CONTENTS

In Memoriam
Elspeth Anne Young (1940-2002) 4

Note from the Editor 5
AFSAAP 2003 6

Guest Essay
1980: The Springtime of Robert Mugabe 7
Neal Blewett

Articles
Governance, Globalisation and the HIV Epidemic in Africa 26
Elizabeth Reid
Africa at the ‘Edge’ of Globalisation 38
Tanya Lyons

Review Articles
Biography and History: Bridging the Gap 49
Peter F. Alexander
Adjusting to Globalisation in Ghana 58
David Brown
Central Africa’s Predatory Elites 63
David Gordon

Book Reviews
Christopher Ehret, The Civilizations of Africa: A History to 1800 70
Graham Connah
Christopher Wrigley, Kingship and State. The Buganda Dynasty 73
Anthony Low
James F. Searing, ‘God Alone is King’: Islam and Emancipation in Senegal. The Wolof Kingdoms of Kajoor and Bawol
Martin Klein

David Dorward

Scott MacWilliam

Rosaleen Duffy, Killing for Conservation: Wildlife Policy in Zimbabwe
Aileen Hoath

Jock McCulloch, Asbestos Blues: Labour, Capital, Physicians and the State in South Africa
Patrick Bertola

Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction
Eric Louw

Sue Kossew and Dianne Schwerdt (eds), Re-imagining Africa: New Critical Perspectives
Jean-Marie Volet

Greg Gow, The Oromo in Exile: from the Horn of Africa to the Suburbs of Australia
Penelope Hetherington

Apollo Nsubuga- Kyobe and Liz Dimock, African Communities and Settlement Services in Victoria: Towards Better Service Delivery Models
Wayne Pelling

Susan Ziehl, Population Studies
David Lucas

Lillian Tibatemwa Ekirikubinza, Women’s Violent Crime in Uganda: More Sinned Against than Sinning
Josephine Harmsworth Andama

Joy C. Kwesiga, Women’s Access to Higher Education in Africa: Uganda’s Experience
Sarah Ntiro
Research Matters
Recently Completed Doctoral Theses 104
New Missionary Collections in the UK 104

Notes
A Note on Zimbabwe’s Structural Predicament 106
John Moore
Whatever Happened to Australia’s Aid to Africa? 110
Cherry Gertzel
Scolma’s 40th Anniversary Conference 113
The Noma Award 2002 113
African Research Institute 114
African Studies Centre WA 114
People 115
Conferences 115

AFSAAP News
AFSAAP Annual General Meeting: Minutes 119
Reports 122
The 25th Annual AFSAAP Conference Postgraduate Workshop 126
James Gray
Proposed Constitutional Amendments 128
AFSAAP-CAAS Exchange 128
Elspeth Young who died in August of this year was a social geographer who chose to work largely with underprivileged or socially disadvantaged people in difficult or forgotten places. Her early work in Papua New Guinea including her field work in the PNG Highlands for her Ph.D set her on a life of study and work with development issues in non-western cultures. She is best known for her work with indigenous peoples in Australia. Those same concerns for indigenous peoples and for the impact upon their development however widened her focus to include other areas including not only the Asia-Pacific region but also Southern Africa; and a three months’ research fellowship at the University of Botswana in the first half of the 1990s extended her work to include the San people of the Kalahari. One staff member of what was then the Basarwa Research Committee remembers her as ‘small and intrepid’. While she herself called it ‘a short tourist visit’ (see her seminal study Third World in the First: Development and Indigenous Peoples) she obviously hoped to return. At ANU, during her time at the National Centre for Development Studies and with the Department of Demography, African graduate students enjoyed her wonderful friendship, support and hospitality. It was only in the 1990s that I myself in fact came to know Elspeth. Short as it was, that association leaves me in no doubt that it is for this generosity and gift of friendship and genuine empathy for indigenous communities including in Africa that those of us in AFSAAP who knew her will most remember her.

A Memorial Service for Elspeth Young was held in the Great Hall of University House Canberra on October 25th.*

Cherry Gertzel

* Professor Fay Gale’s Obituary of Elspeth was I understand published by the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, of which Elspeth was elected a Fellow in 2000. Meg Deane’s tribute to Elspeth is forthcoming in the Alumni Newsletter of the National Centre for Development Studies.
Note from the Editor

Of the several themes running through this issue of ARAS perhaps the most critical is that of the causal linkages between the growth of poverty across the African continent and the process of globalisation not only but especially over the past twenty or more years. Elizabeth Reid’s fine article on the HIV epidemic across Africa moreover makes clear especially the significance for our understanding of those linkages of the fact that the disease does not follow state borders and boundaries any more than ‘the forces of global markets and of multinational corporations’; or we need now to add, global terrorism. David Brown’s review article on Ghanian experience of internationalisation and development should also remind us of the history of structural adjustment while Tanya Lyons broader picture seeks to understand Africa’s present global location. Amongst the book reviews Patrick Bertola’s review of Jock McCulloch on asbestos mining in South Africa as well as Scott MacWilliam’s on the Office du Niger both should remind us that globalisation is not a recent phenomenon. Thus African states seeking to reverse the process of impoverishment continue to battle against what is still ‘donor conditionality’ and of a mindset that is unable to change. Against this it is reassuring to know that, notwithstanding the decline of Australian official development assistance to Africa, Australian community concern for the future of the continent remains high.

Of other contributors to this issue I would like especially to thank Neal Blewett for allowing us to publish the diary he kept when he was an Australian Observer to the (first) Zimbabwe elections of 1980 and which offers some fascinating insights into the Zimbabwe political process in its early years. Combined with John Moore’s short note in this issue and Professor Ranger’s reflections on Zimbabwe’s most recent elections in the last it adds to a better understanding of the complexities of that process.

I should draw the attention of members to two particular items on page 128 in the AFSAAP News section of this issue. The first is the constitutional amendments listed which aim simply to ‘tidy up’ some parts of the Association’s constitution. The second item is the announcement, foreshadowed in the Minutes of the 2002 AGM, of the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) offer, to (paid up) AFSAAP members, of a reduced subscription rate to their journal, the Canadian Journal of African Studies (CJAS). This is a generous offer to what is one of the major journals in the field of African Studies which will not only benefit AFSAAP members but establish a welcome link between the two associations. Finally once again I am indebted to Karen Miller for her expert assistance in the final production of this issue.

Cherry Gertzel
December 2002
Africa on a Global Stage: Politics, History, Economics and Culture

Thursday October 2\textsuperscript{nd} and Friday October 3\textsuperscript{rd}
Flinders University of Technology – Adelaide, South Australia

FIRST CALL FOR PAPERS

The twenty-sixth Annual Conference of the African Studies Association of Australasia will be held at The Flinders University of South Australia on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} of October 2003. The conference convenor is Dr Tanya Lyons.

The aim of the conference will be to examine all of the major issues facing Africa today, and to put Africa in focus on a global stage. With the recent war on terror and global connections with terrorism, understanding the African context will prove to be an important factor in coming to terms with current world events. Papers, panels and seminars on these themes are encouraged, however all papers relevant to African Studies will be considered. In particular papers from postgraduates are encouraged.

Accommodation is available at the University Hall on the campus.

Further information will be posted regularly on the AFSAAP website.

Please submit abstracts of no more than 300 words before May 30\textsuperscript{th} 2003
Send abstracts to Dr. Tanya Lyons
Email: tanya.lyons@flinders.edu.au

Please note: Final papers must be written and submitted prior to the conference by August 30\textsuperscript{th} 2003 as an email attachment in Word or RTF format. If this is not possible send via the post on a floppy disk.

Dr Tanya Lyons
AFSAAP 2003 Convenor
C/-Globalisation Program
Flinders University of South Australia
GPO Box 2100 Adelaide 5001,
South Australia
By the end of 1979 Zimbabwe Rhodesia, as it was then known, had been racked by civil war for over seven years with some 20,000 killed. The insurgent forces – the Ndebele dominated Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), with its bases in Zambia and the Shona forces of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), operating out of Mozambique – had come together in 1976 to form the Patriotic Front to overthrow the government of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front. With his Unilateral Declaration of Independence unrecognised by either the United Kingdom or the international community and with his regime subject to international sanctions, a desperate Smith sought in 1978 both to outflank his revolutionary enemies and to secure international acceptance by a compromise settlement with the internal moderate black nationalist leaders, particularly Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his United African National Council (UNAC) and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. Elections in April 1979 brought Muzorewa to power as Prime Minister, though his cabinet contained significant but minority Rhodesia Front representation. But as the external nationalist leaders - the leaders of the insurgency, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe - were excluded from the compromise the civil war continued unabated. Nor did the Muzorewa regime secure international recognition or any easing of sanctions.

In these circumstances Smith and Muzorewa were compelled to the conference table with their enemies Nkomo and Mugabe in London during the last months of 1979. Under the chairmanship of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, the Lancaster House Conference achieved a settlement agreed on by all parties whereby a cease-fire would come into place, to be monitored by Commonwealth troops, and elections would follow in March 1980, supervised by British electoral officials. In these elections the political parties of Nkomo and Mugabe – the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) respectively – would participate along with the parties of the incumbent regime.

As part of the Lancaster House understandings Commonwealth countries were invited to send national observers to the elections. Australia sent a delegation of four parliamentarians – Neil Brown, Liberal and leader, Bob Katter,
National party, Senator Ted Robertson, Australian Labor party and myself* - complemented by the Commonwealth Chief Electoral Officer, Ken Pearson, and an up-and-coming diplomat, David Evans. This is the diary I kept during the month I was in Rhodesia. It is virtually unaltered though purged of a number of personal observations – mainly on my colleagues and on the landscape of what is a very beautiful country.

Getting there and getting to know the leaders
Saturday 9 February 1980
We had a briefing in Perth for the Rhodesian observers’ expedition before flying out this evening to southern Africa. Full of good humour and macabre jokes about the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia. For once, however, little public criticism of junkets and jaunts.

Ken Pearson, and his research officer, Greg Snyder, have done a vast amount of preparatory work and regaled us with much of it. They both see judgements about the fairness and freedom of the elections in a wider context than simply the adequacy of the electoral rules. Foreign Affairs played only a secondary role in the briefing but Chris Edwards gave a lucid presentation of the political situation and regretted he was not coming with us. His observations were supplemented by David Evans, an old Rhodes scholar contemporary, who will travel with us.

Neil Brown, a sardonic, self-aware man promises to be an excellent chairman of the group. Ted Robertson knows little about the situation but is eager to learn. Bob Katter knows little too but on this issue his heart is in the right place.

Long flight into daylight to Mauritius and now, with night catching up, to Johannesburg, where we arrive about midnight.

Sunday 10 February
Johannesburg simply confirmed my feelings of two decades ago about South Africa. At the Carlton Hotel black and white silhouettes indicated the availability of racially distinct loos.

Our departure for Salisbury was marked by the first of no doubt many dramas over the coming month. Having got everyone aboard the Air Rhodesia jet the stewards discovered that two passengers had deposited their luggage but not themselves. Sufficiently ominous for the authorities to have us all disembark, identify our own luggage in the sweltering heat and then clamber back on board leaving two

* (Ed) Neal Blewett was at that time a Back Bench member of the Federal Labor Party.
orphaned cases on the tarmac. A steep and nauseous descent into Salisbury airport suggested continuing concern about rebel ground-to-air missiles.

The Monomatapa Hotel – named after a great race of Ndebele kings – is to be our luxurious western-style base for the duration of our stay. Despite the fact that the personal office of the Prime Minister, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, is on the fifteenth floor the hotel atmosphere is remarkably relaxed, although tension mounted later in the evening with reports of an effort in Fort Victoria to assassinate the radical Robert Mugabe by means of a remote-controlled mine.

In the evening our delegation and the Australian diplomatic representative, Charles Mott, hosted a party in the Monomatapa. Had an enjoyable conversation with Mick Shann, one of the more famous of Australian public servants, who is the Australian representative on the most prestigious of all the election watch committees, the Commonwealth Observer group. Despite the press he thinks the overall situation is improving, although he was quite prepared to alarm novices like me with tales of mines and terrorists.

Had a long talk with Diane Johnstone (Foreign Affairs) who had appeared as a most impressive witness before our Southern Africa committee and who has been here for about a month. She thinks everything is poised delicately on a knife-edge. She agrees with Shann that the assassination of any of the three leading contenders – Muzorewa, Mugabe or Joshua Nkomo would wreck the effort for a peaceful solution. She finds Nkomo the most charismatic, Mugabe the most intellectual, of the African leaders.

**Monday 11 February**

Disappointing morning as James Chikerema, one of the moderate nationalist leaders, failed to turn up and the Patriotic Front press conference run by a junior member of the ZANU hierarchy was rather flat. But the different treatment of the auxiliaries - forces attached to the Muzorewa regime - and the nationalist guerrillas is a major grievance, as are fears of the latest powers available to the Governor under ordinance to prohibit candidates and parties from electoral activity in particular areas. First used against the Treasurer of ZANU, Enos Nkala, yesterday.

Mott gave us a competent, off-the-cuff but well-organised briefing on the whole situation. Little that was new in it apart from a suggestion, perhaps representing a departmental view, that the structural dependence of the Governor, Lord Soames, on the Rhodesian administration introduces a clear bias into the elections. Nevertheless, Mott tended to discount the chances of Muzorewa.
Took a trip out to the university and the suburb of Mount Pleasant – a kind of anglicised North Shore – thirties mansions in vast gardens with immaculate lawns and shorn hedges. Mugabe, with revolutionary bravado or perhaps simply at the behest of security, is lodged in Mount Pleasant, to the fury no doubt of some of the inhabitants.

To Government House at 6.30 to meet the Governor. Government House – a splendid imperial mansion ‘ Indian residency, class 2’, quite Italianate in the setting sun and set in ample gardens. Australians formally suited and tied at the suggestion of the Anglophile Mott; Soames careless and thinner than anticipated in a safari suit. His wife – a Churchill daughter – charming, unaffected and with a capacity to convey real interest in any interlocutor. Soames much more approachable, serious and less squirearchical than I had expected, although understandably somewhat haggard and run-down. He sees ZANU as the ‘bad boys’ and as the major threat to a free and fair election. Nkomo ‘playing the game’, Mugabe not. Unsatisfactory in response to a question on the auxiliaries – seems blind to the need to give an equal role to the guerrilla forces as he is prepared to give to Muzorewa’s irregulars, who have been incorporated within the Rhodesian security forces. Determined apparently to use stronger measures under latest ordinance to prevent electoral disruption and intimidation. Defended ban on Nkala claiming that he had been warned about intimidatory statements. ‘If ZANU doesn’t win, the war will begin again.’ Dismisses Organisation of African Unity criticism as partisan and expected, although noted that the neighbouring states – Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana – cautious and responsible in their criticism. ‘The further away the less notice they take of the facts.’ Although one may disagree with some of his stances, it is impossible not to sympathise with him. His real dilemma is that if he doesn’t take firm action the election will not be free and fair but any action will be likely to deny freedom and fairness.

**Tuesday 12 February**

Eight a.m. session with Chris Andersen, Rhodesian Front Minister for Justice. Discussion began with squash-playing amiabilities, but he quickly proved himself an articulate defender of the existing order. Election was not free and fair, above all because of intimidation by Mugabe’s ZANLA. Told a few atrocity stories. Critical of Soames for not being firm enough and expressed the belief that the momentum of intimidation now such that it would be difficult to reverse. Argued that any party systematically practising intimidation, as ZANLA is, should be banned from the election.

Andersen interpreted the constitution as permitting a Rhodesian Front coalition with a) the majority black party, b) with any coalition of black parties (even if these
did not have a majority of common roll votes, that is did not command the black majori
ty). Indicated that a satisfactory result would be a Muzorewa- Nkomo-
Rhodesian Front coalition. Also implied that a Mugabe victory would be won only
by intimidation and would not be acceptable. Stressed Mugabe’s Marxism and
produced a ZANLA document full of standard revolutionary rhetoric.

Visited Joshua Nkomo in a bungalow in one of the native townships outside
Salisbury. Ironically, he was guarded by white Rhodesian security men, among
others. Nkomo, a massive figure, would have looked fine in the robes of a Ndebele
chieftain but a well-cut western lounge suit diminished him. Nkomo was low key,
presenting himself as the victim of circumstance. Began with an attack on the
auxiliaries but passed quickly to his real enemy, Mugabe. ‘Robert’ had ‘double-
crossed him’ in breaking the Patriotic Front alliance for the election; ‘Robert
planning all along to betray him’; ‘Robert had bred a monster, which was now in
control’. Nkomo believes that, because of the behaviour of the security forces,
Muzorewa’s auxiliaries and Mugabe’s ZANLA, the election cannot be free and fair
but nevertheless is opposed to any postponement of the election. Would rather live
in an ‘independent but tyrannical Zimbabwe’ than in ‘a colonial Zimbabwe’. He
obviously wishes that Soames would take firm action against Mugabe but cannot
afford to be associated with any British anti-Mugabe actions. There was a sense of
his having few options at the moment and of playing it low key until his freedom of
manoeuvre was restored.

After lunch met with Ndabaningi Sithole, a prominent moderate nationalist. He had
a jovial face but strangely cold eyes. He claimed there was ‘country-wide
intimidation’, alleging majority of districts subject to intimidatory tactics. Three
sources of intimidation: Nkomo’s ZIPRA, Mugabe’s ZANLA and the Bishop’s
auxiliaries. The results will not be of an election but of intimidation; the results will
reflect ‘not the will of the electors but the will of the intimidators’. The legitimacy
of any government emerging from such an election would be questioned, which
would frustrate the whole intention of the election. He favoured the banning of any
parties found responsible for intimidation. The war had been ‘a franchise war’ – to
secure the vote for the people of Zimbabwe. The war now won, people had got the
vote, and should not repudiate the right they had fought for. Election Commission
‘almost powerless’. People were sick of the war. Mugabe’s threat to withdraw from
the election was simply a bluff. Spiritually ‘Mugabe was living in Maputo not in
Salisbury’ – quite unrealistic in his perceptions of the situation. Sithole argued that
the auxiliary forces should be treated in the same way as the guerrilla forces.
Sithole hoped that with the support of most party leaders he could pressure the
Governor this week into postponing the elections.
In the afternoon we attended a meeting of the Election Council with representatives of all the parties present and presided over by Sir John Boynton. Surprisingly amiable and good humoured with the Rhodesian Front delegates alongside those from ZAPU. Quite paradoxical considering the bitterness out in the country. Then a long briefing by electoral officials.

Evening visit to Bishop Muzorewa in the Prime Ministerial Lodge. Security was very tight. Car boots were searched and there were metal detector tests for the lot of us. The Lodge was decorated with sickly sweet religious scenes and highly romanticised landscapes. Very sticky interview, with the Bishop being quite uncommunicative to begin with. He seemed very depressed and was obviously suspicious of all international observers. Gradually relaxed though he never became voluble. Believed the Governor was weak as the Lancaster House agreements violated on many occasions without effective action being taken. Officials of his party, the UANC, not able to visit many areas without taking guns, but presented UANC’S actions as responses to the activities of both wings of the Patriotic Front. ZANLA had committed enough breaches of the cease-fire to be proscribed, ZIPRA not so bad but he was still pretty critical. He supported drastic action against Mugabe but thinks the recent ordinances futile. Strongly antagonistic to any criticism of the auxiliaries. He claimed that too many international figures treat ZANLA as ‘angels’ while condemning auxiliaries whose offences are far less. For someone with all the advantages of incumbency and the administration on his side he seemed strangely pessimistic.

The observer group was joined today by Alan Griffiths from Foreign Affairs who has been travelling with Fraser and Peacock and who is said to be the architect of Fraser’s Rhodesian policy. Very likeable even loveable character, quite idiosyncratic, highly intelligent and not at all an organisation man. He has a strange speech habit of swallowing his words and his untidy clothes contrast markedly with most of his diplomatic confreres.

**Keeping the peace and winning elections**

**Wednesday 13 February**

Very full day with morning and afternoon briefings organised by the Electoral Commission at Meikles Hotel. Brigadier Gordon, a monocled British officer, gave a lucid and sympathetic account of the monitoring operation whereby a small Commonwealth military force oversees the observance of the cease-fire. This seems to have been carried through with considerable success and Patriotic Front co-operation despite great haste and appalling inadequacies in the original planning and much local inefficiency. There had been no planning until Christmas Day for any resources for the assembly points where the guerrilla forces were to gather.
apart from the provision of tents and blankets. Tensions rise in the assembly places whenever unauthorised planes fly overhead or there is another assassination attempt on Mugabe. Gordon alleged that the monitoring task was being frustrated by the refusal of the Salisbury administration to accept the guerrilla armies as part of their administrative responsibilities. In the ZIPRA assembly points there was an efficient, tightly disciplined army under canvas; ZANLA not disciplined or well organised. ‘Why’, said the Brigadier, ‘they still point their guns at British generals – just not done’. There had been ‘a staggering de-escalation’ in violence since the cease-fire. Nevertheless there remained ‘seriously troubled areas’. The situation was worst in the east, also fairly bad in north-east and south-east. There was some evidence that some guerrillas had left the assembly points and been replaced by non-combatants. There remained a number of ‘no-go’ areas for the police, mainly in ZANLA areas. On intimidation the weight of the evidence was against ZANLA and the ZANLA leadership was beginning to admit a lack of control over some of its cadres. Gordon alleged that Muzorewa’s auxiliaries were firmly under military control. The British monitoring forces had made a fairly comprehensive survey of the auxiliary forces: large number of military commanders had been removed; some evidence of intimidation but not of ‘contrived intimidation’. He made a quite revealing analogy. He likened auxiliary efforts in erstwhile guerrilla dominated areas as an operation ‘in winning hearts and minds’ similar to the British in Malaysian villages from which they had expelled the guerrillas. This surely is what the Patriotic Front groups are complaining of – they had not been driven from the villages but voluntarily retired to the assembly points. And now they find themselves replaced by armed auxiliaries whom they see as agents of Muzorewa’s UNAC. The police occasion no such worry.

The chairman of the Election Directorate – the Rhodesian body actually administering the election – declared that intimidation threatens the whole election process. Believes it’s cynical to consider that the various intimidations cancel each other out. Believes that the existing degree of intimidation if continued would nullify the possibility of a free and fair election in many districts. The newly acquired ordinance powers of the Governor may well need to be used to prevent the election being undermined by intimidation. Neil Brown gutsily and rightly protested that the chairman could make all these assertions and then rush off to another meeting without submitting himself to questioning on his quite critical remarks.

But the best part of the briefing was provided by the British electoral supervisors from each of the eight provinces. Commonsensical, balanced and anti-alarmist they were a corrective to the press and much political gossip.
Mashonaland East: Dominated by ZANU in the east, but relatively free competition in western and southern parts. In the villages generally open electoral competition but in tribal trust lands intimidation rife. Only intimidators named – ZANU. Salisbury dominates the province and some intimidation in rural areas around Salisbury but not in the black townships. Allegations in this area both against ZANU and the auxiliaries.

Manicaland: A very complex picture with variable patterns of intimidation, mainly ZANLA but allegations also against Rhodesian security forces and auxiliaries. Some clear ‘no go’ areas in Manicaland. Some guerrillas deliberately left behind by Mugabe, others simply dissident. Fairly free around Umtali, in the protected villages and smaller settlements. But intimidation rife in the tribal trust lands.

Victoria: Some suggestions of police efforts to weaken the infrastructure of ZANU. Most of the charges levelled against the auxiliaries proved to be ‘phoney’. Nevertheless auxiliaries partisan in support of Muzorewa and UANC – ‘to an extent an intimidating influence’. There seems to have been a deliberate policy of leaving guerrillas behind throughout the area. Estimates about 1000 guerrillas still at large. Intimidation serious because of large ZANLA forces – partly countered by auxiliaries and white farming community.

Matabeleland South: Both ZANLA AND ZIPRA forces in their assembly points. There had been a late ZANLA westward push into this area. In the urban areas open and free competition between parties. In the tribal trust lands under ZIPRA influence little political activity and no obvious intimidation. In tribal trust lands in dispute between ZIPRA and ZANLA there is ‘competitive intimidation’.

Matabeleland North: Sixty percent of Bulawayo is Shona-speaking and Nkomo success may not be as great as anticipated. No problems in Bulawayo. In most of rural areas civil administration has not existed for the past two years. It is anybody’s guess as to how many ‘outlaws’ at large – about 400 to 500 would be a ‘cautious guess’. They have the effect of deterring parties other than those of the Patriotic Front from campaigning.

Midlands: Real intimidation problem lies in eastern and southern districts. – again where civil administration has broken down in recent years. But official does not believe intimidation will have significant effect on election result.

Mashonaland West: Intimidation mainly in the tribal trust lands and mostly covert and subtle. Reprisals were exacted by Patriotic Front guerrillas after last election. Province divided into ZANLA and ZIPRA areas and a disputed zone. ZANLA mainly responsible for intimidation. Police and auxiliaries certainly not anti-UANC. Farmers allegedly actively organising farm labourers to attend UANC meetings.

Mashonaland Central: Strongest evidence on intimidation against ZANLA; then auxiliaries; lastly white farmers. Farmers supposedly threaten to sack workers who vote for the Patriotic Front parties. There is a list of unsubstantiated charges against
the auxiliaries but most of the criticism directed against ZANLA although again little evidence. The past exercises a heavy influence on the present. There is considerable movement in and out of the assembly points. Official believes there are some 750 guerrillas loose in the area with some heavy concentrations. The support for Mugabe derives from the belief that he is the only man who can end the war.

Out and about in the country, a hotel bomb and guerrilla camps
Thursday 14 February
Flew to Bulawayo in the morning. The purpose was to observe the white roll elections but this was a peculiarly dull affair. The Rhodesian Front won fourteen of the seats without a contest and seems likely to win the other six. Workers from one of the white opposition groups claimed, ‘Smith has sold us out to the Kaffirs.’ White opinion, at least as sampled through the electoral workers, appears quite unregenerate – our land, blacks are children, outside instigation, no one understands our problems or us. No apprehension of the tragic cul-de-sac into which the Rhodesian Front has led the country. Whites would support Muzorewa, tolerate Nkomo (though they damn him for the shooting down of the Viscount airliners), and flee Mugabe – the Marxist.

Reading in bed about 11 p.m. when hotel shaken by what I took to be a clap of thunder followed by a slither of hailstones. It was in fact a bomb and the force of the explosion had shattered the tiles that covered the façade of the Monomatapa. The front entrance of the hotel appears to have been demolished by the explosion. We were not allowed out of the lifts so cannot determine the extent of the damage or learn anything of injuries. But from the fifth floor fire escape windows the hotel appears to be surrounded by flashing police cars and television lights. Mercifully there seems little in the way of ambulance activity.

Friday 15 February
Apparently the bomb was in a church almost opposite the Monomatapa and the blast shattered most of the glass and brought down many of the tiles cladding that side of the hotel. A spate of bombings in the city overnight, including one that seems to have consumed the culprits and their car.

5.30 a.m. flight to Bikita in Victoria Province on board a Canadian Buffalo which lands like a dive bomber. Fine young district commissioner looked after us. Although he was clearly a supporter of the government he was scrupulously fair in his briefing. During the day he tended to stress the damage of the war – ruined sheep dips, murder and abduction of chiefs and headmen, land mines (Patriotic Front taxed the family of any black man foolish enough to detonate a land mine –
waste of war material). Nevertheless he saw all this as part of the rational objective of the guerrillas – to destroy the prevailing administrative order. Although some people would brand him a racist he had an understanding and sympathy for the local people and had made sacrifices to help them unparalleled by most of the sloganeers. He was a lesson in the pitfalls of ideological categorisation.

Met a wise old priest – a Father Kuchmann - at the Swiss Catholic mission at Silveira, beautifully sited at the head of a valley with the clichéd kopjes all around. He had clearly achieved a *modus vivendi* with the guerrillas - they had pressured him, destroyed his communications (cut his telephone lines, dug up his airfield, mined his roads) but they had never attacked the mission. Despite all this he had a real sympathy for the guerrillas, obviously preferring them to Muzorewa’s auxiliaries. They came to him he said to ask for advice as to whether they should go to the assembly points, particularly as they feared they would be supplanted locally by the auxiliaries. On the elections he believed the war had left a legacy of fear, which would influence the elections; above all people believed that only Mugabe could ensure that the war stayed stopped. And rather sadly he concluded, who was to say that they were not right? The young district commissioner thought ZANU would win in the area, although he did not relish the thought. There were partisan accusations of intimidation but the British election supervisor thought there was little overt intimidation and the district commissioner agreed. Certainly in Bikita village there was a wide display of party posters, with only Mugabe’s portrait oddly absent, although generally ZANU had made little effort with posters.

