. And it is in this post-truthiness that our boundary beacons and markers are embedded, it is this world that I roam with you a little. This is a world where our certainties, including lines in the sand, the imagination of our boundaries, are crumbling. What remains? We are in a season of the world where one of the most significant struggles is that of giving a name to the realities of our now. You know the landscape through which your metaphorical boundaries intend to creep: the rise and re-entrenchment of global tribalism—euphemised as alt-right…isn’t that the new non-word being bandied about…. nationalism, Brexit, regionalism, partisanship, supremacy, whatever--tribalism, and its evil sister, the extensive, thorough, strategic demonisation of “the other”. Naturally, history repeatedly tells us how this will end. A human frenzy that
accelerates into an unstoppable, diabolic rage that will result in some horrendous mass blood-letting which will lead survivors to another round of shame, guilt, regret, outrage and the promise (again) of ‘oh no, never again’.

Here is a world where an unrepentant sound-bitey demagogue is to take the seat of authority in the United States, his pointing finger just a breath away from an Armageddon nuclear holocaust button. He got there through a democratic process, a free and fair election fairy tale. Well, in this we can read how the boundaries of “civilisational” paradigms now reveal themselves. This, friends, is supposed to be the apex of democracy, the great adventure our nations are walking towards. Incidentally, watching that man gloat and heckle his way across the United States to the roaring approval of enraptured masses beggars one’s previous notions about America. The more things change, the more they are the same. Adolf Hitler would have been impressed. For an African person of Africa, the scene unfolding is uncomfortably familiar. As much as I admit to enjoying –yes, it is petty – the current discomfort of a few American acquaintances struggling to embrace the consequences of their choices—that orange hued leader of their free world—the world will still have to contend with a Trumpian-led earth, at least for next four years. Look, it may all prove wonderful anyway. There is also Teresa May and Marie le Pen on the side-lines, mind you.

What the American election process gestures to is the reality of our limits. It indicates how dogmatic insincerity couched under political correctness and glossy branding will still collapse under the pressure of the actual choices of the human heart. The fact that a tribal supremacist wins precisely because he is a tribal supremacist implies that there are far more hidden worlds within the imagined, idealised America, and indeed our world, and indeed the African continent. The questions that traverse the heart find answer one way or another, whether we want to hear the truth or not, even if, in the USA’s case, the truthful answer is Mr. Donald Trump. Let us gesture to some of the questions that may be lurking within these present boundaries of the human heart, given the theme of the conference. None of these questions is ever likely to be answered because to do so would demand that the myths and brands by which we insist on defining our worlds would have to be dismantled. Few are ready to do this. Here are some of those questions:

Would there have been an immigration surge and an ISIS if the USA had not moved boundaries, defied international protocol, manufactured lies to invade and destroy Iraq and Afghanistan and then continued blithely with the annihilation of Libya? Today, why is there such a massive building up of war tools right now in so many corners of the world including the Caucasus and Eastern Europe? Is the world preparing for a gigantic scale war? Why is Russia being turned into a global pariah using the same format that was created to justify war in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (which failed)? To what purpose? Who benefits the most from the wars in the world? Since all weapons carry serial numbers if the United Nations is truly desirous of ending wars why are they not able to sanction the sources of these boundary-less weapons which are also the countries that are its main funders?

What we prefer to do instead as a human race is to bury those questions with our hysterical laughter at the antics of the gruesome Kardashians, who have been turned into a signal icon for human regeneration, aspiration and forgetfulness. We prefer Pollyanna-
ish and Orwellian newspeak, with tinker-bell descriptions, “collateral damage” to
disguise and deny the reality of our fears, discontent, terror and confusion. Meanwhile,
the earth is reeling. If it is not from angry persons plotting doomsday scenarios, then it is
a climate wounded-ness that sees a never-before-experienced scenario of the melting of
the north and south poles. The seas are rising. I understand that here, your particular
thing is to loudly deny the disorder. Fortunately for the rest of us, you are also probably
going to be the first people to be able to announce the fate of our planet in bubbles from
within the depths of the deluge.

As a response to existential global uncertainty, the UN, in its wisdom, a few months ago,
in October, appointed Wonder Woman, this pneumatic-bosomed illusory white female
caricature with a wasp’s waist, who wears the American flag as underwear, as the
Honorary Goodwill Ambassador for something called the Empowerment of Women and
Girls. It was a solemn ceremony. When this happened the world should have realised
that, to extend use of one of the most satisfyingly descriptive Anglo-Saxon expression,
our world was truly and royally …buggered.

We are living in the eye of the storm of that popularised curse/blessing wrongly
attributed to China: May you live in interesting times. The closest Cantonese expression
refers to a clown in and of current time. Clowns. Rather apt. Still, the forces of nature,
space, time and whatever else seem to have unleashed a whirlwind that is driving the
world as flotsam and jetsam. We feel it, we see it, we read the signs, but do not dare
construct a lexicon for this, do we? And with all this, here you are, proposing to move
evolution and theology suggest adversity is good for the human soul. If that is the case,
when whatever this is is done with the planet, its survivors shall be supermen and
superwomen. In a season of such terrifying flux, borders are a moot point. Frontiers will
have to be re-imagined and probably called something else. The human person will also
have to reconsider who or what it is. Pope Francis has dared to call this time as that of a
piecemeal World War III. We freak out. Yet the possibility that an apocalypse has erupted
beneath our living room couches while we keep up with the Kardashians is real.

Boundaries are already in movement; the future is in a state of uncertainty. You have
already witnessed (the edited versions) of millions of humans escaping historical homes
out of existential distress; they walk deserts, they cross boundaries, crash through
frontiers, tear down electric wire fences and sail across wild seas in rubber dinghies
seeking safety, hope and a home. The last mobilisation of this kind was in the period of
World War II. These humans journey into harbours that are throwing up gates against
them. But they keep moving. To what? Where? Transcending boundaries? You have seen
the pictures of some of our Africans who have sought to leave for the imagined nirvana
of elsewhere now turn the Mediterranean Sea into a cemetery. Meanwhile the African
Union, among other African institutions, sustain their impeccable record for profound
silences about matters that truly matter to their citizens.

There are other boundary movements that slip off the radar. I am not sure why this is the
case considering that these are bigger than any other migration taking place in the world
right now. I refer to the massive Chinese influx into Africa—official figures are one
million, unofficial figures double that, persons now spread throughout the African.
Continent. Mandarin is now a factor of African social and linguistic realities. The blend of cultures and the fruits of such union through Sino-African children is more apparent now. I ask you then, is the next African decade a Chinese one? Anyway, if anyone wants to explore African boundaries, look to China. (I am being facetious). Great resource finds on our continent coupled with an awareness of lack in other parts of the world have increased the populations of persons of Caucasian descent, the numbers are always disputed and minimised (the IOM have no figures for current European migration into Africa) because this sort of human movement does not subscribe to a favoured mythology. The figures for these are also in excess of a million, with Angola and Mozambique, in the time of the European economic crisis receiving together over 700,000 young European economic migrants who settled there to start new lives. Refugee crisis anyone?

Back to the context of this season of the world and its wordlessness.

We feel, see, and hide from what we are most uneasy about. We prefer to draw a line across what does not conform to our delusion or brand of the world. We are silent before the unceasing bloodletting. We skip past the news of the slaughters in Uganda, Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, entire communities living within the Amazon: the water wars in the US, the soul-destruction in detention camps worldwide, including that generated by Australia’s own Faustian pact with Nauru, and more significantly the Auschwitz-like American concentration camp in Guantanamo bay, that grotesque giant stain on human conscience that good men and women, including many of us here who proclaim, study and articulate human rights, still ignore.

How is this even possible?

What is the reality of lines drawn out in a world where the best resources available are dedicated to renewing, reinventing and valorising tools of human violence and destruction to which we have acceded power, and now, with reference to drone warfare, handed over a moral impetus to? A boundary-less machine can be directed to choose whether a human being anywhere in the world lives or dies. Is this the pinnacle of civilisation? For a long time, the greatest threat to civilisation was imagined as an invasion from a powerful galactic force, aliens. Yet all this time the alien was us; a strange race that has devolved to both cannibalise and worship itself. The only ones capable of and willing to and particularly invested in destroying the earth in a cataclysm is us.... And we are willing to do so for the most spurious of reasons: to prove the primacy of our pitiful ideologies so that we can be emperors of a swamp. Exceptional? Ha!

The world’s latest atavistic impulse is one that is imbued by a virulent Islamophobia. It is unbelievable and unconscionable that the same world that not too long ago experienced that abhorrent depiction and dehumanisation of a peoples could lead to the slaughter of the human soul, the bestial behaviour of human beings and the destruction of the core of human decency can now regurgitate that evil to visit it anew upon others. Friends, if 45% of our African population is linked to Islamic mores, how can even you allow this repugnant paradigm to take root unquestioned by our individual and collective sensibilities? To you, the Africans here, with your endless silences—as still as yoghurt –
do you even comprehend what this means for your cultures and identities? What happens to being and belonging when by virtue of your facing Mecca in prayer you become defined as a “terrorist-in-waiting” by a culture and paradigm that prefers and perpetuates a most idiotic and ignorant lens to explain away actual human and existential crisis? The primary purpose of which, as you and I well know, is the sustenance of a lucrative war and suffering ecosystem. You and I have experienced the progressive and strategic framing of this horrible lie until it has acquired the semblance of truth—a post-truth that becomes a post-reality reality. And in this matter, not once have I heard an African reframing, an African reactiveness. Not once. Africans, your boundaries of existence are receding and you are blind, deaf, dumb and stupid to it. Your governments have even designated your own soldiers to blow up a portion of your own population, to hold them in suspicion only because 45% of them proclaim “Allahu Akbar”.

The consequences of such extremes of human foolishness manifest in weird new cultural practices: allow me to be regale you with the tale of a rather senior World Bank official who last year, arriving in Johannesburg, her first visit to Africa, showed up surrounded by six, giant, heavily armed, helmeted like pumped up black beetles on steroids, security contractors hired to protect her from the violence of her vivid imagination. I would have done anything to enter into her senses as her plane door opened to a view of the African city. She proceeded to painstakingly sustain her delusions even as she trip-tropped, trip-tropped all over Sandton Mall like billy goat gruff, needing to justify the expenses of a psychosis created by a cultural commitment to wallow in profound benightedness. What is the language for these new modes of human strangeness?

This, our amputation from both reality and humanity are the consequences of an investment in an unsustainable idea of the world and its humanity, this gross alienation from what should bond, bind and build. You speak of boundaries and bridges, tell me, what types of structures have you called forth to overcome a refusal to experience even in difference, the humanity of another? What kind of boundaries are you proposing to transcend, the now embedded human fear of other humans? We are pleased to invest in propaganda infrastructure to peddle dis-information. We define phrases like “collateral damage” to sanitise and conceal the reality of millions of wilful, innocent murders and destruction of hospitals and homes for which there are no Nuremberg trials.

Listen, Donald Trump is appointing as Pentagon head, a man, who if the principles of Nuremberg were to be applied, should be hanging at the end of noose, until dead. But he is about to oversee the largest war arsenal in the history of humanity under the leadership of an erratic being. Behold, your world. With this in mind, what does it mean for you and me to be a human being now? Even in front of the awareness of enhanced consciousness of the cosmos and the universe, why are some more still more human than others? Nothing speaks so much of this than the visa application process to which most Africans are subjected. Name of grandmother? Bank account details? Are these people insane?

Even with new revelations shared with us by those seekers, in say, the world of quantum physics or cosmology, why is the prevalent operating mythology still epitomised by the vacuous Kardashians? Why do we prefer that? Even with what we have heard about the awesome wonders of human possibility, why is the inclination that of a willingness to be hypnotised into forgetting reality, to persist in the visiting of such gross wounds on an
already suffering world today? It is no secret that “human rights” is enforced by one set of people, and directed at select others. Its interpretations vary, of course. It does not stand a chance when confronted by the phrase “extraordinary renditions”. In October, woman-crushing, human beheading, Yemen invading Saudi Arabia was voted into the human rights committee to replace newly designated pariah of the Occident, Russia. All I will say about that is that it is only a matter of time before the collective human soul gets weary of its own hypocrisy and calls a time out. Wither your boundaries now?

To you who live in these extraordinarily conflictual times, what language have you created to match its demands? What does “boundary” actually mean for a time such as this?

Language is a road map and a blue-print, a provider of impetus, a prophetic vessel. Yet we seem to either be too paralysed or far too implicated to try to generate an intimately truthful lexicon that might transfigure this present, or at least allow us all to cross out of our present limits. Without language, how do we intend to enter the depths of our present reality in order to even understand it? The Kardashians are a colourful and hypnotic screen that shield us from reality, no? They are not alone. The latest poster child for our condition is poor Boris Johnson—I hear he went to school and studied – British Foreign Secretary. In October 2016, he declared, ‘that Africa (the country) could do with some British values’, so that the country Africa might join the league of humanity as structured by the vacuum of his imagination. I emphasise this, for in the delusional man’s version of the story of English incursions into other lives and cultures, there are no shadows, no demons, no hollows, no genocides, really no messy bits. His eternal soundtrack is Elgar’s Pomp and Circumstances No 1 in D minor.

He no doubt keeps up with the Kardashians.

Against this backdrop, now let me touch on aspects of my literary life, focusing on the parts that connect with your theme.

I am a citizen of an imagined space called “Kenya”, whose frontiers were created by an English cartographer when Kenya, the colony, was a British project. What changed in 1963, on the day those who became “Kenyans” call Independence Day? I stated in a different forum how my experiences of the nation only assert to me that the infrastructure and edifices of the colonial state established after the genocidal invasion designed in 1884-5 in Berlin (purists get irritated when I persist in referring to this as the first world war), are still intact. The colour of the skins of taskmasters may have changed, but everything else progresses as it has for over a hundred and fifty years. For example, there is no day that trains taking Congo’s mineral resources towards the sea to the waiting ships of many foreign nations, not once even in the throes of serious bloodletting have those trains stopped moving. Remarkable, isn’t it?

The people who receive the money are in former colonial capitals, while we waste time and energy asserting… what? Independence? From what?

I live in an Africa experiencing a second wave invasion in a massive resource grab enabled by our many amoral leaders who are mortgaging bounteous landscapes, and
signing up to massive unpayable loans with strangers. It is likely that within fifty years the great underclass on the continent will be, again, Africans themselves, newly bankrupted vassals of a new set of foreign overmasters deliberately invited in under our bemused gaze. It is said that history repeats itself especially when lessons first offered remain unacknowledged, unlearned and unresolved. The problem is not with the stranger. It is with us.

Anyway, given these, what moves storytellers of Africa? I don’t know about the others, but I shall tell you something of my own compulsion to search dim lit places of the world and my continent; to live and then walk through the valleys of peoples’ shadows in order to try to make sense of the time in which I find myself; our framing, our place, our future in the face of so much. I love the gift of being human and sharing life. I love humanity. I love ideas that challenge, invite, inspire and grow life. I also wonder about, worry and want to fix life’s fragile and broken places, because something of this time inhabits me and sheds pieces of its ghosts upon my own story. I have a very Catholic urge to name demons, and stare at faces of the enemies without and within before seeking, as part of a collective, to exorcise these. I love the earth. it is a privilege to live here. I love the continent of my heritage. I love my country. The bigger arc of my literary life is a love story that craves a “happily ever after”. So I roam the disciplines, a bit like a pickpocket. I eavesdrop into the thinking from everywhere; silos bore me. I work with words as a mechanic tinkering with leaky places in a marvellous machine. I am a bit of a pathologist, diagnosing a corpse for its cause of death imagining I might prevent a similar fate for myself and what I love. I have wondered why post-colonial Africa became stunned and inarticulate about its world and stopped writing itself into the world with pens of fire. I try to witness to those silences—a place filler—I want the silences to give up ghosts and names so that I can write them as stories and offer them to light, and then with them, find the treasure of peace. My works also interrogate the notion of the nation. I do not believe it exists. In this post-truth world does that even matter, given the reality of the march of super companies and the fetishisation of money? More seriously, I often also wonder if a nation like Kenya and its people suffer a grievous moral injury in their core and memory. Do societies experience collective post-traumatic stress that is not yet framed in a socio-political lexicon? In some of the frameworks of holocaust studies, I have found profound resonance to much of Africa’s secret angst, all the things of shame, guilt and grief that remain unspoken.

The book ‘Dust’ set me on that path when after Kenya’s descent into hell in 2007-8, I needed to kick open painted over tombs where we had nurtured our demons. It led me to wonder if ancestral trauma caused by a violence inflicted on the humanity of another live out its irresolution by haunting succeeding generations? For most African nations, a horrible war was consolidated in 1885 in Berlin, and imposed itself upon them. It has never really stopped, despite the theatre of changing flags. How do you move when all your energies are expended in circling, hiding and avoiding a grievous existence-questioning wound? Do we imagine that the resonance of horror embedded in memory simply fades away? What do you imagine was and is the state of the soul of a man of old Africa experiencing the crushing deceptions, the betrayal of his hospitality by strangers? Who watches his known world disappear and experiences the total powerlessness and betrayal-by-silence of once favoured deities. I see no archiving on the parts of our people about this. This absence, I imagine, damages all parties. We have held no memorials for the destroyed. We use our boundaries to shield us from the past and its
unrequited ghosts. People who are our brothers, mothers, fathers, ancestors, accusers. There is no “long ago” to the consequences of human deeds.

As a world and continent we have never grieved our excesses, our losses of self, families, community, worldview, gods, goods, stories, time, spaces, lands, archetypes and imagination in word, deed and thought. I posit that these live out their lack of resolution to the present. Is it from these too that we seek to escape through our boundaries? What does the now mean to a continent that was massively defeated in an undeclared brutal and genocidal war; a place where defeated men and women could do nothing when their wives, husbands, parents, lovers, sons, and daughters were seized, raped, sodomised, brutalised, mutilated, and hunted in their presence?

Linked to this, there was a way of economics woven in intricate trade networks that the Post-Berlin conference war had been hijacked and taken over. Global monsoon networks reached into the continent’s own heart before reaching into China and Azerbaijan where an Africa diaspora has long existed; the trans Saharan trade, the southern circuit that moved gold, ivory, gemstones into the coast. The space that is Africa is largely made up of a people and culture in and of movement as a path to wealth, adventure, humanity and encounter. What is the impact and implications of the such losses of economic wherewithal that offered so many African cultures an access to the world on their terms? These were violently taken over way by assorted European trading companies that are the parents of the conglomerates we are familiar with today, who own, manage, control the resources from a continent that does keep the world afloat. We do not talk often about this—or if the conversations occur I have not been a party to them. The responsibility for this lack of questioning rests squarely at our assorted African doors.

I wonder why in most cases, after fifty years of supposed independence it is easier and cheaper for me travel to Paris and live there for two months than it is for me to travel to Ouagadougou from Nairobi. Why? We are a people who seem to have not only lost agency over their resources, but also lost the endless scope of their actual and imagined existence in the basic of ways: to give you an example, most Africans today have no idea that coffee was never about Starbucks or Colombia; that coffee culture, its identification, use, consumption as beverage, medicine and ritual substance is originally, intrinsically and creatively African. Again, when I define the African milieu as encompassing all our seas, and discuss African maritime imaginaries, many gawk at me as if I am speaking to them in hieroglyphics.

What bothers me the most as an artist is our wilful African unknowing, wilful constraints – boundaries – to imagining, thinking, hearing and seeing. Are we then to move from ignorance to ignorance, a floating people disconnected from our own humus and unable to speak of it, not only to the world, but more painfully, to ourselves? A people whose story is limited, constrained framed and only retold by others, a story so small that ours becomes an existential battle of making our lives miniscule enough to enter into the categories created in order to not again, suffer a brutal fate worse than death? Hovering above our psychic heads is the real fear of a return to the diabolic violence that can be unleashed at the whims of one culture that for the most part—apart from the Germans, has declined to examine its conscience and review its consciousness of life and humanity in the face of its impulse to atrocities and the denial of these. I do worry about a post-
independence Africa that lost its voice so that it is inarticulate before the realities of a Libya, Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, Colombia or Ukraine, Brexit or Trump. Yet only bystanders, and victims of fate have nothing to say about their destiny. Only the long dead have a right to such silence. How do we proceed to traverse into the present and future through the unknown territories of our being where there are neither bridge builders nor bridges?

There is a phrase we popularised in Kenya during election 2013: “Accept and Move On.” Moving on. It was assumed that the diabolic violence of the PEV could be commanded into silence. But the violence and its ghosts keep interfering with our present, feeding from it; we have known no psychological peace. We are caught in a death-roll of a putrefying form of corruption, we are consuming ourselves, and subject to a disgusting inner corrosion coming from such refusals to give name to our horrors. You who speak of movement and boundaries, do you ever imagine that one of the keys to the future is buried in our many darknesses that require courage and humility to excavate in order to extract roots embedded in the past? Given that movement points to two directions, do we dare step into deep truth telling in order to repopulate the present with what will set the future free? Your theme is a pertinent one in that it invites a fresh calling into being of paradigms for a continent and world in urgent need of life-giving ideas about itself.

Now, for a more optimistic note to conclude this reflection:

The African continent plays host to the youngest of the world’s populations. Youth bulge, or demographic dividend it is called. These lot look at the world with other eyes. They host each other in their rooms. They travel fearlessly. They set up online literary platforms like Jalada.com—look it up – that think beyond no boundaries and have, for example, translated a story by Ngugi wa Thiongo into over a hundred languages, including Urdu. They code. They regenerate vocabularies. They milk sacred cows. They live, for the most part, an expansive imagination that has no lexicon attached to it yet. Secondly, the influx of new souls and cultures into a continent that thrives on variety is also a great portent in more ways than it is challenging. Unlike the popularised consensus, not necessarily articulated by Africans themselves, I can also read the influx of the Chinese people into Africa through hopeful lenses. Cultural renewal through exchange of people has always been a force of transformation in the world. These combined forces, the youth, the migrants present an atypical movement impetus on the continent that perhaps, promises a transformative idea of place that just may be able to bear the weight of this agitated world and guide it, maybe, into a more wholesome future.
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“She is made of and coloured by the earth itself”:  
Motherhood and Nation in Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor’s *Dust*

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Yvonne Adhiambo Owuor identifies, ‘[t]he human body and person [as] the locus of [her] artistic quest’¹ and it is this focus on the body which drives her intimate portrait of Kenya’s independence struggle in her novel, *Dust*. Rather than engaging with the concerns of ‘diasporic identities [and] cultural otherness’ ², which so often form the preoccupations of the African literary diaspora, Owuor’s rendering of East Africa acknowledges the alterity experienced by Africans in their own lands, inhabiting peripheries within their home nations.

The novel is a sense memory, a synesthesia of bodies, emotions and landscapes, suffused in the sensation of *Uhuru* (freedom) indefinitely postponed. The opening vignette follows the final moments of a young, successful engineer turned criminal in disgust at the depths of corruption he encounters in Nairobi, Odidi Moses Ebwesit Oganda. Bleeding into the tarmac, fatally shot by police, Odidi hears his phone ring:

“Odidi savours the ringing.  
It tastes of ordinary things.  
Like presence.” (p. 13)³

As he lies dying, Odidi calls for his mother, *Akai-ma,* …

[s]he wards off ghouls and bad night entities, wrestles God, cast ancient devils into hell before their time, and kicks aside sea waves so her son will pass unhindered.” (p. 11)

The life-force of Akai is a narrative lodestone, her actions and relationships shape the events of the novel. A great tragedy of *Dust*, is Akai’s inability to protect her family, in spite of her prodigious and elemental power. Akai Lokorijom is a woman whose initiation came at the moment of the protracted and painful birth of the Kenyan republic-

“while the colony tumbled into and out of its halfhearted local war, Akai bloomed. … After she menstruated, the clan shunted her off to a secluded place to learn the ways of women … Akai ran away before the sessions ended, and she sought her beloved stepfather: “Initiate me into manhood!”  
He bellowed with laughter.  
Akai laughed with him.  
Her mother covered her mouth and thought Akai had been cursed.

¹ Speech at AFSAAP conference December 2016  
All quotations are taken from this edition.
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“You have shamed me.”
Akai twisted her nose. “How?” (p. 237)

Akai’s refusal to fulfill the initiate obligations of her gender as a Turkana woman reminds students of Kenyan history of the struggles in Kikuyuland between the Kikuyu community and the British missionary campaign to end female circumcision, the so-called “Female Circumcision Controversy” of the early 1920s.

In the face of the erosion of traditional forms of tribal authority, the alienation of lands, the establishment of “native reserves”, and restrictive taxation systems, initiation stood as one of the powerful remnants of Kikuyu cultural identity and social organisation. The ban on both female circumcision, irua, and membership of the proto-Kikuyu nationalist organisation, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) refigured the Kikuyu tradition of female initiation. Defence of irua, “always the sign of a “true Kikuyu”’, came to be seen, not as a relic of rural Kikuyu culture, but rather, “as a mark of loyalty to the incipient, as yet imaginary, nation.” The KCA further politicized the circumcision issue by linking it to the land grievances of the Kikuyu, suggesting that this attack on Kikuyu tradition would jeopardise the tribal organisation of land – that ‘uncircumcised girls would not find husbands among Kikuyu men, and, therefore, would turn to Europeans who would not only take the women but also would take Kikuyu land.’ The result of a concerted and coercive campaign against circumcision resulted in Kikuyu teachers and families of students who supported circumcision being expelled from mission schools, and the establishment of the Kikuyu run school system, outside colonial control. Although Akai’s personal initiation controversy echoes the Kikuyu struggle, Owuor’s choice to write Akai as a minority tribal identity, Turkana, is significant. Kikuyu accented English is a language of authority in Nairobi – heard in the voices of police, the medical examiner and the government officials who are present at Odidi’s death, and his journey back home in a coffin.

Where the establishment of Kikuyu run schools has been credited with helping to consolidate Kikuyu resistance to colonial domination, Akai’s attendance at the missionary school was a product of her family’s poverty and the cultural belligerence of the missionary project. She persistently troubled earthly and divine authorities – plaguing her teachers with questions: What desire is at the heart of God? Who fills it? Where do stars go, if, as you say, they die? Where is the farthest far

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6 Natsoulas, T., 1998, pg 144.” … Faced with this mounting pressure from politicised Africans, and a lack of definitive support from the colonial government and courts, the missions announced that church elders, and Africans working for the missions, principally, as teachers, were to formally sign a document renouncing female circumcision and their membership of the KCA. Shortly after this announcement, one missionary society reported they had lost 90 per cent of the congregation and 80 per cent of its students.”
Akai embodies many of the fears of a breakdown in cultural order that were at the centre of the circumcision controversy; at once fearless, unwomanly and ungovernable – she was

a consummate shirker of herding duties and a cook who always burned food
more likely to be found hunting, swimming, challenging young men to wrestling
matches. (p. 237)

Walking home from school through the desert at the end of term, Akai meets two men at a water hole she visits on a detour, the British adventurer and colonial government enforcer, Hugh Bolton, and his servant Aggrey Nyipir Oganda. She is immediately attracted to Hugh, and begins an affair with him, living at Wuoth Ogik, the homestead Hugh had built for himself and his English wife in North Eastern Province, while an infatuated Nyipir looks on. If the fate of this relationship is a culmination of the Kikuyu fears that uninitiated women would take up with English men, Owuor offers only the unimaginable price Akai pays of the liaison. Akai’s first children, born to her as a teenager, are twins fathered by Hugh Bolton; progeny of the late colonial moment. Hugh casts her out on hearing of her pregnancy, sending her alone, down the river to her family. Ostracized from the community on her return, Akai and her mother live at a homestead her mother builds outside the village. The women raise the twins in isolation, naming them Ewoi and Etor, Turkana names for the acacia trees which stretch out into the African savannah.

During an argument over water, Akai slaps her mother – a rejection of authority which would finally prove fatal. Akai is cast out of her mother’s house with a dirge ‘you are dead…’ (p. 369). The infant children of the late colony, rejected by their colonial father, and then by Akai’s Turkana family, are sent out with their mother into the desert to be tormented by thirst; and to be consumed — in a bitter irony — not by dust, but by flash flood, ‘it was not death that came, but water … paradigm the carcasses of the newly dead.’ (p. 370). Battling forces ultimately outside her control, Akai is unable to protect or nurture her children, to provide the emotional and physical safety of home. Akai chooses to operate without boundaries, though her ungovernability ultimately exacts an intolerable toll.

Returning to Wuoth Ogik, literally translated from Lou, ‘the journey ends’ (p. 334), Akai begins a relationship with Aggrey Nyipir Oganda. A Luo man from Lake Victoria, exiled to the desert of North Eastern Province, Nyipir reminds us of the boundaries which governed Africa beyond the violent borders of the colonial encounter. He is known in the novel by his middle name, after ‘one of the ancestral brothers who led the Luo migration down the Nile, through Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Congo, Tanzania and into Kenya.’ As Juliane Okot Bitek explains –

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Nyipir and Nyabongo (or Gipir and Labongo, depending on what Luo one speaks) were brothers who betrayed each other and forced a separation at the banks of the Nile with each brother on a quest to find dala, gang, to wuoth, to wander until they found a place to call home.\(^{10}\)

If the ill-fated twins of Hugh Bolton and Akai were a metaphor of the failure of the colonial project, the children of Nyipir and Akai are the promise of the new republic. We meet Akai for the first time, aiming an AK47 at her adult daughter, Ajany, in the nighttime headlights of the car which has transported the body of her son, Odidi, home to his family to Wuoth Ogik, which has become the Oganda family homestead, following the mysterious disappearance of Hugh Bolton many years earlier. Mad with grief at the murder of her son by police in the back streets of Nairobi, Odidi is not the first child Akai-ma has lost to the dust. And his death should have been prevented.

The soundscape of the novel is a Babel of languages and voices. The characters which populate the world of Dust are themselves holders of many names, speakers of many tongues – embodiments of African resistance to borders and nationalist monoculture – indeed, Gareth Griffith explores many of the popular political and musical allusions in his paper for this panel. Akai’s generation speak all Kenya’s official languages, ‘English, Kiswahili, and Silence’ (p. 287). For a novel so rich in dialogue and music, Akai-ma says little. Rather, it is the story of her intimate life – the men she loved, and the fates of her children – which drives the novel. Her silences speak to the terrible price of freedom, joining those of others who lived through independence, all of whom are, as Owuor herself articulates, ‘[s]ubject to a disgusting inner corrosion coming from such refusals to give name to [their] horrors.’\(^{11}\) Perhaps in a realization come too late, upon receiving the coffin containing her son’s body, Akai –

\[\ldots\text{ rocks her son, strokes his face, rocks her son. Odidi, she croons. Odidi wake up. Son. Listen. Ebwesit. I’m calling you.} \]

\[\text{To name something is to bring it to life. (p. 40)} \]

Through the story of Akai, her lovers and her children, Owuor invites us to witness the intimate toll of the independence struggle, far removed from the easy patriotism which is the preference of the political elite of the late Republic who prefer the celebration of the life and martyrdom of select shujaa, warriors, Mau Mau heroes. Like the other newly imagined citizens of the Kenyan republic who populate Owuor’s trans-generational landscapes, Akai finds the boundaries of nation and family complex and stifling, unpredictable and violent. She is elemental, enigmatic, ‘made of and coloured by the earth itself.’ (p. 38) Just as she is of the desert, Akai repeatedly disappears into the expanse separating the homestead, Wuoth Ogik from Nairobi, ‘the real Kenya’ (p. 17). The desert landscape is often experienced as a place of death and privation, to be traversed, endured, survived; Akai seeks in it a kind of paradoxical refuge in times of desolation.

The insatiable desire for home burns through the novel, ‘a familiar sense of homelessness. Ceaseless unbelonging’ (p. 230). Most often this yearning is experienced

\(^{10}\) Okot Bitek, Juliane. 2015.

\(^{11}\) Owuor, Yvonne. 2016. Keynote Speech, AFSAAP conference Perth
as bodily sensation – reminiscent of *hiraeth*, the ephemeral linguistic gift of the Welsh, England’s first colonised. Without direct English translation, *hiraeth* expresses a heartache of a home lost in the ‘foreign country of the past’\(^{12}\), an ‘intense longing for home and place … so strong it can cause physical pain’.\(^{13}\) As Odidi is dying, his longing to return home washes through his consciousness, a melange of sensations, such that the emotion has become tactile –

Scent of return.
Burnt acacia-resin incense. Desert essences – dung, salt, milk, smoke, herbs, and ghee, the yearning for rain. (p. 15)

Throughout the novel, we meet characters for whom this pull of origins, and the desire for the familiarity of home is overwhelming, even where these places have been previously abandoned in favour of the “Far Away” (p. 17). Akai herself is a locus of homecoming, experienced by her lovers and children as a kind of grounded, earthly phenomenon, ‘flow[ing] like magma, every movement considered, as if it has come from the root of the world’ (p. 38), because as Owuor reminds us, ‘sometimes we are places, not people’ (p. 13). Searching for this sensation of home is an abiding metaphor of nation. As Pamela Petro explains in the Welsh case, ‘the deeper, national hiraeth is something you don’t have to go away to experience. You can feel it at home in Wales. In fact, that’s where you feel it most.’\(^{14}\) For Kenyans, the tantalising promises of *Uhuru*, were denied even at the moment of national independence, the fate of Kenya sealed with the assassination of Nyipir’s hero, fellow Luo, and charismatic independence leader, Tom Mboya. Kenya’s nationalism has failed to deliver on the promise of independence, producing only the bitter fruits of graft and corrosive ethno-politics.

**Give this pain to no one else – family as metaphor for nation**

*Dust* is a kind of mythography\(^{15}\) of the Kenyan republic, told through the body of Akai – in equal parts because Akai herself is a mythic embodiment of nation, and because the fates of her and her children are the fates of all those ‘holders of a persistent and transcending dream’\(^{16}\) of the Kenyan nation. So much violence within the post-colony is manifest *within*, and against families. Where Ngugi and Achebe use the centrality of the normative pre-colonial African family and community to illustrate the destruction of the colonial project through the disintegration of the family unit, Owour’s imagined Kenyan families are already and always living this destruction. In contrast, Coetzee’s *Disgrace* leaves us with knowledge that the progeny of the new, allegedly racially integrated South Africa is tainted by the original violence of rape. While the futility of the romance in Andre Brink’s *Beyond Darkness* offers nothing of the hope of a new generation in a

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\(^{15}\) To humbly borrow from Audre Lorde.

protagonist assisting the suicide of his lover, and being tried for her murder. On the explicit tragedy of love in the post-colony, and the failure of family formation in the post-colonial world — *Dust* offers the reader a qualified redemption, only in the death or scattering of the previous generation, and a literal bonfire of structures of the past — can a new Kenya be imagined.

As much as Akai is consumed by her love for her children, we find her incapable of giving or receiving affection, communicating little of love or vulnerability. Grief and love alike are expressed and experienced as kinds of violence. Characters of *Dust* experience love as a punishment, a weakness, a madness — Nyipir experiences his love for Akai as his Achilles heel in a colonial prison during the Emergency where, after enduring days of torture, finally their threat to find and torture his wife breaks him, ‘only then he screamed. … Creeping, crawling shame. … he had wailed, *Unisamehe!* Mercy! Can’t describe the ways of losing faith’ (pp. 315 - 317). The product of the love of Hugh Bolton and Akai turns Akai into an outcast, realizing the bitter price of living outside clan authority as she is thrown out of her lover’s house, only to be thrown out of her mother’s home with her infant twins. Akai is called Akai-*ma* but this foundational maternal identity is more a reminder of the children she has lost — to the tyranny of the desert, her own family — unable to protect them from the emotional and physical violence that has shaped her own life, or from the “real Kenya”. Writing on Shailja Patel’s collection of poetry, *Migritude*, Kenyan intellectual Keguro Macharia noted

> “if “love” could be paraphrased, I think it would be that: “Give this pain to no one else.” … it is a prayer, a hope, an expectation, uttered to a distant transcendence, and perhaps it can only be uttered to a distant transcendence, because it asks for what seems impossible.”

The inability of Akai’s fierce motherhood to protect her children is emblematic of the failure of the Kenyan state to protect and nurture its citizens. The pain is intergenerational, “a coagulating wound. … it seeps and spreads, and becomes a subterranean stream of blood in Kenya” (p. 315).

“*The sun in Nairobi … is brutal in its rising.*”

*Dust* is a novel made of elemental substances — landscapes are dust and flood; emotions are expressed as sweat, tears, blood. Nyipir remembers his time tortured in a British prison as ‘[s]hit, urine, sweat, blood, tears and shame’ (p. 316). Human emotion takes on a viscosity in Owuor’s Kenya, where violence moves through people, and communities like the capricious rains, and floods which shape, destroy and remake the landscapes. Kenyans pray for independence like a desert prays for water, only to be granted flash flood. A foundational alterity is produced through the tyranny of distance, and the struggle to comprehend the new demands of a new, unfamiliar, and uncaring nation. Owuor’s nation demands unthinkable sacrifice of its citizens, while offering nothing in return.

Akai joins these elemental forces as magma, emanating from, and returning to the earth. But Akai is not a maternal archetype, rather her relationships and her children suffer the


consequences of her resistance to cultural rules. The Kenyan historian Tabitha Kanogo describes the effect of the increased mobility of the colonial encounter afforded ‘travelling and travelled’ women, for whom ‘migrations of the body more often than not resulted in migrations of the mind, the heart, the psyche’. But this freedom, and individual agency, ‘whether it was newly acquired, or repeatedly thwarted … depended in large measure on the unleashing of forces over which no one involved had control.’

If Kenyan girlhood was ruptured by the colonial encounter, Owour’s women are literally disrupted, displaced, dislocated, and isolated. Akai is an allegory of the forces she unleashed in her quest for ‘fresh universes’ (p. 236).

Writing on the state of literature in East Africa, Njeri Githire noted the Sudanese poet and critic Taban lo Liyong ‘lament[ed] … what he saw as a literary wasteland, a dry, desolate, barren stretch of wilderness where literature simply refused to sprout’. Githire argues Liyong’s scathing critique fails to acknowledge the depth of Africa’s oral traditions, and normalises a hierarchy of literary production which privileges written texts. If our journey through Dust has taught us anything, it might be that the expanse of desert is an infinitely productive space; that dust is the formative substance of nation, at times infertile, volatile, unpredictable, dangerous, consuming. Dust reminds us of the amorality of ordinary substances – blood, dust, salt, water and fire are transformative, healing, and destructive in turn.

Commenting on her novel, Yvonne Owuor explained that she –

“wish[ed] to understand something about [her] country, one that murders the best of its own. What kind of nation gets terrified of a great imagination? What kind of people annihilate holders of a persistent and transcending dream?”

The fates of the characters of Dust have biblical resonance, at the whim of elemental forces of the Old Testament, including not only the physical tyrannies of the landscape, but the equally unpredictable and violent forces of the colonial encounter. The independence struggle is experienced here as a fundamental test of humanity - test more often failed than passed.

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22 Selasi, Taiye. 2014.
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Narrative, Popular Culture and Resistance in East Africa

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Narrative (including story-telling, memorialisation, testimony) is one of the most powerful tools of self-apprehension and self-validation for oppressed people and potentially a mode of resistance. Narrative in this sense needs to be seen to go beyond the written to oral and visual forms. Not only film, television and social media but popular forms, not directly under institutional control—for example graffiti and street art.1 Kenya has been the site of such as those of you who have read Mokua Ombati’s account of the use of graffiti and public art to influence civil and political behaviour in Kenya in the AFSAAP Journal No 36, 2015, will be aware. As Ombati asserts “in the run up to the 2013 elections, the urban physical space became the new ‘shrine’ for graffiti. The display of graffiti … within the city of Nairobi entered the Kenyan public space with a bang” (Ombati 2015, p. 33). He describes it thus:

The graffiti attacks elite corruption, poor governance, and the ineffective and unaccountable leadership considered to be a threat to the prosperity, stability and cohesiveness of the nation. It calls for effective governance and morally accountable and responsible leadership. While graffiti may not be considered an enlightened means of resistance, the mural displays and graffiti illustrations cover the public, physical space with slogans of uprising and protest that imagine the possibility of resisting elite oppression (Ombati 2015, p. 33)

Several of the murals reproduced show the image of what the graffiti artists term “vulture politicians”, who prey on the people. One of the images shows a vulture-headed politician sitting on the head of a woman. ...One of the graffiti reproduced shows a vulture with a rope around its neck being towed backwards across the image by a small human figure. The surrounding words include the slogan in a bubble from the towing figure, saying “Powers to the people. I will be the change. I want to see. My voice, My Vote, Our Future”. As this suggests the emphasis is on the ability of people to employ the political process to effect change by refusing to vote for corrupt “vulture” politicians who are in other graffiti reproduced in the article shown carrying briefcases labeled “stolen loot”. Boniface Mwanga, one of the artists, comments that:

We are using images of a vulture member of parliament stamping on the face of protestors and parliament to tell Kenyans when you sell your vote, you are mortgaging ‘our’ future—the young generation’s future ... we are trying to

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1 This panel presentation draws upon a more extensive coverage of these issues that at the time of presentation and of writing this account of my panel contribution was still in preparation. That will be published sometime in 2017 as part of my contribution to the edited collection The Social Role of Narrative: Human Rights and the Cultural Imaginary, Gareth Griffiths and Philip Mead (Eds.), Ibidem, Hanover/London,
encourage men and women of integrity and character to vie for elective office because if they don’t you will find vultures on the ballot . . . (quoted in Ombati 2015, p.35)

But even more widespread across Africa than graffiti has been the use of popular music as a form of resistance. The music of Nigerian Fela Anikulapo Kuti is a notable example, as a song from his album Beast of No Nation can illustrate: the song lampoons the then military dictator Major-General Muhammudu Buhari, who had recently had Fela Kuti imprisoned.

The time weh I dey, for prison, I call am “inside world” /The time weh I dey outside prison, I call am “outside world” /Na craze world, na be outside world/ CRAZE** WORLD *(after each line) **(crazy) /Na be outside- da police-i dey/ Na be outside- da soldier dey/ Na be outside- da court dem dey /Na be outside- da magistrate dey/ Na be outside- da judge dem dey /Na craze world be dat/ Na be outside- Buhari dey /Na craze man be dat/ Animal in craze-man skin-i /Na craze world be dat /Na be outside- Idia-gbon dey /Na craze man be dat- oh Animal in craze-man skin-i /Na craze world be dat /Na be outside- dem find me guilty/ Na be outside- dem jail me five years ------------------I no do nothing. 2

The title song was taken up by the young Nigerian writer Uzodinma Iweala in his novel of child soldiers Beasts of No Nation (Iweala 2005). The novel was made into a film in 2015, illustrating again how porous are the boundaries of narrative in the modern world.

This is the aspect of Yvonne Owuora’s work I want to draw attention to briefly today. Her career and work clearly shows how contemporary writing in Africa engages across boundaries, moving the division between popular and high culture and unifying African stories across national, class and ethnic identities.

Owouo’s novel Dust may well be considered in due course as potential film material but even in its present form as traditional print narrative it shows how important the referencing throughout of popular music is to the shaping of the narrative. The ubiquity of reference to popular music throughout the text acts as a sort of soundscape, as the reader, who is presumed to be familiar with the songs and musical forms named and quoted in the text, is invited to “hear” the songs as an accompaniment to the words on the page, supplementing them and adding emotional and cultural density to the narrative. In this way the references to songs in the novel function in a way analogous to the way the score of a film adds to the experience of its audience. Every part of the text is imbued with references to music, beginning with the continual referencing and quoting of traditional Kenyan, Ethiopian, Somalian and Eritrean “water songs” (the novel is set in the remote Turkana region of

2 http://www.nitrolyrics.com/fela-kuti_beast-of-no-nation-lyrics.html, downloaded November 12th 2016. It should be noted, of course, that Buhari was reelected President of Nigeria again in 2014, replacing Goodluck Jonathan in what has been hailed as a sign of the growth of democracy in Nigeria, since it was the first time a President in Nigeria was replaced by an election in which the loser stepped down.
northern Kenya that borders on two of these countries, Ethiopia and Somalia). One of the major characters, the policeman Ali Dida Hada, is an Eritrean refugee who has crossed the largely porous and fictional borders fleeing what the text ironically calls “the Horn of Africa’s liberation wars” (Owuor 2014, p. 219) and has adopted Kenyan identity. In addition the text is marked throughout with references to a wide variety of popular music. These range from current Kenyan forms such as mugithi, which records the “overloaded” culture, to use Achille Mbembe’s term, (Mbembe 2001, po.147) of the bars of Nairobi’s slums, through famous Kenyan musicians such as Fadhili Williams, to the Congolese singer and political activist Franklin Boukaka and the more romantic Cape Verdean female singer Cesaria Evora, as well as the songs of Fela Kuti discussed earlier. Thus, for example, early in the novel, when the main protagonist Ajany has just been confronted with the death of her brother Odidi, her pain at the situation that has led to his death and that of so many others is amplified by the text referencing one of the songs of the Congolese musician Franklin Boukaka.

Outside sounds.
Etude of squealing tires.
Bird chirp.
Machine-gun opening sequence.
A scream.
Fragments of a song from some unseen citizen’s room.
Franklin Boukaka’s plaintive summons--Aye Africa ... kokata koni pasi, soki na kati koteka pasi--and for a whole minute it overwhelms the frenzied crescendo screams of Haki yetu, ‘Our rights’. (Owuor, 2014 p.21)

When the song is quoted, however briefly, a whole range of meanings that the text explores throughout and which are common to human rights struggles across Africa are invoked as the words of the song are recalled by the reader:

Aye Afrika, eh eh../O Independence! O Freedom!/Chopping wood is tough/after chopping selling is just as tough/ with this suffering how sad/with the kids I won’t make it/Some for whom I voted/ went for power and nice cars/When voting time comes/I become someone for them/I wonder/ the white man left/who is independent?/Aye Afrika, O Independence!/Aye Afrika, O Freedom!3

Through this and many other references to this continent-wide range of popular music, the novel evokes a sense of a pan-African, shared space and common problems of oppression and abuse. These popular songs of protest and longing, like the traditional water songs, refuse to be contained within the limiting and divisive concepts of the sovereign nation promoted by the ruling elites. As discussed in the first section of this paper, the way those elites use ethnicity as a means to divide and rule the nation replicates not only the practice of the colonial rulers they are supposed to have displaced but encourages the brutal suppression of opponents based on their supposed conflicting ethnic and national identities. As well as using these references to popular music to create a “soundscape” that reinforces the novel’s

3 See the original with English subtitles at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvDn11AEoas. Downloaded November 12th 2016.
message against brutality and corruption in Kenya, the text also references many of the popular images that have been developed in street art to represent the negative forces in Kenyan society. In particular, the image of the vulture to represent the forces of greed that oppress Kenyans that we saw was such a prominent feature of the recent street art in Nairobi is used throughout the novel.

Static. Kofi Annan’s voice weaving through in words that don’t connect: Parties...eminent persons... bloodshed... peace... violence... Peace...spoken...Honorable gentlemen...war...tribal...politics...

Nyipir says, voice crackling, “They know when a body is cooling.”

“Who?”

“Vultures”. Within a dark nook in Nyipir’s heart, a long-ago man whispers, “By the time I’m done with you, you’ll become another. You’ll become mad. To live.” Nyipir shivers.

“Vultures”. Nyipir wipes his face with the blanket (Owuor 2014, p. 68).

This fascinating and powerful novel weaves together the story of the atrocities of colonial rule during the colonial period with the post-independence regimes’ use of the same brutal methods to repress opposition to its rule, reinforcing the point made by so many popular artists that the current elite rulers have merely replaced the colonial oppressors and employ the same or even worse tactics to retain power. Throughout, the failure of the new rulers to transcend the practices of the repressive colonial regimes is emphasized by the incidents of the story and by the use of references to the popular awareness of how this oppression has continued expressed in popular images and music. The full use of these elements in this rich text must await a more detailed analysis than space permits here. But these examples show how popular and traditional art forms are forging new and mutually enriching relationships in modern Africa and uniting popular and traditional art forms in the struggle for human rights. That struggle often seems endless and sometimes inconclusive but if I may finish on an cautiously optimistic note, the history of narrative and of the human imagination and the social role they have played is a story of persistence rather than conclusion, of unending effort rather than of triumph. Like human rights themselves the truths such narrative seeks to tell are perhaps inevitably deferred, always a promise of what might be rather than what is, a promise of what we seek rather than what we have achieved. The social role of narrative is always in this sense an engagement with the unattainable. As J. Hillis Miller put it:

The law is always somewhere else or at some other time, back there when the law was first imposed or off to the future when I may at last confront it directly, in unmediated vision. Within that space, between here and that unattainable there of the law as such, between now and the beginning or the end, narrative enters as the relation of the search for a perhaps impossible proximity to the law [ . . . ] the function of narrative for those who have 'eyes to see or ears to hear with and understand' is to keep this out in the open” (Miller 1987. p.25).

It may be too simple to suggest unequivocally, as Shelley did in the early 19th century, that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” but it may be true to say that the forms of legislation and the forces that bring it into being are deeply influenced by how
people narrate the experiences of their world. Story, image, song and written or spoken memories all act to construct the cultural imaginary from which we derive our own identity and through which we seek, however inadequately, to perceive that of others, recognizing the ways in which they differ from us and the ways in which we share their concerns and needs. Our engagement in this conference, often in recent years concerned more with academic forms of social analysis, reminds us of the power of literature and of the broader range of imaginative forms this particular novel highlights to engage with the importance of imaginative narratives.

It is arguable then that what allows us to survive and develop as a species is not anything material, for example our ability to develop tools or to use language. As we reach out to broader ideas of where we stand as humans in the evolutionary pattern we recognise that other species have developed many of these characteristics. It is possible that it is the imagination that really allows human beings to behave in the ways they do, for good or for bad. The imagination allows human beings to conceive a reality different from that which they are experiencing and to understand their world as part of a changeable past and future. The exercise of this power to imagine allows human beings to manipulate their world in a unique way. This may be why we can cause so much devastation but it may also be the means by which we can take control of our future in positive ways. The imagination and its power, harnessed through story and memory, may be the most important aspect of our lives and the most neglected.

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The Past Never Dies: Historical Memory of the Slave Trade and Relationship between African Americans and Contemporary Migrants from Africa to the US

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Abstract
The article is based on field evidence collected in seven states in 2013–2015. It shows how differences in the historic memory of African Americans and African migrants influence their mutual perceptions and relationship. Both groups’ collective memory and mass consciousness of the transatlantic slave trade is most important in this respect. The slave trade is the event that gave rise to the very phenomenon of Black Americans and to the problem of the “Black world” and its historical unity. This article argues that the historic memory of the slave trade, slavery, and the fight against it is of key importance to African Americans’ historic consciousness. This memory is also important to Africans; however, not to the same degree. Secondly, Africans see the slave trade differently, not as a history not of Blacks’ betrayal by other Blacks, but of exploitation of the Blacks by the Whites. Significant differences in the perception, estimation, and importance attached to the slave trade, slavery and anti-slavery struggle separate these two groups of the Black population rather than unite them in the face of “White” America. The lack of the sense of historic unity alienates African Americans and African migrants from each other spiritually and mentally, thus contributing to the establishment of an ambiguous and complicated relationship between them.

Introduction
From the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, in most countries of the New World, the European slave trade resulted in the formation of large communities of people whose ancestors had been forcibly removed from Africa, mainly from her west coast. In the United States in particular, these Africans and their descendants have become an unalienable part of the nation’s historical, ethno-cultural, and socio-economic landscape from its early days. According to data for 2013, African Americans amounted to 12.6% of its population, 39.9 million of its 316.1 million people (Anderson 2015).

Africans’ voluntary migration to the Western Hemisphere, including the US, began about the same time as the end of slavery – in the 1860s. The first voluntary migrants from Africa to the US were natives of the Cape Verde islands (Halter 1993; Wibault 2005). However, for more than a century, voluntary migration from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States was

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limited. Voluntary African immigration increased only in the 1980s, about 20 years after The Immigration and Naturalization Act of October 3, 1965, which abolished the discriminatory quota system for non-Europeans, as well as Southern and Eastern Europeans. In the 1990s (Dixon 2006; Terrazas 2009; McCabe 2011), this immigration accelerated as many Africans lost hope for a politically stable, socially just and economically prosperous society in their own countries. As a result, in recent decades more people resettled from Africa in the US than were displaced forcibly for the entire period of the slave trade (Dodson & Diouf 2004; Roberts 2005; Clark 2006; Arthur 2010; Curry-Stevens 2013). In the twenty-first century, the US has become the major recipient of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (Capps et al 2012). The stream continues to increase; natives of this region form one of the most rapidly growing groups among all the immigrant communities in the US.

Three quarters of Africans residing in the US came to the country no earlier than 1990 (Terrazas 2009), 61% of them in the twenty-first century (McCabe 2011; Capps et al 2012; Zong & Batalova 2014). Between 2000 to 2013, the number of African migrants in the US increased by 137%, from 574,000 to 1,400,000 people, including a 13% increase during a four-year period, 2010 to 2013 (Zong & Batalova 2014; Anderson 2015). Nevertheless, they still form just 4% of US residents who were born abroad (Zong & Batalova 2014), 3.2% of black residents of the US and 0.4% of the total US population (Anderson 2015). Interestingly, Africans arrived in the US from all the countries of the continent. Nevertheless, English-speaking countries and states beset by civil war remain the main nations of origin. Half of American Africans are natives of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia or Somalia (ibid.). By 2000, Africans lived in all fifty states of the country and the District of Columbia (Wilson 2003). Today most of them reside in New York, Texas, Maryland and California, with at least 100,000 Africans in each (Terrazas 2009; McCabe 2011; Zong & Batalova 2014). About 95% of Africans in the US are city dwellers, mostly residents of large urban agglomerations, led by the New York City and Washington, DC areas, each also home to more than 100,000 (Takyi, Boate 2006; Terrazas 2009; Reed & Andrzejewski 2010; McCabe 2011; Zong & Batalova 2014).

Today in the United States, these two communities with sub-Saharan Africa genetic origins – African Americans and African migrants – exist side by side, but have different histories and occupy different positions in contemporary American society. Black residents of the US whose ancestors were brought from Africa as slaves hundreds of years ago are called “African Americans” in this article; the majority of this community’s members recognize this name as most correct, a judgement generally accepted throughout the wider American society and academia. Contemporary black voluntary migrants from all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and their children are called “Africans”. African Americans and African migrants form different communities, not a single “black community”. Many respondents told us that these communities will not integrate in the future either because, ‘Africans and African Americans are too, too, too different’, although some admit that it might be possible with the Americanization of the African migrants’ children. Despite the common roots, significant “social distance” persists between black communities, and in particular between African Americans and Africans (Iheduru 2013). Given major differences in their histories, this distance makes sense. On the other hand, it contradicts mythologies and ideologies of several powerful intellectual and political schools that began to spread among African Americans, Africans and African Caribbeans in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Such schools of thought as Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, and Afrocentrism argued, and still argue, for the
common cultural and spiritual basis of all black people – that is, a specific spiritual and mental life no matter where they were born. According to this view, the global “black brotherhood” requires joint action by all those of the “black race” in a world ruled by whites.

At the same time, the absence of “black unity” does not mean that the relations between the black communities are hostile. They cannot be characterized unambiguously at all, not least because they are not quite the same in different age, social, and educational groups, in megacities and in rural areas, or in the country’s different historical and cultural regions. It was not by chance that our interviewees from both communities described the relations between black Africans and African Americans in the widest possible range from ‘excellent’ to ‘antagonistic’. Between these extremes, we heard a range of assessments: ‘good’; ‘friendly’; ‘respectful’; ‘generally positive’; ‘normal, but not close’; ‘more or less decent’, and; ‘not bad but that could be better’. On the one hand, some assessments included: ‘not brilliant’; ‘superficial’; ‘cold’; ‘cautious’; ‘strained’; ‘suspicious’; ‘watchful’; ‘bad’; based on ‘mixed feelings’; ‘misunderstandings’; ‘lack of mutual understanding’; ‘wrong perceptions’; ‘prejudice’, and; ‘mistrust’. The relationship between African migrants and African Americans resembles the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of two magnets. They both understand that among all the ethno-racial communities in the country, they, along with African Caribbeans, are the closest to each other; for many non-black Americans, the communities often merge into one. They also recognize common roots and similar problems in a society in which racial division is so important. But their many cultural differences arise immediately when they interact because of mutual attraction; those differences are then “translated” into the “language” of images of the other culture, causing mutual repulsion. There is no reason to disagree with one of our interviewees who noted –

It’s still very hard for Africans to accept African Americans. Also for African Americans to accept Africans – they see Africans, a lot of African Americans see Africans as just any other foreigners.

A variety of factors lead to this sort of perception and the relationships that consequently develop between African migrants and African Americans. Among them are differences in collective memory of the most important events of the past; these differences strongly shape mutual perceptions between members of these communities. They become especially apparent when comparing the typical views of African Americans and Africans on the history of the Atlantic slave trade and its aftermath.

**Theoretical Background and Collected Evidence**

In this article, we focus on historical memory of the two black communities in the US. Such memory largely shapes any group’s collective identity, just as collective identity shapes people’s attitudes towards cultural “others”. Historical memory is not a “verbatim quote”, a “cast” or a “photo” of real history. Rather, any historical memory may be inaccurate or simply false, because ‘contrary to history, memory is an emotional experience related to a real or imagined recollection and allowing all kinds of manipulations, changes, displacements, oblivions’ (Filippova 2011, p. 75). However, the product of the historical memory is not necessarily a lie or fib. Even if a particular memory is historically inaccurate, the cultural myths generating that memory may give an accurate measure of a phenomenon or even an epoch. These images and myths will also make sense to the people who believe them and, therefore, influence their worldview and behaviour. Constructed and reconstructed by
various ideologists on the one hand, and passed through a filter of popular mass consciousness generation after generation on the other, in a group’s historical memory, events can become refracted or even distorted.

Historical memory thus reflects the everyday creativity of individuals or groups of people, depending on the socio-cultural context in which they currently live. This is why history, created, modified and stored in historical memory, requires an attitude to itself as a Durkheimian “social fact” (Durkheim 2009) of today, rather than a true or false transmission of past events. Historical consciousness always correlates memory of the past with the present. People reconstruct what happened in the past according to what is important for the group and how it supports group identity in the present (Repina 2014). As a result, collective historical memory concentrates on key moments in a community’s history, reassesses the past depending on the socio-cultural changes in the present, and helps reshape the collective worldview. Thus, historical memory defines “us” and “them”, as well as the nature of the relationship between “our” and “other” socio-cultural groups. The latter is especially evident in the way African Americans and recent African immigrants in the United States perceive and relate to each other.

This article is based on the field evidence collected by the author and his associates. The field evidence was collected from 2013 to 2015 in seven states (Alabama, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York and Pennsylvania), thirteen towns and cities ranging in size from 8,000 (in Guntersville, AL) and more than 300,000 (St Louis, MO), to the bigger cities of Boston, MA, and Minneapolis, MN, and the megacities of Chicago, New York and Philadelphia. The methods of structured, semi-structured, non-structured interviews and observation were used. In total, we recorded 196 interviews and conversations of different duration and degree of structuring with African Americans, natives of twenty-three African countries, and people from other communities who have experience of communication with them. We made notes of observations of many events in the lives of African Americans and African migrants. We analysed 806 original photos, flyers and business cards of African establishments and enterprises, brochures of political and cultural organizations of African Americans and African migrants, Sunday prayer brochures of ‘black churches’, museum booklets and so forth.

We believe that the scope and quality of this collected evidence allows us to draw valid conclusions about the cultural and anthropological aspects of mutual perception of and, therefore, the relationship between African Americans and modern migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to the US in general and with regards to the present article’s topic, in particular.

**Slave trade and its aftermath in African American and African historical memory**

The differences between African Americans and African migrants in interpreting the slave trade and its aftermath are especially profound and critically important for their relationship. Given the slave trade era was black history’s “bifurcation point” at which it divided into the history of Africa and history of Africans and their descendants overseas, historical memory of it impacts powerfully on African Americans and Africans’ perception of each other and their relationships. In the view of many respondents, in the history of black people –

nothing is more important than “slavery”. The reason is because it is the
one thing that ties all black people together the world over.

As Zain Abdullah writes –

While the historical past of American slavery joins Africans and blacks at the hip, their separate imaginings of this event and its horrors result in a new type of divergence between them. (Abdullah 2010, p. 67)

In the words of an African American interviewee –

physically our [Africans and African Americans’] DNA is similar, but spiritually and emotionally we are different because the trauma that affected us is different.

The slave trade gave birth to the black experience in America – the very phenomenon of “black Americans”. It would also lead to the ideas of a “black history” of all black people and of an “African cultural tradition” in both the Old and New Worlds. The African American community itself emerged from the centuries of humiliation, suffering, and struggle that began with the slave trade and slavery. The memory of that struggle still to a large extent determines African American attitudes and social behaviors, regardless of social status (Akbar 1990; Eyerman 2001; 2012). This comment was typical of how many respondents felt –

Nobody can doubt that what we, blacks in this country, had two hundred years ago is less [freedom] than what we are having now. But are we truly free? I don’t think so. Is our mindset free from the memory of enslavement? No. The “slave” is still affecting our society… I think that mentally, not physically, the blacks here are still “enslaved”, still lack a strong voice to be heard.

Some scholars even suggest that the trauma of slavery, with all of its social humiliation, makes African Americans feel superior to African migrants and, therefore, keep social distance from them on the basis of “interiorized racism”. The latter means that they unconsciously mimic the white oppressors’ attitudes toward Africans (Iheduru 2013). As Bernard Lategan’s (2013) study has shown, historical memory can strengthen individual and collective identity by emphasizing links with the past, but without creating a basis for the perception of change. In such cases, identity is often used to justify entrenched positions, to reinforce existing stereotypes and to resist change, blocking the ability of individuals and groups to see themselves as part of a positive future. The pain of a past in which they were enslaved also appears in the reluctance of many African Americans to talk about the subject, as well as in Afrocentrists’ increasing insistence on replacing the word “slaves” with the more accurate “enslaved” in the public sphere.

The enduring inflammation of the historic memory of the slave trade and slavery in African American mass consciousness among both black and white Americans, has resulted in the opening of new monuments, memorials, museums, and exhibitions, as well as a wave of radio and television programs, web sites, novels and popular science books (Oostindie 2001; Horton & Horton 2006; Gallas & Perry 2015). The solemn opening of the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History and Culture in Washington, DC, by President
Obama in September 2016 became a culmination and apotheosis of this activity. For Africans, the slave trade, both European in West Africa and Arab in East Africa, also symbolizes the subjugation of black people; however; they consider it more a historical event that an element of personal identity. Because they are not descendants of slaves, and because they now live in sovereign African states, they experience the slave trade as far less powerful in their historical memory and mass consciousness. More so, sometimes Africans look down on African Americans because they are descendants of slaves and allegedly still carry the ineradicable stigma of “slave mentality”. The Africans who share such views wonder –

Why should I care about them [African Americans] and the Transatlantic Slave Trade…? What does this have to do with me? I realize that their ancestors originated from my neck of the woods but so what?

As noted above, most African Americans continue to see themselves as second class citizens in the only country they have ever known, a country that their ancestors were instrumental in forming. As the US First Lady Michelle Obama said in her speech at the Democratic National Convention’s opening night in July 2016 referring to the White House, ‘I wake up every morning in a house that was built by slaves’ (Washington Post Staff 2016). Our respondent, an African American woman, who lives in one of Philadelphia’s most respectable black neighbourhoods, spoke vividly about it –

During the four hundred years of enslavement we helped to build this country. And we were not even allowed to use a bath. So that’s trauma.

Another black citizen of the “City of Brotherly Love”, from the lower middle class, answering the question of which historical figures are most prominent for America, said, ‘to me, black people who were brought here as slaves – we built America.’ The historical memory of that period is so alive in black Americans’ consciousness that our respondents unselfconsciously identify with the black slaves who contributed so much to their country, using the term “we” when speaking about them. History and the present form an indissoluble symbiosis. So many African Americans think of their ancestors not merely as heroes deprived of glory, but as their comrades-in-arms. The ‘time of slavery negates the common-sense intuition of time as continuity or progression; then and now coexist; we are coeval with the dead’ (Hartman 2009, p. 431). Projecting the past onto the present is a characteristic feature of African Americans’ consciousness; this is not peculiar to Africans.

Black Africans and African Americans are unanimous in glorifying victims of slavery and celebrating those who fought against the slave trade and slavery. In the words of an African respondent, ‘[t]he great men and men and women who have led the movement for emancipation are many and they provide great interest’. Among the most outstanding figures in American history, members of both communities often named those who contributed to this struggle, which legally ended 18 December 1865 with adoption by the US Congress of the 13th amendment to the Constitution proclamation that abolished slavery and involuntary servitude (except as punishment for a crime): Abraham Lincoln, Richard Allen, Frederick Douglass, and Harriet Tubman. The slave trade unites blacks as a common symbol of oppression in the face of whites; however, it is not strong enough to create a feeling of historical and cultural unity. For one thing, a feeling of unity based on dissimilarity to some third party, rather than of shared sameness, will be fragile. For another, the slave trade is interpreted differently in
the historical memory of African migrants and African Americans. It occupies a different place in their consciousness.

The attitude of African Americans to Africans is determined to a large extent by the important part played in their collective memory by the true historical fact that Africans themselves supplied white traders with slaves. As a result, black Americans not infrequently look at Africans as descendants of those who sold their ancestors into slavery. This sentiment is so strong that Godfrey Uzoigwe, a US-based Nigerian historian, sees no prospect of rapprochement between the two black communities if the African Union (AU) will not offer African Americans an official apology for complicity in the slave trade (Uzoigwe 2008).

Once again, events that occurred more than 200 years ago have become so powerful in African Americans' historical memory that contemporary Africans seem responsible for centuries-old atrocities. In some ways, African participation in the slave trade resembles Original Sin; it has no statute of limitation, passing from generation to generation, extending to every African and to Africans collectively.

Of course, such charges often offend African migrants though some try to treat this situation with understanding. Africans (and African Caribbeans) sometimes invoke the trauma of slavery to explain the negative personality traits and behaviour they characterize as typically lower class African American, such as aggressiveness, rancor, suspiciousness and so forth. According to an Ethiopian interlocutor –

Africans in America are doing well because they have a different culture than that of African Americans; their ancestors were not slaves, and they are not fixated on the problem of racism, which does not allow African Americans to rise socially and culturally.

Certain African Americans also justify some of these behavioural problems as products of their oppressed past. Furthermore, the wish of some African Americans to nurture a “free” African identity so that they can feel part of the “great African civilization” is caused by their conscious desire to get rid of the trauma of slavery – the feeling of inferiority of their own socio-cultural identity and the humiliation of living in a society that still looks at them as at descendants of slaves. For some African Americans, African immigrants enjoy the benefits that they have not earned. Most African Americans thinking this way are poorly educated but some are well educated. African migrants, the logic goes, owe the very possibility of enjoying these benefits to the suffering and the struggle of African Americans, whose torment and humiliation was partly caused by Africans. This position reflects a widespread, specific feature of such people’s outlook –

African-Americans may think, ‘oh, you are attacking our part of the American portion’. You know, because in their mind they think a certain part of America is for Caucasians, a certain part is for Latin Americans, a certain part is for African Americans, a certain part is for Asians. So, when Africans are coming, then the same African Americans with this kind of mentality think, ‘oh, you are coming to take our part, to take what we already have’, and this creates some tensions.

From this perspective, the events in Washington, DC, in 2005 are instructive. The migrant
Ethiopian community applied to the city administration, asking that the part of the Shaw neighborhood in which they lived be officially named “Little Ethiopia”. The administration was ready to meet the request, but Shaw’s African American community rejected the project. That community considered the project an attempt to capitalize on growing commerce and an influx of tourists that resulted from victories in the struggle for civil rights, created by African Americans rather than recent African migrants (Kedebe 2011; Oray 2013). Many of those we spoke with presented this conflict as a purely ‘economic issue’, ‘a story of “this little pie”’ of public goods which could not feed everyone (see also Crary 2007). Still, the socio-cultural component seemed undeniable. In fact, the organizers of the protest openly confessed to it in the press. Speaking of the Ethiopians –

They haven’t paid their dues, said Clyde Howard, 71, a retired postal worker and longtime Shaw activist. ‘Where were they during the [1968] riots? They’re Johnny-come-lately. What gives them the right? Just because you opened a store?’ (Schwartzman 2005)

This story is not unique. In Philadelphia, African American hairdressers tried to prevent hairdressers from Africa and the Antilles from working, on the grounds that they did not have the necessary permits. Also in Philadelphia, as well as in Chicago, African Americans demanded that city authorities stop accepting green card lottery winners from Africa. Even during the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections when Barack Obama enjoyed broad support from African Americans, some members of this community did not vote for him because his father was a Kenyan from Africa, not an African American (Williams 2008; Sundiata 2015). Because Obama and his ancestors had no experience in the suffering and humiliation at the heart of the African American experience, some blacks viewed him as an outsider (Sarmah 2007).

At the same time, as mentioned above, some African Americans try to cope with the trauma of slavery by cultivating “a spirit of Africa”, positioning themselves as primarily African. Some of them start wearing “African” clothes, change a “white”, “slavish” name for “African”, “return” to Islam – allegedly ‘the way of life they [Africans] took with them to America as slaves’ (Winters 1985, p. 56), or even to ‘African’ ancestor cult (Williams n.d.). Generally, they strive to feel, think and behave in ‘the African way’, as they understand it. For example, as the coordinator of the St Louis annual African festival, an African American herself, told us, although she manages to involve some African migrants, the vast majority of participants are African Americans seeking their cultural roots. Among those participants, she listed performers of African dances, manufacturers and sellers of handicrafts in the “African style”, and cooks of African foods at the festival, as well as visitors. Usually these people are from the lower middle and middle classes. They began doing so in the 1950s and 1960s in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement (Paulun 2012). To “real” Africans, and not only those living through the sale of attributes of “Africanness” (clothes, bijouterie, souvenirs), such people seem comical and even unintelligent.

However, among the more affluent and educated African Americans, including those in the upper middle class and wealthy celebrities, the desire to restore the link with black Africans has taken other forms. To a great extent, those forms are shaped by the socio-political context of the time. Until the “black revolution” of the 1960s, African American music contained no themes of “Mother Africa”; ‘the African American was thinking of him- or herself as a
resident of America’, but in the ‘60s African American unity, Mother Africa, struggle for the rights and freedom are the main themes’ (Zaitsev 2004, p. 128, 130). African American writer Alex Haley’s novel Roots: The Saga of an American Family played a particularly important role. Roots tells the story of several generations of the author’s ancestors – from enslavement in Africa and forcible resettlement to America in the mid-18th century until emancipation a century later. It was first published as a novel in 1976, with a TV mini-series based on it, broadcast in 1977.

Roots – and the idea of restoring both personal connection and the continuity of the black world’s culture – inspired many members of the African American community of the time. The African American elite and upper middle class began taking DNA tests to discover the African ethnic groups from which they came (Nelson 2008; 2013; Clay 2011). For example, the famous TV personality Oprah Winfrey found out that she is a descendant of the Kpelle from modern Liberia, and the actress Whoopi Goldberg, that her ancestors were from the peoples of Papel and Bayot in the present-day Guinea-Bissau. Actor Isaiah Washington’s test showed that his ancestors on the maternal side were the Mende and Temne from Sierra Leone, after which he not only became actively engaged in charity work in that country, but also got his citizenship. His ancestors on the paternal line, according to the DNA test, were the Mbundu from Angola. Ancestors of the father of the founder of Afrocentrism Molefi Kete Asante, as it turned out, were the Yoruba, while his mother’s were the Nubians. One of our respondents turned out to be a descendant of the Cameroonian Bamileke. The well-known Cameroonian anthropologist Francis Nyamnjoh even found it necessary to write and post on the Internet an ethnographic overview of his people, the Tikar, especially for those African Americans who found their origins in that ethnic group (Nyamnjoh 2007). Other African Americans, who cannot afford a DNA test, now refer to the website ancestry.com. That website often has little valuable information or does not have it at all, but can be accessed free of charge. Ironically, African Americans who learned the ethnic group or modern nation from which they came generally continue thinking of themselves as Africans ‘in general’, so strong is the habit of thinking in terms of race, the typical African American logic of cultural thinking.

Wealthy African Americans also began taking advantage of “roots tourism” with non-profits and special travel agencies organizing such tours (Zijlma n.d.). Black tourists from the US and other countries of the New World would go to sites connected with the slave trade. There, in restored architectural monuments, recently created museums, reconstructed ceremonies, and the stories of guides and local residents, they find history waiting for them, presented to match their ideas about it. Even when historical facts are distorted, the experience retains its power to terrify and otherwise move these tourists emotionally. President Obama and his wife gave additional impetus to such tourism in July 2009 when they visited Cape Coast castle in Ghana, one of the main sights from the slave trade era.

However, in Africa all American citizens are perceived as Americans, regardless of skin color. At home, these tourists had created origin stories, partly because they found it impossible to be “just Americans”. Accustomed to considering themselves as African Americans, in Africa they are merely “Americans”. For the most part, residents of the African countries they visit perceive black Americans as strange but wealthy Western tourists who would pay handsomely for this “roots” experience. In Ghana “non-African Africans” are called oburuni, which once meant “European” or “white person” and now means any...
“foreigner” in the Twi language (Lake 1995; Mwakikagile 2007). In East Africa, the same semantic transformation happened with mzungu, the Swahili word for “European” or “white person”, which is also now used in relation to black Americans. An elderly employee of a museum of African American history in Boston sadly told us about her experiences in Africa. Considering herself an African, she went to Africa and saw that for natives, black Americans are not ‘brothers and sisters’, as they were for her, just wealthy tourists from a prosperous country. Or consider this story, told by another elderly African American, who calls Africa “sweet home” –

I have convinced them [Africans] I am not wealthy; you know, they think everybody, every African American that comes is wealthy, they think you live in a big house, you have a lot of cars and TVs, you have the like. Actually, I had to save money for years to make this trip. I stayed myself and no one sponsored me. I had to eat tuna fish for months! They mustn’t say that [I am wealthy]! They don’t have a concept of that! They think this is America, that money just flows [in America]! They didn’t know how much I sacrificed! So I think understanding is not that easy, and I had to convince them not to treat me like a tourist, for, you know, they think you are a sack of money!

