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

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OF AUSTRALASIA AND THE PACIFIC

THE AUSTRALASIAN REVIEW OF AFRICAN STUDIES

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The Australian Review of African Studies aims to publish authoritative, informed critical material on Africa and African Affairs that is interesting and readable; and to balance specialist and more generalist articles in an interdisciplinary approach. Articles should aim to be no more than 6,000 words. Articles are peer reviewed. Short notes of up to 2,000 words on contemporary African issues and events are also welcome as are reports on research projects, African University events etc. Contributions should be written in a style accessible to as wide a range of readers as possible. E-submission is welcome.

All manuscripts and correspondence should be sent to:
The Editor, *Australasian Review of African Studies*,
Professor Ware, PDAL, University of New England,
Armidale, NSW, Australia, 2351.
hware@une.edu.au

or for book review matters:
Dr Jeremy Martens,
History, University of Western Australia,
Perth, WA,
jmartens@arts.uwa.edu.au

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The introductory article in this edition of the *Australasian Review of African Studies* is a retrospective piece by Emeritus Professor J.C.Caldwell of the Australian National University who is in many ways the doyen of African studies in Australia. Certainly he is the only Australian academic to have won a United Nations award for his research on Africa.

This issue of the *Australasian Review of African Studies* contains more polished versions of a number of the papers from the annual African Studies Conference held at Macquarie University in Sydney in September 2006. This eclectic conference moves around Australia to allow the maximum number of impoverished students and funds-strapped academics to experience the pleasure of exchanging views with people with a common interest in matters African.

The 2008 Conference will be held at the Australian National University in Canberra

These papers reflect the wide ranging interests of people living in Australia who are studying Africa and Africans from the labour force in Eritrea, and Gracia Machel's contribution to combating child soldiery, to the history of links between Sudan and Australia, and African views on Australia's divorce laws. As the numbers of Africans living and studying in Australia grow we can expect to see more Africans studying their own diasporas. As always it will be vital to ensure a balance between the maintenance of academic standards and allowing an authentic African voice,

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2008 Conference

African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific

Australian National University
Canberra January 30th to February 2nd

Two Themes:

Africans in Australia
&
Outsiders in Africa

Postgraduates Day is 30th.

Details from David Lucas @ david.lucas@anu.edu.au

Or AFSAAP Website

The Sexual Theme in a West African Demographic Research Program

By John C. Caldwell, Emeritus Professor of Demography, Demography & Sociology Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra

E-mail: Jack.Caldwell@anu.edu.au

Sexual relations are an important element in human life. Yet this theme has not been an important one until recently in African social science. Indeed, Evans Pritchard, when reporting on the Nuer, apologised to his readers for having to mention the subject briefly. There has, of course, been a large literature on male circumcision but as a rite of passage.

This situation changed as international programs of family planning started in the 1960s and HIV/AIDS interventions got underway from the late 1980s. A significant role in this change was played by Australian National University researchers from first the Department of Demography and then the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health. All research involved collaboration with African researchers in West Africa at the Universities of Ghana, Cape Coast, Ibadan, Ife, Ekiti, and beyond West Africa at Makerere and Nairobi.

Family planning research began in 1962 in Ghana. Such research has had a remarkable history in that it has largely succeeded in discussing contraceptive use with little mention of either sexual relations or marital status. In Ghana, as later in Nigeria, we found that the major problem was not sensitivity about the issue but in the rural areas a difficulty in comprehending what we were talking

about, and, among the academic and other elites, a deep suspicion that contraception was a practice so contrary to the African way of life as to be almost subversive. For a while we worked, for the only time in our research experience, without local collaborators other than our increasingly enthusiastic student researchers. Many of them later used this experience to gain entrance to population graduate programs in overseas universities.

The central problem was to ensure that respondents understood our questions and gave meaningful answers. The solution was two-fold. First, we prepared and repeatedly tested and simplified an English-language questionnaire. This was subsequently translated into ten Ghanaian languages with an emphasis on meaning and on responses that made sense rather than on a word-by-word exact translation. The second approach was to contact all centres appearing in our sample in order to make contact with chiefs and elders to explain our interests and exchange gifts. Eventually, we held a village or township meeting at which our local interviewers explained the subject matter of our investigations and we all took part in lengthy discussions about sexual relations, contraception and antinatal practices. We asked them to think about these matters and to discuss them before we returned with interviewers. This approach ran directly counter to all advice in textbooks on social surveying, but it went a long way towards discovering reality and throwing light on how contraceptive behaviour would develop. Within a decade Ghana would establish a national family planning program, and within four decades would have reduced family size by over one-third.