**Saturday 16 February**

Dramatic flight in an old DC3 over the northern escarpment into the hot, humid valley of the Zambesi. Landed first at Centenary, near where the civil war began eight years ago, to hear briefings from the district commissioner and the British electoral supervisor. There was a distinction in emphasis between the two men: the former thought the election endangered by intimidation, the second that, although there was some ‘peripheral intimidation’ (and he showed a philosophical grasp of the difficulties of the term), the great bulk of the electors would vote as their consciences dictated.

The district was interesting in that south of the escarpment was mainly white farming land with large numbers of black labourers, while north of the escarpment in the tribal trust lands the blacks had been mainly herded into protected villages. The intimidation was allegedly going on in the protected villagers, presumably the farmers having their labourers in hand.
Flew over the escarpment and then travelled in a vehicle, with a steel casing to protect against land mines, over some fifty kilometres of dirt road to assembly point Alpha. The observers were seated for security in the protected seats while the media, including women journalists, had to clamber on the back.

At Alpha we found some thirty British troops monitoring about 1300 ZANLA guerrillas. Fifty had come in yesterday and there was a hope that this would signal the movement in of the remaining guerrillas in the north. Relations seemed amicable between monitors and guerrillas with football matches between the two. However, as we had apparently not got the OK from ZANLA headquarters our own contacts with the guerrillas were pretty negative. Comrade John, the local ZANLA liaison officer, was a magnificent hunk of a man, but taciturn and surly, so that after a few prods even the journalists abandoned him though he posed happily for the photographers. It is obvious that, without a politically astute liaison officer from outside, the local figures are reluctant to talk.

**Sunday 17 February**

Out to the headquarters of the monitoring force at Morgan High School where Colonel Coles, the Australian commander, briefed us on the operation. Not only are the Commonwealth forces supervising the sixteen assembly places, but they are also observing the security forces at all levels. The critical issue facing the monitoring forces is when they are to pull out. The British general in command, with whom I think Coles agrees, believes they should be pulled out immediately after polling. But Soames and his political advisers would prefer to retain the monitoring force both to keep the Patriotic Force guerrillas in the assembly camps and to act as a guarantee against a white Rhodesian take-out operation.

Then by road to Bindura where we are established in some comfort in the Coachhouse Inn. Immediately off to a ZANU rally nearby with a crowd of 10,000 and some effective demagoguery by male and female ZANU candidates. Colourful, noisy and massive gathering – the envy of all the Australian politicians present.

A barbecue lunch, a leisurely dip in the swimming pool and a gossipy evening with the British election supervisors who are in residence, as well as the local Australian officers plus Comrade Mau, the ZANU liaison officer. The Australians attached to monitoring the Patriotic Force troops seem to have established easy, indeed quite amicable relations with the Patriotic Front people, though they have a low opinion of them as soldiers. On the other hand the young officer monitoring the local security forces is somewhat dangerously imbued with Rhodesian dreams of a coup.
against the assembly points. Most of the election supervisors, while admitting there is some intimidation, think the chances good for a reasonably free election.

A Welsh ex-police superintendent, who has been monitoring the police, was full of tales concerning the Selous Scouts, a maverick group in the Rhodesian Security forces who, he alleges, were the church bombers in Salisbury. He also alleged that General Tongogara, a key ZANU power broker and commander of the guerrilla forces, who had been killed in a car accident in December, had had five bullet wounds when dragged from his wrecked car. The motive – his quarrel with Mugabe over the latter’s decision to fight the election separate from his Patriotic Front ally, Nkomo. He also succeeded in alarming Alan Griffiths about the general insecurity, particularly the state of the roads. Having discovered today that our military have not been given any responsibility for our safety Alan is busily persuading Canberra to provide us with security should the whole country blow up.

Monday 18 February
Off to assembly point Bravo where a mixture of British and Australian troops (several from Woodside in South Australia) are monitoring about 800 guerrillas. As Comrade Mau travelled with us we were able this time to go into the guerrilla parts of the assembly point, accompanied by the local ZANLA luminaries – Captain Gabriel retired, the Patriotic Front camp liaison officer, Comrade Nathan, the military commander, and several others all variously garbed in semi-military outfits. The British are not only feeding the guerrillas but are also providing clothing via Hong Kong – which the guerrillas have promptly dyed for camouflage purposes. Again relations between monitoring force and the guerrillas seem amicable, despite an encroachment by Rhodesian security forces through the camp buffer zone, which led to a clash last week in which 5000 rounds were expended without anyone being seriously hurt. Boredom, however, seems the major danger and is seriously worrying the guerrilla leaders. One way of offsetting this is by drilling; another the singing of various choruses. We were greeted by the local choir, marching quite impressively, and singing superbly a ditty which began, ‘We are coming with explosives’. Various other offerings apparently of a military or ideological persuasion were presented, often with miming and dancing. Neil Brown was so moved that as leader of the group he addressed the comrades using a full Marxist vocabulary that would have shocked his constituents in Diamond Valley. I persuaded Alan Griffiths to turn off his ubiquitous tape recorder so that no record might exist of so politically incorrect a statement.

We then went to a protected village in which several of the local kraals had been combined into a fenced and protected unit. It had a splendid lookout tower from which one could see the empty kraals from which the villagers had been evacuated.
The people still work their fields but there has been some opposition to the protected villages because of the distances involved in reaching them and the difficulties people have in protecting their crops at night from marauding pigs. Not at all clear whether the protected villages are designed to protect the villagers or to separate the guerrillas from the people. Some allegations of intimidation by the auxiliaries – they provide an external defence for the PVs – were made, and certainly the UANC posters were the only ones visible.

Then visited several white bastions – a local engineer’s and the police barracks bar, the Dungeon, where hospitality was splendid and views primitive. Then an evening with our host at the Coachhouse and a young American missionary and his wife – the latter well intentioned but paternalistic and wishy-washy. Mine host’s wife mixed Christian platitudes with abuse of the terrorists or ‘terr s’ as she called them. I felt like suggesting that the use of the term ‘terr s’ was de-humanising and un-Christian as were they not all God’s creatures but desisted in the interests of harmony.

**Robert Mugabe**

**Tuesday 19 February**

Big event of the day was the afternoon meeting with Robert Mugabe. Surprisingly the security seemed much less obsessive than with Bishop Muzorewa – indeed the whole atmosphere in and around the house appeared relaxed and convivial. Mugabe, looking much older than his picture on the election posters and clearly very tired, was generous with his time giving us an hour and a half. He is obviously the most intellectual of the party leaders and possibly the most ruthless but it was difficult to fit this quietly spoken figure with the demon presented by the Rhodesian press.

He gave a clear and rational analysis of the election from his own perspective and admitted flaws on his own side. He tended to go on too long in his opening remarks and I was faintly irritated by his paranoia though he has much to be paranoiac about. He argued that many of the difficulties had come about because the British had not provided a long enough period for disengagement – great troubles in getting instructions to guerrillas in the bush. Labelled Soames as ‘violator-in-chief’ because of his lax attitude to Rhodesian security forces and the auxiliaries. Rhodesian forces never retired to bases even in disengagement period and auxiliaries widely deployed. Soames will do nothing about the auxiliaries. Mugabe does not know whether he is in ‘collusion with white Rhodesians’ or merely ‘impotent’. But the result of Soames’s military policies is that by the end of the elections he will not have created a real peace.
Admits some ZANLA forces still not in assembly points, perhaps between 200 and 300. Mugabe claimed that ZANU originated the guerrilla war and followed by ZAPU. Outlined the geographical strategy of the war and noted that while ZANLA dominated the north and the east and ZIPRA the southwest the forces were ‘intertwined’ in the central areas.

Mugabe denied intimidation in any general sense. ZANU has impressive and elaborate administrative structures in liberated areas. Other parties will fail to win votes in these areas, however free the elections. ‘To tell people to vote for Muzorewa in the liberated zones is like telling them to vote for Smith.’ Nkomo has similar areas but, as Mugabe is to be presented as ‘the diabolical figure’, Soames never mentions this fact.

He admits there have been incidents for which ZANLA forces were to blame, but overall picture distorted by Combined Ops, always the enemy of ZANLA. Moreover, many acts falsified to lay blame on ZANLA or ZANU. (This certainly seems true of the Salisbury church bombings where the evidence points overwhelmingly to the maverick Selous Scouts).

Mugabe claims that the new punitive ordinances were never envisaged at Lancaster House. ZANU was not prepared to accept bans on campaigning for they would overthrow the basis on which the cease-fire was to stand. The election would not be free and fair if Soames ‘geographically quarantined' certain areas.

He pities the press more than he condemns it. Herald attacks are making Mugabe a popular hero. He hopes the monitoring forces will remain to deter those who would initiate another unilateral declaration of independence.

**More travels: Manicaland, Kariba, Victoria Falls**

**Wednesday 20 February**

Our expedition today into the east – Manicaland – enlivened by a series of helicopter jaunts. The towns seem politically free and electoral competition marred by little untoward. Even the tribal trust lands seemed relatively satisfactory although some complaints of ZANLA intimidation and counter charges by ZANU supporters against the auxiliaries. No doubt now in my mind that security forces and auxiliaries have exploited the cease-fire to re-assert effective authority in areas where they were previously under challenge, and have engaged in a political minds and hearts operation – repairing roads, mending dips, opening schools. However desirable in themselves these actions only became possible for the security forces and the auxiliaries because of the withdrawal of the ZANLA forces to the assembly points following the cease-fire. There is a structural bias against ZANU in the
operation of the cease-fire, although I suspect it may make little difference to the outcome.

On the other hand there have been some barbarous acts by groups acting under the ZANLA banner and some deployment of security forces since the cease-fire has been inevitable.

Tonight at a reception found that most observers I talked to agreed with my present psephological conclusions:

1. That no black party would secure an absolute majority
2. That Muzorewa and Nkomo had the greater coalition potential for both could seek allies to their left and right

There also seemed general agreement that a Muzorewa-Rhodesian Front alliance or a Mugabe absolute majority would be catastrophic. This leaves Joshua Nkomo as the critical figure although considerable variance of opinion as to whether, if free to choose, he would ally himself with Mugabe, his Patriotic Front ally, rather than with Muzorewa.

**Thursday 21 February**
To Kariba for what turned out to be more of a tourist jaunt than an election visit. The election will certainly be free and fair in Kariba district – for some 10,000 voters from perhaps the most isolated tribe in Zimbabwe who have been little troubled by the war, are untouched by any intimidation and whose only election problem relates to transport in the difficult terrain. Saw also my first tsetse fly, which is again becoming a scourge of the district.

We then flew to the Bumi Hills, crossing at a low altitude the 1500 square kilometre Matusadona national park with herds of elephants, buffaloes wallowing in mud, a possible hippopotamus and on the landing strip a herd of elegant impala.

**Friday 22 February**
Spent the day quietly in the library of Parliament House, Salisbury – which had been hotel, barracks and post office before its present incarnation – working on the theoretical problems of freedom and fairness in elections.

**Saturday 23 February – Monday 25 February**
Flew to Victoria Falls for the weekend. Stayed at the Victoria Falls hotel – reminiscent of the hotels of the Raj in India or a slightly seedy first class on a P&O liner. Perhaps because I have never seen a truly great waterfall this is one of the few experiences that beggars the anticipations. All the old clichés are appropriate.
Polling and reporting  
**Tuesday 26 February**

We attended the last meeting of the Electoral Council which maintained until its closing moments the mood of amicability that had characterised most of its sessions. However at the end ZANU attacked the UANC for a how-to-vote leaflet which its spokesman described as ‘despicable’ and ‘contemptible’. It was not clear, however, whether the leaflet had ever advanced beyond the specimen stage. More significantly some of the small conservative parties, whose prospects are bleak, prepared their post-election positions by declaring the elections unfree and unfair because of massive intimidation. This position was taken with the covert although not the overt support of UANC. Obviously the Bishop is still hoping to win.

In the afternoon had our first long session on the report. After a very prolonged discussion we secured general acceptance of a set of criteria I had prepared in order to judge whether the election was free and fair. Brown and Evans were the chief obstacles: Brown feared that any commitment to fair electoral principles in our report might somehow compromise the Liberals’ commitment to unfair electoral principles at home; Evans with the diplomat’s concern to offend no-one was alarmed lest any criterion might lead to hard-hitting remarks, particularly about the role of the British.

**Wednesday 27 February**

First day of the polling. Flew south to Chiredzi in Victoria Province centre of the lowveld irrigation schemes. It is a European farming area with large sugar plantations supported by a large black labour force. It is a particularly controversial region as it is the only area subject to the Governor’s emergency ordinance prohibiting ZANU from holding public meetings there. Most unsatisfactory responses from the district commissioner and the local security officials as to why the ordinance was invoked there. Polling seemed to be going well with no signs of intimidation, plenty of party propaganda available and no signs of tension. The only disturbing features were some petty harassment, including the arrest of four ZANU party officials, and the overt display of armed force around the polling booths. The queues of voters in the hot sun were amazingly good-humoured and patient. I annoyed a white Rhodesian newspaperman by responding to his remark that there were no signs of the jollity of the last election by quipping that this one was for real. The press generally was pretty obnoxious, dominating briefing sessions with their quest for the sensational and alienating the Rhodesian officials by their rudeness, thereby inhibiting dialogue between observers generally and the officials. News tonight was that polling was massive and quiet throughout the country. One day down, two to go.
The evening was devoted to further long discussion on the report. Progress slow. Some signs of disagreement but the consensus still survives.

**Thursday 28 February**
The morning was given over to writing further drafts; the afternoon spent touring the polling stations in the native townships around Salisbury. Polling continues steady though not so heavy as on the first day. Despite overcast weather and some rain large party demonstrations with singing and dancing were being held outside most booths – on most occasions ZANU appeared to top its rivals in terms of noise, size and enthusiasm. There were some pretty thuggish characters involved in the mobilising of all groups and a high proportion of the participants was below voting age.

The evening was devoted to tortuous consideration of further draft. The fireworks will begin with evaluation.

**Friday 29 February**
Day devoted almost entirely to working on report. I wrote a segment on context which was accepted without too much debate although my language was toned down as too provocative. In the evening the others agreed to a caveat I had long urged on the possibility that the white representation combined with the coalition arrangements might lead to a government which was not a reflection of ‘genuine majority rule’.

**Saturday 1 March**
Broke back of the report this afternoon with some big advances on the evaluation sections. No serious disagreements. Alan Griffiths and I drafted a useful section on law and order imperfections and Evans and Brown a good first draft on intimidation.

**Sunday 2 March**
We completed first full draft of report by lunchtime. It needs editing but the substantial work is done. Brown, Evans and I prepared a summary of our conclusions to be telexed to the Prime Minister this evening. Oiled with South African riesling the rest of the group approved the draft without serious amendment.

Rajeshwar Dayal and his Commonwealth Observer Group gave a press conference on their interim report released this evening. It was a non-event as the delicate balance within the Commonwealth Observer Group prevented Dayal from elaborating in any way on the interim report. Nor did he have the wit to carry off so
vacuous an exercise. As our own conclusions parallel closely those of the Commonwealth Observer Group - although I think we are in a much better position to defend them - we have urged Brown to telephone Foreign Minister Peacock this evening to secure approval of the public release immediately of our summary of conclusions. Otherwise we shall be accused of plagiarism.

_Denouement_

_Monday 3 March_

Mugabe is sweeping towards a totally unexpected victory. Flew with Alan Griffiths to Umtali, an attractive town encircled by hills and overlooked, ominously by Mozambique, for the Manicaland count. It was ZANU all the way with the white poll assistants becoming increasingly gloomy and the black counters barely hiding suppressed cheers. Although efforts were made in the interests of secrecy to hide how the count was going, my amateur scrutineering suggested approximately eighty percent of the vote for ZANU, about twenty percent for the rest. ZAPU and UANC were each struggling to get the ten percent necessary to get any seats. ZANU should therefore get at least nine if not all eleven of the Manicaland seats. ‘What did Mugabe say of Bishop Muzorewa?’ quipped a giggly Griffiths. “There but for the grace of God go I”.

Back in Salisbury the evidence grows that Mugabe has swept the Shona-speaking country, winning all the seats in Victoria and never scoring less than seventy percent outside Matabeleland. The Bishop has simply ceased to count as a political force. The white Rhodesians have long lived with the illusions that it is only the bad blacks, or the terrorists, or simply the fault of the Marxists, or only the stirrers from outside. Today the veils of illusion have been rent asunder. Naturally the mood in the capital was pretty tense.

_Tuesday 4 March_

An overwhelming and unexpected landslide for Mugabe: ZANU fifty-seven seats, ZAPU twenty seats, UANC three seats. The eclipse of the Bishop and his UANC is total. Indeed so complete is the victory that intimidation falters as an explanation. It just cannot explain that throughout the Shona lands Mugabe and ZANU scarcely ever fell below eighty percent of the vote. Troops and tanks are everywhere on the streets, but the ZANU crowds are good-tempered. ZANU T-shirts proliferate, _jongwe_ (the cock), the party symbol, is omnipresent and the atmosphere in Salisbury is like a Mardi Gras, but a Mardi Gras with tanks. The whites are stunned – the illusions shattered perhaps forever.

Mugabe himself has behaved impeccably. I missed his press conference this morning but this evening on television he was the bourgeois politician personified
– suited, moderate, conciliatory, the only discordant note the insistent ‘comrade’ in oral and visual titles. He promised a government of national reconciliation, including ZAPU and representatives of the white community. He has apparently been in conclave with both Smith and Nkomo over the past two days though the Bishop apparently has been snubbed. General Walls will remain in command of the army and will supervise the integration of the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces while the present irregular elements - for example the Selous Scouts - are to receive short shrift. Civil servants are to retain pension rights; land policies will proceed but with respect for property rights; and wholesale nationalisation is eschewed. Even South Africa was promised a policy of non-intervention. ‘Swords will be turned into ploughshares.’ Intelligent whites must have wondered what on earth the war was all about. But, of course, pragmatism and moderation are essential for Mugabe until he has control of the levers of power. The real test will come when Mugabe and ZANU are entrenched in office.
This paper explores the complex ways in which the HIV epidemic links into the world and looks at its causal links with development and globalisation. I want to trace its tendrils out into the larger world, and then show how the tendrils of the larger world curl around and shape the HIV epidemic itself. Understanding this complexity is important, for how we understand a phenomenon determines the way we respond to it and determines what institutions are established to manage it. I explore this complexity through a story that I have taken from an article by Helen Epstein in a recent New York Review of Books.¹ The story is set in the South of Mozambique but it could be set in many places. Helen Epstein travelled to the South of Mozambique because she noted that the rate of HIV infection in this poverty stricken agricultural region was significantly higher that in Maputo, the capital: sixteen percent in the adult population compared with thirteen percent in Maputo. Helen wanted to talk to the women for she thought that they might be able to tell her why the virus was spreading so quickly in this rural area. She wanted to ask whether people used condoms and if not why not. Her story became a story about people’s struggle to get the pensions that are their due.

**Manifestations of the epidemic at micro level**

A meeting was arranged in a small clearing by the main road. The women brought with them tattered pieces of paper: birth and death certificates, employment records, bankbooks and more. Helen met with them one by one and asked about HIV. In their turn, they showed her the pieces of paper and asked how they could get the pensions and other benefits owed to them as wives and widows of men who had worked in the gold fields of South Africa.

---

¹ Elizabeth Reid is a development practitioner and a Visiting Fellow, Gender Relations Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. Formerly she was Director of the HIV and Development Programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This paper was given at the October 2002 AFSAAP Conference, and I am grateful for her permission to include it in this issue of ARAS as a companion piece to her earlier article in the June 2002 issue of this Review. (Ed)

or elsewhere in the migrant labour system. They told of futile journeys to the office that deals with mine workers’ pensions, of officials who always asked for more documentation, or told them to come back later, or that the money had not yet arrived.

The women wanted to talk about money. Yes, eyes averted, they had heard about AIDS. Yes, eyes averted, their husbands had died of TB, or had wasted away, or they did not know why. But they were entitled to a pension and they wanted to get access.

Helen asked the man who had accompanied her to ask the group if anyone would talk to her about the HIV epidemic. Men and women, miners, former miners and widows rose to their feet and drifted away.

How can one understand these interchanges? For Helen, as for many of us, to understand about HIV infection rates is to find out about condom use and access to information. The women just talked about pensions. But, perhaps the women were in fact talking about the HIV epidemic. Perhaps they understand the epidemic through its impact and Helen through its way of spreading. The impact of this epidemic is insidious. It gets absorbed into life. There are more blackouts, roads are less well maintained, the post office is slower, small businesses begin to fail, more people are eligible for pensions.

This is an epidemic whose impact becomes absorbed into the complex patterns of daily life. The way it manifests itself is determined by the differing settings and socio-economic determinants of people’s daily life. It renders itself difficult to detect, even at the micro level, because individuals and institutions move almost unselfconsciously into coping mode.

As Helen Epstein walked away from the small clearing after the meeting, a teenage boy approached her and said that he wanted her to meet his mother. She followed him to a dusty yard where his mother lay on a straw mat. Three little girls played in the yard and an old woman dozed under a papaya tree. His mother was very thin and coughed a lot. It’s TB, she said. Her name is Elisa.

Like the women at the meeting, Elisa knew that her husband had contributed to a pension fund in South Africa. Shortly after he died, she went to the local mine worker’s pension office to collect it. She was told that she would have to go to South Africa to collect it. She applied for a visa and prepared to go. However, she fell ill. She asked if she could send one of her children but was told that she herself had to go. She has been sick for more than a year now. The
family is becoming increasingly destitute. One by one, the children were being forced to drop out of school. Her only hope was the pension.

**The irrelevance of borders**

The global understanding of the epidemic has been shaped by borders and nation states. We tend to conceptualise and respond to the epidemic in units of nation states: national AIDS control programmes, national surveillance systems, and so on. But the epidemic does not follow these borders. Just as the forces of global markets and of multinational corporations also supersede them. Elisa had to get a visa to go to another country to get her pension.

From the beginning of the twentieth century men from the south of Mozambique have migrated to the mines of South Africa in search of work and wealth and change. But the South African Chamber of Mines and its recruitment wing, TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa), have not recruited from the north of the 22nd parallel since the 1920s. The commercial farmers in those regions were afraid that they would lose workers to the mines, where the wages were much better, and so the administration made a deal with the mines to recruit from the south only.

Currently there are some 40,000 Mozambicans working in the mines and many more trying their luck as casual labourers, farm workers, hawkers, mechanics, criminals and prostitutes. The mineworkers sign yearly contracts and may spend twenty or more years travelling back and forth between the mines and their farms. These workers contribute to their employers’ pension and other benefit schemes throughout their working lives. Increasingly since the mines began retrenching workers in the 1980s and 90s Mozambicans are working on the mines as contractors, that is, without benefits, pensions, etc. In case of accident or illness they are just sent home. About 12,000 Mozambicans are now employed on these contracts.

The epidemic flows along lines of need, desire, market forces and sociality, wherever these flow lines run. It circulates where money circulates, gravitating to centres of employment and of economic prosperity. It treads the paths, catches the buses, and goes where people go. Political markings are as irrelevant to it as are markings of class or race or sexual orientation. The epidemic has its own boundaries. Where these flow lines contour themselves across borders, as in this story, the design and implementation of the response will have to cross the same borders. This will require new forms of collaboration in all sectors of society: government, civil society and the private sector.
As well as conceiving the epidemic in nation-based terms, the global understanding of the epidemic has been in terms of risk groups and core transmitters. This too needs re-thinking. If we were to tell this story in terms of risk groups, the risk groups would be the miners and the women who service their barracks and bars. In South Africa, these two groups been the focus of ‘risk group’ based programmes and risk group based surveillance systems.

It was found in one risk group study that thirty percent of the miners were HIV infected and eighty percent of the women who work as sex workers. However, almost as an afterthought, this study also tested people in the nearby towns where they discovered that almost sixty percent of the women in the local township between the ages of twenty and thirty were infected. These women did not earn their living by prostitution and they did not have many partners. Around half said that they had had sex with fewer than three different men in their entire lives. Yet they were almost as likely as the sex workers to be infected.

The miners had sought the complexity of longer-term relationships with the women in the nearby towns, as well as or instead of the sexual exchanges of the camps and bars. Their desire lines were neither shaped nor constrained by the global understanding of the epidemic in terms of risk groups. They sought ways to bring intimacy and companionship into their lives.

Again, our conceptual apparatus for understanding the epidemic and its impact needs to be re-formulated. We need to understand and look for patterns of social connectedness.

One of the two main gold mining companies with whom the Mozambicans work, AngloGold, announced in late April 2002 that the anticipated cost to the company of the HIV epidemic at its peak would be in the order of US$4 to $6 per ounce. If the company were to do nothing to manage the epidemic the

---

2 Dr. Peter Piot, in his opening address to the recent International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific (ICAAP) in Melbourne, challenged this understanding: ‘Let us stop the fantasy that drug injectors, or men who have sex with men, or sex workers, or rickshaw drivers, are somehow ring-fenced groups, as if they do not have normal lives where identities, practices and partners merge and flow. So we must abandon the dangerous illusion that close targeting alone is the prevention magic bullet.’

3 Denise Gilgen et al., *The Natural History of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: a Biomedical and Social Survey in Carletonville*, Johannesburg, CSIR, 2000, quoted in Helen Epstein.

4 Against a background of a total cash cost of $178 per ounce for 2001.
price would be likely to rise to $9 per ounce.\(^5\) AngloGold estimates that between twenty-five and thirty percent of its southern African workforce of 44,000 people are HIV infected. The platinum mining companies and other gold mining companies have made similar estimates. In response, the South African mining sector has developed extensive HIV prevention, care and support programmes. Most of these programmes provide care and support for workers through voluntary counselling and testing, elective wellness clinics for those infected, the treatment of opportunistic infections and STIs, and an ill health retirement system for those no longer able to work.

Many of the mines have begun programmes in the surrounding communities to minimise spread and to ensure that a support network is in place as the toll of the epidemic increases. What is striking however is that the policy statements do not discuss the particular issues raised by a migrant workforce. None of the community-based programmes funded by the mining sector are in southern Mozambique.

Recently one of the mining firms, Anglo American, announced that it would be making antiretroviral treatment available to its workers. This does not include the growing number of contract workers who will just be retrenched or sent home. Nor does it seem to include treatment for the spouses or children of its workers, unlike Heineken’s staff treatment programmes or, in the case of the Debswana Diamond company in Botswana, the spouse.

To return to Elisa, if she cannot get her pension would she be likely to be able to access an HIV treatment programme? Or for that matter will the eligible men in her village gain access? Thus, our story is also a story of different ways of being in the world: that of the South African mining sector and that of the widows of southern Mozambique. Pensions, health care and now treatment are provided by the mining sector. Most of those in the south of Mozambique entitled to these benefits are not receiving them.

**Governance and access to treatment in a globalised world**

One of the shadows that fall between these two realities is the shadow of bureaucratic inefficiency, of a lack of accountability, of moral as well as financial corruption, of gendered exploitation and of social marginalisation. In short, the shadow is the failure of governance.

There is an organisation that exists to handle the exigencies of borders. The South African Chamber of Mines early established an office of TEBA, in Maputo to deal with Mozambican mine workers’ pensions. Its historical role has been to recruit workers and to disburse their salaries, pensions and benefits. Recently its officials admitted that pensions and compensation money are owed to at least 10,000 Mozambican miners or to their families. They claim that they are not able to find the beneficiaries. This office was contacted on a number of occasions about the payment of Elisa’s pension. In the end, Elisa had to go to South Africa to collect it. Helen Epstein went on to discover that about $40 million of unclaimed money has accumulated in the major pension fund to which most unskilled Mozambican workers contribute.

In a world increasingly driven by multinational corporations and their mindsets, there is a need to ensure the better functioning of existing governance institutions, at national, regional and institutional contexts, to facilitate the bridging of such different realities.

It is relevant to ask what difference might it make to people’s response to the epidemic if they were able to access pensions and other entitlements. It is a global fact that elites find access to treatment and that most HIV infected businessmen and parliamentarians in Africa have some sort of access. The range of uses to which the money might be put include making sure their children were educated, spending it on alcohol and other ways that would circulate the virus more quickly, organising themselves to prevent further infections in their midst, searching for treatment. If Elisa were to want to take antiretrovirals so that she could take care of her children, would she be able to get access? The local hospital has very few drugs in stock, antibiotics only sometimes. Even if HIV treatment drugs were available to people in southern Mozambique, there is a question of cost. What constitutes a fair price for antiretrovirals drugs and who should determine it are unresolved questions. The World Trade Organisation and its intellectual property agreements reach directly into these communities, and reinforce the vicious circles of poverty and deprivation caused by the institutions and practices of globalisation. These seemingly remote global institutions and practices limit and undermine the choices of Elisa and her neighbours.