African states also see black Americans as a potential source of income and make considerable efforts to attract them as investors and tourists, even providing opportunities for “homecoming” – moving to their countries for permanent residence. Ghana is especially active in this effort (Pierre 2013) since the time of her first President, Kwame Nkrumah. (One of the most prominent proponents of Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah was motivated by ideology, rather than “mercantile” reasons to support black Americans’ repatriation [Gaines 2006; see also Alex-Assensoh 2010]). Other West African states are trying to keep up. In particular, since the early 1990s, Benin has sponsored a complex of measures to provide a “proper” representation of the history of the slave trade that would produce social capital, to be used as both a political instrument and source of income (Araujo 2007). As one knowledgeable African American respondent told us –

I think it [resettlement to Africa] is [a chance] for those who want to go and have a true love for it [Africa] and want to be immersed in it, not just to come in and stay in it. And lots of the African Americans that talked to me, they see it as business – the potential of business. And that concerns me. That concerns me seriously because they think only how make a profit and things like that. And African governments, for example, of Ghana, in their turn, try to attract African Americans as investors, not like brothers; they see it as money, this does not go from the heart. But what they also want is to make them very hummable. They see we come with money but they believe we could, being black, be more trustworthy and the government think we can be more appeasable than anybody else. …and that’s the fear of the day: they have this belief that African Americans can be trusted more; they ignore how Western we are in one sense. We may be the same in color but we still value, you know, what takes over people. So, the same happens in South Africa; lots of African Americans went to South Africa after apartheid. And lot of recruitment Ghana did, but South Africa
Still, our respondents showed us, over and over, that the vast majority of African Americans and African migrants, as well as black Caribbeans, find a mass “return” of black natives of the New World to Africa unnecessary or at least unrealistic. Contrary to many black thinkers from William Blyden to Kwame Nkrumah, adherents of Afrocentrism do not insist on it either (Khokholkova 2014). In the words of a respondent, today “[t]he world has gone far beyond this type of thinking’. Most African Americans are entrapped in ‘double marginalization’ – in the white socio-cultural mainstream and with regards to the African ‘motherland’ where, they admit, they are unable to return either physically or psychologically (Elliott n.d., p. 8–12). Nevertheless, small communities of “homecomers” do exist, in particular in Ghana. The depth and strength of feelings experienced by these people at “coming back home” to Africa, to the “land of ancestors”, is so intense that it is difficult to describe. These feelings are vividly expressed in the book of such a person, Seestah Imahkus, a US native now permanently residing in Ghana (Imahkus 1999). But the position of the homecomers in local society often becomes very complex. Many of them feel cultural dissonance with their new compatriots, have problems with the state authorities, or feel disappointed that they did not receive a much warmer welcome (Lake 1995; Mwakikagile 2007; Jalloh & Falola 2008; Schramm 2008; 2009; 2010; Alex-Assensoh 2010; Forte 2010; Delpino 2011). In the words of a Liberian woman residing in the US for many years –

I could be wrong, but this is how I see this thing after long being with the African Americans now. This is their home and I’ll see that anticipation of all that desire to go and to learn what that [African] heritage was – for them, this is heritage. Those African Americans, who moved to Africa, for example to Ghana, complain of being not welcome cordially there because they want to impose their culture on the people.

As a young African wrote on an Internet forum –

Nobody wants African Americans to return to Africa because they will be foreigners; they are better off where they are [now]. And our ancestors stayed behind [economically] because they were probably weaker, but we are where we are supposed to be [their home in Africa].

Nonetheless, those African American respondents who see themselves first and foremost as Africans, usually did not rule out the possibility of resettling in Africa, even if only when they retire. Yet, many African Americans from all walks of life feel their American identity so deeply that they are not interested in returning to their African roots, either personally or as members of the ethno-racial community. They do not feel anything special, either good or bad, about Africans, and treat them as any other immigrants. Outside major urban communities this indifference is enhanced by the fact that relatively few African migrants live there, limiting their personal contact.

While African residents often see African American “roots tourism” as an opportunity to capitalize on the eccentricities of rich Westerners, our African migrant respondents see it

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differently. They sneer at those African Americans ‘who try to be more African than Africans’, seeking ‘real Africa’ without leaving their home country. They are equally disdainful of those who wear pseudo-African clothes or buy souvenirs that have very little to do with real folk art. Immigrants are also negative about the ‘fashion’ for DNA testing. At the same time, many Africans believe that DNA testing will help African Americans realize that Africa is not culturally homogeneous; as noted, Africans find the image of ‘Africa in general’, widely spread among African Americans, inaccurate and condescending. Moreover, when rich and renowned African Americans take a DNA test, immigrants dismiss it as personal self-promotion, even if after taking the test they begin to invest in their ‘countries of origin’. After all, the amounts invested are an insignificant part of their total wealth. However, African immigrants unanimously support roots tourism, as well as other kinds of trips to Africa. Such trips increase the amount of genuine knowledge African Americans have about Africa, encouraging them to abandon negative stereotypes and promoting better relationships between African Americans and African migrants in the US.

While the transatlantic slave trade and slavery are crucial for African American respondents’ historical memory, its value for African migrants is different. For one thing, the slave trade is not a primary factor in the identity of Africans. For another, Africans think of the slave trade less as the betrayal of some black people by others, as of the exploitation of black people by whites. Paradoxically, Africans emphasize the racial aspect of slavery more forcefully than African Americans. Be that as it may, the collective historical memory of the slave trade within these communities separates them more than it integrates them as they face “white America”.

Conclusion
Fundamental differences in perception, estimation, and evaluation of the slave trade and its consequences make a significant contribution to the establishment of an ambiguous and complicated relationship between African Americans and Africans in the present. The impact of not only events of the past but also of the memory of them on mentality and behaviour of the African Americans and Africans, on their mutual perception and relationships is realized by many intellectuals from both communities. In the words of the residing in the United States Nigerian scholar and diplomat Femi Ojo-Ade, between African migrants and African Americans, ‘whether we like it or not, there is a divide, a deep one, a dangerous one…’ (Ojo-Ade 2011, p. 14) The other researcher, Msia Kibona Clark, half Tanzanian, half African American, characterizes the relationship between Black communities in the US as ‘dysfunctional at best and hostile at worst’ (Clark 2006).

At the same time, one of the central points for ideologists of all the “black nationalism” teachings is the postulate that all those whose skin is black and roots are in Africa are “brothers and sisters”. Among our numerous respondents, there were those who agreed with this statement. Some of them took it with specific reservations. According to one of the interlocutors, Africans and African Americans share the same historical background-

We were exploited. So, if you go back to that historical experience we share, we should be calling ourselves brothers and sisters. But if you wanna know from political point, the way we treat each other is not like brothers and sisters, though from the historical point, we should.

Another respondent believes that Africans and black Americans are brothers and sisters, ‘but
Martin Luther King said: “don’t ever call a man your brother unless he acts like one”. For most African Americans and especially Africans, the postulate about pan-black brotherhood sounds as nothing more than an ideological slogan, wrong and even absurd. Uwah (2005) stated that, ‘I have come to believe… that for the most part, our shared sense of identification and affinity begins and ends with the awareness of the commonality of skin color’ (p. 24). Kalu Ogbaa (2003), a Nigerian scholar and writer residing in America, asks himself a question and answers it: ‘For example, both groups are victims of racial profiling by the police. Does that then mean that their intergroup relations are good and smooth all the time? Certainly not’ (p. 111). As a respondent said–

I do not believe we are brothers and sisters just because society classifies us based on skin color and on the fact that all black people suffer some form of social discrimination. We are not brothers and sisters just because all Blacks get their roots from Africa. Brothers and sisters should care for one another.

Thus, the “magnetic poles” of the black communities both attract and repel them; the differences in historic memory of African Americans and recent African migrants in the United States do play a significant role in determining the nature of their relationships.

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Race and Ethnicity: Similarity and Distinction in Identities of Contemporary African Migrants and African Americans

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Abstract
From 1980 to 2012, the African-born population in United States grew from just under 200,000 to 1.6 million. What has surprised or even shocked African immigrants in North America is that race remains a significant and pressing social category; racialised power relations and hierarchical differentiation exist, and people of black African descent are still struggling to define and redefine their identities, roles, and places in the global community. As Marilyn Halter (2007) stated, the foreign-born blacks come to realize that their cultural distinctiveness does not shield them from racism and discrimination. Their black skin color also serves as an ascribed marker of ethnic and cultural identity and membership or belongingness to the group, as well as marks them for discrimination and prejudice from the wider society. This paper investigates the complexity and ambiguity of the relations between old African-American communities and emerging African communities. It attempts to find an answer to the question: why, despite the congeniality of many cultural myths and ideological settings, African-Americans and Africans are different communities with certain specificity of relationships? The paper presents the results of the research projects, African Americans and Recent African Migrants in the USA: Cultural Mythology and Reality of the Intercommunity Relations (2013) and, The Relations between African-Americans and Recent African Migrants: The Socio-Cultural Aspects of Intercommunity Perception (2014-2016), supported by the Russian Foundation for Humanitarian Research, grant #14-01-00070.

Introduction
International migration has become a major epiphenomenon in Africa today. The sheer volume and scope of this migration is unprecedented. The current migration of the well-educated is one of the major social and cultural transformations shaping the future of the region. However, the migration of skilled and educated labor is not confined to Africans with internationally marketable skills. African and Asian professionals are competing in all areas of professional and skilled jobs in the United States in particular. (Arthur 2010, p. 48). In case of the United States, it is very interesting to look at the relationship between African Americans and the “new Diaspora” of African immigrants to the United States. The relationship is complex, sometimes not without conflict, but the two groups can no longer continue to segregate themselves from each other. In the future, the voice of African immigrants is likely to gain ground in areas of both domestic and foreign policy as Africans and African Americans prove to be valuable resources to each other.

Methods and collected evidence
The field studies were done in the USA in September to November 2013, August 2014 and September to October 2015. In 2013, a team of researchers directed by Prof. Dmitri Bondarenko started a study of mutual perception and relationships between Black
communities in the USA. To date, the research has been conducted in seven states (Alabama, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Missouri), in a number of towns, as well as in cities (Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, and Saint-Louis). The methods of interview (structured, semi-structured, and non-structured) and observation were used. Extensive structured interviews, usually done by preliminary appointment, were recorded on tape. In total, in 2013-2015, the work on the topic of the project was done in 13 towns, mid-size and big cities of seven states: Albertville, Guntersville, and Huntsville in Alabama, Chicago and Evanston in Illinois, Boston, Cambridge, and Springfield in Massachusetts, Minneapolis in Minnesota, St. Louis in Missouri, New York City in New York, and Philadelphia in Pennsylvania. 196 interviews and conversations of different duration and degree of structuring were recorded, notes of observations of many events in the lives of African Americans and African migrants were made; the photo archive consists of 806 photos.

Statistic Data on modern African migration

While the trans-Atlantic slave trade brought large numbers of Africans to the United States as forced migrants from the 16th to the 19th centuries, significant voluntary migration from Africa to the United States began in the 1980s. In 1970, there were about 80,000 African immigrants, representing less than 1 percent of the total foreign-born population. During the following four decades, the number of foreign-born people from Africa grew rapidly, roughly doubling each decade. From 1980 to 2012, the African-born population in United States grew from just under 200,000 to 1.6 million. Today, according to the 2008-2012 American Community Survey (ACS), Africans make up a small (about 4 percent) but growing share of the country's 39.8 million immigrants (Gambino et al 2014). Over 75% of the African immigrants came to live in the United States after 1990. (Grieco et al 2012). This data does not include the more than 10,000 African students that enter U.S. universities every year. In fact, many historians estimate that more Africans have immigrated to the United States since 1980 than came to the United States during the entire period of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade.

In 2009, almost two-thirds of African immigrants were from East and West Africa, but no individually reported country accounted for more than 14.1 percent of the foreign-born from the Africa region. The top countries of origin for African immigrants were Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, and Kenya. Classes of admission for African immigrants who gained lawful permanent residence in 2010 were also diverse, with 48 percent having done so through family relationships, 24 percent through the diversity visa program, 22 percent as refugees and asylum seekers, 5 percent through employment, and the rest through other means. Compared to other foreign-born populations, African immigrants reported higher levels of English proficiency and educational attainment in 2008-2012, and were more likely to be of working age and to participate in the labour force.

African immigrants were also more likely to be recent arrivals to the United States and to live in households with an annual income below the poverty line. There were substantial differences between origin countries with respect to the share living in poverty. For example, immigrants from Nigeria (10.6 percent), Morocco (10.8 percent), Sierra Leone (13.5 percent), and Ghana (14.6 percent) were much less likely than African immigrants overall to live below the federal poverty line. In contrast, almost half of all immigrants from Somalia (49.9 percent) live in poverty, and poverty rates for immigrants from Guinea (42.7 percent) and Sudan (41.2 percent) are also well above the average for African immigrants overall. Somalia
and Sudan have both accounted for a large number of refugee admissions over the past decade. In 2008-2012, the top five countries of origin for the 1.6 million African immigrants in the United States were Nigeria (209,908, or 14.1 percent of all African immigrants), Ethiopia (148,221, or 9.9 percent), Egypt (138,194, or 9.3 percent), Ghana (108,647, or 7.3 percent), and Kenya (87,267, or 5.8 percent). No individually reported country accounted for more than 14.1 percent of the African immigrant population.

Over one-third of all African immigrants resided in New York, California, Texas, and Maryland. New York had the largest number of African immigrants in 2009, with 168,426 individuals or 11.3 percent of the total African-born population, followed by California (143,214, or 9.6 percent), Texas (124,691, or 8.4 percent), and Maryland (117,315, or 7.9 percent). The African-born in these states collectively accounted for 37.1 percent of all African immigrants. Other states with African immigrant populations greater than 60,000 in 2009 included New Jersey (79,420, or 5.3 percent), Massachusetts (76,832, or 5.1 percent), Georgia (75,692, or 5.1 percent), Virginia (69,941, or 4.7 percent), and Minnesota (63,982, or 4.3 percent). African-born adults were more likely than the native-born to have a bachelor's degree or higher level of education. In 2009, 41.7 percent of African-born adults aged 25 and older had a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 28.1 percent of native-born adults and 26.8 percent of all foreign-born adults. Of these, 25 percent of Africans reported a bachelor's degree as their highest credential, compared to 17.9 percent of the native born and 15.8 percent of immigrants. Additionally, 16.7 percent of Africans reported having a higher degree than a bachelor's, compared to 10.2 percent of the native-born and 11.0 percent of immigrants.

For many of Africa’s immigrant population in the United States, a major reason given for leaving Africa is to escape the continent’s persistent political turmoil, civil unrest, war, and factionalism. Political instability has stalled the continent’s push toward creating stable regimes and democratically centered institutions of governance. The lack of political accountability and transparency is a major cause of the deterioration of Africa’s political governance structures. A majority of the immigrants cited this as a primary consideration in their decision to migrate. For other immigrants, the perceived fear of instability and violence accompanied by feelings of insecurity were cited as secondary incentives to emigrate.

When you think about democracy, when you think about freedom of speech, when you think about your own personal freedom and security – it’s much more better in America, than in Africa, you see… (Interview 22)

But economic reasons for migration are still dominant behind African migrations to the United States. The migration literature is filled with a plethora of studies delineating the importance and assessment of economic factors in explaining the reason(s) why people migrate. No matter the type of work available to them in the West, the migratory process is rationalized as offering better economic outcomes relative to what is available in Africa. Migrants stand the chance of earning relatively higher wages in the West. Holding jobs that most of them indicated they would not perform at home, many of the immigrants focus on the wage differentials between work in Africa and the West in general. A considerable number of immigrants and their families enjoy standards of living that most would not have attained if they had stayed in Africa. Economic issues dominate the formulations of the meanings of immigration. Negative experiences with discrimination and perceived denial of economic
opportunities on account of skin color and place of origination were cited as major problems facing the immigrants in the United States. For some of the immigrants, good educational background does not easily translate into better access to economic resources and opportunities.

Despite the great potential, English knowledge and education level, the African immigrants were more likely to live in poverty in 2009 than were the native-born and the foreign-born overall. In 2009, a greater share of African immigrants lived in a household with an annual income below the federal poverty line (18.5 percent) compared to the native-born (13.6 percent) and immigrants overall (17.3 percent). Black Americans have become aware of the increasing presence of black immigrants in their communities. In Atlanta, Georgia, there has been a 284 percent increase in the African immigrant population during the past two decades. In the Midwestern cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul, the black African immigrant community grew by over 600 percent during the decade 1990–2000.

There is always that envy… you are from Africa, you’re gonna take our jobs, we know why are you here. It’s not only at that level, but it’s even at professional level. (Interview 15)

Identification: Similarities and Distinctions
Officially, in 2008-2012, 74.4 percent of the African-born population reported their race as Black, either alone or in combination with another race. African immigrants identified as Black at a much higher rate than the native-born (14.0 percent) and the foreign-born overall (8.6 percent), and accounted for 33.3 percent of all foreign-born Blacks and 2.7 percent the total Black population in the United States. Since the voluntary migration of Africans to the United States, systematic efforts have been made by scholars of the African diaspora to unravel the contents of the relationships that African immigrants establish with other minority groups, particularly native-born black Americans. A survey of their research has revealed cultural similarities among the two groups. As a visible minority group, African immigrants share a host of common physical and cultural traits with their native-born counterparts. Like black African immigrants, African American and Caribbean-born blacks share a common bond of descent and ancestry from Africa. Their black skin color also serves as an ascribed marker of ethnic and cultural identity and membership or belongingness to the group. There are racial minorities with similar colonial experiences when it comes to minority-majority group relationships at the national and supranational levels. A shared heritage of slavery and foreign colonisation marks the collective experiences of the two groups: African migrants and African Americans. In a race and colour-conscious American social system, African and American-born blacks continue to occupy lower social hierarchies when multiple dimensions of well-being and life chances (healthcare, income, lifespan, longevity, home ownership, access to capital, and wealth) are contrasted with white Americans. Most African Americans are still inclined to see themselves as second class citizens in their home country, a nation wherein their ancestors have always played an important role. An African American from Philadelphia spoke vividly about it –

During the 400 years of enslavement we helped to build this country. And we were not even allowed to use a bath. So that’s trauma. (Interview 17)
Another Black citizen of the City of Brotherly Love responded to the question, ‘what historical figures are most prominent for America?’ –

To me, black people who were brought here as slaves; we built America. However, everything is based on caucasians. You see all those statues [in the city], some of them are for blacks, but mostly they are for caucasians. (Interview 15)

Our field research evidences that notwithstanding common features between African migrants and African-Americans, the differences between them and misconceptions, as well misunderstandings are obvious. Many African Americans are indifferent to their African roots; some of them do not even want to associate themselves with the natives of her underdeveloped countries. Marilyn Halter (2007) noted that the history of the relationship between native and foreign-born black immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean has been an uneasy one. The foreign-born blacks are said to assert their cultural differences and look to the numerous associations that they form to minimize the deleterious effects of discrimination and racism. As Halter aptly stated, the foreign-born blacks come to realize that their cultural distinctiveness does not shield them from racism and discrimination. Their black skin color marks them for discrimination and prejudice from the wider society. I do not want to generalise in such sensitive questions, but some respondents told us that attitudes towards them from African Americans were worse than from other groups in society. It could be a result of heightened expectations. As one respondent stated –

…that’s part of the cultural shock. You come, you see somebody looking like you, you think that this person might be more … you know, for support, for help than somebody who looks different from me. But you find out that people who looks different from you are more helpful than people who looks like you. (Interview 16)

I have had racial discrimination directed toward me by African Americans more than white persons did. (Interview 11)

Our respondents identified the roots of this situation with stereotypes which existed among African Americans as well among African migrants about each other. The contact between African American and modern African migrants are shadowed by stereotypes of Africans as either poor and uncivilised, or smart and arrogant. African men are also seen as domineering and African women as passive and accepting of the abuse they get at the hands of oppressive African men. African Americans are seen as lazy, obsessed with racism and lacking a culture. African American women are seen as loose, while the men are seen as violent criminals.

…in Africa there are a lot of negative stereotypes, and a lot of Africans come to America having extremely negative viewpoint or stereotypes of African Americans: that they are lazy, that they are rude, that they are ignorant, that they are poorly educated… (Interview 6)

Tanzanian born and American raised, Msia Kibona Clark pointed out that the Nigerian slang word “Akata”, which Americans were first exposed to in the film “Sugar Hill”, is a word used by some West Africans to refer to African Americans. The word, roughly translated, is a derogatory term meaning “savage”, “slaves”, “captives”, or (like in Sugar Hill) “cotton picker”. These are some of the images that tend to hover over any contact between Africans
and African Americans (Clark, 2012). And from other side, the stereotypes which African migrants face –

...But as for African Americans in general, they think that they can learn nothing from us. They think that we live in the bush, in jungles. They have everything, and we got nothing! So if you are from a city and I am from bush, you think there's nothing you can learn from me. (Interview 4)

You also get that they think that we are undereducated; most of us live in poverty and on the trees, this all traditional stereotypes. (Interview 16)

Many people say that African Americans have a sort of grievance towards Africans. Most typical –

I even heard that some of them like to say ‘You sold us’, ‘Our ancestors came here as slaves because your ancestors sold them’. (Interview 7)

Some respondents, NGO activists have noted that –

It’s pity, but we don't have a strong African American voice on the issue of immigration. (Interview 16)

Because African Americans do not consider this an important issue, for them social problems, discrimination, equal opportunities are more significant. For misunderstanding between African migrants and African Americans our respondents blame inter alia American mass media. Our respondent from Somalia who is now a Canadian citizen and Boston resident stated that –

I’m a teacher and I talked to so many and had conversations and tried to find out where this little hostility comes from. And I found that they see Africans on the TV, dying from hunger and this and that, and they just don’t want to associate with you. They see Africans as the poor who came here in large numbers as refugee. (Interview 20)

The image of Africa in the American media according to our respondents’ views, is such that they do not make distinctions between African countries –

They never say “Liberia”, they always say “Africa.” All what is happening in Liberia, is happening in “Africa.” Everything happening in Kenya, is “Africa.” They never identify the countries, so a lot of the people here do not appreciate the fact that Africa is a continent, even though in Africa we have different cultures. But people just do get that as if we just live in one country – “Africa”. (Interview 3)

The education system plays a role in the misrepresentation of Black people as a whole. One of our respondents tell us a heartbreaking story, but with a positive outcome of how African American and African migrants can come together –

When I went to work in America, to the Department of Energy, I was the only African in my unit. And the staff in the unit were all Americans – one White and the rest Black. But I come in touch with people easily, so it did not take long for
me to make friends. Today those – the staff and I, and our families – we are very close. But I remember one day when one of them looked at me with tears in her eyes, and she said: “If you had not come into this unit, I would have never known that it was possible for me to proudly feel African.” And I said: “Why?” And she said: “Because of what we were taught at school.” She was older than the other staff. And she said: “In school, I was never taught to appreciate my heritage.” (Interview 3)

For some of the African émigrés, diaspora identity will be shaped by links with the nation-state. For others, the content of diaspora identity is going to be informed by a Pan-African dynamic. Yet still for others, the formation and continuity of diaspora identities will be filtered through immigrants’ sense of statelessness, refugee status, tribal, clan, ethnic, class, gender, or even alumni relationships. It is not merely the formation of a common African and African American diaspora that is questionable, but the existence of just one “African diaspora” is difficult to imagine. Not just one “African diaspora” was formed, instead Senegalese, Ethiopian, and other national diasporas have formed; most African respondents think the same way. These diasporas are extremely heterogeneous and internally fragmented – ethnically, religiously, socially, politically. At the same time, migrants from different states may share commonalities, including ethnicity, language and religion. There is business, friendship, and sometimes family relations between them; sometimes their members demonstrate Pan-African feelings. Nonetheless, the country of origin is the identity’s “reference point” for most first generation African migrants. They try to keep it for their children. For example, respondents from Somalia (more often) or Nigeria said they prefer marriages to people from their countries for their children.

…Ah, I’ll tell you so: yes, only Nigerians. Because of culture. That’s the only one (culture - V.U.) she knows. Because she grows with Nigerian parents, our life is Nigerian. That’s the only life she knows.

- But you said you are typically American.

- Not in the area of marriage. Not in the area of marriage. For me, I am American. I know she cannot cope with the American culture, she cannot live in the house with the American culture. Any house! We still live in the family with respect, they (daughters - V.U.) are humble, in all, being Nigerians. I want them to continue to do that, and in the place where we are they (Americans - V.U.) don’t proceed that. (Interview 21)

But some research says that there are more Africans married to Americans of African descent than to Americans of European descent (Clarks, 2012). Marriages between Africans and African Americans for some of respondents constitute not only new strong links between two communities, but also a new feature to identities of all Black Americans, or even challenge to identification of African Americans as well as Africans migrants to the United States.

Conclusion

What surprised or even shocked African immigrants in North America is that the peoples of black African descent are still struggling to define and redefine their identities, roles, and places in the global community. For black African immigrants, the articulation of racial identity is linked to the historical symbolisms often associated with being black. When we had a talk with our respondents, racial identity was not awarded much importance. They identified themselves as Blacks because the society identifies them in this way. Coming from
highly diverse backgrounds in every aspect of human endeavour, the new black immigrants entering the United States add to the ethnic and racial tapestry of the United States. In particular, they transform, enrich, and broaden the African American ethnic quilt with their cultural presence. Within this plural and ethnic mosaic representing black American identities, is the notion of shared cultural essences, the varied ways in which black African culture adds to the black American racial and ethnic tapestries. Overall, contact between Africans and African Americans is often complex and multi-layered. Economic background, level of African-centered consciousness, length of time in America, age, and family influences, all play a part in the interactions between Africans and African Americans. The study demonstrates that all of these immigrants, irrespective of the modes and circumstances of their migrant journeys or what brings them to the shores of the United States, are united by a common core principle: to use migratory contacts to change how Africans as a group are viewed by the rest of the world and at the same time use the experiences they garner abroad to empower Africans. And though their absence from the African scene may continue to cause a depletion of talent and human resources, ultimately these immigrants give back to Africa more than has been invested in them by their respective home governments. And once again to make it clear: for African Americans, race is a key point of identification whereas for African migrants it is their home country, religion, ethnicity, and only after all of that, race.

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The ANC and Capital: Aspirations to Hegemony

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Abstract
Recent years have seen a worldwide crisis of confidence in economic systems, elected leaders and state structures. This is especially acute in South Africa where confidence in the African National Congress (ANC) has been fatally undercut by corruption scandals, economic stagnation, and state failure. The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa's (NUMSA) departure from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and ongoing attempt to create a United Front opposed to the government presents a new challenge to the ANC by an independent union. A Gramscian view of this situation understands these organisations as counter-hegemonic movements emerging organically from the articulation of subaltern class-consciousness. This paper contends that the ANC is operating an unstable hegemonic project through the vehicle of the South African state. However, bias toward key blocs of capital in economic policy, incompatible with the needs of the population at large, has made it increasingly untenable. Despite this “organic crisis” the ideology of neoliberalism underwriting this hegemonic project has deeply penetrated common sense understandings. This paper is a work-in-progress; research is still being undertaken and interviews are undergoing further analysis.

Introduction
South Africa exists on the periphery of the capitalist world system, as a supplier of minerals, precious metals and cheap labour. The extraction of surplus value from regional to urban centres, and onwards to industrialised countries, has been a feature of the South African economy since colonialism. This system of cheap labour was intensified under Apartheid and has been deepened by neoliberal policy prescriptions in the post-independence period (Koelble 2004). The African National Congress (ANC) proactively supports this through labour laws that promote greater labour flexibility, segmentation and informalisation, and the externalisation of labour contracts (Barchiesi 2003). This has resulted in a cheap, informalised, mostly black labour force, and a white dominated professional white-collar and managerial strata (Statistics South Africa 2014, p. 3). Further, despite the stated intentions of equality and integration, the inequities of urban development have been reinforced by the overwhelmingly black working class still living in Apartheid ghettos spatially excluded from predominantly white suburbs (Bond 2010).

ANC economic policies have generated sluggish, uneven economic growth punctuated by currency devaluations. This has resulted in increased income inequalities, falling wages, growing unemployment, increased utilities costs and much higher non-payment rates and disconnection levels (UNDP 2003; Bond 2010). Although the official unemployment rate hovers at around 25 percent, the real unemployment rate is closer to 35 percent (Statistics South Africa 2014, p. 10). The corresponding increase in inequality has bolstered public dissatisfaction with the ANC, evident in the ANC’s loss of Pretoria and Johannesburg in the 2016 municipal elections. Public disaffection was further exacerbated by the failure of the
South African state to provide reliable basic services such as water, electricity, and waste disposal. This has resulted in a sharp upsurge of popular protest since the mid-2000s, especially acute in the most affected areas: The Eastern Cape and Gauteng province. Strikes also escalated throughout this period, growing from 57 recorded incidents in 2008 to 99 in 2012 (Muirirapachena & Sibanda 2014, p. 553). Police responses have become increasingly heavy handed; the use of live rounds, dogs, high pressure hoses, and pepper spray is common. Between 1999 and 2012, 200 striking South Africans were killed, 313 injured, and over 3,058 arrested (ibid.).

These events culminated in the 2012 Marikana massacre during which the South African Police Force killed 34 striking mineworkers and injured 112 others at the Lonmin Platinum Mine (Lonmin) in Marikana (Alexander 2013, p. 605). As the first massacre of workers since Apartheid, it marked an all-time low in relations between workers and unions, and unions and the ANC. In the wake of this tragedy, South Africa’s labour force began to look askance at their own pay and pressed for higher wages. A worker revolt continued well into 2013, inspiring a number of wildcat strikes demanding much higher wages than their unions had negotiated months earlier (Bond 2014, p. 13). The clear conflict of interest between the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and Lonmin led to the formation of the apolitical mineworkers’ union, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). In the wake of this workers’ revolt the ANC became increasingly hostile, proposing bills that, if enacted, would clamp down on media freedom and access to justice. Meanwhile, the South African Police Force continued to employ excessive violence, killing four people in Mothutlung during a peaceful protest over the lack of water (Bond 2014, p. 5).

The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)
One of the most significant developments during this period was the rejection by COSATU affiliate NUMSA of the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance, and its commitment to establishing a United Front. The Alliance is comprised of COSATU, the ANC, and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Formed in 1987, the Marxist-Leninist union, NUMSA, has long been seen as the most radical affiliate of COSATU. It is a hard-line workerist union committed to the ‘independent political interests of the working class’ (Ruiters 2014, p. 430). With over 365,000 members, NUMSA is notable for its vocal opposition to neoliberal economic policies such as privatisation and liberalisation. As such, NUMSA has long been critical of union involvement in the ANC-led Alliance, sponsoring a resolution in 1993 that COSATU should not have a formal alliance with the ANC. Instead, NUMSA espoused forging alliances with ‘progressive community and political organisations’, and looking at ‘new forms of organisation that will unify the working class’ (Ruiters 2014, p. 430). Although this idea was attacked by the SACP and ultimately rejected at the 1994 COSATU conference, it continued to circulate within the union (Gall 1997).

The suspension of left-leaning COSATU general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, on the 14th of August, 2013, provoked the ire of NUMSA and sympathetic leftist groups already discontent with the ANC. The subsequent massacre of mineworkers led NUMSA to adopt unprecedented positions which harkened back to its 1993 resolution. Citing the ANC’s failure to address the needs of the working-class poor, NUMSA committed itself to the establishment of a political organisation committed to the interests of the working class (NUMSA, 2014). Together with nine other unions, NUMSA resolved to create a United Front
bringing together social movements and community organisations in a similar vein to the United Democratic Front (UDF) of the 1980s. Additionally, it demanded COSATU break away from the ruling Tripartite Alliance and withdrew support for the ANC in the run up to the 2014 general elections (Ruiters 2014). This resulted in a gain of 38,000 members in 2013 whilst other unions, notably NUM, faced precipitous decline (Ruiters 2014, p. 430).

The response from the ANC-led Alliance was swift and brutal. The SACP branded NUMSA a class traitor, whilst COSATU suspended and attempted to expel NUMSA and Vavi. In late 2014, NUMSA was summarily expelled from COSATU in violation of its own charter constitution. The new Liberated Metalworkers’ Union of South Africa (LIMUSA) was ushered in as a replacement in early 2015 (Mail & Guardian 2014). Meanwhile, NUMSA expanded the scope of its operations beyond metalworkers and aligned itself with nine other unions and numerous civil society organisations. These unions have been playing a strident role in helping lead and coordinate protests by various groups, committees and civics surfacing throughout SA, including the ongoing student fees protests (Ruiters 2014, p. 431).

Theoretical Framework

This paper situates NUMSA’s actions in the broader context of counter-hegemonic struggle. As such, it employs the Gramscian concepts of “hegemony”, “organic crisis”, “organic intellectuals” and “common sense” to understand social and political struggle in South Africa. In Gramscian terms, the faltering ability of the ANC to co-opt or contain counter-hegemonic struggles suggests that the ANC’s attempted hegemonic project is in crisis. Hegemony refers to the power inflation that accrues to a leading group as a result of its ability to convince subaltern groups that the former are bearers of a general interest (Arrighi 2005, p. 32) This is deeply interconnected with the Gramscian conception of ‘common sense’, for only through penetrating and reorienting common sense can a leading group establish hegemony (Dufour 2008). The collapse of Apartheid required the reconfiguration of the ruling bloc and the creation of a new racially inclusive national consensus. Although racially excluded subaltern classes were integrated into the leading group, white South African capital and wealthy Afrikaners forged a new national consensus in which they still played a leading role. As a result, the new dispensation was overwhelmingly biased towards the interests of ‘financial capital and conglomerates anchored in the minerals-energy complex’ (Marais 2011, p. 395). This bias took the form of active state support for international expansion, fiscally conservative monetary policies, and policies of economic liberalisation and privatisation.

The capture of the ANC by key blocs of capital was ideological and material, with the ANC profiting from its new economic trajectory, and creating a system of patronage and corruption. This new consensus took for granted key neoliberal precepts including the assumptions that market liberalisation, positive monetary policy and privatisation were key drivers of economic growth (Ngwane 2007). However, the building blocks of hegemony in South Africa remain eclectic and contradictory. They include elements such as: profound criticism of the Apartheid system; recognition that the ANC ‘channels and embodies the values and aspirations of liberation’; a liberal political system; consensus that economic growth is in everybody’s best interests and that the pursuit of growth is best facilitated by a relatively free market; the need for a (temporary) welfare system, and; belief that dependency on the state ought to be avoided (Marais 2011, p. 395). These contradictions constitute the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), whose principal
This hegemonic project is highly elastic, tempering its neoliberal policies with state interventions such as the provision of state housing, public-works programs, and social grants. Furthermore, race and ethnicity are employed to project internal deficiencies onto external blame groups, resulting in sporadic outbreaks of xenophobic violence. The ANC invests itself with great moral weight by evoking the symbols and concepts surrounding the national liberation struggle to undermine counter-hegemonic projects (Darracq 2008, p. 602). However, the contradictions between the requirements of capital and the needs of the population have increasingly undermined the ANC’s ability to foster consent. The ANC attempted to bridge the gap between the governed and the governing by replacing Mbeki with Zuma, framing the ‘reconfiguration of elite dominance’ within the discourse of the ‘National Democratic Revolution’ (Marais 2011, p. 405). While initially successful, this attempt has proved short-lived, with the latter’s presidency plagued by a series of corruption scandals.

Methodological Framework
Just as hegemony is embedded within the norms, social practices and ideology developed within a specific regional and national context, so too is meaning. This study is interested in this historical and cultural bedrock. It employs an interpretative methodological paradigm using qualitative methods to examine the hegemony of, and resistance to, the ANC hegemonic project. Fifteen interviews of “organic” intellectuals and a comprehensive analysis of texts such as newspapers, government communiqués, journal articles, books, and interview transcripts, were conducted. This combination is useful in determining the validity of information and illuminating alternative interpretations of events.

Analysis of academic texts is supported by a historically informed textual analysis of official ANC communiqués available to the general public, newspaper clippings, and other texts pertaining to ANC economic theory, and domestic and foreign policy. These texts are treated as both important sources of information about the ANC and South Africa and are analysed to determine the extent of embedded neoliberal logics. Newspapers chosen for this study include: The Citizen; The Sowetan; the New Age; The Star; The Times; Sunday Times; Mail & Guardian; Cape Times; The Independent, and; Business Day.

Interviewees were contacted based on the researcher’s familiarity with their body of work in criticising the ANC and neoliberalism, and/or their relationship with NUMSA and affiliated unions. This constituted their credentials as “organic” intellectuals. Interviews were conducted in an appropriate professional space, recorded and transcribed, and a copy will be sent to the subjects for vetting. Interview subjects were audio recorded, asked four questions followed by a series of prompts, and asked whether or not they wish to be de-identified. These interviews were conducted in English for clarity of expression and ease of transcription, and were thirty to sixty minutes in duration.

I have adopted a five-stage approach for the analysis of interview transcripts, including: (1) ‘careful read-through and note-taking’; (2) extracting ‘notable quotes’; (3) ‘coding/finding the themes’; (4) ‘selecting the themes you are going to focus on’, and; (5) ‘interpreting and writing up the interview data’ (Morris 2015, p. 126-133). This approach is rooted in what Glaser and Strauss (1967) labelled the ‘constant comparison method’. This involves ‘searching for similarities and differences by making systemic comparisons across units of
data’. Latent meanings of the interview transcripts are emphasised in an attempt to get at the ‘common sense’ understandings of interviewees.

Research Findings

“Organic” intellectuals occupy a pivotal role in Gramscian thought as the ‘thinking and organisational’ component of a fundamental social class essential in contesting hegemony (Gramsci 2014, p. 6). “Organic” intellectuals perform the function of organising subaltern classes through the formation of a coherent counter-hegemonic ideology. Analysing how South African intellectuals understand NUMSA and the ANC alliance is crucial to understanding the extent to which the ANC neoliberal project is hegemonic. Of the fourteen analysed interviews of organic intellectuals, two rejected the notion that the ANC is hegemonic, three claimed that the ANC was hegemonic at a certain level, and four claimed that it is hegemonic. However, interviewees generally agreed that ANC economic policy is to some extent neoliberal, with several maintaining that neoliberal doctrine was hegemonic and others noting ANC involvement in a ‘class project’. Generally, interviewees were critical of the ANC state with numerous seeing its policies as intended to enrich a small minority at the expense of the majority. Although it is clear that the ANC sees itself as hegemonic and is seen as aspiring to hegemony, the literature on the ANC characterises the hegemonic project as unstable and faltering. This is borne out of its spasmodic capacity to foster consent and social cohesion among subaltern classes through state activities (Marais 2011, p. 397).

Gramsci placed emphasis on the ‘counting of votes’ as a measure of the ‘expansive and persuasive capacity’ of the ideas and opinions of the leading group (Gramsci 2014, p. 192-193). As such, I conducted a review of the 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 national and provincial elections and the 1996, 2000, 2006, 2011 and 2016 municipal elections, to discern any noticeable trends. The review revealed that the ANC successfully forged a new national consensus in the post-apartheid period, but entered a period of organic crisis from 2006 onwards, manifest in declining voter turnout and falling popular support. According to the Electoral Commission of South Africa, the ANC enjoyed widespread electoral support in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 national elections garnering 62.65, 66.35 and 69.69 percent of the popular vote, respectively. Similarly, the ANC received growing levels of support in the 1996, 2000 and 2006 municipal elections: 58, 59 and 66, respectively. Although the National Party won the Western Cape in 1994 and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) won KwaZulu-Natal in 1994 and 1999, by 2004 the ANC was in control of every province (http://www.elections.org.za). However, stagnant economic growth, devaluations of the rand, and growing unemployment translated into declining electoral support from 2006 onwards. Between 2004 and 2014 national electoral support fell by 7.54 percent, while municipal support fell by 12.39 percent from 66.3 percent in 2006 to 53.91 percent by 2016. Additionally, the ANC lost its outright majority in 4 of the 8 metropolitan municipalities, with the DA gaining control of Nelson Mandela Bay, and forming minority governments in Johannesburg and Tshwane (ibid.). Closer inspection of the national elections reveals declining levels of voter turnout with only 58.6 percent of people of voting age casting a valid vote in 2014. Thus, although the ANC won with 62.15 percent of the popular vote, only 36.42 percent of the population actually elected to vote for them (ibid.). No alternative political party is likely to defeat the ANC in the short term; however, these trends suggest a crisis in the ‘expansive and persuasive capacity’ of the ideas and opinions of the leading group (Suttner, 2014, p. 25;
The instability of the ANC hegemonic project is further illustrated by its faltering capability to coerce or contain counter-hegemonic movements. The resurgence of labour strikes and service delivery protests from the late 1990s onwards can be seen as a response to the ‘local manifestation[s] of neoliberalism expressed in GEAR’, the ANC’s economic policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Dwyer & Zeilig 2012, p. 120). In the early 2000s various social movements emerged including the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the Landless People’s Movement and Abahlali baseMjondolo (Saul, 2003, p. 9). While the ANC was initially successful in marginalising social movements through non-violent means, it has proven incapable of quelling the rise of so-called ‘service delivery’ protests and union marches after 2007. The upsurge of ‘spontaneous’ uprisings are also problematic for the ANC at a structural level as they signal the rearticulation of the working class experience (Ngwane 2007). In response, the ANC has increasingly resorted to barefaced coercion, employing violence to crush protests and periodically assassinating activists (Bond 2014, p. 2).

The ANC hegemonic project has a fluctuating capacity to foster consent; however, neoliberalism has become embedded in ‘common sense’ understandings. ANC economic policy is based on the neoliberal concept of ‘enhanced competitiveness’ emphasising fiscal austerity, export-oriented production, and privatisation (Narsiah 2002, p. 3). The internalisation of neoliberal rationalities is evident in repeated ANC calls for wage restraint; a growing preoccupation with labour productivity by business commentators; the stigmatisation of social protections as handouts; privatisation of basic commodities such as water and electricity, and; the expansion of a public works system (Marais 1998, p. 127. The latter has been criticised for the use of ‘points of leverage for instilling in its recipients the ‘correct’ attitudes and aspirations’ (Hart 2007, p. 26). Neoliberal discourse is also evident in the growth of micro-finance and micro-enterprise schemes, which have become integral to government understandings of the economy, notably in the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA). The growth of advertisements in newspapers for micro-credit and sections on saving money and ‘managing your finances responsibly’ are also highly indicative of neoliberal understandings of wealth-making.

Although NUMSA’s decision to withdraw support from the ANC was ostensibly based on its opposition to neoliberal policies, the way it is understood widely differs. There is a dissensus among South African newspapers on the significance and the role of NUMSA as an opposition movement, with many pro-Democratic Alliance (DA) papers viewing it as a sign of the ANC’s crumbling alliance, whilst others see it as personality-based. Interviewees were also divided on NUMSA’s United Front approach, with some critical of the relevance of Marxism to the current dispensation, while others emphasised the potential of the United Front to revitalise civil society. Several interviewees also saw the NUMSA-COSATU split as another ideologically or personality motivated split, with most respondents unsure of the long term significance, but broadly supportive of its departure from COSATU. The failure of the NUMSA nine to decisively launch its United Front initiative, job shedding in the steel and manufacturing industries, and ongoing internal consternation over whether it should enter national politics has created an impression of inertia among commentators. However, its decision not to campaign for the ANC has had
flow on effects, notably coinciding with an 11 percent drop in the party’s support in Gauteng in 2014 (http://www.elections.org.za).

Conclusion
This paper argues that the African National Congress (ANC) is operating a hegemonic project centred on the state and underpinned by a neoliberal economic discourse. The eclectic and contradictory nature of this project has resulted in a movement which cynically projects itself as liberal, Marxist and neoliberal all at once. This project is unstable and has become increasingly dysfunctional as the ANC has lost legitimacy as the bearer of a general interest. The ANC’s electoral decline underscores a period of “organic crisis” whereby it has increasingly been unable to coerce or contain counter-hegemonic groups from the mid-2000s onwards. Although it is unclear whether the ANC was or is hegemonic, it is suggested that the ANC enjoyed its greatest legitimacy between 1994 and 2004. Additionally, neoliberalism has penetrated subaltern ‘common sense’ understandings, and is reproduced in the media despite opposition within civil society.

The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) has emerged from this period of organic crisis as a detractor of the Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). NUMSA is involved in initiatives which challenge the neoliberal policies of the ANC. NUMSA’s organisational capabilities have been significant in the mobilisation of subaltern classes within civil society, such as the #FeesMustFall campaign, and reinvigorating debate over the linking of unions and social movements. However, it has failed to connect with numerous sectors of civil society. Its approach is interpreted by organic intellectuals as muddled, with sectors of the media situating the NUMSA-COSATU split within the context of the ANC-led alliance’s infighting. However, the extent to which NUMSA’s united front poses a challenge to the ANC as an organic, rather than conjunctural phenomenon, remains unclear.

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A Gramscian-Marxist Framework for the Study of African History:  
A Background Paper

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Abstract
This paper will lay out the structure of a Gramscian-Marxist framework for the analysis of modern African history. This framework is built around core Marxist understandings of capitalist processes and class relations, with emphasis on the specifically Gramscian developments around the nature of the state, and ideas of hegemony, common sense, and the role of organic intellectuals. This also incorporates developing ideas in the area of Uneven and Combined Development, and insights from World Systems Theory, on how relations between core and peripheral states also impact the underlying class dynamics. This framework creates a narrative of shifting power relations and ideological paradigms over the last century, which gives the necessary context for understanding recent events in African politics. Thus a broad narrative of global history over this period will be presented, with specific reference to the African situation. This paper is intended as a broad background paper to Benjamin Hale’s paper, ‘ANC and Capital: Aspirations to Hegemony’. The paper is published as part of the 39th Annual African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) Conference Proceedings 2017.

Introduction
Marxist theories of the international political system, and within it capitalist imperialism, attempt to elucidate the confluence of two patterns of social organisation and competition: economic and geopolitical. Economic structures and competition are characterised by class relations and transnational linkages, while geopolitical structures revolve around the political and military power of states, and their control of territory. Thus, the whole array of states, international organisations, corporations, non-state actors, and civil populations must be integrated into a coherent framework for a complete understanding. The Marxist political-economic premise that the actions of various actors are guided by the forces of the global capitalist economy, and the priorities of capital accumulation is foundational to this analysis. However, it has long been recognised that different players’ interests differ, both domestically and externally. Notwithstanding this, states are generally held to serve the interests of their domestic capitalist class, which constitutes the primary source of taxation revenue and employment for the national population. Conversely, popular political support for a ruling regime suffers if there is a fall in economic prosperity. Therefore, there exists no general conspiracy of government and big business, but a commonality of interests (Callinicos 2009). The complexity of these sets of relationships is magnified when trying to determine how they interact in the definition of the ‘national interest’. This complexity requires an examination of antagonistic relations between and within different sectors of society, the relations between businesses and workers, and the competing interests of different sections of the state.

The global balance of economic and military power has emerged from the historically
conditioned material realities of different sections of the globe. Marxists have detailed the concept of “uneven and combined development” to describe the interconnected fabric of societies at varying levels of development and their economic and geopolitical relations. Imperialism refers to the imposition of control and unequal relations on other areas, for the profit of the imperial actors. The resultant developmental differences arise from uneven distributions of natural resources and localities’ particular histories. They are reproduced by the modern structures of international relations and the global economy (Arrighi 2007; Callinicos 2009; Harvey 2003). While Marxists see capitalist political-economic processes as transcending national boundaries, it is also recognised that the combination of the real legal authority of nation-states and the material reality of localised networks of resources, population, production and consumption, mean that coherent national economies do exist, and are heavily impacted by local histories, cultural values, and political beliefs. Furthermore, the natural interlinkages with neighbouring geographical entities mean that regional economies develop with their own characteristics, and consequently become features within the global dynamics of capitalism. This division of the world into regionally differentiated economic zones was particularly emphasised by Dependency and World-Systems Theorists, such as Immanuel Wallerstein. The more empowered regions of the global economy were dubbed as the “core”, and the disadvantaged areas as the “periphery”. The economic dominance of the core zones ensured a continuous influx of extracted value from the periphery. The super-exploitation of people in the periphery through artificially low wages, allowed a maximisation of profits in the core capitalist economies. Historically, the core dominated in manufacturing, and the periphery was consigned to the production of raw materials and agricultural outputs. However, in recent decades there have been important shifts in this distribution of labour as domination by the core capitalist powers is challenged (Harvey 2003).

For the most part, the stability of the global economic system and dominance of particular states are not maintained by open coercion, but through willing cooperation. The Marxist concept of “hegemony” captures this complexity. As noted by Arrighi (1999) –

Whereas domination rests primarily on coercion, the leadership that defines hegemony rests on the capacity of the dominant group to present itself, and be perceived, as the bearer of a general interest. … Hegemony is … the additional power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the dominant group’s interests, but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest. (p. 26)

Hegemony, ‘depends on the capacity to articulate and orient common sense at the national and global levels through powerful international institutions and material capabilities…[and] relies both on coercion and consent’ (Dafour 2008, p. 456). From the 1970s onwards, neoliberal economic policies became increasingly important in structuring global common sense and guiding the aims and processes of international institutions and relations. Harvey (2005) argues that neo-liberalism, ‘proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (p. 2). The state should establish the right conditions for security and the operation of the market, and beyond that have little involvement in the operations of society. Bond (2006, p. 11) records that internationally, a ‘Washington Consensus’ developed to emphasise the priorities of: ‘fiscal discipline’; ‘reordering public expenditure priorities’; ‘tax reform’; ‘liberalising interest
rates’; ‘a competitive exchange rate’; ‘trade liberalisation’; ‘liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment; privatisation’; ‘deregulation’, and; ‘property rights’. According to Bond, ‘African structural adjustment programmes followed this set of strictures quite loyally from the early 1980s, leading to systematic macroeconomic instability’ (ibid.). Arguably, in the continuing global economic turbulence that began with the 2008 economic crisis, there is what Gramsci (1932) would call an “organic crisis” within global political institutions, shifts within the sediments of “common sense”, and cracks in the structures of global hegemony.

The Rise of Capitalist Imperialism and Western Hegemony
Historically, capitalism as a system emerged through the processes of European imperial domination. Karl Marx argued that –

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the turning of Africa into a commercial warren for the hunting of black skins signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. (in Bond 2006, p. III)

The processes of “capitalist imperialism” emerged during the mid-19th Century. Callinicos (2009) and Harvey (2003) argue that by the 1850s and 1860s a true global capitalist economy had taken shape, drawing the globe together through the new technologies of communication and transportation: the telegraph, the railway and the steamship. Across Europe the bourgeois class exerted increasing power over state apparatuses, and various revolutions, civil wars and state formations marked the overall transformation of global class configurations. By the 1870s, European states were driven by capitalist logic, dominated by the search for profit and the need to reinvest surplus capital. Failure to satisfy these conditions often resulted in economic crisis and stagnation. Investment and market development in Africa, Asia and Latin America thus expanded dramatically from the late 1800s, and inter-state rivalry for influence rapidly evolved into a grab for colonies – such as the Scramble for Africa from 1884 onwards – and eventually into the first World War. Consequently, Smith (2006) argues that –

No longer could geographical unevenness be passed off as an accident of historical geography, the result of being outside the project of civilisation… The dynamics of unevenness were now increasingly recognised as internal to the dynamics of capitalism itself…Whatever historical remnants of pre-capitalist societies…were now enveloped, appropriated and soldered into a larger global capitalism. Unevenness now primarily emanated from the laws of capital themselves rather than from the archaeology of past social and geographical difference. (p. 185-186)

This envelopment of the world involved the embedding of regional developmental differences between core and periphery, and the delineation of a fixed hierarchy of races to justify this – often supported by interpretations of newly emerging evolutionary theory. According to Wallerstein (1989), Africa’s incorporation into the world-economy was a slow but steady process that had commenced by the late 1700s. Incorporation involved the mobilisation of significant local production processes as part of the global division of labour, and the formalisation of local political structures into nation-states bound by the practices of the global interstate system. However, by the beginning of the 19th Century, the continent had been affected, directly or indirectly, by the loss of population and lasting social and economic
effects of war associated with the Transatlantic Slave Trade. This left a legacy of political fragility in many areas (Ajayi 1989). Given the European demand for cash crops such as palm oil, peanuts, sisal and rubber, Africa’s internal network of trade routes increasingly became conduits of wealth and firepower, and channels of ideology distributing European religious and political ideas. For Berman (1998), the structure of the colonial state radically transformed the organisation of African societies and contributed to the formalisation of ethnic communities and modes of ethnic political mobilisation. By structuring the field of individuals’ social, economic and political choices, the colonial state helped shape the scope of ethnic politics in various areas, and the despotic bureaucratic and coercive systems of managing national populations and production that would later be taken over by local post-colonial elites (ibid.).

For South Africa, incorporation into the world economy accelerated due to the Napoleonic Wars as Britain hastened their delivery of new British colonists. Through the development of sheep-rearing in the Cape Colony and sugar production in Natal, Southern African colonies became part of the international division of labour. This also led to conflict with the pre-existing African and Afrikaner populations, and the expansion of European influence into the interior through the Great Trek. British governments originally declined to face the costly exercise of subduing the whole of Southern Africa, with its African states and Boer Republics. However, from the 1870s onwards, Europe’s new internal drive to invest, and local discoveries of diamonds and gold, led to the British expeditions to conquer the region (Bhebe 1989). British economic interests also demanded the transformation of the region’s African population in order to secure vast supplies of the labour they required. An economy based on mining and plantation crops required the creation of a local working class, and labour was eventually drawn from across Southern Africa. Politically, the British worked to ideologically mobilise the white settlers of the region, to articulate a story of unified white supremacy in order to guarantee the security of British interests in the region. As Rodney (1989) noted –

The combination of European capital with coerced African labour registered a sizeable surplus in products destined for European consumption and export. Crops and minerals were exported and the profits expatriated because of the non-resident nature of the capital in the mining and plantation companies and the import/export houses. However, some of the accumulation was reinvested. This allowed Southern African capital to grow to massive proportions... Mining dominated the post-war economies of Southern Africa, and came close to transforming the whole region into a single colonial economy. ... the process of monopolization and cartelization assured the hegemony of large-scale capital in the then Union of South Africa, South West Africa and the Rhodesias. (p. 339-340)

As the global hegemon, Britain had established an international network of pre-capitalist colonies and dependencies to which it marketed its industrial wares. The emerging hegemon, the United States, developed its power in competition against other advanced capitalist economies. Its negotiated hegemony amongst other industrial powers relied on the support for international institutions that managed inter-capitalist relations. America’s vision was transnational, rather than focused on protected imperial networks, and its strength lay in an economy based on mass-production, organised by multi-branch private corporations, and supplying a continental domestic economy – isolated from threats and competitors by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. However, while US capitalism would eventually establish global
hegemony without formal territorial empire, it mobilised enormous military power and used it to intervene throughout the world. The US emerged from Second World War as an overwhelmingly dominant power. It developed its martial forces and a global network of military bases. Its industrial economy was rejuvenated, and its currency was supreme. In the face of the Soviet Communist enemy, the US presented itself as a global defender of freedom and private property, and American power as central to European collective security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As states across the world became independent through decolonisation, the US and Europe based their relations with them on privileged trade deals, patronage, corruption and covert subversion. Institutionally, an international framework would manage and stabilise trade and economic development through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank of Settlements (IBS), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

During this period, Western states did not engage in direct exploitation of Third World labour as First World investment increasingly avoided poorer countries. The main source of enrichment was the extraction of cheap raw materials, particularly minerals and oil. The workers, peasants and urban poor of the developing world were progressively marginalised from the global economy. Many developing states looked to import-substitution to assist industrialisation, generally requiring large loans to fund their huge investments in heavy industries. However, they would eventually find that industrialisation would not allow them to catch up with the income and wealth of the West, or the political power associated with it (Arrighi 2003). Indeed, World Bank President Robert McNamara acknowledged that high rates of growth in low-income countries had –

…left infant mortality ‘high’, life expectancy ‘low’, illiteracy ‘widespread’, unemployment ‘endemic and growing’ and the distribution of income and wealth ‘severely skewed’. Although for most of the 1970s the income of many Third World nations increased in absolute and relative terms, the welfare of their populations continued to improve at a slow pace, if at all. (Arrighi 2003, p. 322)

Throughout this period, the US and key allies maintained their control over global resources through military intervention or the support of anti-democratic factions. A key trend-setting intervention was the 1953 British and American coup in Iran, which overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq when he acted to nationalise Iranian oil resources and undo the exploitative relationship imposed on the country while under British domination. The instalment of the Shah of Iran as the unchallenged dictatorial authority secured new oil contracts for American companies and transformed Iran into a pillar of American influence in the Middle East for the next 25 years (Engerman 2009; Harvey 2005). This would soon be followed by the overthrow of the left-leaning government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, to protect the plantations of the United Fruit Company from nationalisation and the Americas from “communist influence”. By the early 1970s, the rising influence of radicalism in Chile, demonstrated in electoral support for the Marxist President Salvador Allende, led the Nixon administration to politically and economically undermine the country, before eventually supporting the military coup of General Pinochet in 1973. During his years as a US-supported dictator, the Pinochet regime murdered more than 3,200 people, imprisoned at least 80,000 people, and forced tens of thousands to flee the country to avoid political persecution (Weiner 2008; Klein 2007). However, escape to neighbouring countries often brought no solace, as more than 100,000 Latin Americans were affected by the US-
sponsored Operation Condor, under which –

…the intelligence agencies of the Southern Cone shared information about ‘subversives’—aided by a state-of-the-art computer system provided by Washington—and then gave each other’s agents safe passage to carry out cross-border kidnappings and torture, a system eerily resembling the CIA’s ‘extraordinary rendition’ network today. (Klein 2007, p. 91)

In South-East Asia, in the decades after World War II, Britain and France fought to reconsolidate influence in their colonies and the United States worked to support its allies and to intervene in the functioning of governments across Indochina. From 1960, this included CIA assistance for Laotian General Vang Pao’s anti-communist guerrilla army, including the transportation of Pao’s opium to heroin-refineries in coastal regions by the CIA’s Air America. The resultant product was consumed in prodigious quantities during the Vietnam War by America’s own troops in the region (Weiner 2008). McCoy (2003) asserts that –

As our knowledge of the Cold War grows, the list of drug traffickers who served the CIA has lengthened to include Corsican criminals, Nationalist Chinese irregulars, Lao generals, Afghan guerrillas, Haitian colonels, Panamanian generals, Honduran smugglers, and Nicaraguan Contra commanders. (p. 44)

Despite Western rhetoric espousing democracy during World War II, in the 1950s and 1960s the European states fought to maintain as much colonial and neo-colonial control in Africa as possible. America’s African policy generally facilitated this, as transition to independence was thought to only aid the spread of Soviet influence. The US also supported the newly constructed system of Apartheid in South Africa, which laid significant foundations for the segregation of its people during this era (Dobson & Marsh 2001; Nicol 1978).

Postcoloniality or Imperialism by Another Name?

In supporting South Africa’s National Party government, the US and global allies were fully aware of the ANC’s growing struggle for justice around the Freedom Charter, and the impact of Apartheid legislation. 1 Southern Africa was already considered the most economically important sub-region of Africa for the West, and its strategic importance grew in the context of the Cold War. South Africa was, therefore, the key to maintaining influence throughout this region. Until the Kennedy administration took power in the US, Black Africa remained absent from American foreign policy thinking. It came to the administration’s attention in the form of 17 African states gaining independence and the Congo Crisis that emerged in Central Africa from 1960 onwards. While the US formally passed motions in the United Nations Security Council (UN) censuring Belgian imperialism in the Congo, they also intervened publicly and covertly to support anti-Soviet candidates (Chainawa 1993). The US also supported a UN vote in 1961 that advocated an end to Portuguese rule in Angola; however, NATO assistance to Portugal was crucial in the prosecution of Portugal’s colonial wars in

1 These included: the Group Areas Act (1950), which classified and geographically segregated South Africans by race; the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), and; the Criminal Law Amendment Act (1953). The latter two were used to suppress opposition parties and political protests. The Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (1953) and the Mines and Works Act (1956), prevented African workers from industrial organisation, and proscribed them from working in skilled jobs. Additionally, the Bantu Self-government Act (1959) created self-governing ethnic Bantustans which the South African government hoped would further exclude Africans from national political influence (Chanaiwa 1993).
Africa from 1961 to 1974. Davidson (1981) has noted that for Portuguese forces fighting in Guinea-Bissau –

All such materiel as jet bombers, helicopters, napalm, small naval vessels, and certain types of cannon and bazooka were and are provided by one or other of the NATO powers. Of the latter, the most important in a military sense have been Britain, France, the United States and West Germany… (p. 87)

Although Africa faded from US consciousness as the Vietnam War took centre stage, passive support for Apartheid South Africa would continue, with Nixon accepting the system’s permanence in the December 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Dobson and Marsh 2001). US Option Two in that study would go on to guide US policy into the 1980s, with its assertion that –

…[the] whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies... [Accordingly,] we would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states... At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that … their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with white-dominated states. (in Fatton 1984, p. 61)

By the mid-1970s the fall of the Portuguese empire temporarily brought Africa to the fore in Cold War thinking. Communist governments and insurgencies gained influence throughout Southern and Central Africa – which the CIA attempted to roll back at first through its funding for anti-communist guerrillas in Angola (Weiner 2008). Although the Carter administration employed a more liberal rhetoric in foreign affairs, Carter saw South Africa as a stabilising force on the continent, and economic cooperation as key to the nation’s eventual reform (Fatton 1984). While the Carter administration supported a 1977 UN Security Council resolution to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, the Apartheid government had already achieved virtual self-sufficiency in military production, and was still assisted by some other US allies. Israel, in particular, had a long-running relationship with the Apartheid regime, in part motivated by the similarities between their nationalist ideologies and the radical politics of their enemies. The two states cooperated in intelligence, training, and technological development, including the advancement of their nuclear programmes. It is also reported that Israel assisted South Africa in bypassing embargoes on commercial exports (Mazrui 1993; Chomsky 199; O’Brien 2011; Brenner 1984). In the 1980s, the Reagan administration reinvigorated American support for the Apartheid government to shield South Africa from global disinvestment campaigns. Reagan’s “constructive engagement” with South Africa looked towards gradual reform of the South African political system, without disturbing the nation’s structures of power and maintaining the nation firmly within the Western alliance. The geopolitical value of South Africa to the West had by this stage been clearly delineated as its strategic position overlooking the Cape shipping route around Southern Africa, its role as a local representative for Western states in African political and economic affairs, and its vast mineral resources.

Throughout this period, significant changes had begun to come about in the global economic order and the narratives of common sense that bolstered it. By the late 1960s the global
Keynesianism of the Bretton Woods order that had underwritten the United States’ institutionalised hegemony began to face growing crises. The US began to gradually falter under the economic costs of: maintaining their expanding consumerist order at home; competing with the revived industrial economies of Japan and West Germany, and; funding the deepening military conflict in Vietnam. The Nixon administration’s response was the jettisoning of US-dollar convertibility to gold in 1971 (the Nixon Shock), and the printing of US dollars; the latter increased the money supply by 40% between 1970 and 1973. Inflationary pressures, industrial militancy, rising commodity prices – particularly oil prices after 1973 – and increasing financial speculation all fed into “stagflation” in Western economies during the 1970s. The lack of profitability in the real economy encouraged investors to look for profit through speculative activities, and with that the deregulation of financial markets and a move towards the financialisation of Western economic centres (McNally 2011). Ideologically, the principles that would become known as “neo-liberalism” would find a central place within the new global common sense, and support America’s reasserted hegemony. This political-economic doctrine, with its focus on restricting government intervention beyond that which secures private property and market institutions, developed from the 1930s through the writing of thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman. Thus, from the late 1970s onwards, real wages in the United States and other Western states began to fall as, ‘governments and employers around the world launched a coordinated offensive to roll back union power, labor rights, and employees’ wages, benefits, and conditions of work’ (ibid., p. 42).

While the West suffered economically during the 1970s, many developing nations were able to temporarily benefit from higher natural resource prices and the abundant supply of credit on offer. The rising economic and political influence of developing states led to the articulation of demands through the UN of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to assist the developing world in closing the developmental gap with the First World. However, the response of the US was to reshape global economic conditions (Arrighi et al 2003; Mazrui 1993). In 1979, the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, oversaw changes in US domestic economic policy that began the neoliberal offensive against work conditions and social spending in the US, and imposed a liberalising doctrine on nations across the globe. This induced the Third World debt crisis, ‘the lever for predatory invasions of economies in the Third World designed to pry open their markets, seize their assets on the cheap, and lock them into debt’ (McNally 2011, p. 25). By increasing US interest rates enormously during 1979 and 1980, Volker sparked a massive redirection of global capital flows into the United States. This quickly soaked up cheap investment capital from which the developing world had benefited, and produced interest rate rises around the world. The crises that these debt pressures began to cause throughout the developing world, drove many nations to seek assistance from the international financial institutions – which had by now themselves adopted the core principles of neoliberal economic doctrine.

Africa’s share of direct investment from major developed states declined dramatically during the 1980s. Meanwhile, trade liberalisation policies have been estimated to have cost Africa hundreds of billions of dollars since the early 1980s, and the continent has concurrently paid back more than four times the original value of its loans since 1980. Thus, the average African country’s GNP per capita shrunk between 1970 and 1998 (Bracking 2009; Henwood 1998). The new neoliberal doctrine would guide international thinking on African development, with the World Bank “Berg Report” of 1981 specifically claiming that the
causes of the African economic crisis were internal and related to government over-regulation of their economies (Arrighi 2002). Thus, the World Bank and IMF used the desperation of developing states to impose harsh conditionalities through Structural Adjustment Programmes, in exchange for loans and debt relief. Consequently, African nations reduced the power of the developmental state, implemented massive social service cutbacks, withdrew government guidance from the economy, and removed protective barriers such as exchange controls, tariffs and public food subsidies (Saul & Collins 1999). According to Budhoo, ‘everything we did from 1983 onward was based on our new sense of mission to have the south ‘privatised’ or die; towards this end we ignominiously created economic bedlam in Latin America and Africa in 1983-88’ (in Klein 2007, p. 10). Thus, by the mid-1980s, the “Washington Consensus” of neo-liberal principles was embedded in the common sense of Western political elites and the global political and economic institutions which formed the foundation of the international order.

Conclusion: South Africa, the ANC and Capital

In South Africa, massive internal resistance, international support, and the end of the Cold War all created the conditions in which the transition to majority rule became inevitable. The 1990s were a period of deep economic turmoil for the country. By 1992, social conditions in South Africa were “near-revolutionary”; however, the National Party government was increasingly implementing neoliberal policies (Bond 2010). During the negotiations towards majority rule, Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) successfully moderated popular anger and engaged in detailed discussions for a hand-over of power. In January 1990, Nelson Mandela wrote to his supporters to confirm that –

The nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC, and the change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable. Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and encourage, but in our situation state control of certain sectors of the economy is unavoidable. (Klein 2007, p. 194-195)

However, these plans were all be dropped as the transition process progressed. In negotiations, Prime Minister F.W. De Klerk attempted to preserve as much power as possible for the white minority, and to protect them from the possibility of land expropriations and nationalisation of corporations. While Mandela and his negotiating team did well in refuting a number of proposed political schemes towards this end, in economic negotiations the ANC gave in to the idea that the ascendant Washington Consensus was now the only way an economy could be run. Centres of economic power would be handed over to supposedly impartial experts, under the guidance of IMF and World Bank economists. Amongst other concessions, the ANC agreed to an independent Reserve Bank in South Africa, constitutional guarantees against land expropriation, the repayment of $25 billion of Apartheid-era foreign debt, and signed on for an $850 million IMF loan whose conditionalities severely limited the ANC’s policy options. With its economy opened to the world, investors could easily punish any movements away from neoliberal policies through currency shocks and capital flight, further disciplining the ANC government. Thus, the ANC oversaw the implementation of neoliberal principles of privatisation, relaxed exchange controls, free movement of investor capital, and high interest rates to control inflation. The coming decade would see the number of impoverished South Africans rise, along with the rates of eviction and the cutting of essential services. Unemployment skyrocketed to a peak of over 40% over the next decade.
These economic impacts were racially stratified, with black households losing 1.8 percent of their income from 1995 to 2005 in comparison to white households, who gained 40.5 percent (Bond 2010).

The ANC did not achieve this transition alone – the other members of the Tripartite Alliance, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), were also responsible for overseeing these changes and influencing persuasion over the South African populace. This is one of the reasons why the key centres of opposition to the neoliberal project in South Africa have emerged outside of these groups, or have defected from it (Desai 2003). New political parties, shack-dwellers’ movements, service delivery protests, and the renewed militancy of trade unions who have broken away from COSATU, promise to challenge the ideological hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism in the years to come.

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African Realism: Reconceptualising Notions of State Weakness in Western Thought

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Abstract
This paper critically engages dominant understandings of African state (in)capacity, particularly notions of state ‘failure’, ‘fragility’ and ‘weakness’. Drawing from Ali Al’amin Mazrui’s (1977) delineations of latent, imminent, and active instability, it is argued that the contemporary ‘Westphalian’ international system and the nation-state are characterised by latent-imminent instability. The latter and global process of policy transfer, diffusion and convergence are the primary causes of African state instability. Thus, the governance challenges facing African states are principally due to the regulatory or jurisdictional competition that characterises the contemporary re-scaling of governance and ‘traditional power’ re-strategisation, as well as African leaders’ failure to view the nation-state as a transitional mode of governance. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, it is argued that the country is neither a weak, fragile or failed state. Rather, it is a strong unstable state that highlights the need to reconceptualise democracy in Africa.

Introduction
Ali Al’amin Mazrui (1977) drew a distinction between economic development and economic power. Because of the abundance of their natural resources, the countries of the Middle East and Africa have greater economic power in comparison to the Western world. The question, therefore, is what are the mechanisms preventing African states from strategically utilising their economic power to overturn the human insecurity challenges confronting Africa? Mazrui argued that the global system is characterised by more stability than at first appears. Each country of the ‘Third World’ is a hostage of latent, imminent, or active instability within its borders. This state of affairs gives rise to a paradox of stability at the level of the international system, with internal upheavals characterising states’ domestic political landscapes. Thus, the ‘stability’ that Mazrui identified in the international system is more accurately revealed to be rigidity.

Mazrui compared the international system to a caste structure with four defining characteristics, including –

a) Heredity, whereby hereditary descent determines one’s caste or racial membership;

b) Separation, whereby segregation characterises relations between different castes or races, with intermarriage a taboo;

c) Division of labour, whereby particular vocations or professions are associated with a particular caste or race, and;

d) Principle of hierarchy, which determines one’s societal rank and status.

Caste systems are highly rigid and provide little ability to transcend the demarcated boundaries, let alone overturn the system itself. Mazrui argued that it is the inflexibility of
rigid systems that makes them vulnerable to abrupt revolutionary upheavals. Thus, rigidity
should not be conflated with stability. The appearance of stability that characterises rigid
systems is tautological. It is due to the resilience and continued sanctioning of custom over a
protracted period of time. Rigid systems are strengthened by their prior survival as well as
some degree of responsiveness to changing circumstances. Additionally, the international
system and its veneer of stability are maintained partly through the drawing of a sharp
distinction between caste and class and their treatment as mutually exclusive categories.
Mazrui himself upheld this dichotomy in his assessment of the international system as more
like a caste structure than a class structure.

Calling the above dichotomy into question is the case of the emerging economies or BRICS –
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – which highlights that social mobility and
limited flexibility exist at the level of the international system. This is so even as “Southern”
states like South Africa and Brazil continue to be dependent on commodity exports despite
diversifying their revenue bases. Class adds much needed flexibility to rigid systems, because
it allows those belonging to a low caste or race to establish a new status, despite the
constraints they are subject to. The acceptance of a dichotomy between caste and class
obscures the mutually constitutive nature of these categories and serves to maintain the so-
called “Westphalian” states system and liberal-capitalism, by providing a veneer of stability
(Jakwa 2016).

Mazrui (1977) distinguished between active, imminent and latent instability. Rapid changes
and severe political uncertainty characterise active instability. The rise and fall of institutions,
emergence and submergence of leaders and fluctuation in policies define it. Imminent
instability refers to the absence of turbulence and expectation of its sudden eruption at any
time. Latent instability is, therefore, when change and turbulence are expected in the long-
term. Imminent instability necessarily entails latent instability. Thus, thinking about both the
nation-state and the international system it buttresses as being characterised by latent-
imminent instability by virtue of their exclusionary ethno-racialist foundations, has
significant implications for how we understand state instability in Africa. It provides a
nuanced point of departure for critiquing prevailing understandings of ‘weak’, ‘failing’,
‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states.