The research program moved to Nigeria in 1969, first at what was then the University of Ife (now Awolowa University), and to the University of Ibadan in 1973. The latter was a segment of : The Changing African Family Project, carried out in 13 African countries, and it served as a flagship for the wider program. It was in Nigeria that new approaches and new concepts were first tested. This research focused on the Yoruba people of southwest Nigeria and consequently questionnaires were needed only in English and Yoruba. Nevertheless, a great deal of care was taken in translating

quite a sophisticated questionnaire into Yoruba. The first efforts were the most literary [sounding as some students said 'just like the Yoruba Old Testament'] but gradually the questionnaire became simpler, even coarser, often using well-known proverbial expressions or phrases from popular high-life songs. Ultimately, the aim was achieved of having no correlation between level of education and level of response. It was this research program that later allowed us to predict that the African fertility transition would differ in a number of ways from the European or Asian transitions, in that the first substantial demand for contraception would come from young unmarried people, and that subsequently the proportional decline in fertility would be similar at all ages (elsewhere it was greater among older women of higher parity). It also became apparent that sexual relations outside marriage (and even within marriage) often had a transactional component, although bonds of affection and permanency made it inappropriate to use the expression "commercial sex".

The HIV/AIDS Epidemic

Those of us who had focused on health issues in sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly concerned as it became clearer in the 1980s that the world's severest epidemic of AIDS was developing in East Africa. Although the disorder was first identified in 1981 in Los Angeles and in 1982 in Africa, the exact nature of the African epidemic was still unclear in the mid-1980s. It was not until 1986 that we felt there was a role for demographers to play. Consequently, from that time we started contacting those African institutions and individuals with which the ANU Demography Department had links. From about that time, too, the Rockefeller Foundation began to expand its interest in the behavioural side of health. Because of our work on parental education and child survival, originating in the first place in the Changing African Family Project, the Foundation offered to support me on a half-time basis to extend this work and to support an ANU Health Transition Centre as well as a journal: *The Health Transition Review*. Most of these matters were settled in 1988 and at the end of that year the Centre

and I transferred to the ANU's new National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health. The Centre at first worked generally on the behavioural aspects of health, holding in 1989 an important international conference on the subject in Canberra. At the same time our preliminary work on the African AIDS epidemic began in Nigeria, based on Ekiti State University (then Ondo State University) where the head of the Sociology Department was an ANU PhD Graduate (I.O. Orubuloye, now Vice Chancellor).

The earliest work was funded with ANU research money, until the point where we had sufficient funding and publications to secure a grant for further research from the Rockefeller Foundation. This in turn allowed us to win a large and continuing grant throughout the 1990s from Swedish technical aid (SAREC/SIDA). It was the latter grant that allowed the work to spread from West Africa to the rest of the sub-Saharan African region.

The initial research was in Nigeria and it spread successively to the University of Ghana and the University of Cape Coast (also in Ghana) and with the additional funding, to Makerere University in Uganda. This group of institutions was justified by our belief at the time that there was a full scale epidemic in Uganda, an emerging one in Ghana, and the potential for a huge epidemic in highly populated Nigeria. As it happened, HIV/AIDS did not spread into most of West Africa (except in Abidjan) as rapidly or as greatly as was then anticipated. This had the research advantage that work on sexuality could proceed in West Africa in a reasonably calm atmosphere.

History repeated itself. In the early 1960s Ghanaian researchers were reluctant to be associated with family planning research, but, as the international demand became louder and funding for research and overseas scholarships grew, both individuals and their institutions changed their outlooks. This did not solve the problem for AIDS research because it became clearer that the research had to probe sexuality much more deeply. We partly solved the problem by using the term "sexual networking" rather than "sexual activity" even though we knew the latter phrase had an exact meaning that we would later have to use. The problem was also overcome by

employing all the traditional frameworks for research such as setting up an organization (at first, the West African Research Group on Sexual Networking). Increasingly, research articles were published in the leading journals, although no major journal devoted exclusively to the social and behavioural aspects of AIDS emerged.