The failure of globalisation, Joseph Stiglitz argues in *Globalization and its Discontents* can be traced to the fact that, in setting its rules, commercial and financial interests and mind-sets have seemingly prevailed within its

---

institutions of governance, that is, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. The intellectual property regimes established under the Uruguay Round and encapsulated in the TRIPS Agreement, that is, the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property, overwhelmingly reflect the interests and perspectives of the producers, be they agricultural or pharmaceutical producers, as opposed to the users, whether in developed countries or in developing countries. US, European and Japanese drug companies now have or will have in 2005 the means to stop drug companies in the developing world from ‘stealing’ their intellectual property, even if these latter are making life saving drugs available at a fraction of the price. In the case of the HIV epidemic, this will effectively condemn to die the six million people in need of antiretrovirals in the world today.

This moral flaw in what Stephen Lewis calls the ‘heartless soul of this globalized world’\(^7\) has however led to a pan-African HIV treatment access movement. In a meeting of activists from twenty-one African countries in Cape Town in late August a social movement was born that may well challenge and up-end the commercial and financial interests and mind-sets that now control the politics and the institutions of globalisation, as well as their own national and regional leaders.\(^8\)

Let us assume that this treatment access movement succeeds in bringing life saving and enhancing drugs to more and more Africans, as I believe it will. But it is still unclear when Elisa and her neighbours will get access. The local and national imbalances of power and privilege favour urban populations, men and the socio-economically advantaged. Bringing HIV treatment to Elisa and her neighbours will require going against the grain of these axes of power. It will require the commitment of some people of courage and determination.

The HIV epidemic, development and globalisation
However even if people in southern Mozambique were able to access these drugs in an affordable, equitable and appropriate way, they would still die in large numbers of the diseases of personal and national poverty: of hunger, of unsafe water, of other pathogens of unsanitary and unhygienic conditions, in child birth, and so on.

---

\(^7\) NEPAD and HIV/AIDS, Speech by Stephen Lewis, Special Envoy to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on the HIV Epidemic in Africa, June 2002, in the run-up to the G8 Summit in Canada.

The vast majority of untreated HIV infected people die of these poverty related causes and making HIV treatment drugs available will not in itself change this. Further, recent research carried out by the Medical Research Council of South Africa argues that in populations with a heavy infestations of worms, antiretroviral drugs, whatever their cost, are rendered ineffective. The treatment for worms is cheap and its administration does not require great technical competency. Yet worms are endemic.

The causal linkages between the HIV epidemic, development and globalisation are dense and tight. If the treatment for HIV were one glass of safe drinking water, it is not clear that more people would have access to treatment. Increasing access to treatment drugs in resource poor settings will involve a similar complexity to increasing access to pensions for the people of Southern Mozambique.

These factors have been introduced to deepen the understanding of why infection rates are higher in southern Mozambique but there are more.

Machievelli long ago pointed out that not only princes are corrupt, whole populations can be corrupt and corruptible. We might phrase this insight differently these days, perhaps in terms of the social capital of a community or society. As used here, social capital is a predicate or quality of relationships, both interpersonal and intergroup relationships. It refers to the extent of trust and mutual respect that exists between people and groups of people, and to the extent that there is mutual support or solidarity and a sense of, and commitment to, the common good.

Social capital is as unevenly spread as wealth or privilege across societies. Some societies are more atomised than others. In some, self-interest is more dominant than a sense of the common good. The extent of mutual support and trust varies. Rituals and procedures for the resolution of conflicts exist and function, or otherwise. Mutual aid societies or community service organisations are sparse or thick on the ground. A recent USAID funded survey found only two HIV prevention groups working in the southern province, one which markets condoms and the other a group that has been trying to mobilise the NGO community by holding workshops and conferences.9

It is now recognised that the organisations of civil society are central to an effective response to the HIV epidemic. They act as social contractors, entering

into agreements with government, donors and others to provide a range of needed social services. They are the advocates of social justice, the guardians of rights, the advocates of need and the bearers of a humane response. They mediate conflict between individuals and the institutions of the public and private sectors. They link communities to potential partners in action.

Yet we know little about the conditions in which they spring up, thrive and falter. There are few NGOs or CBOs, other than church groups, in Elisa’s area. There are needs but there does not seem to be an organised response.

The organisations of civil society are the social resources or social capital of a community put into service. For such organisations to come into existence requires group social capital or bonding social capital. That is, it requires relationships of trust and respect within a group, an interest in the common good, and a capacity for collective reflection and action. Bonding social capital strengthens the ties of support in a group and creates the possibility of working together for an agreed end.

A thriving civil society also requires bridging social capital: the occasions and networks to build trust and respect across differences between people and their organisations, an ability to work out social conflicts or to challenge social apathy, and again a sense of the greater good. It is possible that the long absences of so many men have stripped the community of some of the necessary social resources for social capital formation: time, trust, education, and concern for others. Alternatively, it could be that the absence of so many men is in itself an indication of the weakness or fragility of social relations and values in this area. It may be, in other words, a social reason why so many men leave for the mines and for other reasons.

Communities or societies where social capital is strong cope better with the epidemic and its impact than those where it is weaker.

The one person responding to the HIV epidemic whom Helen Epstein did identify was the director of the Mozambican miners’ union, AMINO. With virtually no financial or political support, he was helping people access their pensions and other benefits, providing care and support to affected households, distributing sewing machines to widows and talking to new recruits about HIV protection. All of the letters that he had written to national and international bodies have raised only a couple of thousand dollars. He was committed despite working against the grain of indifference, inefficiency and corruption.
Faced with this epidemic and its ravages leaders, such as this union official, emerge. They are one of the gifts of this epidemic. Their courage and commitment needs to be supported if a country is to make headway against the social, economic and personal destructiveness of the epidemic. Such people and their organisations are willing to devote their own time to achieve and protect the well-being of others, to act against the grain of tradition, indifference or prejudice, to put the social capital of communities and nations into service.

However there have been too few such leaders at the national and regional level in Africa. There are notable exceptions: Kenneth Kaunda and President Musevene spring immediately to mind. This lack of leadership has led to a critical flaw at the heart of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The partnership places emphasis on good governance, democratisation, and anti-corruption, which, it argues, Africa can deliver. NEPAD’s laudable development goals include an annual growth rate of seven percent for fifteen years; cutting poverty in half by the year 2015; reduce infant mortality rates by two thirds; reduce maternal mortality rates by three quarters; full school enrolment and so gender equality.

While these are essentially the Millennium Development goals there is no recognition in NEPAD that they will be unachievable in the twenty-five African countries where the prevalence of HIV is above five percent. One has to look far and long to find the few references to the HIV epidemic, buried in the middle of the NEPAD document at paragraph 125:

One of the major impediments facing African development efforts is the widespread incidence of communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Unless these epidemics are brought under control, real gains in human development will remain an impossible hope.

African leaders are asking for $64 billion a year to finance NEPAD, so it can be seen as human and political not to want to disconcert potential donors. But their silence can be construed also as a failure of leadership and their silence makes silence, or neglect, too easy a stance for donor nations. Since 1990, overseas aid flows to the twenty-eight countries with the highest adult HIV prevalence rates (four percent or more) have fallen by a third. Over the same period, development assistance to Africa as a whole has fallen dramatically

---

from US$36 per person in 1990 to just US$21 in 1999 and the inflow of
foreign direct investment as a proportion of the global total has also fallen.¹¹
During the same period, these falling aid flows have shifted away from
development assistance, to humanitarian assistance, and away from support to
multilateral agencies and programmes to bilateral aid.

There seems to be little understanding amongst those African leaders who
drafted and adopted NEPAD or amongst the leaders of their donor partners of
the argument in the recent WHO Report of the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health where Jeffrey Sachs and his team argue that:

The linkages of health to poverty reduction and to long term
economic growth are powerful, much stronger than
generally understood. The burden of disease in some low-income regions, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, stands as
a stark barrier to economic growth and therefore must be
addressed frontally in any comprehensive development
strategy.

NEPAD sets out to be a comprehensive development strategy for Africa, yet in
its own words, development will remain an impossible dream unless the
interrelated epidemics of HIV, TB and malaria are bought under control, unless
the linkages of health to poverty reduction, economic growth and human
development are placed center stage.

Conclusion
This story of pensions, of children taken out of school and of a lack of good
governance tell us a great deal about the resources required for a humane and
effective governance of the epidemic.

The story of Elisa and her neighbours in southern Mozambique shows that the
resources required include:

✓ Leaders of courage, both local and national;
✓ Social connectedness and forms of social organization;
✓ Supportive political systems;
✓ Functioning bureaucracies sensitive to questions of equity and gender;
✓ Honest politicians and bureaucrats, capable of speaking truth;

Corporate sense of social responsibility, expressed in new commercial practices and in partnerships with the public sector and civil society;

Changes in the structures and practices of the governance institutions of globalisation, in particular the World Trade Organisation.

Today much of the discussion of the resource needs of the HIV epidemic emphasises financial resource requirements. The story of pensions indicates that financial resources are required, but equally important are the social, moral, political, governance and human resources.
Africa at the ‘Edge’ of Globalisation

Tanya Lyons*

Introduction

Following the end of the cold war and as major powers through the 1990s reduced or withdrew their support from strategic locations around the world most African states remained highly vulnerable in the global economy. The prevailing view of Afro-pessimists was of a continent marginalised and on the periphery of the global economy; beset by corruption, poverty, disorder and misrule; and so backward that, having no future it would continue to slide further into corruption, poverty, disorder and misrule.12 The end of South African apartheid in the mid-1990s however stimulated a sense of renewed hope; and from this perspective of Afro-Optimism globalisation now appeared to offer Africa a bright future of integration into global markets on African terms. Expressed originally in terms of an African Renaissance this optimism has more recently encompassed on the one hand the formation of the African Union and the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and on the other the emergence of growing anti-corporate social movements that suggest new developments across the continent. Historically Africa was a target of imperialism and the development and expansion of Europe and capitalism. Core/Periphery analyses of global developments kept Africa at the margins. Globalisation at the start of the new millennium however from this optimistic perspective can be seen to create opportunities and development challenges, which are part of the process of globalisation itself to those traditional relationships; and which offer prospects for the future for both Africa and Africa in relation to globalisation.

This paper suggests that while Africa illustrates dramatically the competing definitions of globalisation it is nonetheless at the ‘edge’ of globalisation rather than being perpetually pushed back to the periphery. Given its many different images we examine the ‘contested’ nature of globalisation itself and its human consequences as illustrated today by the juxtaposition of commodities, consumption and social justice movements. The paper questions Africa’s global positioning in the Third World and existing global divides between the

* (Ed) This is a shortened version of the keynote address that Dr Lyons gave to the South African Historical Society Bi-Annual Conference, Mafeking, North West Province, South Africa in July 2001.

First World and the Third, before considering briefly the potential for development within these global processes and structures.

**Contested images of globalisation and its human face**

Whether or not globalisation is no more than internationalisation dressed up for the corporate ball ‘sceptics’, ‘globalists’ and ‘transformationalists’ would all argue that globalisation has taken on a life of its own as a global explanation for global patterns of trade and development. The only problem with this has been its Eurocentric (developed country-centric) definition - as something wonderful bringing the world closer together.

Paolini has argued that:

> the terrain of globalisation is surveyed very much from the viewpoint of the western observer. When we travel to the outer perimeter of the western reach and vision, in particular Africa, globalisation not only takes on a different character, but also encounters a different set of forces and pressures.

For example, an Australian travelling, in the sense of ‘world travel’ either in planes or ships, to view Africa from an ‘empathetic’ position will see a set of priorities, regarding her or his positioning within the globe, completely different from the one to be found by staying at home and world travelling via CNN or commercial television travel programs. From the latter viewing point s/he would see Africa as a place for going on Safari; and fail even to consider that Africans may see themselves differently in conjunction with the rest of the world. Australians might assume that Africans have a view of the world and their place in it similar to ours given that ‘much western theorizing about globalisation spins off into accounts of cyberspace and a “postnational” world ... [while] Third World critiques of globalisation emphasise an older paradigm of economic dependency and North-South imbalances’. When asked to define globalisation, many Australian university students invariably identify advances in communications technologies bringing the world closer together into this global village. They are suitably surprised - and some disappointed - if the course content shifts from the wonders of global communications technologies and cyber-identities to the harsh realities of global divides such as the divergent

---

13 Albert Paolini, ‘Globalisation’ in Philip Darby (ed.), *At the Edge of International Relations, Post-colonialism, Gender and Dependency*. London, Pinter, 1997, p. 34.
15 Paolini, op cit, pp. 34-5.
locations of indigenous peoples compared to former first world people in the
distribution of and access to basic resources - perpetuating global disparities
both within states and trans-nationally.

Of the many definitions and images of globalisation here we see it as
encompassing the social, economic and political processes which occurring in
one society have an increasing impact on others. The world is thus shrinking;
and people are increasingly aware of the interconnections. Hence the label of
the Global Village\textsuperscript{16} - one world - one future - mediated by communications
technologies.

Far from its original conception from the 1960s of fast communications
networks and media expansion the concept of the Global Village may promote
an image of peace and freedom; but at the same time it has accelerated the
penetration of national borders by multinational and transnational corporations.
The encroaching movement of the latter has often been by government
invitation (with open arms and tax concessions). Mostly they have been
welcomed by ‘us’ the consumers because we want to live in a world where we
can have a Big Mac and a Coca-Cola wherever we go. There is much comfort
in the known - the homogeneity of habits and cultures.

If this is globalisation - the interconnections of familiarity - it is based on the
mechanics of the free market and not on the notions of world peace and
universal care principles. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) would appear
to be encouraging the erosion of state sovereignty to promote this free trade in
goods and services with a rational belief that it will bring prosperity; the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) arguing that integration into the world
capitalist economy is the most efficient means of national development in the
least developed nations. What has been happening since the end of the Cold
War however and what is more familiar has been not only the increased
dominance of Global Corporations (MNCs and TNCs) and fast food franchises,
but the increasing presence of poverty across the world. This is the human face
of globalisation with which we are now familiar; and wherever the traveller
might go this familiarity can never be comforting. Instead we just become
weary of the images and blind to them. We may feel increasingly helpless to
change anything, and just accept it. This is the human face of globalisation
which many of us see with one eye on the comforts of capitalism and the other

eye closed. The challenge of globalisation is to open that eye, and focus both on the human consequences of globalisation.  

We catch a glimpse of the human consequences of globalisation simply by the movement of people around the world - the largest movers being refugees fleeing from political, economic or natural disasters. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees’ (UNHCR) role since the 1950s has been to provide refugees with the ‘basic necessities such as shelter, food, water and medicine in emergencies and seeking long term solutions, including voluntary return to their homes or beginning afresh in new countries.’ But the world has changed since 1950 when this United Nations agency was established. The movements of people have become too large and too frequent. There are today at least twelve million refugees of concern and some thirty million people displaced within their own countries. The mass movements of refugees and illegal immigrants globally has made hospitality in host countries run thin. It is these people, legal and illegal workers, women and men, who are the most vulnerable to globalisation. The slave trade was one of the first globalised mass movements of people. Today slaves are still ferried across the world from various locations to dangerous destinations. When national governments promote free trade and financial transactions they do not factor in the human and increased financial costs that result from this economic globalisation. However ‘as difficult as it is to find a safe analytical perch from which to assess the large-scale consequences of globalisation ... it may be even trickier to understand its effects on daily life or to glimpse its human face.’

If understanding globalisation and its human consequences were made into a global Hollywood style movie, there would be no doubt that the can with the ‘red and white lettering [which] forms a universally legible ideogram for the worldwide consumer economy’ would make its way into the camera range without even a product placement contract. Films such as *The Gods Must be Crazy* (South Africa) and *The Cup* (Tibet) have shown us that Coca-Cola is one of the few commodities that holds ‘the position of meta-symbol.’ In fact, ‘in much political, academic and conversational rhetoric the term Coca-Cola comes to stand not just for a particular soft drink but also for the problematic

---

18 www.UNHCR.ch
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
nature of commodities in general .... It may stand for commodities or capitalism, but equally Imperialism or Americanisation.’

Coca-Cola’s place in the globalisation agenda is simple. ‘Coca-Cola can fill a package with liquid and put it in the consumer’s hands much more cheaply than anybody else in the world .... Whether it’s filled with tea or New Age or Coca-Cola is really almost irrelevant.’ In fact ‘satisfying the immutable need for liquid allows for fashions in beverages, hence this commodification has extended to water itself.’ The concerns that some communities or individuals might have with corporate globalisation may result from the fact that instead of the nation being able to control environmental pollution of waterways through clean industrial policies, the solution to pollution and bad water seems to be to bottle the drinkable drinking water and let private companies sell it. Water is airfreighted around the world in little bottles for the world’s rich, while only two-thirds of the world’s population have access to safe drinking water. Is this Globalisation? A competition between Coca-Cola and water? Whatever the outcome, we begin to see the human consequences and the effects of ‘globalisation’ on our daily lives.

In a globalised world Africa remains at present in a somewhat interesting juxtaposition between the competing liquids of Coca Cola and water. In the land-locked country of Zimbabwe for example, the international visitor driving from the airport is greeted by the imposing ‘Coke Corner’. The large billboard dominating a major intersection from the airport - often congested due to the presidential motorcade - highlights how a global corporation can deliver liquid refreshment far more efficiently than the nation-state can provide water in a drought prone region. Coca-Cola’s presence also highlights its globalising potential and nationalistic development trajectory. In Zimbabwe, certainly until recently, there was a hierarchy of Coca-Cola consumption. Imported cans of Coca-Cola cost more than the local bottled variety, and even had greater value than locally brewed beer. Cans that attract no refund were a status symbol among the middle-classes, while street kids were content to collect the used local bottles for the Z$1 refund. While Coca-Cola’s dominance on supermarket shelves may be seen as a colonising force, flat Coca-Cola does hold high esteem amongst parents with colic babies and individuals with diarrhoea or a hangover. The Coca-Cola Company’s investment in Zimbabwe nonetheless

22 Ibid.
25 See Zygmunt Bauman, *op cit.*
offers many opportunities and symbolically bridges the gap between Zimbabwean tradition and westernisation. It should be no surprise that Coca-Cola has been one of the largest employers in Zimbabwe. What needs to be asked is whether, just as Coca-Cola can bubble away the corrosion on a car battery, clean a toilet, decompose a steak in forty-eight hours or rot your teeth, globalisation can erode the huge disparities between rich and poor peoples and nations?

Perhaps, like Coca-Cola, globalisation is not being used for its most effective purposes. Even though some authors such as Daniel Miller\textsuperscript{26} have argued that coke is ‘not typical of globalisation’ because of local differences, it is nonetheless easy to make a connection with Coca-Cola and globalisation. The popularity of the sweet black liquid according to Humphrey McQueen:

\begin{quote}
indicates how corporations can influence demand. To say that nobody needs a Coca-Cola is to overlook how very much the Coca-Cola Company needs us to need a coke .... Beverages don’t generate revenues. It’s the art of selling somebody something and collecting money that generates revenues .... Many of our needs have been induced by capital, which thereby has sharpened the conflict between saving and spending, work and leisure .... Nobody is born with a need for Coco-Cola. On the contrary it is an acquired preference, as the company acknowledged in its maxim ‘take five drinks and you’ll like it.’\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

Is there an equivalent expression that could be used to encourage African nations, such as Zimbabwe, to embrace rather than fear globalisation?

Part of the globalisation process involves ‘winners and losers’ and this signifies clearly that Africa’s position in relation to the rest of the world today is that of losers; particularly as many African states have handed over the control of their countries economies to the World Bank and IMF. This contributes to their marginality and has left a vacuum in many states, where national governments are unable to offer a vision for the future. Yet we cannot ignore that while Africa may be located at the edge of the globalised world the continent is also incorporated into global economic, political and social processes that are

\textsuperscript{27} Humphrey McQueen, \textit{op cit}, p. 24.
indeed integral to the Globalisation process. As Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed out:

on one hand Africa is displaying signs of a transition to emerging market status with all its positive benefits. On the other hand, however, it is still continuing to suffer both from the lingering effects of previous ills (such as debt and SAPs) that produced major economic, social and political problems, and from the new hardships brought on by this newly emerging market status.²⁸

Hence we need to ask whether Annan is suggesting that the globalisation of free markets may have a positive or a negative effect on Africa? If the argument is about claiming ‘newly emerging market status’ should African nations be asked if they want to be involved in globalisation? Or rather, involved in a continuing exploitative relationship within the ‘global economy,’ under the guise of export processing zones, free trade areas and agreements, not to mention World Trade Organisation agreements. Would all of this encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and create jobs? If so at what cost? If there is no choice we may as well quietly hope for the best: that despite the positive and/or negative effects globalisation will have on Africa at least some will emerge as ‘winners’.

Afro-Optimism and the confrontation with global divides
Nonetheless since there is little progress to be made in being pessimistic about Africa’s future we must be cautiously optimistic in this age of globalisation. The Afro-Renaissance of the mid-1990s that accompanied the end of Apartheid and the staging of the first democratic elections in South Africa produced a new confidence that the continent can transcend its inherited problems and define its own new path. The states that take on this challenge in conjunction with civil society (not to mention global corporations), could even replace the legacy of external intervention and poor leadership which over the last twenty-five years has left many problems and few hopes. This will not be achieved by withdrawing from globalisation (that is, through nationalism or protectionism) but by improving the continent’s performance in the world economy. If such involvement in globalisation is to be on African terms we need to consider Africa’s global positioning in more detail; and any analysis of globalisation’s impact on Africa and the broader implications must be attempted from a global

perspective and in relation to other developing nations, economies and regions within what is termed the Third World.

International Relations discourse emanating from the west pushes the Third World to the edge, marginalised or invisible. Rather than highlighting the concerns of those marginal international actors, ‘in emergent discourses about “global culture” and globalisation, [the Third World] becomes mostly incorporated, repressed, homogenised.’

We need to ask however how relevant is the term Third World in light of the ‘rise of the Fourth World’ and the demise of the Second World in the post-cold war period? The term ‘Fourth World’ originally emerged in the 1970s as a reference for indigenous peoples around the world to state their location as oppressed nations, unrecognised or marginalised. Yet we need also to ask, as Holton questions, whether to ‘speak of Four Worlds’ is in fact ‘symptomatic of the divergent location of different parts of the world within structures of economic and political power, and ... equally evidence of the divergent life chances and different types of cultural identity that emerge within this context.’

For Paolini the term ‘Third World’:

still carries meaning as a shorthand for the multitude of cultures and identities that remain marginalised, dispossessed and increasingly insignificant in the late modern age, it is useful not only as a sign of discomfort for various global scenarios and projections ... [but] remains indispensable to any attempt to understand the global nature of modernity in the contemporary period, if only to remind us that the ‘global’ does not end at the Tropic of Cancer.

Yet at the same time the continued use of this term ‘Third World’ poses problems in that it places ‘all underdeveloped or non-western nations in the same category, thereby minimising important differences between them.’ The question whether to use this shorthand term for African states remains to be answered. However, in light of recent discourses about globalisation and claims (for example, by Paolini) that the globalisation lense has obscured the

---

29 Albert Paolini, op cit, p. 33.
differences within the ‘global’, it may be necessary to keep the concept of the ‘Third World’ in open discourse to ensure that the level of global discomfort vis-a-vis global realities (such as the widening gaps between rich and poor countries) remains.

We need to ask therefore how much is the Third World actually involved in a positive way in this process called globalisation? While we do not need to be connected to the Internet to be connected to globalisation, do we in fact have a globalised world? Certainly many of the Third World’s ‘elites’ take part in some of the processes such as global governance, have access to Information Communication technologies (ICTs), are members of multinational companies’ boards, or ‘part of the cross cultural traffic in music, fashion and ideas.’\textsuperscript{34} They meet each other and benefit from the goods on offer. Yet these elites are a minority of the Third World. Others may also be involved in the facets of global civil society such as through their activism in grassroots campaigns for Human Rights and the environment (for example, through Oxfam, Amnesty, Greenpeace). Yet despite the globalised involvement of these individuals and community groups, they are still subject to the perils of the state and even communal divisions.\textsuperscript{35} Perhaps for the ‘rest’ - for those individuals and communities facing the edge of the ravine - finding solace or happiness in a can of Coca-Cola or simple ‘retail-therapy’ (note the number of shopping complexes in Southern Africa named East Gate etc. corresponding with similar names in Australia such as South Gate and West Field) may be all that is needed. Globalisation may indeed have little purchase for the majority living in the so-called Third World - and it may actually have no meaning, apart from continued marginalisation or invisibility in the global arena, and exploitation both from within and without.

Yet, at the same time that many in the emerging middle-classes in Africa are scrambling for Brandnames,\textsuperscript{36} there is also a ‘formidable movement for social justice ... emerging’ that is based on both local empowerment measures and international relationship building across all of the social protest agendas - race, class, gender, environment - and is transcending ‘the barriers erected by both domestic state bureaucrats and Washington’s financial bureaucrats.’\textsuperscript{37} With the original successes of the Movement for Democratic Change in

\textsuperscript{34} Paolini, \textit{op cit}, pp. 41-42.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid}.
Zimbabwe and the South African AIDS campaigners against global pharmaceutical companies – Africa in fact, as Patrick Bond has argued, is at the ‘cutting edge’ of globalisation. The continent has its own internal social movements, demanding civil rights and liberties, and is able to use global networks and activists involved in the rapidly growing global anti-globalisation/ anti-corporate/ anti-capitalist social movements that have manifested themselves in post-modern formations on the streets around the world since ‘the battle for Seattle’ protests against the IMF and WTO in November 1999. Moreover long before Seattle, Melbourne and Prague and global Anarchists donning their balaclavas for anonymity in street rioting, Africans had been protesting against the International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural adjustment programs and other austerity measures imposed on them from outside since political independence was achieved in many African nations.

Some authors have suggested that this kind of First World solidarity for the Third World is naive and ill-conceived. Chanting their slogans to shut down meetings of international financial institutions or international/regional policy making bodies (IMF, WTO, World Bank) they are accused of being out of touch with the needs of Third World states and peoples. Pires O’Brien for example has argued that these global institutions are the only global forces that can create jobs and investment and end poverty in the Third World. Given a choice between living on a subsistence agricultural plot with no employment opportunities or income potential, and working on the production line for a global fashion label’s out-sourced factory in a newly created Free-Trade Zone, surely that Third World person would choose the latter, even despite the knowledge they would receive low wages and poorer labour practices compared to a similar operation in the west, because at least it is a choice. In line with this argument then, the first world protesters’ aims to help the Third World peoples, are at the edge of reality. The question however is, if it really is a choice or is it like the Nike slogan tells us - Just do it - because simply there is no choice. As we have seen in Africa corporations do not hold the solution to poverty, and are efficient only to the extent of the speed that they can withdraw their investments when the nation-state no longer provides the security, stability or economic incentive to operate.

Thus while (from the pessimists’ view) Africans remain at the edge of economic globalisation and vulnerable to shifting global markets, global trends

---

38 Ibid.
and inefficient national policies, viewed from an Afro-optimist perspective Africa is on the ‘cutting edge’ of a globalised civil society supported by growing anti-corporate social movements. One that has huge potential for something new developing on the continent this millennium. Perhaps with the formation of the African Union we will see a convergence of ‘different globalisations’ holding huge potential for African nations, local communities and indeed a globalised world. From Coca-Cola to water, and from corporations to International Financial Institutions, Africa is located at the point of convergence, at the nexus of globalisation.

\[^{40}\text{See ‘Different Globalisations: Governance, Dissent and Politics’, Special issue of } Policy, Organisation and Society, \text{Vol 20, No. 2, 2001.}\]
Biography and History: Bridging the Gap

Peter F. Alexander


History, it has been said, is written by the victors. Like most truisms this is not entirely true (German historians have written extensively on the Second World War) but it has enough validity to raise an interesting question: what happens to written history when the tide turns and the previously defeated become dominant? One might expect that the history of former struggles might come to seem very badly in need of revision, and at the very least, in need of some recovery of the voices of the silenced. Jeff Guy’s biography of Harriette Collenso is a vivid example of this historical recovery. The voices he summons out of the abyss of the past, like Saul raising Samuel, are those of the defeated Zulu kingdom, and of nineteenth century women. The linkage between the two is one of the main strengths, and the most interesting problem, of this book.