Must the Occident speak?
The perceived deficiencies of African states are associated primarily and solely with internal
shortcomings in leadership. This conceptualisation relies on implicit notions of a
pathological ‘African personality’ and African parochialism. Indeed, the latent-imminent
instability of the nation-state and international system is unacknowledged. Many analyses of
and approaches to addressing Africa’s governance challenges are, therefore, founded on
shaky and problematic ground. From colonisation to the post-independence period, the
‘filling’ of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ national jurisdictions in Africa has followed the following schema –

1. Indigenous modes of socio-political organisation were and/or are thought inadequate
   and in need of supplanting by the nation-state;
2. The nation-state in Africa is thought inadequate due to African parochialism,
   primordialism and patrimonialism, which necessitates open economies and external
   private and public governance;
3. National, regional and global multilateral institutions are caught between order-affirming and order-challenging tendencies, and;

4. Consent (or ‘compradorisation’) is operational at each ‘stage’, and these ‘stages’ are concurrent with each other, further complicating resistance(s) to and practices of ‘good governance’.

The next section will elaborate on the third (3) element of this schema. However, this schema is central to the maintenance of the veneer of stability at the global level, because it identifies instability as a feature unique to individual states and particular regions. In order to illustrate this schema’s operationalisation, it is important to elucidate and critique the tradition of thought from whence it emerged, and conventional understandings of juridical sovereignty.

Much scholarship on state instability is informed by two paradigms which are presumed to be distinct: realism and liberalism. Although there are different varieties of each of these views, realism, is generally thought to be rationalist and objectivist, whereas liberalism is thought to be subjectivist because it emphasises (economic) interdependence and inter-state cooperation under anarchy. Generally speaking, for liberals, commonly shared institutions, norms and values mean that states are not simply constrained by anarchy’s structural imperatives to increase hard power capabilities and to balance (or bandwagon) behind other powers in the international system. However, despite liberalism placing emphasis on the interdependent nature of inter-state relations, both realism and liberalism are objectivist views because they share the same constitutional rules or onto-epistemological assumptions about the nature of the world. Both take individual state actors as the primary point of reference. These actors are intrinsically self-interested, utility-maximising agents. This self-interestedness is the primary cause of conflict between actors, which is a necessary feature of inter-state relations. The nation-state is, therefore, necessary and required as the primary mode of socio-political organisation and a precondition to peace. Consequently, relations between states in the international system are theorised to be anarchic, because there exists no central governing authority or supra-state. The international system is one of self-help, and individual states primarily look after their own interests, even as they work through multilateral arrangements.

Upon closer inspection, these two views are inseparable and form a single liberal-realist paradigm. Liberalism and realism share an individualist ontology, with differences existing with regards to the possibilities realists and liberals see for cooperation and the effective management of inter-state relations. Disputes occur only at the level of methods or ‘regulative rules’ states should implement in navigating an anarchic international system (Reus-Smit 1997). Realists emphasise hard power (military capabilities, population, geography, alliances) and liberals emphasise soft power (shared institutions, norms, interdependence). Another difference is the greater or lesser extent, respectively, to which the constraining nature of structure on agency is emphasised. Thus, the inseparability of these two views lies in their identical individualist ontology. Additionally, the disputes about methods that have characterised the liberal-realist intra-paradigm debate is misguided, given hard and soft power, persuasion and coercion, concurrently characterise(d) the ‘rise of the State’ in Africa and African states’ relations with each other and external actors (Bobulesca 2011; Guilhot 2014; Gartzke 2007).

Constructivist thought is generally held to present a sharp departure from liberal-realism, which upholds scientific realism. Liberal-realism emphasises the constraints that structure
places on agency; agency does not exact much influence on structure. Rather, it is exercised within the bounds of existing structural arrangements so as to limit the negative impact and effects of structure on states’ material realities and relations with each other. However, on constructivist views, ‘actors are argued to have both ontological and epistemic influence’ (Hynek & Teti 2010, p. 175). For constructivists –

Because the existence of both physical and social objects depends on thoughts and linguistic structures (ontological mind-dependence), scientists cannot construct knowledge about these outside their own ontological representations. The point is not to deny the existence of material reality…but to focus on the consequentiality of representations of that reality. (ibid.)

In International Relations scholarship, Alexander Wendt (1992) demonstrates the marriage between constructivist thought and the liberal-realist paradigm. He upholds “‘a kind of structural idealism’” whereby structure and agency are mutually constitutive, but the form structures take is also a function of historical necessity (Hynek and Teti 2010). This is notable when critiquing predominant understandings of African state (in)capacity. Wendt (2003) proposes a ‘teleological theory of the ‘logic of anarchy’” which suggests that a world state is inevitable’ (p. 491). Although he acknowledges that ‘at the micro-level the process is neither deterministic nor linear, and forward movement may be blocked for periods of time,’ and that ‘there are many pathways by which a world state may be achieved, [with] human agency [mattering] along every one’, he unquestioningly upholds a Eurocentric teleology that disavows global coloniality (ibid.). The world state whose emergence Wendt anticipates ‘within 100-200 years’ is a logical and structural-historical necessity. That is, it is not contingent on well-functioning ‘international institutions, interdependence and/or democratic states [which] can lead to cooperation and peace within anarchy’ (ibid., p. 492). However, Wendt’s Eurocentrism is not dissimilar to that of liberal-realists who posit Western forms of socio-political organisation, institutions and local Western values as the desirable “end-state” for African states and peoples. His Eurocentrism differs only in his explicit disavowal of contingency in the achievement of various end-states, including world government. The following passage illustrates this; he states that –

Historically, politically autonomous groups have taken many forms – tribes, city-states, empires, leagues, and so on – but over time this variety has been reduced to a single form today, the territorial state. If the theory [of the inevitability of a world state] is correct this convergence was itself inevitable… (504).

The above implicitly constructs colonisation and the imposition and transplantation of the nation-state form on non-European peoples as a structural-historical necessity. It upholds predominant conceptions of juridical sovereignty and equality amongst states in the post-independence period. Wendt does not believe ‘our imagination’ should be constrained in thinking about what the international system’s ‘end-state’ might be ‘in light of the internationalisation of political authority that has already occurred without a centralisation of force – in the form of the UN, EU, WTO, ICC, and so on’ (ibid., p. 506). Commensurate with this view and further demonstrating the marriage between Wendt’s structural-constructivism and the liberal-realist paradigm is Robert Jackson’s (1987) conception of juridical
sovereignty and ‘quasi-statehood’ which belongs to the liberal-realist tradition. Jackson believes that the juridical statehood of African states was derived from a right to self-determination that did not require the possession of empirical statehood by newly independent African states. Empirical statehood or sovereignty is characterised by the capacity for effective and civil government, preferably with consent from the governed. Juridical sovereignty is, on this view, de-facto recognition of state legitimacy and non-interference in other states’ affairs. In the 21st century, emphasis is placed on the need for empirical sovereignty as opposed to non-interference.

For Jackson, the nation-state, despite having been a colonial imposition, is not inherently problematic. Indeed, it is desirable; however, its value as an organising principle is undermined by the primordialism of the state in Africa. This understanding of African statehood is flawed, including Jackson’s conception of juridical statehood. Juridical sovereignty should instead be understood to mean recognition of state legitimacy only when a given state is organised in accordance with external actors’ interests (Jakwa 2016, p. 77). Jackson’s view and others who see the possibility for re-dressing the instability and so-called “weaknesses” of the state in Africa in global governance arrangements, disavow the multi-causal nature of Africa’s governance challenges. These causes include not only internal shortcomings in leadership, but the latent-imminent instability of the state, international system and accompanying processes of policy transfer, diffusion and convergence. These processes are facilitated by global multilateral organisations and institutions. They provide the conditions of possibility for so-called ‘quasi-states’ in the global present. They also constrain African regionalism(s).

Global policy convergence and state instability
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), policy transfer refers to “processes by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in a given political setting (past or present) informs the development of these same instruments in another political setting” (quoted in Knill 2005, p. 766). It is ‘concerned with processes rather than results’ (ibid.). Policy transfer is complementary with policy diffusion which ‘refers to processes...that might result in increasing policy similarities across countries...’ (ibid.). Significantly –

…policy diffusion is not restricted to the operation of specific mediation mechanisms, but includes all conceivable channels of influence between countries, reaching from the voluntary adoption of policy models that have been communicated in the international system, diffusion processes triggered by legally binding harmonization requirements defined in international agreements or supranational regulations, to the imposition of policies on other countries through external actors. (ibid., p. 766)

Policy diffusion leads to policy convergence. The latter refers to –

any increase in the similarity between one or a set of policy characteristics (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (e.g. supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence thus describes the end result of a process of policy change over time towards
Answering the question of which actors engage in policy transfer, this paper argues for the multi-causal nature of African state instability. Colonisation, the ‘rise’ of the state in Africa, post-independence national, regional and global multilateral arrangements have been marked by processes of policy transfer and diffusion, and political-economic convergence. Convergence is a result of a combination of top-down, bottom-up, and horizontal transfer and diffusion processes. Bottom-up causes refer to shared norms between states which result in emulation of new or emerging standards. These standards are often adopted out of belief in their ability to advance mutual understanding between actors and increase state legitimacy. Thus, policy adoption can be understood in terms of shared norms and competition amongst domestic political actors pursuing their respective interest(s) which are represented in terms of a broader ‘national interest’. Horizontally, this translates into cross-national competition, whereby individual states seek to occupy leadership roles regionally and/or globally in the pursuit of the national interest. Top-down causes include coercion of local, national and regional actors to adopt particular sets of policy, ‘when institutions [and other states] leverage financial resources for policy replication’ (Sugiyama 2011, p. 32). Common examples of top-down processes include World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes, and World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements which have restricted African states’ ability to harness their collective economic power as they have been subject to regulatory capture due to traditional or former colonial powers’ re-strategisation of their power-bases in the post-independence period. They also include the very “rise” of the state in Africa and its continued upholding as an ideal-type model of socio-political organisation by both African leaders and external actors. These processes and the multi-causal nature of African state instability ground the third (3) element of the schema outlined in the previous section, which is that national, regional and global multilateral institutions are caught between order-affirming and order-challenging tendencies (Phillips 2016).

In keeping with the above analysis, Olukoshi and Laakso (1996) rightly argue that –

the approach to nation-building which was favoured by the post-colonial authorities was one which, by its increasingly centralising, top-down logic, was also authoritarian especially as the legitimacy of the state and of the post-colonial nationalist project started to weaken. (p. 16)

Furthermore, the weaknesses inherent to the nation-state project were exacerbated by global economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, African states’ continuing dependency on their former colonial powers and export of raw materials in a volatile world market. Diminishing terms of trade and the introduction of austerity measures to counteract poor-performing economies resulted in the further destabilisation of African states. These dynamics revealed the unsustainability of the capitalist global economic order, shattering the veneer of stability and the class-caste-racial dichotomy that underpins it and informs inter-state relations in the global present. A worsening global economic environment undermined African states’ ability to provide welfare and other public services to their populaces, calling the legitimacy of the state into question. This diminishing of state legitimacy was exacerbated by the fact that across the continent, African states’ leaders sought to consolidate one-party regimes and ethno-racialist patronage networks. Thus, whilst the Western world was discrediting welfarist
Keynesian principles for a neo-liberal world order that advocated a decreased role for the state in the economy, African states were experimenting with state-led development but soon found themselves buckling under neo-liberal pressure. Neo-liberalism is generally associated with deregulation and the decreasing role of governments in determining national economic policies. However, the locus of regulation has merely been shifting since the 1970s. Indeed, there is no such thing as deregulation. Bell and Hindmoor are correct to argue that –

Even where governments do not govern directly but, instead, choose to govern in partnerships with non-state organisations, governments still retain authority for the ‘metagovernance’ of these arrangements…which requires governments to undertake a range of functions in relation to the support of governance arrangements. These include overseeing, steering and coordinating governance arrangements; selecting and supporting the key participants in governance arrangements; mobilising resources; ensuring that wider systems of governance are operating fairly and efficiently; and taking prime carriage of democracy and accountability issues. (p. 155)

Whilst the above is true, governments around the world neither possess nor exercise the same level of authority in the metagovernance of global governance arrangements. States do not have an equal say in the steering of the internationalisation of political authority and accompanying organisations such as the United Nations, WTO, World Bank, IMF and International Criminal Court amongst others. This is due to the coloniality of power in the global present. “Coloniality” explains the continuation and prevalence of colonial forms of domination despite the end of direct colonial rule and administration in much of the world, including in places which were not formally colonised historically e.g. China and Ethiopia. It refers to the racial –

social classification of the [world] population – expressed in the ‘racial’ distribution of work in the imposition of new ‘racial’ geocultural identities, in the concentration of productive resources and capital, as social relations, including salary, as a privilege of “Whiteness”. (Quijano 2000, p. 218)

Another contributor to the destabilisation of African states in the post-independence period was the Cold War, which saw many African liberation movements and states become actors and sites of great power proxy wars and struggles for influence (Willet 1998). This experience exacerbated the proliferation of small arms across the continent and the consolidation of pre-existing ethno-racial faultlines. These factors continue to characterise relations between states, and states and non-state actors. Additionally, they underpin interstate border disputes. The Cold War also added another tier to African states’ dependency on external actors for development and other funding. Its conclusion, following the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, and its rebirth as the Russian Federation, signalled the end of the bipolar world system and the emergence of a unipolar era dominated by the United States. However, this unrivalled post-Cold War dominance was short-lived as the 1998 Asian economic crisis illustrated Chinese state capitalism’s resilience to the too often active instability of the Western-dominated global financial system. In a limited sense, Chinese state-led development ushered in ‘a return’ to Keynesian economics, albeit under an illiberal political system. These events facilitated the
rise of the ‘emerging economies’, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS),
whom are believed to present an alternative to Western-dominated global multilateral
arrangements. Largely because of these emerging economies, today we live in a multipolar
world where the United States and Western bloc’s hegemony continues to be challenged. This
is despite the BRICS’ acceptance of neoliberalism as the raison d’être of global politics.

The interlinked and mutually constitutive nature of security, trade and investment matters
cannot be under- or overstated. Despite the BRICS increasingly presenting a formidable
global force, their acceptance and adherence to neoliberal logics means structural adjustment
programs and so processes of policy transfer and diffusion continue unabated. Much like the
debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s provided the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) with
the leverage they needed to make loans or funding to African states conditional on the
acceptance of various policy prescriptions, so too this continues today. Olukoshi and Laakso
(1996) summarise the content of these prescriptions succinctly when they say –

…the programme entailed massive and repeated currency devaluations,
exchange and interest rate liberalisation, public enterprise privatisation,
liquidation and commercialisation, the withdrawal of all subsidies and the
introduction of user charges on a variety of social, welfare and other
services, the liberalisation of trade, including the abolition of state
marketing boards and trading agencies, the retrenchment of large numbers
of public sector employees and the imposition of a freeze on public sector
employment in the quest for the elimination of budgetary deficits, attempts
at the reform of civil service of African countries, and a generalised curb
on state intervention in economic processes. Increasing donor co-
ordination and cross-conditionality meant that most African governments
had little or no option than to accept the adjustment package whether or
not they agreed with its policy thrust. (p. 18)

Richmond (2014) further argues that, ‘[p]eacebuilding and statebuilding have become central
to international relations…and the search for a sustainable international and domestic order
through a range of forms of intervention’ (p. 449). Human rights, democracy, capitalism and
the rule of law are central to the liberal-realist paradigm, including its structural-constructivist
iterations. Inequality is a necessary feature of not only capitalism and its contemporary
neoliberal variant, but the modern nation-state itself. Indeed, ‘its tolerance is built into the
modern state and global governance’ (p. 450). Furthermore, ‘if inequality is a root of some
dimensions of conflict – especially related to power, material resources and identity – then
the state being built is already failed by designed’ (ibid., emphasis added). The global
economic and international system are founded on a competitive individualist ontology that
upholds the “sanctity” of state sovereignty and territorially-bounded, homogenous identities.
Inequality and the conflict that stems from it are symptoms of the instability inherent to the
nation-state and international system and their exclusionary ethno-racialist foundations.

In the post-independence period, peacebuilding continues to be inextricably tied with
‘democratisation and economic recovery’ (Manning & Malbrough, p. 145). Democratisation
is equated with multipartism, that is, with strong opposition politics and electoral practices.
State sovereignty is inextricably bound with both the ballot and the barrel of the gun. African
states, including through regional organisations such as the African Union (AU), continue to
be dependent on countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), particularly the European Union (EU), for peace funding. The EU’s member states and other OECD countries exercise the most influence in international trade and financial organisations. This is an issue for peacebuilding initiatives and security cooperation, because-

[Index] while all of the donors involved in a peace process may share the goal of ending the fighting and building a durable peace, they may have very different ideas about how to go about it. They are unlikely to have identical or even compatible ideas about which tasks should be prioritised, how tasks should be sequenced, and how to measure and respond to compliance by domestic actors. (p. 146)

The problem is not only donor governments’ competing foreign policy objectives and the obstacles these present for cooperation, coordination and responsiveness to local realities (Boyce 2002, p. 1025). It is also the profitability of attending to narrow national interests as donor governments seek to re-strategise their power bases and influence in the post-independence period. Additionally, emerging powers such as China are increasingly key players in African peacebuilding initiatives (Sun 2016). Thus, when assessing the material realities of most African states today, we must trace continuities between their historical past and post-independence trajectories, and the ways in which global governance arrangements militate against African leaders viewing the nation-state as a transitional mode of governance. The development of productive approaches to conflict resolution and the strategic use of African states’ economic power to meet their development goals requires a nuanced appreciation of the hybrid and rigid governance environment within which African states are situated and operate. Focusing on Zimbabwe, the next section illustrates how these dynamics continue to shape the country’s post-independence trajectories.

**Zimbabwe: Strong state, weak player and instability’s hidden dimensions**

Zimbabwe’s post-independence experience tells us a lot about state “weakness” and “failure”. Zimbabwe is neither a weak nor a failed state. It reveals the excesses of the nation-state form in the continued upholding of an ethno-racialist exclusionary mode of rule inherited from its experience of colonisation. This has resulted in acute levels of human insecurity exacerbated by post-independence global governance arrangements. Zimbabwe is a strong, unstable state confronting numerous challenges to human security. This section looks at what the identifiable processes of policy transfer, diffusion and convergence that have constrained the nation-building project in Zimbabwe and undermined peaceful domestic political transitions are. It asks what are the continuities and discontinuities that can be traced between colonial and post-independence Zimbabwe?

Very few discontinuities exist between post-independence African states and their predecessors. In the context of the modern nation-state, “democracy” refers to the diffusion of power amongst and between different legislative bodies which possess different powers and provide limitations on each other’s exercise of power. In Southern Africa, British colonial rule brought more than the nation-state, because –

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constitutionalism, with its characteristics of diffusion of power, checks and balances, limited government, and the protection of individual rights and minorities. (Reyntjens 1988, p. 59)

The difficulty with democracy in Africa is not simply that independence did not result in a departure from the colonial constitutional past as this continued ‘under another label’ (ibid.). Neither is it a matter of identifying the so-called emergence of authoritarian regimes with the post-independence period and colonial powers’ establishment of political systems with strong executive branches that ‘exercised power in a manner that could bear only very few institutional checks’ (ibid.). Doing so would beg the question of what makes post-independence rule any more authoritarian than colonial rule when the latter was primarily concerned with the protection of white minorities and those Indigenous groups who were awarded privileges as part of colonial powers’ divide and rule strategies. The nation-state’s principal function in the colonial era was to entrench the rights of some over others through the valorisation of the rule of law and introduction of formalised legal codes. Power diffusion in the colonial context was, therefore, limited to those actors who were central to the colonial regime’s power consolidation efforts and the broader checking of power was in the repression of disaffected majorities.

The multi-party system similarly emerged as a means of buttressing these divisions and reinforcing the ethno-racialist foundations of the nation-state. Up until the 1950s Rhodesia was a one-party state, with the ruling party under changing names, regularly returning to power with each successive election until 1962. Initially, the party was known as the Rhodesia Party until 1933, the United Party until 1954, and the United Federal Party until 1962 (Utete 1979). Under Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front government, the one-party state structure became deeply entrenched. Elections continued to be upheld and to perform the primary function of serving white minority interests. The constitution and rule of law that stemmed from it resulted in the introduction of legislation such as: The Subversive Activities Act of 1950, the Public Order Act of 1955, the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975, and the Emergency Powers Maintenance of Law and Order, Regulations of 1976, amongst others. Each of these Acts sought to restrict and criminalise the black majority from organising itself or demonstrating against the white minority regime. It also sought to entrench socio-economic inequalities and inequities through the continued dispossession of black people. Indeed, early iterations of regionalism in Southern Africa were under the auspices of colonial governments, beginning with the short-lived Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963, otherwise known as the Central African Federation (ibid.).

Democracy’s normative content has thus far been authoritarian, that is if we understand authoritarianism to mean the upholding of what Silva (2009) calls “necessitas”. The latter – produces both the subjects of ethical life, who the halls of law and forces of the state protect, and the subjects of necessitas, the racial subaltern subjects whose bodies and territories have become places where the state deploys its forces of self-preservation. (p. 14)

A strong executive with little accountability and no adequate checks and balances is not the only form of authoritarianism. Arguably, as colonial settler states, the United States, Canada,
New Zealand and Australia are paradigmatic cases of liberal-democratic authoritarianism. The ongoing disenfranchisement of Indigenous Australians reveals the “whiter side” of electoral politics. Any political regime that upholds “necessitas”, irrespective of its different configuration in relation to others is authoritarian. Thus, liberal-democratic authoritarianism should not be promoted as a model of good governance in Africa for it is characterised by – …an extreme concentration of power in a personalised Executive, who controls both the Legislature and the Judiciary, one-party military rule and lack of limited government, and the effective denial of a number of fundamental rights, particularly those that may have a political impact (such as freedoms of the press, assembly and association). (Reyntjens 1988, p. 67)

In Australia, the ‘personalised Executive’ can be understood to mean white domination of legislative structures and membership in a hegemonic Western bloc that has ‘over-extended’ itself in the post-independence period vis-à-vis Washington Consensus and War of/on Terror, as part of its power consolidation efforts. Illiberal democracy is, therefore, a desirable and achievable end in the African context, particularly given African states’ inheritance of regime hybridity. The implications of this argument for contemporary notions of ‘good governance’ is that if it is to gain currency, we will move away from the universalisation of a single historical and developmental experience towards greater responsiveness to local peculiarities. It presents a means of overcoming strong and unstable states and the rigid international system they buttress.

Zimbabwe’s colonial inheritance is rich and diverse. Zimbabwe’s experience of settler colonialism means, as with other parts of Africa, that foreign intervention is a characteristic and historical feature of Zimbabwean domestic and foreign relations. Furthermore, upon becoming juridically independent in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited an army situation of divided loyalties; a factionalised and fractured political system; tactics and methods of repression, and; a dichotomy between so-called constructive politics and the politics of negativism. The latter led Prime Minister Robert Mugabe to proclaim during an interview in 1981 that, ‘My position is, it’s a luxury to engage in the politics of opposition’ (ThamesTv 2016). The rule of law is sacred in Zimbabwe as the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), as previous colonial governments, has frequently turned to the constitution to consolidate its rule. The work lies in remodelling the rule of law so it is primarily utilised to safeguard human security.

These “inheritances”, which were buttressed by the Lancaster House Constitution 1979 which Zimbabwe inherited at independence in 1980, created the conditions of possibility for the instability the country is faced with today. This Constitution restricted the form land redistribution was to take post-independence and entrenched a power-sharing agreement, mandating a Government of National Unity (GNU) that maintained the white minority’s political-economic dominance. The Gukurahundi Massacres or genocide against Ndebele people classified as dissidents in the 1980s or Zimbabwe’s unacknowledged civil war, increasing land hunger and the introduction of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in 1990s at the behest of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), resulted in a deteriorating political and economic situation. Post-independence and post-Gukurahundi opposition politics arose in this context in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change.
(MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai’s leadership. Opposition organising, particularly after the introduction of the much maligned Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 (FTLRP) which resulted in capital flight and smart sanctions on the ZANU-PF regime, resembles the mobilisation efforts of the armed liberation struggle. As Utete (1979) notes –

In the early 1960s the nationalists put so much emphasis on lobbying Great Britain, the United Nations, and other sympathetic countries in Africa and elsewhere, that what had begun as a tactic to gain external support appeared to develop into an overall strategy of political struggle. The attempt to generate external pressure against the Rhodesia regime threatened to become a substitute for internal political organisation and mobilisation of the masses. (p. 90)

Indeed, ‘the movement substituted the general African decolonisation paradigm for a strategy that should have been based on the special socio-economic and historical circumstances of Zimbabwe’ (p. 94). Thus, Zimbabwe post-independence rule under ZANU-PF and accompanying opposition politics, including iterations of power-sharing the country has seen to date, have all been characterised by top-down, bottom-up and horizontal processes of policy transfer, diffusion and convergence. Zimbabwe’s political-economic crisis continues to worsen, with ruling party and opposition fractures amidst mass disaffection and demoralisation. The former has shown no willingness to step down with upcoming harmonised elections in 2018. Many opposition parties have arisen since the 1990s, a secessionist movement is underway in Matabeleland, and the economic crisis has worsened as the country undergoes another set of structural adjustment reforms at the behest of the IFIs. Due to the FTLRP, Zimbabwe’s relations with the West became strained, if not hostile. This resulted in the country’s ‘Look East’ foreign policy, characterised by a dispersal of economic dependence to non-Western actors, principally China and Russia. Arguably, this is an attempt at political-economic non-alignment; however, it is yet to yield positive outcomes for Zimbabweans.

From the colonial to the post-independence period, Zimbabwe has only experienced strong leadership which has which has made a strong state out of the country. Zimbabwe reveals that today; strong statehood is simply a government’s ability to mobilise state apparatuses to safeguard regime security. The more resources a government has to deploy to do this in the face various internal and external constraints, the weaker the state becomes. Weakened state apparatuses present an opportunity to build a more inclusive political system. However, a lack of foresight can result in protracted conflict situations. Despite the leadership and political-economic crisis facing Zimbabwe, it is still a strong state, but one that is weakening. Given the country’s complicated history with elections, as with much of the continent (Goldsmith 2015), a transitional power-sharing arrangement that avoids the pitfalls of previous iterations, in lieu of elections in 2018, is necessary to prevent Zimbabwe’s further destabilisation as it undergoes a period of active instability. A GNU is potentially a means to leveraging weakening state structures in the reconceptualisation of democratisation in Zimbabwe and Africa more broadly.

**Conclusion**

Drawing from Mazrui’s (1977) delineations of latent, imminent and active instability, this paper has argued that the international system is characterised by latent-imminent instability...
with frequent instances of active instability. It is inherently unstable and to date has seen very few “weak” or “fragile” states. Rather, a common feature is strong but highly unstable states confronting numerous human insecurity challenges. Furthermore, processes of policy transfer, diffusion and convergence undermine, if not preclude, peaceful nation and statebuilding projects in Africa. The regulatory and jurisdictional competition that characterises the global present grounded as it is in a liberal-realist individualist ontology, incentivises forms of rule and regimes that undermine human security, due to complementarities and tensions between external (global and regional, state and non-state) and domestic actors. The continued valorisation of state sovereignty continues to sanctify strong states and multiparty liberal democracy. This paper argues for the desirability of weak states and illiberal democracy in order to chart out present and future trajectories for Africa that prioritise human security. Using Zimbabwe as an example, the multi-causal nature of the instability confronting the country is revealed, with emphasis placed on continuities between its colonial past and post-independence present. It is revealed to be a strong state, which today is partly maintained through exclusionary electoral practices. It is argued that in lieu of the elections scheduled for 2018, Zimbabwe should pursue a transitional power-sharing arrangement, towards a future political system that is not centred on party politics, single or multiple. Furthermore, the nation-state must be understood as a transitional mode of governance.

REFERENCES


Nuba Mountains: Current Conflict and Implications

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Abstract
Sudan was once the largest country in Africa and the first to gain independence from Britain on January 1st 1956. Fast-forward 60 years and the country has never enjoyed stability, tranquillity or permanent peace. It has been at war with itself in the south, east, the centre, the west and experiences constant political unrest in the north. The protracted violent conflicts bequeath destruction, devastation and multifaceted grievances to generation after generation. Various peace proposals have been concluded, and many agreements have been signed in an attempt to end the most perennial conflict African continent has witnessed. However, war persists. Territories such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Blue Nile are regarded as killing fields associated with political violence and fragmentation that produce unprecedented civilian casualties (Beny and Halle 2015). The conflict has severely affected economic growth and threatens the disintegration of the social fabric of the entire Sudanese community. Peace agreements have, thus far, failed to address and historicise the root causes of the conflict. Instead, successive governments have tackled the side effects and symptoms the problem produces while preserving the status quo. The result has been a failed peace building project.

Introduction
The Sudan was popularly known as Africa’s cosmopolis. This was due to its vast territory which was approximately one million square miles and about one quarter the size of Europe (Holt & Daly 2011). It was also known for its geographical and cultural diversity of its population. The first census results released on 17 January 1955 revealed the extent to which linguistic, religious and cultural diversity was deeply rooted in Sudanese society. It listed 752 tribal groupings that speak more than 110 languages (Census result report1955) published by the Office of Census, Ministry of Social Affairs. Post-independence authorities did very little to rectify pre-colonial and colonial development disparities. They preserved the status quo without much effort to redress the past injustices of the country’s pre-colonial and colonial legacies. Failure to resolve these issues has caused recurring violent conflicts related to tensions surrounding: citizenship and national identity question; the disparities between the national wealth the country produces and its distribution; the discrepancies between political power and its distribution, and; political Islam. These tensions must be thoroughly addressed by the post-independence national elites if the country is to establish an enduring peace.

Discontented with the manner in which top national jobs were being distributed by northern political elites through the Sudanisation program that was triggered during an interim period

1 Prior to the historical voting in of the newly elected National Assembly on the political status of the Sudan (19 December 1955), in which session Sudanese across the political spectrum voted overwhelmingly for independence from both Britain and Egypt, Census results released by the Ministry of Social Affairs revealed that those who claim affiliation to Arab tribes constituted 39%. There were 752 registered tribal groupings, and the spoken languages amounted to 110.
which preceded full independence, military units in Torit (southern region, comprised mainly of South Sudanese), rebelled against the newly established national central government in Khartoum (Ahmed2010). Thus, when people were joyfully celebrating independence in the northern part of the country in January 1956, South Sudan had already plunged into a bloody civil war. By February 1972, the social fabric of South Sudan was greatly damaged by 17 years of brutal violence. The then president, Jaafar El-Numeiry, reached a Peace Accord with Southern the rebel movement known as Anya-Nya 1 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Accord, popularly known as Addis Ababa Agreement, brought relative peace and stability for eleven years only to flare up again in May 1983; this time, it engulfed the whole country.

Subsequently, many peace initiatives and agreements have been reached; however, none of them has been honoured (Aler Abel 1990)². The lack of genuine political will and vision on the part of successive national governments to end the war by addressing the root causes of the conflict has rendered all peace agreements futile and worthless. Successive governments, while suppressing ethic, cultural and religious diversity, have spared no effort to preserve the territorial integrity of the country at whatever cost. This has included the partitioning of the country in 2011. In 2005, the National Congress Party (NCP) government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in which the two areas, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, were entitled the right to popular consultation under the protocol of resolution of the conflict in the two areas within the framework of the CPA. These areas were to: (a) evaluate the implementation of the CPA in their respective states by elected legislatures, and; (b) engage in negotiations with the national government to rectify any shortcoming in the constitutional, political and administrative arrangements of the CPA. Abyei area was assigned a separate protocol known as The Resolution of the Abyei Conflict. The protocol accorded Abyei area special administrative status under the presidency. Coinciding with the South Sudan referendum, Abyei residents were to cast a separate ballot with two options: (a) Abyei was to retain its administrative status in the North, or; (b) be part of the Bahr el Gazal state of South Sudan.

The above remained unresolved and contested issues between the government and the SPLM, which gradually eroded hard-earned trust between the two actors. The gradual erosion of trust between the two parties to the agreement had not only put CPA in to jeopardy, but it rendered constitutional governance created by the CPA dysfunctional. The latter eventually culminated in a full scale civil war in both areas and contributed to estranged relations between Sudan and South Sudan. Thus, the CPA was terminated. Despite the fact that the CPA brought a significant end to one of the most protracted and devastating bloody conflicts in that part of Africa, it also brought enormous challenges and responsibilities for the Government of National Unity (GNU) to deal with. For peace to hold within and between both Sudans, the following needed to be implemented –

1. National reconciliation and healing process;
2. Initiation of trust building process;
3. Rehabilitation of areas hit hard by the war;

² Abel Aler is a prominent South Sudanese politician. As an insider who lived through the events leading up to the independence and post-independence precipitating the Anya-Nya 1 war, his book provides detailed information on Sudan’s recurring violent conflicts.
4. Setting up of a transparent, democratic and accountable government at all levels, responsible for honest and smooth implementation of the CPA.

The aim of this paper is to provide a historical overview and to critically examine the root causes of the country’s intractable violent conflict, its impact on the Nuba region, the ripple effects it produces that impact on other aspects of socio-economic life for ordinary citizens, and the institutionalized machinations of northern political elites.

Historicising the Root Causes of the Conflict: Fault Lines

To understand the historical causes of Sudan’s complex problem, it is important to understand the socio-economic and political historiography of the country, and in particular the role of the Sudanese states (kingdoms) that existed before and after 1820 and successive colonial and post-colonial administrations played in applying biased development policies on different regions. It also requires an examination of the role those regimes played in producing specific interpretations of ethnicities and ethnic relations, and the cultural antagonisms – sometimes violent ethnic relations – that ensued as a quintessential product of such interpretations.

Development of the Sudanese states before and after the eighteen century was an important element if not the crucial one, that determined the kind of socio-economic and political relationships in general.

Two elements determined such relationships: (a) the slave trade, and (b) the way peripheries were administered by the central authorities. From the peripheries came the slaves, labour force and surplus in food production (animal and agriculture) to enrich the centres. From the centre came policies, laws, administrators and other government officials. (Douglas 2003). The history of Mohammed Ali Pasha in Sudan played an important role, not only in keeping those relations intact, but developing them further. As the need for slaves expanded, the Islamic state needed a strong standing army which in turn needed slaves to replenish the ever-depleting army institution through which it engaged in constant fighting. The current violence against Nuba can be seen as a continuation of the institutionalized perpetuation of violent insecurity from pre-colonial kingdoms (McMichael 1922; Sprauling 1987), including Turco-Egyptian rule and its slave trade institutions (Pallme 1844; Llyod 1908; Trimmingham 1949). The Nuba Mountains, South Sudan region, Blue Nile and Darfur were the peripheries that bore the brunt of the violent conflicts associated with slave raids. From their hinterlands, the States’ centres drew slaves, some of whom were used for international trade, others for domestic work (Holt & Daly 2011).

The current conflict is seen widely by the peripheries as Khartoum’s deliberate policy not only to keep the old wounds bleeding, but to keep poking them time and again. The fact remains that, the very underlying factors that led to the secession of South Sudan remain intact today. President Omar El-Bashir in addressing a rally in Gadarif city – East of the country – on 14th February 2011 bluntly stated after the secession of South Sudan, that he does not want any Daghmasa, a mixture of bad things. El-Bashir was referring to those cultures and traditions that are not considered constitutive elements of Arabic nationalism. His remarks resulted in him being viewed as a demagogue who appeals to the passion and

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3 Mohammed Ali Pasha was an Albanian officer in the Turco-Egyptian army whose forces, between 1820-1822, were able to conquer all of contemporary northern Sudan. During the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Mohammed sought to establish his own firm rule over Egypt and later over Sudan as well. His motivation for conquering Sudan, as he claimed, was men and gold to fuel his ever-expanding war making machinery.
sentiment of the public through crude oration. His racial rhetoric represents a core and central theme on which NCP socio-economic policies rest, which again, represent the crux of the country’s intractable political violence directed squarely against the peripheries. It allowed no hope for political and religious harmony, tolerance and co-existence. With such political ideology as a governing ideal, there will be no chance for national reconciliation, accommodation, and management of diversity. Furthermore, in such circumstances, the achievement of social integration is an unthinkable matter.

The conception of slave-master relations and the politics of segregation with which post-colonial elites were classifying people according to their ethnic affiliations and geographical locations, produced a specific socio-economic and political system directing the course of the country’s history. It is the same system which is responsible for the marginalization of the peripheries and informing the behaviour of Omar El-Bashir towards the peripheries. Any solution that does not lead to the dismantling of such an anachronistic and corrupt socio-political system will not bring a lasting peace the country longs for. It will reproduce the same but multifaceted system. This is the situation the peoples of Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile, who have no claim to direct Arabic descent face. There is no intrinsic rationale for such a deliberate, resentful and rigorous segregation and rooted hatred towards African Sudanese, beyond an exclusionary ethno-racialist ethic on which the national identity of the Sudanese nation is constructed. That is to say, the government of Sudan segregates people along ethnic, religious, colour, linguistic and cultural lines. These lines represent fault-lines, each of which can become a full political cause and can explode at any time when politically manipulated. This is exactly what is happening in contemporary Sudan.

Despite the fact that Sudan has many Muslim populations within its borders, the government, which claims to promote Islamic traits and safeguard Muslims’ interests, persecutes and kills Muslims and non-Muslims in the name of Allah or holy war (jihad) in Darfur, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, (www.sudanreeve.org, accessed: 2016). The religiosity of Muslims in Darfur, Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile was never a blessing nor did it offer them a sanctuary from persecution. It never deterred the government of Khartoum from carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocidal crimes against them. The truth remains that, the ongoing war in Sudan is not a religious war, as the government continues to claim. It is an ethnic cleansing disguised by religious proclamations (www.sudan.reeve.org, accessed: 2016). In order to elicit moral and material support to fuel their war machinery, the government persistently sells false allegations to the Arab and Islamic worlds, that they are fighting a sacred war on behalf of the entire Arab and Islamic nations to rid the country of all elements incongruent with Arabic and Islamic cultures. This is clear from the messages president Omar El-Bashir and his generals send when addressing military convoys and in the mobilization of militias.

Despite ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural diversity manifest in the country, successive governments in Khartoum have used excessive coercive force to produce conformity to an unrepresentative and asymmetrical national identity created by Arabic-Islamic-based ruling elites. This identity is constructed on the qualifications of one particular ethnic group, leaving those who resist assimilation as second class citizens in their own country or facing total annihilation as enemies. The enemy has to be exterminated and spared no effort in trying to build constitutional legitimacy to such a controversial, unacceptable and unqualified ethnically based corporate national identity. If nationalism is believed to be a vehicle to nationhood, then it should have been all encompassing. As an ideology, nationalism in Sudan

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should have been understood as the political expression of a diverse community coming
together to assert their collective and common sovereignty as a nation. Respect for diversity
is a fundamental tenet both in Christianity and Islam. Sudan, by definition, is a heterogeneous
society, and the imposition of homogeneity of whatever kind by coercive force will tear it
further apart.

People experience a common sense of belonging and affiliation to the same nation, if and
only if they recognize each other as being so. Nations are artefacts of people’s convictions,
loyalties and solidarities. A category of persons occupying a given territory or speakers of a
given language can become a nation only if and when the members of the category firmly
recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other by virtue of their shared membership
of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them in to a
nation (Ernest 1983). Despite achieving independence some 60 years back, Sudan has never
enjoyed peace, stability and tranquillity and has never had a permanent constitution. The
modern history of Sudan has been marked with military coups, starting from 1958, 1969 and
1989. At the heart of the root causes of Sudan’s persistent violent conflicts is the political,
economic, religious and cultural marginalization of the peripheries coupled with the failure
by successive governments in Khartoum to recognize, accommodate and manage diversity.
However, a nation built on the bond of ethnicity or blood and thus on ethno-cultural
nationalism in a multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic country does
not recognize others except as aliens or second class citizens living in a nation-state.

The particular ethnic group on whose credentials the national identity is constructed
constitutes the “nation”. Membership to such a nation is determined by genealogical descent
not by choice. There is an ever-growing feeling among the Sudanese of African origin that
God did not create all of them Arabs, so they will never become Arabs by default in order to
be acceptable as first class citizens in their own country. As such, the peoples of Nuba
Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur find it hard to secure recognition and acceptance as
members of the national community with equal civil, political, socio-economic and cultural
rights. Central government has never conceded such recognition. However, it is the aspiration
of the people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Darfur and other marginalised areas to have
equal recognition of their equally inalienable rights achieved. It is the ambition of the peoples
of these areas that Sudan is transformed and re-structured in such a way that unity in diversity
is attained and respected, and those constitutional provisions that guarantee mutual
recognition to one another and acceptance of others as others are established and reinforced.
In such a transformed nation, the key bond that would hold people together is citizenship, not
blood or ethnicity.

There is nowhere in this contemporary world, even in South Africa during the Apartheid era,
that people were subjected to double Apartheid – religious and racial – except in Sudan
where, the people of Nuba, Blue Nile and Darfur have been undergoing such brutal policy
since 1956. This prolonged dual apartheid system has produced untold suffering on these
peoples. The systematic racial, religious and regional discrimination meted out against them
and deliberate marginalization of the majority of the Sudanese of African origin in Nuba
Mountains, Blue Nile, Darfur, far North and the East of the country are institutionalized
policies successive governments in Khartoum pursue, based on nothing other than their skin
colour, ethnicities and their religious beliefs.
The Current War: Nuba Resilience
On May 2011, the government organized elections in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan State, for the gubernatorial and state legislature. Elections, if conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner, were seen by many as a necessary mechanism prescribed by the CPA in the hope that finally it would precipitate democratic transformation. The elections held historical significance for both North and South Sudan, and would have offered a useful lesson for the unresolved issues remaining in the Nuba region and other areas of the country in the post-CPA era (Rift Valley Institute African Elections Project 2011). The official result gave the NCP ruling party’s incumbent governor Ahmad Muhammed Harun – indicted by the ICC along with the president – the victory by slight margin. SPLM, having claimed election fraud, disputed the result outright.

The future of the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA) combatants was ensured as part of the Security Arrangement Protocol of the CPA. The government, without regard to this provision, to the popular consultation protocol, and to the final political settlement of the conflict in the two areas, resorted to forcefully disarm and dissolve SPLA combatants in joint integrated units (JIU) (CPA 2005). Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) were inspired by the secession of the troubled South Sudan – as they put it – which they believed to be the God father that provides stalwart support to SPLM/N. Furthermore, according to the then Minister of Defence, Abdurrahim Mohammed Hussain, SAF could crash SPLA/N within 72 hours if they refused to lay down their arms. The disputed elections and the forceful disarmament attempt of SPLA combatants by SAF triggered the current war across the state in June 2011, with catastrophic humanitarian consequences and re-opening of old wounds (The Rift Valley Institute African Election Project 2011).

Nuba by tradition are agro-pastoralists dependent on subsistence agricultural farming and animal husbandry for their livelihood. They are popularly famous for their wrestling tournaments, tattooing and body painting. They are a conglomerate of linguistically diverse African ethnic groups bound by their distinct but common culture, united, again by their common history of oppression, geographical location and traditional religious beliefs (UNHCR 2008). The gradual occupation of their historical plain lands in greater Kordofan by Arabs resulted in Nuba being pushed southwards. The long periods of inhumane subjugation and violent slave raids carried out on them by Turco-Egyptian armies and the Mahdists aided by local Baggar tribes-men compelled Nubato move further southwards to the hills, the present day Nuba Mountains, seeking refuge. Various literatures that cover Nuba historiography conclude that, Nuba were the first to inhabit the plains of greater Kordofan before any other group. As such, they are the autochthonous peoples of the region (Lloyd 1908; McMichael 1912; Trimmingham 1949; Saavedra 1988). The involvement of power centres aided by local Baggaras in the enslavement of Nuba, the harsh oppression and policies of deliberate marginalisation successive governments applied on them, resulted in Nuba developing a centrifugal attitude towards central governments. For Nuba, the government principally attends to regime security and they, as Nuba, have nothing to do with it. The local Baggaras not only participated in the subjugation, enslavement, displacement and forced relocation of Nuba, but have persistently contested the land rights claims of Nuba land.

The more government intensified its brutal campaign of terror, the more it became detested and abhorred and the more Nuba people became increasingly determined to continue the struggle regardless of the consequences. For Nuba; giving up means total annihilation.
South Sudan was entitled the right to self-determination to be executed at the end of the interim period to determine its collective future political status. The CPA purported to achieve unity or separation based on the voluntary and free choice of the South Sudanese. The NCP government has failed to live up to its responsibility. No national political program has been initiated as an endeavour to make unity attractive, and the South Sudanese people, united by frustration, grievances and anger, voted overwhelmingly for secession in a referendum held in January 2011 (Southern Sudan Referendum Final Result Report 2011).

South Sudan seceded and was declared an independent State on July 9th 2011, after waging a bitter struggle for 56 years against the dominant political ideology created by northern political elites. This ideology divided the nation rather than unify it. Secession was a means for the attainment of the political transformation of the country, in which citizenship, recognition and accommodation of the diversity inherent in the country, which are the unifying factors of the Sudanese nation on a voluntary basis were to have been achieved. The ideals were enshrined in the New Sudan Vision promulgated in SPLM manifesto (SPLM Manifesto 2008).

The Way Forward
The scourge earth policies and war by attrition the government systematically metes out against people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur, have produced deep seated resentment and protracted bloody civil wars the country has no capability of extricating itself from. It is widely believed that lasting and durable peace can only be attained if there is a vision and political will on the part of the NCP government to address the root causes of the problem. Unlike South Sudanese, people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur have a greater desire to remain in a united Sudan that respects and accommodates cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversities and also respects universal values such as civil rights and the rule of law. They desire a united Sudan where all citizens are recognized as first class citizens and bearers of inalienable rights, provided that the NCP-led government holds the same political creed. It is the belief of the people in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile that, if the NCP and its president continue to hold views on peoples of the three areas -Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur – as daghmasas and insects, the remaining Sudan will be torn further apart.

This paper argues that just and durable peace can be attained only through a comprehensive political settlement that contributes to the restructuring of the Sudanese State and that effects change in the perception of Sudanese nationhood. However, people in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur espouse a strong believe that the time has not only come, but is overdue for –

1. A comprehensive political settlement that leads to restructuring of the Sudanese State along civic ideals, or;
2. Self-determination for the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur.

For more than 60 years of tragic civil conflicts, the people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur have endured untold hardships and horror, and were made to make huge sacrifices.

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4 South Sudanese frustrated by lack of goodwill on the part of NCP government voted overwhelmingly for separation with the following result: 98.93% cession and 1.17% unity.
in order to survive. These sacrifices will be remembered by generations for years to come as meaningless if the terms of the settlement are less than the wholesale restructuring of the Sudanese state along civic national characteristics or self-determination for the three areas. As a matter of historical fact, successive governments in Khartoum have been slaughtering people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur for over 60 years in systematic campaigns of terror. This is because they refuse to acquiesce to the NCP conception of nationhood.

The mere thought of once again leaving the people of the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur under the tender mercies of NCP government under whatever terms of a peace agreement other than those outlined above, is untenable. People will never be prepared to accept any settlement that does not give meaning to the huge sacrifices they have made. Of course, the history of Sudan did not begin with the advent of Islam or Arabs; it predates both. However, without apolitical settlement that guarantees the dismantling of the current governing political ideology and the ethnic concept of nationhood—Arabism and Islamism—the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and the Blue Nile will eventually cease to be part of that nation.

**IDPs and Refugees**

For the past five years of war in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, the Sudanese army and its surrogate militias, known as people’s defence forces (PDF) and Janjaweed Arab militias, have perpetuated egregious human rights violations on an innocent civilian population. People are shell-shocked, terrified and living in constant fear in caves and valleys (www.sudanreeves.org, accessed: 2016). The indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civic targets by the Khartoum Government in SPLM controlled parts of the region such as churches, schools, health care facilities, water points and populated areas, has caused massive casualties. It has destroyed basic life amenities such as water, shelter, and basic health care and rendered people helplessly vulnerable to ecological fluctuations such as drought, pests and diseases. It has also precipitated a humanitarian crisis; people affected are faced with prolonged and man-made difficult living conditions and hunger.

In the Nuba Mountains alone 612,000 people were internally displaced within the region during the first two years of the war. 100,000 more fled to government-controlled parts of the country. A total of 93,000 persons crossed the border into Yida and Adjuong Thock refugee camps in neighbouring South Sudan. In Blue Nile, 83,000 were internally made homeless while a further 40, 000 crossed the border into neighbouring Ethiopia. 110,000 more crossed the border into refugee camps such as Doro, Khor Yabus and Yusuf Batil in neighbouring South Sudan. Between the period of 2011 to 2013 alone, more than 500 people inside the two states—Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile have died from starvation and other related diseases. People are being killed on daily basis by Soviet-made, high altitude Antinov bombers, jet fighters such as Megs, sokhoys, helicopter gunships and by medium range Iranian-made rockets such as shiraz and Shahab.

A total of 1,200,000 are currently living in SPLM-controlled parts of the Nuba region. These people are terribly affected physically and mentally by the war. They are innocent victims of NCP brutality. The IDPs population stranded inside the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile is worse off. No relief assistance has ever been allowed to aid them. They are confined inside caves, because of insecurity most of the daytime and, therefore, are unable to attend to their farms. This couples with major annual government dry-season offensives in which
government forces burn down villages, loot and/or destroy heaps of collected crops in order to create protracted man-made harsh living conditions for a people already vulnerable and struggling to survive. These figures are not constant; they are variables movements of people from one place to another, seeking physical security and refuge are largely controlled by war dynamics.

**Humanitarian Crisis**

No humanitarian assistance has ever been allowed into war affected areas of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile; however, a negotiated humanitarian relief proposal was initiated on February 9, 2012 by the UN, AU and League of Arab States (LAS). It came to be known as the Tripartite Agreement and was met with an unwavering rebuff from the Khartoum government. The government continued to place a blanket denial of humanitarian access to the silently suffering people of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. This, coupled with its systematic use of food as a weapon of war, led to an ever deteriorating humanitarian crisis. There is a strong growing feeling of desperation, hopelessness, helplessness and frustration among the people affected by the conflict in the two areas as they continue to suffer silently and to live in dire need of urgent humanitarian intervention.

During the first period of war, 1985 to 2005, no information was coming in or going out of the Nuba region and most of the atrocities committed by SAF and its surrogate militias went unreported. In such circumstances, barter became major economic activity in a situation of little or no money economy. Use of wild fruits as food supplements, communal support to destitute families, and strict self-reliance are coping mechanisms Nuba developed that made them resilient and hardened. The NCP government in Khartoum should not be allowed to use food as punishment to people fighting for their political rights. Saving the lives of desperate people should not be the precondition of a political settlement of the conflict, nor should people’s lives be held hostage by a national sovereignty claim. Humanitarian access must be allowed to save lives of a civilian population caught in the middle of the conflict. The African Union (AU) should initiate a move to invoke Article 4 of its Constitutive Act to intervene in order to save lives of people of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. It is the responsibility of the international community to assert more pressure on the Khartoum government to unconditionally acquiesce and allow humanitarian access to affected people in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.

**Education Program**

Education is a human right for every child regardless of race, gender, colour, religion or geographical location. Omar El- Bashir directed his war executing agents to destroy schools, mosques, churches and health facilities. This made a whole generation of Nuba youth miss opportunities for education. However, despite the challenges the education program faces, SPLM civil administration made education their top priority in liberated areas. The table below shows education statistics, and distribution of schools by counties –

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5 The Article 4 (h) of African Union Constitutive Act states: The right of the Union to intervene in a member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war cries, genocide and crimes against humanity.
There is a lack of qualified teachers and the schools often stay closed for most of the dry-season, because of government military offensives and during the times of air bombardments. Schools are excessively targeted by war planes. No healthy learning environment exists, which is a threat to physical security. The whole education program lacks basic requirements such as scholastic materials and a school curriculum.

Qualified Teachers
There are four mixed and functioning secondary schools, one of which is run by the Dioses of El-Obied, and two teacher training institutes. Senior leavers after completing form 4, do not know where to go next to pursue their education further.
ICC Indictment
The Sudan leader, Omar El-Bashir, was indicted by the ICC in 2009 on account of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide he and his generals committed in Darfur. His forces continue to commit gross atrocities against people of the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan. The crimes, according to the Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR 2011), may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is with the spirit of restoring permanent peace and national reconciliation that the ICC and the international community established mechanisms in order to bring Omar El-Bashir and all those who commit similar crimes against their own people to face justice.

Conclusion
One of the contributing factors to ever-increasing social inequality in the Sudan is the fact that regional strategic development policies are planned and financially supported by the central government. When regional development policies are defined and planned from the central government, there is always a high possibility of preferential treatment of regions receiving development funds. Peripheries suffer most. The decision-makers in Khartoum target certain regions for development funds—mostly they favour the regions where the ruling elites hail from—leaving the rest to gradual underdevelopment (Imbalances of Power and Wealth Sharing 2003).

Although Sudan is an oil exporting country, the oil revenues have not been utilized to uplift the living standard of the ordinary citizen through provision of better social services such as education, health care services and safe water, among others. Given development projects are always carried out with violence, oil has become a curse even to residents of the areas in which oil is extracted. Development does not always lead to political stability. It can be a source of social unrest. Sudan is a typical example of this; oil revenues are not used to purchase weaponry not to fend off external threats, but to brutalize its own people in the name of protecting Islamic Sharia Law.

It is absurd and equally paradoxical to hold colonial administration squarely accountable for all the country’s mounting upheavals 60 years after the achievement of independence. Post-independence elites and all preceding successive governments should be held accountable for all those ills which were the product of their own asymmetrical policies. The failure by successive regimes in Khartoum to demonstrate genuine political will to resolving the conflict once and for all, casts a gloomy image of the country’s future. The practical secession of South Sudan offered an unprecedented incentive for parties to the conflict and those hostile to the centre to strongly entertain the idea of breaking away if conflict persists. The segregationist policies along ethno-racialist fault lines, not only jeopardize the stability of the country, but threaten its very existence as a functioning, vibrant and viable civic State.
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An Examination of Radicalisation in the Context of Migration

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Abstract
The piecemeal attainment of durable solutions has increasingly led to the indeterminate confinement of refugees and placed them in a state technically referred to as protracted refugee situations (PRS). The Somali refugees in Kenya, the focus of this paper, are an archetype of PRS. Protracted refugee situations not only present humanitarian concerns but also raise complex security challenges as a result of conflict spill-over into neighbouring countries (Loescher et al 2008; Milner 2011). While camps are conceived as safe havens for vulnerable refugee populations and are as such perceived as neutral spaces, they are also a hotbed for politics, extreme views and militarisation (Ek & Karadawi 1991). The host country and other actors sometimes respond through securitisation, which implies politicising and transforming issues into matters of security. This approach can potentially interact in a complex web with other contextual factors to motivate (non)violent radicalisation. This paper briefly conceptualises the dynamics of radicalisation within a refugee camp microcosm and its interaction with other subsystems at national, inter-state and regional levels. The paper relies on primary data sources namely reports, 10th moment data sources, government policies and legislation, and applies soft systems thinking to highlight the interactive dynamics of radicalisation.

Introduction
The existing scholarship on the nascent field of radicalisation can be described as conceptual rather than empirical (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). While most literature has focused on why radicalisation happens, there has been less focus on how individuals progressively adopt beliefs and behaviour that support and in some instances, culminate in acts of terrorism and other forms of political violence. A preponderance of research on terrorism has grown to currently include group, network, organisational, mass movement, socio-cultural and international contexts. However, the dynamics of that process remain poorly understood while the pursuit of a single theory is misguided (Crenshaw 2000; Silke 2001; Laqueur 2003).

Discourse on refugees does not occur in a political vacuum and is often informed by a range of constraints and priorities, ranging from security and the state’s internal capacity to govern. In exploring the dynamics of radicalisation in a refugee camp microcosm, this paper underscores the interconnectedness of elements at micro, meso and macro levels. The paper conceptually condenses a chapter of the main thesis on the interplay between actors, instruments and interventions in a refugee camp context. Subsequent sections of this paper allude to but do not exhaustively discuss broader regional dynamics, an area that remains poorly understood in the province of security (Loescher et al 2008; Milner 2011). As an initial process of making the case for the complexity of radicalisation with the camp as the epicentre, the paper demonstrates the importance of examining contextual factors permissive to radicalisation. This is achieved through a description of the deplorable conditions at the sprawling Dadaab Refugee Complex in Kenya, which predominantly hosts Somali refugees. The text further animates the policies of the host state and exposes the contextual paradox of
Kenya as a safe haven. Suffice it to say that the complex confluence of a multiplicity of factors and actors in the process of radicalisation and how radicalisation emerges in inter-group dynamics is not necessarily a singular refugee experience. While certain groups are often profiled as predisposed to radicalisation and/or acts of terrorism, other actors including government, media, scholars, and the general public among others, can precipitate radicalisation and can also be violently or non-violently radicalised in their response to acts of violent extremism (Schmid 2013).

The paper advances the central theme of liminality in situations of protracted displacement and the resultant coping mechanisms. Within the context of protracted refugee situations, a liminal state captures the period when ‘the past is momentarily negated, suspended or abrogated and the future has not yet begun’ (Turner 1982). It references a refugee’s interminable camp entrapment in a state of limbo. Existing evidence (Woods 2016) suggests the need to review this definition to reflect motion and capture the inter-connectedness in the present, past and even future refugee lived experiences in time and space. In this context, ‘momentarily’ may denote a freeze that may be singular in nature. Therefore, the paper suggests the adoption of a working definition of liminality as “the intermittent negation, suspension or abrogation of the past (Turner 1982) and an uncertain, erratic yet ongoing future”. This paper draws inspiration from prevailing global developments in the field of migration and terrorism and attempts to establish transnational linkages to strengthen the discourse between the two fields. The underlying argumentation for the rejection of reductionism justifies the adoption of a systems analytical approach that transcends the camp context. This paper, nestled within a broader thesis attempts to fill the gap of ahistoricity, acontextuality, acomplexity and adynamism by analysing radicalisation within the broader context in which it incubates and ultimately (or not) emerges alongside the dynamic and evolutionary character of historical and other contexts.

**Trending Refugees and Trendy Global Responses**

As part of its overall mandate of international refugee protection, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is charged with the responsibility to implement durable solutions for refugee situations. The agenda for durable solutions constitutes one of three viable options namely: voluntary return of refugees to countries of origin once safety can be guaranteed; local integration within the host country; or third-country resettlement (UNHCR 2003). Over time, the importance accorded to each of the three durable solutions has changed. Some scholars (Malkki 1995; Verdirame et al 2005) have argued that since the 1980s, repatriation remains the most preferred durable solution. However, the nature of conflict habituated systems and high degree of volatility that is characteristic of refugees’ countries of origin do not often provide permissive conditions for sustainable return. This effectively rules out the option of repatriation in such situations. The strategic options of resettlement and local integration that were more viable during the colonial and Cold War eras are no longer regarded as such. The end of communism and colonialism, and increase of migration from developing to developed countries have shifted preference to voluntary repatriation especially among industrialised countries. For developing countries, the right to exercise state sovereignty by maintaining borders and regime security conflicts with the obligation to protect refugees. At the same time, impoverished host countries like Kenya are reluctant to bear additional burden of supporting local integration due to their weak capacity to cater for both nationals and refugee populations (Chimni 1999; UNHCR 2006). Yet as state parties to the Refugee Convention, signatories have a duty to comply with the regime.
Evidently, the convergence of these issues implies that the compassion that once distinguished the responsibility to protect is losing traction as host countries continue to make certain strategic considerations on refugee matters.

Indeed, the global dynamism of migratory flows has marshalled an unprecedented, irregular surge of migrants particularly from Africa and the Middle East into Europe. This trend of increasingly complex migration flows has been termed ‘mixed migration’ and is defined as ‘complex population movements involving refugees, asylum seekers, economic and other migrants, as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants’ (IOM Glossary 2011). This movement is characterised by massive flows that present rising political significance at national, regional and global levels. Strict border controls and the obvious barriers to resettlement and integration increasingly compel mixed migrants to resort to illegitimate means to migrate. This trend signifies the reality of massive numbers of people willing to migrate longer distances at greater risk to safeguard their physical and economic security. This wave of migration has unwittingly evoked anti-migrant sentiments in transit and host countries (Danish Refugee Council 2014). Such migration crises tend to influence how states respond to refugee flows and operationalise existing refugee regimes. Orchard (2014) suggests that these crises delegitimise the existing protection regime thus triggering a loss of confidence and a search for alternative responses to refugee issues. It is, therefore, not surprising that in light of the current migration crisis, Europe and Turkey have reached a landmark deal to stem the flow of refugees and other migrants by applying a policy of refoulement. (Al Jazeera 2016; BBC 2016). Other European Union (EU) countries have also passed national legislation to discourage immigration. (The Washington Post 2016).

More countries have taken similarly strong positions on migration that include policy proposals that bar the entry or encourage refoulement of refugees facing real threats in their countries of origin. During the 2015-2016 presidential campaign period in the United States, immigration provided a strong rallying point particularly among republican candidates opposed to the ostensibly lax American immigration laws (Time 2015; Politico 2016). Australia on its part has pursued the ‘Pacific Solution’, which involves the interception and offshore detention of refugees and other migrants through deals with impoverished countries in a bid to curb irregular migration within its borders (Koser 2015). On the African continent, Kenya sensational claimed that Dadaab, a camp predominantly hosting Somali refugees is a breeding ground for terrorists, and has repeatedly threatened cessation of status and forceful mass repatriation of refugees (The Guardian 2015; Daily Nation 2016). What could possibly have provoked these controversial policy prescriptions that obviously denigrate international humanitarian law?

In early 2015, an advisor to the Libyan government warned that the Islamic State (IS) was exploiting the Europe migrant flow by smuggling jihadists with the intention of setting up terrorist sleeper cells across Europe. Pentagon has also reported that in some cases, IS volunteers blend with migrants and then break away in Tripoli to head to Syria (The Telegraph 2015; The Guardian 2016; The Telegraph 2016; Schmid 2016). At the same time, Islamic State has previously threatened to flood Europe with agents disguised as refugees, while an operative within the organisation has claimed that this threat has already been executed (Jihad Watch 2015; Sky News 2016; Schmid 2016). One of the perpetrators of the spectacular terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 130 people in Paris in 2015 is reported to
have posed as a refugee. Reports indicate that he entered Europe through Greece and registered as a refugee on a fake Syrian passport (BBC 2015; The Telegraph 2016).

Quintessentially, the currency underlying this thread of discourse is the role played by recent terrorist attacks in advancing the securitisation of refugee issues. Securitisation implies politicising and transforming issues into matters of security. This process involves the social and political construction of threats into national and state security issues. This is for example evident in the use of extrajudicial means as a form of intervention to threat management (Murphy 2007; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998). The non-entree asylum regime of the European Union (Levy 2010) on one hand and the threats of cessation of refugee status by Kenya on the other have seen the thickening of the external borders constructed to securitise the supranational and national polities (Zetter 2014a). The progressive reinforcement of the structure of border control has considerably diminished the quality of protection for asylum seekers. Ultimately, the quandary for most governments remains negotiating the balance between national security and the humanitarian imperative to provide protection to refugees within their borders. Accordingly, important elements that this paper examines include camp make-up and state of human security, the potential for militant infiltration, and to a limited extent, the dynamics of interaction and level of influence among camp dwellers.

**Protracted Refugee Situations and Somali Refugees in Kenya**

As the world grapples with the ongoing migration crisis and the realisation of durable solutions dither, the practice of detention and containment of refugees in camps has gradually become the norm. The interminable spatial encampment of refugees has resulted in what is typically known as Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognises a refugee situation as protracted if 25,000 or more refugees from one country of origin have been hosted by another country for five or more consecutive years with no immediate prospects for durable solutions (UNHCR 2009a). According to the UNHCR, the 25 countries most affected by prolonged refugee presence are in the developing world. The average length of refugee habitation in host countries has gradually increased from an average of nine years in the 1990s to stand at around 20 years at present (Guterres 2010).

Protracted refugee situations arise from extended political crises in the countries of origin and the failure of the host countries to effectively respond to refugee influx. As a response, host countries typically resort to extended encampment of refugees in remote areas and impose restrictions on movement (UNHCR 2004b). Furthermore, protracted displacement is symptomatic of drawn-out intractable regional conflict system dynamics that often culminate in conflict spill-over into neighbouring fragile states (USCRI 2004). The protracted Somali refugee situation in Kenya, the paper’s case study, is one such complex crisis.

Somali refugees have migrated to distant destinations like Europe, Southern Africa and the Arab Peninsula. However, the majority are hosted in the Greater Horn of Africa region, particularly in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Kenya is the primary destination of refugees coming from South Central Somalia. While Kenya also hosts urban Somali refugees in the capital city of Nairobi, the majority of Somali refugees are hosted at Dadaab Refugee Complex, established in 1991 (Lindley 2011; UNHCR 2014). Kenya, similar to her neighbours, is affected by internal displacement and small scale refugee outflows as a result of political violence, natural disasters, environmental degradation and forced evictions (IOM, 2015). The country has historically been lauded for its liberal asylum policies that allowed
most refugees to locally integrate until the end of 1980s. However, in the 1990s, the massive influx of refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia compelled the shift towards a more restrictive policy, a relatively common occurrence when there is a sharp spike in refugee flows (Banki 2004; Campbell et al 2011).

North Eastern Province, the province that hosts Dadaab Refugee Complex is semi-arid with average temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius. The area’s fragile ecosystem, sparse vegetation and absence of surface water impose exacting living conditions for the local inhabitants and refugees. The province has limited natural resources, experiences intermittent flooding and has a history of cholera and measles outbreaks (Adelman 2005; Lindle 2011; Kumssa and Jones 2014). The region is infested by mosquitoes and has a high prevalence of malaria (Adelman, 2005). It is mostly inhabited by pastoralist Somali Kenyans from various Darood clans who share the same language, culture and religion as the Somali refugees (Horst 2008). Due to the overlapping identity between the host community (Kenyan Somalis) and the refugees, about 40,000 Kenyan “refugees” have encroached the camps (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000; KNCHR 2007; Enghoff et al 2010; RCK 2012).

Interestingly, past Somali governments have staked irredentist claims over the host province and recognise it as being part of Greater Somalia (Solomon, 2009). The province has a history of violent repression and marginalisation under both the colonial and successive Kenyan governments. Underdevelopment notwithstanding, the province has historically been unstable and weakly governed with incidents of banditry, cattle rustling and insurgency. The region has also experienced a proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a result of the conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda. For the most part, when these social, economic and political grievances persist in such refugee hosting areas, marginalisation may lead to radicalisation, which may ultimately lead to violence (Lindley, 2011; UNHCR and World Bank, 2015).

Emerging Systemic Gaps within the Kenyan Security Architecture

While the prima facie refugee determination process is an imperative for emergencies and has been recognised as the fastest and most efficient way to provide protection, it is not without its shortcomings. In an illuminating book, Rawlence (2016) explores the lives of nine refugees in Dadaab by tracing their flight path and experiences at the camp. He narrates the story of Guled, a man who claims to have been forcefully conscripted into Al Shabaab. As an Al Shabaab operative, he lived in a displaced camp in Somalia where aid agencies operated with Al Shabaab’s consent. Guled later fled Somalia on a dangerous journey that involved being smuggled across the border. He eventually finds sanctuary at the camp in Dadaab. What is more interesting is that on arrival at Dadaab, he wanders around the camp before a chance meeting with a former school mate, Nuur. Nuur explains to Guled that he is supposed to register as a refugee in order to receive a ration card and access other services. Upon arrival at the UNHCR registration centre, an employee enquires from Guled the reason for his flight from Somalia to which he simply replies, “insecurity”. The employee does not document further details about his Somali experience and Guled becomes duly registered as a refugee.

This narrative resonates and supports other scholars’ acknowledged positions of the limitations that confront the prima facie Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process.
Harrell-Bond and Kagan (2004) decry the lack of transparency and accountability in UNHCR RSD operational procedures. They recommend the reformation of RSD procedures and pursuit of other means of recognising refugees that lessens the burden and high risk of error in prima facie recognition for mass movements. They further argue that the UNHCR conception of prima facie determination in the 1960s regarded refugees falling under this group as temporary in nature. Hyndman and Nylund (1998) advance the argument and posit that this transient view of refugees in camps has permitted the politicisation of refugee determination processes and led to the gradual commitment to weaker standards. These arguments highlight the international community’s failure to commit to the realisation of durable solutions, which is comparable to a conspiracy to apathy. This conspiracy has inexplicably led to the passive acceptance of a stronghold that foists a stranglehold on refugees, the antithesis of sanctuary. The indeterminate settlement of a diversity of denizens in structures originally conceived as temporary is now widely embraced as the norm.

On another front, in response to terrorist attacks in Kenya, the government has tightened its stranglehold in the province of refugee macro-policy. Kenya suspended the registration of new refugee arrivals in Dadaab since Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia in 2011. During this time, aid agencies scaled down operations due to increased insecurity in Dadaab (WFP 2014). In 2012, the government issued a directive halting refugee reception and directed the closure of all urban registration centres. This directive evoked widespread protection concerns and increased rights violations among refugees (Refugees International 2013). In 2013, the Kenyan government, the Federal Government of Somalia and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement that set out a legal framework for the staggered repatriation of refugees (Tripartite Agreement 2013) to an unstable Somalia. So far, voluntary repatriation has occasioned only a slight reduction in the number of refugees at the camp since 2014 (IOM 2015). Even so, overall donor funding for the Dadaab Refugee Complex has significantly diminished as Kenya deplores the international community’s failure to fulfil its financial obligations (The Star 2016).

Kenya has ratified a number of regional and international instruments and passed several legislations governing refugee affairs. Some of these laws including the infamous Security Laws (Amendment) Act (2014), have been described as an assault to democracy. Some sections of these laws are not only in blatant contravention of existing international and regional refugee instruments but are also potentially open to abuse by state structures. It is important to assess the impact the broader policy environment has had on refugees at the camp level. While some sections of these laws duly respond to security concerns, they are equally repressive and infringe on human rights. As such, they present a dilemma for refugee host states. Should considerations on national security supersede the humanitarian imperative or vice versa? In response to this dilemma, the Kenyan government seems to have capitulated to public pressure and has issued yet another threat to shut down Dadaab refugee camp before the next elections in 2017 (Daily Nation 2016). This conforms to the current global trend on securitisation of refugee issues. The insufferable state of human security at Dadaab Refugee Complex is yet another systemic gap within the security architecture. The refugees at Dadaab face a host of human security challenges that encompass the complexity and entwinement of critical and pervasive threats. These challenges fall within a wide spectrum of military, political, social, environmental, economic and cultural threats that cannot be exhaustively covered in this limited paper. There is an existing body of literature that has extensively documented the deplorable conditions at this camp (See Lindley 2011; UNHCR JAM 2014;
By way of example, this paper briefly highlights some of these conditions.

The refugees at Dadaab face a host of human security challenges that encompass the complexity and intertwining of critical and pervasive threats. These challenges fall within a wide spectrum of military, political, social, environmental, economic and cultural threats that will be discussed in this section. The concept of human security compels a comprehensive examination of threats and shifts analysis from micro to systemic enquiry (UN Human Security Unit 2009). The refugees at Dadaab are the subjects of appalling living conditions in a complex spread over thirty square miles. In the local lingo, the name Dadaab means ‘the rocky hard place’ due to the presence of boulders obscured by vast sand cover (Rawlence 2016). The camp and its surroundings are served by winding, dusty, murram roads that restrict mobility particularly during the rainy seasons. As a result, stranded vehicles hinder the flow of humanitarian and business supplies (UNHCR JAM 2014).

The camp structure is an open, insecure and transient space with informal housing. The shelters are either temporary tent structures or semi-permanent erections constructed from bricks, steel and concrete (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2014). Other shelters are constructed from mud, twigs, reeds and scraps (Kumssa & Jones, 2014; Rawlence 2016). Most families share a single unit that accord no privacy to couples (Adelman 2005). The poor quality shelters do not provide sufficient protection from sun or rain. In addition, the ragged shelters expose refugees to theft and other risks. The camp is partitioned into sections with shared water and sanitation points, and compounds fenced with acacia thorns. The dilapidated pit latrines and stagnant puddles of sewage are a health risk to the users (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2014; Kumssa & Jones, 2014; Rawlence 2016). Exposure to harsh weather and other environmental conditions in the camps makes the camp inhabitants susceptible to diseases and other risks (Rawlence 2016). Other concerns include erratic water shortages, reports of disturbances during food distribution, and alarming levels of poor nutrition and infant mortality (UNHCR JAM 2014).

Despite humanitarian efforts to meet refugees’ basic needs, wretched living conditions continue to afflict Dadaab denizens. Dadaab continues to be overstretched with new arrivals as long-standing refugees remain trapped in a state of limbo. The camp originally established to host 90,000 refugees has exceeded its full capacity and houses over 350,000 refugees at any one time (Kumssa & Jones 2014; IOM 2015). Consequently, the camp continues to buckle under pressure from infrastructural inadequacies, limited essential service delivery and logistical quagmire. Humanitarian organisations are fraught to cater for basic needs by optimising meagre resources and providing very basic assistance. Notwithstanding this, there is a huge registration backlog, which may pose problems for those who may be asked for identification outside the camp (UNHCR JAM, 2014). The burgeoning camp population implies that law enforcement agencies may not have sufficient capacity to effectively serve the camp. This has implications on security since in order to be granted passage, refugees become extortion targets by corrupt border officers. Admittedly, the arrival of refugees with their own clan tensions has also intensified insecurity in the already restive region (Loescher & Milner 2005).