Different organizations played different roles. The ANU Health Transition Centre provided basic informational services and a coordination of the whole program. It also held primary responsibility for fund raising, accounting and reporting to donors. Here basic information from published research on African sexuality, HIV/AIDS, and efforts to explain epidemic patterns were assembled, distributed to all collaborators, and summaries sent out for publication. Volumes of selected papers from annual workshops were published and distributed. *The Health Transition Review* published an increasing number of the program's research articles although they never outnumbered papers on other aspects of health.

In the early period of research, Ekiti University played a similar role to that played by the University of Ibadan in the Changing African Family Project. It was there that ANU researchers spent the longest time and where many of the research projects, especially those on sexual activity, were first tested. The two universities in Ghana focused more on the impact of the epidemic, the experience of those infected, and the provision of care. In Uganda there was a concentration on larger surveys of the more traditional demographic type with an emphasis on statistical analysis.

Measuring Sexual Activity

Where the project first started no-one was certain about the cause of high levels of infection in sub-Saharan Africa. Some held that the explanation was excessive levels of vaginal cleaning and drying; others that infection arose from a succession of rapid scarifications with the same knife used on each person; others that the level of homosexuality was really much greater than had been reported. We and others drew together evidence throwing doubt on each of these

explanations. There may be the same level of homosexual attraction in the region as in the rest of the world, but, outside marginal regions of Arab influence, anal intercourse is at a fairly low level, partly because it is widely associated with witchcraft. It is true that one of our projects showed such relations to occur frequently in gaols, but between persons inclined to heterosexual activity both before and after their imprisonment.

At an early stage the program drew the conclusion that its chief focus should be on heterosexual activity.

It is pertinent here to pause and ask why there might be an unusual level of sexual relations outside monogamous unions. The Changing African Family Project had thrown light on the situation among the Yoruba, a situation which was later shown to exist widely across the region. Tradition demanded that a woman should be sexually abstinent during pregnancy, for around two years after birth (originally three years) and after menopause. Given that fertility was high (on average six or seven live births, and still five nowadays), a monogamously married man had sexual access to his wife for only about 40 per cent of his married life, while one with two wives had access for no more than 60 per cent of the time. Traditional society assumed sexual relations would still occur for men who were barred access to wives either because they were still single or because their wives were compulsorily abstaining, and provided access to brothers' wives or other women (often the same woman would become an alternative partner in successive periods). Wives were not supposed to admit that they knew of the existence of these other women, and even those who told us about their own extramarital relations often claimed ignorance of their husband's activities.

The design of our research was based on the assumption that sexual relations before or outside of marriage constituted a highly sensitive subject, much more so than family-planning practice. We may have been too cautious but this was a pioneering effort that could afford few mistakes. Two points came out early from our discussions with important local figures. The first was that the society was less sensitive about its sexual behaviour than it was about outside

authorities knowing the results. Our contacts identified both churches and government as being seen as puritan kill-joys who wished to suppress all sexual relations outside of marriage. We assured communities of complete secrecy with the identification of both individuals and population centres being destroyed at an early stage in the processing. The second point was the fact that the teams were from the local university with which the local people had a strong identification. This was because it had been established (as Ondo State University, now Ekiti University) in the face of opposition from the Federal Government.

In contrast to the Ghana family planning survey experience, we did not hold village meetings to explain our topic but held long individual discussions with, and enlisted the support of, key figures such as the chief, the policeman, the schoolteacher, health personnel, and any well-educated local person. Also, in contrast to earlier work, we no longer employed a cluster of houses as the final sampling unit but chose households by simple random sampling at this stage so that it was unlikely that neighbouring households would be selected and so know what we were discussing.

For interviewers we selected by trial and error those persons who could empathize with their respondents, get on their wavelength, show an understanding of all information received, and get over the message that no-one would ever learn their replies. This was more a matter of personality than anything else, and those capable persons who just did not have the right personality were made data processors. We employed a high density of supervisors so that each interview could be discussed immediately after its completion. Sensitive information included that on financial and commodity support in return for ongoing sex, and gifts or money received as a result of sexual relationships. Such economic transfers are complex and we identified and defined truly commercial sex as being paid for at the time and each time.

The first survey work was directed at detailing the number of different sexual relationships occurring currently, for past intervals, and over a lifetime. Particular attention was paid to parallel relations

because of the greater likelihood of such relationships accelerating the spread of HIV. The frequency of sexual activity and of multiple relationships over time was not very different from that found in European or American studies. But, in Africa, married persons were more likely to have parallel relations and less likely to use condoms.