Guy is Professor of History at the University of Natal, and his speciality has been the history of the Zulu people. Working with the example of Shula Marks (doyenne of historians of Kwa-Zulu Natal) before him, he produced in 1979 an important and beautifully researched book, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom*, which traced the British defeat of Cetewayo’s kingdom in fascinating detail. He also wrote *The Heretic* (1983), a biography of one of the Zulus’ most impassioned defenders, the nineteenth century bishop of Natal, John William Colenso. This book was in part a study of a remarkable Victorian figure, in part a further contribution to Guy’s examination of Zulu history: an attempt in fact to bridge the gap between biography, with its focus on an individual, and the broader history of an entire people.

The subtitle of Guy’s latest book, *The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism*, indicates the same bridging spirit at work, and the book is in a sense the continuation and completion of both his earlier books: it is both a biography of Bishop Colenso’s activist daughter Harriette and a continuation of Guy’s history of the conquered Zulus.
Harriette Colenso was born in 1847, in England, daughter of a clergyman who was also a well-known mathematician: John Colenso was the author of standard textbooks on mathematics and arithmetic. In 1854 he was plucked from his quiet parish by Bishop Robert Gray of Cape Town, and appointed the first Anglican bishop of the new diocese of Natal. It was a daunting task: Colenso had to make a diocese from scratch, in a huge area very thinly populated by whites, and with a large and restive Zulu population. He built a large house, Bishopstowe, for himself just outside Pietermaritzburg in 1855, and set to work with the optimism and energy that now seem so characteristic of Victorians: uncharacteristically, he was also open to the views and beliefs of his Zulu neighbours. Christians, he said even before leaving England, had to be willing to learn from other people ‘about the God who was witness in their hearts’.

And he did: by the time he returned to England on sabbatical in 1862, he had been persuaded by some of his Zulu converts that large sections of the Hebrew scriptures were full of contradictions and could not be believed. He published book after book making this case, and was naively amazed to find his contribution not welcomed in an England increasingly uneasy about its moral foundations. He also seemed not to understand why Bishop Gray thought it dishonourable of him not to resign since he could no longer agree with his church’s teachings. Instead Colenso fought for the rest of his life to remain in the diocese while attacking the beliefs he had sworn (and was paid) to maintain and affirm. Even when convicted of heresy in 1864 and replaced as bishop, he refused to leave either his big house or his income, cultivated a split in South African Anglicanism which endures to this day, and ministered for the rest of his life to a dwindling band of die-hard believers.

Harriette and her four siblings (two sons, three daughters) were raised in this atmosphere of ceaseless controversy and bitterness, and there is no doubt that they were permanently affected by it. Harriette in particular inherited her father’s quarrels as she inherited his convictions. She spent the greater part of her life trying to keep alive his splinter church, and she also developed his profound attachment to the Zulu royal house. These two interests both filled her life and consumed it, and it is on the second of them that Guy focusses in this book.

Harriette Colenso grew up speaking Zulu almost as well as she spoke English. Her Zulu was so much better than her father’s that the Zulus nicknamed her Udlwedlwe (‘walking stick’) to indicate that she was her father’s guide and support. His interest had swung from sterile theological concerns to a desire to defend the Zulu cause in the 1870s, and particularly at the time of Langalibalele’s trial in 1873 for rebellion. Thereafter a focus on Zulu rights had become John
Colenso’s chief interest, and that of Harriette. The Colensos had already been isolated from white society in Natal by the bishop’s heretical views and by their sense of social and moral superiority over their neighbours, a superiority which they made no effort to hide; their sympathy for the Zulus intensified this isolation. ‘Somehow we seem to be out of harmony with the society of the place’, complained Harriette’s strong-willed mother in puzzlement.

The Zulu royal house was in need of sympathy and support by the 1870s, because the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, had become convinced that some kind of South African political confederation was needed to unite under British rule the untidy collection of British colonies, Boer republics, and nominally independent black territories of which the Zulu kingdom was one. This confederation would of course require the subordination of both the Boers and the Zulus. In his earlier books, Guy has told in detail the story of the British ultimatum to the Zulu kingdom of December 1878, the British invasion of January 1879 and the battle of Isandlwana, in which Zulu *impis* wiped out a small British force, followed in July 1879 by the battle of Ulundi which ended the power of the Zulu monarchy under Cetshwayo. Accordingly he moves over this familiar territory with economy, detailing mainly John Colenso’s attempts to monitor the situation and provide an alternative account of it to balance the official British one.

This book really begins digging into its subject with the death of John Colenso in June 1883, and the determination of Harriette Colenso to continue his work. The increasing fragmentation of the Zulu people after the battle of Ulundi troubled her deeply, and she longed for a violent response on the part of the Usuthu, the royalist faction: ‘The real difficulty has hitherto been the want of the sinews of war’, she hotheadedly complained. Wiser heads among the Zulus realized that further military challenge of the British would be fatal. Instead, the Zulus turned on each other. It was the chiefs opposed to the royal house, notably a powerful group, the Mandlakazi under their leader Zibhebhu, who were able to benefit from the eclipse of the royalists. In the Zulu civil war that followed the royalist forces lost. King Cetshwayo, hotly pursued by the Mandlakazi, fled into British protection and died in 1884; his young son Dinuzulu unwisely collected an army and challenged the British, who in 1890 sent him and a small retinue into comfortable Napoleonic exile on St Helena for eight years.

The Zulu kingdom had deliberately shut itself off from literacy, and accordingly historians have struggled to find ways of making the Zulu voice audible in retrospect. It is here that the Colensos come in. The collection of papers, both John Colenso’s and Harriette’s, which Jeff Guy’s meticulous research has
uncovered, contains the decades-long attempts of father and daughter to help the Zulus speak for themselves, in memoranda, letters and articles transmitted to their Liberal supporters in England, and to English newspapers and magazines. In particular, Harriette’s fluency in Zulu, and her intense identification with Zulu culture, made her a conduit by which the Usuthu faction could make their voices heard at the time and since. The Mandlakazi, by contrast, seem to have been permanently silenced.

Christian missionaries in southern Africa have a long and honourable history of attempting to defend black Africans against the cupidity or rapacity of white settlers, and against the clumsy attentions of colonial bureaucrats. The Colensos form a striking part of this benevolent tradition, in which appeal to the British public and the British government were the strongest weapon of defence. Harriette and her father collected, translated and transmitted statements, protests, petitions and assertions from the Usuthu, and very frequently took it on themselves to speak for this royalist group as if it represented all Zulus. They also printed many translated documents, using their own printing press and trained Zulu typesetters at Bishopstowe.

Such was Harriette’s association with the Usuthu that she very frequently identified herself as a Zulu. ‘I am ashamed of being English’, she wrote. Instead she would refer to ‘us, Zulus’, and she once signed herself, ‘H. E. Colenso, Natal Colonist and Zulu.’ She also significantly referred to herself as one of the Usuthu. Guy prints several photographs of her carrying the white cow’s tail, the shokobezi, royalist symbol of the Usuthu, often looping around it the iziqu, the wooden beads awarded to a warrior who had killed an enemy in battle, and it seems likely that the monarchists among the Zulus recognized and welcomed her association with them.

The support and advice of the Bishopstowe family however was very much a mixed blessing. John Colenso, once he had been convicted as a heretic, was something of a broken reed, on whom the Zulus leaned at their peril; Harriette, excitable, passionate and monomaniacal, was little better. Their main importance to the Usuthu was as publicists and witnesses, megaphones who transmitted the Usuthu point of view to England, rather than as advisers. The Usuthu came to realize, too late, that taking the advice of the Colensos was dangerous.

At two vital points, their advice to the Zulu royal house was to result in catastrophic setbacks. In 1884 the Transvaal Boers recognized Dinuzulu as Zulu king and backed him militarily against his numerous and powerful Zulu
enemies, demanding in return a slice of his territory. The Usuthu needed Boer support against the Mandlakazi and others: the question was, how much precious Zulu territory would they have to surrender to their dangerous white allies. They keenly felt the need of a white helper to aid their negotiations with the Boers, and they turned to Bishopstowe for suggestions.

Unhappily, John Colenso was a particularly poor judge of character, as the range of conmen and alcoholics he appointed as his clergy amply demonstrated. At his urging, the Usuthu accepted as their adviser William Grant, a venal and conceited man of limited intelligence. On Grant’s advice the Usuthu reluctantly handed over the Boers more than a third of the Zulu territory, an outcome they were bitterly to regret and which the British administrators were powerless to overturn.

Nor was this the only Colenso miscalculation. The British government might not want to extend British rule over Zululand (Lord Derby, State Secretary, vividly remarked in language which was not then considered racist, ‘I don’t want more niggers’), but Natal’s white settlers coveted Zulu land and Zulu labour. In 1893, the Natal lawyer and politician Harry Escombe persuaded Harriette Colenso to demand the incorporation of what remained of Zululand into the territory of Natal, so that it fell into the control of the white colonists, and to insist that this take place before Dinuzulu was allowed to return to Natal. Astonishingly, she did so, to the puzzlement of her Liberal supporters in England, and to the frustration of Dinuzulu, whose imprisonment on St Helena was prolonged and the remains of his kingdom destroyed.

These two errors (to use no stronger word) had profound effects on the course of Zulu history: nothing more clearly shows the weakness of the Zulu position after the battle of Ulundi than the Usuthu’s being forced to depend on the Colensos for advice and support. It was almost inevitable that that frail support would be ineffective; Harriette Colenso’s use to the historian, as a recorder and preserver of the Usuthu voice, was much more important that her help to the Usuthu themselves.

And this is where a problem emerges with the hybrid style of bio-history which Guy has chosen. His book seeks to be both a biography and a general history of a people’s struggle. But the chasm between the two forms is a wide one. Biography, by its nature, focusses on individuals, and to the extent that it lends itself to the study of a group or nation like the Zulu, it depends on the increasingly challenged great man (or woman) theory of history. A biography of one of the protagonists in this unequal struggle between Zulu and Briton - a
biography of Dinuzulu, say, or Shepstone - would be genuinely illuminating of the wider picture. A biography of Harriette Colenso, on the other hand, risks focussing on her ineffectiveness as an historical player, and simultaneously overlooking her interest as an individual. Guy is repeatedly obliged to admit that ‘[Harriette’s] warnings ... the huge effort and expense to expose what had gone before and get a fresh policy devised for Zululand, the Usuthu protest documented in the Blue Books and in the hundreds of pages printed, had failed.’ Failure, in fact, becomes the leitmotif of any description of Harriette’s political efforts. Which raises a fundamental question about the structure of this book. Why a biography?

It is not that Harriette Colenso, as an individual, is lacking in interest. On the contrary, she emerges from Guy’s pages as a complex, passionate, courageous and generous human being, who devoted her life to the Zulu royalist cause without counting the cost or looking for any reward. And the cost to herself and her family was huge: she sank all of their meagre savings into the Usuthu cause and then ran up large debts, and she devoted the best part of her life to the Usuthu struggle, giving herself to the limit of her strength and her resources. She allowed neither her sex nor her lack of money or position to stop her: she would face any danger, whether that meant travelling across war-torn Zululand in an open wagon, or confronting and scolding powerful British statesmen in their offices in Whitehall. The Usuthu struggle, she once wrote ‘is like a nightmare to us, and I only wish that we could make all our friends as miserable about it as we are’. She certainly tried. And in spite of her ineffectiveness, in spite of repeated disappointments and betrayal by allies, in spite of alienating Natal society, and boring and antagonising even her English supporters, she never gave up. She is a fascinating example of the indomitable spirit of Victorian Britain and a great nineteenth century instance of a self-liberated woman.

But Guy, because the history of the Zulus is his guiding thread, can do little more than hint at the private complexities that made this extraordinary woman what she was. The impact on her of her father’s endless quarrels, and her consequent isolation from white society; the disfiguring acne from which she suffered in girlhood, and which she seems to have felt shut her off from any hope of marriage; her profound attraction to Zulu men in the near-nakedness of their traditional dress, which showed in her urging them not to adopt white clothing, and her vividly admiring descriptions of them in letters (‘a grand dashing set of men’); her evident jealousy when Dinuzulu took a white concubine on St Helena: these elements clearly link, in a complex way, with her lifelong work for the Usuthu cause. Guy, because he is primarily an historian and not a biographer, treats them as peripheral issues, to be registered with a sideways glance, and then
dropped. To say this is not to criticise his approach, but to focus on the gulf that lies between biography and more general histories.

This gulf shows even in the expert iconography which Guy brings to bear on the many excellent photographs of the Colensos which he has discovered and reproduced in his volume. They are in themselves a triumph of his meticulous scholarship. He is particularly good at reading the Usuthu props with which Harriette tended to equip herself when about to be photographed, notably the *shokobezi* which so clearly shows her partisanship with the royalist house, and by implication her dismissal of their Zulu opponents. (He makes rather less of the *iziqu*, the battle-beads which show her dangerous pugnacity: Sir Henry Bulwer, in a dispatch of 1882, was to blame her for inciting the Usuthu to violence, as did Baron de Worms in Parliament a decade later.)

But it is in Guy’s lack of interest in reading other aspects of the photographs that the triumph of historian over biographer in his approach shows most clearly. Harriette had a lifelong, complex and curious relationship with her sister Agnes, which struck even other members of the family as odd. Agnes was very tall, profoundly withdrawn, shy, silent, unconventional and deeply attached to Harriette, on whom she was clearly dependent psychologically and emotionally. Another sister, Frances, (who had an unhappy love affair with a British soldier killed at Isandhlwana and who mourned him for the rest of her life) significantly described the relationship between Harriette and Agnes as akin to that of ‘husband and wife’. Agnes called Harriette ‘Harry’; Harriette used for Agnes a range of pet-names. ‘Harry’ smoked cigarettes, a daring and unfeminine action for the time, and at least once was inclined to try a pipe.

Guy’s photographs show that whereas in England Harriette dressed in conventional feminine garb (which she had to borrow from her hosts), in Africa, by contrast, she wore clothing which was at once strangely masculine and ecclesiastical. She routinely wore a wide-brimmed man’s hat, with her hair concealed in it so that she appears to have a man’s cropped cut, and she combined this with strange long robes apparently of her own design: a blouse and long dark skirt, over which was a flowing but shorter white garment open in the front and secured by a girdle. The effect is strikingly like episcopal dress of the period, a white surplice over a black cassock, a white neckcloth like a clerical collar, and to complete the image, around the neck is a long chain supporting what may be a cross. The photographs make clear what her actions do too: that she saw herself as having taken the place of her dead father, the ex-bishop. Elements such as these, which would be central to a biographer’s need to
understand his subject, are merely peripheral to Guy’s excellent history of the Zulus and accordingly are downplayed, quite understandably.

But biography, because its emphases are so different from those of a general history, poses dangers to the historian. Guy’s focus on the Colensos, father and daughter, leads him (perhaps unconsciously) to share some of their convictions and assumptions about the Zulu struggle in a way that a more general history might not have permitted. In particular, it is clear that for Guy, as for the Colensos, the Usuthu are the focalisers of the Zulu struggle: other powerful (and militarily victorious) Zulu factions are given prominence only insofar as they affect the Usuthu. It is as if a biographer of the English Civil War period were to draw so heavily on the papers of a female supporter of Charles I that he began to write as if the Cavaliers were the only faction worth detailed attention.

Just as Harriette routinely took it upon herself to speak for the Usuthu, and to assume that in doing so she was speaking for all the Zulu, Guy occasionally appears to make the same association. ‘She [Harriette] fought in the name of the Zulu royal house’, he remarks, ‘which she believed, rightly in so far as it represented social continuity, had the support of the majority of people in Zululand.’ Rightly? Who, even at the time, could know what the majority of Zulus supported? Neither white nor black leaders would have thought of asking them. Guy’s book is peppered with such phrases as, ‘The vast majority of Zulu were not prepared to treat British troops as enemies’, and ‘Most of the Zulu people hoped to remain neutral between Dinuzulu and the British’. These and similar assertions may be in line with Harriette Colenso’s opinions, but they are heroic assumptions.

The obverse of Harriette’s tendency to regard the Zulus, in their complex multiple factions, as her friends the Usuthu writ large, is her tendency to interpret British policy in South Africa as the playing out of the personalities of those British officials she had met (and generally disliked). Of the broader thrust of British colonial policy she seems to have had little grasp. Everything for her was personalised. Guy’s history shows the impact again. Describing an unsatisfactory meeting between Harriette’s *bête noir* Theophilus Shepstone (Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal), and the Usuthu leaders, in 1877, at which they refused to address Shepstone by his title, Guy comments:

Furious at being publicly crossed, Shepstone broke up the meeting. He was never to forget what had happened, and he made sure that the Zulu generally, and the men in particular who had so insulted him, were to suffer for it. The Zulu, quite rightly,
were to see this meeting as the beginning of the conflict that was to end their independence.

British colonial policy, however, was directed from London, and influenced by the personalities and predilections of a great many bureaucrats, of whom Shepstone was not the most important - except perhaps in the eyes of Harriette Colenso and the Usuthu.

Shepstone was in fact a profoundly sensible and moderate man, whose balance may be judged from his summation of John Colenso’s troubled life: ‘The pity is not that he [Colenso] took the view he did, for that was the result of an ardent love of justice, but that he looked upon everyone who could not take the same view as he did in the light of a personal enemy, & bequeathed that blasting legacy to his children’. But Guy appears to share Harriette’s cynicism not just about Shepstone, but about British officialdom in general, seeming to accept that British policy was motivated solely by money: ‘No matter what sins, crimes or stupidities had been inflicted on the Zulu by the local officials’, he writes, ‘a surplus on the books outweighed them all.’

Biography is an important branch of history, but by its nature it has a microscopic, not telescopic, focus. It offers hugely enriching detail to the historian, but it also has the dangerous tendency to narrow the field of view. Matters of vital importance to the individual may be of little importance to the group, and vice versa. Guy has made a valiant effort to link the two forms, and thereby illustrated the difficulties of doing so. His account of the Zulu struggle is an admirable, much-needed revision of this vital piece of South African history, offering a richness of detail that has previously been lacking, and important new emphases that were sorely needed. His biography of Harriette Colenso, on the other hand, is like one of the architectural drawings of Harriette’s acquaintance John Ruskin: in one corner all complete in elaborate, finely painted detail, in another corner just a pencilled sketch which leaves one crying out for more. Harriette Colenso deserves a full-scale biography, and Jeff Guy is the man to write it. But he would have to take his eyes off the Usuthu to do so. The View Across the River is an admirable illustration of the blurred but real borders between different forms of history.

School of English
University of New South Wales
Kensington, NSW
Adjusting to Globalisation in Ghana

David Brown


Neoliberalism is still in fashion, and three propositions about neoliberal globalisation remain stubbornly resilient. The first is that globalisation undermines the state’s capacity for managing its economy, and thereby weakens both the authority of the state and the cohesion of the nation, particularly in the case of countries on the periphery of the global economy. The second is that while the neoliberal economic policies advocated by international capital may indeed sometimes have the short-term effect of increasing the gap between rich and poor, they nevertheless reduce market distortions and promote long-term economic development. Finally the third is that the liberalisation of the economy which is achieved by these neoliberal reforms carries with it the benefit of political liberalisation and thence democratisation, and so serves to replace the weakened authoritarian nation-state, with the strengthened democratic nation-state. Thus the apparently disruptive impact of globalisation should, so the argument goes, be seen as ‘merely transitional’.

Ghana is a nice case for critically reflecting on these ideas, and these three excellent studies provide an opportunity for doing so. From the 17th century onwards its economy was based on global trading networks, in slaves, gold, palm oil, timber and cocoa, with the imposition of British colonial rule facilitating the export-oriented economy. Anti-colonialism took the form more of a fight for control of these export revenues, than a demand for economic and political restructuring, and
Kwame Nkrumah came to power by promising to use the cocoa revenues for rapid national socio-economic development. He launched a statist (‘dirigiste’) development strategy which relied on the use of cocoa revenues to promote import-substitution industrialisation. This meant a plethora of economic controls and subsidies which increased the size and power of the state bureaucracy. As opposition rose from overtaxed cocoa farmers and others excluded from the patronage of this state machinery, Nkrumah turned the competitive democratic system into an authoritarian one-party state, which he sought to legitimate by reference to the imperative of national development.

By 1964 it was going wrong. Cocoa output fell, and this coincided with a historically low world price for cocoa, leading to a massive decline in government revenues. The government faced a foreign debt and trade deficit. It responded with further import controls resulting in more shortages of consumer goods and imported foodstuffs, more corruption by bureaucrats administering the various controls, and more inflation. The economic crisis generated political instability. Between 1966 and 1982, Ghana had five different governments, all with low capacity and low legitimacy, and all faced by one core problem. The economic crisis could only be solved by a government willing to devalue the currency, to reduce state controls, to increase taxation and to ask for additional foreign loans. But any government which attempted to take these measures would apparently immediately lose popular support, and face opposition from key groups in the military and the bureaucracy. This is what happened to the elected Busia government of 1969-72, which devalued the currency and removed controls on import prices. This led to a ninety percent increase in the price of imported goods, including essential foodstuffs. The government was immediately removed from power by military officers who resented having their salaries cut, and who were supported by urban workers hit by the increased price of foodstuffs.

The lesson was clear. So governments instead tried to hold on to power by maintaining the system of state controls, trying to reform them in various ways, but never radically dismantling them, with the result of ever more corruption, economic decline, and indebtedness. This of course led eventually to even more public disillusionment with the regime, culminating in its removal from power. This spiral of collapse produced, at village level, a retreat from the state into localism and communalism, as evidenced in the growth of support for animist and religious cults, the mobilization of ethnicity, increasing out-migration, increasing crime and banditry, and a rising tide of discontent aimed variously at foreigners, neocolonialism, corrupt elites and ethnic others. When Jerry Rawlings came to power, by yet another military coup in December 1981, he campaigned against inequality and corruption, proclaiming himself a ‘man of the people’ - a democrat, a
socialist and a neo-Marxist. But he nevertheless maintained an economic strategy based on state controls, and refused to accept new IMF and World Bank loans because they were conditional on a devaluation of the currency.

Then came the revolution. In 1983 Rawlings did his U-turn. He abandoned the strategy of state controls and launched a strategy of economic liberalization, which included the devaluation of the Cedi. He moved from rejecting the World Bank’s structural adjustment programme as neo-colonial exploitation to becoming its favourite and model pupil. The decline in real GDP of 6.92 percent in 1982 gave way to a growth rate of 8.6 percent in 1984, averaging at 4.5 percent for the period from 1984 to 1990. The costs were high, particularly for urban workers, and there were indeed several coup attempts, but Rawlings retained widespread popularity, convincingly winning two competitive and reasonably fair elections in 1992 and 1996, staying in power for far longer - eighteen years - than any other Ghanaian leader. He managed to restore political stability and democracy, handing over peacefully to his electoral opponent in 2000. He also managed to rebuild national unity, in part by being the first government leader not to visibly display ethnic favouritism in his policies.

On the face of it therefore the case of Ghana conforms to each of the three generalisations about globalisation, in three consecutive periods. Prior to 1983 the globalisation of its cocoa economy inhibited the state’s capacity for economic management, undermined its state authority, and provoked ethnic tensions. From 1983 to 1992 the change of economic strategy from control to liberalism turned economic decline into economic growth. And from 1992 onwards economic liberalisation was accompanied by effective democratisation.

But as Aryeetey, Harrigan and Nissanke remind us in their *Economic Reforms in Ghana: the Miracle and the Mirage* (p. 344), quoting Hans Singer (1989), ‘Seldom is any splendid story wholly true’. The eighteen contributions to this edited book subject Ghana’s structural adjustment experience to close scrutiny by comparing the economic impact of the state interventionist policies pursued between 1970 and 1983 with that of the liberal policies pursued since 1983. The book examines respectively fiscal policies, the external sector, financial and labour sectors, industrial and agricultural sectors, and socio-economic development; and then offers an overall assessment of structural adjustment. Since 1983 ‘Ghana has done most of what the foreign actors have demanded, foreign capital inflows have been high, and the country is indeed well-endowed with natural resources such as arable land, forests, extensive mineral deposits (including gold and diamonds), and hydro-electric power’ (p. 345). Why then were the growth rates of 4.6 percent between 1983 and 1991 no higher than those which had been achieved in 1969-71 under
interventionist policies, remaining well below ‘East Asia’ expectations, and declining through the 1990s? The economy was just as fragile in terms of its dependence on raw material exports in the 1990s, as it had been in the 1960s. The investment rate had declined from 24 percent in 1960 to 16 percent in 1994, to a level that seems to doom Ghana to continued reliance on foreign loans; and real GDP per capita has declined from US$227 in 1960 to US$188 in 1994 (p. 55). Far from being a ‘miracle’ Ghana’s economic reforms have been a mirage providing only short-term relief, which is probably not sustainable, and failing to break the country out of the ‘vicious circle of poverty’.

The thirty economists contributing to this volume do not of course agree on the facts or their meanings, and this is not solely because of the ‘wide variation in data sources, each with its own degree of inaccuracies’ (p. 4). Moreover many of them are better at examining the technicalities of the ‘how’ question than reflecting on the crucial ‘why’. But some important explanations do emerge. They conclude overall that it is not so much the choice of economic strategy which makes the difference as the way in which it is implemented and the socio-political context within which it is applied. Structural adjustment cannot be expected of itself to transform a state with limited capacity and an economy whose structure is inherently fragile. These initial points are neatly illustrated by looking at what happened in one specific locality, Jerry Rawlings’s home locality of Anlo; as does Emmanuel Kwaku Akeyeampong in his *Between the Sea and the Lagoons*.

Akyampong’s well-documented and well-written study of the Anlo Ewe examines the development of their coastal locality near the mouth of the River Volta through the export of slaves from the 17th to the early 19th centuries; and then their subsequent decline. Anlo became marginalised partly because it was bypassed by the export routes for timber, cocoa and gold, but partly also because its fishing was severely disrupted by the Nkrumah government’s decision to build the continent’s largest hydro-electric dam upstream, while refusing to invest funds to tackle the associated river and coastal erosion in Anlo. By 1981, two-thirds of Anlo’s main town, Keta, was under the sea. The Anlo Ewe have responded to ecological disaster, the vagaries of globalisation, and their marginalisation by governments by ‘retreating’ into religious cults and oppositionist pan-Ewe ethnic nationalism.

Anlo’s marginalisation within Ghana paralleled Ghana’s marginalisation in the global economy and Jerry Rawlings accession to the Presidency held out promises for both. In 1985 Rawlings committed his government to a major US$84 million development project to resolve Keta’s coastal erosion, reversing the policy of neglect adopted by all previous governments. Planning vacillations and financial problems brought delay, but by 1996 international capital had been raised and the
Keta Development Project was initiated. Nevertheless by 2000 when Rawlings handed over the Presidency little of substance had been achieved. It is difficult to believe however that the gap between promise and achievement, in Ghana as a whole as well as in Anlo, is explainable solely or even predominantly by reference to managerial, administrative and financial problems. As Gyimah-Boadi and Jeffries’ chapter in the Aryeeetey book recognises we need to look to the dynamics of politics, and the role of political leadership, for an answer.

There seem to be three distinct explanations for the relative failure of Ghana’s economic liberalisation strategy which intertwine in these books. The first asserts that the core problem lay with the regime’s failure to use the opportunity to promote what became called ‘good governance’, building strong state institutions for the effective regulation and implementation of the liberalisation reforms. Rather than this being merely an oversight, Hutchful suggests that it occurred because Ghana began to ‘slip back into its familiar “patrimonial” mould’ (p. 1).

The second explanation asserts that the key problems lay with vacillations in implementing policies and repeated modifications of the strategy, both on the part of the World Bank and IMF, and also of the Rawlings government which failed to fulfill crucial conditionalities. The third and surely most fundamental reason seems to be that the success of structural adjustment depends upon what Hutchful calls a ‘synergy between state and market’ (p. 231) which is dependent upon close links between the governing regime and the domestic business sector. Hutchful explains how sections of the regime remained suspicious of, or antagonistic to, the business sector; so that such links were never developed. The result was that the capacities for development generated by foreign loans and by structural reforms in the various sectors of the economy were never followed up by effective private sector investment. The private sector’s performance remained at best ‘languorous’ (p. 2).