Refugees in protracted displacement experience onslaughts on physical security both within and outside camp precincts, and Dadaab is no exception. Some host countries have
manipulated refugees as political instruments by galvanising negative public sentiments to advance discriminatory migration policies (Loescher et al 2008). Kenya, for example, has conducted security operations at the camps in the wake of past terrorist attacks. This approach is likely to have negative unintended consequences that may impel the emergence of extreme beliefs or violence among refugees. This is an illustration of how mass displacement is both a source and consequence of insecurity (Loescher et al 2008). Kenya, in its most recent attempt to quell public security concerns has yet again threatened to shut down Dadaab refugee camp (Daily Nation 2016). Even though the tripartite agreement that guides the voluntary repatriation of refugees becomes defunct in late 2016, this announcement is temporally strategic, because the Kenyan general election campaign period is already on course. A populist response to the refugee problem, therefore, presents an opportunity for the current establishment to gain political mileage on matters of security. Unsurprisingly, the humanitarian and security costs of such a premature, forced and logistically challenging repatriation process may not have been accurately assessed. Within the Kenyan mainstream society, social exclusion among refugees is bi-directional and advanced by both Somalis and Kenyans. On one hand, a challenging economic environment coupled with scarce resources, runaway security and Somali irredentism has elicited fear and suspicion of the ‘Other’ among Kenyans. Furthermore, refugee antipathy has reinforced a strong Kenyan national identity. Kenyans generally perceive Somalis as lacking the willingness to integrate in mainstream Kenyan society as a result of their distinct socio-cultural background. For these reasons, strong public opinion has animated debates on refugees and influenced government policies on the same.

There has been little respite for the legions of refugees trapped in limbo under insufferable conditions at the camp. As a result, refugees have developed an enduring appetency for the single most desired yet least achievable of the three durable solutions. Inevitably, orientation towards resettlement to rich third countries is not only immensely popular, but an actively sought goal among Somali refugees. People are typically compelled to represent their resettlement cases skilfully, which could also imply some degree of embellishment (Lindley 2011). Emergent inconsistencies in refugee stories have bred distrust between UNHCR and Dadaab refugees. UNHCR tends to be suspicious of refugee stories while the latter does not have full trust on the UNHCR to fairly judge their cases against resettlement criteria. In fact, some refugee experiences are adapted along the judgement criteria to fit the more deserving and vulnerable cases for resettlement. There have also been accusations levelled against UNHCR for selling spaces to those with the financial muscle to buy their way out of the camp (Horst 2008).

Resettlement has little strategic value when the negligible annual resettlement cases are considered. While Europe and other Western countries have made significant contributions towards supporting refugees in other host countries, they have abdicated burden sharing with a paltry 1% of carefully selected Dadaab refugees accounting for resettlement in the developed world (Reliefweb 2016). In numerical terms, there are 9,000 new refugee arrivals for every 8,000 people resettled every year. While hopes for resettlement diffuses frustrations with deplorable camp life, it also creates “buufi”, which is a strong preoccupation with resettlement. This preoccupation continually entraps

refugees in an illusory liminal state (Turner 1982) that precludes improvement and focus on the present (Lindley 2011). Meanwhile, their aspirations suffer a tragic intermission as
timeless uncertainty confronts them. Suffice it to say that the unwitting coalition of the homeland, host state and third country conspire in apathy offering little to no prospects for repatriation, local integration or third country resettlement.

The values and principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights determine the global criteria for inalienable human rights (UNSG 1948). Sovereign states are obligated to ensure the full enjoyment of rights by allowing access to social, economic, political and civil rights. The universality of these human rights guarantees access for all including refugees who seek protection outside their homeland. Clearly, this is not entirely the case with Somalis hosted at Dadaab Refugee Complex. Failure to fulfill these rights may compromise state stability and security. A stateless individual whose rights are violated can become easy prey for recruitment into radical groups seeking to reap from an environment of disaffection (Betts 2009).

Coping Mechanisms within an Uncanny Stronghold
Refugees in prolonged camp residency tend to adopt a range of coping mechanisms to deal with previous exposure to violence, forced migration and adapt to their new environment with varying degrees of resilience. Numerous studies have identified factors that act as predictors of resilience that include risk and protective factors, for example: traumatic experiences; self-regard; family cohesion; social capital; caring relationships at family; school and community levels; perception of the world (Cowen & Work 1988; Resnick et al 1997; Janoff-Bulman 1992); psychological preparedness for trauma (Basoglu et al 1997). Research findings have also revealed the creative processes of coping and meaning making that survivors draw upon that in turn provide insightful data into the concepts of risk and reliance (Goodman 2004; Luthar & Cicchetti 2000). Coping mechanisms can be both passive and active and range from effective to ineffective strategies (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury 2003). Some refugees tap into new and existing social capital, strengthened religious beliefs and cognitive coping strategies such as the espousal of positive aspirations and reliance on inner strength. Others resort to more destructive strategies such as self-harming, avoidance and social alienation (Abraido-Lanza et al 2004; Halcon et al 2004; Goodman 2004).

Among a range of other positive coping mechanisms not discussed in this paper, some refugees tend to adopt active and purposive coping strategies characterised by strong political inclinations. This is manifest in increased political consciousness and open engagement in political activity that is reinforced by ideological beliefs (Basoglu et al 1997). As a result, camps become politicised spaces where refugees assert their national, ethnic, political and other forms of identity (Romola 2010). The process of politicisation can progress into the adoption of extreme views and transform into violent or non-violent radicalisation. However, this neither happens in a vacuum nor does it develop suddenly within a camp context but is linked to broader contextual dynamics. As an illustration, the first country of asylum for refugees is usually a neighbouring country that shares similar if not slightly differing dynamics of a conflict habituated system, as has already been discussed in the case of Kenya. Many of the host countries particularly in the developing world face similar constraints of instability, are in post-conflict transition and are themselves fledgling democracies. While these safe havens provide some degree of security and relief from suffering for refugees, they often present new dynamics that interact in a complex web of systems and subsystems that can serve as drivers for radicalisation (Loescher et al 2008).
The sketch diagram below whose elements have been captured in previous sections and will be discussed briefly in the next section is instructive of this dynamic. The open-ended internment of refugees in camps can be counter-productive because it can compound existing security problems and generate new ones. Military raids and direct camp attacks notwithstanding, the culture and organisation of camps create a viable climate for violence. The presence of weapons and bored, disillusioned young men makes the situation more volatile. These factors constitute important precipitants for crime, violence, emergence of ethno-political factions, and increased likelihood of conscription into armed groups or organised crime. Armed elements can hide among the refugee population with camps more likely to fall under the domination of political or military actors. When crimes are organised in a camp context, the human cost it inflicts goes beyond the confines of the camp. As such, encampment policies aggravate rather than address security problems (Jacobsen 2001).

**Stage 1 Conceptual Model of Radicalisation: A Security System Conundrum (SSC)**

![Stage 1 Conceptual Model of Radicalisation: A Security System Conundrum (SSC)](image)


**The Greater Horn of Africa Security System Conundrum**

The lack of immediate durable solutions coupled with a breakdown of peacebuilding efforts and agreements in countries of origin leads to the indefinite confinement of refugees in camps. This indeterminate warehousing of human beings can pose significant challenges for peace and security not only for the host country, but for the wider region (Loescher et al 2008). As an example, the examination of the history of the Somali conflict reveals that the
Somali protracted displacement is a result of the protracted humanitarian crisis in Somalia that shares an intimate relationship with the Greater Horn of Africa conflict system (Healy 2008). Similarly, drawing from the above diagram, the Somali protracted refugee situation is both a source and consequence of insecurity (Loescher et al 2008) beyond the Dadaab refugee camp microcosm, engulfing the Greater Horn of Africa region. Over the years, the issue of insecurity at Dadaab Refugee Complex and its environs has been a growing source of concern. There have been incidents of police harassment through arbitrary detention of refugees and forceful return over unlawful entry into Kenya (HRW 2010; RCK 2012). The failure of these measures to curb unlawful entries into the country is noteworthy since refugees have resorted to human smuggling to avoid police detection. In addition, state agents who are custodians of security have perpetuated the existing culture of corruption and impunity in their involvement in financial extortion of refugees. Given this state of affairs, how is the state’s security apparatus likely to inadvertently incubate radicalisation?

In September 2011, suspected Al Shabaab militants abducted a Kenyan driver working for CARE, an international NGO with operations in Dadaab (IRIN News 2011). In October the same year, two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) doctors were abducted and their driver murdered (The Guardian 2011). The general security situation at the camp continued to worsen throughout 2011 as the Kenya Defence Forces launched “Operation Linda Nchi” to counter Al Shabaab’s incursion into Kenya. In June 2012, four foreign aid workers working for the Norwegian Refugee Council were abducted and their driver murdered (Al Jazeera 2012). By 2013, there was increased reporting of incidents of rape, shootings, assault and murder. Discoveries of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, shootings and the use of remote controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had become regular occurrences at the camps. The threat of abductions affected humanitarian agencies’ operations and occasioned the scaling down of interventions (IRIN News 2011). In 2015, suspected Al Shabaab militants abducted a Kenyan teacher, raising further concerns of insecurity at the camp (Daily Nation 2015).

Growing evidence suggests that some youth at Dadaab are becoming radicalised and engaging in violence both in Kenya and Somalia, including indications of Al Shabaab activity in the camp. During 2009 to 2011, the Kenyan government trained and conscripted thousands of Somali youths from the predominantly Somali North Eastern Province of Kenya and Dadaab Refugee Camp to join the Somali Government troops in the fight against Al Shabaab in Somalia (Wikileaks cables 2009; Wikileaks cables 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009, 2012). In addition, other youths were trained in Djibouti, Uganda and Ethiopia. The youths conscripted by the Kenyan government deserted the force following the latter’s failure to meet its financial contractual obligations. The government has been unable to trace these youths but emerging reports reveal that a considerable number of youths have joined Al Shabaab while the rest returned to Kenya and are believed to be operating sleeper cells (Standard 2015).1 At the same time, Al Shabaab was also reported to be recruiting from within the camps (Human Rights Watch 2009, 2012; Danish Refugee Council& UNHCR, 2013) while some youths in Dadaab revealed that a number of their peers voluntarily left the camp to join Al Shabaab in Somalia (Wikileaks cables 2010).

In fact, a 2013 study commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council and the UNHCR

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1 The National Assembly Majority Leader, Aden Duale informed a local daily that the government report in question is gathering dust at Parliament’s archives.
identified voluntary and forced conscription of youth within the camp into Al Shabaab, and increased criminal elements within the camp as some of the major protection issues. The study further acknowledged the camp security situation as compromised due to the presence of members of Al Shabaab operating under the guise of refugees, and a refugee constituency of Al Shabaab sympathisers (Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR 2013). Notwithstanding this, fears and concerns abound among Somalis over Al Shabaab’s possible infiltration of the refugee camp following the unresolved murders of a couple of men seen to have cooperated with the police on security matters (Lindley, 2011). Dadaab refugee camp has also been used as a ‘safe haven’ for the storage of stockpiles of arms trafficked from Somalia in transit to other destinations in the region (International Peace Institute 2011). Evidently, the civilian character of the refugee camp appears to have been compromised by both the Al Shabaab, the Kenyan Government and other actors with the refugees trapped in the middle. Following the spectacular terrorist attack at Garissa University, the chairman of the Kenya Refugee Affairs Commission, Ali Korane, confirmed that the terrorists stayed and assembled their arms at the camp (The Guardian 2015).

The glaring security conundrum within Dadaab and the interplay of multiple undercurrents have influenced wider security dynamics within Kenya, Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa region. In recent years, the Kenyan government has played a more active role in the reception and registration of refugees due to security concerns. Some of the regional security threats include (see SSC diagram above): the potential spill-over of the Somali conflict; Al Shabaab recruitment and activity within Kenya; the potential union of grievances between Somali Kenyans in North Eastern Province and extremist organisations; dissent within the Muslim minority community (Lindley 2011), and: the proliferation of illicit arms in the Greater Horn region (Wasara 2002). These regional threats tend to have microcosmic ramifications at the camp level.

The disintegration of order during liminality seems to facilitate the establishment of new customs. Protracted confinement under insufferable camp conditions has a galvanising influence and creates an enabling environment for these grievances to transform into radicalisation and or acts of violence. Arendt (1973), while deploiring the practice of warehousing refugees, maintains that the global interrelated civilisation is at risk of producing barbarians from its midst by forcing multitudes of people into savage conditions. Additionally, after 9/11, other scholars have suggested a relationship between refugees and terrorism and the potential for militarisation in refugee camps. Makaremi (2010) submits that the Taliban is the product of Afghani camps in Pakistan established by UNHCR, resulting from incomplete humanitarian management. This argument essentially underscores the failure of the international community to address the humanitarian needs of forced migrants and poignantly highlights the construction of refugees as both victims and a threat as a result.

**Conclusion**

Dadaab Refugee Complex is the poster child of a botched humanitarian response. This characterisation has been highlighted through the role played by various actors and instruments at the camp microcosm. Notably, the existing legal and policy frameworks that implicitly and sometimes overtly conflate refugees with terrorists have advanced the Kenyan government’s belligerence towards the Somali protracted refugee situation. The international refugee regime’s failure to sustainably address the needs of refugees, host states’ frustrations and deleterious response are palpable. While political actors’ pressing concern remains
national security, very little has happened in the way of acknowledging and understanding the humanitarian situation at the camps.

This paper has exposed the collective experiences of insufferable conditions at the camp microcosm. It is evident that conditions at the camp do not meet minimum humanitarian standards as set out in the Refugee Convention. The paper also demonstrates how these camp conditions and the regional context sometimes mirror Somalia, the country the majority of the refugees fled from. The central variable of protracted displacement, which insulates liminality is an overarching theme of this research. As briefly demonstrated, identity-based discrimination, restricted movements and long periods of confinement in camps results in social isolation and impairment. The case presented demonstrates the limitations of refugee instruments, and in particular, the anachronistic 1951 Refugee Convention and the Kenyan government’s weak security architecture, that ultimately compromise security. The paper has also highlighted the sources of the state’s vulnerability to insecurity and demonstrated a strong appreciation of radicalisation as constituting a significant threat to oft overlooked vulnerable refugee populations.

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Border Control and Movement of Terrorist Groups in West Africa

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Abstract
Borders in West Africa are undeniably porous. This is an issue of concern for West African governments, individuals, civil society groups and the international community as a whole. This porosity has contributed to the easy movement and crossing of borders by terrorists in attacking innocent people and targets across the sub-region of West Africa. Boko Haram (a terrorist group), which has its headquarters in the Bono State in Nigeria, easily crosses the Nigerian border as it attacks targets in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (another terrorist group) from Algeria, has a base in the northern part of Mali and easily crosses the Malian border and attacks targets in Burkina Faso, Niger and Cote D’Ivoire. In understanding why borders in West Africa are porous, this paper identifies a number of contributing factors including: the lack of clearly identifiable sub-regional and national border control policies; lack of political will; lack of intelligence gathering; lack of capacity, and; lack of cooperation and coordination (networked borders) with other States. Measures to strengthen border control and policy recommendations are offered.

Introduction
Borders and boundaries are a defining trait of human civilization. They can be used to express everything from one person's property lines to the farthest reaches of a global empire. Additionally, people often form identities based on local, state, or national borders. The earliest known land maps were created roughly four thousand years ago in the Middle East. These maps were used to show property ownership within a region. As civilizations expanded and explored new areas, maps became an important way of defining the known world, and of designating regions of control. Some of the most common borders between regions or nations are natural boundaries, defined by the environment itself. Oceans, rivers, and mountain ranges all serve to divide land masses into distinct areas (Global Issues in Context 2016).

In Africa, however, boundaries were demarcated through political means. The conference held in Berlin, Germany, in 1884–1885 formalized the arbitrary boundaries that the European colonial masters had scrambled in their colonies. Many of these same boundaries remained as national borders even after the colonies achieved independence from their European occupiers several decades later (African Union Border Programme 2013). Okumu (2011) intimates that African countries are increasingly facing the daunting task of managing these borders in ways that secure their territorial integrity; and he adds that they struggle to prevent illegal entries and exiting of people, goods and animals.

Borders in West Africa are undeniably porous and that is an issue of concern for West African governments, individuals, civil society groups and the international community as a whole. This porosity has contributed to easy movement and crossing of borders by terrorists in attacking innocent people across the sub-region of West Africa. Boko Haram (a terrorist group), which has its headquarters in the Bono State in Nigeria, easily crosses the Nigerian border as it attacks innocent people and infrastructure in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (another terrorist group), originally based in Algeria and with another base in northern Mali, easily crosses the Malian border to attack targets in Burkina Faso, Niger and Cote D’Ivoire. This paper seeks to investigate why this level of border porosity in West Africa has become pronounced and the measures and policy recommendations that can be adopted to secure the borders in preventing the movements of terrorist groups within West Africa. The first part of the paper seeks to: theorize borders and conceptualize border control and terrorism; outline the need for border control; outline the characteristics of West African borders, and indicate the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) border instruments and policies adopted thus far. The second part delves into the factors that account for the porosity of West African borders and its effects on the politico-socio-cultural lives of West African states and their citizens. Finally, the third part discusses the measures and policies that can be adopted to strengthen West African states’ borders in order to contain the ease with which terrorists easily cross borders.

The theory of complex and networked borders
A border theory that best suits contemporary West Africa is Complex and Networked Borders (CNB). This theory maintains that borders are mobile and highly differentiated in nature. This means that, states can have reciprocal arrangements such that domestic border controls can be located abroad. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) now has reciprocal arrangements with both Belgium and France to locate domestic border controls in those countries. In 2004, British immigration officials began operations in Lille, Calais and Paris, checking the documents of those seeking to travel to the UK (Rumford 2006). According to the CNB theory, borders are diffused throughout society. Guiraudon and Lahav’s (as cited in Rumford 2006) refer to this as “remote control”, where border control takes place at different points in society not simply at the territorial limits. In addition, the state is increasingly “privatizing” aspects of border security by, for example, requiring airlines, hotel keepers and owners of internet cafés to document movements and uncover those whose presence is undesirable.

In effect, networked borders (that is, those not necessarily located at the perimeter; airports, travel agents, railway stations) constitute a barrier to the mobility of “outsiders” without economic means or proper travel documentation. Borders may take the form of political boundaries and securitized perimeters, but they are also increasingly mobile and dispersed and, a consequence, more commonly encountered and frequently traversed (although not by all). Importantly, borders are not experienced in the same way by all people (Rumford 2006); what operates as an impermeable barrier to some, constitutes open doors to others. CNB theory explains why border control in West Africa is lax. Border control in West Africa is not networked and there is lack of cooperation and coordination between and among West African states. This theory, therefore, helps to strengthen the argument that border control in West Africa ought to have extraterritorial focus underpinned by coordinated policies, while territorial border control is equally strengthened with support from the private sector.

Defining border control
According to Okumu (2011), border control is about asserting territorial sovereignty by enforcing the boundary through permanent surveillance. By implication, what border enforcement and surveillance mean is that the state must have the capacity to trace the movement and use of goods and data and the actions of people once they are in the national territory. In this paper, border control, border security and border management are used
interchangeably. Border control is understood as networked and consists of many stakeholders working to secure the sovereignty of states.

**Defining terrorism**

The first key element of terrorism is that there is violence or the threat of violence and it is deliberate, arbitrary, intentional, and a predetermined strategy undertaken primarily for political reasons (Makinda 2003; Jackson 2010; Primoratz 1990; Lutz & Lutz 2004). For Jackson (2010), the targets of terrorist violence are not necessarily the victims of the violence, but rather the audiences to the violence. From this perspective, terrorism is a form of political communication rather than direct military action. In his view, political violence must have an identifiable organization in order for it to be classified as terrorism. For the United States Department of State, there must be sub-national actors or clandestine agents perpetrating violence to advance a cause. This includes groups pursuing religious goals, national/ethnic/linguistic/regional goals, left-wing ideological goals, right-wing ideological objectives, groups whose goals involve a clear mixture of objectives to the extent that no single one predominates, and the use of terrorism by governments, especially in contexts where “unofficial” groups undertake the action rather than government agencies (Lutz and Lutz 2004). There must be identifiable targets and perpetrators of the violence. The United States Department of State and scholars like Makinda (2003) maintain that non-combatants are targeted as was the case in New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. These non-combatants include military members who are attacked during peacetime.

**Why the need for Border Control?**

Border control helps to facilitate or limit the movement of people, animals, plants and goods in and out of a country. It ensures that borderlines are secured and ports of entry are controlled. Border control further ensures that the rules under which people cross borders are legally adhered to and that goods moved across borders have been paid for (e.g. excise tax, levies). Most importantly, it helps to prevent the transmission of diseases, smuggling operations and terrorism, among others (Okumu 2011).

**Characteristics of West African borders**

African borders were drawn during the colonial period and are a Westphalian concept classified by Hartshorne (1938) as super-imposed boundaries. Compared to Europe and North America, Africa is relatively new to the Westphalian concept of boundaries. That is not to suggest in any way that borders did not exist in Africa prior to contact with external influence, particularly that of Europe. Borders have always existed as social phenomena that govern inter-human and inter-communal relationships. Similarly, African pre-colonial socio-political structures and institutions have, in their own rights, functional categorizations that can be equated to present-day borders. There are about 110 inter-state boundaries in Africa and numerous other intra-state borders that crisscross the length and breadth of the African continent. The origins of all of these borders can be traced to colonialism and imperialism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Therefore, it was the treaties, agreements and exchanges of notes and protocols between the various colonial powers that provided the legal basis for present-day boundaries (African Union Border Programme 2013).

Present-day borders are artificial and arbitrary and cut across cultural heritages and divide ethnic groups and tribes into different States (for example, Ewe people of Ghana and Togo, Hausa people of Nigeria and Niger, Kissi people of Guinea and Sierra Leone, among others).
The borders were arrived at without reference to the social, political, or cultural characteristics of the people they partitioned. A clear indication of the arbitrariness of the borders is the fact that 44 per cent of African boundaries either follow meridians or parallels, and another 30 per cent follow rectilinear or curved lines. Furthermore, the 104 international borders existing in Africa in 1984 and 1985 have dissected 177 cultural areas or groups. The artificiality and arbitrariness of African borders are also the products and reflections of the rivalries between the imperial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition to these rivalries were the obsessions to exclusively claim certain real or imagined African resources. Consequently, most African borders are poorly defined and porous and have been a source of conflict on the continent. For example, tensions between Burkina Faso and Mali (Agacher Strip), Cameroon and Nigeria (Bakasi Peninsula), Guinea and Sierra Leone (Yenga dispute), Burkina Faso and Benin (Koualou Town), among others.

**Political and legal instruments: The African Union and the Economic Community of West African States**

Measures have been adopted to help mitigate the many border related tensions in Africa by the African Union (AU), including the 1964 and 1986 Resolutions that were adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on peaceful resolution of border disputes between African states. Subsequently, the AU (which succeeded the OAU), in its Constitutive Act, Article 4 (b) emphasized on the maintenance of the status quo of borders that were inherited during independence. Additionally, in July 2002, there was a Memorandum of Understanding on the delineation and demarcation of African boundaries which was expected to have ended in 2012, but in 2007 it was extended for another 10 years and is now expected to be achieved in 2017 (African Union Border Programme 2013).

However, ECOWAS as a sub-regional body has no comprehensive border control policy for its member states except in some protocols where border related issues have been mentioned. For instance, the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, under Article 46, talks about control of cross-border crime. The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2006 under Article 22 also makes reference to controlling cross border crimes. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework emphasizes cross-border initiatives and proper management and the ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan also addresses aspects of border management, but does not comprehensively address border insecurity issues as a whole (Lamptey 2013).

**Reasons for the porosity of borders in West Africa**

Most West African states lack clearly identifiable national border control policies. What are perceived as border policies are the various actions undertaken by the sectors and ministries dealing with border-related issues. As such, there is lack of synergy, coordination and cooperation within and between departments, and between countries. Until recently in Nigeria, the police, customs and immigration officers were under the Ministry of Police Affairs and Interior; all were responsible for dealing with border related issues in an uncoordinated manner.

Definition and scope of what constitutes border control has been limited to the confines of sovereign states and this does not warrant coordinated policy and actions to be adopted and implemented effectively to control borders in the face of globalization which has created gaps.
in traditional border management and control. Moreover, there is lack of political will and commitment of resources to effectively manage borders. For example, the ECOWAS Community Levy for the first quarter of 2016 stood at 185 million dollars; a worrying development is that most member states are not paying their dues for ECOWAS projects (Vanguard Nigeria Newspaper 2016). Furthermore, there is poor motivation among border personnel which has led to extortion and bribery at the various border posts. This has culminated into nefarious activities at the various border posts. Moreover, there is inadequate intelligence gathering and sharing between agencies and countries and a lack of state of the art facilities and equipment to secure and manage borders.

One Major Effect of the Porosity of West African Borders

One major effect of the porosity of West African borders is the ease with which terrorists cross borders to engage in what is called “TEAR”, an acronym for “THEY ENTER, ATTACK and RETREAT”. Two such prominent terrorist groups are worth discussing. They are Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a Salafi-jihadist militant group operating in the Sahara and Sahel. The group traces its provenance to Algeria's civil war in the 1990's and has in the past decade become an al-Qaeda affiliate with regional ambitions. AQIM and its offshoots pose the primary transnational terror threat in North and West Africa. The group aligned with al-Qaeda in the 2000's to stage high-profile attacks and improve recruiting and fundraising and has the ultimate aim of ridding North Africa of Western influence and overthrowing governments deemed apostate, including those of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It aims to install fundamentalist regimes based on Sharia (Laub and Masters 2015). A successful Algerian counterterrorism campaign forced AQIM from its operational base near the Mediterranean to the Sahel region that includes Niger, Mauritania, and Mali, where the group has established footholds. AQIM and its affiliates recently launched an attack in Mali in November 2015, Burkina Faso in January 2016, and Ivory Coast earlier in March 2016. This has largely been possible due to the ease with which AQIM is able to cross the porous borders of the victim states.
Boko Haram

Boko Haram was formed in 2002 and have a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur’an and believe that the creation of Nigeria by British colonialists imposed a Western and un-Islamic way of life on Muslims. The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf (1970-2009) set up a religious complex, which included a Mosque and an Islamic school. Many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria, as well as neighboring countries, enrolled their children at the school. But Boko Haram was not only interested in education. Its political goal was to create an Islamic state, and the school became a recruiting ground for jihadists. The most commonly accepted translation of the name “Boko Haram” in the indigenous lingua franca Hausa, is: “Western education is forbidden”. Boko originally means fake, but came to signify Western education, while haram means forbidden. It has also been translated as “Western influence is a sin” and “Westernization is sacrilege”. The group’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”.

Boko Haram declared a caliphate and joined ranks with the Islamic State. Islamic State accepted the pledge and named the territory under Boko Haram's control as the Islamic State of West Africa Province. In August 2016, Boko Haram apparently split with the Islamic State over appointment by the Islamic State of a new leader to take over the affairs of Boko Haram (BBC News Website). Boko Haram easily crosses the borders of Niger, Chad (in Central Africa) and Cameroon (in Central Africa) to attack, kill and retreat. This is a worrying development as both AQIM and Boko Haram have attacked and killed innocent people in eight (8) countries within a very short space of time.

Measures for effective border control in West Africa

Several measures can be taken for effective border control in West Africa:

1. ECOWAS must have a common border control policy framework for its member states and member states must develop comprehensive national border control policies within the ECOWAS framework;
2. Member States must equip their officers with the state of the art facilities and build their technical capacity;
3. Intelligence gathering and sharing between and among states ought to be promoted and networked;
4. ECOWAS must liaise with other sub-regional bodies like Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), and other development partners for this venture, and;
5. Last but not the least, member states must mobilize resources domestically to support their policy direction and this can be done through: (1) savings, for instance, the heritage fund in Ghana; (2) effective tax collection through formalizing the informal sector and taxing them, instituting a proper legal framework for tax regulation, having a formidable fiscal regime and simplifying the processes and procedures of tax registration; (3) rationalizing government expenditures by balancing spending on investments and consumption and putting a stop to sharing of state monies with friends and cronies; (4) arresting capital flight from the shores of West Africa; (5) expansion of market base in West Africa must be given serious consideration by diversifying production, embarking on manufacturing, improving the tourism and mining sectors among others.
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Conclusion
The porous borders in West Africa are due to a number of factors. Prominent among them are the lack of policies to guide the actions of ECOWAS member states and lack of arrangements to deal with border-related issues. Border control is not networked and there is a lack of synergy, cooperation and coordination within and between departments, and between states. Above all, there is lack of technical capacity and the needed resources to advance mechanisms to strengthen West African borders. Effective border control is therefore needed to stop the ease with which terrorist cross borders to attack, kill and retreat with impunity by networking borders through African initiatives by developing sound border policies by the sub-regional body (ECOWAS) and member states. These policies require effective mobilization of domestic resources by West African states while external financial assistance ought to be complementary.

By way of developing sound border control policies by both the ECOWAS and its member states, the following recommendations are given:

1. The policies ought to take into consideration the impact of globalization on traditional borders;
2. The border policies must be developed in such a way to serve as a bridge to refugees and asylum seekers and barrier to criminals particularly terrorists;
3. Serious consideration ought to be given in the type of investments that will be adopted in border control (whether a fence wall will be erected, border patrol agents will be deployed or high level of surveillance and radar technology will be adopted);
4. Border control policy directions should be extraterritorial and ought to embody legislations aimed at conducting border controls before an individual reaches the actual physical border (e.g. the intensification of visa regimes, imposition of passenger identification duties on carriers before travel, with non-compliance leading to significant sanctions under various carriers’ liability schemes), and;
5. Border control policy ought to co-opt the private sector into performing elements of immigration control. The privatization of immigration control occurs both before and after entry, as well as both extraterritorially and within a state’s territory. Prime examples of privatized immigration control are the obligation on carriers to conduct identification checks before travel (Weber 2015), the obligation on carriers to collect personal data on their passengers and to transmit these data to state authorities before travel and the obligation on employers to conduct identification checks on their employees and to refrain from employing irregular migrants (ibid 2015).
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“There are NO (Teddy) Bears in Africa!” Discuss.

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In November 2007, a middle-aged English primary school teacher in Khartoum named Gillian Gibbons was arrested and jailed for allowing her class of seven-year olds, after due electoral process, to name a teddy bear “Muhammad.” Gibbons might have thought she would be safe in Khartoum. The civil war had ended two years earlier, and Khartoum was a long way from the ravages of famine and the fighting in Darfur. But with the Rift Valley Fever epidemic starting up and the terrible floods that year, she should have known it would not be a teddy bears’ picnic (““Muhammad” teddy teacher arrested’ 2007)\(^1\).

We know exactly what happened to Gillian Gibbons. She was reported by the school secretary, formally charged under Section 125 of the Sudanese Criminal Act, found guilty of "insulting religion” and sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment. Ten thousand protesters took to the streets of Khartoum, demanding her execution. After eight days in jail, through the intercession of two British Muslim peers in the House of Lords, however, she was granted a presidential pardon and deported. But what happened to the teddy bear? The media never reported his fate. This got me wondering about all the other bears in Africa whose fate I had never before considered.\(^2\) In this article I want to

\(^1\) The BBC reported the school’s director, Robert Boulos, as saying that Gibbons has been following “a British national curriculum course designed to teach young pupils about animals,” and that “this year's topic was the bear.” Apparently the teacher had asked one of the children to bring her teddy bear to school. Then she has asked the class to choose a name for it. “They came up with eight names including Abdullah, Hassan and Muhammad,” Mr Boulos said. The children voted; and twenty of the twenty-three children chose “Muhammad” as the bear’s name. Then each child took the teddy bear home for a weekend, during which he or she had to keep a diary about what they did with the bear. Finally, all the entries were collected in a book with a picture of the bear on the cover and a message that read: “My name is Muhammad.” It seems clear that the project was based on a research project reported three years previously that found teddy bears a useful tool to boost the motivation to learning in young children. The children’s befriending and diarising of the teddy bear not only improved their motivation but also had “a positive backwash” on the school, providing it with “a positive interpersonal context.” (Andrews, 2004, pp. 1-18).

\(^2\) There is also a question – not the subject of this paper - about what happened (or will happen) to the blaspheming children. If the aim of the teddy-bear project was to improve their interpersonal skills and enhance the motivation to learning, were these skills, for example, damaged by the arrest of their teacher and the surrounding controversy concerning the blasphemy laws? According to developmental psychologist, Robert Kegan, children make meaning based on the differences they perceive between the different objects that they choose or receive to engage with, which they apprehend as having internal lives of their own. And if, as Colleen Goddard points out, “the self-appointed object is refuted, critiqued or denied in any way, attachment difficulties may arise later in life.” (Goddard, 2014). It is likely that the teddy bear named Mohammed, once stripped of his name, was also removed from the classroom. Did the parents then remove their children from the school? The Unity High School at which Gibbon taught in Khartoum is an independent school, founded by the Coptic community in 1902, and aims to provide a British-style education to children from ages 6 to 16 years of age, culminating in the IGCSE examinations from Cambridge University. In the neighbouring Islamic nation of Egypt, on March 2016, a juvenile court sentenced three Coptic Christian children to five years in prison and ordered a fourth placed in a juvenile
think about teddy bears and their relationship to Africa, and more particularly, I want to think about how they function – what kind of cultural work they do in the production of the literary and political geographies of Africa.

Contrary to popular belief, there were bears in Africa once! The Atlas bear is perhaps not strictly native, having descended from brown bears imported by the Romans from the Cantabrian Mountains of northern Spain. However, it once ranged all across Northern Africa. In East Africa we have the Nandi Bear. It is a cryptid – a creature allegedly sighted on many occasions, but which has no scientific foundation. Teddy bears of course are not real bears. They are not mere objects either. The scientific categorisations – living and non-living – are not very helpful in this regard, certainly not if we allow Tristan Garcia’s philosophical position that it is pointless for any thinking, feeling person (religious or otherwise) to resist inclusion in ‘the flat system of interchangeable things’ (Garcia 2014, p. 1). Adults encourage children to invest teddy bears with symbolic power, and child psychologists have developed a variety of theoretical perspectives about the teddy bear (Pedrick & Oberhelman 2005, p.124). It is not only children who rely upon this investment of symbolic power in teddy bears to preserve them from darkness. A survey for Travelodge in 2012 found that over a third of British adults still sleep with a teddy bear to comfort and preserve them in their sleep (Daily Mail 2012). However, the teddy bear’s original purpose was political.

In 1902, at the end of a long and tiring Mississippi bear-hunt, the US President Theodore Roosevelt found himself confronted with an exhausted creature tethered to a willow tree, run down by hounds and clubbed into submission. The President declined the kill, judging it unsporting; instead, he ordered someone else to put it out of its misery. The cartoon depiction of the incident in the Washington Post a few days later was captioned “Drawing the Line in Mississippi,” and was thought to refer to the President’s opposition to lynching in the South. However, a Brooklyn candy storeowner with a sideline in stuffed toys picked up on the cartoon. He put in his shop window two stuffed toy bears his wife had made, with a sign that said “Teddy's Bears”, and soon he was mass-producing them.

Over time, the teddy bear was disconnected from its original context of African slavery in the Americas, and today most people have no idea that the now-ubiquitous teddy bear was originally a mythological projection of the US presidency, representing compassion – and seemingly bridging the borders of both human and non-human subjects, races and species. It hardly likely they will recognise the irony of that characterisation in relation to Teddy Roosevelt’s 1909 African safari, a year-long trek across British East Africa – during which he and his son, Kermit shot and killed more than a thousand African animals, including 17 lions, 11 elephants and 20 rhinoceros.

The President’s pardon of one exemplary American bear – the bear that gave Teddy Roosevelt his name – is a deceiving ceremony of innocence. It speaks of sovereign facility for a 32-second video filmed by their teacher mocking the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). They were charged with "mocking Islamic prayer rituals" and "disrupt[ing] public order." Their teacher was sentenced to three years in prison for assisting their crimes. Freed on bail, the children fled Egypt and, with the aid of human rights organizations in Turkey, applied for humanitarian visas to Switzerland (Caballero, 2016).
power, just as the “collecting” of a thousand African trophies in name of American science does. The bear that he chose not to kill in Alabama was murdered the moment he turned his back, and the animals he killed in Africa were shipped back to Washington, stuffed and mounted for display in the nation’s capital as part of the Smithsonian Institution’s museological dioramas of American education and power.3

My reference point here is Donna Haraway’s book Primate Visions, which links the semiotics of diorama display in the US to the founding principle of Manifest Destiny, underwriting the War Against Terror and global capitalism today, much as it did the expansion westward and subjugation of America’s native peoples in a previous colonial period. For Haraway – and a great many other scholars since – taxidermy is a useful label to identify a diverse range of imperialist and capitalist methodologies for locating sovereignty, extending property and maintaining control by means of a kind of suspended animation. That is, by the slowing or stopping of life processes either by applying external pressure or intervening internally. The granting of a symbolic pardon is often a means to divert attention from these actions. A good example of this is China’s cancellation of a large portion of Zimbabwe’s Chinese debt last year, at the same time coercing Zimbabwe into adopting the yuan as legal currency and exempting China from its indigenisation laws, thereby enabling Chinese investors to increase their shareholding and gain increased control over the local economy (Fiskesjö 2013, p. 53).4 The pardon serves to boost the taxidermic powers of the pardoner.

We all know how the discourse of darkness was projected onto Africa in the previous century by Europe as a way of endowing its economic imperialism with the justificatory mission of enlightenment. Even in 1958, when Michael Bond created the now famous English immigrant Paddington Bear, the manuscript he sent to his editor stated that the hero had come to England ‘all the way from darkest Africa’5 (HarperChildrens.com 2007). The editor was better informed about the geographical distribution of bears and advised Bond that there were no bears in Africa, and Bond changed the text, so that Paddington now comes from ‘deepest darkest Peru’ (Bond 2016, p.3). Although Paddington has never been to Africa, he does not lack influence there. In 2014, the decision to hold the African premier of the film, Paddington, in Zimbabwe was reported in the British press as ‘a charm offensive’ aimed at healing ‘the rift in UK-Zimbabwean relations by demonstrating a cultural affinity between the two nations’ (Smith 2014, 3

These “became some of the most popular exhibits in the new National Museum building, now the National Museum of Natural History. Unveiled to the public in 1913, they remained on exhibit for most of the twentieth century. Today only one Roosevelt specimen, this white rhino, is still on public display.” http://naturalhistory.si.edu/onehundredyears/featured_objects/roosevelt_rhinoceros.html - accessed 9 January 2017.

4 Magnus Fiskesjö (p. 53) explains the power of the pardon in this way: “The power of pardon signals the location of sovereignty, which finds its expression the decisions placed directly in the sovereign’s hands: the decisions on wounding or resting the executioner’s axe (whether in specific cases, as for fellow humans on death row, or animal by animal), or in the decision to make or avoid war, whether foreign or civil. And sovereign power finds its most obvious expression in—is always reconstituted in—every concrete example of every pardoned turkey or every exemplary teddy bear, as in the case of every death row captive, and, most important of all, in every decision on whether or not to trigger the suspension of normal order, as in that exceptional state of emergency known as ‘war’.”

Paddington is a quintessentially English bear and on occasion a very useful armchair ambassador to boot – a figure of “soft power.” But he is also a spokesperson on occasion for immigration, and it is worth remembering that the first publication of *A Bear Called Paddington* in 1958 came at the height of the African-Caribbean immigration to London. The most famous English teddy bear never to visit Africa in his literary lifetime is of course Winnie the Pooh. It would have been easy enough for him to go there. After all Christopher Robin spends an entire morning on an adventure to Africa without leaving the house. However, Pooh never set foot in Africa. Still, it could be said that he makes no sense without it.

Frederick Crews’ satirical work focuses on Pooh’s ill-fated attempt to sneak up on a beehive and rob its inhabitants of their honey by attaching himself to a balloon and disguising himself as a small black cloud. He realises too late that they are ‘the wrong sort of bees’, (Crews 2006, p.91) and that he has made no escape plan if they decide to attack, which of course they do. Crews’ satire of postcolonial criticism goes like this: since Pooh has blackened himself for camouflage, it is obvious that the bees must also be black, metaphorically speaking. In other words, they are “Africanised” bees, whose defensive action is underwritten by Cesaire and Fanon. A footnote alerts us to the fact that lately, there has been widespread racialised panic in the US concerning attacks by “Africanised” killer bees. This is the empirical evidence that the swarm of bees that attack the teddy bear is really nothing more than a hallucinatory vision of the racial hysteria that he himself exemplifies as a character of the English imagination.

Of course, the instrumental force of an object such as a teddy bear does not always live up to its imagined symbolic power, and in narratives where this occurs the end result is invariably tragic. This is one way to look at the death of the protagonist, Sebastian Flyte, in the quintessentially English novel, *Brideshead Revisited*, by Evelyn Waugh (1945). Sebastian is a charming but deeply troubled English lord, who seeks solace, but finds ruination in alcohol, and who fetches up finally in Tunisia, hoping to find redemption through suffering and self-abasement. With him to the end is his faithful friend and protector, a teddy bear named Aloysius (after the patron saint of youth). However, the teddy bear’s protective power is not equal to Sebastian’s desire for self-destruction. The novel encourages us to imagine Sebastian ending somewhere in North Africa, torn to pieces by angels and demons – or if you prefer, by his own contradictions, his devotion to ministry in Africa on the one hand, and his devotion to rum on the other. Aloysius serves as a proxy for God, and the inability of the teddy bear to save Sebastian signals the tragedy of Christianity in the modern world, a loss of power underpinned by the general decline of faith. Sebastian’s tragedy is symbolic in another way, for it is also the tragedy of a misguided missionary. A postcolonial reading of the teddy bear’s failure to save him might argue that the bear’s power only operates in the savage zones, whereas (as Sebastian’s sister tells us) he leaves England to escape the savages, not to join them.6

Space constraints prevent discussion of other teddy bears who operate in the symbolic domain of Africa – teddy bears on safari (e.g. Smythe 1995), teddy bears lost and found (e.g. Ichikawa 2001), or who journey to Africa simply to show the African animals what

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6 My dissatisfaction with Waugh’s novel, however, is not that I have to infer the fate of Sebastian, for which I am given plenty of clues, but that I am given no clue whatsoever as to the fate of Aloysius in Africa.
a bear is (Mrs Moose & Pauley 1993). There is a bear who marries a meerkat, only to be blown up by a terrorist bomb (Murdoch 2016). And there is another who is falsely accused and imprisoned in the US on 9, 678 different criminal charges including terrorism, sodomy, witchcraft and treason, and who only begins to understand what has happened to him when he travels to Egypt (Chase 2006). But what happened to the teddy bear at the centre of the Khartoum Blasphemy case? The arrest of Gillian Gibbons certainly had some unexpected repercussions. Within days, a whole sloth of bears called “Muhammad” appeared for sale on the Internet. Most of these were located in the US and were being sold as part of a counter-discursive strategy to oppose Islamic fundamentalism. One advertisement on ebay claimed that, by ordering the teddy bear you would be showing your support ‘for American freedom’. Another seller provided a character reference for his teddy bear: ‘He violates no laws nor has he any religion. He does not mean anything except that his name happens to be what it is.’ But the reference soon became a rant: ‘This is America and you better start believing that if we do not stand up and name our bears what we want you may not have a choice, as all the good names will be taken.’ The rant ended with a warning: ‘American bears bite and claw till the last . . .’ Another seller offered a nameless bear with a ‘beard and moustache conversion’ kit guaranteed to ‘make any bear Mohammed’ (“Plight of Gillian Gibbons”, n.p.) Within a very short time, Mohammed the Teddy Bear from Sudan had become a weapon of international ideological warfare, a media sensation and a global marketing phenomenon.

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Ethnic Favouritism in Primary Education: Evidence from Kenya

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Abstract
Kenya has experienced widespread disparities in primary educational attainment across its different ethnic groups, whose geographical concentration retains the hallmarks of colonial administrative legacy. By investigating the co-ethnicity of Kenya’s primary school children with the country’s sitting presidents from 1963 through 2005, this study measures the effect of ethnic favouritism on educational attainment by drawing on data from the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) and the official population census. Results indicate that while ethnic favouritism occurs, the disparities in educational attainment are largely due to early exposure to education during the colonial era; moreover, co-ethnicity is not the sole defining factor of favouritism, which was found to operate at the district level (i.e., the greater the share of the co-ethnic population, the greater the favouritism and disadvantage of non-coethnics). Conversely, co-ethnics in non-dominant districts do not benefit from co-ethnicity with the president.

Introduction
Despite the fact that the 2013 Kenyan election witnessed a peaceful political transition, reminders of the ethnic conflict that raged in the aftermath of the preceding 2007 election remain, raising concerns that a salient consciousness of ethnicity may consistently undermine prospects for the country’s economic and political development. The consciousness of ethnicity in Kenya was first created by the British colonial administration, who geographically divided its territory into districts according to what it assumed to be different ethnic groups. After independence, the post-colonial government further reinforced geographic divides by aligning parliamentary constituencies with former ethnic boundaries (Alwy and Schech 2004). Therefore, from the provincial to the district level, Kenyan regions are seen as ethnically homogenous within each district but heterogeneous across districts, as shown in Appendix 1.

During the colonial era, formal education in Kenya was first introduced by foreign missionaries and was racially segregated by the colonial government, resulting in severe neglect and lack of educational resources and facilities (e.g. physical schools) for African children when compared with their European-, Asian-, and Arab-descent counterparts (Esihiwani 1989). However, this division was not only between the races, as ‘even among Africans, ethnic difference was manipulated to keep the various communities apart under the principle of ‘divide and rule’” (Esihiwani 1989, p. 3). As a result, before Kenya’s independence in 1963, significant disparities in primary education existed across different ethnic groups, as shown in Figure 1, which are mainly attributed to the geographic location of their respective homelands.
The first post-independence government made multiple attempts to address the problems facing the education system. In addition to the free education policy, the famous Ominde Commission, which was set up in 1964, ‘recommended expansion of educational facilities for those districts and provinces that had been educationally disadvantaged in terms of numbers of schools and enrolments’ (Alwy and Schech 2004, p. 270). The subsequent two governments also pledged to provide free primary education in order to realize the goal of universal primary education for their citizens. However, their efforts were not equally directed toward the various ethnic groups. According to Oucho (2002), the post-independence governments allocated resources in a way that allowed political leaders to favour their home regions or their own ethnic groups. Indeed, the literature shows that ethnic favouritism has been and remains prevalent in Kenya’s primary education (e.g. Franck and Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2016). This is also reflected in public opinion polls (Mwabu et al 2013) as well as voting behaviours (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). Therefore, even though the consciousness of ethnicity was constructed by the colonial government, the nature of the disparities between ethnic groups changed from being one of geographical distinctiveness to being materially advantaged or disadvantaged due to ethnic group differences.

The time trend in Figure 1 shows that the politically dominant groups, namely the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, have consistently outperformed other ethnic groups for the major part of the post-independence era. The Kikuyu had already asserted their position as good performers in primary education prior to independence, and have maintained it thereafter. This can be partly attributed to early exposure to education, as white settlers during the colonial era were predominantly located in their home territory, Central Province. This enabled the Kikuyu to profit the most from the disproportionate allocation...
of educational resources to the settlers (Alwy and Schech 2004). In addition, the educational success of the Kikuyu at the primary school level can be further ascribed to the group’s Independent School Movement, which reflects their early recognition of education’s importance (Stanfield 2005). Even though the Kalenjin people were extremely disadvantaged in terms of education at the time of independence, they began to outperform other ethnic groups from the 1970s onwards.

Thus, the question becomes whether the dominance of the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin people in education can be attributed to ethnic favouritism. This study will address this question using household data from the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) and the official population census. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on ethnic favouritism within the African context. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, explain empirical methodology and data sources. Section 5 presents empirical results, while Section 6 provides additional results from robustness checks before a conclusion is drawn in Section 7.

Literature Review

The concept of ethnic favouritism has been traditionally used to explain the poor economic performance of African countries, such that it is seen as a result of ethnic diversity (Easterly and Levine 1997; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). One reason why ethnic diversity may hinder economic development is its correlation with the under-provision of public goods, as previous studies have found (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1999). Although it is widely accepted that there is a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision (Habyarimana et al. 2007), a recent study by Gisselquist (2013) found that ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily lead to inadequate provision of public goods. The relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision varies according to the public goods themselves. Thus, it remains an open question what exactly that relationship is (Gisselquist 2013).

One of the main assumptions underpinning the negative association between ethnic diversity and public goods provision is that societies that are polarized due to ethnic diversity are prone to rent-seeking by different ethnic groups and have difficulty agreeing on public goods allocation (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999). This assumption is implicitly based on another, namely that the various ethnic groups have different policy preferences. Even though the field experiment by Habyarimana et al. (2007) found that there are no significant ethnic differences in terms of security, drainage maintenance, and garbage collection in Uganda, this does not rule out potential ethnic differences regarding preference toward other public goods in different contexts. A systematic analysis by Lieberman and McClendon (2012) confirmed a preference-based explanation for ethnic favouritism, such that co-ethnics have the same preference toward education.

Another line of studies on ethnic favouritism focuses on formal theories of ethnic politics (Franck and Rainer 2012) to explain why political coalitions are based on ethnicity. For example, in Fearon’s (1999) model, ethnicity is used as an exclusion criterion to minimize the size of the winning coalition and to maximize the political “pork” the coalition might get. The reason why ethnicity serves as the criterion is that it cannot be
chosen by an individual, unlike an individual’s political affiliation (Fearon 1999). More recently, Miquel (2007) noted that his model is consistent with a public fund allocation bias under which, ‘the government biases the allocation of resources by restricting access to bureaucratic posts, to the military or even to education to members of elected ethnic groups’ (p. 1270), such as the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin in Kenya.

Discussions about the potential costs in economic welfare or political instability as well as the motivations of ethnic favouritism are still ongoing. An increasing number of studies have begun to empirically investigate the prevalence and magnitude of ethnic favouritism. To the best of the author’s knowledge, Brockerhoff and Hewett (1998) provided the first cross-country study in Africa. They found that large disparities exist in child mortality among ethnic groups, a finding they attribute to the landscape of the political economy in countries such as Kenya. More recently, a study by Franck and Rainer (2012) systematically measured the existence and magnitude of ethnic favouritism in 18 African countries. Their results showed that there is a widespread effect of ethnic favouritism in both primary education and infant mortality. Similar results can also be found in Kramon and Posner (2016) and Burgess et al (2015), who, respectively, investigated ethnic favouritism in primary education and road construction in Kenya. By contrast, in Guinea, Kudamatsu (2009) found no evidence of the acting president having favoured his own ethnic group in the health sector. One possible explanation for these mixed results can be found in Kramon and Posner's (2013) study, which shows that the manifestation of ethnic favouritism varies markedly depending on the sectors one happens to study.

Most previous studies on ethnic favouritism have investigated its prevalence and magnitude without clearly defining it. Only Burgess et al (2015) explicitly defined the concept of ethnic favouritism as, ‘a situation where coethnics benefit from patronage and public policy decisions, and thus receive a disproportionate share of public resources, when members of their coethnic group control the government’ (p. 2). This current study follows this definition, although it provides indirect evidence of ethnic favouritism due to a lack of direct data on the distribution of public resources in Kenyan primary education. Another common drawback of previous studies is that they fail to clarify the specific level at which ethnic favouritism operates. There are two possible levels: (1) ethnic group, where only co-ethnics of the sitting president can benefit from ethnically favoured policies (e.g. ethnic-specific cash transfers or biased allocation of public sector jobs); (2) district level, where both co-ethnics of the sitting president and local minorities living in the districts where the dominant ethnic group shares ethnicity with the president benefit from it (e.g. building new schools or hiring more qualified teachers at the district level).

If ethnic favouritism operates at the ethnic group level, then co-ethnics of the sitting president can enjoy benefits no matter where they live. If ethnic favouritism operates at the district level, some co-ethnics of the president may not receive the benefits, while local minorities in the districts where the dominant ethnic group(s) share ethnicity with the president in power do. Another problem from previous studies is that, as mentioned in Section 1, inequality in socio-economic outcomes such as primary educational attainment already existed when Kenya gained independence in 1963 because of the education policies during the colonial era. Therefore, it is essential to isolate the initial conditions’ effect across different ethnic groups in educational attainment when
measuring the magnitude of ethnic favouritism.

**Empirical Methodology**

This study utilized the following empirical model to investigate the prevalence of ethnic favouritism in Kenyan primary education at the ethnic group level –

\[
Y_{iet} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{e0} + \beta_2 \text{coethnic } iet + \theta e + \delta t + X_i \beta + \varepsilon
\]  

\(Y_{iet}\) measures the primary educational attainment of individuals from ethnic group \(e\) who started primary school in year \(t\). \(Y_{e0}\) expresses the average of primary educational attainment for each ethnic group \(e\) in each province, using individuals who started primary education before independence as a measure of the initial condition. This can also capture the potential effect of education level and income of the parents on educational attainment, as indicated in other studies (Lloyd and Blanc 1996). Table 1 compares the key characteristics of individuals that were used to calculate the initial condition by ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>Female Dummy</th>
<th>Years of Primary Schooling</th>
<th>Primary Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin</td>
<td>1950.79</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamba</td>
<td>1950.76</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>4.19***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>1950.61</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>5.10***</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>1950.86</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.89**</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhya</td>
<td>1951.14</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>4.41***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>1951.01</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>3.85**</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1951.10</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Individuals who started primary school before independence are used for calculating the initial condition and the sample means are shown in the table. Kalenjin is used as the base group of t-test. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 1 per cent level of the t-test, respectively.

Two approaches are used to define the main variable of interest, namely co-ethnic. The first approach assumes that ethnic favouritism has an immediate effect on education, which continues if an individual started primary school during the period in which his/her co-ethnics were in power. Under this premise, co-ethnic is defined as a binary variable, taking the value of one if the individual started primary school during the period in which the Kenyan president was his/her co-ethnic, and zero otherwise. Franck and Rainer's (2012) second approach views the variable of co-ethnic as a continuous variable that expresses a share of years in primary schooling corresponding to a co-ethnic president when individuals were between the ages of 6 and 13 (or 14 after 1985), assuming that ethnic favouritism only has a contemporary effect. While \(\theta\) denotes the ethnicity fixed effect to capture ethnically specific factors (e.g. culture) that may influence education attainment, \(\delta\) is a dummy variable for each starting year of primary school in order to control for time-fixed effects. \(X_i\) represents a vector of individual characteristics including religion and gender.

The former regression model investigates ethnic favouritism operating at the ethnic group level and tests whether ethnicity alone can determine if an individual benefits from ethnic favouritism. However, public education is usually provided by administrative
### Table 2. Characteristics of Individuals by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
<th>Female Dummy</th>
<th>Years of Primary Schooling</th>
<th>Primary Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>1939.97</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirinyag</td>
<td>1939.50</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>1940.33</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyandarua</td>
<td>1940.00</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>1940.70</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muranga</td>
<td>1939.65</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>1940.22</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwale</td>
<td>1939.26</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilifi</td>
<td>1939.04</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tana River</td>
<td>1939.08</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamu</td>
<td>1938.78</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taita Taveta</td>
<td>1938.67</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsabit</td>
<td>1939.74</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo</td>
<td>1939.10</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu</td>
<td>1940.30</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machakos</td>
<td>1939.35</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitui</td>
<td>1938.73</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>1940.13</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garissa</td>
<td>1941.24</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wajir</td>
<td>1941.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandera</td>
<td>1941.92</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siaya</td>
<td>1938.22</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisumu</td>
<td>1939.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>1940.43</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Nyanza</td>
<td>1939.69</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pokot</td>
<td>1939.39</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baringo</td>
<td>1939.71</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td>1940.42</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kericho</td>
<td>1940.59</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>1940.29</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>1938.88</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Nzoia</td>
<td>1940.70</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi</td>
<td>1939.69</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laikipia</td>
<td>1940.16</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narok</td>
<td>1939.43</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajiado</td>
<td>1940.06</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgeyo Marakwet</td>
<td>1939.57</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uasin Gishu</td>
<td>1940.52</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busia</td>
<td>1938.77</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakamega</td>
<td>1939.90</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungoma</td>
<td>1940.35</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s calculation is based on the 1969 census.
units, which were districts before the 2010 Kenyan constitutional amendment. It is also more efficient to provide public goods in districts where the president's co-ethnics are concentrated. The Kenyan population census since the region's independence shows that every district has one dominant ethnic group. If ethnic favouritism operates at the district level, the local minority may also benefit from ethnic favouritism. In order to ascertain if ethnic favouritism operates at the district level, this study uses the following empirical model –

\[
Y_{it} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Y_{d0} + \delta_2 \text{coethnic_districtid}_{it} + \mu_t + X_i \gamma + \nu_{idt} \quad (2)
\]

\(Y_{it}\) denotes the primary educational attainment of individual \(i\) in district \(d\) who started primary school in year \(t\). In addition, \(Y_{d0}\) is the average primary educational attainment for people who started this level of education in district \(d\) before independence, as a measure of the initial condition. Table 2 shows a comparison of key characteristics by district used to calculate the initial condition at the district level.

Moreover, \(\text{coethnic_districtid}_{it}\) equals 1 if individual \(i\) started primary school at district \(d\), where its dominant group shared ethnicity with the president in year \(t\). This study changes the threshold of the dominant ethnic groups' population share when defining \(\text{coethnic_district}\) in order to verify whether the magnitude of ethnic favouritism differs. Additionally, \(\mu_t\) denotes a year fixed effect, while \(X_i\) is a vector of individual level controls including dummies for religion, female, and local minority.

| Table 3. Coethnic Dominant Districts Included in Different Thresholds |
|-----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Threshold (%)   | >30 | >50 | >70 | >80 | >90 |
| District        | Nairobi | Laikipia | Nandi | Baringo | Kambu |
|                 |       |       |      |     | Kirinyaga |
|                 |       |       |      |     | Muranga |
|                 |       |       |      |     | Nyandarua |
|                 |       |       |      |     | Nyeri |
|                 |       |       |      |     | Elgeyo Marakwet |
|                 |       |       |      |     | West Pokot |

Source: Author’s calculation based on 1969 census.

Data

This study derives individual level data from five rounds of the KDHS, conducted from 1993 to 2014. The total sample size for this period is 88,744; however, as the 1993 and 1998 KDHS only surveyed seven Kenyan provinces, this study excludes 3,718 observations of the North Eastern province to maintain consistency. In the remaining 85,026 observations, 4,849 individuals started primary schooling before independence, which is used to calculate the initial conditions of different ethnic groups. Thus, the remaining 80,177 observations are used to measure the magnitude of ethnic favouritism.

Until the 2008 KDHS, information on the district ID was provided for each of the households sampled, however It was not possible to use the 1993 to 2008 KDHS data to conduct district level analysis because geographic information and specific names of these districts are not publicly available. The newly available 2014 KDHS is the first
nationwide survey covering all 47 counties in Kenya and provides information on both ethnicity and residential area at the individual level; however, it no longer provides district-level information because of the 2010 constitutional amendment, which changed the administrative units into counties instead of the provinces and districts that had been used before. The initial condition at the district level is calculated using the 1969 census with a sample size of 344,401, collected from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) International. In alignment with the 1969 census data, this study recoded 47 counties in the 2014 KDHS according to the original 41 district boundaries. Additionally, information about the dominant ethnic group in each district was collected from the official report of the population and housing census in 1969, conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

Empirical Results
This study first investigates whether ethnic favouritism operates at the ethnic group level. Table 4 shows the results of analysis using the KDHS data from 1993 to 2014. All specifications in Table 4 control for ethnic group fixed effects, time (starting year of primary school) fixed effects, gender, and religion. The estimated results in panel A show that after controlling for the initial condition, which significantly influences current primary education attainment, having a co-ethnic president at the time of starting primary school is expected to increase the length of education at this level by around 0.19 years and the probability of completing primary school by about 3 per cent. Compared with the effect of early exposure to education during the colonial era, the effect of ethnic favouritism on educational attainment is comparatively small. Moreover, it is also smaller than the estimations of recent studies, such as Kramon and Posner (2016), which estimate a 0.36 years of increase of primary school. This suggests that measuring the effect of ethnic favouritism without considering the initial disparities may lead to overestimation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Ethnic Favouritism: Evidence from Primary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Coethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female*Coethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: KDHS 1993–2014 are used for estimation. All specifications include the female dummy, religion dummies, ethnic group fixed effect, and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level,
and 1 per cent level, respectively. Coethnict in panel A is defined using the first approach, and otherwise for panel B.

It is worth noting that even though the estimated results in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 show that ethnic favouritism has a significant effect on the years of primary schooling for females, a longer period at primary school did not lead to a higher probability of completion. The estimated results in panel B of Table 4 show results similar to those of panel A, notwithstanding that a different approach is used for defining the variable coethnic. For simplicity of interpretation, coethnic is defined using the first approach in the tables to follow. If ethnic favouritism operates at the ethnic group level, the president's coethnics who are outside coethnic-dominant districts can benefit from ethnic favouritism no matter where they live. In order to test this, this study includes an interaction term between the variable coethnic and the dummy variables for every coethnic district. It re-estimates the first model using data from the 2014 KDHS to obtain the results shown in Table 5. The data indicate that coethnics living outside the 14 co-ethnic districts did not benefit from ethnic favouritism, which suggests that ethnic favouritism does not operate at the ethnic group level. In addition, the estimated results in columns (2) and (4) demonstrate different patterns of ethnic favouritism in different districts. In Kikuyu-dominant districts, with the exception of the two Kikuyu presidents’ two home districts (i.e. Kiambu District for President Kenyatta and Nyeri District for President Kibaki), only the Nakuru District is estimated to have benefitted from ethnic favouritism.

One possible explanation is that the Nakuru District is a swing voter district, as classified in Morjaria (2011), and the two Kikuyu presidents targeted the swing voters instead of core supporters for political gain. The same argument can also be applied to the Uasin Gishu District, one of the Kalenjin-dominant districts. Similar to the other two Kikuyu presidents, President Moi also favoured his home district, Baringo, in terms of primary education. However, the estimated results show that he adopted different strategies toward his core supporters. Compared to the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin is a recently politicized ethnicity and consists of seven Nandi-speaking ethnic groups (Weber, Hiers, and Flesken 2015). Thus, it is highly possible that the Kalenjin people demonstrate culturally heterogeneous preferences toward education; for example, the preferences of the pastoral people, Pokot, may vary from those of other Kalenjin sub-groups. Formal schooling is not typically a priority for pastoral people (Narman 1990), so the negative effect of ethnic favouritism estimated in Table 5 for the West Pokot district seems reasonable (see table below).

Additionally, in order to test whether ethnic favouritism operates at the district level, this study estimates the second model using KDHS 2014. Table 6 presents the estimated results, which suggests that people living in a coethnic district are expected to attain 0.27 years more primary education. However, on average, the local minority did not benefit from ethnic favouritism, as they are predicted to spend 0.58 fewer years in primary schools.

Despite Kenyan districts being largely ethnically homogenous, the extent of ethnic homogeneity is quite different, as shown in both Table 2 and Appendix 1. For example, in Kikuyu-dominant districts, the population share of Kikuyu ranges from more than 30 per cent to more than 90 per cent. Considering the efficiency of ethnic favouritism, it is
reasonable to expect that the magnitude of ethnic favouritism increases as the population share of the dominant group increases. Thus, this study redefined the variable coethnic_district using different thresholds of the dominant ethnic groups’ population share. In Table 7, the estimated results show that the more homogenous the coethnic district is, the more benefits the district is estimated to get from ethnic favouritism. After excluding the potential cultural heterogeneity in Kalenjin-dominant districts, the estimated results in column (5) present a significantly positive effect for ethnic favouritism.

Not only does the extent of ethnic favouritism vary according to the different thresholds of the variable coethnic_district, but the magnitude of the benefits local minorities may receive from ethnic favouritism also differs. The estimated results in columns (1), (2), (3), and (5) of Table 8 (below) shows that as the population share of the dominant ethnic group increases, the level of disadvantage of local minorities also tends to increase.

Robustness Checks: Two Types of Time Lag
Two types of time lag may exist when investigating ethnic favouritism in primary education. The first is the policy implementation time lag that occurs when policies are not immediately put in place upon appointment of the co-ethnic presidents. Thus, this study integrates a one-year and two-year time lag when coding the main dependent variables, co-ethnic and coethnic_district. The second is the primary education starting time lag, which exists to account for the large number of over-aged children joining or re-joining primary schools due to policy changes (Vos et al 2004). Late enrolment and re-enrolment are taken into account when coding the two main dependent variables.

Panel A and panel B of Table 9 and Table 10, respectively, show the estimated results for the two time lags at both the ethnic group level and district level. Compared to the policy implementation time lag, estimated results suggest that the primary education starting time lag is more relevant to Kenya, since the magnitude of ethnic favouritism increases in tandem with the time lag of years of starting primary school.

Gender-Specific Time Trend
To verify if the gender-specific time trend eliminates the effect of ethnic favouritism toward females, this study re-estimates the regression model in Table 1 to include both female- and male-specific time trends. After controlling for gender-specific time trends, the estimated results in panel C in Table 9 show that having a co-ethnic president positively influences both the length of primary education and the completion rate for female students, which confirms the argument from previous studies that females are more responsive to policy interventions (e.g. Franck and Rainer 2012; Glewwe and Kremer 2006). Implementing policies that are favourable toward female students may, therefore, be effective in improving their educational attainment.
Table 5. Ethnic Favouritism: Evidence from Coethnics in Coethnic Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Years of Primary Schooling</th>
<th>Primary Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.436***</td>
<td>0.442***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0184)</td>
<td>(0.0188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
<td>0.100***</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0296)</td>
<td>(0.0609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu Dominant District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Nairobi</td>
<td>-0.0293</td>
<td>0.165***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0871)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Laikipia</td>
<td>0.0970</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0980)</td>
<td>(0.0341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Nakuru</td>
<td>0.320***</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0958)</td>
<td>(0.0297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Kiambu</td>
<td>0.152*</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0906)</td>
<td>(0.0315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Kirinyaga</td>
<td>-0.215*</td>
<td>-0.0163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.0355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Muranga</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.00753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0999)</td>
<td>(0.0318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Nyandarua</td>
<td>0.0775</td>
<td>0.0906***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.0320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Nyeri</td>
<td>0.157*</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0828)</td>
<td>(0.0272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalenjin Dominant District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Uasin Gishu</td>
<td>0.434***</td>
<td>0.112***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0764)</td>
<td>(0.0258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Nandi</td>
<td>0.379***</td>
<td>0.0512**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0760)</td>
<td>(0.0255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Kericho</td>
<td>0.460***</td>
<td>0.0548**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0666)</td>
<td>(0.0218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*Baringo</td>
<td>0.302***</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0924)</td>
<td>(0.0273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic*West Pokot</td>
<td>-1.972***</td>
<td>-0.298***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.0263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0748)</td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>41444</td>
<td>41444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistics</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>159.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. All specifications include the female dummy, religion dummies, ethnic group fixed effect, and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Table 6. Ethnic Favouritism at District Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Years of Primary Schooling</th>
<th>Primary Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.671***</td>
<td>0.675***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic District</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td>(0.0244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local minority* Coethnic District</td>
<td>-0.577***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0639)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.477***</td>
<td>2.440***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of Observations             | 43856                      | 43856              | 43856              | 43856              |
| R-squared                          | 0.295                      | 0.296              | 0.154              | 0.154              |
| F Statistics                       | 293.4                      | 290.2              | 209.7              | 206.0              |

Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. All specifications include the female dummy, religion dummies and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 1 per cent level, respectively.
### Table 7. Ethnic Favouritism at District Level, Different Thresholds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threshold (%)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share&lt;30</td>
<td>0.671***</td>
<td>0.673***</td>
<td>0.690***</td>
<td>0.676***</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>(0.0116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share&lt;50</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>0.303***</td>
<td>0.479***</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
<td>0.485***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td>(0.0242)</td>
<td>(0.0266)</td>
<td>(0.0417)</td>
<td>(0.0336)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share&lt;70</td>
<td>0.0255</td>
<td>0.0310</td>
<td>0.0498***</td>
<td>0.0617***</td>
<td>0.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00596)</td>
<td>(0.00602)</td>
<td>(0.00663)</td>
<td>(0.00922)</td>
<td>(0.00975)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43077</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43856</th>
<th>43077</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. All specifications include the female dummy, religion dummies and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Table 8. Ethnic Favouritism at District Level, Different Thresholds and Local Minority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threshold (%)</th>
<th>(1) Share&gt;30</th>
<th>(2) Share&gt;50</th>
<th>(3) Share&gt;70</th>
<th>(4) Share&gt;90</th>
<th>(5) Share&gt;90 West Pokot excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.675***</td>
<td>0.675***</td>
<td>0.688***</td>
<td>0.677***</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>(0.0116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic District</td>
<td>0.384***</td>
<td>0.397***</td>
<td>0.522***</td>
<td>0.190***</td>
<td>0.515***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0244)</td>
<td>(0.0246)</td>
<td>(0.0268)</td>
<td>(0.0430)</td>
<td>(0.0332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Minority*Coethnic District</td>
<td>-0.577***</td>
<td>-0.526***</td>
<td>-0.333***</td>
<td>0.311*</td>
<td>-0.552***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0639)</td>
<td>(0.0679)</td>
<td>(0.0897)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of Observations**
43856 43856 43856 43856 43077

**R-squared**
0.296 0.296 0.297 0.294 0.298

**Panel B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Condition</strong></td>
<td>0.866***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coethnic District</strong></td>
<td>0.0393***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00650)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Minority*Coethnic District</strong></td>
<td>-0.0455***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0137)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of Observations**
43856 43856 43856 43856 43077

**R-squared**
0.154 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.157

Note: KDHS 2014 is used for estimation. All specifications include the female dummy, religion dummies and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote significance at the 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Table 9. Robustness Checks, Ethnic Group Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Years of Primary Schooling</td>
<td>Primary Completion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Lag</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A</td>
<td>Policy implementation time lag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.409*** (0.0120)</td>
<td>0.409*** (0.0120)</td>
<td>0.502*** (0.0133)</td>
<td>0.502*** (0.0133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
<td>0.144*** (0.0217)</td>
<td>0.101*** (0.0215)</td>
<td>0.0160*** (0.00583)</td>
<td>0.00538 (0.00581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
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<td>79577</td>
<td>79580</td>
<td>79580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Panel B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Primary Start time lag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.410*** (0.0120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
<td>0.224*** (0.0221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>79577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Gender-Specific Time Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.406*** (0.0120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
<td>-0.0342 (0.0312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female* Coethnic</td>
<td>0.311*** (0.0343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.235</td>
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</table>

Notes: KDHS 1993–2014 are used for estimation. All specifications include female dummy, religion dummies, ethnic group fixed effect, and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels.
### Table 10: Robustness Checks, District Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Years of Primary Schooling</td>
<td>Primary Completion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Lag</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A</strong></td>
<td>Policy implementation time lag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.672***</td>
<td>0.672***</td>
<td>0.865***</td>
<td>0.866***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0114)</td>
<td>(0.0177)</td>
<td>(0.0177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic District</td>
<td>0.276***</td>
<td>0.255***</td>
<td>0.0211***</td>
<td>0.0117**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td>(0.00599)</td>
<td>(0.00596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations</strong></td>
<td>43856</td>
<td>43856</td>
<td>43856</td>
<td>43856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Start time lag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>0.670***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coethnic</td>
<td>0.277***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations</strong></td>
<td>43856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: KDIIS 2014 is used for estimation. All specifications include the female dummy, religion dummies and years of starting primary school fixed effect. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level.
Conclusions

The difference in the socio-economic achievements across diverse ethnic groups has persisted in Kenya since its independence; however, previous studies have not investigated whether this disparity is due to the colonial legacy or ethnic favouritism since independence. This study helps differentiate between their effects on the current disparity in Kenyan primary educational attainment across ethnic groups over time. Moreover, it also provides insight on the mechanism through which ethnic favouritism operates.

Indirect evidence from previous studies shows that ethnic favouritism is prevalent in Kenyan primary education; however, the magnitude of ethnic favouritism is smaller than the estimations of previous studies. The current study’s estimated results show that having a co-ethnic president when individuals begin their primary schooling correlates to an increase of around 0.19 years of primary education. This effect, however, is not equal for all co-ethnics of the sitting presidents. Only the co-ethnics living in a co-ethnic-dominant district benefit from this favouritism, which suggests that ethnic favouritism operates at a district level.

Moreover, the extent of ethnic favouritism varies depending on each district’s population share of the in-power president’s co-ethnics. Generally, the magnitude of benefits increases as the population share of the dominant ethnic group in the districts increases. However, in districts where more than 90 per cent of the inhabitants share ethnicity with the sitting president, the magnitude of ethnic favouritism differs according to the president’s coalition-building strategies. Moreover, as the population share of the dominant ethnic group in the districts increases, the level of disadvantage of local minorities tends to increase. It is worth noting that having a co-ethnic president has a significant and positive effect on the education of females. This study’s results support former studies’ findings that females are more responsive to policy interventions (e.g. Franck and Rainer 2012; Glewwe and Kremer 2006). Providing favourable policy toward females may thus be effective in improving their educational attainment. Despite the availability of information on how education-related public resources were allocated under presidents of different ethnic groups, data limitations prevented this study from showing direct evidence of ethnic favouritism. Additionally, this study does not provide direct evidence to clarify the specific mechanisms through which ethnic favouritism operates.

In line with Kramon and Posner (2016), the estimated results in Table 5 suggest that ethnic favouritism does not operate through the demand-side mechanism. If ethnic favouritism operated at the ethnic group level, demand factors (e.g. personal monetary gain and expectation of higher return from education) might promote the primary educational attainment of co-ethnics regardless of where they lived and whether they could obtain a disproportionately positive allocation of public resources. However, the estimated results in Table 5 show that co-ethnics living outside co-ethnic-dominant districts do not benefit from ethnic favouritism.

Furthermore, the current study’s estimated results show that ethnic favouritism operates at the district level and that the magnitude of ethnic favouritism generally increases in tandem with the dominant ethnic group’s population share in the co-ethnic district. One
possible explanation for this is that supply factors such as school construction and the hiring of teachers affect primary educational attainment, and it is more efficient to provide education-related supplies in highly homogeneous districts. This also provides indirect evidence that ethnic diversity undermines educational public provision, which is consistent with findings in previous studies, such as Miguel and Gugerty (2005). However, in the most homogenous districts, the effect of ethnic favouritism demonstrates mixed results, which may be attributed to, for example, the heterogeneity within Kalenjin-dominant districts.

REFERENCES


### Appendix 1. Districts and Dominant Ethnic Groups Over Time

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Note: The term “Kalenjin” was first used as an ethnic category in the 1979 census. In the 1969 census, the Kalenjin population share is calculated as the summation of its seven sub-tribes (Tugen, Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Pokot, and Sabaot) for consistency with the later census.
“Ethical Imperialism” and the Export of Research Ethics Regulation from the Global North to South Africa

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Abstract

The global export of principlism forms part of broader international flows of capital, students and academics, as well as knowledge and ideology. The impact of global capital has had a long-standing effect on research ethics governance. Pharmaceutical companies have sought to open up new markets and take advantage of cheaper sites for multi-centre drug trials. Multinational research teams have looked to those countries with lower risks of litigation, low labour costs, pharmacologically ‘naive’ participants, weak ethics review and the absence of other regulatory processes. As a result, research in low- and middle-income countries has burgeoned. As developing countries struggle to keep pace, the Helsinki and UNESCO Declarations have created regulatory templates for those without the infrastructure to create their own, and a range of capacity-building initiatives in research ethics have encouraged researchers in many developing countries to follow these models. Increasing student and academic mobility and international research collaboration between the global North and South may also ease international transfer of a range of research and education policies that favour universalist approaches to research ethics. Contemporary regulations in countries such as South Africa have shadowed developments in the North and have extended biomedical regulation to all forms of research. However, in some parts of the global South and the Fourth World, there is an emerging distrust and a critique of the motivation for some of the funding for capacity-building in research ethics. For many, opposition to universalist claims is not simply targeted at insensitivity in application but draws on critical ethical traditions such as indigenous, postmodern and postcolonial ethics to challenge the universal basis for principlism, and calls for a deeper understanding of and engagement with how different societies, cultures, peoples and disciplines understand ethics, research and ethical research.

Introduction

Zachary Schrag’s book (2010) on the growth of the regulation of research ethics in the United States portrays a history of mission creep and intensification of the gaze. This has occurred in the guise of reform, concern for the protection of participants and, of all things, deregulation. Schrag interprets the extension of oversight from biomedical sciences to social sciences within his own country variously as bureaucratic empire-building, thoughtless imperialism, and ‘merely collateral damage’ in the goal to ‘contain medical research’ (p.189). Regulations have been extended to cover social sciences on the basis of ‘ignorance and power’ (p.9), ‘haste and disrespect’ (p.192). Federal officials have had little understanding of the practices of social sciences and have demonstrated scant interest in rectifying the situation. Social sciences have rarely been invited to contribute to the development of regulations that cover their work. The pattern has been
for jurisdiction to be extended without consultation and for disciplines to be caught off-guard by a meta-narrative of ethics governance that they do not yet understand and by regulations couched in language that initially appears to exclude them.

While wary of over-generalising from the experiences of the United States, I want to take Schrag’s idea of ‘ethical imperialism’ (which is anything but ethical) and assess the value of applying it to the export of patterns of research ethics governance not just between disciplines, but between countries. I explore the growth of research ethics regulation in South Africa and examine what might be driving research ethics policy transfer from the global North to the global South and how that might be having an impact on the work of social scientists.

Research Ethics Regulation in South Africa
Like much of Africa (Israel, 2015), research ethics regulation in South Africa has been propelled by bioethics. South Africa became one of the first countries to respond to Beecher (1966) and Pappworth’s (1967) concerns about questionable biomedical research practices in the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1977, the South African Medical Research Council produced its Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research, the most recent edition of which was published in 2015. Moodley and Myer (2007) reported the ethics review system in South Africa was functioning reasonably, but found wide variation in capacity to conduct reviews in a timely and informed manner between committees depending on their geographical location and institutional history. Membership was dominated by white males, scientists and clinicians and failed to contain adequate representation from those communities from which participants might be drawn (Moodley and Rennie, 2011). As a result, committees might be seen as reinforcing ‘the asymmetrical power relationship that already exists between predominantly white researchers and predominantly black participants’ (Moodley and Myer, 2007).

Before 2004, there was no statutory national requirement that social science research be subject to ethics review. However, following a scandal involving breast cancer research, nationally binding ethical guidelines for health research were published by the Department of Health in 2004 and s72(6)c of the 2004 Health Act implied that all research with humans fell within the Act’s purview. The Health Act also established the National Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC) with responsibility for the oversight of local research ethics committees and researchers. The NHREC allows research ethics committees to use different procedures depending on the level of risk (creating a binary division between high and low risk). Universities responded to the 2004 Act by expanding review to cover social sciences and humanities. Where this occurred, review processes were initially resisted by some researchers (Louw and Delport, 2006) and regarded negatively by others. For example, Mamotte and Wasenaar (2009) surveyed social scientists at one university and one research organization. In the former, 60 per cent of researchers reported only negative experiences of the research ethics committee, though the low response rate of 10.1 per cent from the combined sample means that any interpretation should be cautious. Researchers in the university were frustrated by the ‘slowness of review, inadequate review, and problems that arose as a result of the centralization of review, the review of student research and researcher naivety about research ethics and ethics review’ (p. 74).
In 2015, the Department of Health published the second edition of its guidelines, *Ethics in Health Research: Principles, Processes and Structures*. The document specifically warned research ethics committees not to apply a ‘so-called “medical model” of ethics review’ (s.1.1.6) to social science research. However, once again there appeared to be tensions between its statutory remit, its somewhat confusing concurrently held ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of health research, and claims that the NHREC intended the guidelines—

> …to address research more broadly to achieve the specific goal of providing guidance for researchers so that all research involving human participants or animals may be conducted in accordance with the highest norms and standards. (s.1.1.13)

The argument that a health research document produced by a health research ethics council operating under the authority of health legislation might inform all research is not unique to South Africa. It rests on the proposition that principlism offers the possibility of a universal set of standards. This proposition has been rendered incontestable by South African regulators, who state that—

> It is important to recognize that, although research methodologies and analytic paradigms may differ, all research must be judged against the same ethical principles. No philosophical justification exists for judging different methodologies against different ethical standards. (Department of Health, 2015, s.6.1)

*Ethics in Health Research* drew heavily on Wassenaar and Mamotte’s work (2012). While these two scholars have argued in favour of universal principles, they have also recognized that these principles might be difficult to apply in practice since ‘context, history, culture, and politics, as well as the social, gender, and economic status of participants, can have implications for how ethical principles are applied in different settings’ (p. 274). As a result, the 2015 guidelines acknowledged that research ethics committees that dealt with social science proposals needed to be familiar with social research paradigms, noting that different disciplines had varying accepted methodological standards. Indeed, the document devoted one chapter to qualitative research. This might have been an attempt to protect qualitative researchers, but might also have the effect of presenting qualitative methodologies as departures from the norm of quantitative research.

Social scientists originally argued that the 2004 *Health Act* did not apply to them and this might be part of the explanation for Mamotte and Wassenaar’s findings. There have also been calls, albeit contested, for particular disciplines to build alternatives to principlism. Spiegel (2005), for example, urged his colleagues to call upon both an ethics of care and the ‘flexible and responsive’ tradition of exposé anthropology that was a legacy of that discipline’s opposition to Apartheid. Spiegel argued that these might enable anthropologists to maintain an agenda appropriate to the country that continued to explore ethics and a research agenda beyond liberal questions of ‘public power and individual rights’ (p. 134). Drawing on the ongoing work of Thaddeus Metz (for example, Metz 2013), other anthropologists have suggested that an ‘Afro-
communitarian’ notion of mutuality, *ubuntu*, might be better suited than an imported ethics of care to sub-Saharan Africa (Morreira 2012). Metz has aimed at developing ‘a normative ethical theory of right action that has an African pedigree and offers something different from what is dominant in Western moral philosophy’ (2007, p. 332). However, the 2015 Guidelines refuted departures from its principles though it is possible for multiple philosophical approaches to underpin principlism.

Senior social scientists have also questioned how research in South Africa might be well served by intensification of regulatory oversight without any accompanying effort to nurture better ways of working through ethical dilemmas. Indeed, Deborah Posel and Fiona Ross (2014) have argued that current regulatory regimes may be suppressing debate about ethical research practices among researchers who fear provoking resistance from reviewers if they present ‘an unsettling or unruly picture of the research process’ (p. 3). Instead, in South Africa –

…the trend toward more intense regulation does not guarantee a correspondingly full or thoughtful debate about questions of research ethics. Often, the regulatory concerns are more technical than ethically substantive. (ibid.)

This argument was supported by De Vries and Henley (2014) who described how, as researchers and as research ethics reviewers, they have witnessed the tension between ‘official ethics’ and ‘ethics on the ground’. As members of a university ethics committee they had not challenged the former in relation to some highly prescriptive models of informed consent, attributing their silence to: recognition that ‘official ethics’ may need to meet national or international regulatory requirements; uncertainty whether they knew the best way to obtain consent, and; conflict between their role as gatekeepers to research activity and their vested interest as members of an institution seeking to engage in high quality research. They suggested that these might be reason enough –

But perhaps the real source of our ethical dilemma is that we do not – or perhaps no longer – believe that ethics committees ‘do ethics’ in the way that we as social scientists think ethics needs to be done in practice. (pp. 85-86)

South Africa has used a legislative mandate to create national regulation of research ethics based on principlism. Explicitly constructed around the needs of health research, the ambit of the regulation might initially have been unclear. Nevertheless, over time and (where necessary) through subsequent iterations of guidelines, regulators have extended their remit and intensified scrutiny of the social sciences. As in the United States, social scientists had little say in the drafting of the guidelines that were to cover their disciplines, and have found their objections ignored or deflected. Social scientists were also unable to join the committees that conducted reviews under the regulations. Failure of national guidelines and ethics review bureaucracies to understand the nature of social science research has led to complaints from social researchers that research that they regarded as ethical was being delayed or blocked by unsympathetic reviewers. Even more troubling are stories that research ethics committees have insisted on approaches that researchers regarded as unethical. Nevertheless, despite limited empirical evidence
of the effectiveness of research ethics regulation on social scientists and a good deal of criticism within their borders, the South African model may be influencing regional patterns of research ethics governance.

Exporting Principism

The global export of principlism forms part of broader international flows of capital, students and academics, as well as knowledge and ideology. The impact of global capital has had a long-standing impact on research ethics governance. Some of the earliest medical research ethics committees around the world were established to allow medical researchers to compete for United States health research grants. United States regulators have used this funding as leverage to ensure that both the spirit and the letter of American legislation are followed. More recently, pharmaceutical companies have sought to open up new markets and take advantage of cheaper sites for multi-centre drug trials. Multinational research teams have looked to those countries with lower risks of litigation, low labour costs, pharmacologically ‘naive’ participants, weak ethics review and the absence of other regulatory processes. As a result, research in low- and middle-income countries has burgeoned. As developing countries struggle to keep pace, the Helsinki (World Medical Association 2013) and UNESCO (2006) Declarations have created regulatory templates for those without the infrastructure to create their own, and a range of capacity-building initiatives in research ethics have encouraged researchers in developing countries to follow these models.

One of the drivers for global policy transfer has been the influence of transnational professional networks. These groupings may draw on their shared world view, and use their recognized expertise in particular areas to assert authority over a policy domain, develop and entrench particular norms and choices. The concept of ‘epistemic communities’ has been used to analyse the development and influence of such networks (Haas, 1992). Members derive legitimacy by drawing on internationally-recognized approaches to respond to the particular circumstances in their own countries. In turn, these ‘successes’ are used to garner support for similar initiatives elsewhere. A critical feature of transnational epistemic communities might be the cohesion that develops from mutual socialization through shared training (Cross, 2013). Growth in internationalization of higher education might play a part in providing access to and mobility within such global communities. Encouraging student and academic international mobility has become a part of many countries’ national development plans, either as a way of enhancing local intellectual capital or asset stripping other nations. Student mobility has also become an important source of income for those countries and institutions seen as favoured providers of education.

The destination countries for South African tertiary students are dominated by the global North: United States, the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union (UNESCO-UIS, 2012). Movement to other countries in Africa has been minimal, though South Africa has in its turn become a leading regional hub for sub-Saharan African students (UNESCO-UIS, 2012), particularly those from the Southern Africa Development Community. Knowledge is not simply transferred uncritically from Northern academics to international students. However, there are various ways in which enrolment at Northern institutions might socialize and discipline international students. Having enrolled in international degree programmes, students need to meet the requirements of those courses, even if they and their lecturers and supervisors share a
common critique of research ethics regulations (Sikes, 2013). Ideas may be adopted but they may also be resisted, avoided or shaped through interaction between students in ways that we may not yet understand. Students can also be exposed to the alternatives to principlism that can be found in feminist, critical, postcolonial and indigenous writings (Israel, 2015; Denzin et al., 2008; Mertens and Ginsberg, 2008). Not every research student and academic returns from the research heartlands to the research peripheries of the world, but those that do may ease international transfer of a range of research and education policies including those related to research ethics (Shamim and Qureshi, 2013).

Capacity-building programs funded by the global North delivered in the South may also promote policy transfer through epistemic communities. In Africa, for example, funds and training programmes have been provided by, among others, the World Health Organization, the Fogarty International Center of the United States National Institutes of Health, and the Pan African Bioethics Initiative and Training and Resources in Research Ethics Evaluation (TRREE) for Africa. In some initiatives, researchers and administrators are brought to designated centres in the global North as groups for specific courses or within faculty exchange programmes. In other cases, regional fora are run in developing countries, often with the help of local returnees from courses in the developed world. South Africa has acted as host for two regional health research ethics capacity-building programmes – the South African Research Ethics Training Initiative (SARETI), and the International Research Ethics Network for Southern Africa (IRENSA). Over eight years, IRENSA provided a one-year diploma and internship for almost 100 mid-career health care professionals. These professionals included members of 40 research ethics committees, mostly in South Africa, but also drawn from other Anglophone countries on that continent. It would be churlish not to acknowledge the importance of ethics capacity-building programs for health research. However, some initiatives might be problematic. Commentators have questioned whether some systems being supported by United States-funded research ethics initiatives in lower- and middle-income countries are sustainable and whether they rely too heavily on professionals from the global North, are well-designed or accurate, or are appropriate in these, or even any, setting (Eckstein, 2004). More stridently, De Vries and Rott (2011) portrayed some courses as less of a dialogue and more like ‘missionary work’, a one-way flow of western ideas and influence. Not all training is necessarily valuable and it is possible that some of these initiatives, by failing to reject the mistakes of United States regulation, may be particularly unhelpful to social science research.

The attitudes of some North American and European institutions towards working with Southern partners may also serve to entrench Northern approaches and undercut competing Southern-based claims to expertise. Leslie London and Helen MacDonald (2014) described two cases where Northern regulators had initially appeared to recognize local expertise in South Africa, only to ignore and marginalize recommendations made by those experts. In the first instance, a European funding agency requested South African review of a research proposal from a European-based American anthropologist. The research project would employ a doctoral student to explore HIV healthcare offered through a non-government organization in South Africa. According to London who was acting as the local reviewer, the NGO knew nothing of the research and the proposal failed to demonstrate understanding of local ethical sensitivities or ethics regulatory
requirements. Among other matters, London was critical of ‘parachute research’ and a division of labour whereby Southern researchers gathered empirical data for analysis by Northern theorists, analysis that would not be shared in any obvious way with the South African research or participating community: ‘Once shared, the researcher disappears with the knowledge, the experience and the intellectual capital’ (in London and MacDonald, 2014, p. 101). Despite this assessment by South African reviewers, the research was funded by the European agency.

In the second example, a US undergraduate student planned an eight-week ethnographic research study of aspects of AIDS-related stigma in the Western Cape. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at her university passed the proposal but required ethics clearance in South Africa and, to enable this, the student negotiated affiliation to the University of Cape Town. MacDonald reviewed the proposal on behalf of the Department of Social Anthropology, found ‘glaring’ weaknesses and concluded that the form mandated by the IRB had produced a lengthy shopping list of ethics issues to be addressed, but not ones that could elicit the ethical thinking that might be needed by an ethnographer working in this field in South Africa. However, the IRB refused to cede the authority to review modifications to the review committee in Cape Town making it difficult for the local committee to insist on or even allow redrafting in response to changes in the field. In so doing, ‘the northern institution made a large investment in ethical oversight but oriented this investment entirely towards limiting its legal liability, with little regard for local ethical practices in South Africa’ (in London and MacDonald, 2014, p. 94). London and MacDonald blamed the behaviour of the two Northern institutions variously on methodological naïveté, lack of expertise in ethnography, arrogance, and the trumping of ethics by legal liability. Of course, these behaviours were only able to stand without modification because of the power differentials between European and North American institutions on the one hand and perhaps the highest ranked African research institution on the other. The ways transnational research relationships tackle research ethics needs to be understood within the context of the political economy of research. Research ethics regulatory policy and practices have been exported from the global North to the South as part of the flows of capital and academic labour. In order to secure grants from the United States, medical institutions in the South have had to establish research ethics guidelines and review structures that reflect arrangements in the United States. These arrangements have been supported by transnational professional networks populated by academics and graduates returning from North America and Europe, as well as by health research capacity-building programs funded by the North. As we have seen, they are not easily challenged by social scientists.

One rationale for the adoption of principlism is that countries in the South need to conform to international conventions in order to either protect their citizens or remain competitive in the market for international research. The assumption appears to be that supranational initiatives are inherently better than local ones. The issue of where the locus of responsibility for developing policy and regulation should rest is not unique to research ethics. Within federal entities such as the European Union, various conceptions of subsidiarity have supported a countervailing response to pressures for greater centralisation of governance. Subsidiarity is based on the premise that moves to centralise authority need to be justified and cannot just be asserted as good. So, only those matters that cannot be dealt with at the state level might warrant international
regulation, offering a ‘rebuttable presumption for the local’ (Føllesdal, 2016). Under a liberal contractual model of subsidiarity, individuals are recognised as having an interest in shaping the social institutions that might control their lives, so that among other things: institutions are responsive to the needs and interests of citizens; local communities can resist external domination, and; members of a community can engage in active citizenship (Føllesdal, 2014). Additionally, other groups who have no legitimate interest in the way a community shapes its regulation on a particular matter can avoid excessive interference, though they might provide assistance in order to avoid a competitive deregulatory spiral (Genschel and Plumper, 1997).

Within research ethics, Kotalik (2010) recognised that the principle of subsidiarity might be operating within states that had national statements, but left the interpretation of those statements to local review bodies. However, he failed to consider how international actors might be ignoring the same principle at national level. Different states might indeed acknowledge the importance of a range of international bodies, declarations and principles, but deploy subsidiarity to assert the right of individual states, sub-state communities and individuals to play significant roles in fashioning local policy and regulation in response to their particular social and cultural contexts. Of course, the principle of subsidiarity does pose its own problems, the most obvious being determining at what point and on what basis can a higher level intervene in the decisions of a more local grouping. Nevertheless, it might provide a way for states such as South Africa and for disciplines such as the social sciences to resist the universalist claims of supranational bioethical regulation.

Conclusion

Research ethics regulations largely: are produced and conducted in the global North; are based on universalist claims about ethics and the primacy of the individual; exclude other belief systems; take advantage of institutionalized power differentials, and; erase colonial and neo-colonial experiences. Other contexts and experiences are excluded or, if incorporated, seen as offering only inflexible, historical points of reference. When biomedically-derived regulations are imported, the experience of social scientists in South Africa suggests that it may be difficult to influence their initial formation and ambit. Researchers who fail to comply with imported ethical requirements risk forfeiting funding, having their papers rejected by publishers or losing their jobs. Even where social scientists have mobilized, changes in the imported regime may be difficult to achieve.

It is deeply troubling that so many countries have imported regimes from the global North that are flawed within their own context, but also appear incapable of respecting different ethical traditions, learning from local knowledge of context, or engaging with local researchers, institutions, participants and other stakeholders in the world of research. In many ways, Schrag’s language of ‘ethical imperialism’ seems to be a useful analytical device for understanding the export of research ethics regulation from the global North to South Africa. It may also hold some rhetorical value. However, it may also disguise sophisticated patterns of incorporation, accommodation and resistance which, for us to understand, require a level of empirical research that is yet to be undertaken at a local level. When researchers resist the roll-out of universal ethical norms, they may be seeking guidelines that display greater cultural sensitivity. However,
for many, opposition is not simply targeted at insensitivity in application but draws on
critical ethical traditions to challenge the universal basis for principlism, and calls for a
deeper understanding of and engagement with how different societies, cultures and
peoples understand ethics, research and ethical research.

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and the publisher for allowing me to provide a condensed version to the African Studies
of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) conference proceedings. Some of this paper is
also drawn from Israel (2015).

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Reflections on methodology for a qualitative cross-cultural study of human rights

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Abstract
The aim of my doctoral research is to build a picture of how African families from refugee backgrounds understand and construct human rights, and to explore how this data might inform cross-cultural social work practice. To achieve this goal a qualitative study with a critical constructionist orientation was undertaken. In-depth semi-structured interviews were utilised to create opportunities for co-construction of meaning about human rights through the examination of participants’ lived experience. A number of fundamental components in the research contributed to its complexity, including vulnerability, culture, language and ontology. Drawing upon the literature, several methodological components were put in place to address these complexities and to support the strength, efficacy and validity of the study. Firstly, a small group of African-born informants who comprise a research reference group were invited to contribute ethical, conceptual and practical insights at key points in the study. Secondly, concepts of liberation through dialogue that were embedded in the study shaped the semi-structured interview guide, cycles of participant recruitment and data checking processes. Thirdly, the application of interpretive phenomenological analysis sensitised me to both the meaning of participant experience of human rights, and the way experience was conveyed in the research. Applying and then reflecting upon these aspects of the research project has led to new understandings of good practice in qualitative research with a critical orientation. In this paper, I present the methodological challenges and learnings that have emerged throughout the study.

Introduction
During the 10 years from 1997 until 2007, armed conflict significantly undermined peace, stability and security in many African countries, causing large numbers of people to flee, and prompting the Australian Government to prioritise resettlement of African refugees above other groups from 2004-2007 (UNHCR 2009). Subsequent studies of their wellbeing in the diaspora have highlighted the multiple, complex and intersecting impacts of pre- and post-migration trauma in this population and documented both challenges and opportunities in resettlement (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury 2007; Dhanji 2010; Hebbani, Obijiofor & Bristed et al 2010; Hugman, Pittaway, & Bartolomei 2011; Lejukole 2008; McArthur, Thompson, Winkworth, & Butler 2010; Westoby and Ingamells, 2010). The evidence base amply demonstrates that African families’ experiences of war and trauma, flight, transition and resettlement significantly impact on family composition and structure in the diaspora. It also shows that African family values, norms and power dynamics differ from Australian norms and values in important ways, African families report not feeling understood or respected by service providers in relation to family matters (AHRC, 2010; Milos, 2011; Wille, 2011).

Social workers and other professionals endeavour to respond to the particular needs of
such families. Yet they operate in contexts where legislation, policy frameworks and organisational imperatives may not fully support practice quality, exacerbating tensions inherent in supporting, protecting and advocating for these vulnerable communities (Bates, Baird, Johnson, Lee, Luster & Rehagan, 2005; Bromfield & Holzer, 2008; Bromfield, Lamont, Parker, & Horsfall, 2010; Pine & Drachman, 2005; Sawrikar, 2009). Many studies document the failure of mainstream services to comprehensively address the needs of African families from refugee backgrounds in Australia (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2007; Hugman, 2010; Lewig, Arney, Salveron and Barredo, 2010; McArthur et al., 2010; RCOA, 2010).

Human rights legislation and frameworks are thought to strengthen social work interventions by focusing on unique stories about, and approaches to, wellbeing, adjustment, development and inclusion, and promoting respectful, hopeful, resilience-building cross-cultural encounters (Bricker-Jenkins, Barbera and Young, 2009; Cemlyn & Briskman, 2003; Flynn, 2005; Ife, 2008; Nipperess & Briskman, 2009). However, African perspectives on human rights vary considerably from those promulgated in the West (Addo, 2010; An-Na'im, 1992; Flynn, 2005; George, 2008; Legesse, 1980; Merry, 2005; Nasu & Saul, 2011; Outhred, 2010; Zou & Zwart, 2011). Moreover the capacity to influence human rights in a way that shapes public policy and formal discourse is often concentrated in the hands of the powerful (De Feyter, 2011; Outhred, 2010). Some argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Conventions and Protocols (1959, 1967) arose out of a limited cultural frame of reference achieved by compromises and assumptions that effectively reinforce hegemonic tendencies and have done little to prevent serious contraventions of human rights by governments, corporations and individuals, or bring such perpetrators to justice (Donnelly, 2003; Nasu & Saul, 2011; Wronka, 1992). The ideal of the social construction of rights (An-Na'im, 1992; Zou & Zwart, 2011), or of human rights from below (Ife, 2008), contrasts starkly with positivistic notions of rights, natural law and natural justice concepts (O'Manique, 1992). It is for these reasons that dialogue and grassroots engagement with human rights is necessary (Gomez Isa, 2011; Ife, 2006; Nasu & Saul, 2011; Outhred, 2010).

Providing an opportunity for African families from refugee backgrounds to share their perspectives on human rights is important as a means of overcoming hegemony in relation to human rights (De Feyter, 2011; Outhred, 2010), facilitating Afrocentric processes of meaning-making (Asante, 1983; Schreiber, 2000), celebrating the worldviews of African families from refugee backgrounds and bringing new understandings about their perspectives on the wellbeing of their families and communities. Therefore, my doctoral study asks, how are human rights constructed and understood by African families from refugee backgrounds, and how might this contribute to social work practice? The ontology of the study was social constructionism paired with hermeneutic phenomenology. Social constructionism is underpinned by critical theory which engages with power imbalances and oppression and has a transformational agenda whereby dialogue and critical self-awareness are the pre-eminent tools for achieving social change (Crotty, 1998; Dryzek, 1995; McLaren, 1997). Hermeneutic phenomenology is based on Heidegger’s process and framing of the exploration of the meaning of concepts or experiences located within, as opposed to abstracted from, context (Wojnar & Swanson, 2007).

A thoughtful approach to cultural difference between my participants and myself was
supported by my knowledge of cultural theories. Biculturalism was useful as it emphasises the conscious and deliberate process where ‘individuals learn to function in two distinct social cultural environments’ and ‘mediate between the dominant discourse and the realities that they must face as members of subordinate cultures’ (Darder 1991, p. 84). The ‘third space’ was also a source of fascination and resonance, referring to a metaphysical space that offers unique possibilities to those in between or critiquing cultural practices (Bhabha 1994). Berry’s (2001) acculturation framework focused me on the two central issues which require mutual negotiation by migrants to a new culture and the members of the receiving community, namely engagement with difference and the retention of cultural attributes within the broader society. Conscious of the impact of cultural difference and the potential for ideas to get lost in translation during the research, and wary of inadvertently re-traumatizing or imposing an understanding of human rights on my participants, I implemented safeguards in the research design which will be discussed in the next section. With these in place, I utilised semi-structured interviews to focus on participant experiences, ideas about human rights and meaning making in the resettlement context.

**Research Design**

My research methodology facilitated the exploration of culturally located and diverse participant views of human rights and responsibilities. I undertook a qualitative study with a critical orientation that involved individual, couple and kinship interviews lasting for about 1 – 1 ½ hours. Participant stories and experiences offered meaningful insights about the practice of human rights that potentially broaden and deepen our application of human rights in the helping professions. Data collection centered on metropolitan Sydney and occurred in two distinct phases: October 2013 to March 2014, and September 2015 to August 2016. The study sample was 15 participants in total, 7 males and 8 females from countries of origin including: Liberia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and the Ivory Coast. Ages ranged from 25-64 years of age and length of time in Australia ranged between 3 to 14 years. About 13 people from the cohort had professional or semi-professional roles and responsibilities in the community, including: counselling, community work, religious ministry, cultural liaison, nursing and childcare. Two participants were unemployed. 10 participants had a Bachelor’s Degree, 3 of whom also had a Master’s Degree, and 3 had a TAFE Certificate or Diploma, 1 was completing his HSC and 1 did not disclose their educational level. All participants were spoke multiple languages including: English (all participants), Krio (4), Swahili (3), Arabic (3), French (3), Kreyol (1), Dinka (1), Kinyarwanda (1), Luo (1), Kono (1), Mende (1).

Cyclic reflection upon methodological matters facilitated the building of knowledge about good practice in research design. This article focuses on my discoveries about the importance and function of my research reference group, the efficacy of my semi-structured interview guide and my selection of Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis as the means of data analysis. Regarding the research reference group, six community leaders, workers and contacts from African families from refugee backgrounds were invited to participate, utilizing links with agencies such as: The Asylum Seekers Centre, the Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors, Transcultural Mental Health Centre, Settlement Services International and the African Studies Association of Australia and the Pacific. Face-to-face meetings, phone calls and emails were used flexibly for the convenience of each member. Individual meetings promoted a
diversity of roles, contributions and insights in the research and avoided groupthink. Contact with reference group members adhered to the confidentiality and boundary requirements of the Australian Catholic University Human Research Ethics Committee and the Australian Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics. I involved the Research Reference Group in as many aspects of the research design as possible. The results section of this article presents data on the contributions of the reference group to the research, followed by discussion and analysis.

I developed the semi-structured interview guide specifically for this project, informed by Ife’s (2010) human rights community consultation framework and Holstein and Gubrium’s (2003) chapter on race, subjectivity and the interview process, but also informed by a phenomenological concern with understanding the lived experience of participants. Its design was iterative in keeping with the conceptual framework of critical constructionism. Following introductions, discussion of the research purpose, obtaining consent and permission to record the interview, participants were invited in Part 1 of the interview to introduce themselves and their cultural background. Part 2 comprised an invitation to talk about human rights in their own words, and discuss the meaning of human rights to their family and community. Participants were asked to share stories, songs, poems, pictures and experiences that might illustrate their views. The value of this knowledge for social workers and the context and meaning of help seeking and importance of trust building was explored in Part 3 of the interview.

Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was utilised for data analysis as it resonated with the consultative and dialogical approach taken in the study and provided tools for attending closely to participant attempts to make sense of their experience (Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009). This method of analysis facilitated the interrogation of my own reading of and understanding of the data in iterative and inductive cycles of analysis in the tradition of Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle of understanding (Wojnar & Swanson, 2007). IPA involves five cycles of analysis, three within a single transcript and the final two working across transcripts to identify and organize subordinate and superordinate themes (Smith et. al., 2009). Each transcript followed the same pattern of immersion in the data, followed by initial note making about experience and finally a deeper reading of the transcript to explore participant explanations about their experiences. My analysis of each transcript in this way yielded a new data set that required summary and facilitated comparison and contrasting with other transcripts to identify commonalities and differences between descriptions and facilitate theory-building. In this way data analysis was informed by the notion of the “thick description” (Geertz 2002; Ryle 1968, para 9). Data and a discussion of how the particular methodological aspects outlined above contributed to the strength of the research is presented below.

**Research Results: “Good Words Pull Cola Nar Mot”**
The phrase in Krio “Good words pull cola nar mot” was provided by Participant 10, and highlights how a researcher’s respectful approach or “good words” will elicit useful responses

…Because people like to chew cola nut. So when you go there, you see he or she chewing his cola nut. He talking to you, he no listen to you because he chew,
chew, chew. But when you bring peaceful approach with respect, [he] stop chewing – here - let me put my cola nut here, see…They will listen to you. But if you come with, no this is it! You should do this, you should do this, you should do that; you’re supposed to be doing this, this, this, they will continue, continue to chew!

This phrase was Participant 10’s contribution to a discussion about practice quality. It points to his skills and views about capturing a client’s attention to support change and growth and resonates with my findings on best practice in research design for cross-cultural phenomenological studies where priority must be given to eliciting participant expertise, creating a safe interview space, and enhancing participant power. In sharing various concerns with my supervisors and the research reference group and applying their recommendations iteratively to the semi-structured interview guide, I moved closer to the maxim above. The following example demonstrates this process. Participant 2 and 5’s responses below were elicited by my question, “I am interested in how your families and communities understand human rights”:

We say that we don’t know human right. Because imagine something that you were grown in and you come to a different culture, now you always feel…cover up, stay with that fear in you… That’s what I say I don’t know human rights. (mmm?) I really don’t know. I must admit that fact. (Participant 2)

Thank you for your contribution and your willingness to know something about what is called human rights. I myself I can (cough) I can say I don’t know anything about this, ah I just heard about what is called human right ah about how human right works ah and yes, I know – I, yes , I don’t know ah any definition about it ah but this I think when same when something talk about it, something like about human right there’s look like, I think – I myself I get ah I get it, just feel my, when you have the words for human right or the right of humanity it’s look like ah when you see the light somewhere there. (Participant 5)

These statements about understandings of rights contain hesitation, uncertainty and conceptual distancing. There is awkwardness and minimising of wisdom. The idea of “not knowing” becomes the overpowering force in the conversation. The line of questioning seems to have prevented participants from tapping into their stories and forms of knowledge. In contrast, the following participant responses were elicited by the revised question: “Do you have a word or words in your language for human rights?”

Yes. Very hard for you to understand although if you would be able to write it. We say uburenganzira bwa muntu. Muntu is human. Uburenganzira is rights, then uburenganzira bwa muntu is like to -[Interviewer: Rights to the human?] Yes, that’s it. [Interviewer: Do you want to write it down for me?] Yeah, of course, yes….Sometimes some people use it in French but, droit de l’homme, but we use uburenganzira bwa muntu...... What it means to me is actually broad as well. But I think it means a lot. It means that people need to have the same rights, need to be equal, need to be um not selected from one culture, from one religion, from the colour of the person….(Participant 12)

This statement about rights is affirmative, certain and immediate. There is nuance, exploration, explanation and the sharing of wisdom. There is a sense of ownership over, and pride in, the knowledge being shared. The phrase
Participant 12 provides directly translates from Kinyarwanda into English as ‘rights of everybody’. She says '[it will] be very hard for you to understand’, showing awareness and empathy towards me because I am unfamiliar with her language. She writes the words for me to reflect upon later. Importantly for my research, when Participant 12 tells me these words in her mother-tongue, it opens the conversation and she begins to list a range of experiences that imbue meaning into the words, focusing mainly on the need for people to have equality without discrimination.

This second quote is also delivered with confidence. This man explains that there is not a word that directly translates from Dholuo into English and that the words that are closest actually mean something quite different.

The words for human rights in my language doesn’t exist. But having said that, the educated class and some of us say the words such as twero. Twero means responsibility. And that word, twero padano mean the responsibility of people. It is not a right word to me, because it would translate as responsibility for human beings. This word does not make a better translation for human rights, because it would mean human responsibility. (Participant 13)

In sharing this wisdom, Participant 13 highlights the importance of personal responsibility as opposed to individual entitlements. This conversation about the difference between the Western individualistic paradigm and that of the Acholi people is important. The question “centres” his language and hence perspectives. It assumes that there are concepts close to human rights in participant languages, rather than testing how much they understand about an external concept. The conversation becomes critically reflective and dialogical and enhances the ability of the participant to tap into his stories and forms of knowledge, and by extension, enhances the quality of the data collected and the eventual findings. By engaging in this way, I was allowing for decolonisation of the concept.

Another potential example of decolonisation in the research is presented below. Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis sensitised me to nuances occurring in these research conversations and facilitated deeper reflection upon content as well as process. I will show with a brief excerpt how it was a form of data analysis particularly well suited to this study.

**Suitability of Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis for this study**

Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis guides the researcher to successive levels of analysis from general notes, to a focus on specific messages and how these messages are conveyed, before making links to theory. In the excerpt below, my initial notes on emerging themes highlighted the protective role and resistance of Participant 2’s father to the cultural norms of the time as a way of “doing” human rights. However, looking at the way the story unfolds highlights potential interference in the narrative.

**Researcher:** So, then what are your thoughts on [FGM], presumably that, you’ve experienced that as a child?
**Participant 2:** It’s not, it’s not good
**Participant 4:** Is it true that you went through that when you were a child?
**Participant 2:** No I didn’t go through that because my Dad never wanted his, his girls to do it so he never did it to any of his girls, no, yeah, but I have friends
I have heard since, who all did it yeah. In my village, they are still doing it.
Participant 4: Oh, do you do the circumcision for girls?
Participant 2: Mmm
Participant 3: Mmm they used to do it in Liberia
Participant 2: They do it in Liberia, not used to
Participant 3: Like you know in Sierra Leone (yeah) the same, the same way but
there’s – have they put laws into place now to stop it?
Participant 4: In Kenya, there’s cultures that do that like the Masai’s but our role
stops it.
Participant 3: But our law prohibits it. It’s very big on that.
Participant 2: Eh I’m not, they have not had any law about it.
Participant 4: You mean it’s an acceptable thing?

The other female participants were highly engaged in the discussion and it is a high-energy situation with swift comparisons of laws and norms of different countries occurring. Some of the participants question the legality of the practice in parts of Africa and in effect interrogate Participant 2. This raises the possibility that it might have become difficult for Participant 2 to tell her story. This reading of the data stimulated further research and reflection on my part. I applied circumspection to the example, no longer quite as certain that it was a story of resistance to oppression. In this case IPA facilitated a closer reading of the text and the identification of contextual aspects that may have influenced Participant 2’s narrative. It helped me to identify and deconstruct my assumptions about what was being said. In this way, the processes of IPA sensitised me to cultural nuances and supported decolonisation in the research.

So far, I have discussed two elements of my research design that contributed to the strength of the research. A third aspect was the involvement of my research reference group. This is discussed below.

The value of a research reference group for an outsider researcher
To highlight the value of the research reference group for me as an outsider researcher I conducted a review of the multiple contributions made by members of the research reference group throughout my research to date. These contributions included vouching for me to the ethics committee; providing a letter promising to support participants in case of emergency; review of the research flier, consent form and interview guide; advice about enabling participation; raising awareness about the research and vouching for me with participants; reviewing and advising me on my data summaries; consulting with elders and/or communities about the data summaries; involvement in theoretical and conceptual discussions throughout the research including matters of trust, reliability and reciprocity; advising on cultural safety, engagement of interpreters, skills to promote dialogue and risks to research participants; and affirming the value of the research.

This list highlights the involvement of members of the research reference group in many aspects of the study. They gave generously of their time in reviewing documents, recommending that a small gift be provided for all research participants, advertising the research, linking me with participants, guiding me on the meaning of data, helping to interrogate and address assumptions and blockages in the research process and supporting theory building objectives. Indeed, the collation of this data highlights that the research reference group have been pivotal to the research. They enabled data
collection, supported cultural safety and strengthened the findings through their involvement in data analysis.

Another aspect that is important to highlight in terms of the value of the research reference group for me as an outsider researcher is the learning about reciprocity, which they facilitated. I conducted a review of the reciprocal acts that occurred and have documented them in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reciprocal Acts</th>
<th>Reference Group Member/s</th>
<th>Researcher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vouching</td>
<td>Connecting me with potential participants</td>
<td>Connecting a group member with an academic colleague who shares his professional and research concerns about recovery in mental health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-disclosure</td>
<td>Sharing own wisdom and expertise to deepen the research</td>
<td>Sharing my own family and community experiences of rights especially in relation to generational responses to grief and loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information giving</td>
<td>Sharing knowledge to enhance cultural safety in the research</td>
<td>Sharing professional knowledge about university courses, eligibility, costs and application processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation</td>
<td>Reviewing and affirming the research findings</td>
<td>Encouraging members and their families in their study and career aspirations - sending them information about interesting career openings and showing belief in their aspirations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Reciprocal acts between research reference group members and the researcher in the study Human Rights as Constructed and Understood by African Families from Refugee Backgrounds

Table 1 highlights specific acts of reciprocity that occurred within my relationship with research reference group members such as vouching for one another, responding to requests for information, engaging in self-disclosure and mutual affirmation that sensitized me to the more embedded but vitally important possibilities for reciprocity between my study participants and me. These included being interested and supportive in relation to shifting political and economic realities in their countries of origin, affirming their knowledge and sharing my own in meaningful ways, and attending functions and events when invited. It can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that the more recurrent nature of interactions with the research reference group members increased the potential for reciprocal acts to occur. Members of the research reference group functioned as “cultural liaison” (Halcon, et al., 2004; Lim, 2009, p. 1030; Williams, 2008) by linking me with participants, engaging with me in critical reflection about the data and research design and informing me about cultural issues throughout the research process. The research study was publicised by discussing with service providers more generally and seeking permission to display a flier in their organizations. However, the research reference group was more instrumental in recruitment, linking me with 75% of participants and vouching for me with community elders.

Discussion
Concerns about outsider researcher positioning, especially with participants from a refugee background, highlight potential power differentials, multilayered cultural, ethnic and gender identities, experiences of misunderstanding, the need for cultural empathy and skills for effective engagement (Gair 2011; Pernice 1994; Ryan, Kofman, & Aaron, 2011). Further, it is argued that special care is required through the research process to ensure transparency, accountability and depth in data analysis and conversely avoid superficial or unsupportable accounts of the lived experience of participants (Fox, 1989, p.18; McNess et.al., 2013). These aspects support culturally sensitive research but do not necessarily amount to a culturally safe and decolonizing research approach.

Careful reflection upon language and power differentials (Ruzzene 1998), approaches to relationship building, reasoning and philosophy across cultures and contexts were implemented reflexively as part of the research design. The reference group established early in the process assisted me to be as reflective and critical as possible about culture and othering tendencies. The notion of critical friend (Foulger, 2009) framed this role, and members of the group were encouraged to challenge my assumptions and interpretations, share their knowledge and expertise and contribute to a deeper understanding of all aspects of the research process. Experts in the field such as Hugman et al (2011) hold reciprocity to be part of the ethic of care and responsibility in research with individuals and communities from traumatized backgrounds. In my study reciprocity came to life in the interactions with the research reference group members. My ongoing relationship with research reference group members confirms the importance and potential of prolonged engagement with those involved in the research.

Documenting and demonstrating reflection upon the insights arrived at, the background to those insights and the degree to which value judgements are informed in the process of research are both fundamental to rigour in qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Johnson & Waterfield, 2004) and the application of decolonising methodologies (Smith 2012). As human behaviour is symbolic Geertz suggests we must ask rather than assume what is being said through particular choices of action and behaviour. If we do not seek the required background information our interpretations will produce “systematic misunderstandings” (Geertz 2002, p. 66). Employing Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith et al, 2009) in this research facilitated my interrogation of the data in iterative and inductive cycles of analysis in the tradition of Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle of understanding (Wojnar & Swanson, 2007). IPA facilitates a high level of attentiveness to the data and the context in which the data is located. This aided my recognition of patterns of speaking across the interview and ways of telling the story, and sensitized me to what might lie behind the story in terms of the research relationship, power, choice and approaches to expertise, as has been found with other studies with refugee populations (see for example Rosbrook & Schweitzer, 2010; Schweitzer, Greenslade & Kagge 2007; Shakespeare-Finch & Wickham, 2010).

Finally, my increasing confidence to employ reciprocal self-disclosure elicited experiences and responsibilities in the lives of African families from refugee backgrounds which complicated their participation in the research study. When I shared something of my own self and challenges that I was facing, participants reciprocated with brief stories about their own lives and the events that made it difficult to set a date for our research interview. They told of the birth of children and grandchildren, travel as representatives of their communities, family or community deaths in the weeks before
our interview, and changing jobs and workplaces. My sharing of my own life circumstances, which were in essence very similar, elicited these stories. This helped contextualize the interview and supported me to manage my research agenda respectfully.

Conclusion
The goal of this research project was to highlight unique understandings of and priorities about human rights to inform and influence cross-cultural practice. Immersion in the stories, experiences and perspectives of African families from refugee backgrounds gathered via dialogue within semi-structured interviews and systematic, rigorous analysis of the data collected has confirmed the value and timeliness of cross-cultural, rights-focused dialogue with African families from refugee backgrounds settled in Australia. This article has focused on key methodological elements that impact engagement, cultural safety and power in research and demonstrated ways of supporting iterative co-construction of meaning in the research space.

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Africa: Moving the Boundaries


Reflections on the Dilemmas of Feminist Fieldwork in Africa

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Abstract
The feminist dilemmas of fieldwork in Africa are explored in this personal retrospective reflection on conducting research in Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s about the role of women in Zimbabwe’s anti-colonial liberation struggle. Having grappled with the feminist ethics of doing such research at the time, its enduring legacies provide timely lessons for current and future researchers conducting interviews in the field. In particular, the politics of ‘who can speak for whom?’ will be (re)examined, and this chapter will ask the question if any “woman” researching in/on Africa has the emancipatory potential to challenge the dominant colonial and postcolonial discourses that have determined historical texts.

Introduction
Twenty years ago Christine Sylvester (1995) both inspired and challenged me to just go to Africa, and into the field to conduct feminist fieldwork, but warned me not indulge in “feminist tourism” (p. 945). She outlined a strategy that I implemented, of “empathetic co-operation” for the western feminist doing research about African women. This was based on Sylvester’s world-traveling tips (p. 957) derived from Norma Alarcón (1990), who was inspired by Alison Jaggar (1983), who cited María Lugones’ doubts about white Anglo women research women of colour –

… Before they can contribute to collective dialogue [white Anglo women] need to know the ‘text’, to have become familiar with an alternative way of viewing the world … You need to learn to become unintrusive, unimportant, patient to the point of tears, while at the same time open to learning any possible lessons. You will have to come to terms with the sense of alienation, of not belonging, of having your world thoroughly disrupted, having it criticised and scrutinized from the point of view of those who have been harmed by it, having important concepts central to it dismissed, being viewed with mistrust… (my emphasis).

Twenty years later, this chapter is a reflection upon my decisions, choices and feminist justifications for choosing to go to Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s to research the roles of women in the anti-colonial liberation struggle and their subsequent experiences in the post-colonial African state. The fieldwork undertaken was specifically conducted to

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1 The title for this chapter was inspired by Diane Wolf (1996), and this chapter is based upon the prior publications of Tanya Lyons (1999a; 1999b; 2004). It will be published in the book, ‘Women Researching in Africa’, edited by Ruth Jackson and Max Kelly, and is currently at the draft stage.
achieve a doctorate in philosophy (PhD) through the Department of Politics at the University of Adelaide, South Australia. While my motives were justified by the best of intentions, this fieldwork required me to critique my own feminist credentials and objectives, and to assess the strengths, weaknesses and outcomes that this research ultimately produced.

Twenty years ago, “identity politics” (Diaz-Diocaretz & Zavala, 1985; and Keith & Pile, 1993), or the “politics of identity” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, pp. 119-20; Petersen, 1999) was relatively new in political science, informed by feminism, postmodernism and postcolonialism – all challenges to the mainstream theories – and required a declaration of who you are or claim to be – using signifiers such as white/black, male/female, first/third world, etc. (Lal, 1996). However, no matter how I described myself (then or now), and despite my feminist world travelling ethical guidelines in hand (Sylvester, 1995), when I finally got into the field – in Zimbabwe in 1996 – Zimbabwean-Australian author Sekai Nzenza-Shand (1997a; 1997b) still criticised me for being just another foreign, middle class white girl choosing to do fieldwork on women in Africa. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) has argued, declaring your identity and position as a gesture ‘can never suffice’ (p. 271). Linda Alcoff (1991-92) also warns that it is an easy and frequent trap to just ‘speak for others’ without their consent (pp. 5-32).

Frustrated by my own inconvenient otherness and too far into my PhD research and field work to change topics and write about something more politically correct – such as issues facing female, white, middle-class university students studying in South Australia – I carried on regardless! Yet, Nzenza did have a point. Why was I writing about the plight of Zimbabwean women who had fought in their national struggle for liberation? The answer lies in the question ‘why?’ and the refining of this question to find a niche angle to explore it. On this question I was influenced by Carol Bacchi’s hallway advice regarding a simple but effective approach to research: to find an answer to the question, ‘what is the problem?’ (Bacchi, 1999; also see Bletsas & Beasley, 2012).

War is the problem, and women appear to suffer more and/or differently during wars, compared to men. Hence, applying a feminist historiography to the issue, the researcher can easily explore and report on something that probably hasn’t been studied in depth before, and thus make an original contribution to the academy, which is required to achieve that academic recognition. Thus, I could have been, ‘the arrogant perceiver [who] does not countenance the possibility that the Other is independent, indifferent. … coerc[ing] the objects of his [or her] perception into satisfying the conditions his [or her] perception imposes’ (Frye 1983, p. 67), thereby, ‘discovering it and bringing it back home through colonial and imperialist activities’ (Sylvester, 1995, p. 947) to serve my own ends. I hope I wasn’t. I hope I have respected the women I interviewed and their stories and voices in this history told through my research.

I wonder if any of my male counterparts at the university would have worried about this issue, or if it was just something peculiar to the feminist perspective subscribed to by

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2 Carol Bacchi was an academic where I undertook my Honours degree and later my PhD in the Department of Politics at the University of Adelaide. Although at the time, I didn’t appreciate it, her hallway advice to me was invaluable to my research development. She is now Emeritus Professor in the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Adelaide.
female scholars in the 1990s? Would the men have gone to an African country to interview women on their experiences of war? The fact is they didn’t (see Youngs, Jones & Pettman, 1999). Indeed, it has only been in more recent years that some male academics have included a gendered lens in their examination of war (e.g. Lahai, 2012; Dureismith, 2012; Hills, 2015), but it is obvious that women researchers led the academic brigade in this challenging and important field of research (e.g. Addis, Russo & Sebesta, 1994; Cock, 1989; 1991; Cooke & Woolacott, 1993; Enloe, 1983; Nordstrum, 1999; Pettman, 1996; Tetreault, 1994) and we need to acknowledge their legacy, and/or our part in it.

This chapter will, therefore, retrospectively reflect upon my experience of conducting feminist fieldwork in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, and will question the ethical position of doing such research and its enduring legacies. In particular, this chapter will examine the politics of ‘who can speak for whom’ and why anyone researching in Africa has the emancipatory potential to challenge the dominant colonial and postcolonial discourses that have determined historical texts.

The Seven Dilemmas
Twenty years ago when I travelled from Australia to Zimbabwe to research the issues facing women and war in Africa, I was young and naïve. Nonetheless, I was concerned enough to want to avoid being viewed as an interfering or patronising foreigner in Africa, and did not want to be labelled as culturally insensitive or dare I say “colonial”.

Dilemma 1: How can the western, feminist-Africanist locate her work without being situated within the neo-imperial or Africanist/Orientalist discourse (e.g. Mikell, 1997; Said, 1978; Mudimbe, 1988)?

Australia hadn’t colonised any African states, so I felt rather confident the latter would not apply, but I remained the white/foreign/female/other throughout, and the perception was that I had many advantages, such as access to funding. Although I was lucky enough to hold an Australian Commonwealth Scholarship to conduct my PhD and research, I was not financially rich – nor the stereotypical privileged middle class white girl – so I busied myself with organising fundraisers in order to purchase a return airline ticket from Adelaide to Harare. Such perceived advantages, however accurate, were negated when this researcher was met with the ‘scepticism, defensiveness, and ambivalence’ of some postcolonial feminist scholars who argued that this research only served to ‘silence’ African woman (Nzenza-Shand, 1997, pp. 170-1; Mohanty, 1988, pp. 61-88).

As an Australian woman harbouring feminist tendencies and with a strong sense of social justice, I was (and remain) dedicated to African Studies and was fortunate to have been a student of the late Professor Cherry Gertzel (Buswell et al, 2015). However, up until my fieldwork I hadn’t yet set foot upon the African continent, and acknowledged that that was a problem that had to be rectified. In consultation with other women researching in Africa, I carefully considered my positionality, my purpose and reasons for going, and bravely (or arrogantly?) declared that my research was worthwhile, and that not going would not benefit anyone. However, despite applying in advance, my Zimbabwean research permit had not been issued by the week of my departure.
Dilemma 2: Do I stay or do I go?

Christine Sylvester, who happened to be visiting Adelaide University at the time (in 1995), advised me to “just go!” She said it quite sternly, so I did! I entered Zimbabwe on a tourist visa, and organized my research permit when I got there. Sylvester provided the best advice I had received from anyone about doing fieldwork in Africa. The other dilemmas I was to face when I got there… Sekai Nzenza argued that when white women speak their voice is valued but when black women speak their ‘speech is denigrated in academic circles because [they] lack the language of theory’ (Nzenza 1995, p.103). She explained that there are culturally insensitive ‘obstacles to understanding’, which contribute to the silencing of African women.

The difficulty is compounded by the problems and possibilities of high theory, which at the present is the chosen mode of articulation. On the one hand, I recognize its enabling potential and the fact that it cannot be shut out of African thinking. On the other, it is very distant from our experience, and it is, after all, understood only by a small elite, largely in the Western world (Nzenza-Shand 1997b, p. 215).

Academic theories are usually generated for academic audiences. It is not simply high theory that uses and thus silences (in this case) African women’s experiences. The perception in the late 1990s was that the position from which the “white woman” researcher spoke guaranteed an audience, and that her work was more likely to be read in academic circles where (the subject) African women were rarely located. Nzenza concludes that ‘the issue is not that the women have been silent, but that they were not heard or understood’ (ibid., p. 216). African women were speaking in other ways within their communities, but the western world was incapable of hearing, hence also confirming Spivak’s subaltern thesis, they can speak, it is just that no-one is listening (Spivak, 1988).

Nzenza suggests that the –

future [for] feminist methodologies rel[ies] on oral forms of evidence. The only problem is how this data should be collected and how it is presented ... The researcher still retains the power to select questions, and to silence those words she feels are not important to her research. Clearly her ideological position also determines the way conclusions are drawn from raw data. The African woman remains a static, silent object of research, while her life is ‘spoken for,’ and about, in feminist academic circles (Nzenza 1995, p. 104).

Reina Lewis offered a strategy to search for the subaltern voice within ‘orientalist discourse’ which she argues is, ‘an uneven matrix of orientalist situations across different cultural and historical sites in which each orientalism is ‘internally complex and unstable’ (1996, p.4). Lewis defines the subaltern voice as, ‘embryonically counter hegemonic … [which] may contest and to varying extents transform the power relations of hegemonic discourse’ (Lewis 1996, p.4). This meant that the subaltern voice would be audible within hegemonic discourse, and appear clearly in the cracks of the latter. Thus, we begin the task of searching in the cracks of hegemonic discourse until we hear
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the voice of the subaltern (the African woman).

**Dilemma 3:** Assuming we are successful in finding it, how can we then project her voice to ensure it is heard by a wider audience, both inside and away from academia?

John Beverly questioned whether we can actually represent the subaltern either mimetically – speaking about – or politically and legally – speaking for – without confronting the dilemma of subaltern resistance to elite conceptions and without ignoring the ways she can speak, if she is just ‘spoken for’ (1998, pp. 305-319). Beverly asks, ‘what would be the point after all of representing the subaltern as subaltern?’ The aim of my research was clearly not to represent the subaltern as subaltern, but to re-present them as a subject of Zimbabwean history from the ‘welter of documentary and historiographic discourses that [had] den[ied] the subaltern that power of agency (Beverly 1998, p. 306).

In this case, it was about the Zimbabwean liberation war and postcolonial Zimbabwean gender politics, which had silenced the female guerrilla fighters, and denied them as “women ex-combatants” a right to be acknowledged for their contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation from Rhodesian white minority rule. In my research I did not claim to represent the subaltern, but to acknowledge the absence of subaltern representation. To be unrepresented means to be unheard. To be heard means to be no longer subaltern. To represent the subaltern in this way meant that they became actors and agents of their own history. The point was not to be the voice of the subaltern, but to engage in a dialogue with her, and thus I aimed to privilege her voice in the context (and restraints) of academic research (Marcus 1994, cited in Lal 1996, p. 206).

Chilla Bullbeck (1996) has argued that this approach could be perceived as ‘Orientalism’, or exoticizing the Other. That is, representing the same images, voyeuristically retelling the same colonized stories, and recapturing the same exotic images for the Western gaze (Said, 1978). Indeed, Nzenia (1995) was concerned about this and offered a critical methodology for the white Western woman to research the African woman – simply acknowledge that you are coming from a position of power. Indeed, as an Australian woman heading off into Zimbabwe to do fieldwork, it was necessary for me to consider and challenge these critiques of my potential perception as a white woman of privilege. Yet, there were already a sizable number of western women academics and activists researching women’s issues in Africa, and critiquing Women and Development (WAD) and Gender and Development (GAD) perspectives (eg. Parpart, 1989; Chowdhry, 1995; Parpart & Marchand, 1995; Mbilinyi, 1993, cited in Christine Sylvester 1995, p. 956; Razavi & Miller, 1995). Their voices were given authority to speak within the discourse of “women in/and development”, and it enabled them to pursue the needs of African women. While it was true that those pursuits were perceived and paid for by the West, were they fulfilling Bullbeck’s Orientalist critique of just exoticising the Other, and had they reflected on Nzenia’s concern to simply acknowledge their positions of power? Either way, here lies the next dilemma.

**Dilemma 4:** Is it better to speak for rather than to ignore?
Although my particular research in Zimbabwe reported in my PhD and subsequent book (Lyons 1999b; 2004) was not conducted with the vast global funding and resources assumed by and within the Women in Development (WID) field of research in the 1990s (Sylvester 1995, p.956), these critics are solemn reminders of how feminist theory and research can easily shift into colonial gear despite their efforts to highlight resistance to colonial power relations. So how did I avoid being criticised as “colonial” in my research on women in Africa? I have to admit I was not altogether successful.

Up to the mid-1990s it was not uncommon for women’s lives and their histories to be diminished or even excluded from historical texts. My research found that Zimbabwean women’s voices and, therefore, their experiences had been excluded from mainstream history in Zimbabwe. When consulted (by other feminist researchers), their stories provided valuable insights into this country’s history (Barnes, 1992). The feminist researcher is, therefore, not only justified in this approach, but can provide an essential service in the collection of oral histories, and as in this particular case study, to centralize them in the discourse and or history of war (Staunton, 1990).

In my research I firstly considered women’s oral histories as central to these significant events (Bozzoli 1994). Of course, I was not the first feminist researcher to have this epiphany, and a number of feminist historians had documented women’s voices to reclaim their pasts. I was particularly influenced and inspired, and fortunately mentored by the late Canadian academic Susan Geiger who worked in this area (see Geiger 1992). In my particular research however, I found that the volumes of women’s herstories remained either unpublished or silenced by mainstream history as they gathered dust on archival shelves, deemed irrelevant to the wider political debate or academic discourse. However, even this strategy was not sufficient on its own when considering Jayati Lal’s (1996) ‘uneasy’ concerns about using the voices of the subject as ‘garnishes and condiments’ to the researchers’ main course (p. 205). Indeed, Sylvester (1995) has labelled this ‘garnish’ approach as a type of “feminist tourism” preoccupied with proving that we have been there and done that, ‘leaving us with baseball caps affixed with tourist decals – ‘I climbed Mt. Kilimanjaro with Tanzanian National Feminists’” (p. 945). Baseball caps don’t suit me anyway, so this wasn’t my path.

How many international relations theorists have stopped to consider if their utilisation of a particular case study supports a particular theoretical point which then relegates a whole gender to condiment status or the whole research as a type of voyeuristic tourism? I am convinced that no self-respecting feminist would want the “narrative” to be all about “themselves”, but to utilise their effort to expose the stories that need to be told.

Yet, in the 1990s there was almost too much self-reflexive caution and concern about researching “other” women. For my research, without the voices of women ex-combatants, the research would have been an unappetising aperitif with no main course on offer. Simply, there would have been no point.

**Dilemma 5:** Can any fieldwork or research (feminist or not) centre the subject’s voice to the exclusion of theory?

In using the voices of women to explain theory, we are not “capturing” the Other, ‘via new technologies of inscription: tapes, surveys, interviews, word processing,’ but
providing an opportunity for these women to, ‘shape [her] own self-representation’ (Lal 1996, p.204). That is, the researcher cannot begin to claim that she can control the participants’ responses. For example, interviewees may decide to misrepresent their socio-economic situation or embellish the truth of their stories in some way. Indeed, during my fieldwork interviews in Zimbabwe, some of the women recreated their own histories either by not mentioning, avoiding or denying some painful aspects of the war. In many cases the women did not stick to the prepared questions, but talked freely of their experiences. They were asked why they joined the struggle and to describe their experiences of war as women. The questions I asked the women ex-combatants were divided into three sections: 1) before the war; 2) during the war; 3) after the war. Initially, I had a list of twenty-seven questions. However, after three interviews with these questions, I realised that it was too lengthy. The women just did not have the time to sit down for the whole day to discuss them, and most were too busy to agree to second and third interviews. Hence, the questions were reduced to eleven. In most cases, one formal interview was conducted with each woman ex-combatant and informal contact was maintained with some of the women.

Remembering their experiences during the war was difficult for many women ex-combatants. Most women did not feel comfortable talking about the political situations that occurred during the war, either because it is still too politically sensitive to discuss or they were unsure of the facts, so the interviews related to personal experiences. These experiences, reflected the political and emancipatory strategies that concerned or involved women. The participants, ‘are often not just responding to our agendas and to our questions, but they are also engaged in actively shaping their presentations to suit their own agendas of how they wish to be represented’ (ibid.). Therefore, participant interviews or any other method of collecting women’s oral histories for any research focusing on women is central to feminist discourse and research, and it must be shaped by both the researcher and the researched. It must be collaborative. Any prior misrepresentations can be avoided by representing the voices of the women involved with consideration of the above dilemmas of feminist methodology. The thesis I undertook, therefore, evolved into an examination of the juxtaposition between Zimbabwean women ex-combatants’ voices – their oral histories, stories and representations of their experiences – and the prior representations of women as guerrilla fighters predominantly featured in the various discourses of Zimbabwe’s liberation war. These women’s voices captured in the researcher’s text signified that they were no longer Spivak’s “subaltern”, because the women had represented themselves and challenged their subordinated status in the discourse of/on war. There is no doubt that my fieldwork in Zimbabwe benefitted from some women speaking out about how their roles in the liberation war had been represented and misrepresented. Indeed, some women participants used this research to re-represent their situation and reinvint themselves as “heroines” of the liberation struggle, rather than succumb to the negative stereotypes of women guerrilla fighters that affected their demobilisation and post-independence compensation for their roles – compared to their male counterparts. Others simply took the opportunity to discuss their roles in the war with someone (another woman), perhaps for the first time since independence. These women were the heroines of their own stories, and I was privileged to be able to listen, transcribe, analyse and publish them.
To ensure my obligation to the collaboration, and to avoid any accusations of “feminist tourism” or “arrogance”, I ensured that copies of my final manuscript were deposited in the National Archives of Zimbabwe and the Women’s Resource Centre in Harare, for future Zimbabweans to be able to access. This was in a time before the World Wide Web, Google and online social media. I considered it important at the time to include the full text of the women’s interviews in appendices – not as “garnishes” – in order to preserve their voices to the full extent possible in a written form. For many it was their only opportunity to speak about their experiences. Therefore, I deposited the de-identified interview transcripts in the Zimbabwe National Archives and later they were included in an online open access database entitled Struggles for Freedom – South Africa (see JSTOR, nd). Nonetheless, trying one’s best to take into account all of the postcolonial considerations of identity and the politics of one’s own position does not automatically exempt one from the neo-imperial discourses. I began my own fieldwork with all of these considerations, concerns and questions in my mind.

The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) provided much assistance and enthusiasm for my project and introduced me to a small but vocal group of women ex-combatants. Each woman ex-combatant I interviewed was given a copy of the questions before the interview and a description of my research objectives and university affiliation. Each woman was also offered the choice of remaining anonymous and most preferred this. However, the women who were already in the public eye were named with their permission.

During my interviews with women ex-combatants in Harare I was sensitive to their possible stereotyping of me as privileged and powerful. I tried to show them that I was just a student, keen to connect with them without being perceived as colonial. After discussing my life experiences with them they felt more relaxed to tell me theirs, as they realised I was not a “powerful other”, and agreed this was an opportunity for collaboration. However, this led to another dilemma for me as a foreign student researching in Zimbabwe.

Dilemma 6: Should I have paid the women for their interviews?

Already uncomfortable about my perceived position of power as a white, western middle class woman in Africa, I felt pressured to meet most requests for financial compensation for conducting interviews with the women ex-combatants. For example, during a focus group interview with women ex-combatants held at the ZNLWVA offices in Belgravia, Harare, I was required to pay for their travelling and food expenses. Although I did not have additional funding from my university to pay for interviews and research assistants, and knowing that some other foreign researchers in Zimbabwe (mostly American and some British PhD Students) did not consider it ethical to pay for interviews, I nevertheless did so. These women had come out of their way to meet me and talk to me. I did, however, make a point of purchasing enough copies of the local oral history publication, Mothers of the Revolution (Staunton 1990), and gave each woman I interviewed a copy of this as well, which I hoped would contribute to the sharing of all of their stories.

When I began interviewing women ex-combatants in Harare, my initial aim was to get a
better understanding of what the liberation war meant to them, how they had fought differently to men, and how they represented themselves, especially in their roles as the Guerrilla Girls, a label that was ascribed to them during the struggle. What I found was that they had very different interests, and me making token payments for the interviews did not affect this outcome. Most of the women indicated that they were concerned with getting access to government compensation, funding, or rehabilitation schemes in recognition of their liberation war activities. They were rather less worried about how they had been represented in the mass media, novels, or by academics. As Nzenza (1995) has argued, it is clear, ‘that while the Western feminist is concerned with the oppression of African women, they are much more concerned with the urgent needs of day-to-day living’ (p. 102).

While my research was necessarily academic and required a certain demonstration of academic traditions, this did not preclude the creation of dialogue and an “empathetic cooperation” which accounted for the “politics of identity”. The outcome of my research was that it did make a contribution to the wider discussion about women and war in Africa, in particular to the debates concerning the position of women ex-combatants in Zimbabwe, who had been disadvantaged (or advantaged – for example Teurai Ropa3) economically, socially, and politically through their roles in the liberation war. Without the critical feminist tools discussed above and, therefore, without any sense of accountability to the subject, it might be necessary to just stay at home and not go anywhere. With these tools, it remains possible to confer and begin to resolve the dilemmas of feminist fieldwork in Africa.

The story of women’s experiences and history of the liberation war in Zimbabwe can never be just one story. There are thousands of stories to be told. The eighteen interviews I conducted with women ex-combatants sixteen years after the end of the war, are together only pieces of the historical puzzle. They do not make up the authoritative history of women’s experiences, nor do they have more or less authority than other collections of women’s oral histories in Zimbabwe (eg. Nhongo-Simbanegavi 1997; 2000). For many of these women, the memory of war was an individual and painful experience, and they did not want to make their histories political.

There was no ongoing collective identity of Guerrilla Girls, or subsequently a group called women ex-combatants. There was no women’s section within the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) or outside of it, although the term women ex-combatant existed in public discourse. Most women who had fought as Guerrilla Girls did not benefit from post-independence rehabilitation programs designed to integrate ex-combatants into society.

**Dilemma 7: In hindsight, would I have done any of it differently?**

Hindsight is a lovely thing, but at the time I did my best and I have no regrets. Over the years I have received a handful of letters or emails from Zimbabweans thanking me for my contribution to their women’s history. For example, one unsolicited email from a

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3 Teurai Ropa (guerrilla war name for Joice Mujuru, became the Minister for Women’s Affairs after independence, and went on to become the Vice-President of Zimbabwe (Lyons, 2003). She is now in 2016 the leader of opposition party Zimbabwe People First.
Zimbabwean living in exile declared the following –

To say I was impressed and intrigued by the depth and breadth of your thesis would be an understatement, as it touches parts of our history, a history which was not taught to us growing up in Zimbabwe, but was experienced by real people who remain(ed) silent for reasons you well-articulated. (name withheld)

This speaks for itself and does not require further critical feminist reflections to justify my role within the research. I can’t help but think that the next generation of women academics involved in African Studies, who are following me through the university sector in Australia and elsewhere, whether focusing on feminist concerns or not, are the embodiment of the successes of global feminism and will indeed make ongoing and valuable contributions to global social justice and peace, through their contributions to knowledge and understanding of African issues (see Balaton-Chrimes 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2013; 2014; Balaton-Chrimes & Haines 2015; Burke 2012, 2013; El-Gack 2016; Jakwa 2016; Meger 2010; 2011; 2014; 2015; Mertens 2016; Mertens and Pardee 2016; etc). These women researchers involved with Africa (both African and non-African) have the emancipatory potential to challenge the dominant colonial and postcolonial discourses that have determined historical texts. I am also confident that in the future they will resolve the dilemmas of the past and create a better understanding of and for the future.

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The Impact of Othering on African Immigrants’ Settlement in Australia

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Abstract
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Black Africans in Australia. It seeks to do this by shedding light on the experiences of African immigrants living in South East Queensland. The paper draws on data findings from a recent study in Queensland. It discusses the process of othering and highlights the relevance of visible markers of ethnic group membership to African immigrants’ settlement outcomes. By discussing the representation and othering of Africans in Australia, the paper indicates how othering practices can hold the potential to marginalise, isolate and exclude immigrants to Australia. Given the representation of Africans as visible “Others” and its consequences, the paper argues that what is required is a decisive ideological shift in thinking away from the colonialist frame that has traditionally informed perceptions of Africans to a postcolonial outlook that challenges racist assumptions and constructions of Africans.

Introduction
In Australia, African immigrants constitute a highly visible and rapidly growing immigrant group. As a relatively new and visible immigrant group, they are placed as culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) in the context of a predominantly white Australia (Hebbani and Colic-Peisker 2012). Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2008) consider immigrants’ visibility in terms of difference as a disadvantaging social fact. Here, “visibility” refers to characteristics such as ethnicity, race, language, or culture that distinguish immigrants from the dominant members of their host countries (Colic-Peisker 2009). These distinguishing factors can set social boundaries and can help maintain patterns of disadvantage in society (Healey 2014). Immigrants who are labelled and treated as ‘Others’ because of their visible racial and ethnic traits often experience marginalisation, isolation, decreased opportunities and exclusion (Johnson et al 2004).

Given the growing presence of Africans in Australia, this paper highlights the relevance of visible markers of ethnic group membership to African immigrants’ settlement outcomes. While their legal statuses may vary, their blackness and visibility in relation to the white “Australian” majority remains an important defining characteristic. Their blackness can single them out for discriminatory or differential treatment (Colic-Peisker 2009). For this reason, this paper examines the settlement experiences of African immigrants to Australia with a special focus on the impacts and implications of their representation and othering in Australia as visibly and culturally different immigrants.

1 The term white Australian is more satisfactory than oft-used concept of ‘Anglo’ Australians, because the category ‘Anglo’ and ‘Anglo-Celtic’ are not a dominant mode of self-categorisation by white Australians or by people who share the racial category ‘white’, at both a conscious or unconscious level. Additionally, it may not account for the many non-Anglos and Anglo-Celtics who can be defined as white persons on the grounds of sharing a common set of phenotypes (skin colour, hair texture, facial features) and trace their genealogical roots to Europe (Gallagher 2007).
The paper draws upon data findings from a study of African immigrants living in South East Queensland. The paper suggests that the othering of Africans is an important factor in the poor settlement outcomes of Africans in Australia. Social practices that construct the African racial and skin colour differences in terms of hierarchical otherness continue to limit opportunities for African immigrants.

Othering – What Is it?

Despite being a socially constructed concept, race has been the dominant means by which individuals and groups are labelled as “Others”. The idea of race reinforces the distinction between the “Self” and “Other” such that the conflicting relationship between these two figures is integral to identity formation and self-awareness. One process of cultural racism is Othering, the overemphasis on difference (Essed 1991). For Tait (2013, p.57), the term is about “deciding who’s in, who’s out.” It derives from hierarchical “us” and “them” thinking in which “them” is seen through negative stereotypes (MacNaughton, Davis and Smith 2009). Many people can be othered because of how they look (skin colour), speak (accent) or dress (cloth). Tait (2013) argues that othering is the main reason for racial inequality in society and can be seen in everyday power relations in schools, workplaces and in the street.

Several scholars have used the notion of othering to examine the experiences of visible immigrant groups with racism, marginalisation and exclusion in Australia (Henry-Waring 2008; Hatoss 2012; Ndhlovu 2013). Henry-Waring (2008) argues that there are meta-discourses of Otherness. These are highly pervasive sets of ideological constructions that shape attitudes, beliefs and actions prevalent in Australia and within which ideas about difference and diversity are created and refuse to be dismantled. It is within these discourses that whiteness is valorised as the norm. It is from the purview of whiteness that others are constructed, defined, scrutinised and controlled. The meta-discourses of Otherness act as hegemonic carriers of ideology and power and give primacy to Whiteness at the direct expense of those defined as the Other and conventionally configured as outsiders. The inclusion of certain immigrant groups in Australia comes at a cost because their difference is embedded in a context of Otherness (Ang 2001).