Rawlings’ political skill lay in his ability to use manipulative means to maintain his power and legitimacy while pursuing policies which seemed designed to alienate his key support bases; - devaluing the Cedi, promoting the interests of rural farmers over those of urban workers, reneging on his socialist promises, and exposing himself to elections. He succeeded by clothing neoliberal policies in socialist language and symbolism, shifting the blame for national underdevelopment away from tribalism and neocolonialism and towards a ‘corrupt old guard’, employing democratic procedures for populist ends, and camouflaging authoritarian measures by the corporatist co-optation of critics. It was this skillful authoritarianism which provided the political basis for structural adjustment, which suggests the possibility that it was the shift away from authoritarianism to democracy which caused the problems.
Hutchful persuasively explains the tension between economic liberalisation and political democratisation. He shows that calls for democracy originated not with the regime but with the various groups in civil society opposed to, and being hurt by, the process of economic restructuring. Rawlings reluctantly democratised ‘from above’ in order to pre-empt his opponents, but he never hid his opposition to pluralist democracy which he recognised as implying a shift of power away from the non-political technocrats most committed to economic liberalism, and towards the political brokers who could mobilise electoral support. Economic liberalisation was thus incompatible with democratisation, which empowered forces both within the regime and beyond who sought to slow down the restructuring process. As the tension between economic liberalisation and political democratisation became more intense the politics of patronage and the economics of corruption revived.

None of the three generalisations on globalisation, indicated at the start of this essay, stand up to scrutiny in the case of Ghana. Political collapse was turned into political stability not by the changing forces of globalisation but rather by the change of political leadership, from the crude and corrupt authoritarianism of Nkrumah, Acheampong and others, to the skillful and manipulative authoritarianism of Rawlings. The various reforms associated with economic liberalisation did indeed fail to alleviate poverty, and did generate short-term growth based primarily on increased aid flows but failed to generate anything which could be denoted as ‘development.’ And rather than the economic liberalisation policies of the regime generating reforms in the direction of political democratisation it was opposition to economic liberalisation which prompted democratisation, and then helped to undermine economic liberalisation. It is interesting to note the way in which the three books end. Hutchful sees the handover of power from Rawlings to Kufour as the handing over of a ‘poisoned chalice’ (p. 248). The Aryeetey book ends with a ‘justifiable doubt’ and reprovingly notes that ‘good governance, a strong state and the process of debating and implementing broadly accepted policies need more attention’ (p. 363). Akyampong on the other hand, reports that the Anlo Ewe ‘look forward to a renaissance of their economy and society’ (p. 214).

Department of Politics and International Studies
Murdoch University
Murdoch, WA
Central Africa’s Predatory Elites

David Gordon


Some places are cursed by wealth. Central Africa promised great riches to nineteenth century European conquistadors. After deciding on their spheres of influence and interest they set up borders to their self-proclaimed realms; uniting hundreds of previously diverse and distinct polities and peoples, and ruled them with a unique mixture of force and paternalism. Unlike British and French-ruled Africa these colonies had the misfortune of rule by those who preferred to rely on direct violence, or at least the threat of it, rather than more subtle forms of domination. When independence arrived, the colonists showed little stomach for being ruled as they had ruled – they abandoned their colonies with the same haste that they had colonised them and instead attempted to work from afar with new African collaborators. While the rhetoric of African nationalism was fierce, united nationalist movements failed to coalesce and the region was convulsed by civil wars almost resulting in a number of secessions. States decayed, politicians prospered, and only the mines and the security apparatus that guarded them continued to function. The majority of people hardly noticed the extraction of the subterranean riches; indeed, they were fortunate if even employed in the process. For many, convoys of Mercedes Benzes driven over the potholed streets were the only signs of the revenues accrued in foreign bank accounts.

With a few adjustments of dates and personalities this bleak description can be made to fit the history of both Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; the former Zaire). There were differences of course. The Portuguese had a presence in Angola long before the Belgians had one in the Congo, although Angola’s eastern boundaries would only be defined after King Leopold II had delineated the boundaries of his realm and ‘pacified’ the people – by and large achieved by 1900. After the revelations of cruel abuses and mismanagement that led to the transfer of the Congo Free State to the Belgian parliament in 1908 a
more enlightened colonialism was supposed to have begun; in fact little changed. The Portuguese outlined a new, reformed colonial policy in 1926 but again the inertia of existing practices undermined attempted reform from above. During the era of decolonisation, the Belgians had little will to stand up to the winds of change and quickly abandoned the Congo in 1960, seeking the USA as an ally to secure their mining interests. Portugal, under the intractable will of the Salazar dictatorship, remained a little longer, and only abandoned Angola in 1975. During the transition to independence, both Angola and DRC became the site of Cold War intrigues, yet they found different allies. The Movimento Popular de Libertaçăo (MPLA) managed to hold the capital Luanda with Cuban and Soviet military aid, declared a ‘people’s republic’, and ruled according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine; their main opposition was the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) supported by the USA and South Africa. In the DRC, with US military aid, Joseph Desiré Mobutu rid himself of Patrice Lumumba’s leftist government, negotiated an end to the secession of the southern province of Katanga, and embarked on a curious mixture of African nationalism and state capitalism. In both cases, a cynical and nepotistic kleptocracy abused state office to gain exclusive rights over mineral and petroleum wealth.

For most casual observers of African politics this description holds little surprise with regard to Mobutu’s Congo. But wasn’t Angola’s MPLA fighting a war against rebels sponsored by a racist regime to the south and the neocolonial hegemon, the USA, to the north? Tony Hodges has little time for political ideology; in fact he claims it has become rather irrelevant in Angola, where the struggle is really about different elite factions attempting to capture state offices that allow access to oil and mineral revenues. While Hodges concedes that ideological differences, ethnic factions, and Cold War conflicts were all an aspect of the war, the fundamental driving force has been ‘personal ambition, mutual suspicion and the prize of winning the state and the resources to which it gives access’ (p. 18) – in other words, a war stripped of all justifications, fought for prebendal privileges.

In Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism Hodges explores the rise of what he refers to as the ‘oil nomenklatura’; the ‘nexus of elite families inter-related through marriage and political allegiances who have benefited from this “manna”’ (p. 139).41 The postcolonial elite, mostly composed of coastal Creoles and represented by the MPLA movement, exploited the residual administrative structures of Portuguese colonialism to enrich themselves through

---

41 The phrase seems to have first been coined in M.E. Ferreira, ‘La reconversion économique de la nomenclature pétrolière’, *Politique Africaine*, (57), 1995.
privileged access to foreign exchange, credit, import licenses and state assets. The most significant source of revenue has been through the state oil company, the Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis (SONANGOL), which has allocated concessions to foreign companies for the exploitation of Angola’s off-shore oil reserves. While the allocation of these contracts provided opportunity for corruption, the oil revenues themselves have also largely disappeared in the ‘black hole’ that exists somewhere between SONANGOL, the treasury and central bank. As if this is not enough, the revenues that do actually make their way to the state budget are allocated disproportionately in favor of this elite; for example, in a country where only about fifty percent of all children received the first six classes of basic education, thirty-six percent of the 1995 education budget was allocated to overseas scholarships.\(^42\)

The evidence for this study, a typically journalistic mixture of rumor and statistics (often culled from World Bank and IMF reports), points to the massive frauds committed by Angola’s MPLA ruling elite: The statistics point to glaring gaps in the national budget; the rumors suggest how they came about. It is a pity that Hodges cannot be more specific about the charges that he levels; however, given that the elite is rarely called to account for their excesses, this would be difficult. While most of the book is dedicated to the abuses of the MPLA government there is a chapter on UNITA and diamonds which balances his account and also points to the difficulty of enforcing financial and other sanctions against a rebel group with access to such a high quality, fungible, easily moved resources.

For Hodges, the ‘predatory characteristics’ of this state elite are part of a distorted form of capitalism that resulted from the encounter of Soviet socialism with dependence on a lucrative export commodity. Not only did ‘Dutch disease‘\(^43\) lead to economic reliance on a single export at the expense of other sectors of the economy, but it also allowed for political distortions that favored a small elite. Since the system favors this small elite, attempts at reform are continually sabotaged by the inertia of vested interests. One complaint that can be made of Hodge’s view of ‘normal’ capitalism is that it seems a little benign; indeed much of the world at some point in history has dealt with the impacts that a prosperous export has on an otherwise weak economy. But what does seem distinctive in the Angolan case, although quite common to other parts of Africa, is the lack of accountability that the state has towards other classes; it has become the

\(^{42}\) In 1996, the amount allocated to foreign scholarships dropped to 18%. Hodges, 33, 41.

\(^{43}\) Dutch disease’ refers to the reliance on a single natural resource, which leads to neglect of other economic sectors. The term originates from the effects of north seas gas exploitation on the Dutch economy.
predatory instrument of this small bourgeoisie, without the ‘relative autonomy’ that characterizes other capitalist states.

One reason for this peculiar state formation must be the colonial legacy. Whether in the form of the revenue-maximizing *Bula Matari* described by Crawford Young or the system of ‘decentralised despotism’ of Mahmood Mamdani, the colonial state was always characterised by stronger links to an international capitalist civil society than to local African societies; it was an instrument of dependency *par excellence*, and continued to be so in the post-colonial period.44 Yet why was the post-colonial nationalist movement, which was so committed to overthrowing the vestiges of colonialism, unable to transform the structures of the colonial state? Hodges does not attempt to address this question directly – one shortcoming of the book is that it fails to locate Angola within an African or international literature and is hardly adventurous in terms of comparative or theoretical insights – but he does suggest an answer. According to Hodges, the Angolan nationalist movement was never very strong. The three rebel movements that fought the Portuguese failed to organize a united front and proved no more than a ‘minor irritant to the Portuguese’ compared to the far more successful liberation movements in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. When the Portuguese left Angola, for reasons that had little to do with the Angolan resistance, the new rulers simply adopted and adapted the style and structure of colonial rule to the post-colonial context.

A similar story can be told about the history of the Belgian withdrawal and African elite take-over of the Congo. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, who is a long-time activist in the Congolese democracy movement, would probably agree that Congolese nationalism failed to revolutionise the structures of the colonial state. His book is a study of the democracy movement in the Congo which for Nzongola-Ntalaja is inextricably linked to the struggle for national liberation – as such it is a study of a failure, for democracy and national liberation seem as or even more unattainable now than they were during that fragile window of hope and opportunity in 1960 shattered by the ‘Congo Crisis’ and the brutal murder of Patrice Lumumba, the hero of Congolese independence. Nzongola-Ntalaja’s angry book is haunted by this failure. Following a theoretical model outlined by Cabral and Fanon he blames the petty bourgeoisie which allied with the workers, peasants and the lumpenproletariat in an anti-colonial struggle, only to abandon them and take up the positions of their former rulers in the colonial state. The ‘intellectual bankruptcy’, ‘political opportunism’ and ‘immaturity’ of this weak,
dependent petty bourgeoisie culminated in Mobutu’s kleptocracy, by 1992 no more than ‘a band of bloodthirsty thieves who survived by looting and thuggery…’ (p. 142).

The book takes us through Leopold’s Congo, Belgian colonialism and decolonisation with few surprises. The section on the crisis following Congolese independence draws on some personal research and agrees with Ludo de Witte’s recent and controversial claims of high level Belgian and even UN complicity in Lumumba’s assassination.45 The account of Mobutu’s rule relies on the work of Crawford Young and others; although we do learn more about the emergence of the opposition movement, both inside the Congo and in exile. As we approach the present, Nzongolo-Ntalaja begins to offer an insider’s view of the fast changing Congolese political landscape since the sovereign national conference of 1992 (the Conférence nationale souveraine), which he attended as one of seven internally renowned Congolese scholars. Despite its shortcomings, Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that the conference launched the Congo towards a democratic future, only to be hijacked by Laurent Kabila and the successive waves of Rwandan and Ugandan invasions. The section on the second Ugandan-Rwandan invasion of 1998 is enriched by Nzongola-Ntalaja’s frank discussion of his consideration and refusal to join his former colleague and friend, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, in a foreign-backed rebellion against Kabila’s regime.

The author combines the class analysis of a Marxist with the loyalty of a nationalist, always concerned to locate the strengths and weaknesses of a particular movement according to the socio-economic position of its leaders and their class affiliations; he argues that ultimate hope for a successful mass movement that can translate into a democratic regime lies with the mobilisation of the dislocated peasantry, gathered in their thousands as an urban or semi-urban ‘lumpenproletariat’. This approach may provide a call to action; it may be appreciated as an expression of anguish and frustration; it is unfortunately rather unsatisfying for historians of Congolese nationalism. Social formations are subordinated to Marxist categories; there are few voices in this history because the discourse of political struggle articulated by the Congolese rarely conforms to the argot of Marxist academics. The discursive constructs of Congolese nationalism are only alluded to in a few dispersed sentences, and the reader searches for more. For example, the proximity of religious and political struggle indicated by the biblical metaphors that describe Congolese political

personalities: Patrice Lumumba is the Christ-like figure betrayed by his Judas, Mobutu, to powers of Rome; Pierre Mulele, the assassinated rebel leader, is the saint martyred in his struggle for justice; the democratic movement’s leader Etienne Tshisekedi is described as Moses occasionally led astray in his attempts to lead his people to the Promised Land. Such descriptions suggest some unifying ideas of Congolese nationalism – they, rather than statements of class solidarity, are the ideological cement of this imagined community.

These two very different books are about remarkably similar historical trajectories. They suggest that a peculiarly African ‘predatory state’ has arisen in response to the unique encounter between the African elite, the global demand for certain resources, and the legacy of extractive colonial states. Scholars now need to move beyond an analysis of this state formation to look at the social and cultural movements that have emerged in the wake of this predation; to describe the idioms and ideologies that Africans have used to discuss, critique and engage with these polities. It seems that only then will answers about the paths of democratisation, the futures of states, and the reconfigurations of civil society begin to emerge.

Hodges published his account before the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s rebel leader, and Nzongola-Ntalaja takes us up to the assassination of Laurent Kabila and his son Joseph Kabila’s accession to power. Recently, in both Angola and DRC, peace deals have been signed and troops are being demobilised. Is this the end of an era? Are the predatory states about to give way to something new? The distinguished scholar of Africa, Ali A. Mazrui has asked whether ‘real decolonization is not the winning of formal independence, not the changing of guard on independence day, the raising of new flags, or the singing of new national anthems, but the collapse of the colonial state itself, the cruel and bloody disintegration of colonial structures.’46 This is perhaps the most sanguine historical understanding of Central Africa’s last thirty years.

---

Modelling the African Past


Most of us who attempt to write about the past accept that we are engaged in an act of creation, rather than in the revelation of hidden truth that constitutes the popular idea of our efforts. We are like sculptors creating images from clay; the outcome is determined by our ideas, perceptions and skills as well as by the materials and tools with which we have to work. In more than one sense of the word, we model the past. In the case of the African past this is a particularly difficult task. With a documentary record that is patchy through space and time and mainly illuminates more recent periods, rich oral traditions of uncertain dependability beyond a few centuries, and archaeological evidence that has been inadequately studied, writing the story of Africa is beset with problems. In recent times there have been some notable attempts by historians to cope with these, such as Roland Oliver’s *The African Experience* of 1991 and John Iliffe’s *Africans: The History of a Continent* of 1995. From a different standpoint archaeologists have also grappled with the task; for instance David Phillipson’s *African Archaeology*, with editions in 1985 and 1993, and my own *African Civilizations*, with editions in 1987 and 2001 (but limited to social complexity in tropical Africa). Now we have a linguist’s contribution from Christopher Ehret, a well-respected researcher into the history of African languages. This comes only four years after the same author gave us a substantial regional study of a large slice of the continent in *An African Classical Age: Eastern and Southern Africa in World History, 1000 BC to 400 AD*. In contrast, the new book is a synthesis of the whole of African history, that has clearly involved a mind-numbing amount of work, and not only presents a mass of well organised detail but is also successful in identifying significant trends both in Africa’s own past and in its relationship with the rest of the world. The question is: how well has he modelled Africa’s past?

Among the prevailing problems for both historians and archaeologists when they attempt broad syntheses of the African past are the selection of a conceptual framework and the choice of entities from which to construct the story. Too many archaeologists, for example, have continued to perceive the
African past in terms of nineteenth-century European epochalism, and still employ an artificial framework made up of phases of the ‘Stone Age’ and ‘Iron Age’, which they people with inventions such as the ‘Sangoan’ or the ‘Kisalian’. Christopher Ehret, in contrast, uses the kaleidoscopic patterns of languages and their changes through time as his framework, and peoples his story with groups who spoke those different languages. The result is a far more coherent account of human behaviour that actually appears to be about real people. The problem is that the reader is left wondering about the reliability of the relevant patterns and changes and their dates; just how can the author be so sure even though he does repeatedly point out areas of uncertainty or lack of information? This concern about evidential basis is sharpened by the complete lack in such a scholarly work both of in-text referencing and of a bibliography. The intention was, it seems, to produce a textbook that could be used in American undergraduate courses and so instead of proper references the reader is provided at the end of each chapter with only minimal suggestions for further reading, together with rather aggravating ‘Notes for readers and teachers’ that seem to indicate that neither are expected to think for themselves. Indeed, the textbook objective has also weakened the book in other ways, resulting for instance in a somewhat unsophisticated opening chapter in which amongst other things we are told that ‘all societies throughout humanity’s history have been civilized’ (p. 5), thus presumably justifying the use of the word ‘civilizations’ in the book’s title. Certainly that word has often been narrowly Eurocentric in its usage but the solution for most of us working on the African past has been either to use it for all instances of social complexity or not to use it at all.

Ehret’s book is presented as a history of Africa but it is really a linguistic history of Africa, much of which is taken up with a bewildering array of people and languages, making its reading rather heavy-going in places. The writing of Africa’s history requires the bringing together of information from a variety of sources, including documentation, oral traditions, archaeology, linguistics, genetic data, social and cultural anthropology, ethnography, zoology, botany, and so on. Although Ehret has cast his net widely amongst such evidence, the major emphasis of his book remains linguistic. In particular, archaeological evidence gets little attention and when it is used is treated in a cavalier fashion. For example, a date for the earliest copper smelting in the southern Sahara in the third millennium BC (p. 136) is questionable, the statement that cattle were domesticated in Africa ‘first in all the world’ (p. 90) is even more questionable, and there is no archaeological evidence that Igbo-Ukwu, in eastern Nigeria, was ‘the capital of the Nri state’ (p. 315), a claim that is particularly difficult to understand given the stateless character of past Igbo society. Furthermore,
although the book has numerous archaeological and ethnographic artefacts in its illustrations, they are not adequately integrated with the text but seem to have been provided more for decorative purposes than to inform the reader.

In general the book is well printed and produced and is reasonably priced. Its illustrations are interesting and its numerous maps useful. It also has a detailed index. There are signs, however, that either copy-editing or proof-reading needed more care. Thus ‘Ibrim’ (Qasr Ibrim) is on the wrong side of the Nile on Map 16 (p. 204), in the caption for Map 12 (p. 150) ‘First Intermediate Period’ should surely be ‘Second Intermediate Period’, the Hausa city-states were to the west of Lake Chad not the east (p. 389), east and west are also mixed up on pp. 316, 333, and 334, and the in-text references to Maps 20 and 21 are incorrect in a number of cases. However, the book has very few typographic errors of the more usual sort.

There is, however, one aspect of this book that African and other non-American readers might find annoying. It has clearly been written with American undergraduate students in mind, giving it a rather naive parochialism that is inappropriate for a world readership. Thus the American word ‘bayou’ is repeatedly used in connection with the floodplains of African rivers, a usage that lacks precedent in writings about Africa. More remarkable still, the reader is told (p. 459) that: ‘An American retaliatory raid against the “Barbary pirates” of Tripoli, undertaken in 1803 by a force of marines, accounts for the phrase, “to the shores of Tripoli,” which appears in the U.S. Marine anthem.’ It is surely reasonable to ask whether we really needed to know that!

Nevertheless, in spite of its shortcomings, this book successfully identifies the major themes in Africa’s history, giving particular attention, for instance, to social and political changes through time. It also contributes significantly to the ongoing efforts to set Africa into the context of world history, where it has so often been ignored until recently. Overall, Christopher Ehret is to be congratulated for this new contribution to the task of modelling the African past.

Graham Connah
Archaeology and Anthropology
Australian National University
Canberra
Revisiting the ‘Traditional’ History of the Kabakas of Buganda


The publication in paperback of Christopher Wrigley's arresting study of the ‘traditional’ history of the Kabakas of Buganda makes it possible for a rather wider readership to probe into the model it provides for the analyses of such heritages elsewhere; and to assemble the clues it offers for a greater understanding of important aspects of the eras which it covers. A century ago Buganda’s then Katikkiro (Chief Minister), the later Sir Apolo Kagwa, produced the first edition of his ‘Basekabaka b’e Bugand’ (The Kings of Buganda). This soon came to be established both within Buganda itself and elsewhere as the authoritative history of the kingdom stretching back six centuries and more. Kagwa supplemented this with three other studies. There was then a small selection of further contributions by Baganda authors, together with a handful of comparable if lesser accounts from neighbouring kingdoms, particularly Bunyoro. Along with a wide trawl of the secondary literature this wonderful clutch of indigenous histories has been the principal material upon which over a period of some forty years Wrigley has set his mind to mull.

Focusing on a succession of twenty-one Kabakas who are named for the long pre-colonial period Wrigley’s commentary falls into four parts. For commentary it all is. Since while remaining meticulously faithful to the accounts in front of him, Wrigley’s principal purpose has been to explicate the inwardness of the stories which they tell. Thus in a bold start he dismisses the historicity of the first dozen or so reigns, and reads the accounts he has about them as portraying rather a great complex of myths about kingship which was generated not only over a long period of time but over vast areas of Africa and Europe and Asia as well. In contrast he judges the recorded accounts that follow for the ten generations back from the late 19th century as much more plausible as they stand; for they persuasively describe how the initially very small kingdom of Buganda was both originally constructed and then before long enlarged. Here he attaches particular importance to Buganda’s clans which in due course came to be dispersed but often began as the embodiment of the inhabitants of a newly aggregated area. For the subsequent accounts dating back to the early 17th century and through to the late 18th century he has
once more a wary eye. For these obfuscate, so he argues, the principal eventuality of these years - the protracted subordination of Buganda to its then much more powerful neighbour, Bunyoro-Kitara. As he comes to the fourth stage in his exposition we move into the much more familiar era of Buganda’s history from the late 18th century onwards which saw both the considerable reorganisation and growth of the Buganda polity and its encounter first with Arabs and Swahilis from the East African coast, and then the more portentous travellers, missionaries and empire-builders from Europe, on all of which he has illuminating things to say. Dressed in his engaging prose this is a masterly study which makes all in all for a formidable contribution to African historiography.

Anthony Low
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University
Canberra

A Wolof-centred View of the Founding of Colonial Rule in Senegal


James Searing is an American scholar who wrote a thesis almost two decades ago on Wolof elites in early colonial Senegal. Then, instead of rushing into print, he returned to Senegal for two years as a Fulbright professor, learned Wolof and immersed himself in Wolof culture. His first book was a fine study of slavery and the slave trade in Senegal. It profited very much, as this book does, from his knowledge of Wolof and his ability to use Wolof epics and proverbs. Now, he returns to his original area of interest, but with a book more narrowly defined than the thesis. This book focuses on the rise of the Murid religious fraternity with the decline of slavery and the growth of peasant agriculture as a sub-text. It is an effort to provide a Wolof-centered view of the founding of colonial rule. It is, in fact, heavily based on the traditions of one branch of the family of Amadu Bamba, the founder of the Murids. Searing’s major argument is that the Murids, like the French conquest, emerge from a Wolof Civil War, which went from 1859 to 1886. His greatest strength is in dealing with the conflicts within Wolof society.
Much as I have liked Searing’s previous work and have profited from our occasional disagreements, I am disappointed with this one. He seems overly determined to position himself in opposition to other scholars who have worked on Senegal: James Webb, David Robinson, Donal Cruise O’Brien and myself. The problem is that he has often not read these writers carefully. He starts out criticizing James Webb’s notion that the export of slaves into the Sahara, where they were exchanged for horses, was probably as great as the export across the Atlantic. Though Webb documents his case carefully, I think Searing is probably right on this one. During the late 19th century, Senegalese armies were at most one-third cavalry. Horses were always in short supply because of their high death rate. Searing’s criticism of Robinson is curious because he criticizes Robinson’s work as ‘archive-driven history’ and then does not mention that work or use it very well. Robinson’s articles on the Murids were based on archives, on published accounts and on the work of one of his graduate students, Cheikh Babou, who has recently produced an outstanding thesis on the Murids. In general, Robinson uses oral sources as critically as anyone working on Senegambia. Searing also criticizes Donal Cruise O’Brien for supposedly accepting Paul Marty’s argument that the Murid reorganization of rural life was simply a new form of exploitation that took advantage of the gullibility of ignorant disciples. In fact, Cruise O’Brien, who did extensive field work among the Murids, argued just the opposite. He was convinced that the Murids gave real benefits to their peasant disciples and that joining the order was economically rational.

Searing deals with my work politely – he thanks me and credits me with some key ideas – but because I worked on slavery, my ideas are a major target. In many cases, there is little difference between us. Thus, he suggests in the introduction that his explanation of slave emancipation differs from mine in its stress on religion, cash crops and migration. In fact, I discussed all three and attributed a major role to the Murids in providing land and freedom for former slaves. I was hoping that he would either expand on or refine my argument, but he did not do so. He takes issue with my argument that peanut cultivation in the

48 Apparently his manuscript was finished before the appearance of David Robinson’s Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920, Athens, Ohio, 2001.
third quarter of the 19th century made possible the purchase of guns by ordinary peasants, and thus under-wrote the Wolof civil wars he speaks about. Though he does point out that some aristocrats made the transition to cash-crop production, I think that my argument is well-documented and still holds up well.

Documentation is harder to find for slave emancipation in the 1880s and 1890s. The problem is that pressure from France forced the colonial government in Senegal to take action against slavery during the early 1880s at a time when slave labour was important to the expansion of peanut cultivation. The colonial state developed loop-holes that made it possible for rural entrepreneurs to import slaves and then colonial administrators carefully looked the other way for twenty years. There is evidence on what happened, but the tracks are often faint. The issue is posed by a questionnaire on slavery administrators across French West Africa were asked to fill out in 1904. Administrators were among other things asked to give figures on the number of slaves. Both Searing and I were struck by differences between reports from similar cercles and the fact that, overall, the numbers reported were much lower than other data would suggest. Searing refers to the statistical data as a census. I think that most of the data were estimates based on information given by chiefs who wanted to keep the figures down. Searing thinks that the reported numbers were low because slavery had so declined that it was essentially finished. I would accept that there was a significant leakage from slave holdings, but slaves were being sold in Senegal as late as 1903. That means that people thought they would be able to keep control of slaves. I cannot imagine a massive departure of slaves without significant evidence. Of those who left, Searing and I are both convinced that a significant number joined the Murids.

There are also places where he is sloppy. He suggests that most writers see labour migration beginning in the immediate pre-World War I period. In fact, many writers trace it back to the 1840s. He also mis-interprets some of my data on 1889 slave imports into Senegal from Mali. I was not relying on the opinions of French administrators, but on a series of monthly customs reports, which enumerated slave move movements. I could continue. This book will be suggestive to other scholars. Its Wolof-centered view is valuable, but there is too much of what Searing does that is not carefully researched or persuasively argued.