The discursive construction of ethnicity in Australia follows public discourses and a history of settlement that has othered and considered as ethnics certain visible immigrant groups other than White Europeans of Anglo-Celtic heritage who are considered as normative (Bryant and Pini 2010, p. 40). Despite the multiculturalism propagated by Australia, words like “difference”, “race” and “minority” still refer to visible immigrants labelled as culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD). As a result, despite their status as legal Australian citizens, persons who are visibly, culturally and linguistically diverse and living in Australia are positioned as different (Singh 1997) and constructed as others to the Australian ‘Self’ (Ang 2001).

African Racialisation in Australia

Some scholars have studied African racialisation in the Australian media. By ‘racialisation,’ I mean the cultural or political processes or situations wherein the idea of race is ideologically used as a means of explaining or understanding a group or an individual as different (Winant and Omi 1986; Windle 2008; Pierre 2010). For example, Udo-Ekpo (1999) contends that entry into the mainstream Australian labour market is a
significant problem for Black African immigrants to Australia as they experience daily racialisation and discrimination. As he articulates, there are five images of Africans constructed in the Australian media: Africans as unwanted migrants; victims; remarkable people; refugees; or fraudsters. Similarly, Windle (2008) found that Africans, especially Sudanese young people, are defined, characterised and racialised in Australian popular culture as a problem group and associated with violence. He suggests that patterns of reporting on African youth in Australia reveal how both the constraints under which the media operates and the wider sources of institutional racism contribute to new applications of racialising frames. For Anyanwu (2009), members of the African communities in Australia are hardly perceived as equal participants, but instead are treated with patronising sympathy. Ndhlovu (2013) makes the claim that the representation of people of African descent in Australia’s media, as a problematic and non-desired ‘Other,’ is ‘implicitly connected to discourses about Africa, the paradigms and politics through which the ideas of Africa and being “African” have been constructed and consumed, and sometimes condemned since European colonial imperialism’ (p.12). Hickey-Moody (2013), for one, believes that media moral panics, especially about Africans in Australia suggest that they are a social disadvantage; a threat to peaceful forms of social cohesion. According to Hickey-Moody (2013), media moral panics are employed by the government to engineer social unity through creating a common enemy who is characterised, racialised and positioned as either at risk or a threat to public order or a drain on the taxpayer’s dollar. Thus, it could be argued that the perceptions or images held about Black Africans to Australia in relation to Anglo-Australians, embodied in their skin colour, has significant substantial impact on their settlement outcomes. These negative perceptions or stereotypes can determine their position in Australian society.

Methodological Approach
The study was conducted in South East Queensland, Australia. Data was collected using questionnaires, participant observation and interviews. While this paper focuses on the interview accounts, the findings from the general data set that was gathered helped to inform the discussion and findings reported in this paper. Thirty participants were interviewed over a four-month period. The study participants consisted of ten African women and twenty African men between the ages of twenty-two and sixty-seven. It is important to state that these participants were selected purposefully. They were chosen because of their high levels of education and English proficiency, including substantial knowledge about the topic. The participants shared some similarities, notably their racialised “blackness”. The interviews lasted for sixty minutes, during which participants’ responses were probed while encouraging them to provide more details and clarification. The interviews were exploratory and stimulated the narration of experiences that would remain unexpressed within a questionnaire format. The textual data obtained after transcription were analysed using NVivo 11. The thematic approach adopted to analyse and interpret the interview data was useful for finding and identifying common thematic elements across the participants’ interviews. Participants’ accounts suggest that certain othering practices in the dominant system marginalised and excluded them. As black immigrants, they were often placed in the ‘Other’ category and constructed as different.

Research Findings
In the accounts of participants analysed, there is a suggestion that their difference is often overemphasised. If there is one experience many participants in this study can tell you about, it is the experience of being constantly racialised and constructed as the ‘Other’ to the Australian ‘Self.’ Many participants reported situations wherein people singled them out due to the difference attributed to their skin colour. They felt that they were reduced to their skin colour in everyday settings and interactions, which undermined their immigration status as legal Australian citizens. For example, according to Sandra –

If you are a citizen, the colour of your skin shouldn’t matter. But here, when they see me they will ask, where are you from? If I say, “I am from Brisbane”, there is a laugh that will come. After that, they will ask, “what part of Africa are you from.”

While this question may arise out of curiosity and may not have any racist undertones, it is a question about difference, one that is directed at them because of their skin colour. Another example comes from Bruno –

When they see the skin, they identify you as an outsider…I don’t think when a white person meets a white person they ask him, “where do you come from?”

Another participant, Josh, argued that –

It is more pegged on the blacks. Even some people never agree you are Australian, because for them being an Australian you have to be white. They forget that there are so many people becoming Australian by the constitution, some born in Australia and some who acquire citizenship through application after living here for some years.

In fact, many participants felt that the implicit message communicated to them with the question, “where are you from”, is that they are not Australians and do not belong in the imagined Australia. Instead, they are positioned as “Other”, “foreigners” or “outsiders.” Indeed, their positioning as outsiders in relation to Anglo-Australians, embodied in their accent or skin colour, determines their position in the power economy of communicative exchanges (Hebbani and Colic-Peisker 2012). The relevance of visibility for settlement, as Colic-Peisker (2009, p. 176) has argued, is that it marks out immigrants for differential, and often discriminatory treatment in their host countries. Discrimination based upon visible difference is the most important barrier to settlement, assimilation and integration of African immigrants (Hebbani and McNamara 2010). For example, Harry, another participant in this study, argued that his visibility in terms of racial, linguistic and cultural differences affected his settlement and integration processes. According to Harry, Africans in Australia have minimal chances of success because ‘a black person is always seen as low class.’ For this reason, he suggested that, “you will not get anything in this country, particularly, if you are a black African.” Always being ‘picked on’ by his supervisors at work frustrated him. Harry used this phrase more than once in the interview to talk about his personal experiences of racialisation at the workplace as well as his children’s experiences at school. In relation to his children’s experiences, Harry said –

Our kids are being picked on every time at schools. Kids are kids. If a kid is different, he or she is being teased out by the other students. The day she is teased
at school, she will come back home crying to get comfort from the parents. It is worst with the kids, because they don’t know the rules. If kids are picked on, the parents feel it.

This phrase, picked on, may have many associations. In Harry’s comments, it sounds like he felt that they were bullied, intimidated and treated in negative ways. Some other participants felt the same way. For example, Katy felt that she was always picked on by her supervisor. In her words –

When I was working in the nursing home, the nurse in charge was really trying to put me down and treat me differently. I tried to make her understand. Of course, I had a language problem, but I was doing well in my work. But all the time, she tries to blame me whenever there is a mistake.

Also, Dianna, a young university student and one of the young female participants in this study, commented that “people still based their judgment” on black skin colour. She argued that negative stereotypes against blacks restrict a lot of opportunities. The stereotypes associated with blackness can, of course, impact on African immigrants’ settlement outcomes by creating barriers to success and access to opportunities and resources. These stereotypes are largely circulated through the mainstream media and institutions. They permeate books, news, tabloids, TV shows, movies, music, scholarly publications, laws and other media and create a virtual reality – a set of archetypes or well-told stories – that rings true in light of the hearer’s stock of pre-existing stories (Delgado 2000; Henry and Tator 2002; van Dijk 1993). The impact of the media on people’s knowledge and awareness cannot be underestimated. In many cases, it is precisely the media who formulate the public position regarding this or that ethnic group. For example, as Barbara explained that her people are “labelled as a bunch of gangs, drunkards, good for nothing…”

These stereotypes amount to a continuation of colonial ideologies of the African ‘Other’ (Mahadeo and McKinney 2007). Such negative representations of Africans in Australia do have an impact on their settlement outcomes. Unfair media representations have material effects on how Africans are understood in Australian society. They negatively impact on their social acceptance and participation in Australia (Ndhlovu 2013, p.12). These stereotypes can also affect their level of participation, engagement and motivation. The account of Bruno, a former Rwandan refugee, can help to illustrate this.

Bruno immigrated to Australia in 2003 from Zambia as a refugee. He lost his morale to engage in work, leisure activities and participate in the society, because of the stereotypes and discrimination he experienced. According to Bruno –

My morale was very high when I arrived here because of warm welcoming by a case worker from a settlement organisation. They visited me every week, took me out and taught me the way of life in a new country. They took me to classes for enrolment and to Centrelink. I got money from the government which was not the case in Africa, for the government to give you an allowance that you are studying and integrating into a new country. They took my children for vaccination. I was amazed by this kind of government support. But it has decreased with time. When you see some of these stereotypes…psychologically, you become very weak. You lose interest to participate in your activity. You just withdraw from
what you are doing because you are not going anywhere, and you feel powerless
to do anything about it.

There are two points I want to highlight from this data extract above. Firstly, Bruno
talked about his positive experiences of coming to Australia, the support provided by
government agencies such as settlement organisations like Centrelink. However, he
indicated that this support is not long term. Moreover, he suggested that he felt
psychologically weakened by the stereotypical projections in his day-to-day interactions.
This made him lose interest in life such that he did not want to participate in activities,
leave the house, and go anywhere. He felt he was powerless to challenge these negative
racialised projections. Bruno’s account shows not only the change in morale from high to
low among some African immigrants in their settlement journey in Australia, but also
illuminates the significance of black visibility and the severity of the African immigrant
experience of Othering. It captures the pain of being a victim of negative Othering. In
fact, from the accounts and comments made by many participants, it can be inferred that
being at the end of a stereotype-driven judgement can affect the lives and settlement
outcomes of African immigrants. For example, Madison (2012) has argued that –

For many marginalized identities and people of colour, they are known in a
particular world through caricature and stereotypes. A major problem is that the
stereotypical projection of one’s identity by otherworldly constructions of who
one is diminishes the complexity and humanity of one’s individuality, as well as one’s ethnicity or affiliated group. (p. 119)

Thus, it could be suggested that the stereotypical projections of African immigrants on
the grounds of their skin colour have the potential not only to diminish the complexity and humanity of their individuality and their ethnicity, but to cast African immigrants on the fringes of society and away from society altogether. In short, othering practices constitute a major mechanism that contributes to social exclusion and marginalisation by racialising some people as the unremarkable default and others as different, undersirable and lesser (MacNaughton, Davis and Smith 2009, p. 37).

Discussion and Conclusion
Australia’s story is one of the diversity of peoples. The African immigrants living in
Australia, although a very diverse group, add an important chapter to Australia’s immigration history. Their migration and settlement in Australia cannot be conceptualised without an understanding of their experiences of being Othered. This paper has drawn upon the accounts of participants to show that the Othering of immigrants from African nations in Australia can have important implications and challenges for their successful settlement. While the accounts of participants in this study are consistent with the findings of earlier studies on African immigrants to Australia, generalisations to a wider African immigrant population cannot be easily made. Although the sample size is adequate for the type of analysis undertaken in this paper, conclusions about the experiences of the participants in this paper cannot automatically be assumed to be relevant to all African immigrants to Australia. Any generalisations should be made with caution.

Indeed, the participants’ accounts shed light on the experiences of African immigrants and contribute to the literature on Africans in Australia. The participants’ stories indicate
that experiences of being Othered entail social disadvantage, marginalisation and exclusion. The participants’ experiences also reveal something about everyday racist practices in the society. These racist practices happen at everyday level when negative assumptions are made about dark-skinned African immigrants in workplaces and society (Essed 1999; Ndhlovu 2013). These racist practices happen at the structural or institutional level when politicians, teachers or persons in positions of authority make discriminatory statements in the course of their normal everyday duties and when the media profile African youths (Windle 2008). Despite the end of White Australia and the introduction of anti-discriminatory immigration legislations, the fear discourses of the black ‘Other’ remain and are circulated in mainstream media, newspapers, and political speeches. The everydayness of these discourses, including their resultant experiences in the lives of Africans, has a tremendous impact on their settlement in Australia. The everydayness of these discourses reinforces unequal relations in Australian society, which impedes Africans’ full participation and upward social mobility.

The Othering of African immigrants to Australia can also lead to stress, depression, frustration, isolation and disappointment (Johnson et al 2004). It can impact on how they see themselves. When subjected to negative Othering in an ongoing fashion, it affects the Othered who come to accept their marginalised position, avoid integration and participation, and lose self-esteem, confidence and morale. Indeed, those who have experienced discrimination and those who feel unwelcome are less likely to engage and seek appropriate help. Hence, when Black African immigrants in Australia are constructed differently, misjudged or positioned as the Other, their futures, wellbeing, jobs, careers and incomes, including opportunities for social mobility are at stake.

The skin colour that makes African immigrants distinct carries implications for their status and advancement in Australia. As the accounts of participants presented in this paper indicate, the social construction of black skin colour and black identity continue to impact and present significant limitations to their advancement in different ways. The black skin colour can be a significant factor leading to Othering. The black skin colour has historically enabled the categorisation of Africans. As part of the ideological rationale for slavery, blackness was associated with mental inferiority and defined as barbaric, savage, ugly and evil while whiteness was associated with superiority and defined as civilized, virtuous, and beautiful (Keith 2009). Racially, Africans are considered as “Blacks.” This blackness is a problematic marker for many Africans in most white-dominated cultural systems and contexts because of the predetermined racial scripts attached to blackness (Mapedzahama et al. 2011). Therefore, due to the racial imaginary that valorises whiteness, Black African immigrants in Australia are more likely to be positioned as different, stereotyped, underestimated and marginalised. Orelus (2012) suggests that, irrespective of their social class and achievements, many individuals base their judgement on skin colour when they place an African in the “violent”, “lazy”, “savage” and “stupid” box. Unlike white immigrant groups, who are largely invisible nowadays and perceived as part of mainstream dominant group (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2007), African immigrants’ dark skin colour singles them out for labelling as “Others”. African immigrants are more likely to be Othered and aligned with the racist negative stereotypical assumptions and symbolic values associated with dark skin. According to Lewin (2005), “the racist framework of the history of colonisation in Australia clearly indicates that being “black” or “coloured” constitutes a disadvantage in
society’ (p. 638). As the black “Other” to the Australian white “Self”, African immigrants are more likely to be excluded from full participation and membership in the Australian environment.

The symbolic value of African immigrants’ skin colour can be seen in settings where not being white is despised and equated with a lower social status. It can also be seen in settings where racial hierarchy and related racism and discrimination are maintained and reproduced by overemphasising skin colour differences. Therefore, the historical importance of blackness to African immigrants’ social, economic and personal well-being highlights the need to recognise African immigrants’ blackness as a source of disadvantage. According to Mapedzahama et al (2011), black skin colour not only stigmatises Africans, but it also places them at the bottom of the rank in a predetermined racial hierarchy and subjects them to informal white surveillance. Thus, given the representation of Africans as visible “Others” and its consequences, the findings of this paper necessitate a decisive ideological shift away from the colonialist frame that has traditionally informed perceptions of Africans to a postcolonial outlook that not only challenges the racist assumptions and constructions of African difference, but perpetuate the marginalisation and exclusion of the African subject. What is likely to improve the representation of Black African immigrants to Australia over time is positive media coverage and representation of Africans in Australia; good politicians; educators who can help prevent the objectification of African people in Australia, and; further development of multicultural principles in Australia. As Forrest and Dunn (in Hebbani and Colic-Peisker 2012) suggested, multiculturalism has already created a discourse where Anglo privilege has diminished and where there is an opening within the dominant imaginary in which non-Anglo Australians like Black Africans can be included.

REFERENCES


South Sudanese youth acculturation and intergenerational challenges

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Abstract
Although several studies have been carried out about refugee resettlement or settlement challenges, little has been done either academically or practically to understand their parenting experiences and challenges after settling in Australia. This paper explores the impact of South Sudanese youth experiences of the settlement challenges resulting from acculturation and intergenerational conflicts. It explores their perspectives on the difficulties they encounter while adjusting to their new environment and parents' expectations on them to hold onto their original cultures. Youth also attribute their challenges to a lack of appropriate support services, including the absence of strong local community leadership. The combination of these challenges results in many young people becoming more susceptible to mental health issues, antisocial behaviour and difficulties in acculturating as they struggle to balance their cultures of origin and the new environment. This paper was informed by a PhD study, which involved in-depth interactive engagement with sixty South Sudanese participants (parents and youth) through individual interviews and focus group meetings, mainly on their transition, parenting practices and experiences since settling in Australia.

Introduction
South Sudanese have suffered traumatic experiences resulting from forced migration and young people, in particular, seem to have been more susceptible to these harrowing experiences than were adults who might have developed some coping strategies or resilience. According to Kohli and Mather (2003), young people's vulnerability arises through coming face-to-face with traumatic events, particularly for those who become refugees; the effects of war or natural disasters are punishing them in various ways. Upon arriving in their new country, those experiences are often aggravated by difficulties adjusting to their new setting as they try to balance between the new and original cultures (Milner & Khawaja, 2010; Schweitzer, Melville, Steel, & Lacherez, 2006). Earnest (2007) stipulated that refugee children's native culture influences various aspects of their psychosocial well-being, and a cultural explanation may be quite disparate to Western understanding. Adolescent refugees are subject to the effects of their migration experiences, and this includes their new environment's demands as they struggle to forge a new identity and dual cultural membership (Earnest, Housen, & Gillieatt, 2007). However, research on resilience has also indicated that not all adolescent refugees who experienced traumatic events become traumatised, this is mainly because some have developed resilience out of these experiences (Grossman, 2014; Kohli & Mather, 2003). In addition to the acculturation and intergenerational challenges, young South Sudanese and other young Africans are being portrayed negatively by the media in their new environment, and these have added extra pressures on them. For instance, South
Sudanese youth challenges and antisocial behaviours are widely reported and often linked to a media-unified name “Apex Gang.” The name “Apex” surfaced strongly after the youth riots at Melbourne Moomba Festival over the long weekend in March 2016 (NEMBC, 2016). Those "riots" were grossly exaggerated by the media, politicians and anti-migrant lobbyists who claimed they were "out of control." According to the Ethnic Broadcaster (2016: 2), the word “Apex Gang” has become a generic terminology used by journalists, commentators and even politicians to link series of criminal acts involving burglary, assaults, carjacking and home invasion into a particular narrative, often with little evidence, and in some cases clear contradictory evidence that incidents are related to each other or to the Apex Gang at all. So, why is this happening? This paper only presents young South Sudanese who spoke in the larger study, which involved many parents as well. It provides them with a platform to discuss how they have been, and still are, adjusting and negotiating acculturation and intergenerational changes.

Acculturation and intergenerational conflict
Acculturation is defined as a process whereby individuals or groups from different cultures engage in and experience alterations to their original culture as well as behavioural and psychological changes that occur when different cultures meet, affecting individual behaviour, ethnic identity, attitudes and values, and which often cause stress arising from adjustment to a new environment (Bemak, Chung, & Pedersen 2003; Berry 1997; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder 2006; Deng & Marlowe 2013). It also relates to health and other factors that may be affected by the degree to which people subscribe to and keep their own cultural beliefs, attitudes, and values. Acculturation is the process whereby the characters and attitudes of people from one culture are modified due to the presence or impact of another culture. It is seen as a continuum ranging from exclusive involvement in a person’s original culture and beliefs to exclusive involvement in the dominant or host culture (Berry, 2003). Such changes sometimes result in acculturative stresses as individuals try to understand the characteristics of the new culture, or try to give up their original culture partially or entirely (Berry, 1997; Berry et al., 2006; Poppitt & Frey, 2007). Affected individuals may require comprehensive coping strategies and/or support to mitigate stress, which can include awareness or psycho-education about the impact of stress, particularly on families and youth in the new environment (Poppitt & Frey, 2007).

Berry et al’s (2006) work examined how immigrant youth adapts and acculturates, with results similar to the above categories of acculturation. It identified four distinct acculturation profiles: integration (oriented towards both original heritage and new national culture); ethnic (oriented toward original culture only); national (oriented toward new national culture only), and; diffuse (orientation is ambivalent or marginalised). These categories were evaluated against psychological and socio-cultural adaptation and Berry suggested that migrants who adopt an integration strategy have the best psychological and socio-cultural outcomes. Those with diffuse profiles have the worst outcomes while those with ethnic and national profiles fall in between. Their research stressed the significance of encouraging youth to maintain a sense of their heritage and cultural identity, while establishing close ties with the wider society.

Furthermore, Poppit and Frey (2007) studied South Sudanese adolescents in Brisbane, Australia, and confirmed that health and behaviours of immigrants are often affected by
acculturation. Acculturative pressures within a family arise when young immigrants go to school as they experience more rapid acculturation than their parents, mainly to carry out their daily classroom activities and from other social interactions with their peers (Deng & Marlowe, 2013; Poppitt & Frey, 2007). During these acculturation processes, most young people are faced with conflicting beliefs and attitudes that generate disparities between their original and new cultures, putting them at odds with their parents. Research has indicated that many refugee families are not properly supported or prepared to deal with their new daily challenges, which many host cultures are familiar with and sufficiently well-resourced to overcome (Deng & Marlowe 2013; Dunlavy 2010; Renzaho, McCabe, & Sainsbury 2011). This indicates that successful resettlement must include proper support to be able to adapt to unfamiliar systems, customs and becoming active participants in the social, economic and cultural affairs of the new environment (Deng & Marlowe, 2013; Tribe, 1999).

In addition, changes within the family and differences in language skills can create substantial intergenerational gaps as children acquire the new language and knowledge about their environment more quickly than their parents (Khawaja & Milner, 2012). The stalemate created when children start embracing some of the values of the dominant culture that contrast with their parents’ beliefs can lead to tension and conflict. The children may find themselves caught in the middle as they attempt to accommodate both their parents and the new culture (Deng & Pienaar, 2011; Khawaja & Milner, 2012). This can generate a profound identity crisis because of uncertainties about conflicting perspectives, loyalties and expectations (Deng & Marlowe, 2013; Khawaja & Milner, 2012). These arguments may be about freedom, household chores, selection of appropriate friends and homework (Deng, 2016; McMichael, Gifford, & Correa-Velez, 2011; Milner & Khawaja, 2010). The difficulties stemming from these tensions normally highlight the fracture and breakdown of the family as an entity. This underscores the need to understand the impact of the challenges faced by new settler families.

**Methodological Framework**

A qualitative study involved interpersonal and interactive engagement with South Sudanese through individual interviews and focus group meetings. Given the complexities of refugee experiences in various settings and contexts, it was imperative to use a variety of techniques to explore and understand post-migration challenges for South Sudanese in Australia. The debate on how best to approach refugee studies has been ongoing (Bakewell, 2011; McMichael, Nunn, Gifford, & Correa-Velez, 2015; Riggs et al., 2015; Schweitzer & Steel, 2008). As Bakewell pointed out, there is a consensus that refugee studies should be multidisciplinary, but there is less agreement on how different disciplines can be combined to redefine problems outside existing methodologies. This study employed an interdisciplinary approach that integrates perspectives from sociology, psychology, refugee and migration studies, and family studies. It combines narrative and constructivist approaches, which are strongly interlinked and so help to understand and construct the complex experiences of South Sudanese-Australians. Narrative methodology has been employed by many researchers in exploring individuals, groups and cultures as a primary method for making sense of people's experiences (Clandinin & Connelly 2000; Polkinghorne 2007; Riessman 2008). Narrative research, according to Lieblich et al (1998) refers to any study that generates or analyses narrative materials. People are often storytellers by nature, and the stories
they narrate provide coherence and continuity to their experiences, and also play a central role in communication with one another (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, & Zilber 1998; Polkinghorne 2007). This approach enables the development of a nuanced understanding of experiences of being parented in South Sudan and how that differs to their parenting practices in Australia.

In understanding South Sudanese experiences, I linked this perspective to a constructivist approach, which stresses that meanings are constructed through the experiences and understandings of individual participants. The constructivist perspective, which draws from symbolic interactionism, was first developed by Blumer (1969) and has become a prominent interpretive stance that examines society and individual actions and behaviours. As part of social psychology, this framework grew from the desire to understand the social and cultural influences that play a vital role in human behaviour (Blumer 1969; Crotty 1998). As Eastmond (2007) emphasised, using constructivism in conjunction with narrative methodology ensures that culture is central to lived experiences, not only in the making of a meaningful story by a particular subject, but also in ways that others understand and retell that story. The aim was to understand South Sudanese stories or interpretations of realities that derive from their social interaction with their new environment and interpersonal relationships, and then analyse and interpret these stories to build from their concepts and theories about cultural transitions in parenting. As a qualitative method, the constructivist approach is the reverse of traditional social research, which begins with a hypothesis and then seeks to confirm, deny or modify the initial hypothesis (Glaser & Strauss 1967). By contrast, constructivist methodology, and particularly the grounded theory technique, begins with the collection of data which is used to generate thematic or other codes that are then grouped into concepts to make them more practical or workable: for instance, from concepts where categories are found, into forming and creating a theory (Bryant & Charmaz 2007). This technique helps to identify patterns within the data through grouping segments of participants’ texts into themes, using four stages of analysis (codes, concepts, categories and theory). Codes help identify anchors of reference and meaning and allow the main points to be gathered. Concepts are collections of similar codes that help make sense of higher-order insights and meanings through data interpretation, while categories are a broad group of similar concepts used to generate hypotheses, leading to theory generated from the collection and explanations in the previous stages (Braun and Clarke 2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967).

Participants and Analysis
Participants in this study were recruited from the South Sudanese community in Victoria, Australia. The study involved semi-structured interviews with 20 participants (parents and young adults) aged from 18 to 50. Individual interviews were held with parents and young adults with roughly equal gender representation. The focus groups involved four separate meetings: one each with women and men; a third had a mixed group of men and women (27 parents), and; the fourth meeting was with young people (7 participants). The interviews and meetings were conducted at times and places convenient to the participants. Each individual interview took approximately one hour while focus groups were between 1.5-2.5 hours. All interviews and meetings were audio-recorded with the participants’ consents in accordance with the National Human Research Ethics Standards relating to participant recruitment and research procedures. Ethics approval was also
The data were translated, transcribed and then analysed using thematic analysis. The analytical process started with translating and transcribing the interviews and focus group meetings. Although some interviews and focus meetings were conducted in English, most were in Dinka and Sudanese Arabic, especially with parents who do not speak English. Even though the researcher's ability to speak these three languages was advantageous in translating interviews and recordings of the focus group meetings, the process was lengthy and excruciating. It normally took many hours simply to translate and transcribe one interview or focus group, as it was crucial to record the participants’ comments as accurately as possible. As the initial transcription and analysis of data are essential in narrative and grounded approach, after each interview and focus group, the researcher listened to the audio-recordings, transcribed the discussion, went through the notes taken during each interview and focus group, and noted emergent themes. If interviews were conducted in Dinka or Sudanese Arabic, data were usually translated and transcribed into English line by line. This data formed the first step of the initial coding. After completing line by line coding, the initial codes were collated and compared in line with the comparative analysis process. As Bazeley and Jackson (2013) stated, early work with text and concepts is about laying the foundation for identification of key themes in the data. These initial coding processes were conducted occurrence by occurrence, given the large amount of data, and this helped in the process of initial conceptualisation of ideas.

Although the quality of this process is enhanced by memo writing from early codes as well as by informed discussions of significant and frequent themes, which highlight areas for further investigation, the researcher also constantly challenged his first ideas by drawing comparisons through sampling various cases (Bazeley & Jackson 2013). As Riessman (1993) described, researchers ought to start by getting the whole interview’s words and selected non-verbal features such as crying, laughter and long pauses correctly noted on paper. This allows the portions of the transcription to be selected for analysis to emerge or to change as a result of the researchers' close attention to the entire transcript, which exemplifies the nature of narrative interviews as dialogues (Riessman, 1993). As this process first involves initial hand coding of the transcripts, it also requires further revision and clarifications for accuracy. The final transcripts were coded manually by categorising common themes. These common themes or categories were elevated into concepts to build a framework to generate grounded theory. Although these subsequent analytic processes were presented in a linear manner, it is important to note that the process was, in fact, concurrent with engaging the South Sudanese, data collection and analysis. This approach allowed the researcher to constantly revisit each step of the data collection and analysis. It also helps in identify patterns within the data and thus assists the analysis by grouping segments of the participants’ texts into themes (Boyatzis, 1998). Grounded theory is primarily about developing hypotheses grounded in the data, where it is important to constantly compare the hypotheses formed with the original data, in order to support or refute the theory derived. This process is significant in developing a broader concept by grouping most of the codes into categories under the larger concepts. The process augmented the abstract interpretive understanding of relationships grounded within the data (Charmaz, 2006). Thus, the techniques of grounded theory led to a major concept, which was fundamental in understanding South Sudanese parenting practices.
and transitional experiences within their families and community.

Results: Youth identity and experiences of their new environment

South Sudanese youth shared their perspectives ranging from parenting and being parented in Australia as well as identity issues, experiences and perspectives of growing up in different cultures. Most grew up in war-torn Sudan and in transit countries of refuge (sometimes also in conflict), and they spoke of having witnessed bombardments, violent death and other forms of atrocities through their refugee journeys.

What I saw is different; I was born in the war, and life was difficult in South Sudan because people used to run for safety most of the time; those who managed to study were very few. The civil war has impacted greatly on young generations, particularly those who were born in the wartime. Some of us have seen people killed and many other bad things in our presence. These are still in our memories despite the fact that some of us are now grown-up adults (Youth Focus Group - 3, male).

As with many other groups, culture and identity form an important part of South Sudanese upbringing; it commonly constitutes intergenerational connections and cultural transmission (Yenika-Agbaw & Mhando, 2014). Young participants in this study identified themselves as either South Sudanese or South Sudanese-Australian, and all identified with an integrative profile as they believed they are integrating their traditional and new cultures. They believe they are South Sudanese in origin but also Australian by citizenship, and that they are adapting to their new Australian culture alongside that of their origin. All the youth participants were either born in Sudan or in the transit countries of refuge before coming to Australia with their parents, relatives or caregivers. They were aged between 18 and 24 years and have been in Australia for over eight years, which means that most would have come to Australia between the ages of 9 and 11. These young people were asked to discuss the differences they see between South Sudanese and Australian traditions and cultures. Most identified many observed differences, especially around cultural values such as respect and freedom. Some have mixed feelings when it comes to their experiences of the new freedoms. Some still identify strongly with South Sudanese culture as they continue to engage in the activities of that community, but others reported losing their culture and native tongues altogether.

I identified myself more with South Sudanese culture. I still do things according to my culture because I don’t want to forget it (Youth Focus Group - 5, Female).

To be honest, I think mine is half: mostly I still follow my cultural values, but I have forgotten my language, which is the only problem I have (Youth Focus Group - 4, Female).

Identity is an important part of South Sudanese culture. For them, it is what identifies an individual and their origin. According to F. Deng (1995), identity is the way others define individuals based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, culture and other determining factors. Identity is a concept that gives a deeply-rooted psychological and social meaning to the individual in the context of group dynamics. South Sudanese identities are affected by their forced migration as well as by their changes and challenges in the new environment as they struggle to balance between their new and traditional cultures (Attias-Donfut 2012; Marlowe, Harris, & Lyons 2014).
Youth perspectives on differing cultures

South Sudanese youth were asked to discuss how they navigate between differing cultures, what stresses arise from this and what their strategies are for coping. Although some spoke of doing what their parents, as their guardians tell them to do, others acknowledged the challenges of growing up caught between differing cultures in which conflicting values often sparked tensions and struggles between them and their parents. Some believe they need to uphold their home traditions as it is important for them to pass them onto their children and subsequent generations. One participant explained the comparative differences he observed in Australia.

Our African culture is always about togetherness and support for one another. For instance, when you wake up, the first thing you do in the morning is to check how your relatives, friends or neighbours are doing or even visit them. People eat together and stay together in bad and good times. When practicing these parts of our culture here, some people who started to know about such cultural values always give us some positive feedback. For instance, someone told me that if we supported one another like this in Australia, then we would avoid all of these problems due to isolation, which is causing a lot of problems within the wider Australian community (Youth Focus Group - 3, Male).

These comments underscore the significance of cultural exchange and the benefits to be gained from comparing and discussing diverse cultural values. Meanwhile, this participant listed some other challenges facing South Sudanese youth as they transition from adolescence into adulthood in an Australian environment.

Turning 18 years is a tough age for many young Sudanese. For example, we have different cultures between South Sudanese and Australian. Most Sudanese boys, when they turn 18, try to move out of home; they can even fight with their mums, particularly when their mums ask them to do certain things. According to Sudanese (culture), even when you reach 18 or 24 years old, you still live with your parents until you get married and do the right things, but here, the culture has changed and that is affecting young Sudanese and the community (Youth – Participant 13, Male).

Although South Sudanese youth are trying to adjust to their new environment and culture, they are also expected by their parents to follow their traditions and customs. As discussed earlier, acculturation is a leading source of stress for new settlers as they struggle to adjust to their new country (Berry 1997). This is because children are learning their new culture at schools, and through interaction with the Australian culture elsewhere, but when they return home, their parents expect them to observe their original cultural values. This situation becomes contentious when parents continue to embrace their ancestral cultures, with a strong emphasis on not allowing their children to depart from their original culture and identity (Deng & Marlowe 2013; Fisher 2007). This is what creates intergenerational conflict and like many other immigrant adolescents, South Sudanese struggle to negotiate a workable synthesis between their original and new cultures in their new environment (Deng & Marlowe 2013; Deng & Pienaar 2011).

Parental expectations and control versus youth’s independence

Youth were asked to share their perspectives on parenting and being parented in Australia. South Sudanese youth participants gave examples of parental control as...
clashing with their independence, and the differences between the Australian and South Sudanese approach based on their different cultural understandings.

The rules are different here compared to South Sudan. Here, young people are allowed by law to do whatever they like while in South Sudan, young people are not (Youth Focus Group - 5, Female).

The issue of parental control versus youth autonomy often leads to struggles in many new settler families. As Mansouri et al (2015) stated, these intergenerational tensions arise from competing understandings about the rights and responsibilities of young people and the level of autonomy and freedom they should be entitled to. However, some young participants also emphasised the significance of parental guidance since greater freedom can be a distraction for some.

South Sudanese are stricter in their parenting styles. Children must follow what they say; if not, you get disciplined. But in Australia, there are some kinds of freedom for the kids… There are laws that can take parents to court and accuse them of child abuse. It is actually a problem because you are growing up, and you don’t know what is right and wrong… Parents are already grown, and they have been through things, so they know what is bad and good for you. Therefore, having too much freedom is bad for some young people (Youth - Participant 12, Male).

Even though many South Sudanese parents believed that being strict is a necessary part of their children's upbringing, strictness does not work in controlling their children as they are already aware of their rights and freedoms in their new environment. This has posed a great challenge to parental authority. This study has revealed parents’ expectations on their children to hold onto aspects of the original culture, but these expectations and the influence of acculturative stress are linked to adaptation changes, which create intergenerational gaps and conflicts. At the same time, children's faster integration or assimilation into their new culture and environment are of major concern to many South Sudanese parents, while the children see their parents’ expectations as over-controlling and an infringement of their rights and independence. Such a division continues to widen the gaps between them.

My parents expected me to hold onto our traditional culture and language as well as integrating into the Australian culture (Youth - Participant 4, Female).

Parental expectations on youth to hold onto the original cultural values are welcomed by some youth.

My parents expected me not to smoke or drink. It’s all about making sure that I grow up in a good way and be a good person (Youth - Participant 13, Male).

Nevertheless, these expectations create an impasse for some when choosing between their parents’ demands and conforming to peer pressures; for instance, to smoke and drink as their friends do and making the right choices can be difficult. Young men and women are encouraged to learn and socialise with their older siblings and relatives. As part of learning about their culture, young South Sudanese are required to spend time with their uncles/aunts and other male/female role models in the community to help them
learn about manhood and womanhood.

My parent expected me to know my people and about how they live and how they get through things; this is what they want me to hold onto… That is why I came to my uncle's house to learn more about my culture (Youth - Participant 14, Male).

Parents not only expect them to learn from their uncles and aunts here in Australia, but they encourage them to go to South Sudan as part of learning and preserving their culture.

They (parents) always tell us to follow our South Sudanese cultures you know - they always tell us to go back home and see how things are done at home, and they always tell us to keep South Sudanese cultural values, not to lose faith in what our culture is and do not fall off the track (Youth - Participant 15, Male).

South Sudanese parents have high expectations on their children to preserve their cultural values and their native languages. Some youth agreed with their parents about the need to uphold these values as part of their identity. While trying to make sense of these differing cultural differences, racism toward South Sudanese (young and old) has a large negative impact on them. Both parents and youth spoke of often feeling unsafe because of their racial visibility and refugee status. Like previous studies, this study has documented youth’s poor relationships with the Australian police and their lack of trust and confidence in responsiveness and understanding from the police, even when they feel their safety is threatened (Grossman & Sharples 2010; Losoncz 2011). However, South Sudanese youth do not attribute all their difficulties on racism and police, since they too can contribute to improve their situation, and advised their peers to stay out of trouble and either go to school or work.

Discussion

South Sudanese youth narrated many challenges ranging from parents’ continuation to hold onto their strict South Sudanese parenting practices to finding themselves being racially picked on by the media and police. South Sudanese youth are trying to adjust their culture of origin to their new environment. They may choose their new Australian culture over that of their origin, but such changes create tension within families, particularly when parents do not wish them to leave their original culture. The acculturative stress, which refers to a unique stress involving adjustment to a new environment, requires coping strategies to cope with the associated emotional and physiological reactions (Bemak et al, 2003; Poppitt & Frey 2007). The acculturative stress South Sudanese youth face involves acculturation-specific factors, such as ethnic identity, dissonant cultural values and second-language competencies (Poppitt & Frey 2007). A significant source of acculturation stress is the parental involvement and control which some young people see as a contravention of their rights, based on their understanding of their new environment. Their cultural identity is sometimes associated with their level of self-esteem, which plays the role of a mediator in the two-culture concept. The same applies to their social group identity, which involves the feeling of belonging to both native and ethnic cultures. The unilinear model of acculturation implies that an individual loses connection with his or her original culture as he or she adapts and integrates into the second culture as part of his or her daily activities (Miller...
& Kerlow-Myers 2009). The underlying theory of the unilinear model is that alterations in cultural attachment happen one step at a time, with the original culture on one side and the new culture on the other. In contrast, the bilinear model of acculturation suggests a probability that individuals can acquire and become competent in a new culture while continuing attachments and competence in their original culture (Miller & Kerlow-Myers 2009).

This study indicated needs for holistic support to address young people's issues in education and employment, and particularly to deal with the challenges resulting from acculturation and the feeling of alienation from their parents and the new environment. Such holistic support must aim to manage and influence them for a better future. This study has shown there is a lack of appropriate support for South Sudanese families even though the current global political goal concerning refugees is to improve their ability to become self-sufficient in their new country (Bemak et al., 2003). It is important to address the key deficiencies in policies concerning refugees’ resettlement/settlement, which neglect the long-term support required for new settlers. All participants, both parents and young people, highlighted the lack of support as contributing factors to their parenting challenges and youth challenges. McMichael et al. (2011) argued that settlement-related services that focus on young immigrants must unequivocally connect with family-linked contexts to aid the families to resettle successfully.

**Conclusion**

This paper highlighted that identity, as in many other cultures, is an important part of South Sudanese culture and children's upbringing. Some young people are strongly attached to their culture of origin but also see themselves as South Sudanese-Australian, a cultural hybrid, in which they have gained new forms of citizenship. However, their new environment’s experiences often impact on their ability to adapt to their new environment, particularly by the changes they face, including the expectations of their parents and the South Sudanese community to hold onto their original culture. The intergenerational conflict and the difficulties for youth navigating between the two cultures relate to the rapidity with which they become familiar with their new culture and embrace some values that may be opposite to those of their parents. Parental demands that their children preserve their cultural values while they are trying to adjust to their new environment often trigger tensions between them: these are also fuelled by the external influences that young people encounter at school and other places of intercultural contact.

**REFERENCES**


Afrikaner émigrés in Australia: Perception vs. Reality in Human Decision-Making

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Abstract
Based on ongoing ethnographic research among post-1994 first generation Afrikaner immigrants in Australia, in this paper I argue that the majority of them bases its decision to emigrate from South Africa on their perception of reality rather than on reality itself. The primary reason why they are leaving their home country is affirmative action, which they view as racist policies that lead to ‘reverse discrimination’. They believe that their children do not have a future in South Africa because of the fact that they have white skin. However, the preliminary results of this study show that in reality, only a very small number of participants has had an actual experience with affirmative action, and secondary sources demonstrate that white privilege still prevails in post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, the underlying, subconscious reason why Afrikaners are emigrating is their fear of the threat that affirmative action poses to their children’s future. As such, it can be analysed according to Maslow’s human needs theory, which shows that they are fundamentally in search of survival.

Introduction
Amid the multitude of emigration flows that characterize our contemporary world, the Afrikaner1 exodus out of South Africa forms a distinctive stream, in the sense that it represents a perpetrator Diaspora that feels victimized. By this I mean that, contrary to general opinion which views them as the apartheid culprits, in their own perception Afrikaners are victims of post-apartheid policies and circumstances which drive them out of their home country, and mostly into Australia.2 During my fieldwork in South Africa in 2011,3 I noticed that most Afrikaners I met had parted or were parting from family and friends who had immigrated or were immigrating to Australia. I also observed that as a people, especially the older generations, they seemed to express a profound sense of sadness, associated with loss and change. This is what prompted me to do a research project on post-1994 first generation Afrikaner immigrants in Australia, which I am currently conducting as a doctoral study at the University of Adelaide. My engagement with Afrikaners, then, comes from an interest in and compassion for their sadness, though primarily from a deep desire to understand it, and them, not to justify or

1 Defined here as ‘white’ South Africans of European descent whose vernacular is Afrikaans.
2 According to official statistics, 10 to 15 per cent of the Afrikaner population has left South Africa between 1994 and 2011, which translates into 300,000 to 450,000 people (Giliomee, 2011, 709; Statistics South Africa [SSA], 2011). Based on statistics from recipient countries, the real figure is estimated to be two to three times as high (Van Rooyen, 2000, 27). Despite a lack of accurate statistical data, using various sources combined (Bormann, 2005; Giliomee, 2011; Oberholzer, 2011; and Lucas, Amoateng, & Kalule-Sabiti, 2006, amongst others), I would argue that most Afrikaners immigrate to Australia. It should be noted that other South Africans are leaving too, and that many would like to but cannot (due to a lack of skills or finances) (Crush et al., 2010; Schönfeldt-Aultman, 2009; Young, 1999, cited in Lucas et al., 2006, 46).
3 For my MPhil degree in African Studies at Leiden University, I conducted five months of field research in Polokwane, Limpopo.
apologize for the past, but to improve our understanding of it, of how it came to be and of how it continues to shape the present as well as the future, of, in the meantime, both South Africa and Australia.

The main argument set forth in this paper is thus based on empirical research. Carried out within the anthropological discipline, the research strategy is qualitative and the approach ethnographic, i.e. the study is conducted through long-term fieldwork in which participant observation, interviewing and informal conversations are the main methods, complemented by the analysis of texts (mainly Facebook group discussions). Fieldwork has been conducted since September 2015 and continues until the end of 2016. Thus far, approximately 150 people have participated in the study, 72 of whom through interviews, which were conducted in Afrikaans. The research sample is drawn from those Afrikaners that emigrated between 1994 and 2016 as adults, and is selected through purposive- and snowball sampling. The majority has emigrated as a nuclear family unit, and the average age of participants is between thirty and fifty years. The main fieldwork location is Adelaide/South Australia, though in total, interviews have been conducted in five different towns and cities covering three different states.

This essay deals with a small portion of the data results so far, namely with the primary reason most research participants mentioned for their decision to immigrate to Australia: they see no future for Afrikaners in South Africa. For nearly all interviewees, as well as for most other Afrikaners that I spoke to in an informal setting (at events), this reason was principally related to future generations: whether it was for their (unborn) children or grandchildren, they asserted that ‘white’ children have no future in South Africa, primarily as a consequence of affirmative action. Before discussing this in more detail, I will first clarify what I mean by the most relevant terms and concepts used in this paper. Importantly, I also note here that the views expressed by participants in this particular case study are not necessarily representative of all Afrikaners in Australia.

Clarification of concepts and terms

Following research participants’ self-definition, with the term ‘Afrikaner’ I refer to a South African of European descent, i.e. with white skin, whose mother tongue is Afrikaans. ‘Migration’ is the permanent or semi-permanent change of residence by individuals or groups (Lee 1966, 49; McLean & McMillan, 347), whereas ‘emigration’ (from) and ‘immigration’ (to) refer to the act of leaving one’s country with the intention of permanently settling into a foreign nation. The ‘Diaspora’ concept, although currently attributed to many migrant groups (Daswani, 2013; Pries, 2013; Tölölyan, 1991) and often conflated with the term ‘transnational community’ (Ong, 2003, 86; Stanley-Niaah, 2009, 756) in its classical meaning refers only to those migrant groups that disperse due

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4 It is therefore important to note that, since both the processes of data collection and analysis are ongoing, the research’ final conclusions may differ slightly from those drawn in this paper.

5 And ultimately, of course, through self-selection: all interviews were held with written consent.

6 It is crucial to distinguish between Afrikaans-speaking ‘white’ South Africans and English-speaking ‘white’ South Africans (those of British descent), because the research participants do this: if anything, they are not British. Unfortunately, not many researchers working on South African emigration acknowledge the importance of this distinction.

The term ‘affirmative action’ in the South African context refers to an amalgam of policies in different sectors of society aimed at redressing the inequalities resulting from apartheid by ‘affirming’ those population groups that the system oppressed, collectively labelled as ‘black’ (Employment Equity Act of 1998). Classifying population groups by the colour of their skin is problematic and arguably racist, however, in any work on South Africa it is still largely unavoidable. In its data collection, the South African government continues to use the old apartheid race distinctions of ‘African’, ‘coloured’ (persons of so-called mixed-race descent), ‘Indian’, currently combined with Asians in general (‘Indian/Asian’), and ‘white’. Moreover, it uses these classifications for the very purpose of redress (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 15; Erasmus, 2015, 104). Thus, it appears that until a better alternative is found, we are stuck with these labels. This is not to say that I agree with their use, and since ‘race’ is a socially constructed concept I use quotations marks whenever I use skin colour as an adjective in this paper. Doing so is incorrect anyhow, since skin colour is a physical attribute, not a state of being (i.e. skin colour is something you have, not something you are). However, precisely because the idea of ‘race’ is socially constructed, it can be argued that people have become their skin indeed. In this regard, having ‘white’ skin, not only in South Africa but globally, has historically become associated with wealth, status, ‘Western civilization’ and, perhaps most importantly, with privilege (Hage, 2000; Garner, 2007; Wadham, 2004). ‘White privilege’ is famously defined as ‘an invisible package of unearned assets that [white people] can count on cashing in each day’ (McIntosh, 1989, cited in Garner, 2007, 35-36) and can mostly be seen as a consequence of European imperialism and colonial conquest. Crucially, certainly for Afrikaners, who could be viewed as its epitome, white privilege has become so normal to those who enjoy it that they are oblivious to it (Garner, 2007, 34-39; Wadham, 2004, 22). Moreover, it arguably leaves people with white skin ‘racially unmarked’ (Schönfeldt-Aultman, 2009, 121), since they represent ‘the norm’ against which all others are defined.

Finally, then, we come to a definition of perception and reality, two terms so crucial in this paper. ‘Reality’ relates to things as they actually exist in the world (often but not exclusively physical objects or actions) and ‘perception’ refers to the way in which those things are understood. Since human beings have an individual mind and a unique frame of reference that is constructed on personal life experiences, they usually have different interpretations of the same thing (reality). In other words, they attach different meanings to the same facts. However, groups of people can also and often do have a collective perception of reality, of which this paper provides an example. In the following section I set forth what the collective perception of Afrikaners about affirmative action in South Africa is.

**Perception: No future for ‘white’ children in South Africa**

Most Afrikaners that participated in this research feel that their decision to emigrate from South Africa to Australia was not a personal choice, but one that was forced upon them to a perceived or actual threat to its survival (Du Toit, 2003, 16; Tölölyan, 1996, 12). As I show in this paper, Afrikaners do this indeed.

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8 For more characteristics of Diasporas, see Clifford, 1994, Kearny, 1995, and/or Tölölyan, 2007.

by circumstances in their home country. The principal reason for this is that they feel that their children’s livelihoods are being threatened, and to a lesser extent their own subsistence as well, first and foremost by affirmative action policies implemented by the successive ANC governments. They view these policies as ‘reverse discrimination’ and they fear that their children, especially their sons, will not have equal access to quality education and/or jobs in comparison with other South African children, namely those often referred to as ‘previously disadvantaged individuals’ (Hoffman, 2011; Mbeki, 2009) and generically termed ‘black’ (as discussed before), who form the main objective of South Africa’s affirmative action policies. Sons (boys, males) are perceived to be most disadvantaged, as they were most privileged during apartheid and are thus now targeted most strongly. Since all research participants believe that South African universities are applying racial quotas to ensure demographically representative student intakes, they feel that their children are being discriminated against because of the fact that they have white skin. They want their children to be assessed on merit, not on race, when applying for university. This is illustrated by the following quote from Marieke, who emigrated in 2007 with her husband and sons:

‘The big reason for us was, I have two sons. They are white sons. With the affirmative actions in South Africa it’s going to be absolutely difficult for a white young man to study and to get a profession. [With the] Affirmative action, I think now, at universities, it’s seventy per cent is being given to black students, and the other thirty per cent is being divided between your other previously disadvantaged, so your Indians, your Coloureds, your Chinese, your Asians are being advantaged even before a white South African, then your white woman, and then the white boy. So this is, he will be the very last. And even if his points [performance] are the best, first all the other students will get a place at university. And our eldest son had at that stage already shown very good potential, he can go and study something because he has the capacity. And that’s when we realised: “We are OK. We have jobs. We are qualified, our professions are set, we are OK. But for that generation, for our children, we want something different. And this is why we started the whole process and came over [to Australia].’

10 From the forty-three research participants of whom the interviews were analysed in full detail at the time of writing, thirty-six stated that they left South Africa because they saw no future for their children, and, to a lesser extent, neither for themselves, due to affirmative action policies. This translates into 83.7 per cent of the research sample. One person came to Australia to join her adult children, who had also emigrated because they did not see a future for their children in South Africa. Four people (9.3 per cent) mentioned crime as their primary motive, though in relation to their children as well: they felt that they were unable to protect their children from violent crime. Lastly, there were two participants, a couple, who came to Australia because of a job offer. N.B. ANC stands for African National Congress and refers to South Africa’s post-1994 ruling party.

11 Marieke, interview with author, 2015. All citations from interviews in this paper are my own translations from Afrikaans to English. To protect the identity of research participants, pseudonyms are used. Since there are relatively few Afrikaans names, I have chosen Dutch names as pseudonyms, to prevent Afrikaans people in Australia from being identified by mistake. Dutch and Afrikaans names are generally quite similar. To further protect interviewees’ identities, the exact date, time, and location of the interview is never stated.
For the next phase in their children’s lives, that is, when entering the job market, the interviewees neither feel that their offspring will have a fair chance due to affirmative action policies. Furthermore, most research participants feel that their children (and, again, especially their sons) will suffer life-long insecurity because of their disadvantage of having white skin, in the sense that they are perceived to be prone to losing their jobs. Most male interviewees see job loss as a very real personal threat as well, and for one of them it has become a reality, which was the reason for his move to Australia. Arjan told me that he was retrenched in South Africa at age fifty-four, and that there was just no way that he would get a job again in the country. ‘All the [white] men above fifty years of age who lose their jobs do not get another one’, he stated. ‘You can just forget it. They throw your CV in the paper bin immediately. They don’t even look at it any further.’

When discussing the subject of ‘reverse discrimination’, another participant, Richard, stated –

‘I always had the risk, if you are above fifty, fifty-five years of age, and you are a white man, and you lose your job, then your chances to get a job are zero, you know. My brother in law has been without a job for a year now, and he’s around our age. But your chance of getting another job there is zero.’

Indeed, the overall perception among interviewees is that when a white man loses his job after the age of fifty (and some mentioned forty), he will not acquire a new position. This will make him and his family extremely vulnerable, because at that stage in his life he will have children in high school and/or at university, and he will not be able to support them anymore, which means that the entire family will get into financial difficulties and, in the worst-case scenario, end up in a ‘white’ squatter camp.

Thus, in sum, the great majority feels that they, as ‘white’ South Africans, and especially as Afrikaners, are being discriminated against in post-apartheid South Africa. The threat that affirmative action poses is felt much more strongly for their children since this generation has not yet received or completed its education and has yet to settle itself into the workforce. Participants feel that affirmative action gives jobs to South Africans with black skin at the expense of South Africans with white skin and that the latter group is negatively affected by affirmative action policies in general. In this, they see ‘white’, and Afrikaner, males as the prime victims. Next to this, they believe these policies to be wrong as they are based on race: they feel that people should be judged on their competencies and achievements and not on the colour of their skin. In their perception, South Africa has, with affirmative action, continued the use of institutionalised racism – the very policy that should have ended in 1994 - but then ‘in reverse’. The next part of

\[12\] Arjan, interview with author, 2016.
\[14\] They feel that as a group, they are being punished more severely for apartheid than English-speaking ‘white’ South Africans, since it was the Afrikaner Nationalist Party that dominated the apartheid governments.
\[15\] N.B. Most participants stated that it was OK to have affirmative action policies in place for some time after the end of apartheid, but that they should have ended by now. Importantly, there was also one participant who formed an exception by specifically stating that she does not believe that ‘white’ people do not have possibilities or that they are being discriminated in South Africa (Carolien, interview with author, 2016).
this essay investigates to what extent these claims are congruent with reality.

**Fact I: Affirmative Action is not ‘reverse discrimination’**

Before I can discuss the perception that affirmative action constitutes racism, I first need to define what the concept actually entails, in more detail than I have done in the introduction. In general, affirmative action policies are programs designed to tackle a series of inequalities that mainly but not exclusively focus on minority groups (Dhami, Squires & Mohood, 2006, cited in Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 23). The term does not so much refer to one single policy, but rather to an amalgam of components of other legislation, policies and behaviour, including employment, education and government contracting, that are undergoing continuous change (Holzer & Neumark, 2000, 484-485).

In South Africa, the main legal frameworks for the implementation of affirmative action are the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 (BB-BEE, shortly BEE) with their subsequent amendments (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 15; Mbeki, 2009, 68-69). Both frameworks provide laws aimed at achieving demographic representivity in the workplace, with BEE specifically designed for the private sector. As such, it ensures that employers take proactive steps towards employing or training specifically those who need ‘affirming’ since they have been disadvantaged in the past (Holzer & Neumark, 2000, 484, my emphasis), and who would otherwise not or less quickly be employed or trained. Taking proactive steps principally distinguishes affirmative action from other antidiscrimination measures that only prevent employers or institutions from discriminating against certain groups in society (ibid). The goal of affirmative action in South Africa is thus to correct the pre-1994 imbalances and to ensure that the previously disadvantaged groups (‘black’ South Africans) enjoy the same benefits and opportunities as the privileged group (‘white’ South Africans), now guaranteed to them in the Constitution (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 15, 23).

The Afrikaners that have participated in this research are not the only ones to be critical of affirmative action in South Africa. Several political parties including the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Freedom Front Plus, and also civil society organisations such as Solidarity and Afriforum argue that these policies marginalise South Africans with white skin (Modisha, 2007). The term ‘reverse discrimination’ to denote affirmative action policies is widely used, not only in South Africa but also in other countries that have similar measures in place. 16 Does affirmative action indeed constitute (legalised) racial discrimination? Most scholars seem to agree that, yes, it does, but since it is used for the purpose of redressing past injustices, it is ‘fair discrimination’ (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 19), a clear contradictio in terminis (the very concept of discrimination means ‘unfair’), or ‘acceptable discrimination’ (Chow, 2009, 355).

For any law to be racially discriminatory in the world today would seem illegitimate, however, in our recent past it was business as usual, of which South Africa is perhaps the prime example. Since ‘white’ South Africans have racially discriminated against ‘black’ South Africans for at least forty-six years (apartheid) and actually for more than three centuries (colonialism), it can logically be argued that there should be justice and there should be consequences. In a legal form, this could take the shape of affirmative action.

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16 See, for example, Pincus’ work (2000, 2003) on the USA.
The crucial point here is that the two are directly related to each other and that the relationship is causal: the elevation of one population group came about because of the oppression of another, and intentionally so. The disadvantage of ‘black’ South Africans was not some unwanted by-product or unfortunate side effect of something that was otherwise beneficial: it was purposively created to privilege ‘white’ South Africans. The very concept of ‘privilege’ signifies dichotomy: without the opposite, it is meaningless. Thus, because of this causal relationship, it is not possible to make contemporary South African society more equal by only focusing on bettering the formerly oppressed and leaving the (previously and continuing) privileged untouched. The latter group has a responsibility to answer to the consequences of their actions by giving up their privileges in order to let those whom they deliberately disadvantaged in order to gain those privileges join the playing field.

Therefore, I would define affirmative action as neither ‘reverse’-, ‘fair’- nor ‘acceptable’ discrimination but as legalised responsibility. If apartheid constituted institutionalised/legalised racism, then affirmative action constitutes institutionalised/legalised responsibility. It means acknowledging a past mistake, accepting the consequences of that mistake, and working towards correcting it. Thus defined, it seems that those Afrikaners and other ‘white’, privileged South Africans who oppose affirmative action and see themselves as its victims, are unwilling to take this responsibility. Furthermore, it could be argued that those who are leaving South Africa because of these policies are fleeing their responsibility. The underlying problem appears to be that this group does not genuinely acknowledge the past mistake in the first place. Nearly all research participants stated that they felt that apartheid was wrong, but that they themselves were never racists. In other words, they acknowledge the faulty system, but deny any personal responsibility for having created and/or for being part of that system.

Fact II: ‘White’ South Africans are still privileged

The second, and related, general perception, that affirmative action in South Africa is negatively affecting South Africans with white skin and Afrikaners in particular, does not appear to be congruent with reality either, when looking at the empirical evidence of both primary (my research) and secondary (existing studies) sources.

Concerning the first, of the sixty-eight interviewees belonging to the workforce, only three individuals had an actual, real life experience with affirmative action. This translates into 2 per cent of the current research sample. The three participants in question were all males and in different stages of their careers: Jaap did not get a training place after graduation; Mark was told by his manager that he could not get a promotion; and Arjan (quoted in section one) was past mid-career when he was retrenched. There

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17 This is not to say that affirmative action in its current form is ideal; there are many valid criticisms on the policies, proved by their continuous adjustment (Chow, 2009; Holzer & Neuman, 2000; Roberts, Weir-Smith, & Reddy, 2010). Also, a lot of the discontent about affirmative action may not come from the policies as such but from their misuse (see, for example, Archibong & Adejumo, 2013), most notably around BEE, which is prone to corruption and mainly serves the interests of a small ‘black’ elite (Bond, 2005; Calland, 2006; Hoffman, 2011; Mbeki, 2009; Naidoo, 2011).

18 It should be noted that a number of research participants was 18 years of age or younger in 1994, and could thus not have had much opportunity to try and change the system.
was also one participant who owned his own company and decided to leave because he felt unable to find qualified people from the previously disadvantaged groups, which would ensure that his company complied with BEE policies. Next to this, there was (only) one interviewee who knew somebody close to him (his brother-in-law) that had lost his job due to affirmative action. If we include these two individuals’ accounts, then the total number and percentage of research participants who have had a personal or secondary experience with affirmative action policies comes down to five and 3.4 respectively.

Secondly, in sharp contrast to most research participants’ perception, studies on South Africa’s economy and on the effects of affirmative action policies show that overall, white privilege has continued after 1994. In fact, the most important critique on affirmative action policies in the country is their relative effectiveness (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 23) and the slow pace of change (Roberts, Weir-Smith, & Reddy, 2010, 6). Data from the South African government shows that since 1994, the unemployment figure for South Africans classified as ‘white’ continues to be the lowest compared to the three groups classified as ‘black’ (Statistics South Africa [SSA], 2016). When comparing the numbers for the most recent years, the statistics show an increase of ‘white’ unemployment in both the highest classes (those with graduate degrees and beyond) and the lowest classes (those without a high school diploma), whereas this number decreased or remained relatively unchanged for the other population groups. However, in the middle- and upper middle classes (those with high school diplomas and tertiary degrees other than university) unemployment within the ‘white’ group actually decreased.

These numbers suggest that affirmative action is successful in both the highest- and lowest echelons of the population, but unsuccessful in the broad middle class. They also help to explain the fact that the great majority of research participants is highly skilled: this is the group that has most reason to feel threatened by affirmative action, as do the most unskilled. Given Australia’s skills based immigration policy (Hugo, 2014; Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2010; Visser, 2004), it is unsurprising that very few interviewees belong to the latter category. In any case, for these two classes, research participants’ perceptions are supported by the statistics. However, for the middle- and upper middle classes, perceptions are contrary to the facts. Also, overall, unemployment for ‘white’ South Africans has decreased in the last year, and, as said, they are still the best employed population group: in 2016, the share of unemployment was 9.1 % for ‘white’ South Africans; 40.9 for ‘black’ South Africans; 27.7 for ‘coloured’ South Africans; and 16.9 for Indian/Asian South Africans (SSA, 2016). As we can see, these numbers are far from equal. Since the South African government does not distinguish between ‘white’ South Africans from British heritage and Afrikaners, it is unfortunately impossible to say whether, in reality, the latter are more affected by affirmative action.

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19 Affirmative action in general (globally) is critiqued for doing little for the poor (Sowell, 2004, 166).
20 Indeed, by the year 2000, there were about as many African (‘black’) households in the top income quintile as there were ‘white’ households (Seekings & Natrass, 2005, 306), a success largely achieved through BEE.
21 Those who do, three out of sixty-eight, all stated that they entered Australia through exceptional circumstances and that it had only been possible because of God’s will. What probably contributed to the fact was that they were willing to move to the most rural places (the outback) and, for two of them, to work for less than the Australian minimum wage.

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than the former. Other studies confirm that the ‘white’ middle class is actually still growing and increasing its wealth - although not in the same pace as the black middle class (Erasmus, 2015, 103) and that, although young ‘white’ men are finding it harder to gain access to jobs, especially the Afrikaans-speaking men from the lower classes, it is still easier for them than for young ‘black’ men (Morrell, 2002, 311). Thus, all that seems to have happened due to affirmative action policies is that the growth of the white middle class has slowed down. Next to this, the racial wage hierarchy in post-apartheid South Africa remains highly distorted in favour of ‘white’ South Africans (Allanson & Atkins, 2005, 1046) and ‘white’ South Africans are still demographically overrepresented in government (Erasmus, 2015, 107). Furthermore, the country’s corporate sector is still dominated by ‘white’ men, who have the lowest unemployment figure of all population groups, namely 1.1 per cent (Van Wyk, 2014). Finally, and completely adverse to research participants’ perceptions, ‘white’ women have actually been included as beneficiaries of affirmative action policies since 2008.23

Similar to beliefs about employment, the claim that university admission is based on racial quotas appears to be an unfounded perception too. Although universities in their admission of students have little to do with the Employment Equity Act (since students are not employees), which prohibits the implementation of quotas (De Vos, 2013), they do not use quota. However, many universities are choosing for stricter admission policies to redress their unequal racial make-up and to mirror South African society better (Jones, 2011). In this sense, a university may, for example, reserve 67 per cent of its places for previously disadvantaged individuals and keep 33 per cent of the places available for any applicant, regardless of race (“Questions over racial quotas at SA universities”, 2016). However, all applicants have to meet minimum criteria for admission (ibid). Next to those that do, there are also universities that do not use race as a proxy for disadvantage and thus as a criterion for admission (Jones, 2011).24 But doing so would only be illegal if a university would make use of a rigid application of a quota system, which, to the best of my knowledge, they do not.

From the above it can be concluded that South Africans with white skin continue to be privileged in South Africa, even though it is difficult to determine to which extent the Afrikaners are more, less or equally privileged in comparison to Anglo-South Africans. They are certainly less privileged than before 1994, but, as a group, they are still privileged.25 This means that the perceptions of the majority of the research participants are contrary to reality. The belief that ‘white’ children, especially boys, and ‘white’ men are specifically victimised by affirmative action proves to be unfounded: in reality, affirmative action policies do not have a large, negative impact on white males.26 If this

22 With their percentage in top management at 73 per cent (Erasmus, 2015, 100).
23 Since the policies are also aimed at redressing existing gender imbalances (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 21; “Affirmative action recognises white women”, n.d.).
24 This implies that research participants could chose a university for their children in South Africa where they would have an equal opportunity to be accepted. Therefore, it seems that they either do not believe this to be true (i.e. they believe that their perception of things is right), or that they only want their children to go to certain universities (that do use race as a proxy for disadvantage and for admission).
25 This is not to say that on an individual level some Afrikaners, and especially Afrikaner men, have been hurt by affirmative action policies and are experiencing real troubles.
26 A conclusion also reached by Pincus in his studies of affirmative action in the USA (Pincus, 2003, 120).
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is not the case, what then, makes Afrikaners really leave South Africa? In concluding this article, I will explain this.

**Conclusion: Emigration decision is based on emotion (fear) & human needs**  

There are two main conclusions that can be drawn from this paper. The first is that most Afrikaners that participated in the study decided to leave South Africa based on their perception of reality rather than on reality itself. Secondly, they decided to leave not because of affirmative action but because of fear of affirmative action, and to be more precise, because of the fear of the threat that these policies pose to their children’s livelihoods. That people in general base their decisions on what they believe to be real and not on reality as such is known. This includes the decision of whether or not to emigrate: as Lee has suggested, for most migrants ‘it is not so much the actual factors at origin and destination as the perception of these factors that result in migration’ (1966, 51). Thus, similar to most, if not all, human decisions, the decision to emigrate is never completely rational and may not even have anything to do with reason at all. In fact, the discovery by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio that people who cannot feel emotions cannot make decisions seems to have ultimately proven that perceptions, since they are based on emotions, are crucial in decision-making.

Fear is an emotion that can powerfully motivate people’s behaviour. Rather than being shaped by the object itself, emotions are shaped by contact with the object (Ahmed, 2014, 6). That is, people have an idea of the object as something to be feared, and this idea is shaped by cultural histories and memories (Ibid, 7, 69). In this case, Afrikaners have an idea of affirmative action as being something fearful, which is based on narratives about what affirmative action constitutes and what it means to them (and to ‘white’ South Africans in general). Ultimately, the fear is a response to the threat that affirmative action poses to their children’s future livelihood (i.e. survival), and to a lesser extent to that of their own. This threat is shaped by the discourses that have created the perception that affirmative action policies lead to fewer (or no) possibilities for education and jobs for ‘white’ South African children, particularly boys.

As such, the Afrikaners’ decision to emigrate can be, like most if not all human behaviour, analysed in relation to human beings’ basic needs, as set forth by Maslow, and specifically to the most fundamental ones, namely physiological- and safety needs.

This means that, underneath the seemingly straightforward and rational reason to emigrate lies the deeper psychological and unconscious need for survival: the research

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28 Damasio’s work shows that emotions often operate as a basic mechanism for making decisions without the work of reason, and in doing so he fundamentally redefined Descartes’ famous statement concerning understanding the human condition, ‘I think, therefore I am’, as ‘I feel, therefore I think’ (Damasio, 1994, 2001, 2003). This resonates Freud’s conclusion based on psychoanalysis, ‘Where id was, there ego shall be’ (1933, 80, cited in Roelke, Goldschmidt, & Silverman 2013, 193) and resembles Maslow’s argument that we should not sharply distinguish between cognitive and conative needs because the former are based on the latter (i.e. thoughts derive from emotions) (1943, 385).  
29 Maslow in 1943 set forth his theory that beneath all the superficial differences that are culturally determined, human beings are very much alike, and that all of them have the same five basic needs, which are, in order of importance: the need for food & water (physiological); the need to be safe (physically, mentally and emotionally); the need to be loved; the need to be esteemed; and the need for self-actualisation.
participants, and especially their children, *need* to have at least food and water and be safe (from an, in their understanding, unfair world).\(^{30}\) In this sense, Afrikaners could have become what Maslow calls ‘safety-seeking mechanisms’ (1943, 376), since their behaviour is completely dominated by their need for safety. Thus, where for Maslow’s hungry man Utopia is a place with plenty of food (Ibid, 374), for the Afrikaner, Utopia is a place without affirmative action. Thus, they decide to leave South Africa and immigrate to Australia. In essence, then, it is fear - ultimately, and unconsciously, of death - that motivates them to make this decision.

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\(^{30}\) Maslow states that injustice and unfairness, what the Afrikaners perceive affirmative action to be, seem to make human beings feel anxious and unsafe (1943, 377). He further argues that this does not have to be because of the injustice *per se* but rather because this treatment threatens to make the world look unreliable, or unsafe, or unpredictable (ibid). I believe that this is exactly what is happening to Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa, real or perceived.
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Abstract
Emigration from Zimbabwe has been quite well documented by the Southern African Migration Project and by other writers, most recently the Edgar & Lucas article, ‘Zimbabwe’s Emigrants: Growth and Change in Australia’, in the December 2016 issue of the *Australian Review of African Studies*. This paper extends the 2016 article with a particular focus on diasporas and stepwise migration, adding to material on other former British territories in southern and eastern Africa. This paper uses three databases and other sources to consider the following questions: (1) is the movement of Europeans from these former British territories a diaspora or return migration; (2) what proportions go where, or do not emigrate; and (3) how prevalent is stepwise migration for example, from Zimbabwe to Australia via South Africa?

Introduction
Prosopography includes the study of the careers, migration histories and other biographical data of a historical group. Here the three databases – of the Overseas Service Pensioners Association (OSPA), the British South Africa Police Regimental Association (BSAP), a paramilitary force which operated in Rhodesia, and Peterhouse alumni (Petreans) – form the core of the study. These are supplemented by examples from the literature, particularly from Shurmer-Smith, the long title of her 2015 book being *Remnants of Empire. Memory and Northern Rhodesia’s White Diaspora*. Shurmer-Smith (2015, p. 250) had in fact constructed a “running database” containing information similar to that which could be derived from the BSAP membership list although her book does not include any statistical analysis. She initially built her database by contacting people from *The Great North Road* site ‘that existed to reunite old North Rhodesians.’ Her target population excluded ‘those aged under 10 at Independence and those who arrived after Independence’ (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 249). All these databases suffer from a number of limitations particularly of selectivity, since they rely on respondents belonging to an association, and keeping in touch with that association.
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Office 1963, p. 237). Table 1 shows that, as might be expected, most OSPA members relocated to the United Kingdom, with South Africa in second place. The South African High Commission (HCT) figures are included because the first author knew that several of the OSPA members were South Africans who retired to South Africa. This explains the relatively high percentage living in South Africa in 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence 2005</th>
<th>Territory of Service</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia</td>
<td>Northern Rhodesia</td>
<td>Nyasaland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>Other Africa</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Other</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Overseas Service Pensioners Association Member Listing.
Note: HCT refers to South African High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland).

On Independence, a distinction was made between HMOCS officers and “non-designated” locally recruited officers whose retirement benefits were less generous. In particular, the latter did not receive relocation costs (Shurmer-Smith (2015, p. 181) and in this sense they were similar to railway and mine workers. An example of someone who worked and lived under different administrations in Zimbabwe for almost 50 years is David Hoskins. He initially went to Zimbabwe, which was then part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in 1959 as a government auditor, presumably as a member of the Colonial Audit Service. When the Federation was disbanded in December 1963, ’a number of colleagues either joined the private sector or emigrated’, but he stayed on. In 1978, the first black auditors were appointed at Independence and a number of colleagues took early retirement. In 1987, Hoskins joined the private sector and in 2007 he left Zimbabwe, probably for the UK (Hoskins 2016).

Kirk-Greene (2001) has referred to ‘the diaspora of the expatriate career civil servants who were still employed by HM government when independence was granted.’ He estimated that 25,000 of these “prematurely retired” civil servants from around the world returned to
Britain where many commenced a second career. Diaspora assumes a scattering which certainly occurred as former colonies gained Independence. However, his definition flies in the face of traditional definitions of diaspora which assume the existence of a homeland as well as settlement outside of the homeland for more than one generation. The British colonial experience was basically that officers (generally male with the few females concentrated in nursing and teaching) were recruited in the UK and sent to a colony. As shown in Figure 1, the majority of OSPA members who served in Southern Rhodesia eventually relocated to the UK, and must largely be considered as return migrants.

In Shurmer-Smith’s Northern Rhodesian study (n=632), 45% of respondents were living in the UK and Ireland, 23% in South Africa, and 15% in Australia and New Zealand (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 156). Several of her respondents were South African citizens with no right to reside in other countries. One key reason for the timing of return migration was that the movers wanted to go back while they were young enough to get another job (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 202). One couple moved to the UK so that their disabled son could have more secure care (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 159). One BSAP member (see next section) migrated after being falsely accused of a criminal offence in Rhodesia.

What about the children of migrants? Were those in the UK and elsewhere who use expressions such as ‘Africa continues to beat within’ and having a ‘sense of exile’ (Shurmer-Smith’s 2015, p. 271) thinking of Northern Rhodesia or Africa as their homeland? Butler (2001, p. 1197) adds other criteria to his definition of a diaspora, one being that it should exist over two generations, in which case they might qualify as members of an African diaspora. Unfortunately, the second generation might be difficult to identify. Given the unusual spelling of his surname it seems as if Ron Madocks (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 220) is the son of J.E. Madocks, who was educated in the
English Midlands, became a cadet in Northern Rhodesia in 1941 and was an under-secretary in 1963 (Colonial Office 1963, p. 367). Ron Madocks finished up in the Midlands apparently near to where J.E. Madocks came from. After leaving Africa he was restless and lived in the USA for a while. The late T.L. Bennett (Colonial Office 1963:255) served in several African countries and has relatives in two of the databases used here but only personal knowledge of his family would reveal that his children are living in South Africa, Australia and Canada.

**British South Africa Police Association (BSAP)**

The British South Africa Police Association (BSAP) was a paramilitary force founded in 1889 in Rhodesia by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company and served as Rhodesia's regular police force until Zimbabwe gained independence. The second database is a sample drawn from the BSAP website. Because of a lack of time and resources only the Members List A-B is covered. With former members being spread across several countries, social media has become an ever popular platform to stay in touch (see http://www.bsap.org/). This white paramilitary force was disbanded in August 1980, and as shown in Figure 1, few members stayed on in Zimbabwe. Those who had left the BSAP in 1976 or later were less likely to stay on (Figure 2). Many of these would have been young conscripts ‘doing their three’ years of national service during the Bush War. South Africa was the preferred destination for this group, some of whom were subsequently employed in security-related occupations.

**Figure 2**

![BSAP Destinations by Year Left Police (%)](http://www.bsap.org/)

Petreans

The third database provides insights into international moves over several decades using a database of around 2,500 leavers (or former students) of a top independent boarding school in Zimbabwe. The school was founded in 1955, originally for boys, with girls following in 1987. The school considered itself a pioneer of multi-racial education and African boys were first enrolled in 1964. Different cohorts of school leavers have experienced pressures to emigrate related to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia in 1965, Independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, and the adverse economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe in the 21st century. The date of finishing school is known for each leaver; year of birth is not known. This research will focus on migration pathways.

Tables 2 and 3 build upon Edgar and Lucas (2016:42-3) by looking at the important European/non-European dichotomy. The latter category is predominately African. The authors identified a little over one in five Petreans as being of African or Asian background on the basis of surname, and almost four in five as of European origin. Table 2 shows the destination countries of African and Asian Petreans by school leaver cohort, from pre-1981 to post-2000. The proportion remaining in Zimbabwe has fallen dramatically in recent years, from a majority (55%) of the pre-1981 cohort to just 8.5% of the post-2000 cohort. South Africa, the United Kingdom and especially Australia have become much more popular destinations over time, accounting for 24%, 20% and 19% of post-2000 leavers, respectively. The USA has remained a popular destination, chosen by 18-23% of each cohort from pre-1981 to post-2000.

Prior to Independence in 1980, European Petreans were much more likely to leave Zimbabwe after school than were African and Asian Petreans – only 15% of pre-1981 European Petreans lived in Zimbabwe (see Table 3). While this percentage increased among 1980s and 1990s cohorts of European Petreans, it has declined to 14% of post-2000 leavers. The United Kingdom has been consistently the most popular destination for European Petreans, chosen by 26-38% of each cohort from pre-1981 to post-2000. South Africa has been regularly in the top three destination countries, and Australia has recently become very popular (22% of post-2000 European Petreans). Only 8% chose to move to North America, compared with 25% of African and Asian Petreans.

Stepwise migration

Stepwise migration usually refers to internal migration, but ‘sometimes it refers to a family making successive moves over one lifetime’ (Petersen and Petersen 1986, p. 586). Here it refers to individuals who emigrated and reached their current residence after living in a third country. For example, they could have gone from Zimbabwe to Australia after a sojourn in the UK or South Africa. The OSPA list does not record stepwise migration. In contrast, Shurmer-Smith’s respondents often gave details of their moves. For those leaving Northern Rhodesia/Zambia from 1962 onwards, many of those having the ‘hardest time’ made ‘the obvious move’ to Southern Rhodesia and ‘most of these relocated south again.’ The term used for such wanderers from Zambia is ‘Soweto’, meaning ‘so where are you now?’ (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 160.). A ‘when-we’ is defined in the Dictionary of South African English as ‘A type of white immigrant, esp. from Zimbabwe’ (Branford 1991, p. 375).
### Table 2. African and Asian Petreans 1965-2011 by Year Left School and Destination (%)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Africa</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>17.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Other</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>463</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 3. European Petreans 1965-2011 by Year Left School and Destination (%)

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>328</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Africa</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>28.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>529</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>194</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Other</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of Shurmer-Smith’s (2015, p. 160) respondents, Tony Frowd, left Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) in 1965 after his government grant at a teacher training college was withdrawn. He went to Bulawayo (Southern Rhodesia) and trained as a rubber technician. Upon going to the UK after that, he started a tyre re-treader business, switching to work for a software house. In 2003, he and his wife Linda moved to Costa del Sol in Spain. From the BSAP data we have estimated that around 5% of members engaged in stepwise migration, of which half went via South Africa to another destination. Possibly this is an underestimate, if they omit some moves. A few moves might better be described as circular migration since at some stage the migrant finishes back in Zimbabwe. In contrast, around one in five Petreans have moved to two or more countries since school, reflecting a much higher engagement in stepwise migration. Many Petreans were engaged in education in other countries and may eventually return to Zimbabwe.

Education can lead to a permanent stay in the destination country but can also lead to stepwise migration. Arnold (2011) has described the emigration of South African doctors. One example in Arnold’s study is Michael Denborough who was born and schooled in Southern Rhodesia, and gained his medical degree at Cape Town before going to the University of Oxford as Rhodes scholar. There, he met his Australian wife and migrated to Brisbane (Arnold 2011, p. 232). It can be assumed that marriage to a citizen of a third country can influence stepwise migration by adding to the knowledge of a potential destination and providing easier access to that destination. A BSAP example is a patrol officer who, after leaving the police in 1979, spent 12 years in Swaziland, Eastern Transvaal and Mozambique working in the agricultural machinery business. He married a New Zealander in Swaziland. After seven years in the UK they moved to New Zealand in 1998. Unusually for contributions to the factual BSAP database, he adds the comment “yuck!!” after referring to his UK sojourn. Shurmer-Smith (2015, p. 201-2) has a description of why John and Lizzie Gormall moved from Northern Rhodesia to England and then to New Zealand. While John was following a degree course in Kent, Lizzie found the locals “strange” and the weather depressing, while John found teaching in comprehensive schools dispiriting.

Conclusion
As Shurmer-Smith (2011, p. 1) has observed, ‘Northern Rhodesia isn’t a place that post colonialism forgot, it is a place that post colonialism chose not to remember.’ However, she continues by referring to the ‘growing literature of memory in diasporic identity.’ For the former constituent countries of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi), there is perhaps much more interest in recent African emigration than in the history of white emigration. Anecdotal evidence suggests that return migration to Zimbabwe could occur if the political and economic situation were to improve. Return and stepwise migration, and the reasons for such moves, are generally difficult to measure. Prosopography, as used above, has provided insights into migration choices and the prevalence and direction of stepwise migration. Such work is labour intensive, searching for biographical details and creating databases.

Research opportunities exist using databases that have not been used for statistical analysis (Shurmer-Smith 2015, p. 250) or could perhaps be created in the case of the Northern Rhodesia Police Association, or railway workers, for example. Outpost
newsletters from various branches of the of the BSAP are still going strong, and include published memoirs. Vignettes from Overseas Pensioner, the magazine of the Overseas Pensioners’ Association, could be explored. Unfortunately, OPSA will cease to exist in 2017; like similar associations, its membership has been ageing. On the other hand, the ‘Object of Colonial Memory’ research project continues to conduct interviews in the UK about ‘the end of empire’ (Jeppesen and Longair 2016, p. 41-2).

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Cultural heritage management and education in Botswana: Exploring integral management strategies for structural change

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Abstract
This research proposes an analysis and assessment of cultural heritage management practices and existing education initiatives in Botswana, Southern Africa. It is crucial for key organizations, national and institutional policies or mandates that influence perspectives of cultural heritage management and its sustainable growth in the country. These organizations include government ministries, departments and their partners which currently face the mammoth task of managing Botswana’s heritage resources. This research aims to present issues and opportunities for the heritage management system and existing underlying causes of compromised performance stemming from gaps within the education system of the country. In my previous master study, context-related factors were identified as having a strong impact on the performance of Botswana’s cultural heritage management system. With a young and emerging economy the government of Botswana continues to search for ways to diversify its diamond mining dependent economy. This focus has however left most cultural heritage concerns at the bottom of the list of priorities. The existing lacking practical training for professionals in the field is an example. These challenges show the need for integrated management projects which should render effective and sustainable efforts. This research aim at producing an in-depth analysis of the current situation as well as proposing new strategies for structural change. Using a critical paradigm approach the purpose and goal of the investigation is to improve and transform Botswana’s current cultural heritage management system through education and practices that should promote greater community participation and cultural appropriation, based on social justice and respect for diversity by international standards.

Background and research questions
The Department of Museums and Art Galleries, linked to the Ministry of Sports Youth and Culture, Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism as well as the Botswana National Commission for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which falls under the Ministry of Education and Skills Development, in the case of this country, are responsible for the general management of cultural and natural heritage in Botswana. These ministries, departments and their partners face the enormous task of managing Botswana’s cultural heritage. Relevant to this research in 2013, UNESCO held the International Congress on Culture: Key to Sustainable Development, in Hangzhou, China. The meeting developed the Hangzhou Declaration in this way placing Culture at the heart of Sustainable Development Policies which was then subsequently presented to the UN General Assembly. The Hangzhou Declaration describes the elements of sustainability with particular emphasis on concept and action which is an approach that could assist the management of cultural heritage in Botswana.
One of the main recommendations of the Hangzhou Declaration is integrating culture within all development policies and programs, using this approach as one that is equal in terms of measure with that of human rights, equality and sustainability (Hangzhou Declaration, UNESCO, 2013). This approach towards the placement of culture, cultural heritage in this research is a critical starting point for this research. With a young and emerging economy, only gaining independence in 1966, Botswana is a developing country that has a lot to learn. As there is a prominent need to relieve the economy of the country from its heavy reliance on its diamond-mining sector (Maruatona, 2013; Sekwati, 2010; Bidpa, 2009). Although other mineral extraction activities have recently begun to grow, this sector currently contributes approximately 40% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Maruatona, 2013). As the government of this country continues to search for ways to diversify the economy of the country this focus has left most cultural heritage concerns at the bottom of the list of priorities from an effective management strategies standpoint. Although gaining momentum slowly, funding remains one of the most prominent challenges for cultural heritage management in Botswana (Molefe, 2016).

At local level, both cultural and natural heritage are protected by the Monuments and Relics Act (2001). This act consists of condensed definitions for monuments, institutional responsibilities and penalties for damage of specific sites. Ironically, no prominent emphasis is given to the current value or significance of education endeavours geared towards cultural heritage management. In addition, the National Policy on Culture (2001) states objectives that aim to create a conducive environment for cultural preservation and participation by all Botswana citizens. The policy defines procedures to preserve and protect cultural heritage by caring for and expanding historical monuments and sites, museums, archives and library collections, artistic and intellectual property. There are however no specifications with respect to the role of education towards mobilization of initiatives or as a means of empowerment towards the achievements of related goal and inclusiveness of site custodians from a management perspective (Molefe, 2016). Furthermore, to some extent the Environmental Impact Assessment Act (2010) can be associate with archaeological remnants of cultural heritage is primarily concerned with identifying and evaluating the environmental impact of developmental activity with particular reference to only he archaeological, aesthetic, cultural or sanitary conditions of the environment. The National Human Resource Development Strategy (2009) mentions that it calls for an explicit, strategically focused and sustained approach which seeks to link social, cultural, political and economic strategies in a more holistic and integrated manner around human capabilities and opportunities. It makes no mention of cultural heritage management but the relevance of this strategy for this paper delineates the need for an integrated approach to develop sustainable cultural heritage management in the country. Similarly, the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) Policy on Education in Botswana (2007) defines education as the foundation of any modern society. It clearly states that in order for Botswana to achieve sustainable development education is needed. This is an entry point for this research in developing a sustainable management structure for cultural heritage which should be informed by or work hand in hand with the education system of the country. Citing Botswana's Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE) of 1994 Tabulawa (2009) defines this policy as the country's response to globalization. He explains that education in the country is under pressure to produce the learner-equivalent of the self-programmable worker. This self-
A programmable worker being one which he describes as characterized by such psychosocial traits as independence of thought, innovativeness, creativity and flexibility. The relevance of this to this paper is that indeed this learner is needed within the realms of cultural heritage management in Botswana to ensure its sustainability at site management level.

On a Global scale management planning initiatives for existing World Heritage sites pose as an important benchmark for this research as they exemplify paramount attempts geared towards heritage product development which could contribute as lessons to be learnt by Botswana’s commodity dependent economy. ‘World Heritage’ stands as a concept which consists of key characteristics which are viewed as exceptional in their universal application (UNESCO, 1972). Therefore, in order for a heritage site to be listed by UNESCO as a site that possess ‘Outstanding Universal Value (OUV)’, would have as an advantage having UNESCO’s technical and managerial support. There are currently only 2 listed World Heritage sites in Botswana out of 2000 registered heritage sites in the country.

The concept of World Heritage is unfortunately not currently fully utilized even though the country urges the development of management approaches that entail strategies and policies for proper protecting of heritage. Botswana’s institutions responsible for developing policies and managing heritage are currently following guidelines that are embodied in two international UNESCO conventions: the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (UNESCO, 1972) and the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO, 2003). The aim of adopting these principles is to ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the protection, conservation and promotion of Botswana’s tangible and intangible cultural and natural heritage. This management based on international standards contributes to build management strategies adopted by the national government that consequently, are the basis for community grassroots management level. Acknowledging that community groups are defined as those who identify, enact, recreate and transmit living heritage (Keitumetse, 2011; Keitumetse & Nthoi, 2009). Keitumetse (2014, p.61) explains that in most developed countries, a more prevalent focus on the cultural heritage and sustainable development link has been placed on urban spaces while developing countries and emerging economies such as Botswana, cultural heritage is readily available and opportunities for education on natural and cultural resource conservation remain open. She points out that community residents are endowed with knowledge and skills relating to both tangible and tangible cultural resources. Building on to her view it is apparent that rural communities therefore provide readily available personnel to be educated and empowered towards modern management purposes for sustainable heritage management based on the Botswana’s Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE) of 1994 as well as The National Human Resource Development Strategy of 2009 which calls for a strategically focused and sustained approach which should integrated human capabilities and opportunities. This could be viewed as a community based approach which should be however synchronized with the desired end state of cultural heritage management in the country.

Although Botswana subscribes to internationally accredited conventions as mentioned above there remains a gap within the incorporation of cultural heritage resources towards development or notable economic gain. Although funding has been identified as an issue,
the identified gap needs to be addressed from a strategic planning point of view. Currently there is no comprehensive or streamlined approach for valorization of cultural heritage resources in Botswana. The heritage management remains at basic level in the country; there is a need to find relevant means of effectively localizing the international approach to local heritage management level. Within the cultural heritage preservation context, current initiatives held by the Department of Museums and Art Galleries, do not seem sufficient in their day-to-day management. Cultural initiatives are demonstrating lack of innovative approaches to sustainable heritage management an example of this being the random rock paintings and rearrangement throughout the country with the colours of the Botswana flag in preparation for independence day, 30th September 2016 as the country turns 50 years. Some have viewed this as a disturbance to nature amongst the social network community in the country. Current fundraising initiatives for the management of heritage in Botswana are ad hoc and need a more professionally structured management approach (Molefe, 2016). There is also a need for a community engagement approach, which requires their empowerment and relevant training; this could allow local communities - those who hold significant indigenous knowledge - with the opportunity of taking part in the management and defense of our heritage resources, current under rapid deterioration (Keitumetse, 2014).

Heritage managers at grassroot level are affected by economic, social and education discrepancies. This research aims to investigate context-related factors impacting on the development of cultural heritage management in Botswana. The idea is to identify risks, potentialities and strategies that can improve heritage management and education initiatives in the country. By inquiring into the institutions responsible for cultural heritage management, current policies as well as their relevance to heritage managers at site level, the research seeks to identify opportunities for making the heritage management system function effectively. The causes of poor performance of cultural heritage initiatives in Botswana are to be outlined in order to recommend relevant sustainable strategies required for the improvement of political, educational and managerial action for socio-economic betterment of local communities.

This study will be led by the following research questions:

- How effective and relevant are the current heritage management policies employed by the Botswana government and other concerned institutions?
- Why do current training initiatives seem to not be sufficient for contemporary cultural heritage management within the country?
- What can be done from a and participatory engagement viewpoint to improve the current local managerial structure of cultural heritage site management in Botswana?
- How can the Botswana National Comission for UNESCO play a more effective role within the cultural heritage management arena of Botswana?

**Objective**

The research aims to investigate context-related factors that are affecting the purpose and practicality of public policies in order to develop new approaches that can enhance cultural heritage management in Botswana. It is focused on:

- Identifying and analyzing managerial practices,
• Investigating the progression and effectiveness of existing cultural heritage management projects
• Analysing and proposing ways to improve the role of UNESCO in the country regarding the strong need for sustainable heritage management approaches in Botswana which embrace education.
• Finding ways to promote community participation and education for empowerment,

Significance
This research will be useful for providing basis for the development and implementation of cultural heritage management and training strategies in Botswana. It investigates the impact of economic development focus on cultural heritage management issues. Identifying and analyzing factors impacting on the performance of cultural heritage management is important for local human development. The research is significant to create awareness among professionals on the trends of cultural heritage management, education and community development in Botswana. This awareness should not be sidelined as the country’s mineral extraction activities continue to boom in isolation.

The potential benefits of cultural heritage resource management within the development framework as a means of brining in much needed structural change will be highlighted in this research with reference to existing literature that concerns the objectives of this study. It is prominent that there are ways of empowering communities, through means of local participation and empowerment of heritage managers partnering with the government towards defining a balanced sustainable approach towards cultural heritage management. This research stands to exemplify that community wellbeing and valorization of heritage from a cultural heritage management perspective and economic development are important for diversifying Botswana’s economy if the correct approach is employed by managing bodies accordingly.

The significance of cultural heritage management can generate new employment opportunities. These embrace employment opportunities within the areas of education, preservation, conservation, rehabilitation and maintenance of heritage sites (for local craftsmen and construction companies). In this way far from being what could be regarded as an unnecessary luxury in comparison with the basic needs of most African countries, all actions in favor of the cultural and natural heritage in Botswana can actually serve as a springboard for further economic development of the country. The research aims to prove that the government of Botswana has a major role to play in the protection of heritage, and should work most closely with the communities who are the primary beneficiaries of development activities amongst cultural heritage sites in the country (Molefe, 2016).

Methodology and Research Methods
Under a critical paradigm, this study aims to employ a critical ethnographic approach. This critical paradigm will permit a deep analysis of empirical evidence concerning the political, economical and socio-cultural aspects involved in cultural heritage management in Botswana. The research will deal with relevant management approaches within responsible institutions and their stakeholders. Therefore this paradigm is suitable for this investigation as the research can be tailored using different methodological
approaches. There are four government ministries that will be used within the study area. The critical research paradigm should address this research by enabling the researcher to explore, identify and transforming obstacles for reasonable social structures, policies, beliefs and practices (Taylor & Medina, 2013) concerning cultural heritage in Botswana. Its primary purpose is to identify, contest and help resolve ‘gross power imbalances’ in society which fuel ethically questionable profitmaking activities that contribute to systemic inequalities and injustices such as social and economic exclusion of some sectors of society, loss of cultural capital and cultural identity amongst ethnic minorities, and anthropocentric climate change and loss of biodiversity. (Taylor & Medina, 2013; Barker, 2008; Thomas, 1993). Critical ethnography is the chosen methodology for this research, as a way of applying a ‘subversive’ worldview to more conventional narratives of cultural inquiry. It does not necessarily stand in opposition to conventional ethnography or even to conventional social science. However, as I intend to identify management issues, including risks, possible causes of the low performance of local institutions by applying ethnographic research methods, such as observations and semi-structured interviews, the associated critical approach can offer a broader reflective style of thinking about the relationships between knowledge and society as well as other social dominations (Barker, 2008; Thomas, 1993).

Data Collection
Qualitative data will be collected through fieldworks. The data gathering will support a situational analysis of current heritage management initiatives in Botswana. This approach will also include documentation investigation and observations.

Fieldwork and interviews
- Heritage managers at all levels and community members responsible for specific sites will undergo semi-structured interviews. Questionnaires will be administered to investigate and outline the current perceptions and understanding of the significance of well-planned heritage management practices.

- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions will be conducted with individuals or groups, such as managers and politicians that have specific knowledge, influence or expertise about the issue being investigated.

Direct observation will involve the researcher observing research subjects for an appropriate amount of time. It can be direct or participant depending on emerging issues and subject under investigation.

Archival research will include literature that may be kept deposited in official or private libraries or archives including publications and annual reports of brochures.

Purposive Sample
Relevant officials responsible for cultural heritage management and education will be interviewed from the Department of Museums and Art Galleries (Ministry of Sports Youth and Culture), the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism and the Botswana National Commission for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) - the Ministry of Education and Skills Development. The management of 4 local heritage sites will be investigated, for the analysis and evaluation
of heritage management practices within those sites at grass root level. This will give a balanced insight from all management levels. Data will also be gathered from other countries including Australia to benchmark on the best education approaches to heritage management practices.

**Data Analysis**

The data analysis and evaluation will bring forward some important points about the opportunities and challenges for the development of heritage management in Botswana. The designs used for achieving the aims of the proposed research is the critical analysis and the structural functionalist method (Philips & Burbules, 2000; Ryan & Barnard, 2000).

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Redefining “Home”: The concept of dala in Marjorie Oludhe Macgoye’s Chira

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Abstract
The debates about Marjorie Oludhe Macgoye’s identity either, exclusively identify her as Kenyan or British-born Kenyan without explicitly interrogating the process by which she became Kenyan. This research recognises that Macgoye is Kenyan through her marriage to a Luo. The Luo are a language group whose traditional land is on the shores of Lake Victoria. To the Luo, the word dala has varied meanings including, but not limited to: a homestead, the ancestral land, the clan, and the general direction of dala before the Luo is Kenyan. As a Luo wife, Macgoye has multiple belongings to these dala spaces, which use location, ethnicity and gender to create Luo cultural identity in experiences involving an individual’s past and the present. These definitions of the Luo dala are interrogated in various ways in Macgoye’s Chira (a novel) showing her engagement with the different appropriations of the Luo dala.

This paper uses postcolonial and diaspora theories, and the Luo concepts of dala to show how her identity and belonging influences Macgoye’s representations. It argues that Macgoye’s Luo wife status informs and redefines postcolonial and diaspora concepts of home. The paper also shows how Macgoye’s being “at home” is shown through her use of both the mother tongue and the mother in-law tongue. Luo storytelling structures and transliterations are identified as indications of Macgoye’s concept of dala. The research aims to show how the cultural re-rooting of Macgoye challenges discussions of displacement, identity and belonging.

Introduction
Postcolonial theory has several notions of home categorised by physical geography, nostalgia, and memory. These notions complicate appropriations of home and undermine the tendency to read home within a dichotomy of destination and arrival. The structure and development of home includes, for diasporic identities, an element of in-betweeness which produces what is often termed, hyphenated identities. When Marjorie Oludhe Macgoye is identified as a “British-born” Kenyan, she performs within this hyphenated context, but she is also identified by critical works as exclusively Kenyan (Wasamba 2000; Kuria 2009). These debates notably fail to interrogate the process by which Macgoye became Kenyan or how she inhabits the hyphen. It can be
argued that Macgoye is Kenyan by her marriage to a Luo, a Kenyan language group whose traditional land is on the shores of Lake Victoria. The resultant Luo wife status, arguably, accords Macgoye a Luo identity, belonging and subject position. Against this backdrop, this study enables the exploration of identity which can, redefine, enrich and inform current diaspora and postcolonial notions of home.

As a Luo wife, Macgoye has multiple belongings to Luo identity spaces, which use location (dala), ethnicity (being Luo) and gender (inclusiveness of the Luo wife) to create Luo cultural identity in experiences involving an individual’s past and the present. The nuanced Dholuo expressions, including the title of the novel, Chira, are lost to non-Luo readers, or ignored or misinterpreted by critics keen to create (much needed at the time) literary analyses that responded to the emergence of AIDS in Kenya. Chira (the text) uses Luo cultural ideas and language in ways that create spaces worth exploring in the context of discussions of home and belonging. It is against this backdrop that this research draws on Macgoye’s treatment of dala, that is, home in the Luo context, to expose how cultural conditioning remains a significant moderating influence to the self in relation to constructions of Kenyan identity. The study argues that the knowledge of the existence of local concepts and narratives in the Luo traditional spaces, dala, is the main issue that Macgoye deals with to show the cultural and social conflict culture faces as it struggles to fit modern disease into its fabric. Macgoye’s Chira explores the power relationships and place of women in the city and in the traditional Luo society, displacement and alienation, and the Luo cultural understanding of chira (the wasting disease) as a self-directed predicament, something earned by the sufferer’s sin.

The existence of cultural concepts and narratives in Luo traditional spaces has not informed previous readings of Chira. Kruger (2004) asserts that, ‘AIDS translates into local concepts, local epistemologies and, finally local spaces’ (p. 118), but this research argues that in confrontations with change, the Luo cultural view influences how individuals view their situations both in dala and in the city. Thus, the location of dala and the interactions from dala in addition to the individual’s engagement with dala should underpin the readings of Chira. The role of dala in Chira creates spaces worth exploring for their contribution to discussions of what Komu (2005) only acknowledges as, ‘some ethnocentric elements in her (Macgoye’s) works’ (p. 9). This paper shows that it is these ethnic centred discussions, which inform the articulations of cultural issues in Chira. The discussions in the text explore more than chira and even this is presented from a Luo focus which includes interrogations of dala as: fixed locations, originary homes, oppressive sites, and spaces where individuals seek to understand disease and cultural values.

**Postcolonial conceptions of “home”**

The English language, in which postcolonial theory is predominantly articulated, defines home in different ways that involve cross-sectional elements of memory, longing and belonging which subvert notions of home as a point of departure and return. When individuals leave the places in which they were born and they carry memories of these spaces with them, home becomes a, ‘mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination’ (Brah 1996, p. 192). In this design, home is not a specific location, but a space constructed in the memory of an individual or a group of people with common origin who experience nostalgia even as they are unable to return to these spaces. Contrasting
Brah’s idea is Ahmed’s (1999) definition of home as, ‘where one lives, or where one’s family lives, or it is one’s native country’ (p. 388). This definition identifies home with a specific location where one belongs by descent or nationality. Ngugi (2005) intersects Brah and Ahmed’s definitions of home by attributing the construction of home to the combination of personal experiences of individuals or groups and their imaginations. A close look at all these ideas of home reveals the ties to socio-cultural influences and national identities in current postcolonial and diaspora theories of home. It also reveals the lack of a unified view of home as shown in the resulting hyphenated identities.

In the context of postcolonial Kenya, the attempts to subvert neat constitutions of home are complicated further by the fact that different Kenyan communities have their own definitions of home, so the hyphen in Macgoye’s postcolonial identity problematises the concept of home in the English language context. In addition, it calls for a discerning understanding of “home” in the context of Macgoye’s Luo-Kenyan experience of place. In this regard, Shutzer’s (2012) criticism of the Kenya government for its, ‘simplistic use of ‘home’—as if it were a concept that all Kenyan citizens shared’ (p. 348) is worth observing. Shutzer points out the effects of colonialism in current Kenyan definitions of home and notes the links between colonialism and the assignation of land which, ‘embedded ethnic identity in geographic space’ (p. 348). These colonial assignations of the “geographic spaces” as identified by Shutzer, are traditionally encompassed in the Luo word *dala* which has varied meanings including but not limited to: a homestead, the ancestral land, the clan and then Kenyan identity.

There are some commonalities between home in postcolonial and diaspora theories with the Luo concept of *dala*. Ahmed’s (1999) definition of home as the location of an individual’s beginning is incorporated in the *dala* reference to the Luo traditional concepts of birth where, ‘those whose placentae are buried within the homestead are seen to belong, be upright, be secure’ (Cohen and Odhiambo 1987, p. 269). In the pre-urban migration Kenya, the Luo homestead may have shifted, but the memories of the location were retained in the oral culture and sometimes marked by special features and included in the family identity as *gunda* (a previous location of *dala*). The placentae of one generation may have been buried either in *gunda* or in the current *dala*, but the clear identification of the location of previous homes allowed individuals to track and link their identities to the places their ancestors occupied. Referring to this as the *biero* (placenta) discourse, Cohen and Odhiambo (1987) argue that it identifies Luo people by where they were born, which makes *dala* a specific location tied to shared and legitimate ownership of physical and geographical spaces. Citing a translated Luo proverb, ‘Of course Odongo does not feel at home because *home* is where the placenta is buried’ (p. 271), Cohen and Odhiambo emphasise the Luo links of home to individual identity, belonging and feelings of being in *dala*. This is in reference to traditional Luo birth practice where the child was born in *dala* and the placenta buried in the homestead of the parents. Before the establishment of the western style health care system, if a birth occurred outside the *dala*, the placenta was carried to *dala* and buried there. The distinction between the Luo definitions of *dala* as a geographical and specific location was highlighted in Odera Oruka’s (1990) witness presentations, in the S.M. Otieno case in which there were contestations of where S.M. Otieno was to be buried. In this legal case, Oruka made further Luo distinctions between *dala* and *ot* which challenged English definitions and showed the difference between English definitions and Luo
understandings. Ot is a house in dala or in the city, but the city dwelling is not home in the Luo context; it can only be a house. According to Oruka, dala differs from home because the individual has no choice of where dala is. The clan, the collective to which the individual belongs by birth, determines the location of dala and it is a physical location (pp. 73–74). The distance from where dala is defined accords it fixity as a specified location at the same time flexibility depending on the site of definition. Within this construction of dala, any reading of Macgoye’s Chira must acknowledge that dala is an essential construct that must be explored for a proper understanding of the text. Individual identity and belonging among the Luo, the community whose story Chira tells, are linked to where dala is as demonstrated by the Otieno case where it was argued that Otieno had to buried where the placenta was buried which was dala and not the Ot he had near Nairobi.

Within the placenta discourse, the cultural re-rooting of Macgoye would have challenged her Kenyan identity because of her English birth, and placed her in the interstices where she does not belong to either culture. However, Macgoye’s origin is acknowledged in her virilocal home where she is accepted and included, and where she becomes an insider in the Luo dala, which influences her cultural understanding of the Luo values. As Petra Brittner (2009) notes, Macgoye’s in-between position does not disavow her first skin, but it can also be argued that it does not deny her articulation of Luo culture and subjectiveness.

“The wasting disease”

In Chira, Macgoye not only identifies the Luo difference between dala and other locations, but also appropriates different characteristics of dala. Chira (the text) explores the contradictions between the “new” definitions of HIV/AIDS and the Luo traditional understanding of chira (the disease) as the consequences of transgressions of Luo cultural norms. The protagonist, Gabriel Otieno (Otish) explores the city life, through his Luo lenses, reviewing all of its new experiences such as employment, Christianity, slum dwelling, relationships and politics. He still has connections to his ancestral home (dala) through visits by people from dala and letters. At the beginning of the novel, Mama Samuel, Otish’s aunt, is in the referral hospital in Nairobi, but demands that medicine be brought to her from her maternal home which Otish successfully arranges for. Whether she recovers because of hospital intervention or the medicine from home is not clearly stated, but Mama Samuel’s belief in the efficacy of Luo medicine is a recurrent idea in the text. Otish travels home (dala) when his mother writes to him to visit because Samuel, his cousin, is severely sick. The now very frail Samuel confesses to Otish about an incestuous relationship with his cousin Josefina who has, by this time, died. It is notable that Samuel himself, in line with his Luo cultural beliefs, attributes his own illness to chira, because incest is a violation of Luo culture. Chira also explores the power and place of women in both the city and the traditional society, displacement and alienation and other postcolonial issues in Kenya.

Chira has predominantly been read as an AIDS narrative (Komu 2005; Wasamba 2000). Most of these readings were in the early days of the AIDS epidemic, where studies were earnestly seeking answers and ways of responding to the disease. Against these nationalistic readings of Chira as, ‘a novel that responds to the HIV/AIDS pandemic’ (Komu 2005, p. 7), is Kruger’s (2004) assertion that the text, ‘is not primarily a novel
about HIV infected characters; instead, the narrative explores the contradictions and dilemmas faced by those likely to contract the disease, who are often torn between shunning the infected and expressing sympathy for their plight (p. 117). There is a notable gap in discussions of Maegoye’s in-depth understanding of Luo cultural norms and her use of Dholuo (the Luo language) expressions. Maegoye presents Samuel’s confession of incest and the discussions between Mama Fibi and Mama Gabriel, which underscore her understanding of the cultural perceptions even in the face of the HIV/AIDS. The struggles to understand how chira has traditionally worked and the new manifestation is evident in conversations in Chira such as –

“It is the red fish they eat down there. My mother always used to warn me about it and I have impressed it on my children. If you have fish, have ngege. It is the only safe one”
“But people do not say it is a food sickness, my sister-in-law. They say it is chira”
“But chira does not pass between kinsfolk” (p. 54)

Macgoye emphasises the cultural understandings of the beliefs of the origin of chira, cultural taboos that surround “the wasting disease” as the Luo characters in the text know it and the traditional beliefs in this context. These “ethnocentric elements” shape the tensions in the text between cultural values and the new disease. Maegoye subverts her Englishness from the outset, in the title, where the cultural values implied highlight the ambiguities in the text. Chira is an ailment culturally identified in the Luo dala and in her selection of the title of this text, Maegoye clearly shows that dala is not only associated with cultural understanding but also provides an explanation for a disease (chira) which complicates the present scourge of HIV/AIDS. When she explains: ‘Richo e makelo chira—it is sin that causes the wasting disease’ (p. 49), Maegoye’s Dholuo (language) and Luo cultural understanding is lost to the non-Luo speaking reader who has no knowledge that this is a popular Luo saying. It was first put in writing in Dholuo by Paul Mbuya Akoko in 1945, long before the AIDS narrative started. What is translated in the text as “sin” is redefined by Odera Oruka’s citation of Paul Mbuya Akoko that, ‘bad deeds bring about chira’ (Oruka 1990, p. 81). Oruka further develops his own definition stating –

Chira is a misfortune which befalls one because of an evil deed in the past—gima rach matimoreni nyime ni mar rach ma isetimo chien. It is also seen as a misfortune on one following one’s conduct in breaking a taboo. (p. 69)

The taboos spoken of here are cultural values that are specific to the Luo and not necessarily shared values within other Kenyan communities. For example, sexual relations between cousins in some communities in Kenya may be acceptable and cousins can be married whereas, among the Luo, in the rules of dala, this is a taboo that undoubtedly result in chira. The previous readings of Chira as an AIDS narrative served the purpose of creating a unified nationalistic view of a social problem. However, Homi Bhabha (1994) would criticise these as attempts to locate writing in what he describes as, ‘a containment of difference . . .the assumption that at some level all forms of cultural diversity may be understood on the basis of a particular universal concept’ (pp. 208-209)
in this case, the nation, Kenya. To read Chira only as a nationalistic AIDS narrative ignores Macgoye’s engagement with the Luo dala and its rules. Writing from the Luo wife perspective, Macgoye does not deny the existence of HIV/AIDS, but she unveils the complications of getting Samuel and his family to transcend the cultural values that equate disease to transgression of social norms, which is named as sin. Kruger’s (2004) statements that chira, ‘is a local Luo term that interweaves a new medical condition, AIDS, with a highly problematic cultural status, that of breaking a taboo’ (p. 117) and later that it is, ‘an obscure, socially stigmatized wasting disease’ (p. 121) fail to show that the Luo clearly understood chira and had cultural regulations to guard against transgressions that would lead to the occurrence of chira. Similar misunderstanding is expressed in Komu’s (2005) declaration (in outsider distance) that, “chira” is a common condition in this community’ (p. 41). Chira is not a common condition, because people would do everything to avoid it; rather, it is a known condition which requires, ‘a new speaking position in an affirmative idiom’ (Krüger 2004, p. 125).

The ambiguity surrounding cultural norms embedded in the complexities of chira in Luo cultural values requires interrogation, rethinking and a new language. It is in this framework of a new language that in different research based on Nigerian settings, both Joseph Ogbodo and Adedeji Odunlade (cited in Komu 2005) identified the need for appropriate language to communicate HIV/AIDS education to the rural communities to stem the spread of the disease. As the HIV/AIDS campaigns continued in Kenya, the Luo coined new language to identify HIV/AIDS, which moved from speculations of the disease as chira to identifying it differently as Ayaki matieka (Aduda 2013), translating loosely to: robbery, exploitation, extinction—finishing, which are the characteristics of AIDS. Wasamba, though engaged in some explication of the text as an AIDS narrative is recognised by Komu as disputing, “. . . traditional beliefs that misrepresent . . . AIDS as a common wasting disease among the Luo known as chira” (Komu 2005, p. 127). It is this “misrepresentation,” which shows limited understanding of Luo social norms and cultural values, that has led to Chira being read predominantly as a story of AIDS and not of a community struggling to find expressions of the challenges of postcolonial Kenyan society. In the traditional society, any sex outside of marriage was culturally unacceptable (Mboya 1945) and chira is only used by the Luo characters in the text to describe the known or speculated sexual engagement of the two cousins, which is a taboo in the Luo culture. It is notable that in the text, outsiders like Njoki, Theodore and Helen readily submit themselves to HIV screening while the other named characters, Luos who interpret their surrounding by the moral values of home, do not except MakOwuor who is pressured by Njoki to be tested. Wasamba (2000) notes that this shows that, ‘people no longer fear to know their status’ (p. 131), but fails to identify the cultural conditioning of the people he is referring to and their non-Luo backgrounds or influences.

Komu (2005) argues that Wasamba –

Identifies the use of condoms, change of attitudes towards the disease, accepting its existence, HIV screening, going public with the disease, improvement of sexual habits and family life education as some of the solutions Macgoye offers to curb the scourge. (p. 30)

While these present valid and useful control and management of HIV, there is no evidence provided in Komu’s critique of where these are included in Chira. Macgoye

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shows that Gabriel, Samuel, Mama Samuel and the villagers, though perturbed about the disease, have a resigned acknowledgment of chira. As stated earlier, there appears to be significant effort to capitalise on the text as an AIDS narrative to the exclusion of the dilemma scripted in the text as implied by the title. Macgoye clearly states (through the omniscient narrator, the women’s village talk) and also shows by the behaviour of Josefina’s father towards his sister, Mama Samuel, the disturbance of cultural values by the incest which is also articulated by Samuel accepting his illicit relationship with Josefina. Komu (2005) reads Chira as “pedagogical” writing (p. 34) exploring causes and effects of HIV showing Samuel’s ‘ignorance and denial of the existence of denial’ (ibid.), but ignores the fact that Macgoye is silent on any other information on how, if she did, Josefina contracted HIV. In the letter that Gabriel receives from dala (another shift in narrative style—the reader hears Gabriel’s mother’s voice) Gabriel’s mother says –

We are asking you to come as soon as possible to see your cousin Samuel, who is very sick. The sickness in not understood by us. The doctor at the health centre has not been able to master it. (p. 44)

Reading this only as the villager’s ignorance where ignorance means lack of knowledge or awareness would not be comprehensive because the statements show that even medical science does not have the capacity to deal with Samuel’s situation. What Gabriel’s mother makes clear is that some social norm has been broken; incest is immoral behaviour, a contravention of Luo social norms as a society that marries outside of their immediate clan. Since Macgoye does not imply or introduce other sexual partners of Samuel or Josefina in the text, it is not clear how the text’s central idea can be unquestionably HIV/AIDS to justify Komu’s (2005) conclusion, ‘that Josefina and Samuel’s infection originated from their incestuous relationship’ (p. 40). Komu’s argument would only imply that incest leads to disease, which is what chira is understood by the community to be. The confusion of the villagers in their experiences with Josefina’s death and Samuel’s illness can only be ignorance and unfamiliarity; their existing knowledge of chira challenges new information, which uses the same language to describe a new thing. Language, ‘is a carrier of culture of those people to whom it is a mother tongue’ (Ngugi 2005, p. 151), so chira is not translatable or equated to HIV/AIDS. As stated earlier, Dholuo has since moved on to adopt other language to distinguish HIV from chira.

Change in community values is depicted as closely related to the containment of the spread of AIDS in predominant readings of Chira, but the language used in the text, besides the title, indicates that language is an important consideration in this text. The use of the word “home” in Chira takes on different meanings. For example, at the start of the text Gabriel’s comment to Theodore Maina, ‘At home, really? On the edge of the city?’ (p. 38) foregrounds the importance of language use and its implications on the Luo understanding of dala as a specific location. Gabriel muses over how the edge of the city can be dala and links this to individual identity when he asks Maina, ‘How do you see yourself?’ Maina’s identity is constructed by where he calls home as incorporated in his response, ‘Why not? I am an orphan. I have no other’ (p. 38). By inhabiting the fringe of the city, Maina is in the Third Space between his ancestral home, which he does not know and the city where he sits on the edges of. This space is where hybridity occurs according to Bhabha (1994, p. 13) and in this liminality, the individual does not retain
any of the originary culture. While movement to the city for Gabriel does not destroy his historical and cultural identity as he still has *dala*, for Maina it is tied up to his status as an orphan raised by his maternal grandmother, who has no connections with his paternal family. For Ngugi (2005), ‘the choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment’ (p. 143).

For the Luo characters in *Chira*, their “natural environment” is *dala* and that is their departure and return point. Thus, when Helen’s mother returns to Kenya after the end of her marriage in Tanzania, the rules and values of her Luo departure point dictate where she is buried, because she no longer has *dala* in her place of birth. Helen’s mother is in-between; she inhabits the hyphen and is excluded from both sides. Her situation highlights the plight of the alien against the Luo cultural values of *dala* that require a married woman to make her own *dala* in the husband’s home. Helen’s choice not to identify with her maternal Luo roots may seem as a choice and has been read as such (Krüger 2004, p. 120), but does she really have a choice in a patrilineal society? Helen is alienated from her Tanzanian background and does not really belong with her mother’s people in the patrilineal Luo society; thus, she has multiple beginnings without a specified *dala*. Gabriel, on the other hand, has *dala* to which he returns. *Dala* becomes the traditional space endowed with cultural identity, acceptance and belonging without much individual choice of where and how much to belong. This challenges the observation that both Helen and Gabriel –

Complicate notions of home and exile by generating a host of imagined communities and diasporic affiliations that emerge as intermediate and temporary locations and that question the familiar concept of home as refuge and a place of undisputed origin and identity (Krüger 2004, p. 121)

The spaces Helen and Gabriel inhabit are real communities that they engage with from the viewpoint of their originary identities, their understanding of *dala* and or lack of it. Gabriel returns home (*dala*) to visit a specific location, and Helen not seeking out her mother’s people could be explained by the patrilineal nature of a society that will alienate a “daughter’s child”. Throughout the text, Helen’s alienation is shown through references to her language in expressions that describe the type of Kiswahili she spoke as Tanzanian and even the use of the word “stupid” that Macgoye parenthetically references as Helen not knowing how bad that sounded to a Luo ear. Language, in the text, is shown as central to an individual’s identity.

**Conclusion**

*Chira* supports the premise that Macgoye’s multiple belongings to the Luo *dala* spaces have influenced her language choices and representation. The diverse Luo appropriations of *dala* are, therefore, important considerations in reading the text to explore how displacement, identity and belonging are framed in the *dala* lens throughout the text. The text echoes the Luo understanding that *dala* is a specific location. This construct challenges current postcolonial attempts to produce a generalised definition of home which does not conceptualise home with the geographical specificity of location imbued with the ability to create definite identities for some cultures. Macgoye’s
exploration of *dala* and use of the Luo *chira* depicts a community dealing with the transition of moral and ethical values in the face of a new disease, HIV/AIDS, which is only a backdrop for the bigger picture of change and the ensuing conflicts in society. Macgoye’s Luo wife status accords her an insider position from where she is able to use Luo concepts of *dala* to inform and redefine concepts of home. She then shows that socio-cultural experiences influence ways in which individuals shape and negotiate their identities. Through her Luo characters, Macgoye shows individual and community definitions of *dala* as a fixed location. Macgoye shows, in the different connections with place, that even within Kenya, home is not a universal construct. She challenges postcolonial and diasporic attempts to standardise English definitions of home. For *Chira*, the fixity of *dala* is important in understanding the language and the society’s understanding of *chira* and the problems inherent in using the same language or word for HIV/AIDS or reading *Chira* only as an HIV/AIDS narrative.

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Educational Experiences of African High School Students in Perth: Findings from a Community Consultation Exercise

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Abstract
One of the key targets of the 2008 Review of Australian Higher Education (“Bradley Review”) is to increase the percentage of Australian university students from low-socioeconomic status (LSES) backgrounds to twenty percent by 2020. Since the publication of the Bradley Review, a broad range of equity programs and strategies targeting various LSES students to enhance their access to and participation in higher education have been implemented. While most West Australian residents from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) seem to fall into the LSES category, the proportion of the population participating in higher education is believed to be low. This paper presents anecdotes from a recent community consultation exercise with African high school students in Perth to understand their experiences and in particular, the manner in which this has influenced their respective post-secondary education career pathways. Following this exercise, a scientific study to explore the topic further is currently underway, while a community outreach event for encouraging the increased participation of SSA school students in higher education has been established.

Introduction
One of the key targets of the 2008 Review of Australian Higher Education (“Bradley Review”) is to increase the percentage of university students from low-socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds to 20% by the year 2020 (Bradley et al. 2008; Commonwealth of Australia 2009). The Bradley Review and the benefits of obtaining a university degree have led to the implementation of various equity initiatives in schools and higher education institutions nationwide targeting students from low SES backgrounds to realise their aspirations to succeed in higher education. While these activities have led to an increase to a ratio of 0.62 for students from low SES backgrounds in higher education, much more needs to be done, as the figure still does not represent low SES groups in the broader population (Naylor et al. 2013; Gore et al. 2015).

The focus on students from low SES groups as targets of equity programs in higher education raises three key theoretical challenges. Some have questioned the label “low SES”, arguing that it is a deficit conceptualisation and portrays so called low SES students as a “problem” in higher education (McKay & Devlin 2015). Dockery et al (2015) have also criticised the “area measure” approach to determining socioeconomic status because it has the tendency to misclassify individuals’ higher education opportunities and the associated potential for policy outcomes (see also Koshy 2011). Thirdly, it appears that the equity in higher education literature homogenizes people from low-SES backgrounds.
Currently, there is a broad range of equity programs and strategies that are targeting refugee students to enhance access and participation in higher education (Silburn 2010; Naidoo 2013, 2015b). While a focus on refugee students is important, it risks clustering students from refugee backgrounds as a homogenous group who have similar competencies and/or challenges, although there is evidence that, among other issues, their experiences relate to the type of school they attend (public, private or mission) and gender (Norton & Cherastidtham 2014; Gale et al 2015). This has been echoed in Naidoo et al’s (2015a, p. 5) recent study of refugee students in the Greater Western Sydney secondary schools. The authors concluded that, ‘refugee background students are not seen as a homogenous group with the same concerns, capabilities and hopes for their future life’ (see also Terry & Naylor 2016). Therefore, there is the need to identify, develop, and target specific members of a low SES group, as opposed to implementing “one-size-fits-all” interventions (see Cardak 2014; Gale et al 2015; Gore et al 2015). With regard to SSA students, they have not received direct and specific attention as learners with specific characteristics, nor have their within-group differences been articulated.

Australian residents from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are often erroneously thought of as a homogenised group, designated as ‘disadvantaged’, ‘refugees’ and/or low SES (Naidoo et al. 2010; Silburn et al. 2010). However, Adusei-Asante et al (2016) have argued in a recent publication that there are three categories of SSA in Western Australia, namely: (1) First Generation refugees; (2) Second Generation refugees; and (3) non-refugees. The First Generation refugees are Africans who were born in SSA, but have fled war or famine. Second Generation refugee Africans are the children of the First Generation refugees. Professionals and international students make up most of the non-refugee category.

The proportion of Australian residents from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) participating in higher education in Western Australia is officially unknown, although it is generally believed to be low. Furthermore, there seem to be no empirical studies identifying the factors that contribute to their post-secondary school choices and destinations. The literature generally identifies issues such as a person’s SES, quality of school or university career guidance and outreach programs, and educational background of parents and/or family as predictors of students’ post-secondary school destinations (Somerville et al 2013; Cardak et al 2014). This paper presents anecdotes of a 2015 community consultation exercise with SSA high school students in Perth to establish their experiences in high school and how this has influenced their post-secondary education choices.

Anecdotes from the community consultation exercise pointed to an environment, particularly in public schools, that may deliberately discourage SSA high school students from pursuing higher education after Year 12, but this warrants further investigation. The exercise suggested that, only one of 6 SSA students in high school are able to go to the university after year 12, with majority of them either pursuing the Vocational Education and Training (VET) pathway or discontinue their education entirely. Below is presented the rationale for high dropout rates after high school and the factors contributing to the seeming overrepresentation of SSA high school students in the VET pathway right after Year 12.
The consultation process began with interaction with community members to obtain a sense of the experiences of SSA in Perth high schools. Four student focus group discussions were held, and an interview with another student. In one of the focus groups, all the students had just completed, while in the other, they were all in Year 12. The rest were made up of students within different year groups (Year 10-12). A total of 15 students, aged between 16 and 25, participated in the consultative discussion, consisting of students from mission schools, public schools and independent public schools. Interactions were informal, and contacts for discussion were made at community gatherings; social functions, church and family gatherings. The informal discussions in the social gathering allowed the participants to freely express themselves after obtaining their verbal consent. Notes were taken during the interviews and focus group discussions. This paper presents the highlights of the themes distilled from the exercise.

Findings
Students who participated in the community consultation exercise shared the following general experiences they faced as SSA high school students. Some mentioned that:

- ‘Teachers are generally good (depending on school)’
- ‘Feel sidelined’;
- Teachers’ attitudes towards us is different as compared with other Australian students’
- ‘Feelings of not fitting in’
- ‘Feelings of not being part of the class’
- ‘Not receiving enough support from school’
- ‘No appropriate feedback from teachers’
- ‘Feeling of working extra harder to be included’
- ‘Generally placed in poor performing class groups, although my academic performance are good’.

Asked about the challenges the SSA students faced, the following anecdotes emerged:

- ‘Fitting in is a challenge’
- ‘Always judged by where you come from’
- ‘Thought of based on your race’
- ‘Low expectations, and making students feel they can’t do certain programs’
- ‘Judgemental base on race’
- ‘Fear to ask questions in class in order not to be judged’
- ‘No support in choosing career path’
- ‘Poor teacher support’
- ‘Understanding the teachers’
- ‘Feelings of de-motivation from teachers’
- ‘English language used as key determinant’
- ‘Feeling of discrimination and racial divide’
- ‘Making us feel they cannot achieve’
- ‘Profiling based on race’.
When we asked the students about the career guidance support they mentioned that:

- ‘All schools had career advisers’
- ‘Feeling of de-motivation received from some teachers’
- ‘Counsellors in some school provide good guidance based on performance’
- ‘Some counsellors make students feel they would amount to nothing’
- ‘Most African students are encouraged to go into the VET pathway’
- ‘Poor feedback on assignments’
- ‘Lack of clarity on what needs to be done’.

We proceeded to ask the students their plans after high school. Only 5 of the 15 students had chosen to go to pursue university education. The other ten had chosen the VET pathway, although six of them were generally unsure of their decision. The students proposed the following measures to help them excel in their studies:

- ‘Motivation from parents’
- ‘3-way relationship feedback system between parents, teachers and students’
- ‘Counselling and continuous encouragement of African students that they are capable’
- ‘Organise forums that would encourage African students’.

Discussion

Our community consultation with students from African backgrounds in Perth high schools has revealed that African students in Perth high schools are experiencing challenges and would need support to succeed at the secondary school level and also making informed decisions on their post-high school educational pathways. Generally, there appeared to be no significant difference in the perception of feelings expressed by students, although the support levels in the mission schools seemed to be better than the public schools. Students from SSA backgrounds reported feeling discriminated against and intimidated, on the basis of their skin colour. Generally, most of them receive little or no support at home to study. Most students also alleged feeling they have been profiled to believe that they are not capable of achieving, pointing mainly to teachers as contributors to this. Others mentioned that their performance was not appropriately used to support them, and generally do not speak out when dissatisfied. The anecdotes also showed that SSA students lack orientation for integrating into the Australian educational system and culture.

Following this exercise, a community outreach event to encourage the participation of Africans in higher education and make informed post-secondary choices (AIM HIGHER SUMMIT) began in 2016. Hosted by Edith Cowan University, the event brings together successful African professionals in various fields to inspire African students in Perth. Furthermore, Edith Cowan University is currently leading an empirical study that is exploring post-secondary choices and destinations of African students across Australia. The study seeks to present an analysis of a ten-year trend (2006-2016) in post-secondary school destinations of SSA students in Perth, Sydney and Melbourne, ultimately aimed at developing a model for encouraging the increased participation of SSA school students in higher education.
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Shifts in African Traditional Herbal medicine (THM): Relevance for HIV/AIDS, as Foremost Among New Diseases, and Impacts of Stigma and Culture Change: A Review

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Abstract
African herbal medicine is as ancient as humankind, and was categorised into organised healing systems since before ancient Egyptian times, around 3000 BC and earlier. African herbs became popularised in Europe, following colonisation of Africa by European nations. Contemporary inroads of African modernisation processes include dramatic culture shifts around understanding the nature and definitions of wellbeing and cure, and the use of ‘medicine’ and ‘healing’ to effect health improvements. Viewing endemic disease in the face of extensive poverty, pressure is exerted by international communities and African national governments to ensure greater reliance on conventional biomedicine, while traditional healing cultures are now often portrayed as ineffective, over-simplistic, superstitious and potentially dangerous, or conversely as exclusively ‘magical’ and disconnected from everyday reality. Despite this, African herbal products have supplied a lucrative global marketplace, to an extent where some species are now threatened. Ongoing interest in the use of herbs is evidenced by popular articles and scholarly research. Significant value is accorded to African indigenous herbal medicine to treat ‘new’ diseases, including HIV/AIDS (as a current lead cause of mortality for adults in Africa). This paper discusses issues pertinent to herbal use in the context of HIV/AIDS treatment, including environmental impacts, and focuses on relevant shifts in the social and cultural contexts of herbal medicine practice in Africa.

Introduction
This literature-based paper will introduce the idea that serious and newly emergent transmissible diseases may be helped in part by recourse to traditional herbal medicines (THMs). It specifically references HIV/AIDS, \(^1\) as the foremost example (WHO 2014, pp. 59-61; WHO 2016; Morens & Fauci 2013) among a number of other strongly medicalised zoonotic infectious conditions identified in Africa in recent decades. These include Ebola, Lassa and Marburg haemorrhagic viruses, mosquito-borne Zika and Chikungunya viral diseases, and Bacillus cereus ‘new anthrax’ (see: Butler 2012 (re the emergence of such new diseases); O’Hearn et al 2016 (re surveillance); Leligdowicz et al 2016 (re Ebola); Brosh-Nissimov 2016 (re Lassa); Pavlin 2014 (re Marburg); Gyawali, Bradbury & Taylor-Robinson, 2016 (re Zika); Chaleem et al 2016 (re Chikungunya); and unfortunately no reference was found describing B cereus anthrax aside of unscholarly

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\(^1\)Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is an infective ‘retrovirus’ organism that causes reduction in immune cells, particularly CD4+ T-lymphocytes. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a serious and fatal late-stage multiple disease presentation resulting from profoundly compromised immunity and deteriorating health, after long-standing or rapidly progressing HIV infection.
media ‘hype’ on the internet). The idea of using THMs for new diseases is of great relevance in African countries, where disease severity and spread is associated with widespread poverty (see: Kelly et al 2013 (re Lassa and post-war housing problems); Barter et al 2012 (re TB and poverty); Bhutta et al 2014 (re global burden, and Infectious Diseases of Poverty (IDoP)); Salcito et al 2014 (re multinational corporations and HR management of infectious disease); and So & Ruiz-Esparza 2012 (re relevant technology)).

HIV/AIDS is now the leading cause of adult deaths in Africa, often in combination with tuberculosis (TB), despite suggestions of declining HIV-associated mortality at a global level (AFP/Africa Check 2014; IHME 2016; Wang et al 2016). This paper describes treatment approaches for and by Persons Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in Africa, specifically in terms of understanding the divergent strategies of biomedicine and ‘traditional medicine’, in the specific guise of plant-based treatment. The manner in which these distinct systems are believed to take effect generally relies on differing cosmologies, cultural assumptions, and perspectives about health and healing.

In particular, the paper briefly outlines the HIV/AIDS disease and epidemic, and details its management by biomedicine. It then engages, by way of contextualisation, with pertinent contemporary issues affecting the use of THM for HIV/AIDS, including socio-cultural experiences of HIV/AIDS disease and stigma, the shifting social roles of traditional herbal practices in Africa, and the relevance of socio-economic and environmental changes. Later sections of the paper provide a summary of a number of studies focused on particular African medicinal plants, whose findings offer potential support for the use of THM to assist in care and treatment of HIV-infected persons. Although the original plan was to present a literature review of African plant research with potential to help HIV-positive persons, it was only possible to include a briefer summary of relevant literature about herbal research, due to time constraints.

Author’s position
My interest in the use of African traditional medicine for HIV/AIDS was triggered by a part of the literature review for my recent PhD research, about complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) use in Victoria, Australia (Holmes, 2015). This literature was concerned with the determined use of traditional healing and CAM by PLWHA in both African and western countries, which is often experienced and portrayed as a type of behavioural ‘deviance’, in that it shies away from medical expectations (such as: Pawluch, Cain, & Gillett 2000; McDonald & Slavin 2010; Musheke, Bond & Merten 2013; Ekwunife, Oreh, & Ubaka 2012).

Brief historic background
African herbal medicine is as old as humankind, and was already categorised into organised healing systems since before ancient Egyptian times, around 3000 BC and earlier (Abou El-Soud 2010). Archaeological evidence of herbal medicine use from the Middle East (in northern Iraq) is dated at about 60,000 years (Saad, Azaizeh & Said 2005). North African, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean herbal medicine usage has longstanding cross-over and similarities, and may be grouped for simplicity.

African herbs became popularised in western Europe due to ancient trade around the
Mediterranean, and the Red and Arabian Seas (including with the historic seafaring nations of Phoenicia, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt and India) and waves of colonisation of African countries in more recent centuries by European nations. While this process led to a widespread commercial use of many African medicinal and food plants over time, in later centuries it was irrevocably bound up with the history of slavery, and contributed to massive exploitation and poverty in African nations.

Across millennia, traders and colonisers arriving in Africa brought common food items and spicy or fragrant plants, that were incorporated into native African fare as foods and medicinal staples. At the same time, the African diaspora carried their traditional knowledge of food and medicinal plants to countries throughout the world. As the oldest land mass inhabited by human ancestors, Africa shared its knowledge of the methods of using foods and medicinal plants with its neighbours – particularly in the Middle East and Mediterranean regions – since ancient times, and established many generations of traditional healing practice.

**Issues of modernisation, HIV/AIDS and appropriate healthcare**

In the post-colonial era, contemporary modernisation processes in Africa include dramatic culture shifts and trends of change in dealing with health, such as questions around how wellbeing and cure are best understood. Commentators observe the relative accessibility and affordability of different forms of ‘medicine’ and ‘healing’, and argue over whether diverse healing methods are appropriate to effect health improvements, based on stakeholder opinions. The HIV/AIDS epidemic poses an urgent pressing concern, on a global scale (Kanta, Unnati & Ritu 2011), having caused millions of adult and child deaths in Africa alone in the course of the past three decades. As mentioned in opening, HIV/AIDS now represents the leading cause of adult mortality in Africa, particularly in combination with TB, a recognised ‘disease of poverty’. HIV/AIDS is inadequately treated with prescribed medications in resource-poor areas.

HIV/AIDS is now endemic in much of Africa, and co-exists with problems of extensive poverty, post-colonial governance issues, and ongoing conflicts. Pressure is exerted by concerned international organisations, national governments and African communities to try to ensure the possibility of greater reliance on conventional biomedicine, to address the spiralling epidemic nature of this problem. Compounding this further, from biomedical and public health perspectives, traditional healing practices that derive from tribal cultures and agriculture-to-market communities are often portrayed as ineffective, over-simplistic and superstitious. Conversely, they may be represented as potentially dangerous, contaminated, or exclusively based on ‘magical’ concepts, and disconnected from a modernist view of everyday reality.

Despite this, African herbal products continue to remain in popular use, providing a clear majority of African people with regular healthcare, and supplying a lucrative global herbal marketplace. Commercialisation and over-consumption has occurred in some regions to the extent that numerous species are listed as threatened or endangered, through excessive harvesting. An ongoing global interest in African THMs is evidenced in part by a recent explosion of popular articles and scholarly research on the topic, and significant value is accorded to herbal medicines that could potentially help treat ‘new diseases’, particularly HIV/AIDS.
The character of AIDS deaths and the spreading HIV epidemic

AIDS-related deaths characteristically involve either ‘AIDS-defining’ disease, in countries of higher economic status (mainly cancer, liver cirrhosis or hepatitis, and pneumonia) (Lewden et al 2005), or other Opportunistic Infections (OIs), or both. The profile of PLWHA who die from AIDS is improving overall, with longer survival, evidence of less reduced CD4+ T-lymphocyte immune cell counts, some preserved immunity, and reduced viral presence (Valdez et al 2001). HIV-positive cancer deaths often occur in smokers (Lewden et al 2005).

In low to middle income countries, and racially diverse communities in developed countries, AIDS-related OIs most frequently cause death from pneumonia, often TB-related, which results in impaired lung function and acute respiratory failure (Kumarasamy et al 2010; Iroezindu 2016). Various studies (McCabe et al 1997; Hirani et al 2011) suggest HIV infection contributes to compromised lung function, and significantly increases rates of potentially fatal infectious pneumonia-type lung disease due to TB or other pathogens, and disabling chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Currently the highest risk globally for developing active TB infection and related lung disease is HIV infection. The incidence of HIV-TB co-infection is extremely high in Africa, representing three quarters of its global occurrence, and causing many thousands of deaths annually (Seeling et al 2014; AFP/Africa Check 2014).

Looking at the HIV/AIDS epidemic from a biological standpoint, some optimism may be drawn from understanding that the strength of new viral diseases becomes attenuated over time, and across the course of sequential waves of epidemic infection. From this perspective, it could be expected that the rate of fatalities and serious illness associated with HIV/AIDS will lessen in severity over time, as a ‘natural’ outcome. This concept is not widely discussed, due to the severity of the disease warranting an interventionist approach. Despite the possibility of viral attenuation and increasing human immunity to HIV, the recently increased lifespan of HIV-seropositive individuals – mainly attributed, in published literature, to Anti-Retroviral (ARV) treatment (for example, see: Hirani et al 2011, p.1656) – is swelling the pool of HIV-infectious persons. It will thereby likely contribute to an accelerated spread of the epidemic, both in USA and sub-Saharan Africa (Vellozzi et al 2009). To substantiate this concern, a meta-analysis of viral markers in newly HIV-positive diagnosed persons in USA and Europe, (Herbeck et al 2012), shows regular decreases over time of measured CD4+ T-lymphocytes (which are reduced by HIV virus), and an increase over time of HIV viral load in blood serum. This finding suggests an increasing virility of newer HIV strains, and likely further spread of the epidemic. The authors also state however that a year-by-year analysis indicates “convergence toward a virulence optimum...[suggesting] the rate of virulence evolution has slowed, perhaps approaching an optimum and stable virulence” (Herbeck et al 2012). This parallels the biological model of co-evolution of virus and host, that moves toward an increased level of host immunity and viral attenuation, until a plateau is reached, representing an optimum infection rate that ensures viral continuation. In summary, from any realistic perspective, HIV/AIDS is ‘here to stay’.

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2 Virgin (2007, pp.369-371, citing research by Fenner and colleagues) explains the concept of viral attenuation by referring to the example of epidemic myxomatosis, introduced into wild rabbits in Australia in the 1950s. This disease showed a well documented decline in virility and rabbit fatalities caused, in a short period of time, alongside a co-evolution of rabbit immunity.
A conventional biomedical approach to treating HIV/AIDS

Biomedical management of PLWHA requires encouragement of patient engagement with conventional care and treatment. Phases include: (1) blood testing to establish a diagnosis (reliant on a sero-positive finding of HIV infection), followed by; (2) referral and enrollment in a drug treatment program; (3) prescription of pharmaceutical ARV agents (also called anti-retroviral therapy (ART) or highly active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART)); (4) monitoring for adherence to prescribed medication regimes and for regular attendance at appointments, or hospitalisations for health crises; and (5) an aim of achieving a reduced viral presence or ‘viral load’ in the body, as measured by periodic blood testing (Kay, Batey & Mugavero 2016).

Antiretroviral drugs are geared to preventing the ‘growth’ (multiplication) of HIV. They may have several functions such as killing the virus, thus limiting viral load, or slowing its entry into cells. ARVs do not completely eliminate HIV from the body, or totally cure HIV/AIDS (AIDS Infonet 2014). However, a multi-faceted treatment approach, including management of psychological stress, promotion of general health, immunity, hygiene and psycho-social wellbeing, and early diagnosis and access to recent combination ARV treatments (cARVs or cARTs) (Lewden et al 2007) purportedly now enables PLWHA to achieve a life expectancy of around 80 years in developed countries, similar to those without HIV.

Method of investigation

This paper does not incorporate a formally structured review of literature, but summarises presenting issues around ongoing use of THMs in Africa among persons with HIV-positive status. It presents social and cultural ramifications of the disease and of ongoing THM reliance, and provides a brief overview of research of relevance to evaluating the worth of African herbal medicines for this context.

Background information was compiled using extensive online searching in 2016, mainly via PubMed and Google. This was enhanced by reference to scholarly anthropological and HIV-focused journals, in order to describe representative socio-cultural studies concerned with lived experience of HIV/AIDS, among PLWHA in African communities.

An increasing number of journal articles discuss THM use for HIV/AIDS, especially in low-income countries. The later sections of this paper focus on such research about African herbs and traditional medicine. THM offers enormous potential to support PLWHA, either to fortify general wellbeing, or to help address co-morbid conditions and bolster the effects of ARV drug therapy.

To this end, an initial basic search was conducted in EBSCO database in July 2016 (repeated August 2016), for search terms (‘herb medicine’ AND ‘HIV/AIDS’ AND ‘Africa’), requesting full-text articles in English, published 1985 to 2016. This search yielded 350 items, which were saved to an Endnote database, and grouped into relevant themes. Further searches were conducted from October 2016 to January 2017 in PubMed, the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, the BioMed Central (BMC) open access database of journal publications, and via the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), and African Journals Online (AJOL), for open-access full-text journal articles in English, of relevance to presenting themes in the paper. This ‘review’ should
not be considered comprehensive however, as all search returns and relevant published articles were ultimately not able to be screened for inclusion.

Resulting topics discussed in the subsequent sections of this paper are: (1) problems of ARV coverage, (2) social and community aspects of the HIV/AIDS experience in Africa, (3) ongoing use of THMs by PLWHA in Africa, (4) a summary of some African antiviral herbs and traditional plant medicines offering potential to help treat HIV/AIDS, and (5) further potential of plant antioxidants.

‘Findings’ – 1. Social issues raised in published literature

Problems of medication and limited access or ‘coverage’

Population coverage with ARV treatment has improved in recent years. Nevertheless, even in developed countries such as USA, while some well-funded research organisations claim almost 100% coverage (IHME 2016; Wang et al 2016), others describe the rate of viral reduction resulting from or associated with ARV treatment in HIV-positive patients quite conservatively, at about 30% (Kay et al 2016), with the vast majority of HIV-positive persons in USA not adequately managed. Problems include low rates of early diagnosis, racial disparities in accessing care and treatments, particularly affecting African Americans, state-based differences in treatment funding, inadequate retention of clients in PLWHA-focused care programs, and patchy adherence to prescribed ARVs (Kay et al 2016).

Such coverage, representing the extent of population access to ARV treatment, is much less again in African countries (IHME 2016; Wang et al 2016), despite vastly greater HIV/AIDS epidemics than those in USA and other high-income countries. Pharmaceutical drugs, including ARVs, often remain unaffordable for consumers in Africa at the dosage rate prescribed by medical personnel (Merten et al 2010; Thomas 2008; Stanifer et al 2015; Granado et al 2009). Furthermore, many HIV-positive people in Africa experience difficulty accessing clinical services, or delay seeking medical diagnosis and treatment, presenting for diagnosis only when their CD4 cell counts are already low and immune health is compromised (Gesesew et al 2016; Geng et al 2011; Audet et al 2014).

Consultation with traditional healers prior to HIV diagnosis has been shown to delay presentation to a medical clinic by a matter of about one month up to several months in Mozambique (Audet et al 2014). Educational training about biomedicine may not effectively dissuade people from seeking treatment provided by traditional healers, or encourage traditional healers to refer patients to medical clinics. Audet, Salato, Blevins et al (2013) also published conflicting information, about education influencing referrals by traditional healers, but found that unfortunately, of the patients thus referred to biomedical clinics, very few (only 3.5%) were then tested for HIV. Cochrane reviews suggest mass media promotion of HIV testing effectively increases its uptake in the short-term (Vidanapathirana et al 2005), while voluntary home-based testing is also an effective strategy (Bateganya, Abdulwadud, & Kiene 2010), circumventing stigma and travel cost attached to clinic-based testing.

In Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, medium to high experience of
stigma, male gender, and lack of knowledge of HIV/AIDS disease, low educational attainment, and TB co-infection or other illness, tobacco smoking, loss of ambulatory function, rural distance, unemployment, shared accommodation, single-room housing, young or older age group, single marital status, and lack of spousal HIV disclosure, are all factors that variously correlate with delayed presentation for HIV diagnosis, as is acquiring HIV through sexual contact rather than by another means (Gesesew et al 2016; Kigozi et al 2009; Beyenne & Beyenne 2015; Aniley et al 2016; Geng et al 2011; Nyika et al 2016). The level of reduced CD4+ count considered ‘late’ at first diagnosis varies between studies, however, which confuses these findings somewhat (cf. Beyenne & Beyenne 2015; Aniley et al 2016; Geng et al 2011). Having an illness appeared to delay rather than to hasten HIV-testing in Harare, Zimbabwe (Nyika et al 2016). Of further concern, the presence of TB, and tobacco smoking, may mask early HIV-related health conditions. Tobacco smoking is shown to activate and ‘stress’ normal immune functions and cause immune exhaustion, including of CD4+ cells, particularly impacting health for HIV-infected persons, among whom smoking is very common (Valiaathan et al 2014). Female gender may also correlate to a relative inability to access services providing HIV diagnosis and treatment, likely due to rural distance, farming work commitments, and language barriers; this suggests an extra group of late presenters and non-presenters to clinics, and non-participants in study cohorts (Geng et al 2011, p. 9; Audet et al 2014).

Factors contributing to earlier diagnosis include family and community support and encouragement, greater education, knowledge of HIV/AIDS or being provided with information about it, higher income, belief in the value of medical intervention, and attending a clinic for antenatal care (Beyenne & Beyenne 2015; Nyika et al 2016).

Very late presentations for diagnosis are reducing in frequency in some African countries coincident with improved funding for ARVs. Globally this amounts to an astonishingly high estimated medical cost and expenditure, from internationally donated funds, of US$10,000 minimum per individual patient in resource-poor areas, who has been commenced on ARV drugs (Geng et al 2011, p. 2). While such funds may arrive in the hands of pharmaceutical companies, health professionals, and governments, this spending does not amount to improvements in available income or general life quality for community members, who often remain very poor by western standards. For example, Kigozi, et al (2009, p. 4) reported that 80% of HIV-positive study subjects at a regional Ugandan urban hospital had a monthly income equivalent to US$60 or less. Audet et al (2014) found few HIV-positive participants in rural Mozambique had completed more than 3-4 years of primary school education, or received any monthly income at all. Based on websites accessed in November 2016, the estimated direct retail cost to purchase ARV treatment for one year, online, without subsidisation, ranges between US$230 up to about $13,000, depending on source and type of drugs, number of drugs and amount or dosage consumed, and choice of branded or generic products, with generics from companies such as Cipla, Sun Pharma and others being vastly cheaper.

Early commencement of ARV treatment is linked to reduction in HIV disease and opportunistic infections (Low et al 2016), and should, therefore, be actively promoted and funded by government health departments. Nevertheless, ARVs do cause adverse drug reactions in a substantial minority of consumers (Weldegebreal, Mitiku & Teklemariam 2016), who are more often women (Riedl & Casillas 2003). Such effects include ‘lipodystrophy’, peripheral neuropathy, numbness or tingling, pain, liver toxicity,
visual disturbances, anaemia, bad taste, nausea and vomiting, diarrhoea, itching, skin rashes, dizziness, heart palpitations, and polyuria (Weldegebreal et al 2016; Ammassari et al 2001; Agu & Oparah 2013). A small percentage of deaths occur as a direct result of ARV treatment (Valdez et al 2001; Lewden et al 2005). This high level of toxicity compromises patients’ life quality, contributing to reduced adherence to treatment and often leading to treatment failure and worsening disease (Weldegebreal et al 2016; Ammassari et al 2001). Furthermore, use of ARVs or HAART does not always correlate with improved survival (Dickson et al 2007), and a sub-group of HIV-infected patients develop a condition of resistance to ARV drugs and/or multiple drug resistance while taking ARVs (Recksy et al 2004).