Martin A. Klein
University of Toronto
Toronto, Canada
Yoruba Women Adire Dyers


The study opens with an analysis of nineteenth century Yoruba society and the social and cultural aspects of indigo dying, the impact of ‘legitimate’ trade and the Yoruba civil wars. While the general impact of European trade and colonialism was one of de-industrialisation, there were always exceptions and the *adire* cloth indigo-dying industry of southeastern Nigeria was one of them. Moreover it was an industry based on innovation and the European textile trade, yet controlled by women. The colonial ‘opening up’ of Egbaland, particularly the arrival of the railway, increasing prosperity based on cocoa cultivation and availability of credit from competing trading firms, greatly facilitated the growth of the *adire*, virtually a new industry. As Abeokuta became increasingly incorporated into the global economy, access to imported cloth and credit led to the dying of European trade cottons with indigenous motifs, in turn, leading to a flourishing indigenous market which extended well beyond Egbaland and even Nigeria. At its height a quarter of Abeokuta’s
population were directly or indirectly involved in *adire* production. Byfield skilfully uses the history of Abeokuta adire as a vehicle to tease out the complexities of Egba socio-economy, the links between town and countryside and gender relations. Her critique of the gendered nature of the colonial state, the relationships of ruler and ruled, as well as women’s assertions of their economic and political interests, is a gem. Her unpacking of the gendered response of the British colonial administration to the impact of the depression, provided price supports for male-dominated Yoruba cocoa production while ignoring the plight of the female-controlled *adire* industry, is a case in point. The women responded to tightening credit and shrinking markets during the depression with innovation - the use of caustic soda and synthetic dyestuffs - in turn opening the craft to greater participation, a decline in quality and tensions within the industry. The decision of the *Alake*, the British colonial ‘Native Authority’, to ban caustic soda and synthetic dyes, in 1929 and 1933, respectively, helped politicise the situation. The *Alake* and the British Resident saw themselves as the defenders of Egba ‘tradition’ against disobedient and acquisitive women. The 1936 Commission of Enquiry resulting from the *adire*-dyers steadfast opposition in many ways marked their apogee. My only regret is that she ended her study with 1940, for decline did not mean death, as the author acknowledges, and the *adire* industry flourished again in the 1960s and remains to this day.

Turning to methodology, readers will find Byfield’s interplay between the colonial records and women’s oral testimony, both fraught with omissions and biases, an insightful case study, with resonances beyond African studies.

This is a worthy addition to the exciting new ‘Social History of Africa’ series edited by Allen Isaacman and Jean Allman. I strongly recommend it to those with interests in African material culture, socio-economic history, colonialism and gender studies, or just those who like reading history well told.

*David Dorward*

*African Research Institute*

*La Trobe University*

*Bundoora, Victoria*
Taking Agrarian Development Seriously


Every so often a book appears which makes the regular reviewer’s task even more enjoyable and rewarding. *Negotiating Development* is such a work. Anyone disillusioned with many current academic preoccupations, including those that endlessly focus attention upon the froth and bubble of kulcha and the politics of identity, should be cheered when important matters are taken seriously. By sticking to tried and true methods of historical scholarship, van Beusekom has delivered a promising study that joins the concerns of development administration with agrarian political sociology, tropical agronomy with international agricultural markets, imperial and local political economy with small farmer behaviour.

Beginning after World War I, van Beusekom details the coupling of a ‘development ideology’ with the French colonial attempt to increase agricultural production. The coupling was underpinned by a rapid acceleration in the provision of state funds for development, with four and half times the amount provided in guaranteed loans between the wars as before 1914. While at first sight, much of the funding was infrastructural investment, especially for transportation of export crops, much greater attention was also paid to how to expand production by African small farmers. As van Beusekom explains, ‘The research and small-scale interventions in agriculture common in this period were all less costly than building railroads and harbors but they had a substantive impact on the way in which colonial officials conceptualized rural livelihoods and attempted to change them’ (p. xxv).

The Office du Niger ‘was the most controversial and costly of these interwar efforts and thus to some degree exceptional, (but) it also demonstrates the complicated path that any development scheme had to negotiate’ (p. xxv). For all these reasons, the history of the Office which sought to expand cotton and cereal production on over half a million hectares of irrigated land is worth examining. The study traces this history through six chapters, which link the outlines of French colonial policy with the inter-war operations of the Office du Niger, the recruitment of farmer settlers for the occupation of irrigated smallholdings in the inland delta of the Niger River and to its north in Soudan,
and the struggles of the farmers against weather, soil and administrative directions. The final stage of the account deals with the increasing political consciousness and organised resistance of the farmers after World War II, and how this led to further changes in ‘Ideas about Development’ at the Office du Niger.

Van Beusekom’s main argument is that development ideology, at least of the twentieth century, should be given its origins in the inter-war years rather than, as is so often done, after World War II. Further, that the ‘practical development experience’ of these years not only affected the immediate application of ‘ideology’ transported from Europe, but also ‘significantly influenced the agricultural policies and the development ideology of the postwar era’ (p. xxi).

In the case of the Office du Niger project, the most immediate effect of this interaction was the early shift away from cotton production, originally favoured by French officials in order to secure a supply of the material for the domestic textile industry. If mutual development, for France and to improve the livelihoods of colonial populations, meant expanded agricultural commodity production there could be no certainty about the forms this would take. Within five years of the conception of the project, with cotton as its main crop, French West African officials concerned with raising living standards of an increased local population began to push for the centrality of grain, especially rice, production. Ending famine in French West Africa, which would also make possible increases in production and export of peanuts from Senegal for France’s oil-seed industry, forced a change. Irrigated grain production would also deal with the fear that conditions of life in the Sahel were worsening due to dessication, particularly through an expanding Sahara desert.

But if the principal crop changed, the preferred labour form of colonial officials did not. Production increases were to occur through smallholder agriculture, with coercion as much as material inducement used to bring households to the land. One consequence of this labour form, particularly during the 1930s and into the 1940s, was extended periods of ‘more equality more poverty’ for the smallholders who were barred from activities which would have extended differentiation, and the increased employment of wage labour by the most successful farmers. After World War II, and into the 1950s, forms of straddling, joining farming, trading and the occupation of higher wage and salaried positions occurred to a greater extent. This extended production outside designated areas and into crops, including millet, for which local terms of trade were more favourable, particularly for the most successful farmers. Van Beusekom neatly shows how continued funding for the Office du Niger
was predicated upon more successful integration of French imperial aims, the sympathies of local administrators and the more effective political organisations led by these farmers.

If the study has a major weakness, it lies in the absence of any comparative material. While focusing upon what is perceived as French development policy, van Beusekom does not consider to what extent this policy was/is accurately described as ‘French’. There are striking parallels with British and even Australian colonial policy of the same period, comparison with which could only enrich an already stimulating account.

Scott MacWilliam  
Development Administration Program  
National Centre for Development Studies  
Australian National University  
Canberra

The Politics of Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe


In *Killing for Conservation* Duffy sets out to demonstrate that international conservation policy, despite being couched in the depoliticising rhetoric of neutral science, is highly contested and inherently political. Although this claim already has considerable purchase within both academic or conservation circles, the author does not seriously engage in advancing its theoretical underpinnings. Rather, the value of her work lies in the insight it offers into the praxis of global environmental politics within a particular national framework.

As Duffy correctly observes, debate surrounding Zimbabwe’s current sustainable wildlife utilisation policy reflects ideological and political struggles in wider regional and global arenas. Yet norms negotiated within such arenas do not necessarily achieve universal salience and impact. Global environmental politics is enacted at the national level within particularistic sets of internal social relations, power structures and environmental conditions (see Warren
and Hirsch 2000). Duffy most clearly illustrates this point in her account (chapter seven) of Zimbabwe’s attempts to achieve international legitimacy for its domestic wildlife utilisation policy through political manoeuvring within the regulatory framework of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES).

The contentious policy, Duffy argues, has been negotiated by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM), the agency responsible for wildlife conservation and the management of Zimbabwe’s Parks and Wildlife Estate, to ameliorate a number of internal tensions born out of complex historical, political and environmental conditions. These include the local abundance of large ‘flagship’ wildlife species with high international aesthetic and economic values, a colonial legacy of racially divisive land distribution patterns (currently bearing such bitter fruit), and ongoing regional geo-political instability.

The DNPWLM is itself a site of contestation. Chapter two examines the policy implications of internal factionalism linked to broader post-colonial struggles to carve out new relationships of patronage and control of valuable natural resources. While the retention of the department by the independent state has contributed to local perceptions of conservation as a white domain, existing personnel have characterised efforts to indigenise the agency as a power grab to be resisted on the grounds of professional competency. Budgetary constraints linked to World Bank induced economic structural adjustment and conditions imposed by external conservation donors have further eroded the capability and status of the agency.

Chapters three to seven examine the processes through which competing local, national and international interest groups ‘mobilize and promote various legitimizing conservation ideologies’ in their struggles to influence and benefit from state wildlife policy. As well as the contestation surrounding CITES, we learn much about the dynamics of commercial and subsistence wildlife poaching within and across Zimbabwean borders, the privatisation of wildlife through the creation of nature conservancies under a DNPWLM regulatory framework, and the subsequent development of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)) aimed at redressing the inequities of privatisation by allowing indigenous populations greater access to wildlife resources.

Ultimately though, Duffy does not totally succeed in drawing these strands into a seamless argument that makes plain why what she has to tell us matters. In
part this is due to awkward construction and a text that lacks sufficient directional cues and linking statements. In chapter three in particular, Duffy’s insightful analysis of poaching as an element of regional geo-politics would be better placed before the section on coercive state anti-poaching strategies that precedes it. Elsewhere, the distinction between the representation of policy positions adopted by different interest groups, and authorial comment on those positions, is not always sufficiently sharp.

A more fundamental problem is that Duffy structures her argument around the basic premise that Zimbabwe’s policy of sustainable wildlife utilization and the preservationist persuasions of international conservationists are diametrically opposed. Certainly since the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 serious fractures occurring along a developed north/poor south divide have been apparent within international environmentalism. However by equating *international* with *developed north*, Duffy occludes the possibility of more nuanced analysis of the ideological and interest based conflicts and sympathies occurring across, as well between local, national, and international arenas and underplays several important points. I would like to have seen a more sustained critique of the motivating ideology of the DNPWLM ‘conservation faction’. To dismiss the agency’s commitment to existing protected areas as an anachronism from the colonial period inconsistent with its current utilisation policy of sustainable wildlife utilization, ignores the fact that the current policy, in common with the dominant international environmental discourse of sustainable development, is rooted in 19th century European sustainable yield resource management theory, and that protection is frequently portrayed by international conservation groups as a vital component of a broader conservation strategy, rather than an alternative.

These problems could have been overcome with tighter editing. It is a pity that they were not as the volume contains many valuable insights into the political nature of environmental disputes, and the author is to be commended for grappling with this complex issue.

* Aileen Hoath  
RUSSIC  
School of Social Science  
Curtin University  
Perth, Western Australia
Jock McCulloch’s book gives us a detailed historical study of the asbestos mining industry in South Africa. Over the past thirty years, as the case against asbestos has been played out in the courts of Australia, USA and UK, little was heard from South Africa, even though it was South Africa’s asbestos industry that produced the first evidence (in the 1930s) that exposure to asbestos causes mesothelioma. Asbestos Blues however provides us with a detailed understanding of how South Africans and others engaged in the mining and processing of asbestos were exposed to substances known to be hazardous and for how long. McCulloch looks first at the historical development of social relations of production and the gender, race and age related divisions within departments of production; second, the involvement of British capital in those processes; and third, the role of the South African state in relation to capital, miners, and occupational health and safety. The result of this thorough study is an account that enables us to comprehend something of the operation of international mining capital and of an important aspect of British imperialism directed to the exploitation South African mineral resources.

This is a text that is readily understood. McCulloch neither speaks down to those unfamiliar with mining nor reduces the complexities of its processes, pneumoconiosis, or the development of the industry to shallow simplicities. Nor does he treat the actors in this drama with anything but a balanced, critical eye. Thus, the reader will readily appreciate the particular nature of relations between those engaged in mining and production processes in South Africa, and the ways in which these operated to expose a range of workers to asbestos. Those without a background in physiology will understand how exposure to asbestos can cause asbestosis and cancers.

The section on ‘life on the mines’ provides a powerful account of conditions in the industry and the exploitation and indifference to the needs of employees.
While these might be ‘understood’ but not excused in the context of a South African society so divided by racialist ideology, the resistance of Cape Asbestos’ London Board to even the most basic expenditure on housing and health brings no credit to international capital domiciled in London. McCulloch’s narrative does not labour the critique of such action, yet by careful attention to evidence and detail he presents an argument whose force is difficult to resist. Exposure to fibre among those milling, handling, processing or transporting asbestos was for example especially problematic on mines. McCulloch cites a succession of instances where employers failed to implement protective measures as required by regulation. In most instances some ‘reason’ could be provided – of course it was ‘reasonable’ in terms of profitable production or in terms of a racist view of the workforce. It comes as no surprise to the reader, therefore, that whereas Price and Merewether found (ca 1930) that in British factories manufacturing asbestos products it took at least eight years of ‘heavy’ exposure to produce asbestosis, in 1952 G.B. Peacock found that black workers in mills at Pietersburg were so exposed to fibres that they showed lung disease within far shorter times: in the case of one juvenile after about seven months exposure (p. 128).

That this could happen and that the nature of the problem could remain relatively invisible was largely a function of the production of ‘knowledge’ and communication, and of the role of agencies of the South African state. Medical knowledge came early: by 1930 Price and Merewether had presented formal outlines of the dangers and consequences specific to exposure to asbestos. Knowledge of mesothelioma came later and Turner and Newall records showed that among its workers in England there were several probable cases of mesothelioma between 1936 and 1963. From 1931 in Britain that knowledge underpinned legislation designed to protect workers. It was not applied to the protection of workers in the employ of British companies’ South African operations. For instance, Cape/Casap51 in London was in 1962 well aware of the conditions at Casap mines and chose to do little in respect of its workers to the extent ‘that the company’s senior personnel had a facility for self deception’ (p. 190).

The role of the state was also problematic. On the one hand the production of knowledge was, in the reported words of Chris Wagner, a pioneer of research into mesothelioma, ‘always about politics’ (p. 180). The industry fostered projects to investigate occupational health and safety, and the relationship of asbestos exposure to mesothelioma. Yet when such research established links

---

51 Cape Asbestos South Africa Pty Ltd, a fully owned subsidiary of Cape Asbestos, London.
between asbestos and ill health the conditions of those industry grants were used to prevent dissemination of the knowledge (pp. 196-197). On the other hand, McCulloch outlines the circumstances under which the asbestos mining industry avoided many of the conditions of the Mining Act in South Africa, bringing into question the role of the state agency responsible for the oversight of mines and demonstrating how actions of the state also contributed to the Prieska disaster. Until the 1950s the industry successfully argued to the Department of Mines that the Mines Act did not apply, chiefly because much mining was by tribute. In the case of monitoring and control of the industry and the environmental consequences of wider asbestos presence, McCulloch demonstrates the vast gap between state rhetoric and action; as late as 1973, the people of Danielskuil could complain about open lorries carrying asbestos through the town, yet bureaucratic ‘ping-pong’ ensured inaction for another twelve years (pp. 119-120).

While it is feasible to argue that those involved in the day-to-day working of mines may have been unaware of the causal relationship between asbestos fibres and pneumoconiosis or cancers, it is impossible to propose that those in charge of the industry could be ignorant of them. However the inaction is understandable in terms of capital’s imperative of profit and reproduction, for the grade or type of ore that can be mined or processed profitably is always a function of the relations of production and the state. We are left, then, with a ‘system of employment on the asbestos fields [that] shows the industry in the worst possible light. At the height of apartheid British companies were issuing annual dividends of twenty percent to their shareholders because South African women and children were labouring over asbestos’ (p.164). Moreover they were doing so ‘invisibly’ in the worst of the possible areas of production because the conventional account, supported by the wording of laws which companies easily circumvented claimed that women and children had gone from the industry in the period after large scale mechanisation from the 1950s. McCulloch clearly shows that this was not so and that women and children remained central to profitable production because they were the cheapest form of labour.

The full extent of disability for South Africans caused by asbestos will probably never be known. The Department of Mines resisted calls for action and it was common for companies to sack employees once they showed signs of disease. Combined with the migratory or transient nature of some labour within the South African mining industry and the marginalised status of black workers, the longer term fate of those who suffered as a consequence of their exposure will remain concealed. McCulloch’s work is an important
contribution to establishing, if not the exact extent of the disaster, at least its general and extensive proportions.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Patrick Bertola  \\
School of Social Sciences  \\
Curtin University of Technology  \\
Bentley, Western Australia}

\section*{South African Constitutionalism in the Post-Apartheid State}


This book explores the emergence of South African constitutionalism during the 1990s – a system which has granted the judiciary considerable political power. Klug is interested in explaining why South Africans adopted a system of judicial review over the country’s central and provincial legislatures such that majoritarian-democracy is effectively circumscribed, and the power of politicians is limited. Klug focuses on two themes which he argues explain this turn to constitutionalism.

First, he discusses the importance of the global context within which South Africa’s 1990s constitutional negotiations took place. It was a context in which the USA had become hegemonically dominant. Hence, by the 1990s, he argues, the ‘decolonisation moment’ was over, having been replaced by a new international order in which American political and economic visions were to be transplanted into the old Soviet Empire, Africa and Asia. For Klug, the 1990s were consequently a moment of globalised constitutionalism. South Africa’s transformation and constitution-writing process was, in part, a product of this contextual ‘moment’.

Second, Klug sketches out the process of South Africa’s 1990s negotiations. He spends some time unraveling the positions of each of the players and the way the negotiations unfolded. His core argument is that the actual process of negotiations saw each of the key players ‘discover’ constitutionalism and

\textsuperscript{52} And see the note on the book’s launch in London in May 2002, in this Review, Vol XXIV Number 1, June 2002.
embrace it as a way of achieving their political goals. To reach this conclusion, Klug appears to rely rather heavily on Kadar Asmal’s interpretation of the unfolding of the negotiation process (based on interviews with Asmal). Asmal was certainly a central ANC player in the negotiation process and so his perspectives offer us valuable insights. However, unfortunately, Klug does not interview people from the non-ANC teams. His interviews are restricted to Asmal, Chaskalson, Dugard, Langa, Morrison and Sachs. This means that, while on the one hand, Klug provides the reader with insight into the subtleties of ANC-thinking, he has to rely on ANC interpretations of the National Party (NP) to explain NP behaviour. He consequently builds his elaborate interpretation of the transformation process on a somewhat limited range of perspectives. Although this does not completely invalidate Klug’s arguments, it is certainly problematic, because Klug misses some core features of the NP’s negotiating-position.

Of the four themes that dominated NP-thinking, Klug considers only two. The four themes were (i) a desire to implement Lijphartian consociational democracy (as a way to avoid majoritarian democracy); (ii) a wish to fragment power (in order to secure ‘minority spaces’); (iii) a fear of communism; and (iv) a strong belief in the rule of law. Klug considers only the first two. Klug’s failure to consider the NP’s long-standing belief in the rule of law is especially problematic for the argument he develops in this book because he thereby misses the fact that constitutionalism was precisely a core feature of the NP’s reform agenda. The NP had a long-standing tradition of recruiting its candidates from lawyers. (De Klerk was, for example, a lawyer-turned-politician). And the NP had always been obsessed with the idea of a ‘regstaat’ (a state-based-on-law) – an obsession that led the NP to even encode its racism into laws, instead of simply allowing racist practices to exist de facto rather than de jure (as happened elsewhere in the world).

Klug’s discussion of the 1990s fails to pay sufficient attention to the symbiotic-relationship that emerged between the USA’s democratisation agenda and the agenda of the NP’s reformers. Effectively, the NP had four interconnected agendas: (i) to negotiate while the ANC was believed to be weak (due to the collapse of the Soviet collapse) so as to (ii) secure a deal protecting property-rights; (iii) secure a deal creating limited state power; and (iv) to create a system that would circumscribe as much as possible the power of (ANC) politicians (elected within a majoritarian system) by imposing as many checks-and-balances on the new parliament as possible. These four agendas neatly complemented the USA’s objectives – that is, the new constitutionalism suited the NP far more than the earlier decolonisation agenda.
Further, given his obvious closeness to ANC sources, Klug surprisingly also ignores the ANC’s pragmatic approach to securing power, in terms of which gradualism was wisely adopted due to the ANC’s relatively weak position in 1990 – that is, in the short term, conceding to constitutionalism certainly circumscribed ANC power. However, it was (correctly) assumed that over time the ANC would be able to get its hands onto the levers of power right across the complex system of constitutional checks-and-balances being created.

Overall, the problem with Klug’s argument is that, because it focuses upon ‘legalisms’, it marginalises the politics of power. This is understandable given that it is a book written by a legal academic with a focus on the legal features of South Africa’s transformation. However, it demonstrates the dangers of focusing on one set of variables to the exclusion of others. The limitations of an overly ‘legalistic’ account of the transformation are also revealed in Klug’s examination of the first two major issues dealt with by the Constitutional Court, namely: the entry of black pupils into the Potgietersrus Junior School; and the conflict between the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government and the central government over the right of the central government to override provincial legislation. Ultimately, these two issues serve to highlight the two core areas of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa, namely: the clash between Afrikaner cultural autonomy and nation building; and the clash between traditional African culture and nation building/modernization. Klug’s legalistic discussion of these two issues (as interesting as they are), ultimately fails to fully analyse the ramifications of these two conflicts and the way the ANC is conceding to traditional-African demands but resisting Afrikaner demands. Focusing only on the legal issues fails to provide a full insight into what is taking place, and why.

However, despite these limitations, this is a useful book. It certainly provides an interesting way of thinking about the 1990s negotiations and the building of a new system of governance in South Africa. It should be of interest to anyone concerned with constitutionalism in general, and with the new system of South African governance in particular.

Eric Louw
School of Journalism & Communication
University of Queensland
St Lucia, Queensland
Literary and Historical Interpretation of a Changing Africa


Re-imagining Africa is one of three edited collections of papers presented at the 1999 Conference of The African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific. Broadly speaking, this particular collection proposes a stimulating array of literature and language papers relating to Africa (with an emphasis on South Africa). It also addresses the issue of literary and historical interpretation at a challenging time for the Humanities. In this context, Dan Wylie’s questions related to ‘the Ethics of Ecological Criticism’ in one of the fifteen proposed chapters go far beyond the issue of his subject matter; that is, elephant conservation in South Africa and the way the issue was framed by literary authors Dalene Matthe and Wilbur Smith in their novels. Above and beyond ecological preoccupations, Wylie’s piece brings to the fore issues that linger in the background of the whole collection: ‘What role literature played, and continues to play, in forming attitudes towards the issues of our time [and] what role literary criticism can play’? (p. 176). The articles selected by Sue Kossew and Dianne Schwerdt provide a number of challenging and well-articulated answers to these questions.

First, Peter Mwikisa revisiting Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Dianne Schwerdt’s analysis of Charlotte Jay’s Beat Not the Bones point to the versatility and malleability of literary writing, reading and interpretation that allows either the perpetuation, challenge or transgressing of past wisdom built on historical distortions. Literary criticism - and, for example, the various readings of such an influential author as Conrad - is the product of socio-cultural circumstances, they argue, and their analysis of the novel’s characters bear witness to the bias that has commended writing and reading of the ‘narrative of Empire’ throughout the 20th century.

A corollary of their argument is the need for alternatives discourses and approaches debunking dominant Western positions and self-perpetuating views. One such ‘alter/native’ (p. 48) - to use an expression coined by poet Funso Ayejina - is being offered by playwright Fémi Òsófisan whose plays are analysed in the chapter by Solá Adiyemi. But many other articles also stress the need to listen to the voices which were muted by hegemonic forces of the past.
Pippa Skotness’ exhibit of Khisan history and material culture mentioned at the beginning of Luc Renders article on Afrikaans literature, or Jenny de Reuck’s attempt to recover the war time stories of the forgotten people of South Africa - especially women - incarcerated in concentration camps during the Boer War, are but two other examples.

Language – and by association literature – ‘expresses the collective experience of a group’ says William Bostock in his piece on South Africa’s Language policy and ‘linguistic exclusion’ (p. 202) is just another facet of hegemonic power at work. Phaswane Mpe argues further in his comprehensive overview of African-language publishing and book promotion in South Africa from 1994 to the year 2000, that ‘complacency of many writers, publishers and their readers, the press and literary critics’ (p. 219), vis-à-vis literature written in African languages, has been also instrumental in bestowing a secondary status to African-language literature. Unwittingly or not, literary texts and criticism hold up a mirror to societies and individuals who try to understand themselves. It is all the more dramatic when a society or individual is ‘on trial’ as shown by Sue Kossew in her analysis of a recent novel by Nadine Gordimer dealing with post-apartheid South Africa. Painstaking attempts to ‘construct a positive moral and ethical climate’ (p. 143) in the pursuit of reconciliation is hindered by all kinds of violence as ‘moral questions of retribution and punishment affect not just the body politic but individuals therein’ (p. 134): Violence inherited from colonisation and apartheid; violence against people from all walks of life, both Black and White; violence against homosexuals who are at the centre of Paul Woods’ article on South African homosexual writing; violence that determines the life of those who stay in their country, but also that of those who have to leave and settle elsewhere: that is, those whose experiences explode in a constellation of diasporic idiosyncrasies. The latter are also evoked in this collection of papers.

*Re-imagining Africa* is possibly all the more important for people who had to leave their ancestral land and must forge new meaningful identities for themselves. Sifting through the ‘archaeological treasures’ of memory - personal and collective - becomes a powerful means to reinvent oneself and to come to grips with one’s condition. But it also ‘unleashes’, as Dan Odhiambo Ojwang shows in an astute analysis of Vassanji’s fiction, ‘the opposition between the desire for change and movement, and an impulse towards conservatism, born of the fear and insecurities [of] diasporic experiences’ (p. 58), thus ‘the extremely ambivalent position of diaspora in relation to nation, tradition, and other cognate terms’ (p. 63). The publication of poetry by Breyten Breytenbach under the pen-name ‘Jan Afrika’ is but another example
explored by Louise Viljoen who outlines its significance in the context of the author’s personal history. So too, Elias Bongmba’s analysis of intertextuality in Cheik Hamidou Kane’s famous novel *The Ambiguous Adventure*.

Literature and literary criticism have always played a major role in debunking old myths, heralding new ideas and shaping the wisdom of the day. This collection, *Re-imagining Africa*, rises to the occasion and represents a ‘must read’ for everyone interested in contemporary developments in Africa. As mentioned by the editors at the end of their introduction: ‘What is important about this collection is its up-to-the-minute engagement with African literature and literary production through the eyes of practitioners, academics and commentators working from within and outside [diverse] African perspectives. It is hoped, therefore, that it will prove to be an invaluable resource for students of African literature worldwide’ (p. 8).

Jean-Marie Volet  
*The University of Western Australia*  
*Nedlands, Western Australia*

**Rebuilding 'Home': Oromo Exiles in Australia**


This book in the author’s words ‘explores the ways in which cultural identities of the past are articulated not only within but also with the present.’ In this way the history of the Oromo in Ethiopia gradually unfolds as background to the experiences of individual Oromo people as they leave their homeland and try to make a new home for themselves in Australia. This is not a conventional narrative but rather an exploration of the ways in which personal identity is constantly reconstructed through the medium of language. There are a variety of cultural performances through which the Oromo rebuild ‘home’ in exile.

The Oromo, who make up more than half the population of Ethiopia, have been marginalised in their own country for many centuries and many have recently suffered detention and torture. By 2001 more than 1500 of those who have fled into exile were living in Melbourne. Because the author lived amongst many of these people and interacted with them on a regular basis while he was writing he sees himself as being in the position of the classic ethnographer who lives
with the community under study. He describes the difficulty of occupying this position because various Oromo people expected his active support in their factional struggles or in their expression of hostility towards other Ethiopians. Although he attempted at times to adopt a pose of neutrality, he was feted by the Oromo and drawn into their celebrations and political activities. While he devotes a chapter to outlining his complex relationship with the Oromo during his period of writing, he explicitly states his personal rejection of what he calls ‘the overheated nativism’ which underpins much Oromo nationalism, both because it is another example of orientalism and also because it is self-defeating. No resolution is possible as long as both the Amhara and the Oromo employ the language of exclusion.

After describing the marginalised cultural position of the Oromo in their homeland, the author maps their performance practices in exile as they make spaces for themselves ‘to live and voice their cultural identities’. They retell stories of the past, dwell on the fate of their relatives still in Ethiopia and mourn those who have died. They invent an Oromo nation and a place called Oromiya. These performances are accompanied by the sharing of food, the playing of music and the watching of videos which record the 1991 mass gatherings of Oromo, organized by the Oromo Liberation Front, in the months following the collapse of the Derg Regime. These videos inspire the retelling of past events when the Oromo confronted their earlier oppressors including Menelik II in 1886.

These performances are dominated by males in a society which oppresses women and Chapter eight of this book is devoted to an analysis of the ways in which women resist their marginalisation. They establish a collective sisterhood in order to exercise some control over their sexuality, their fertility and over valuable objects around the house. The inside space of the home belongs to the women who have traditionally had control over childbirth. Their performances include eating, singing, dancing and praying together. The household is an important centre for extended families to negotiate their identity and create ties of kinship, some of them fictive ties. Weddings, birthdays and christenings are occasions for the celebration of various rites which bind households together.