In light of the persistent use of THMs in Africa, their accessibility and cultural appropriateness, and problems raised in this passage, this author suggests THMs can support general wellbeing for PLWHA, and thereby enhance ARV treatment outcomes. A systematic review of ten studies in African countries showed that ‘task-shifting’ from doctors to non-doctors, including nurses and trained community-health field workers, caused no appreciable differences in HIV patient deaths after a year, and no evidence of differing immunological and virological outcomes based on provider type (somewhat favouring nurse-care over doctors) (Kredo et al 2014). Across studies, there was some improvement or no change in patient numbers lost to follow-up, while costs of travel were reduced, and satisfaction with non-doctor care was greater. Consequently, given the enduring popularity of traditional providers, it may be realistic, wherever culturally acceptable, to train and fund willing THM practitioners, who could test patients for HIV, and dispense suitable generic-brand ARV medications alongside traditional treatments.

Social and community aspects of African HIV/AIDS experiences
An in-depth appreciation of socio-cultural contexts of HIV/AIDS experiences in Africa is also required. While achieving good ground in providing pharmaceutical treatments for PLWHA, biomedical protocols often unintentionally overlook the social aspects and context of HIV/AIDS sufferers’ life experiences (Merten et al 2010), thereby neglecting the importance of community-based components of care and the significance of cultural meanings. Nevertheless, an increasing number of ethnographic and qualitative studies explore these facets of the HIV/AIDS experience.

For example, an ethnographic study by Wyrod (2011) describes how normative expectations of gendered behaviour render HIV-positive status problematic for men, in an urban community in Kmpala, Uganda, due to the impact of negative stigma around a perception of ‘failed’ masculinity. This occurred largely due to loss of opportunities for affected men to earn a living as sole breadwinner for their family, as well as through shame associated with HIV/AIDS-related deaths, of a wife or other female sexual partner, and sometimes children. Wyrod describes the in-built structural nature of gendered norms as reinforcing the difficulties HIV-positive men experience – both prior to and subsequent to blood tests and diagnosis – and reducing their ability to maintain participation in a support group. This group, in any case, was limited in duration and resources, locally provided, and self-managed by group members.

Another study conducted interviews with diverse healthcare professionals who work with HIV and TB co-infected patients in Namibia, an upper middle income country in
sub-Saharan Africa (Seeling et al 2014). It revealed insufficient staff numbers and services provision, as well as inadequate training and knowledge. These problems presented in addition to complex cultural and socio-economic barriers for patients in the community, that included stigma, religious beliefs, and fear of indirect treatment costs, all further compromising access to treatment (Seeling et al 2014).

A review by Tsoka and Mwanri (2014) serves to highlight the multi-dimensional character and socio-cultural location of various types of stigma that occur around HIV-positive status in Malawi, a rural-agricultural nation in south-eastern Africa. Stigma affected both women and men, and impacted workplace relations through discrimination, social exclusion and the internalisation of self-blame. Stigma was perceived to be generated mainly through cultural expectations, including moral teachings associated with religious beliefs, portrayal of AIDS arising only through ‘illicit sex’, lack of knowledge about the disease and fear of contagion, and gender-based behavioural norms (Tsoka & Mwanri 2014).

An interview-based study by O’Brien (2013), of HIV-positive persons from low socio-economic locations in urban Harare, Zimbabwe, notes that gendered understandings, against a traditionally patriarchal cultural backdrop, and the ‘spiritualisation’ of disease and suffering through religious ideation which culminates in the portrayal of HIV as “a predicament for the sexually deviant” (p. 37), both strongly influence self-perceptions, culturally-mediated interpretations, and lived experiences of HIV/AIDS. O’Brien observed (2013) HIV-related stigma in Zimbabwe was entrenched as a form of structural violence, occurring due to state ideologies and institutions that tend to oppress women by upholding traditional views about the limited social or economic status women could hope to achieve. It thereby contributes to misinformation, lack of knowledge, gendered blaming, and fear of witchcraft.

An anthropological study by Thomas (2008) explains the shifting nature of health roles in Namibia. Thomas explores narratives of stigma and a culture of blame around HIV/AIDS, that have emerged from socioeconomic changes, and an erosion of traditions of morality leading to violations of behavioural taboos. Thomas describes the prohibitive cost of accessing THM from traditional healers, in a context where poorer people struggle with cultural alterations that occur through the pressure to accept modernisation (2008). They are helpless to participate fully in an expected level of health-directed behaviours, whether modern or traditional, due to unaffordability in both cases.

Several of these aforementioned studies (Wyrod 2011; Tsoka & Mwanri 2014; O’Brien 2013) describe how having multiple sexual partners remains common for men, and culturally tolerated, even among those known to be HIV-positive. In contrast, infidelities or promiscuity by women (or abortions (Thomas 2008)) may be viewed as tantamount to prostitution, and are socially punished by accusations and shaming. There is therefore an effective double stigma that compromises the socio-cultural standing of women, linked both to gender identity and HIV-positive status.

While surveys (cf. Hughes et al 2012; Audet et al 2013, 2014) occasionally cite traditional healers or self-directed THM use as a cause of reluctance to seek medical treatment, or delays in obtaining diagnostic blood tests on the part of HIV-positive
persons, Seeling et al’s (2014) study suggests this is less of an obstruction to treatment-seeking behaviour than either fear of stigma and discrimination, or Pentecostal religious beliefs (also: Zou et al 2009). Over half of religious survey respondents in Tanzania (Zou et al 2009) believed HIV infection occurs as a punishment from God, and a third felt it was due to not following the word of God, with both these categories correlating with shame-related stigma around HIV. Over 80% believed HIV could be cured by prayer irrespective of their willingness to undergo ARV treatment.

Campbell, Skovdal and Gibbs (2011) disclose however that, while churches contribute to moralising (such as disincentivising condom use), pressuring women, shaming, and stigma, they may also be instrumental in creating social spaces that help to destigmatise HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, and can assist in promoting HIV prevention and caring for AIDS-affected persons. Tsoka and Mwanri (2014) and O’Brien (2013) nevertheless reiterate that religious ideas and moral stigma may compromise medication adherence and access to health networks, while O’Brien suggests (2013, p. 46) that traditional healers in fact often provide or mediate a pathway to greater acceptance of biomedicine and enhanced willingness on the part of patients to seek HIV testing and medical treatment (also evident in: Audet et al 2013, 2014).

‘Findings’ – 2. Relevance of African THM for HIV/AIDS

Ongoing traditional herbal medicine use, for HIV/AIDS in Africa

THM remains a central and substantial part of regular healthcare throughout Africa, as is widely illustrated by findings of numerous recent studies. For example, a comprehensive study in urban and rural parts of northern Tanzania, by Stanifer et al (2015), found cultural associations with THMs that were in widespread use by 56% of respondents of all income levels. These participants mainly identified as Christian, or less often Islamic, in terms of religious orientation. THMs were considered safe, and were used as first-line treatment for common symptoms and ailments, chronic diseases, reproductive problems, and malaria or other febrile illnesses. Most participants had a primary school level education, although some were trained professionals including medical doctors, who also used THMs frequently.

Stanifer and co-authors’ (2015) study participants valued THMs more highly when they perceived the quality of biomedical care they accessed was low, due to communication problems between consumers and providers, or was expensive, with lengthy wait times, or they had limited understanding of biomedicine. Some viewed biomedical treatment as ineffective, inappropriate, unproven or from unknown sources, excessively toxic or chemical, or ‘foreign’ and thus representing of a form of ongoing colonisation. While participants willingly ‘doctor shopped’, seeking biomedical care particularly if THM treatments failed, many placed a very high value on elders’ health advice and family traditions of healthcare. Reliance on and favouring THM persisted even among those who needed to use hospital services often. THM was thought ‘credible’ compared to biomedicine, as it required no scientific proof, due to a widespread awareness and promotion of many testimonials of successful healing and personal experiences of improved well-being. Traditional beliefs regarding causation in health and disease were influential, including notions of ‘evil spirits’, both to explain conditions like epilepsy and mental illness, and overtly ‘physical’ chronic or acute sicknesses (Stanifer et al 2015).
THMs are also in common use for adjunctive ‘non-medical’ treatment of specific HIV-related illnesses. The meaning of THM and other non-biomedical treatments for PLWHA has been widely discussed in publications for over a decade, in both developed and developing country contexts. In western countries, including Australia and USA, PLWHA’s frequent reliance on CAM of many types to self-manage symptoms, reduce stress, help deal with stigma, and boost overall wellbeing, has been reported by consumers to also promote a sense of their being able to resist an ‘uncritical’ dependence on ARVs, and an enhanced autonomy in making decisions about their health (McDonald & Slavin 2010; Thomas et al 2007; Foote-Ardah 2003; Pawluch et al 2000). PLWHA occasionally continue using THMs against medical advice, or to reduce impacts of drug side-effects. Thus ‘traditional’ modes of healing are linked at times with negative stigma associated with HIV-positive status, due to an overriding biomedical emphasis on drug consumption designed to reduce impacts of HIV, and an avoidance of ‘unproven’ therapies. However, Audet and co-authors (2014, p. 2) point out that there are many traditional healers working in some African countries (such as Mozambique), compared to the number of medical doctors and nurses available, who are few. This circumstance raises the issue of THMs contributing to reduced adherence to biomedically-prescribed ARVs, and gives rise to expressed concerns regarding possible drug-herb interactions (Hughes et al 2012; Awortwe et al 2014).

Such a concern was expressed for instance by the authors of a small study in urban and rural South Africa, which found 79% of respondents sourced through HIV clinics used THMs prior to HIV-diagnosis; this reduced to 16%, of almost entirely self-prescribed THMs, among HIV-positive persons taking ARVs (Hughes et al 2012). This cohort also relied on family support, spiritual care and prayer. Those using THM after HIV diagnosis mainly consumed herbal or compound mixtures, most popularly “ubhejane which is believed to effectively treat all bodily conditions” or another “mixture that was believed to heal all conditions (zifozonke)” (Hughes et al 2012, pp. 472, 482, italics added). THM users were wealthier than non-users, and tended not to disclose THM use to medical workers for fear of punitive reactions. Some believed THMs “could counteract the effects of witchcraft” (Hughes et al 2012, p. 482).

An interview-based study in Kenya (Nagata et al 2011) with traditional herbalists, mothers and PLWHA, sought knowledge about medicinal plants suited for treating HIV/AIDS and a purportedly similar local-classified sexually-transmitted wasting disease, chira. In contrast to Hughes et al (2012), Nagata et al (2011) describe extensive ongoing coincident ARV and THM consumption (among 63% of PLWHA interviewed), including self-treatment of chira and HIV/AIDS symptomatology. They mainly used leaves or other medicinal or food plant parts, for chewing, or decocted for internal medicine or external washing. Herbs include Allium spp. (known as ekitungu; A. porrum, used by 88%), bitter orange (machunga/ichunga; Citrus aurantium, used by 81%), pawpaw (poipoi/ipa pau; Carica papaya, used by 72%) and lemon (endim; Citrus limon, by 67%). Among 40 African native and naturalised THMs, Nagata and colleagues (2011) list Neem (mwarubaine; Azadirachta indica, used by 40%), garlic (kitungu saumu; Allium sativum, used by 24%) and several other plants considered potent against HIV.

Similarly, a cross-sectional study in two AIDS treatment centres in Uganda (Namuddu et al 2011) found a relatively high percentage, 34% of participants, coincidentally used
both THMs and ARVs (in this case HAART). THM was most frequently used by those who had consumed ARVs for less than 4 years, or who experienced side effects from ARV drugs (Namuddu et al 2011). Commonly known herb medicines and mixtures were taken to treat problems of ‘constant fever’, cough, pain associated with HIV, itching, low energy, anaemia, frequent illness, reduced immunity, appetite changes, diarrhoea, and sweating (with some of these symptoms tallying closely with side-effects of ARV drugs). The herbs used included guava leaf (amapeera), mango leaf (miyembe), Aloe vera (which is also known as kigagi), hibiscus (bazukuza bafu), bitter leaf (mululuza/olubirizi; Vernonia amygdalina), avocado (ovakedo), and parts of African trees or shrubs (including mpafu tree: Canarium schweinfurtii; red-hot poker tree/lucky bean tree (jilikiti: Erythrina abyssinica); entanda tree (mwooloola: Entada abyssinica); musisiya/mugavu (Albizia coriaria); mazukizi (Dicliptera laxata) and kamuyue (Hoslundia opposita).

These herbal plants were usually obtained from registered herbalists, or grown in gardens. Over 96% of the THM-ARV coincident users reported improvements in wellbeing from herbal treatments (Namuddu et al 2011, p. 4). On this basis, it may be argued that THM use that ameliorates drug side effects could improve adherence to ARVs. Namuddu et al also cite (2011, p. 7, reference #5) a Chinese study demonstrating improved anti-viral effects among THM-ARV coincident consumers. They state furthermore that the percentage of PLWHA in their cohort using both THM and ARV may be an underestimate of the true prevalence, due to pressure from medical staff for patients to not consume THM, resulting in reluctance to disclose such use.

In light of the foregoing, it seems apparent that efforts directed to developing public and biomedical health services for HIV/AIDS in African countries ideally should incorporate the work of traditional healers, and could gainfully facilitate healthful uses of traditional plant-based medicines, and related psycho-spiritual aspects of healing. All these remain important for many African people.

Studies of antiviral traditional herbal medicines for HIV/AIDS
Numerous recent ethnographic surveys and reviews list common use African plants, including many with antiviral properties, some of which are believed to improve health for HIV-positive persons (such as: Kloos et al 2013; Chinsembu & Hedimbi 2009; Kanta et al 2011). Chinsembu and Hedimbi’s (2009) literature survey cites laboratory research demonstrating specific ways in which 46 medicinal herbs or their constituent chemicals act against HIV, in reducing infectious spread, preventing the virus from penetrating body cells, or hampering viral replication at various stages after infection is established. Kloos et al (2013) name herbs recognised for antiviral properties, and used for HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia, including Combretum paniculatum, Dodonea angustifolia, Bersema abyssinica, Ximenia americana, Aconkanthera schimperi and Euclea schimperi, and in South Africa and Zimbabwe, including Azadirachta indica, Moringa oleifera, Sutherlandia frutescens and Hypoxia hemerocallidea.

Tabuti et al (n.d.), describe a current project in Uganda, involving interviews with traditional healers and cultivation of herbs useful for HIV/AIDS. To date healers had documented 302 plants, usually prescribed as complex mixtures, which they used to treat HIV/AIDS and related OIs. The researchers’ aims included establishing the effectiveness

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3 Note: Many Aloe spp. are listed as endangered in CITES Appendix I.
and safety of THM for HIV/AIDS, disseminating medicinal herb seedlings, sourcing plants suited to ARV drug development, conserving endangered species, and promoting commercial use.

Tshibangu et al (2004) investigated the effect of five THMs in 33 HIV-positive study subjects in South Africa. The plants remained unnamed (coded by letters) for publication purposes, on account of the collection and administration of herbs being considered a sacred ritual. Herb medicines were prepared and given to participants by a Lady Mokwena and her assistant, in the form of burnt plant ash, shaved dried wood chips, or powdered or decocted plant material, and were taken before meals, or mixed with food, or drunk as a water-based extract. Despite 3 deaths due to advanced AIDS at the start point of the study, adverse effects were not otherwise encountered during an 8-month program of treatment. The authors contrasted this with the extreme risk of severe and potentially fatal toxic reactions to certain ARV treatments such as nevirapine.

In summary, Tshibangu et al (2004) claim many general and specific virucidal benefits from THM treatments, such as appetite and general weight gain, disappearance of lesions, better energy, and other markers of improved overall health, substantially increased CD4+ cell counts and dramatic decreases in viral load, as verified by numerous clinical tests. They describe a close alliance between indigenous THM practitioners and western doctors, and call for more such collaborations and university teaching of THM, suggesting THMs are excellent in combination with ARVs, to improve the health of HIV-positive persons. Nevertheless, a caution should be noted, as numerous African tree species commonly used for medicinal wood or bark chips or resin, including 5 types of mahogany (Khaya spp.), sandalwood (Osyris lanceolata), several types of dragon’s blood trees (Dracaena, Pterocarpus, and other spp.), the African almond or cherry tree (Prunus africanus), and others, are presently endangered or vulnerable, as listed on the IUCN Red List and in CITES Appendices.

While studies investigating antiviral activity and overall effect of THM for PLWHA are few, and this research is at an early stage, some optimistic anecdotal evidence emerges from participant narratives in anthropological and qualitative health research. Musheke, Bond and Merten (2013) describe a qualitative study of self-care practices among HIV-positive participants in urban Lusaka, Zambia, who avoided treatment with ARVs, in some cases for years. Common-use herb medicines reported for this group include garlic, ginger, Aloe spp. (locally tembusha), plus “Moringa oleifolia, Ngetwa from Tanzania, crocodile fats, Chinese herbal remedies, stametta (aloe mixed with vitamins and herbs) and some [packaged] herbs” labelled with a ‘Back to Eden’ brand (Musheke et al 2013, p.4). Quoted narratives cite the use of guava leaf, lemon leaf or garlic, or lemon and honey, for cough, and moringa, ginger or tembusha, often home-grown, to invigorate the body and stimulate immunity, including by respondents who believed herbs improve health and raise CD4 cell count (pp.5, 8, 9) without noticeable side effects. Another plant called paliba kantu (translates as ‘there is no problem’, and elsewhere called feverbush or stomach-bush, Dicoma anomala), was prepared as a decoction. Enhanced nutrition practice was another recurring theme, as respondents added pounded groundnuts (sashila

4 See #3 re Aloe spp; Ngetwa appears as a packaged brand name herbal product on the internet; IUCN lists African dwarf crocodiles as a vulnerable species.
5 A close species, D. pretoriensis is listed as critically endangered, and possibly extinct, on IUCN Red List.
or *kusashila*) to leafy vegetables, to improve overall nourishment and wellbeing.

Laboratory-based and clinical research about African THM often incorporates a more pessimistic outlook, and is biomedically oriented. A literature study (Mills *et al* 2005a) briefly describes current use of *Hypoxis hemerocallidea* and *Sutherlandia frutescens* from **southern Africa** as antioxidant and immune stimulant herbs for HIV/AIDS. These plants were traditionally used, respectively, for urinary infection, tumours, heart weakness and nervous conditions, and for gastro-intestinal disorders, chronic fatigue, and infected and inflammatory conditions. Mills *et al* (2005a) report that *S. frutescens* is particularly non-toxic, although isolated plant chemicals from both plants may have caused reactions in trial subjects. A study of *H. hemerocallidea* in HIV/AIDS patients is cited (Terreblanche *et al* 2005a), which was terminated due to apparent bone marrow suppression. While inadequate research has been conducted that might verify the plants’ physiological activities, Mills and co-authors’ main expressed concern is that an existing publication (Mills *et al* 2005b) recognises that the herbs potentially interact with HIV-drug metabolising enzymes in the body. Thereby they may cause herb-drug interactions, and purportedly could diminish the medication effects of drugs or lead to drug toxicity.

Awortwe *et al* (2014) found *H. hemerocallidea* displayed the most active herb-drug interactivity, among **South African**-grown or sourced plants used for HIV/AIDS that were laboratory-tested on enzymes. The other plants were *Echinacea purpurea*, *Lessertia frutescens* (see next), *Taraxacum officinale* (dandelion), *Moringa oleifera* and *Pelargonium sidoides*. From a herbalist perspective, *H. hemerocallidea* may in fact be a potent healing agent. However, it originates in grasslands of South Africa that are presently threatened by urban developments, and could become rapidly endangered by commercialisation and over-harvesting. Two similar *Hypoxis* species are listed in the IUCN Red List, one as endangered and another with inadequate data.

In a small study of *S. frutescens* (syn. *Lessertia frutescens*) in healthy **South African** participants, Johnson *et al* (2007) found no adverse effects, but statistically significant improved appetite, respiration, and important parameters of normal blood health. Koffuor *et al* (2014) showed two herbs, *Betula alba* and *S. frutescens*, both significantly reduced viral load in HIV-positive clinic patients in Ghana. Dane Africa and Smith (2015) however, caution against using *S. frutescens* as an anti-neuroinflammatory substance for HIV infection because, based on laboratory research in human cell culture, it demonstrated pro-inflammatory effects and increased migration of affected monocyte cells across a simulated blood-brain barrier. Three closely related species of *Lessertia* from South Africa are listed as endangered, or insufficient data, on IUCN’s Red List.

A study by Bepe *et al* (2011) in Zimbabwe found somewhat lower quality of life scores for HIV-positive patients taking THMs and ARVs, compared to ARVs alone, implying this was linked to the herbs use. The herb consumers group were marginally older in age, better educated, and had taken ARVs for longer periods (p. 7). The patient group that was ‘assessed for QoL’ however had different socio-demographic characteristics (p. 8). The length of the study is not documented (in Bepe *et al* 2011) and no distinction is made between self-sourced or practitioner-prescribed herbs. Bepe *et al* (2011) claimed adverse events were infrequent, with peripheral neuropathy marginally more common, and abdominal pains and skin rash occurring more often.
among THM consumers. Of these, peripheral neuropathy is recognised as a common side effect of ARV drugs, and may also be linked to abnormal weight problems due to pharmaceutical drugs consumption (termed ‘lipodystrophy’); skin rashes also occur through ARV usage (cf. Mudzviti et al. 2012, p. 3). Some HIV-positive patients take herbs with an aim of counteracting drug side effects, or if faced with health problems. They may have a lower quality of life due to such effects, or a worse overall health profile. While Bepe et al. (2011, p. 5) state that the herb Moringa oleifera causes abdominal pain, they acknowledge that ARVs nevirapine and efavirenz both also cause abdominal pain. Studies such as this may expect to demonstrate potential for interactivity between herbs and drugs, and aim to discourage herbs use, but often do not take other relevant factors into account, such as type and source of THMs consumed, reasons for taking THM, cultural significance of THM and its influence on treatment, drug side effects, and QoL scores attributable to factors other than medication or herb effects.

Another study in Zimbabwe (Mudzviti et al. 2012) found 381 of 388 (98.2%) HIV-positive patients enrolled in the trial took at least one type of herbal medicine concurrently with consumption of ARVs, suggesting THMs are of signal importance and widely considered effective. Herbs most commonly used (by 10.6 to 72.7% of participants), in order of highest to lowest frequency, were: Allium sativum (garlic), Bidens pilosa, Eucalyptus globulus (Australian blue gum), Moringa oleifera, Lippia javanica, Peltoforum africanum, Aloe vera, Dicoma anomala, Murunguyane, Hypoxis hemerocalidea and Symphytum officinale (comfrey). Findings of the study (Mudzviti et al. 2012) indicated that consumption of Musakavakadzi and Peltoforum africanum, two indigenous herbs, significantly reduced adverse ARV drug-related reactions, which were frequent and often severe. The authors discuss patient reasons for consuming THMs, including efforts to alleviate discomfort caused by ARV.

**Antioxidant therapy as a promising part of antiviral treatment**

The antioxidant potential of herbal medicines to support patients with HIV/AIDS may be explained in part by referring to research by Asokan et al. (2015). These authors conducted detailed trials in India, and found that a polyherbal formulation had immuno-modulatory action in HIV-positive subjects, and in blood serum studies, related to the degree to which the HIV virus penetrated cells. Antioxidants are known to be responsible for maintaining tissue integrity in the body, including the cell walls. Extracts of the commercialised South African cactus Hoodia gordonii have demonstrated a level of inhibition of HIV-1 (reverse transcriptase, and protease) and antioxidant activity, in laboratory tests (Kapewangolo et al. 2016). However this study has been reported, effectively as a promotion for further commercialisation of the herb, without mentioning that all Hoodia spp. are listed as protected in CITES Appendix II. This listing is due to the sensitive desert habitat and limited range of Hoodia plants, and impacts on and likely further depletion of these species, due to over-harvesting for profit that occurred due to bioprospecting efforts by European pharmaceutical companies, and widespread sale of the processed herb as a weight-loss supplement in western countries.

While discussing therapeutic agents that target steps in the Ebola virus life cycle, Lai et al. (2014) state that high-doses of the common naturopathic antioxidant supplement N-acetylcysteine (NAC) may help prevent a cytotoxic inflammatory-response trigger caused by accumulating virus-associated glycoproteins in the endoplasmic reticulum.
(one of the widely known cellular organelles within body cells). Assuming adequate protein nutrition, supplementary NAC[6] serves as a precursor that promotes the body’s endogenous synthesis of glutathione, an important antioxidant responsible for maintaining oxidative balance within cells, and moderating various nervous system functions and pro-inflammatory pathways (Wu et al 2004; Dean, Giorlando & Berk 2011). NAC (and glutathione) thereby helps prevent inflammation and oxidative stress that causes cellular damage, and protects normal body functions. It is also used to reduce drug, lead and mercury toxicity (cf. Aremu, Madejczyk & Ballatori 2008), to drain respiratory mucus, and help lung disease (Ramos, Krahnke & Kim 2014, p.146), to enhance pregnancy retention in women suffering habitual miscarriage (Amin, Shaaban & Bediawy 2008), and to assist in treating viral infections. This includes HIV, where it replenishes depleted glutathione levels (Roederer et al 1992; Akerlund et al 1996; De Rosa et al 2000; Muller et al 2000), although not clearly in association with ARV therapy (Treitinger et al 2004).

Following these leads, the potential of many THMs and nutrients known for powerful antioxidant functions could be explored to support treatment and wellbeing of PLWHA. Common and widely accessed herbal and nutrient antioxidants used in CAM include green tea, alpha-lipoic acid, beta-carotene and vitamin A, vitamins C and E, minerals including zinc, and many edible phytochemicals obtained from whole plant foods, often colourful fruit and vegetables (Better Health 2012). Existing evidence for such use is limited but promising. Wiysonge et al’s (2011) systematic review of African studies found no evidence of vitamin A supplementation decreasing mother to child transmission of HIV, or leading to improvements across several indicators of maternal or infant health, however it did increase infant birthweights to HIV-positive mothers. Another review found vitamin A reduced mortality in HIV-infected children (Humphreys et al 2010), while a third suggests that, despite vitamin A decreasing HIV-associated child mortality, it did not slow HIV disease progression in adults (Irlam et al 2010). More research is needed about roles of nutrient and herbal antioxidants in moderating HIV.

**Conclusion**

HIV/AIDS causes millions of fatalities, on a global scale, particularly in Africa, and remains inadequately addressed by treatment with prescribed medications in resource-poor areas. This paper has reviewed African experiences of HIV/AIDS disease and treatments, and discusses pertinent contemporary issues of relevance to traditional herbal medicines use for HIV/AIDS, including relevant shifts in the status and socio-cultural contexts of herbal medicine practice in Africa. It then briefly provides a summary of plant-based research that prospectively may assist HIV-positive persons to preserve their health, and advocates for positive aspects of continued African herbal medicines use, with due caution regarding awareness of endangered species. As suggested above, based on this information, greater effort could be made to incorporate the work of traditional healers into funded health systems. Also, there is a need to conduct further detailed review research to establish what exactly has been learned to date about the use of THMs for HIV/AIDS treatment and support in Africa, particularly in human studies.

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[6] Note: some authors (e.g. Dean et al., 2011) caution against high dosages of NAC, which may be toxic for sensitive persons. Low doses are said to be anti-epileptic, but very high doses may cause seizures.
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Active Ageing with the African in Mind: An Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis

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Abstract
This paper examines the contextual meaning of active ageing based on the lived experiences of older African people. The purpose is to determine the conceptual and theoretical fit between the experiential meaning of active ageing and the model proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO), in order to demonstrate the relevance of context in adopting global policy frameworks to deal with human ageing. An interpretive phenomenological analysis of interview data from 30 participants shows that there are significant variations between the WHO model and lived experiences of active ageing. The paper argues that social interaction is the most critical component of active ageing, but has been weakly subsumed into the participation pillar of the WHO model. The paper further argues that while it is important to take into account other dimensions of action ageing, in Africa, efforts must be made to optimise social interaction by strengthening family systems and building community structures that provide opportunities for an active, happy life at old age.

Introduction
The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 2002 active ageing model appears to be the ideal global policy response to population ageing. The model assumes that quality of life at old age is dependent on three key pillars: health, participation and security (WHO, 2002). A number of countries have modelled their national policy responses on the WHO proposal. In addition, the concept of active ageing has attracted a plethora of theoretical and empirical discussions (Constança, Ribeiro, & Teixeira 2012; Walker & Foster 2013). However, to date, very limited discussion exists on the theoretical validity and application of the concept within the African context. This paper attempts to examine the meaning of active ageing based on the lived experiences of older people in an African context and the extent to which the WHO model fits the experiential meaning of active ageing. The context for otherwise similar people is varied, to determine if there are differences in the experiential conceptualisation of active ageing.

The paper is important for three main reasons. First, it strengthens the argument that context matters in adopting global policies on ageing—older people are not a homogeneous group that can be easily grouped to receive the same services (Canadian Library Association 2002). The African context is unique, and requires a unique approach. Second, it is important to spur debate on an African approach to demographic ageing, as there are claims that active ageing is most relevant for the industrialised world, currently experiencing the brunt of rapid demographic transition (Walker 2002). Third, African policy actors appear to be apathetic in regard to committing to mitigate the effects of rapid demographic transition in the future (Kalasa 2001). This is evident in the level of commitment made to the African Union Policy Framework and Plan of Action on Ageing (2002). This puts Africa’s older people in a precarious situation with an uncertain future. Since the WHO proposed the active ageing framework as an
important global policy response to ageing, it is imperative to ascertain the extent to which the framework represents the contextual issues of Africa. The critical questions for this study are: (1) What does active ageing mean to older people of African origin; (2) how does WHO’s active ageing framework fit the African context; and (3) to what extent does living under different policy contexts change the meaning and experiences of active ageing?

**Background**

In 2015, there were 900 million people in the world who were 60 years and above, representing an increase of 48% on the year 2000’s figure of 607 million (United Nations [UN] 2015). The total number of older people is projected to reach 2.1 billion by the year 2050 (HelpAge-International 2013; UN 2013, 2015), an increase of over 100% on current figures. Africa’s current demographic structure is relatively young; however, very sharp growth in the dependency ratio is predicted, with the number of people in Africa 60 years and above predicted to increase from the current figure of 64.4 million to 220.3 million by 2050—an increase of 63% (UN 2015).

There are concerns about how to maximise quality of life for the increasing number of older people globally while maintaining economic and social stability. Some countries are adopting austerity measures (Bonoli & Shinkawa 2005; Zaidi & Rejniak 2010), while others are pushing for extension of working lives (Conen, Henkens, & Schippers 2014; Hwang 2016). As a result of the inconsistencies and lack of coordination in various national-level actions on ageing, several policy concepts, including productive ageing, healthy ageing, positive ageing and successful ageing, have emerged. Despite these alternative concepts, active ageing remains the most popular. Overall, new insights into ageing have encouraged positive images of ageing, as opposed to the stereotyped negative images of the past (Katz 2001). Despite the different theoretical propositions, Katz (2001) and Katz and Calasanti (2014) argued that most of the current perspectives on ageing have been criticised as marketing rhetoric.

Active ageing is the most prominent global policy framework for ageing (Walker & Maltby 2012). The WHO defines active ageing as, ‘the process of optimizing opportunities for health, participation and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age’ (WHO 2002, p. 12); thus, the ultimate goal of active ageing is to enhance the quality of life of people at old age. However, the concept of active ageing, similarly to other ageing concepts, has been criticised. It is believed that the extent to which active ageing has been promoted as the ideal strategy for global ageing is oversold and may be counterproductive (Minkler & Holstein 2008). In addition, the term “active” itself may be misconstrued, reducing policy actions to a focus on physical activities at the expense of other important aspects of the model (Barrett & McGoldrick 2013; Stenner, McFarquhar, & Bowling 2011). Active might also be regarded as an extension of social determinants of health (WHO 2002), reducing national-level policy actions to health promotion and prevention. Boudiny (2013) observed that given the nature of the concept of active ageing, much of the debate has focused on the economic aspects of “active”, without any significant recourse to the overall framework. The emphasis has been on employment, health, pension, retirement and citizenship (Walker 2002 2006).
Research Design
The study on which this paper is based was developed as a multiple method research project involving three different research methods: interpretive phenomenology analysis (IPA), a comparative case study and a survey. However, the methodological approach used in this current paper is IPA. IPA is a research approach useful for examining the lived experiences of people. Generally, IPA is grounded on three key pillars: phenomenology, hermeneutics and ideography (Pietkiewicz & Smith 2014). The study was conducted among older Ghanaians—in all, a total of 30 participants were purposively selected from Ghana, and from Ghanaians living in Australia. The selection of older Ghanaians living in Australia was important in deepening our understanding of how different contexts influence the conceptualisation of ageing, even for people with similar socio-cultural and economic backgrounds. Participants participated in in-depth interviews, which generated data for the IPA of the meaning of active ageing based on lived experiences.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Experiential Meaning of Active Ageing
Participants were asked to describe their everyday experiences of active ageing and what active ageing meant for them. The phenomenological reduction process (inductive coding) resulted in 25 different words, phrases or sentences that older people used to describe their experiences and understanding of active ageing. Within the context of IPA, as argued by Lopez and Willis (2004), hermeneutic inquiry transcends the pure content of human subjectivity, and includes the theoretical implications of such individual narratives in everyday life. The 25 words or phrases were clustered into eight themes based on coding similarity, while also considering the theoretical validity of such themes. According to this analysis, active ageing meant eight things with varying intensities: social interaction, happiness, activity, physical health, independence, spiritual health, public safety and work/employment (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Source: Doh, Hancock & Adusei-Asante, 2017.](image-url)
It is evident that experiential active ageing is a complex phenomenon shaped by several factors (see Figure 1). However, the most important meaning of experiential active ageing among research participants was social interaction; older people who have demonstrated functional social capital, stronger families, continuous social activity within the community context and some income or assets to maintain social interaction appeared to live much happier lives at old age. Social interaction, as defined by Donald, Ware, Brook and Davies-Avery (1978), hinges on the social functioning of the individual. Berkman and Glass (2000) refer to social interaction as the interpersonal interaction and social participation of the individual. Social interaction in its totality is known to have some level of influence on physical and mental health, especially for older people (Seeman et al 2001). In addition, Buys and Miller (2006) observed in their study of older Australians that participation (social interaction) was critical to wellbeing.

The concept of activity was the second most important meaning of active ageing among research participants. Participants’ usage of activity refers to both social and physical activities that are carried out in the company of other people. Menec (2003) stated that every activity has relevance—some activities may lead to the promotion of physical benefits for general health, while others are underpinned by social values useful for explaining active ageing. Other forms of activity offer opportunity for solitary reflection on life. Older people in this study participated in everyday activities such as meeting people, walking around, talking, playing or going to the gym. However, many downplayed high levels of mechanical exercise, especially alone. There is a positive correlation between activity and satisfaction at old age (Diggs 2008; Westerterp 2000). Physical activity is also known to reduce the incidence of coronary heart disease, hypertension, depression and anxiety at old age (Andrews 2001).

The third important experiential meaning of active ageing is being in good health and having opportunities for health services. Being in good health in this instance refers to the absence of diseases, both communicable and non-communicable. However, theoretically, health is regarded as a relative concept, and depends largely on the individual defining it, including aspects of time, culture, social class, age and, to some extent, gender (Morrison 2008). It is, however, generally referred to as a state of physical, psychological, emotional and social wellbeing (Morrison 2008). Along with the notion of being in good health was the issue of having access to healthcare services during moments of ill health at old age. It is also instructive to note that for some participants, ill health was not a barrier to life satisfaction at old age. This confirms the finding of Grundy et al (2007) that even in poor physical health, people can still live happy lives when given the required social support. Other dimensions of experiential active ageing include independence, happiness, work, spiritual life and the notion of public safety (see Figure 1).

**Comparison of Experiential Active Ageing and the WHO Model**

A comparison between the WHO model and experiential active ageing shows important variations. It should be noted that the WHO active ageing model assumes that quality of life at old age depends on three central pillars: health, participation and security (WHO 2002). However, as shown in Figure 1, our interviews revealed eight clear dimensions to experiential active ageing, with varying levels of contribution. In determining the fit
between experiential active ageing and the WHO model, five different aspects of experiential active ageing are clustered under one central concept termed social interaction promotion, including social interaction, activity, work/employment, happiness and spirituality (see Figure 2). Social interaction promotion fits into the participation pillar of the WHO model, which makes participation the most important aspect of the model. However, in practice, participation tends to be the least promoted. Similar findings on the relevance of the participation pillar in the WHO model were noted by Buys and Miller (2006). The argument in this paper is that although the participation pillar appears to be the most relevant in theory, the use of the concept of participation itself constrains the overall benefits of social interaction. As explained by Berkman and Glass (2000), participation is a function of social interaction, which makes the latter a more broad-based actionable concept for policy than the former.

Further, it is observed that the health dimension of experiential active ageing is a perfect fit with the health pillar of the WHO model. However, experiential active ageing has supporting dimensions of health, including the notion of activity and happiness. As noted earlier, in practice, the WHO model has largely been driven by the health pillar and considerations of economic participation (Boudiny 2013; Constança et al 2012; European Union 2012). As Walker (2002) observed, active ageing emphasises employment, health, pension, retirement and citizenship. This emphasis on health and economic participation makes “mere marketing rhetoric”, as observed by Katz and Calasanti (2014). Finally, the dimensions of public safety and independence fit to some extent with the security pillar, albeit with some conceptual variations in real life experiences.

Figure 2. Experiential active ageing and WHO model compared (Doh et al., 2017).
Different Policy Contexts and Experiential Active Ageing

A further objective of this paper is to examine how different socio-cultural contexts shape the construct and experiences of active ageing. The purpose is to deepen arguments about the relevance of context considerations in the adoption of global policy proposals, especially in Africa. To achieve this, a comparison was made between participants selected from Ghana and their counterparts in Australia. The participants were carefully selected by matching background variables, such as educational level, average income per month, skills status, employment status and house ownership.

By comparing people of similar socio-cultural and economic backgrounds living in a different policy and cultural environment, we found that context influences the conceptualisation and experiences of active ageing (see Figure 3). While all the dimensions of experiential active ageing are valid in both contexts, there is significant variation in the emphasis placed on each dimension for optimising quality of life at old age. For example, participants in Ghana identified more with social interaction (52%) than any other dimension, whereas in Australia, the concern was more with physical health and having access to health services (23%)—the value placed on social interaction among participants in Australia was also significant, but some participants reported feelings and experiences of isolation. Activity was also a more important factor among participants in Australia (20%) than in Ghana (14%). Among older Ghanaians in Australia, work or employment was an important factor in their experiences of active ageing (8%), whereas in Ghana, work was almost insignificant (1%). There were no experiences of public safety issues in Ghana, whereas in Australia, public safety is an important component of active ageing (5%).

![Figure 3. Experiential active ageing in different policy contexts—Ghana and Australia (Doh et al., 2017).](image)

Conclusion

WHO’s active ageing model is an important global policy approach to issues of demographic ageing; however, in terms of the adoption of the policy to the African context, based on evidence in this current paper, it is important to pay attention to the
socio-cultural dynamics of sub-Saharan Africa. While acknowledging the relevance of the dimensions of active ageing, the case of older people in Ghana and their counterparts in Australia suggests that the promotion of social interaction provides better opportunities for maximising quality of life at old age (Doh et al, 2017). Policymakers in Africa must pay attention to strengthening the family system in order to restore family life and dignity and promote intergenerational solidarity; it is also important to create community-level structures that support social interaction. Creating opportunities for continuous activity with social and economic value is important, as the evidence further shows that the availability of income or assets assists in the maintenance of social interaction. The complementary roles of health and other social security systems, such as pensions and cash transfers, cannot be ignored.

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Contextual Dynamics of Health Insurance Use: Case Study of Faith Healing and Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme

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Abstract
Health insurance is believed to enhance poor people’s access to healthcare. Thus, one would expect that, in contexts where poverty is endemic, health insurance policies would encourage people to use hospital-based healthcare when they fall sick. However, an ethnographic study of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in the Daakye District of the Central Region provides evidence to the contrary. Our research found that in a pluralistic healthcare context such as Ghana’s, socio-economic factors such as local perceptions of illness and distance to healthcare centres are key predictors of why and how people use health insurance policies. This paper presents a brief discussion of the manner in which those who enrolled in the NHIS have related to faith healing and hospital-based treatment in Daakye District. Our study shows that faith healing remains popular in Ghana, despite the introduction of the NHIS, and puts forward the case for public education and a national regulatory framework for controlling dangerous forms of the practice.

Introduction
Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was introduced in 2004. The NHIS replaced the existing system, known as “cash and carry”, under which patients paid for their medical expenses out-of-pocket (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Agyepong & Adjei 2008). The NHIS was implemented as a pro-poor policy that provides Ghanaians with essential, equitable and universal healthcare access (Agyepong & Adjei 2008). The National Health Insurance Act (2003) established Ghana’s NHIS, and made it compulsory for all Ghanaians to join the scheme, although in practice, this is not enforced. The NHIS operates as an indemnity policy, requiring that those who join only pay a fixed amount for specific illnesses (Aryeetey et al. 2016). Ghanaians working in the civil service, contributors to the country’s Social Security and National Insurance Trust, pensioners, and an exempt group (comprising indigents, children and minors below 181 and those aged above 70 years) are not required to pay premiums, although in some jurisdictions, they pay little sums as administrative costs (Agyepong & Adjei 2008; NHIA 2016).

The NHIS operates biomedical facilities, hospitals, clinics and community-based health planning and services (CHPS). The benefits package includes primary care and hospital care consisting of outpatient and inpatient care, oral health services, eye care services, * Thanks to Professor Birgit Meyer, who supervised the thesis from which this paper was drawn. My appreciation also goes to the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the Vrije University of Amsterdam, Holland, who provided the scholarship for this research.

1 The legislative instrument states that before a child or a minor under 18 years is registered, at least one of his or her parents must join the NHIS.
maternity care and all emergencies. The NHIS was formulated to ensure that the policy covered 95% of the diseases in Ghana and 80% of the country’s disease burden. While no ceiling is provided on the number of instances clients are able to visit health facilities, a gatekeeper system prevents abuse of the policy (Blanchet et al., 2012; Kotoh, 2013; Sekyi & Domanban 2012).

It is generally acknowledged that there are four medical options in Ghana: hospital-based treatment, pharmacies (drugstores), traditional medicines and faith healing (Ae-Nyibise et al 2010; Senah 1997; Twumasi 1978). According to Twumasi (1978), the cultural characteristics of a society influence the manner in which people use existing medical options. Twumasi (1978) further argued that subtle competition among various medical options is a feature of pluralistic healthcare, and people, depending on their particular situation, may vacillate between options. The choice of a particular healthcare option (or a combination of two) is also influenced by the health-seeking behaviour of the person in question. Health-seeking behaviour drives the reasons for which and the manner in which the community patronises available healthcare options (Kroeger 1983; Shaikh 2007). According to Musoke et al (2014), factors that influence health-seeking behaviour can be categorised as physical, socio-economic, cultural or political, and include educational levels, environmental conditions, socio-demographic factors, knowledge about facilities, gender issues, political environment and the health care system itself (Kian 2001; Musoke et al 2004; Ogunlesi & Olanrewaju 2010; Prosser 2007; Ukwaja et al 2013).

The factors relating to cultural beliefs are particularly relevant for this study. According to Meyer (1995), local and cultural perceptions of sickness influence choices in accessing healthcare. In observing the Peki in the Volta Region of Ghana, Meyer (1995) found that the violation of accepted (societal) laws—such as two blood relations having sexual intercourse—was regarded an abomination or “gu”. For the local people, “gu” defiled families, and would result in violators falling ill. While supposedly “gu-related” illnesses were theoretically often treatable at hospitals, families generally called on local traditional priests to perform purification rituals to remove “gu” from their affected relatives. Similarly, Awusabo-Asare and Anarfi (1997) argued that in most Ghanaian rural societies, diseases whose aetiology could not be readily explained were often given “supernatural explanations”—a belief system Senah (1997) confirmed in researching the Botianor area in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana.

Since its introduction, little has been written on how the NHIS has influenced the use of faith healing in Ghana, which is a gap this paper attempts to fill. In recent times, given the lack of medical facilities for mental health patients in Ghana, there have been calls for ‘inter sectoral partnership between biomedical care providers and faith healers to deal with treatment gaps’ (Arial et al 2016, p. 2; see also Ae-Ngibise et al 2010; and Patel 2011). Thus, the focus on faith healing in the context of an affordable pro-poor NHIS is timely. As discussed below, it is critical for Ghana to develop a national policy regulatory framework for streamlining and educating the public on dangerous forms of faith healing.

2 Elsewhere we have discussed the impact of the NHIS on hospital-based treatment, traditional medicines and drugstores (see Adusei-Asante, 2017).
Methods
An ethnographic study was conducted over a three-month period in 2009 in the Daakye District of the Central Region of Ghana. Most residents live in rural settings; nearly one-third live on 240 islands reachable only by boat. In 2009, 150,000 people lived in the district, with nearly 8,000 living in Daakyekrom, the district capital. At the time of data collection, just 10% of the district road network was tarred (Daakyekrom Development Organisation Annual Reports 2006–2009). Tali and Buru were the main languages spoken, with ethnic groups comprised of Tali, Buru, Northerners and others. Seventy percent of residents identified as Christians, while 30% identified as Muslims. As a locality experiencing extreme poverty, the entire Daakye District had only one referral hospital (Daakyekrom Mission Hospital [DMH]), three clinics and 13 CHPS. Most parts of the 240 islands in Daakye District had no clinics or CHPS. Prevalent diseases in the district included malaria, hernia, respiratory tract infections and typhoid fever (Daakye District Development Organisation Annual Reports 2006–2009).

This research formed part of a Master of Anthropology programme at the Vrije University of Amsterdam. As the study was driven mainly by ethnography, review of reports, participant observation and interviews were the main research tools. Annual reports of the DMH and two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that work in the district were obtained to establish the research context. Observation was carried out at the DMH and two faith-healing outlets, mainly in Daakyekrom, to obtain local knowledge of the general conditions and facilities, in- and outpatient activities and treatment procedures (Liamputtong 2009). Thirty formal and informal interviews were conducted for the study proper. Formal interviews were conducted with DMH medical professionals and faith healers. The interview questions focused on the health situation in the Daakye District before and after the introduction of the NHIS, and how the policy had influenced the practice and use of faith healing in the district. Apart from the Reda Islands, where a translator was used, most of the interviews were conducted in the Buru language. Key stakeholders, such as the directors of two NGOs operating in the district and the district directors of the Ghana Health Services (GHS) and the NHIS, were also engaged in formal interviews. Individuals on the Reda Islands as well as on the streets and in homes and workplaces of Daakyekrom were informally engaged in the study and asked if they had enrolled in the NHIS, and if and why they still patronised faith-healing outlets (see Adusei-Asante 2017). The data were coded and analysed manually after several rounds of immersion.

Faith Healing in Ghana
Faith healing is discussed here within the contexts of Christianity and Islam, the two most common religions in Ghana. The practice of Christian faith healing in Ghana goes back to the days of Peter Anim, who started the Faith Tabernacle Church in the 1920s, associated with the founding of Ghanaian Pentecostalism (Larbi 2001). Faith healing involves an invocation of the divine (through all-night prayer sessions, fasting, anointing oil, prayer cloths and soaps, usually in prayer camps, healing crusades and church services) to heal the sick and deliver a person purported to be suffering spiritual bondage (Gifford 2004). The practice of faith healing is rooted in the cultural belief that evil spirits are responsible for sickness (Meyer 1995; Senah 1997), a belief system Onyina (2008) repudiates.

3 The research locality, languages and the name of the organisation have been de-identified.
Faith healing used to be considered an option mainly for the mentally ill or those suffering from “demonic oppression”. This has changed, especially with the advent and popularity of (neo) Pentecostal/Charismatic churches (Asamoah-Gyadu 2004; Sackey 1991). Ghana’s airwaves are fraught with faith-healer broadcasts and advertisements, campaigning for people to visit their faith-healing services. While some do not provide an exact timeframe for healing those who attend their services, others boast of having the ability to heal instantly. Although the practice is criticised for its unorthodox healing processes, some of which are deemed to infringe on the rights of patients, faith healing continues to thrive, particularly in rural Ghana (Ae-Ngibise et al 2010; Arias et al 2016; Human Rights Watch 2012). Sackey (1991) has noted that not all churches agree on the best method of faith healing. Some believe in sole reliance on the Holy Spirit for healing, while others believe this should be combined with biomedicine and traditional herbs, and still others argue it should be blended with hospital-based treatment only (Asamoah-Gyadu 2004; Onyina 2008). Unless otherwise specified, faith healing in this research study refers to all three approaches.

Islamic faith encourages followers to seek appropriate medical attention, yet posits that no medicine will work if God does not want it to work. Therefore, Muslims visiting a medical doctor for treatment must also pray to God to cure the illness. There are specific Quranic verses that Islamic scholars consider to offer help for common conditions such as headaches and fevers. In the case of serious illnesses, scholars may make the patient wear written verses on the body, a practice known as Taweez (Alavi 2008). It is a part of the Islamic faith to be cured (as well as to learn how to cure), so if Muslims become ill and seek medical attention, they are deemed to have done a good deed (Alavi 2008; Tarmahomed 2013).

Findings: The NHIS and Faith Healing

Faith healing takes place in churches, in mosques and at healing crusades. Compared with other parts of the country, healing crusades in the Daakye District were rare at the time of data collection. In the absence of such crusades, residents of the Daakye District relied on local churches for divine healing. I visited and interacted with the pastors and members of two churches that had held healing prayer camps in Daakyekrom; both pastors claimed no sick person had ever died in their healing camps.

Maame Tass, a member and a trained catechist of the Abrabopa Church in Daakyekrom, ran one of the faith-healing centres. Maame Tass was married with three children and ran a bread-baking business alongside her healing ministry. She had a commercial school educational background. Maame Tass preferred her camp to be called the Abrabopa Prayer Centre, where she served as one of the leaders of the women’s wings. At her services, the members took turns to share numerous testimonies of miraculous healing they had received. Maame Tass preached about God’s grace and ability to heal, which endeared her to the members. She shared her three-bedroom house with her patients, including the mentally ill. Although she participated in the NHIS, Maame Tass claimed that she had never used it. Her continual membership in the scheme, she said in an interview, stemmed from her desire to help the poor. Maame Tass debarred her patients

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4 Evangelist Lapeewa of the Fine House Chapel held the most well-known healing crusade in the Daakye District, in 2007
from taking biomedicines in the camp. Uncharacteristically for a Ghanaian prayer camp, she did not use any spiritual water or anointing oil when praying for the sick in her services, but instructed them to engage in fasting and midnight prayers.

The other church, the Glorious International Church, belonged to the Pentecostal denomination. The leader, Pastor Peter, used anointing oil, and also managed a prayer camp where the mentally ill were housed and prayed for. Pastor Peter was married, had three children and lived in the camp in a separate apartment. Pastor Peter believed in medicine, but stressed its limitations in curing spiritual illnesses. He owned a small herbal medicine shop, which he depended on to support his family and church. During my several visits to his services, I found Pastor Peter to be a charismatic figure who preached healing and deliverance as the rights of the Christian. On Sundays, the service numbered about 100, without children, and on Fridays, when he held his healing services, about 80 (mostly women). He was a member of the NHIS, but many of his church were not—some considered it too expensive, while others stated they would not renew their NHIS because their sickness was beyond scientific medicines and hospitals. The church lined up for prayers, and the touch of the man of God was believed to heal and deliver people from satanic oppression. After the prayers, the church shared porridge together.

While most people I interacted with at Pastor Peter’s church had little education, I talked to a 48-year-old man visiting Maame Tass’ healing camp who was the headmaster of a junior secondary school in the district. He had been sick for a year, and claimed to have gone to the hospital several times. When asked what had brought him there, he replied –

Doctors at Cape and Korle Bu [the biggest hospital in Ghana] have done their best, but I am still not OK. They have conducted one test after the other and done numerous scans. Sometimes after three days of being discharged, the sickness comes back, so I heard about Maame Tass and came to try God too.

When I probed as to why he concluded the sickness had spiritual undercurrents, he said, ‘I suspect someone wants to take my position in the school. My sickness comes whenever I go to the school to resume work. It is not normal, there is more to it’. Before the NHIS was introduced in the Daakye District, people visited faith healers with diseases that could have been cured at the hospital, because of the high cost of medical care. However, the NHIS appeared to have changed the kind of sicknesses that faith healers handled in the district. Although faith-healing camps were being patronised, as shown above, people first visited hospitals, and if they were not cured, sought help from the prayer camps. As a result of the NHIS, faith healers tended to handle sicknesses deemed to be untreatable in hospitals, believed to be orchestrated by demons, witches, evil forces or Satan, or a punishment for sins committed, including asram, tukpe, barrenness and mental problems. Even though it was usually the last (but not the least) of the medical options, faith healers assured their followers of protection from forces that inflict pain and suffering. In both churches, Satan is rejected as an enemy who is

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5 Disease believed to cause stunted growth in children.
6 A medical condition believed to have resulted from satanic attack.
With regard to Islam, the Imam in Daakyekrom explained that their faith also believed in faith healing, but because he did not personally have the gift of healing, he did not promise nor encourage it in his mosques. During an interview, he explained that in Islam, people are trained specially to deal with sicknesses regarded as untreatable with scientific medicine. The Imam ridiculed churches and mosques that prayed for sicknesses deemed to be treatable at hospitals. I found out in my interaction with Muslims in Daakyekrom that most of them had joined the NHIS. During an observation of a Muslim service, I heard the Imam encourage the people to shun visiting “spiritual healers” for healing and go instead to the hospitals.

Nevertheless, most islanders from localities with no or limited health facilities had high regard for faith healing. The coping mechanism of some islanders when sick was to self-medicate with medicines obtained from drugstores. If that failed, they would apply traditional medicines. If none of these worked, they would visit the hospital or resort to prayer camps, depending on their financial status. This pattern was repeated if they fell sick again.

Conclusion
This study found that faith healing continues to thrive in Ghana, in spite of the introduction of the free NHIS. The popularity of faith healing is attributed to the culturally embedded belief that the devil is to blame for so-called “biomedically untreatable sicknesses”, the advent of Pentecostalism and the lack of medical facilities in rural areas for Ghanaians who have enrolled in the NHIS. The continuous growth of Pentecostalism in Ghana suggests that faith healing may persist. While some churches are beginning to modernise the practice to make it attractive, others continue to engage in forms that are dangerous, such as forbidding patients from taking their medication while in their care. In the wake of discussions exploring some form of collaboration between biomedical care providers and faith healers to deal with treatment gaps in mental health in Ghana, it is recommended that the peak bodies of the various religions in Ghana, such as the Christian Council of Ghana, the Association of Pentecostal Churches and the Islamic Council of Ghana, establish enforceable codes of conduct for regulating the practice of faith healing and controlling extreme and dangerous forms. At the same time, the establishment of a national campaign championed by the National Commission for Civic Education on safe faith-healing practices is critical. While the Ministry of Health and the GHS continue to engage with faith healers for mutual grounds of collaboration, the Government of Ghana also needs to expand biomedical care to areas in which it is currently lacking, to reduce the need for people to unnecessarily rely on faith healing.

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Pitfalls of Universal Health Coverage Systems: Evidence from West Africa

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Abstract
The importance of establishing universal health coverage policies for facilitating health care access and utilisation in developing countries is recognised in the literature. However, previous studies focus primarily on the fiscal challenges associated with the implementation of universal health coverage schemes, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In the wake of the inclusion of universal health coverage as one of the key targets of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal 3, many African countries are preparing to implement some form of national health insurance system. We seek to contribute to the literature by discussing the experiences of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme and, more briefly, the health insurance initiatives of Senegal and Burkina Faso. Our purpose is to show that implementation of universal health coverage is challenging, but possible, if associated blind spots are managed.

Introduction
There have been incessant calls for governments in sub-Saharan Africa to implement universal health coverage schemes. The inclusion of universal health coverage as one of the targets of the recently launched Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 has been welcomed as a positive step, and a demonstration of the commitment of the international community to realise the vision of a world where every country provides affordable health care for its citizens (United Nations [UN] 2016). Universal health coverage is believed to decrease extreme poverty and drive economic growth, and is gaining critical mass worldwide, with over 300 economists recently endorsing the concept (CMAJ 2012; Obiechefu 2012; Spaan et al 2012; UN 2016). The push for African countries to move towards universal health coverage stems from the reality that the region is unable to deal with epidemics (such as Ebola and cholera outbreaks), and is behind the rest of the world in areas such as family planning, immunisation and sanitation, regarded as basic health services (Obiechefu 2012; UNICEF 2012). This is compounded by the fact that Africa accounts for almost 25% of the world’s disease burden, but has inadequate medical resources (3% of the world’s doctors), and lacks workable private-sector solutions to health care financing (Obiechefu 2012).

Against this backdrop, health economists acknowledge universal health coverage schemes as a solution to health care financing for Africa. Universal health coverage is a policy that provides a form of national health insurance for all or the majority of the citizenry (CMAJ 2012). As universal health coverage is capital-intensive, many governments lack the political will to implement it. The governments of Ghana, Senegal and Burkina Faso have implemented respective policies through user fees, exempting vulnerable population groups, including but not limited to children under five, pregnant women and indigents. A major implementation challenge is the reliance on premiums paid by civil servants to fund the scheme, as typically, non-government workers cannot
afford health insurance (excepting, of course, the very wealthy in the private sector). Throughout West Africa, civil servants account for almost 15% of employees, premiums from this group are inadequate to fund the health insurance schemes (CMAJ 2012; Obiechefu 2012; Spaan et al 2012).

The unpredictability of international aid has made this an unreliable source of health care financing in Africa. According to Obiechefu (2012), donor-funding accounts for just 25% of health care financing in one-third of African nations, with 60% of health expenses paid for out-of-pocket. Obiechefu (2012) further argues that while user fees are a source of revenue for West African governments, they are largely unpopular because of their tendency to drive people into poverty and overburden poor families. As a result, in the mid-1990s, the World Health Assembly recommended against African countries adopting universal health coverage in the form of national health insurance schemes (CMAJ 2012; Kusi et al 2015; Spaan et al 2012).

Current discussion on the challenges African governments face in implementing universal health coverage policies focuses principally on the lack of funds; this paper, however, argues that issues relating to universal health coverage in Africa go beyond fiscal considerations. Our discussion is centred on three West African countries (Ghana, Senegal and Burkina Faso) that have implemented health insurance schemes; however, the lessons learned are important not just for the countries in question, but for all countries encouraged by the SDGs to implement universal health coverage. In this regard, we seek to echo the views of Obiechefu (2012, p. 1) that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to achieving universal health coverage must be avoided and that each country must determine which strategies and reforms best meet their needs.’

**Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme**

Ghana established a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2004 to replace the existing out-of-pocket payment system (Agyepong & Adjei 2008; Arhinful 2003; Sodzi-Tetteh et al 2012). A National Health Insurance Act (Act 650) of 2003 was passed to make way for the creation of a National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), mandated to oversee the implementation of the new NHIS. The purpose of Ghana’s NHIS was to enable Ghanaians to access basic health care services. Act 650 was reviewed and replaced with Act 852 in 2012, which made it mandatory for every resident in Ghana to belong to the scheme (Blanchet, Fink, & Osei-Akoto 2012).

Ghana’s NHIS has five funding streams, including a 2.5% tax on particular goods and services from the Value Added Tax, called the National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL). The NHIL is the largest source of funding for the scheme, contributing 60% of the total (Kusi et al 2015). The NHIS is also funded by a 2.5% per month contribution from formal sector workers through the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). Other sources of funding include profits obtained from National Health Insurance Fund investments, premiums paid by informal-sector workers and an annual government allocation from the consolidated fund to the NHIA (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Sodzi-Tetteh 2012).

The NHIS includes those exempt from payments and those who pay premiums. As explained elsewhere (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Adusei-Asante & Georgiou 2017), the
exempt group consists of public sector employees and self-employed/private employees who voluntarily contribute to the SSNIT. Children under 18, indigents, some people with disabilities (without any productive ability) and persons with intellectual disability also fall in the exempt group. Other groups in the exempt group are retirees with social security benefits and people aged above 70. All government sector employees (18–69 years) who are not part of one of the above-listed groups pay premiums (NHIA 2013).

Payment of yearly premiums is a graduated scheme, ranging between GHC7.2 (US$1.9) and GHC48.0 (US$12.6), depending on the socio-economic group an individual belongs to, determined by the NHIS district offices. The NHIS covers 95% of the disease burden in Ghana, excluding cancers (except breast and cervical cancers), HIV retroviral drugs, dialysis for chronic renal failure, hormone and organ replacement therapy and some non-communicable diseases (NHIA 2013). The NHIS is an important social protection policy, with 10,256,862 subscribers as at 2014, representing approximately 40% of the current population of Ghana, and an outpatient utilisation rate of 29,637,189 (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Jehu-Appiah 2015).

Recognised globally as a promising model for social protection in health, Ghana’s NHIS has made a significant impact in terms of: (1) improving health-seeking behaviours and utilisation of health care (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Blanchet, Fink, & Osei-Akoto 2012; Fenny et al 2016; Gobah & Liang 2011; Jehu-Appiah 2015; Kuuire et al 2015; Teye et al 2015); (2) increasing utilisation of antenatal care (Brugiavini & Pace 2016; Kotoh 2013); (3) reducing maternal mortality (Dzakpasu et al 2012; Sofo & Thompson 2015). However, various scholars (including the authors) have followed the NHIS keenly, gleaning valuable lessons that may prove helpful for other countries seeking to implement universal health coverage systems. These insights are presented below.

The NHIS has led to high utilisation of hospital-based health care, and has consistently exceeded the projected budget allocation. According to NHIA (2013), claims for outpatient services increased from 580,000 cases in 2005 to 23.9 million in 2012, a growth of more than 400%. Similarly, inpatient services increased from 29,000 cases in 2005 to 1.4 million in 2012. Overall, claims increased from GHC7.6 million in 2005 to GHC616 million in 2012 (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; NHIA 2013). Jehu-Appiah (2015) cited the high claim payment as one of the key factors mitigating against the sustainability of the NHIS, arguing that allocated funds are unable to meet the emerging claims liabilities and sustain efficiency-gain initiatives—the total approved allocation (NHIL/SSNIT) for 2015 was GHC1,185.67 million, while GHC280 million was spent in respect of all expenditure for 2015. Providers agitating for higher tariffs over and above this projection compound this challenge (Jehu-Appiah 2015). A further challenge relates to claims arrears and anticipated funding gaps. According to Jehu-Appiah (2015), claims arrears for 2014 totalled GHC360.4 million (as opposed to GHC85 million), while the projected funding gap for 2015 was GHC364.80 million (as opposed to $86 million). This has led the NHIA to pilot a new system called the capitation system, based on the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings’ ideas regarding how to curb the financial challenges facing the NHIS.

1 US$1 was approximately 4GHC in 2015.
Increased utilisation of hospital-based health care exerts pressure on understaffed and underresourced medical facilities, particularly in rural areas. The NHIS brought about unprecedented, unanticipated patronage of hospital-based treatment, and the limited medical infrastructure in rural parts of the country have not been capable of accommodating the influx. The NHIS has exerted enormous pressure on health staff and facilities in deprived areas, resulting in patients spending long hours at the hospital, and raising concerns about the quality of health care received. There have been reports that stressed medical professionals have behaved unprofessionally towards clients, leading some NHIS clients to resolve not to seek medical assistance from hospitals (except in emergency cases), for fear of being maltreated for presenting with illnesses deemed “mild” by health professionals. Owing to distance and the lack of medical facilities and drugs in some localities, some rural dwellers, though enrolled in the NHIS, have self-treated, through drugstores, traditional medicines and faith healing (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Adusei-Asante & Georgiou 2017; Aniah 2016; Dalinjong & Laar 2012).

Kusi et al (2015) found that the NHIS is a burden on households with low socio-economic status and large household size, and called for innovative measures to encourage the more financially able households to enrol, while abolishing the registration fee for children. Kusi et al (2015) also advocated for the need to price insurance according to socio-economic status of households, while addressing inimical non-financial factors to increase NHIS coverage (see also Addae-Korankye 2013). Results revealed that 66% of uninsured households and 70% of partially insured households have sufficient financial resources to fully insure. Enrolling all household members in the NHIS would constitute 5.9% of household non-food spending, or 2.0% of total expenditure; this figure is higher for households in the first (11.4%) and second (7.0%) socio-economic quintiles. All households who indicated being unable to afford to fully insure (29%) were in the two lower socio-economic quintiles and had large household sizes. The researchers revealed that non-financial factors, pertaining to qualities of the insurer and problems in the health system, affect potential membership in the NHIS.

Evidence of abuse of the NHIS has been noted. Some clients take advantage of the free policy to treat particular medical conditions and opt out immediately afterwards. We have noted several instances where this has happened, and have argued for a policy change in this regard, as its absence is negatively affecting NHIS financial viability (see Adusei-Asante, 2017; Adusei-Asante & Georgiou 2017; Kotoh 2013). Health care is a basic human need and should be viewed apolitically; however, Ghana’s NHIS is heavily politicised, with various political parties using it to further their campaign agenda (Kotoh 2013). A change in government results in a change in the persons who make critical decisions on the scheme nationally. In one region, a group of people refused to join the NHIS on the grounds that the New Patriotic Party who introduced the NHIS would use the success of this health care policy as a political slogan. Politicisation of NHIS has been condemned, and politicians admonished to desist from using it for political gains, for the sake of the ordinary people who depend on it (Adusei-Asante & Doh 2016; Braimah, Rufai & Annin-Bonsu 2014; Kotoh 2013).

Other general challenges identified with the NHIS include: (1) subscribers being denied health care as a result of unpaid claims; (2) unauthorised/illegal co-payments; (3)
increasing enrolment to achieve universal health coverage under the current financial constraint, sometimes for political expediencies; (4) agitation for expansion of the benefit package; (5) supply-side and demand-side moral hazard; (6) quality of care challenges; (7) high cost of medicines; (8) over 100% average increases in provider fees and charges (9) administrative barriers on renewal and transfer of membership; (10) gender-specific impacts (Abbey 2003; Adusei-Asante 2017; Dixon 2014; Doku, Alhassan, & Nketiah-Amponsah 2014; Jehu-Appiah 2015; Sodzi-Tettey et al 2012).

**Health Insurance in Senegal**

Full-cost recovery has existed in Senegal’s health care system since the 1980s, owing to government financial constraints (Carrin, Waelkens, & Criel 2005; Mladovsky & Ndiayeii 2015). Accordingly, access to quality health care services is an area of social concern, particularly among rural and peri-urban dwellers, due to the high incidence of poverty (Barnes et al 2016; Jütting 2004; Soors et al 2010). In the last three decades, efforts have been made at both national and community levels to find alternative solutions, leading to the introduction of various forms of health care support and insurance schemes. These schemes can be grouped under two broad categories—user-fee exemption for some segments of the population and some health conditions, and community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes (*mutuelles de santé*), an innovative community initiative (Mladovsky & Bâ 2016; Witter et al 2010). The CBHI schemes date back to 1990, and aim to make health care affordable to the rural poor and the vulnerable. The user-fee exemption policy, though not the prime concern of this paper, is a governmental intervention launched in 2005 in response to hardships associated with out-of-pocket payments at the point of health care services (Carrin et al 2005; Jütting 2004; Mladovsky & Bâ 2016; Ouimet et al 2007).

Senegal has one of the most successful CBHI schemes in sub-Saharan Africa, with 139 such schemes operating in 2004 (Mladovsky & Ndiayeii 2015). Available records indicate that rural subscription to CBHI between 2000 to 2007 increased from 7.1 to 17.9% respectively with a 4% nationwide coverage (Odeyemi 2014; Soors et al 2010). Concurrently, out-of-pocket expenditure on private health care also reduced from 91.7% to 78.5% (Odeyemi 2014; Soors et al 2010). The CBHI schemes are not-for-profit and voluntary, owned and organised by members of the community, on the principles of redistribution of financial resources, empowerment, solidarity and risk sharing (Carrin et al 2005; Mladovsky & Ndiayeii 2015). Schemes are organised into mutual health organisations (MHOs), which determine the board members, convene regular meetings with members and look for hospitals in their respective communities that are willing and able to provide subsidised services to their members. The MHOs are thus responsible for the management of the schemes (Chankova, Sulzbach, & Diop 2008; Jütting 2004). Subscription is on both household and individual bases—each household pays a one-off registration fee, while individuals pay monthly premiums (Jütting 2004). The CBHI schemes have a significant impact on access to health care among the rural poor, with negotiated arrangements between MHO managers and partner hospitals providing subscribers with up to a 50% reduction in the cost of treatment (Chankova et al 2008; Jütting 2004).

Despite the merits of the CBHI schemes in Senegal, the system faces a number of inherent challenges. One is the lack of a legal or institutional framework (Odeyemi 2014;
Soors et al (2010). Although CBHI started in 1990, a legal instrument was only established in 2003, was under revision until 2010, and still lacks the relevant implementation Act (Odeyemi 2014; Soors et al 2010). According to Odeyemi (2014) and Soors et al (2010), this legal vacuum has threatened enrolments, financial sustainability and solidarity of some schemes, due to a lack of control and administrative and implementation abuses. Odeyemi (2014) posits that some schemes value financial viability at the expense of social equity and solidarity, by refusing membership to potential subscribers identified as economically and medically vulnerable.

Further, private health insurance schemes have the tendency to create inequalities and result in low patronage among socially heterogeneous populations, due to differing abilities to pay premiums (Jütting 2004; Sekhri & Savedoff 2005). In addition to the participation cost, the CBHI schemes only provide partial relief to members; for example, in every treatment circle, members are required to make a 50% out-of-pocket payment. Thus, the schemes are unable to provide social protection for the vulnerable who are incapable of paying subscription and monthly premiums as well as up-front payments at service points (Chankova et al 2008; Jütting 2004; Sekhri & Savedoff 2005).

Given the above challenges, Mladovsky & Mossialos (2015) and Ouimet et al (2007) advocate state participation and international support, to augment the efforts of the micro-schemes. They further argue for the incorporation of social science and political perspectives into CBHI policy design and implementation, in order to better understand and maximise equity and sustainability. Since 2007, complementary and mandatory schemes have been introduced, specifically targeting formal employees (Soors et al 2010). One such scheme is Assurance Maladie des Elèves, a scheme for school children (Soors et al 2010). Another complementary policy interventions, though not without implementation difficulties, are user-fee exemptions for childbirth, anti-retroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS and tuberculostatic drugs, and free medical care for people aged above 60 (Soors et al 2010).

**Health Insurance in Burkina Faso**

Like many developing countries, health service delivery has been a central issue in Burkina Faso, where it has been characterised by poor utilisation as a result of high costs and poor quality service (Dong et al 2004). In 1993, the Government of Burkina Faso introduced a user-fee system as a supplement to the existing government health services financed through the tax system; however, there has been a consistent decline in health service utilisation, as many people are not able to afford the cost-sharing arrangement (Mugisha et al 2002).

Burkina Faso has a very restricted formal health insurance system, which is largely exclusive to public sector employees, including the National Social Security Fund (Caisse National de Sécurité Sociale) and the National Social Security Fund for Retired State Employees (Caisse de Retraite des Fonctionnaires). Consequently, a large proportion of the population, especially rural dwellers, have been alienated from state-sponsored health insurance systems (Dong et al 2004). Since 2004, there have been attempts to improve health service utilisation among rural dwellers through the introduction of CBHI schemes in selected districts (Dong et al 2009). However, as observed by Su, Kouyaté and Flessa (2006), the introduction of CBHI led to increased
household health expenditures. Due to this, many households were unable to utilise health services to the fullest. Notwithstanding, Gnawali et al. (2009) and Parmar, De Allegri, Savadogo and Sauerborn (2014) suggested that the CBHI has made some positive strides in inducing health-seeking behaviour and fulfilling equity requirements, albeit greatly constrained by high costs. Overall, current health system financing in Burkina Faso is fragmented, preventing state-level subsidisation (Ridde et al 2013). However, the government’s National Health Development Plan 2011–2020 seeks, among other things, to increase public financing of health services and develop strategies towards achieving universal health coverage. There are fundamental challenges involved with implementing the policy, including modalities of funding through taxation and weak government commitment towards universal health coverage (Agier et al 2016).

In addition, the Universal Health Insurance Law of Burkina Faso was adopted in September 2015 by the National Transition Council (Agier et al 2016; World Health Organization [WHO] 2015). This law created a conditional health insurance scheme, with household contributions to the scheme based on ability to pay. Other operational issues are expected to be established by government decree. The model is being trialled for three years, with challenges anticipated to arise regarding raising adequate revenue through taxation to subsidise health costs, expansion and upgrade of health facilities to accommodate the volume of health seekers and the extent to which the equity-based contribution system will be operationalised.

Conclusion
This paper provides insights into the challenges associated with the implementation of health insurance schemes, with reference to Ghana, Senegal and Burkina Faso. Aside from facilitating health care utilisation and improving health-seeking behaviours, the paper reiterates that universal health coverage schemes are capital-intensive—national insurance schemes can be counter-intuitive if implemented in a setting where human resources and infrastructure to support the policy are lacking. Further, despite efforts to improve affordability, some citizens cannot afford health insurance, requiring governments to devise innovative ways of catering for poorer citizens. Moreover, users of health insurance have a tendency to abuse loopholes if there is no enforceable institutional framework to counter this. The paper also notes that health insurance policies provide ample fodder for political game-playing. As the world readies itself to implement the SDGs, African countries planning to implement universal health coverage systems should look to Ghana and other countries that have successfully implemented such systems for inspiration, while they plan and carefully implement and monitor health insurance systems that cater for their particularised contexts, needs and human resource and fiscal capabilities, informed by relevant feasibility studies.

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