The Structuralist underpinning of this book is reinforced in the final paragraph which claims that ‘Oromo cultural formation in Melbourne is constituted as real through the many acts of linking, voicing and living Oromoness, in which language, through its variety of forms, enables the transformative articulation of “home” even away from home.’ This is a subtle and engaging analysis.
which will give little comfort to those who hope to see our migrant population transformed into dinkum aussies in one generation.

Penelope Hetherington
Department of History
University of Western Australia
Nedlands, Western Australia

Providing Services for African Australians in Victoria


This *Report* has its origins in the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in 1998 to commission a research project to address settlement needs and service provision for Victoria’s Sub-Saharan black African population which then numbered more than 20,000. A Steering Committee chaired by DIMA was convened, including members of the African communities, government and non-government representatives; and this in turn commissioned the Research Committee including Dr Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe, the leader of the team, and Dr Liz Dimock from the African Research Institute at La Trobe University, the two authors of this final Report. The objectives of the Research project were ‘to map, review, examine and analyse existing services to African Australians, to propose benchmarks or best practice in existing service provision and to propose models for service delivery arising from those mappings’ (p. 3). The result is a substantial document which details service provision availability, quality effectiveness and gaps within service delivery. The diagrams, graphs and statistical analysis are well documented and clear.

The authors have written objectively creating a wide-ranging study, full of information not all of which can be touched on in a short review. The Report sufficiently covers the background of Victoria’s African Australian communities; the African perception of settlement services; current service provisions; and includes a comprehensive literature review. It then examines respectively health, youth, family and community services, voluntary sector
and alternative models of service delivery. Disappointingly disability services as a separate area of Community Service do not appear to have been discussed. Mental health is considered but there does not appear to be any mention of psychiatric disability support services to those who face chronic impairment. What the Report points to - and this is its principal recommendation - is the need for an African Central Agency to act as a broker for service provision to the African community in Victoria and for an African Centre that would assume the role of a community centre. This would act as a focal point for celebrations pertinent to African communities, as a resources centre for African Australians and as a centre of education to the wider community about Africa and Africans.

The book cites Community Centres, community-based projects and the Victorian Foundation for the Survivors of Torture (VFST), as providing a range of services to the African diaspora in Victoria. Examples of such services include elderly women’s support groups, traditional art and skills development, police camps, youth support groups, through to complementary therapies and counselling for the traumatised. These serve as effective networking and community resourcing for those working and volunteering in the Human Services sector.

In the process of writing this review the writer had three conversations with colleagues and students all of which confirmed the usefulness of a work such as this. The first conversation arose when I was consulted by a Youth Worker at a youth refuge in which a number of clients were originally from the Horn of Africa. He wanted to make contact with a Horn of Africa community group. The second conversation was with a colleague who had worked with homeless young people in the Western suburbs of Melbourne in the late 1990s and 2000. She had worked extensively with young people from the Horn of Africa and had undergone training with VFST in order to enhance her professional practice with this client group. These two conversations, although anecdotal, nevertheless reflect the document’s finding that there is an ‘increasing number of young people from African communities leaving home and becoming homeless’ (p. 127).

The third conversation was with another colleague who had attended a refugee conference, where the issue of female circumcision, more commonly called female genital mutilation, had been raised. What was borne out of this conversation was the need for cultural sensitivity in the educational process on this matter. On this issue the writers of this Report have not shirked from examining the impact of the national Australian education program regarding
this practice. Whilst they have cited the appropriate professionals’ response to this issue, they note that those women in the African communities affected, who hold views either supporting or opposing it, were not consulted regarding the education program.

It would seem that incidents of cultural insensitivity are not isolated. The writers note that, particularly within health services, difficulties with language as well as a lack of cultural sensitivity are significant problems. Within Community Service courses the ability to work with clients who are culturally diverse and/or have special needs is part of the performance criteria in most units of competence. The new Division 2 nursing curriculum for Victoria has two electives that examine working either with Koori and Torres Strait Islander communities or with culturally diverse communities. It is to be hoped that with more emphasis on cultural diversity, incidents of insensitivity will be lessened, but post 9/11 and Bali that may be a pipe dream.

While issues pertinent to women were discussed the researchers also note that sadly there is a dearth of health services pertinent to men. This is of concern to both African Australians and others because, as the writers also note, there is an interconnectedness between men’s health and socio-economic issues.

All in all the report leaves one with feeling that although there are effective services for African Australians in Victoria more should and could be done.

Wayne Pelling
Centre for Health & Community Services
Box Hill Institute of Technical And Further Education,
Box Hill, Victoria
This is an attractively produced and well-written small book which, according to its Series Introduction ‘is part of a series of small books that present basic sociology in a different way’ and which uses many southern African reference points and examples; hence the appropriateness of a review in this journal.

The book begins with a clear discussion of basic demographic concepts before moving on to Malthus and to the theory of demographic transition. Chapters three and four respectively consider First World countries with low fertility and ageing populations and Third World countries which still have relatively rapid population growth. Chapter five is about South Africa, with an important section on the impact of HIV/AIDS. The final chapter is ‘A comparative conclusion’ which summarizes how three theoretical perspectives, functionalism, Marxism and interactionism, view the ‘population problem’.

Surprisingly, marriage receives little attention in the Population Studies book, so I assume it is covered in another text. Other books in the series include Social Institutions by Derik Gerderblom which the OUP Southern Africa Webpage describes as an ‘introduction to the field in sociology, with an emphasis on the family and education, especially those issues relevant to southern Africa and the developing world’ (http://www.oup.com/isbn/0-19-578076-0?view=za).

The Tables are very readable and in general the population statistics used are up-to-date, from 21st century sources. On the occasions when 20th century sources are used, notably a World Bank report for 1990, this is less satisfactory, particularly for countries experiencing rapid political and social change. The growth of Mozambique’s Gross Domestic Product may have been negative in the 1980s (Table 4.4) but since then growth has been positive. The book tells us the contraceptive prevalence for Kenya for 1986 (11 percent) and 1989 (27 percent) but not for 1998 (39 percent).
According to the Series Introduction the books help ‘build up an armoury of concepts ... written in language that flows and entertains as it educates’. As a demographer who lost touch with sociology many decades ago I appreciated the way in which the Glossary and text combine both sociological and demographic terms. However, occasionally the book departs from the demographer’s professional language register. For example, demographers rarely use the term ‘specific rate’ without a prefix: rates may be age-specific, age-sex-specific, duration-specific, and so on.

Canberra almost certainly has more demographers than the whole of South Africa, amongst other advantages this enables us to preserve our fluency in demographic jargon. In South Africa, population studies are more fragmented and efforts to create a critical mass of South African demographers throughout the country received a setback in 2001 when the Rhodes University Population Research Unit in East London was closed. It was therefore a pleasant surprise to note that the author is based in the Sociology Department of the same University, albeit at the other campus.

David Lucas
Demography and Sociology Program,
The Australian National University,
Canberra, ACT

Understanding the Roots of Violence in Uganda


While as is in many societies violence has for long been an everyday fact of life in Uganda it has many different faces and has arisen in many different forms. Over the past thirty years the country has seen not only the violent overthrow of legitimate authority, or rather perhaps of the previously constituted authority, and the violence of civil war; it has also seen increasing violence against individuals and communities. Both these studies, although very different in their focus, are concerned to understand why and what causes such violence: A.B.K Kasozi explores the social origins of violence in Uganda.
between 1964 and 1985 while Lillian Tibatemwa Ekirikubinza seeks to understand why women commit violent crimes. Both raise questions that continue to need answers.

Kasozi’s book is confined essentially to the period from 1966 when Obote ousted power from the first President, Kabaka of Buganda Mutesa until 1985 when he in turn was pushed out in a military coup by General Tito Okello. The book therefore embraces the period of Idi Amin regime from 1971-79. It is divided into two parts. The first deals with the legacy of violence from pre-colonial and colonial times. The second contains chapters on the period 1962-66, 1966-71, 1971-79, with three chapters on various aspects of the period 1979-85. Having laid a basis for future analysis of the origin if not causation of later violence in Uganda in the first part the writer fails however to bring out the significance of these early events in his subsequent narrative which is largely descriptive; the analysis of the implications of what is described appearing in an incidental adhoc way. Headings are few and far between and do not in fact provide the reader with many signposts. The result is a rambling book that is virtually impossible to read as a narrative of events and difficult to use as a work of reference. It also adds little to other more succinct or analytical accounts of the same period. However, for those particularly interested in Uganda’s political history, it further documents this eventful and violent period in Uganda’s history and furthermore contributes some new material on the earlier period of Uganda’s past. There is also some useful information in the several appendices that form roughly one third of the book. Unfortunately, however, and although the subject is potentially emotive and fascinating, Kasozi has produced a work that is less than enthralling. He not only makes potentially dramatic subject matter a drudgery to read, but fails to establish clear linkages between particular social inequities, religious conflicts, or historical episodes of violence both prior to and during the colonial period.

Tibatemwa Ekirikubinza’s book examines the relationship between Ugandan society and social norms; and Uganda’s laws as set out in the Penal Code and women’s violent criminality. It is based on her doctoral thesis ‘More Sinned Against than Sinning: Women’s Violent Crime in Uganda’ that was originally published by the Institute of Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Copenhagen in 1995. It is based largely on case studies of women in Uganda who were at that time in prison for their crimes, supplemented by a review of similar cases as documented in Court records. Dr.Ekirikubinza also however draws comparisons with the findings of other studies in many other countries to give this account a global perspective. This therefore makes this not only
relevant but required reading for anyone studying gender issues and criminal behaviour.

After introductory chapters setting out the objectives and methods used for the study and reviewing various theories of criminal behaviour, the writer presents a general profile of the women included in the study. They represent a wide spectrum from illiterate to well-educated, from very poor to relatively rich. Their ages are equally catholic, including teenagers and grandmothers, although most are between thirty and fifty years of age. This is followed by chapters that, under the general heading of ‘Husband as Victim’, ‘Marriage, Divorce and Separation’ and ‘Child Victims’, explore and discuss particular issues such as the forms of physical and other abuse within marriage, the role of alcohol, property ownership, polygamy and the provisions of the law with respect to divorce and inheritance, land and other property ownership having bearing on women.

The study explains the limited options available to women, first as a result of the laws that enshrine customs and attitudes rooted in patriarchal traditions and interpretations of the law that are influenced by still prevailing ideas and attitudes about the subservient role of women in society, in the family and most particularly in marriage. Second they face constraints stemming from their generally lower status in society, lack of education and lack of access to capital of all kinds. In addition there are (and these are highlighted) the social pressures on women to conform to stereotypes of behaviour as well as the lack of insight and understanding of others of the extent of the tensions and actuality of domestic violence within particular marriage situations.

This is a thought-provoking book, based on good basic research with tightly argued conclusions. It is at once theoretically based but dramatically gripping. While being a scholarly work, it is nonetheless extremely easy to read. In fact once started I became enthralled and could not put it down. The author vividly portrays the dilemma of women in a male dominated society whose laws and cultural traditions discriminate against women in many, often subtle, ways.

Nevertheless, Ekirikubinza ultimately fails to explain why these women? Many more women are subjected to similar domestic violence and seemingly dead end situations, yet very few do in fact resort to violence themselves. Statistically far fewer women are implicated in violent crime worldwide than men while they are often subjected to much greater physical assaults and verbal abuse than men. Why this handful? There is still much scope for further research. It would also be of interest to carry out a similar study of male
offenders to examine if, with respect to crimes of violence within the domestic situation, the same pattern is repeated.

Josephine Harmsworth Andama
Jinja
Uganda

Educating Women in Uganda


This book should be of great use to all actors in planning, policy making and implementation of women’s education programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Joy Kwesiga has tackled a very complicated subject in a seemingly simple way. The book is based on extensive and in-depth research in the archives of various inter-governmental agencies, state governments including former colonising countries, NGO resource centres, universities and individual collections. With this information she illustrates and proves her points in a comprehensive survey which clarifies many critical issues and concerns relating to the education of women in Africa. What her study reveals is that it is not the lack of policies on women’s education that has restricted women’s access to higher education but the lack of political will, the enabling legislation and the relevant facilities and personnel to implement those policies.

The book is divided into two parts. Part one starts with the justification for producing such a book at this particular time and its importance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Chapters two to four Kwesiga addresses on the one hand the historical and general factors which have sustained the disadvantaged position of women in society world-wide; and on the other hand the benefits of educating women. That way she has brought to an end the theory long held that Sub-Saharan Africa is completely isolated from the rest of the world. The second part which deals with her Uganda Case Study sets down the evidence of her analytical survey and findings; on the basis of which she concludes that educating girls and women needs a multi-sectoral approach which is holistic, involving the support of the family and community, gendered policies by government at national, district and grassroots levels, extensive and in-depth, continuous research and periodic meetings, workshops, seminars, conferences etc. to monitor and evaluate the progress, or otherwise, made.
There are some gaps in the book. There is nothing about the lack of relevant career guidance to girls and women; the need for the nurturing and mentoring of girls making the transition from secondary school either to employment or to entering institutions of higher learning; assistance to women in employment who are overburdened with pressure of work, women in the reproductive period who do not have facilities like crèches and whose hours of work do not take into account their domestic responsibilities. The Uganda story is made more readable and enjoyable by her personal life experiences, illustrations and references. Kwesiga however should also have told her readers how she has managed to pursue vigorously her successful academic career while at the same time being the wife of a university academic and a mother of five, a son and four daughters, all of whom have had access to higher education. This would give hope and encouragement to other women who are struggling with those challenges. Also full credit should have been given to those NGOs which have contributed effectively to the empowerment process of women in Uganda and whose interventions have been adopted by Makerere University with the establishment of the Department of Women and Gender Studies and the affirmative action in favour of women students; by the Ministry of Education with their Family Life Education programme; and by the Uganda Government with the creation and establishment of what is known in 2002 as the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Community Development. The book is also a tribute to the British Christian Missionaries who pioneered formal education in Uganda, including for girls and women, amid scepticism from both men and women and from both Ugandans and foreigners.

The picture on the front cover of the book illustrates graphically the Uganda achievement in about half a century: the half dozen women students at what was in 1945 Makerere College (and living then in what has since been known affectionately as the Box) have become the now thousands of women at Makerere University, Kampala. Some women have had the opportunity to access higher education and have realised their potential in their lifetime. The author herself is a living example of what can be achieved by African women in Sub-Saharan Africa; particularly if the woman has a supportive family and community, the basics of formal educational facilities and a conducive environment; and her Dedication tells the reader in a few lines of parents’ devotion, commitment to their daughters’ education and the personal sacrifices made to achieve that goal.

The numbers however remain small; and not only in Uganda but across the whole of Africa. And in the last Chapter of Part two Kwesiga has asked more
questions than provided answers; thus challenging her readers to continue what she has started. These include policy-makers, opinion leaders, activists of all kinds both in Africa and elsewhere, students and pupils whose ideas should be taken seriously and as well as her colleagues in institutions of higher learning and in civil society organisations. So far women who have had access to higher education have concentrated on doing things and not creating time and space to speak for themselves and document their experiences as the author has done. It is time for them to start writing about their achievements and failures. They too are asked to take up the challenge.

There is a valuable Foreword by long-term development professional Margaret Snyder, who was founding Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and a co-founder of the African Centre for Women at the UN Economic Commision for Africa; and amongst whose many other contributions to the empowerment of women and girls in Uganda has been her support and work for the establishment of the Department of Women and Gender Studies at Makerere.

Sarah Niroyo
Uganda Society
Kampala, Uganda.
Recently Completed Doctoral Theses

Some of the most difficult information to track down in the Australian academic community has always been surprisingly, news of postgraduate research, and of theses in progress and completed. We are delighted therefore to learn that through the past year three doctoral theses in the field of African studies presented by postgraduates at Australian universities have all been accepted and would warmly congratulate the authors on the award of their degree.

Christine Mason  
*Gender, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Eritrea*  
University of New South Wales, 2002

Raewyn I. Porter  
*100 years of Contest: Land and Governance in Uganda*  
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, 2002

Kristine Ryan  
*Gender, Poverty and Conflict. Eritrean Women’s Livelihood Struggles 1890-1991*  
Curtin University of Technology, 2002

New Missionary Collections in the UK

Australian researchers in many areas will welcome the announcement last November from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London of the launch of their Mundus Gateway, the on-line guide to missionary-related resources in the United Kingdom. Since the early eighteenth century missionaries have set out from Britain to evangelise the world. In so doing they have created or collected a wealth of documentation, including archives, personal papers, printed books and pamphlets, photographs, films, sound recordings and artefacts. The materials document the encounter between western missionaries and the peoples and terrain of Africa, Asia, the Pacific Islands and the Americas over a two-hundred-year period and are increasingly being used and appreciated by researchers from a broad range of academic disciplines. However, missionary collections are widely
dispersed and difficult to locate. SOAS has now for the first time brought together descriptions of these scattered resources in a unified electronic guide.

The Mundus database contains summary descriptions of more than 400 collections held in over fifty institutions in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Each description provides content and contextual information, and details of finding aids and of access conditions. The database can be accessed in a number of ways: free-text searching, browsing by name, place and subject indexes and using a clickable map. There are links to missionary-related on-line resources and other useful web sites in the British Isles and the wider world while the Mundus Gallery provides a sample of the extensive range of visual materials to be found in many missionary collections.

Missionary collections comprise research materials of global significance, unique in their range of subject matter and form. Researchers with disciplinary backgrounds in the arts, humanities and sciences as well as missiologists and church historians will find written, printed, oral and visual resources which illuminate such topics as race, class, gender, religion, cross-cultural relations, art, education, medicine, languages and literature, as well as less-expected ones such as climatology, transport and genetics. The Mundus guide also aims to assist in the planning of research visits since full location and access details for each holding institution are supplied.

The Gateway is the culmination of the three-year RSLP funded Mundus Project, to improve access to missionary collections held in a wide variety of institutions throughout the UK. It was compiled by project staff at the School of Oriental and African Studies with technical assistance from staff at the University of London Computer Centre and in consultation with partners at the Universities of Birmingham, Cambridge, Edinburgh and Oxford. In addition to the Gateway the Mundus project has achieved the cataloguing of ninety previously unlisted archival collections and some 40,000 photographs. On-line catalogues have been created to a number of major archives and to some 15,000 printed books. Measures have also been taken to improve the physical storage of fragile materials and to conserve badly affected documents. The Mundus Gateway will continue to be maintained and updated at the School of Oriental and African Studies under the direction of the Archivist, Rosemary Seton.

Caroline Brick
School of Oriental and African Studies
London
(Comments and feedback to mundus@soas.ac.uk)
A majority of Zimbabwe’s critics locate that country’s present crisis in ‘poor governance’. Any aspect of the crisis, be it hyper inflation, unemployment, wealth inequality, the Congo war, land invasions and famine, has tended to be seen as a consequence of autocratic, patrimonial and corrupt misrule; the solution lying in a change of government. Without denying the brutality of the Mugabe regime it needs to be recognised that any solution has to be situated in the context of the structural predicament that since 1980 has confronted the independent state and which has its roots in the highly exclusive structures of production and wealth inherited from colonialism, especially as applied to land and agriculture. Within this structural setting macro-economic policy becomes critical. This note looks briefly at this element of the crisis.

The structural predicament
The historical roots of Zimbabwe’s structural predicament are well-known. The early Rhodesian state enclosed the prime cropping areas and vast tracts of ranching land for capitalist development. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 officially divided the land on the basis of race - a minority of Europeans including multinational companies - about five percent of the population gained exclusive access to about half the country. The African majority lived in reserves, which converted to ‘sink areas’: that is, places bereft of upward development prospects due to a threefold crises of environment, demography and local governance.53 While democratic rights in the colonial period extended only to the white community the cause of political repression emanated less from racial ideology than the skewed structures of wealth. A high prevalence of national poverty had been assured but the depth varied depending on a combination of local (that is, land quality and management) and family specific factors (that is, employment income, number of dependents relative to land allocated). Meanwhile, an impoverished population deprived the economy of a sustainable endogenous development dynamic - meaning, to grow from within.54 The reliance on exogenous stimulants - white immigration,

primary export demand and foreign investment - enriched the white minority but failed to pull African society out of poverty. In turn, uneven development gave rise to an array of economic distortions including trade imbalances (due to a heavy dependency on primary exports vis-à-vis capital imports), cost inflation (particularly imported), fragile domestic markets, speculative investment, capital flight, elite luxury consumption and, crucially, national food insecurity.

Tragically, after the second war of liberation through the 1970s the Lancaster House settlement of 1980 circumvented the thorough overhaul of colonial land structures needed for a viable democracy. Until 1990, Section 16 of the Lancaster constitution restricted land redistribution to market transactions at market value and allowed the state to expropriate land only upon payment in foreign currency.\(^{55}\) Although, notwithstanding Section 16, 72,000 families were resettled in less than five years, in a programme that has been described as ‘unsurpassed in Africa,’\(^{56}\) these provisions effectively froze the prevailing order, which ensured that African entrepreneurs would exploit the state ‘as a basis for accumulation and class formation.’\(^{57}\) In this respect, black rule did not essentially differ from white in that a key preoccupation was to protect minority privilege and oppress any threatening opposition.

**Macroeconomic policy**

The last colonial Government headed by the Rhodesian Front showed scant interest in African health and education but did regulate the free market as a way to offset its shortcomings. After 1965 international sanctions encouraged the resort to state economic controls which until the late 1970s presided over a boom. Strategic foreign exchange allocations, import protection and restrictions on capital repatriation diversified investment opportunities (for example, wheat, aluminium, textiles, fertiliser, luxuries) while controls over prices, interest and exchange rates countered inflation and kept necessities affordable.\(^{58}\) Yet inevitably not least by igniting war, the skewed structural base imposed limits on endogenous development.

In the 1980s without comprehensive land reform the state-directed macroeconomic regime delivered the African public significant advances in

---


health, education and food security. The corollary was increased state expenditure and a persistent fiscal deficit, which proved manageable as long as interest rate controls ensured an affordable supply of domestic liquidity to finance the deficit and repay debt.\textsuperscript{59} Nevertheless, international and domestic capitalist classes - to no small extent led by the IMF and World Bank - insisted that the deficit represented unproductive and unsustainable expenditure. These groups promised stronger growth - export-led and labour-intensive - if, and only if, the Government liberalised the market (that is, deregulated prices, wages, interest and exchange rates, exchange allocation, imports and capital flows) and rationalised services (that is, retrenchment, ‘user fees’, privatisation).

This then formed the rationale and content of the IMF and World Bank conditionally sponsored Economic Reform Program (ERP). Within relatively unchanged colonial land structures however the analysis fatally underestimated the role of the state in ensuring majority basic needs and containing wealth polarisation. In truth, the economy required far less macroeconomic than real structural reform, that is, comprehensive land redistribution, to broaden the dimensions of the national market.

**The turmoil of the ERP**

From the outset economic performance under the Economic Reform Program collapsed. Over 1991–1996, compared to the late 1980s, average real GDP growth fell from 4 percent to 1.7 percent, average inflation rose from 15 percent to 25 percent and interest rates trebled.\textsuperscript{60} Meanwhile, formal employment creation and real wages both declined by one-third and the percentage of people below the poverty line rose from 52.8 percent to an astonishing 75.6 percent.\textsuperscript{61} Then, after the currency collapsed by 71.5 percent against the US dollar on 14 November 1997 the spiral of high inflation and low growth deepened and another 10 percent of the population was reported to fall below the poverty line. The point at which the country’s polity began to fall apart came on November 14 1997 when a combination of factors, namely trade imbalances, and IMF/World Bank credit standoff, unbudgeted war veteran gratuities and announced land acquisition plans provoked a deep currency crash known as ‘Black Friday’. The Zimbabwe dollar fell 71.5 percent against


then US dollar, which added great impetus to the impoverishing spiral of high inflation and negative growth. Thereon, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) intersected with the West over the governance question, a threatened ruling party put democracy and the free market on hold in a bid to obtain salvations from land invasions and the Congo’s resources.

The IMF/World Bank blamed the economic crisis on the Government’s persistent fiscal deficit and resort to domestic financing. Upon monetarist assumptions, a cycle of money creation, excessive demand and high inflation is said to have taken hold, which necessitated a repressive monetary policy of high interest rates. In a mass peasant, import dependent and oligopolistic economy however stagflation was more the result of tight monetary policy, currency devaluation, state retrenchment, greater import competition, liberalised wage regimes and the removal of price subsidies on basic necessities More convincingly, however, the crisis simply contributed to the negative impact of removing state price subsidies (for example, food, health, education, power, fuel and fertiliser). From this perspective, the worsening state fiscal position was more a casualty than a cause.

Of profound political repercussions, the fortunes of the national food economy seriously deteriorated. Under the ERP Zimbabwe emerged as a net importer of the food staple - maize. National sufficiency required about 1.8 million tonnes but for the most part of the 1990s, output averaged about 1.5 million tonnes.62 The droughts notwithstanding, deregulation of the exchange rate and exchange allocation intensified the export bias of irrigated ‘white’ farms, which then heightened the exposure of national food needs to a land constrained and drought prone peasant base. In turn, supply shortfalls contributed to unprecedented food inflation, which increased land desperation, as about half the rural population could not keep abreast.63

But a deregulated predominately white and foreign-owned economy is not easily reconciled with an agenda of comprehensive land redistribution. In late 1997, alongside other factors, such as an IMF/World Bank credit standoff, and the unbudgeted war veteran gratuities and trade imbalances, the Government’s announcement of land acquisition plans sparked the ‘Black Friday’ currency crash. Thereon, as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) intersected with the West over the governance question, a threatened ruling party put democracy and the free market on hold in a bid to broaden the indigenous economic base, via land invasions and the Congo war.

Conclusion
Zimbabweans are again embroiled in a struggle for basic survival, social equity, democracy and national sovereignty. The retention of the colonial status quo after 1980 led to the adoption of an inappropriate and radical free market strategy, which courted disaster. Now, the overriding priority is to broaden the production and income base, lest minority privilege and political oppression become the preoccupations of a new government. Comprehensive land redistribution to satisfy both subsistence and commercial needs could form a dynamic nucleus of endogenous development that lays the foundations of economic and political recovery.

John Moore
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
Melbourne, Victoria

Whatever Happened to Australian Aid to Africa?

A feature article in Melbourne’s Age last June\textsuperscript{64} raised this question once again in the context of the gathering food crisis that already by that time faced the countries of Southern Africa. The Australian government in the face of this crisis of food security has indeed announced additional funding for Southern Africa in the form of $A.6 5 million for food aid to Southern Africa through the World Food Programme regional appeal for Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{65} And at CHOGM the Prime Minister committed Australia to providing $11.5 million over four years to assist African members of the Commonwealth to reduce infection rates and the impact of HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless the short answer to this question is that in real terms Australian overseas development assistance (ODA) to Africa in the 2002/3 year, which will be $60 million, has shrunk to half of what it was in 1995/6; part of and reflecting the progressive decline of the total aid budget over the past thirty years from its peak of 0.5 percent of GNP in the mid 1970s to today’s 0.25 percent of GNP.\textsuperscript{66} In the case

\textsuperscript{64} See The Age Feature ‘Starving Children and Stingy Nations’ by Pamela Bone, The Age June 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2002.
\textsuperscript{65} AusAID Media Release, 25\textsuperscript{th} August 2002.
\textsuperscript{66} The Aid Budget Summary 2002-3, Australian Agency for International Development, p. 1, points out that this figure ‘places Australia consistently above the latest (2001) average of donor countries of 0.22%’. The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) points out however that it also reflects the persistent decline of Australian ODA over the past thirty years. See its Aid Budget 2002-03, Overview and Analysis, May 2002.
of Africa this decline has been accompanied by: the progressive narrowing of
the geographical focus to Southern Africa, essentially South Africa,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, with some much more limited activity in the
other SADC countries and in east Africa; the concentration on fewer sectors so
that sectoral assistance focuses at present on governance, education and
HIV/AIDS; and the progressive reduction of Bilateral aid as it is phased out to
meet the priorities of the AusAID Strategic Plan issued in December 2001.
This is at a time when the United Kingdom has announced its intention to
increase its aid to Africa by 50 percent to almost A$3 billion, bringing it to
twenty times Australia’s per capita level.

The now marginal significance of the Africa program in Australia’s current
and overall development assistance strategy is made abundantly clear in
Australian Aid AusAID’s new policy document presented to Parliament in
September 2002 which states unambiguously that:

Australia’s aid is focused on the Asia Pacific.67

Furthermore this includes humanitarian relief and security so that:

Australia’s Global Engagement beyond Asia Pacific region relies
largely on the international humanitarian system to deliver quality aid
and to lead relief efforts.68

An additional reduction of African assistance will flow on from the decision
that the ‘geographic focus of Australia’s overseas aid volunteer programs is
now targeted at countries with which we have a bilateral aid partnership, rather
than being more widely dispersed.69 Given the contributions of Australian
volunteers to African communities made over many years in the past, and the
strong ties that in numerous cases were built up in the process, cutting off
completely in this way (since bilateral aid to Africa will cease) seems a
particularly sad loss, not only to Africa but to Australians as well.

67 Australian Aid: Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity, Eleventh Statement to Parliament on
Australia’s Development Cooperation Program, September 2002, Australian Agency for International
68 Humanitarian Program Strategy 2001-2003, Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID) Canberra May 2001, p. 6, Executive Summary.
69 Australian Aid, op cit p. 24.
Australia will continue to support an African programme which will ‘provide selective assistance to Africa and the Middle East primarily working through international and non-government organisations.’ Whether this will continue to include both Southern and East Africa as in the 1999-2002 framework is not yet clear. What is clear is that the trend towards AusAID’s ‘outsourcing’ of Australia’s aid and its own withdrawal from direct involvement in aid delivery, which became apparent in that framework, is to be carried further; aid to Africa will be directed increasingly through multilateral organisations, nongovernment organisations (NGOs) and scholarships until AusAID will cease to have any direct involvement in actual delivery.

Australian NGOs have a lengthy history of working in both humanitarian relief and development programmes in thirty-eight out of Africa’s fifty-three countries and at present spend more than $50 million a year on their programs. NGOs have for some years sought and received AusAID support for their African programmes. A significant number of Australian NGOs have considerable experience in key areas including food security, disaster relief and health including HIV/AIDS programmes and are already important actors in AusAID’s sectoral programme. The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), their umbrella organisation, is not slow however to point out to AusAID that they raise more money for Africa annually than the Government allocated in 2002/03; and to emphasise the strength of Australian community interest in Africa which this reflects. The 1999-2002 Australian African Programme began with the statement that ‘Australia’s aid program to Africa is driven by the interest of the Australian community in meeting the needs of African countries’. Such community interest has failed to persuade Australian policy makers as to the need for greater support to Africa. Nevertheless the increased emphasis on their engagement in the delivery of even a reduced Australian assistance to Africa carries with it the possibility of increasing NGO and therefore community influence on the program itself. It remains to be seen therefore what the impact on the NGO community and their constituency will be, as NGOs now compete in the market for these new, broad-based Partnerships with AusAID.

Equally important at this stage are the serious gaps in Australia’s understanding of the nature of the African predicament itself; and the dogged clinging to the notion that governance, or lack of it is the key explanation to

---

70 Ibid, p. 22.
72 See on the relationship between the Australian Government and the NGOs, Working with Australian NGOs, An Australian Aid Programme Policy Paper, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Canberra, August 1999.
Africa’s continuing economic and political crises and economic growth the necessary prerequisite for poverty reduction.\textsuperscript{73} It is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that Australia’s own perceived interests continue to determine her attitude towards her relations with Africa. South Africa is today Australia’s largest trading partner in Africa as well as the largest recipient in the Australian African aid program. Mozambique, which is one of the poorest countries in the world, is also (not least as a consequence of the opening of the Mozal aluminium smelter in Maputo which sources alumina from Worsley, Western Australia) Australia’s fastest growing export market.

\textit{Cherry Gertzel}

\textit{Curtin University of Technology}

\textit{Perth, Western Australia}

\textbf{Scolma’s 40\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Conference}

The \textit{Standing Conference on Library Materials on Africa, (Scolma)} celebrated its fortieth birthday last June with a conference on \textit{African Research and Documentation in the New Millenium}. Among the papers presented through the two days of the meeting Professor John McIlwane and Patricia Larby spoke on forty years of Scolma, and Professor Colin Bundy, Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, spoke on Challenges for our Times.

\textbf{The Noma Award 2002}

The 2002 Noma Award Winner, announced in October, was Hamdi Sakkut, for his \textit{The Arabic Novel: Bibliography and Critical Introduction}. The book was published in 2001 by The American University in Cairo Press. The Award, the 23\textsuperscript{rd} to be made, marks the first time that a University Press has won the Award. It is ‘a comprehensive bibliography of the Arabic-language that fills a gaping hole in the history of Arabic literature. Covering the most mature novels from Africa and across the Sarab world it presents a spectacular amount of bibliographic information, unsurpassed in its scope …. Arabic was established as one of Africa’s languages by 632 A.D’ and this work will be a

\textsuperscript{73} See \textit{Better Aid for a Better Future}, Seventh Annual Report to Parliament on Australia’s Development Cooperation Program, The Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 1997 AusAID, Canberra, November 1997 and \textit{Australian Aid, op cit}, pp. 7-14; also Elizabeth Reid’s article in this issue in which she highlights the enormous complexity of the process of impoverishment, in this case directly relating to the HIV epidemic specifically in Southern Africa.
major canon of the African continental literature unlikely to be surpassed for many years to come.

**African Research Institute**

Former Defence Minister for the Eritrean government, now an opposition member of parliament, Mr Mefinhagos visited the African Research Institute at La Trobe University in September. He addressed a small gathering about issues of concern in Eritrea at the present time, prior to visiting government officials in Canberra.

Bishop Alexis Bilindabagabo, Anglican Archbishop of Gahini, Rwanda, was the visiting lecturer in September in a public lecture series on Ethics and Public Life in the University of Melbourne. In a lecture entitled ‘The Face of Evil in the Modern World’, Bishop Bilindabagabo discussed issues of genius and courage, evil and treachery, out of which understandings of present day Africa were formulated.

**African Studies Centre WA**

ASCWA, which now meets regularly once a month, held five interesting seminars through the second academic semester.

On 30\textsuperscript{th} July, visitor Dr Gary Baines of Rhodes University South Africa, spoke on ‘South Africa’s Vietnam: Literary History and Culture Memory of South Africa’s Border War’ when he explored the ways in which representations of the Border War in recently published memoirs by soldier authors have borrowed heavily from the tropes and themes found in the American combatants’ literature of the Vietnam war.

On 30\textsuperscript{th} August, Dr Jeremy Martens, newly appointed to the Department of History at UWA, presented a paper entitled ‘“Almost a Public Calamity”: Prostitutes, “Nurseboys”, and Attempts to Control Venereal Disease in Colonial Natal, 1886-1890.’

On 27\textsuperscript{th} September, Ms Penelope Hetherington spoke on ‘Writing African History: From Imperialism to Globalisation.’

On 5\textsuperscript{th} November Dr Peter Limb, visiting from Michigan State University, gave a paper on ‘Negotiating the pebbles and the cement floor with the bare skins of their feet’: African Women and Politics in South Africa.’
Finally on 3rd December David Robinson, Ph.D. student in History at UWA, gave a paper entitled ‘Socialism in Mozambique?: The Mozambican revolution in Critical Perspective.’

On 12th November Dr Jeremy Martens also gave a paper at the regular History department UWA seminar on ‘Historicising the State’s Response to Sexual Violence in Contemporary South Africa’.

**People**

Dr Jeremy Martens joined the History Department at the University of Western Australia in July. Born in South Africa, Jeremy grew up in Petermaritzburg and took his Honours degree at the Petermaritzburg campus of the University of Natal. From there he went to Canada, and to Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, where he pursued his master’s degree with a thesis entitled ‘“An Easy Prey to Temptation”: White South African Perceptions of “Coloured” People in the Era of Segregation 1928-1945.’ His Ph.D followed with a thesis entitled ‘“So destructive of Domestic Security and Comfort”: Settler Domesticity, Race and the Regulation of African Behaviour in the Colony of Natal, 1843-1893’ which examined attempts by white inhabitants of 19th century Natal to regulate African behaviour through the enactment of legislation. While ‘hired’ as a global historian, and responsible first of all, with his colleague Dr Esta Ungar, for the Department’s first year courses on world history he sees his teaching as drawing on his knowledge of South African and African history. He also hopes in the near future to introduce courses that focus specifically on Africa. His research interests for the future he says include historical explanations of sexual violence in contemporary South Africa; the destruction of the San in nineteenth century Natal; and he would also like to examine aspects of the implementation of the Immorality Acts in apartheid South Africa. He has already become a welcome and active member of the ASCWA group.

**Conferences**

Oceans Apart, Worlds Together: Africa and Asia in South-South Contexts

The Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) invites proposals for both panels and individual papers for presentation at the Annual Conference which will be held in association with the South Asia Council of the Canadian Asian Studies Association (CASA) in June 2003 at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia. The 2003 Conference brings together South Asianists and Africanists in one day of joint sessions. Professor John
Mackenzie, author of many works on the political, social and environmental history of colonialism will be our keynote speaker.

Priority will be given to panels and papers that address the following subthemes: Colonial and Postcolonial Linkages; Rural Livelihoods and the Global Economy; Making Gender, Understanding Women; Regional, National and Interstate Conflict; Development and Democracy.

Submission Deadline: 31 January 2003. Send all proposals either by electronic mail (saved as WordPerfect, Word or RTF if attachments) or by regular post (but not both) to: CAAS Secretariat c/o CETASE, Université de Montréal PO Box 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 3J7. Email: caas@cetase.umontreal.ca

The African Literature Association with The University of Dayton and Bibliotheca Alexandrina as co-hosts and sponsors will hold its 29th Annual Meeting in Alexandria, Egypt, March 19-23, 2003 with the conference theme ‘Of Lighthouses and Libraries: History ReLit’. The keynote speaker will be Edward W. Said. The ALA has chosen Alexandria, Egypt, as the site for the 2003 conference to participate in the events of the inaugural year of the new library - Bibliotheca Alexandrina. The year 2003 also marks the 25th anniversary of the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism, a text that has significantly contributed to our understanding of the constructed histories of African cultures and to the postcolonial scholarship of the last generation. Papers and panels on all aspects of African literature are invited, but a particular focus on the conference themes and historical perspective is encouraged. For more information visit our website: http://academic.udayton.edu/ala. Deadline for submission of paper and panel abstracts: January 15, 2003. These should be sent to: Faiza Shereen, ALA 2003 Conference Convener, Department of English, University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio 45469-1520. e-mail: shereen@udayton

The 22nd annual conference of the Australian and New Zealand Law and History conference will be held in Brisbane, Australia, 10-11 July 2003. The title of the conference is: Defining Jurisdictions and Boundaries. Contact: connors@usq.edu.au URL: www.usq.edu.au/faculty/arts/anzlhs2003/

The Executive Committee of the South African Historical Society (SAHS) invites you to the Society’s biennial conference that will be hosted by the Department of History at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, South Africa from 29 June to 1 July 2003. This conference seeks to address the structural changes in the political, economic, social and environmental fabrics of Southern African society throughout the region’s historical past. We welcome papers that focus on historical, economic, political, social, environmental, cultural, methodological and theoretical aspects of Southern Africa’s pre-colonial, colonial and independent history. Papers addressing current political, economic, social and environmental issues in the region are also welcome.

The conference will also host the follow-up meeting of the South African Historical Association's (SAHA) conference on Heritage Creation and the Restructuring of Historical Studies (held at RAU, 24-26 June 2002). The deadline for submitting paper proposals is 28 February 2003. Further enquiries to:
SAHS 2003 conference, Department of History University of the Free State
PO Box 339, Bloemfontein 9300 South Africa
Fax: +27 - 51 - 4483942
E-mail: barnards@hum.uovs.ac.za
steynms@hum.uovs.ac.za

The 4th World Congress of African Linguistics and The 34th Annual Conference on African Linguistics will be held on June 17 - 22, 2003 at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. Theme of both conferences: "The Description of African Languages in a Rapidly Changing Field"
The organizers of the WOCAL 4 and ACAL 34 would like to invite papers that address the conference theme, or any other topic relating to African languages and linguistics. Papers can be presented in English or French. Further Information on WOCAL 4 and ACAL 34 available at: http://www.wocal4.rutgers.edu/. In addition we are pleased to announce the following symposium, and two workshops, to be held at the same time and location: ‘International Symposium on The Marginalized Languages of Africa.’ The Symposium is open to all WOCAL participants, and WOCAL participants may submit abstracts for presentation at the Symposium. For details, contact Matthias Brenzinger at:<Matthias.Brenzinger@uni-koeln.de>
Drugs And Empires: Narcotics, History and Modern Colonialism, c. 1600 to c. 1960, 10-11 April, 2003, Strathclyde University, Glasgow.

This conference aims for the first time to explore the history of illicit substances in the colonial context. Chief among those substances currently prohibited for general use are opium, cannabis and cocaine. The global traffic in these substances developed and grew largely as a result of modern western colonialism and indeed each first became subject to international regulation during the age of empire. Yet the imperial dimension of the history of these substances remains relatively neglected.

Please submit abstracts of 500 words/requests for information to Dr James Mills, Department of History, University of Strathclyde, McCance Building, 16 Richmond St, Glasgow G1 1XQ, UK jim.mills@strath.ac.uk http://www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/History/jmills/drugs.htm

An International Conference, ‘Staying Poor: Chronic Poverty and Development Policy’ will be hosted by the Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester from 7-9 April 2003. Themes will include: social protection and the chronic poor; the intergenerational transmission of poverty; understanding poverty dynamics; operationalising multidisciplinary concepts of poverty; chronic poverty. Further Information on WOCAL 4 and ACAL 34 available at: http://www.wocal4.rutgers.edu/ Deadline for paper proposals and abstracts (250 words) 2 December 2002. Contact: David Hulme, IDPM, email:david.hulme@man.ac.uk or Andrew Shepher, ODI, email a.shepherd@odi.org.u
The Annual General Meeting for the Association for 2002 was held at Macquarie University during the annual conference on 4 October. In the absence of the President, Associate Professor Pal Ahluwalia, Dr Liz Dimock, Vice President, took the chair.

Attendance: 22 members
Apologies: Pal Ahluwalia, currently in London.

Minutes of the 2001 AGM, published in the December 2001 issue of the Australasian Review of African Studies, were accepted.

Secretary’s Report
Dr Geoffrey Hawker, AFSAAP Secretary, pointed out that the greater part of his time during the past year had been taken up with the 2002 Annual conference, for which he was convenor and which had not yet finished. He asked to delay his report. On the conference itself, he reported that some ninety delegates had registered and attendance over the past two days had been enthusiastic. About a quarter of the delegates were from African countries. He reminded members that the conference program, abstracts of papers and other information was still available at the web-site. While attendance at the Postgraduates Workshop that had preceded the Conference had been smaller than usual, those present had all enjoyed meeting each other, some for the first time as the Workshop Report makes clear. A formal thank-you was extended to Geoffrey for organizing a worthwhile and enjoyable conference.

The Treasurer’s Report 2001-2002 (appended below) was tabled, discussed and accepted. The following recommendations were made:
• That a loose page reminding members to re-subscribe for the following year should be inserted in the December issue of The Australasian Review of African Studies.
• That all paper-givers at the Annual Conferences should be members of the Association.
• That the Treasurer will again enquire regarding the use of credit card facilities to encourage easy membership subscription payments. The
Treasurer noted that this had been investigated last year and found to be prohibitively expensive.

- Graham Romanes kindly volunteered to organise the membership list in ACCESS software to send out personal reminders to members.

**The Editor’s Report (appended below) was tabled, discussed and accepted.**

**The following recommendations were made:**

- That the Association accepts the arrangement reported reached between the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) and AFSAAP by which members of CAAS may subscribe to the *Review* at our AFSAAP membership rates and AFSAAP members may to subscribe to the *Canadian Journal of African Studies* at a reduced CJAS subscription rate.
- That there should be a check of the free listings to African universities to ensure that they are receiving the *ARAS*.
- That there should be a check that free listings to African Embassies in Canberra and Australian High Commissions and Embassies that receive free copies are in fact receiving them.

**Changes to the Constitution**

Amendments to the Constitution tabled at last year’s AGM should be re-issued in the next issue of *ARAS*, and a postal acceptance declared (see notice on p. 128).

**Postgraduate Essay Prize 2001**

The Postgraduate Essay Prize was not awarded in 2001 but encouragement awards of $50 each were given to May Raidoo for her paper ‘Rebuilding Local Economies: The Case of Foreign Importers in Durban’s CBD’, and Carlos Arnaldo for his paper ‘Provincial Differences in Age at Marriage in Mozambique’. Raidoo and Arnaldo had both presented interesting material based on primary research and the encouragement awards recognise the effort that went into their written papers.

The following recommendation was made:

- That the Secretary of the Association shall in future co-ordinate the Postgraduate Prize in accordance with the existing guidelines that will be distributed to all postgraduate paper-givers.

**Nominations for office holders**

A motion was passed that nominations for office holders will in future be called for prior to the AGM, and published in the June issue of *ARAS*. This will be an invitation to members to offer expressions of interest, and nominations
(including existing office holders) should be sent to the Secretary of the Association before 15 May.

**Annual conference 2003 and 2004**
The next conference will be held in Adelaide and will be organised by Dr Tanya Lyons. The conference in 2004 will be held in Perth and will be organised by Professor Norman Etherington. Geoffrey Hawker will pass his database of conference attendees to next year’s conference organizer and the Executive committee.

**Election of officers**
The following officers were nominated, seconded and elected:

- **President**  
  Associate Professor Pal Ahluwalia, Adelaide University

- **Vice President**  
  Dr Liz Dimock, La Trobe University,

- **Secretary**  
  Dr Geoffrey Hawker, Macquarie University

- **Treasurer**  
  Dr Tanya Lyons, Flinders University

- **Editor, ARAS**  
  Professor Cherry Gertzel, Curtin University

- **Past President**  
  Associate Professor David Dorward, La Trobe University

- **Postgraduate Member**  
  James Gray, Victoria University, Wellington

- **Ordinary members**
  - Dr Christine Mason, University of Queensland
  - Graeme Counsel, University of Melbourne
  - Jolyon Ford, University of Sydney

**Any other business**
David Dorward raised the question of AFSAAP's lobbying capacity, suggesting that the Association should be more pro-active and make links with NGOs, Business, DFAT and other networks. He wondered if a member of the Association might take his place on the ACFOA committee when it meets in Melbourne, maintaining the link with both the African Research Institute at La Trobe University and AFSAAP. Wayne Pelling offered, and David will put forward this offer to ACFOA.

Liz Dimock raised the issue of visas for conference participants from Africa. A motion was passed that the Association should contact the Department of Immigration expressing concern at the difficulty that would-be participants at the conference have in acquiring necessary visas to enter Australia.

Cherry Gertzel drew attention to three members of AFSAAP who had completed and been awarded their doctorates over the past year as well as to
recent books published by AFSAAP members. (See item in the Research section above.)

Reports

Treasurer’s Report 01 July 2001 - 30 June 2002

Funds are deposited in the Australian Central Credit Union (Marion Branch).

Liberty 12 Month AFSAAP Investment Account Number 61684338
Balance at 30 June 2002  $12,136.79
CREDITS
Interest  *  $136.79
Total  $136.79

AFSAAP Current Account number 61568472
Balance at 30 June 2002  $8,061.89
CREDITS:
Subscriptions:  $3,668.85
Rental of mailing list:  $808.22
Donations:  $80
Conference 2000**  $890
Interest:  $5.93
Total:  $5453

Total CREDITS  $5569.79

DEBITS:
AFSAAP Review and Newsletter:  $3,151
Letterhead  $231
Postage  $29.60
Govt BAD Tax  $4
Total DEBITS:  $3415.60

Total Balance at 01 July 2002  $20,198.68
Notes:
*tax withheld from A/C for last financial year $128.83 will be refunded to the Liberty account 16 July 2002 as the Credit union had lost our ABN number, but now has it.
**A Return of funds from the 2000 Adelaide conference totalling $890 was received 21st September 2001 and is included in the figures above.

Subscriptions
We have received a total of 312 individual and institutional subscriptions between January 2000 and June 30 2002. In that same period we had a total of 104 free subscriptions. As you can see from Table 1 below the actual number of paid subscriptions has dropped from 103 in 2000 to 82 in 2002. However, we have 168 members listed on the mailing list (not including the free list of twenty-six) which means that more than half of our members listed - a total of 86 - have not paid in 2002. I have been conducting a radical cull of the mailing list over the last year and deleting those who have not paid for three years. A total of twenty-one names will be culled in December 2002 if they have not resubscribed.

| Table 1 Number of yearly subscriptions to AFSAAP |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | total |
| 103 | 93 | 82 | 26 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 312 |
| 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 104 |

Paid Individual Subscriptions
Free Subscriptions

Website
The AFSAAP website www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/global/afsaap is kindly being hosted by the Flinders University server. However they cannot host the AFSAAP.ORG domain name so this name has not been purchased as planned. Nonetheless, I have updated the website and hopefully all of the clicks and buttons work.

Membership costs
Regular Member in Australasia/Pacific Region $AU25 (outside region $AU30)
Organisational Member $AU50 (outside region $AU55)
Student membership $AU15 (outside region $AU20)

Tanya Lyons
AFSAAP Treasurer July 2002

The Australasian Review of African Studies in its new format and status is now into its second and I believe successful year. The reaction from readers has been positive and encouraging. My first point is therefore to thank the contributors to both issues published since my last report (December 2001 and June 2002) and also members of the Editorial Advisory Board for their support and assistance.

No significant change has been made in relation to editorial policy the aim of which remains to publish material that is authoritative, interesting and readable; and which contributes to our better understanding of the complexities of the African condition. The journal remains inter-disciplinary. Editorial requirements of contributors allow for wide variations in perspectives and style; the one clear requirement with respect to the latter is that articles must be accessible to as wide a range of readers as possible. The readership of the African Studies Review and Newsletter out of which the Review has emerged has always been very wide-ranging and this remains the case today; hence the need to balance the academic with the non-academic and the specialist with the more generalist interest. I am myself in no doubt that this can be achieved without any danger to the journal’s professional standards; and I am encouraged therefore by the continuing interest in and support for the less ‘formal’ material included in the Notes section. There is no doubt in my mind that this must be maintained. A more extensive Note to Contributors and a Style sheet have now been drawn up and will be published in the next issue of the Review.

As the only Australian journal that is devoted entirely to African affairs and given the need for more readily available critical material on Africa for Australian readers the most important need at this stage of its development is to encourage contributions of such specialist material for publication in the Review. I would urge academic and professional members of AFSAAP to bear this in mind both in terms of their own work and of their students. The strengthening of links between Africanists in Australia and overseas and the increased international circulation of the Review has already been beneficial in this respect and I am hopeful that as the journal becomes better known the flow of articles from overseas will further increase. One encouraging development over the past year has been the number of articles submitted for consideration from African universities. Young African scholars are understandably anxious to publish outside their own countries and my experience is that there is a role for the journal to play in this respect. (I might point out that the AFSAAP
postgraduate essay prize instituted three years ago has been awarded on two of the three occasions to African postgraduates studying in Australia).

The Contents of the journal are now included in the AJOL website which lists all journals published in Africa and more recently a number of journals like ARAS which are devoted entirely to Africa. Our own AFSAAP website also carries the Contents of each issue of the Review. We are therefore becoming better known across Africa itself. We also send complementary copies to a number of African universities, and I am hopeful that we may be able to expand that number.

Earlier this year I circulated to members of the AFSAAP Executive the memo ‘Housekeeping for ARAS and Matters Related’. While up to date the Review has been produced at minimal cost, including in its new format, and I am hopeful that we may be able to continue in this way, that memo was prompted by my awareness of the possible longer term financial constraints, for a small Association such as AFSAAP, incurred by increased production costs for the journal in the future. It sets down current costs of production for the Review and the support that we have received first from Flinders University of South Australia, School of Social Sciences and second from the Curtin University of Technology School of Social Sciences and Division of Humanities. The Association is enormously grateful for this support which has been invaluable, but ultimately recognises that it is on members’ subscriptions that the Review may ultimately have to rely. I am pleased therefore that the Treasurer reports some increase in membership over recent months and hope that this will continue. What is especially obvious is the small number of university libraries and African Studies Centres that subscribe, in Australia as well as overseas; and Dr Dimock and I have been discussing the best way to publicise the journal better. We also send complementary copies to a number of African universities, and I am hopeful that we may be able to expand that number.

In relation to overseas membership I have to report that the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) which publishes the Canadian Journal of African Studies (and the present Editor of which, Emeritus Professor Martin Klein, is a member of the ARAS Editorial Advisory Board) has suggested an arrangement with AFSAAP and ARAS whereby members of each Association may subscribe to each other’s journal at the membership rate. Also that each journal should advertise in the other. As Editor I have welcomed and accepted this proposal and recommended to the AFSAAP Executive that it should be agreed. Details will be advertised in the December 2002 issue of ARAS. Following from this and after some consultation, especially with the Editor of
African Affairs, it seems that for the present it is unnecessary to introduce a separate subscription for the journal which at present goes to all members of the Association as part of their subscription either as individual or as institutional members.

Cherry Gertzel, 
Editor (1/10/02)

The 25th Annual AFSAAP Conference Postgraduate Workshop

The Postgraduate Workshop this year provided an informal opportunity for students to exchange ideas, views, research and aspirations before the Conference commenced. The day-long Workshop was attended by half a dozen Masters and Doctoral students from Macquarie University, the universities of Melbourne, New England, New South Wales, and Victoria University of Wellington, as well as academics from Flinders and La Trobe University, and the University of South Africa.

The Workshop offered participants the chance to meet with like-minded colleagues who share an interest and passion for Africa. Discussion reflected the range of disciplines of those involved and centred on African art, education, history, literature and politics. This made for interesting and lively conversation, and the African and Australasian backgrounds of participants ensured a variety of perspectives were exchanged.

Three papers were presented on the day, and two others were presented by postgraduates during the Conference itself. Titles included ‘Women and Slave Holding in Nineteenth Century Coastal Fante’, ‘A Critique of the English Curriculum in Former British Colonies – Kenyan and Indigenous Australian Contexts’, ‘Superpower Might and the High Cost of the Blade’, ‘The Oral History of School Boycotts in South Africa’, and ‘Child Soldiers in Africa.’

A challenge faced by African-studies students is the feeling of isolation in their academic fields. Difficulties in research and the exchange of information and ideas are common for Africanist students in Australasia, where we are often one of only a few Africanists at our institutions. The Workshop was an act of solidarity in that sense, allowing us to provide support and encouragement for one another which will continue throughout the year with the election of the Postgraduate Coordinator onto the AFSAAP Executive.
We also touched on the ‘Big Question’ in every student’s life: What Next? For those of us doing Masters, the question was not quite so daunting, as we have our PhD years ahead of us. For the PhD students, life in academia seemed the likely option. However, research, study and teaching were the words that came to everyone’s lips when we thought about our future.

Adelaide 2003 will be the next opportunity for us to meet up again and see whether we have finished the thesis we were supposed to have completed six months ago! The small, informal nature of the 2002 Postgraduate Workshop will be repeated so that students can once again discuss topics of interest and importance to them in an environment that encourages lively and eclectic discussion.

James Gray  
Victoria University of Wellington  
New Zealand  
Email: salmiakki007@hotmail.com
Proposed Constitutional Amendments
The following amendments to the Constitution of the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (as amended in 1995) were tabled at the AGM 2001 and are now due to be ratified.

Proposed Amendment to Para 3:
Current: ‘Membership of the Association …. There shall be three categories of Members: full members, student members (the subscription for whom shall be lower than for full members) and honorary life members’.
Proposed Amendment: ‘Membership of the Association …. There shall be four categories of Members, regular members, organisational members, student members (the subscriptions for whom shall be lower than for full members), and honorary life members’.

Proposed Amendment to Para 7:
Current: ‘A bank account in the name of the Association shall be established, all cheques drawn by the Association to be signed by any officer singly’.
Proposed Amendment: ‘A bank account in the name of the Association shall be established, all cheques drawn by the Association to be signed singly by either, (i) the President and Secretary/Treasurer, or (ii) in instances where the latter office is held by two individuals, the President and Treasurer.’

If there is any dissension to these proposed amendments, please notify the Secretary of the Association, Geoffrey Hawker, by 28 February 2003, at which date, if there is no dissension, the amendments will be ratified.

AFSAAP-CAAS Exchange
Under an arrangement agreed between AFSAAP and the Canadian African Studies Association (CAAS) AFSAAP members may now subscribe to the Canadian Journal of African Studies (CJAS) at a substantially reduced subscription rate of Can$80. Student subscription rate Can$60. AFSAAP members wishing to take advantage of this offer should contact: Roger Riendeau, email <roger.riendeau@utoronto.ca>