Those persons undertaking computer modelling of the epidemic wanted information on real sexual networks – chains of sexual relations and whether parallel or successive. To their dismay, we regarded using data from one person to locate another to be ethically unacceptable and agreed to go only as far as asking interviewees about their various partners and what they knew of the other sexual contacts of those partners. This showed both woeful ignorance and a disturbingly high level of trust. [Understandably, most people in Africa and elsewhere prefer not to think about their partners having sex with someone else].

One aim of the research was to discover why there had been such an explosion of sexually transmitted diseases when European colonizers first arrived and why levels have remained high. This could hardly be explained entirely by infection from a small number of administrators and missionaries. The answer received from our own work and that of some early anthropologists was a change in the scope of sexual relations. Our answers came from a survey of old women, who readily explained the system into which they had married, even though their daughters and grand-daughters knew little or nothing about it. Yoruba society, like most African societies, was characterized by polygyny. Enough potential wives for polygamists could be secured only by females marrying soon after puberty and males marrying very late – now at about 30 years, and in the nineteenth century and earlier at nearer 40 years. The system was maintained by the old men being able to control the age at marriage of young men who needed both permission and bridewealth in a system where old men owned or controlled everything. To some extent the young men were distracted by being warriors, but, nevertheless, it was realized that, if they remained sexually frustrated until marriage, society could easily be destabilized by the revolt of young men. The solution was to regard married women as having

married into their husbands' families. Unmarried young men had discreet sexual access to their married brothers' wives and to the younger wives of their fathers (with the exception of their own mothers). This system was regarded as incestuous by the missionaries. It broke down as young men gained a degree of financial independence when the new colonial society provided employment on plantations, in businesses, and in the construction of roads, railways, docks and other buildings. Taking up such work was hastened in those colonies that demanded a poll tax. Not only did the average age at marriage of males begin to fall, but before marriage they could afford relations with prostitutes, who, having many partners, were much more likely to have acquired a sexual disease (and, in due course, HIV/AIDS).

This work was extended by participating in a large survey of around one thousand prostitutes across Nigeria's urban centres. Several points became clear. Because many African cultures do not identify sin with female sexual activity outside marriage as strongly as do the world religions, the control over young women was less strict. Rural girls longed to go to the city and usually did not see their employment in bars and nightclubs as being prostitution. Those with secondary education usually regarded such city employment as being less demeaning than staying in the village as shifting cultivators or traditional market women. Most intended to return to their villages with enough money to set up a small business and had little of the fear found in Asia and Europe that their past would catch up with them and destroy their marriage or position in the village.

The research program also examined people in occupations most characterized by parallel sexual relations: long-distance lorry drivers and young itinerant market women who ply their trade in lorry parks frequented not only by lorry drivers but also by their passengers. The drivers themselves often spent the night at recognized truck stops where sex and food was available, often both from the same woman over many years. In Nigeria the road between the populous south and north passes through thinly populated barren country where a major source of income is selling truck needs, food and sex on the highway. We chose an excellent spot for interviewing, the

great Ibadan lorry stopping point which is the taking-off place for the long journey north.

By the early 1990s we were in position to draw several conclusions:

(1) The average number of different heterosexual partners was not surprizingly high but, given that there was a moderately high number of parallel partners, it was probably sufficient to sustain an AIDS epidemic without such ancillary factors as vaginal cleaning, scarification or anal sexual relations.

(2) A contributing factor catalyzing HIV infection was almost certainly the high level of untreated STIs (sexually transmitted infections). Indeed, treatment was often not sought, especially among males, on the grounds that the symptoms were merely a sign of adulthood. This was compounded by the fact that during sexual relations at night wives usually were not able to identify an infection in their husbands.

(3) Because sick prostitutes often returned to their home centres, their co-workers were usually unaware of the level or even existence of HIV infection among them. This meant little stress on the need for condoms, a problem aggravated by a very strong male aversion to condom use for either family planning or prophylactic use.

(4) Similarly, it is nearly impossible for a wife or even a steady girlfriend to insist on condom use because such insistence would be an accusation of promiscuity.

(5) There is widespread scepticism amongst Africans as to whether HIV infection is the sole cause of AIDS. If it has other causes such as witchcraft or predestination, then foregoing sexual relations or demanding condom use might be futile.

(6) The fact that commercial sexual relations often occur as a result of drinking alcohol in the festive atmosphere of little bars or dancing halls leads to carelessness. Actual drunkenness seems to be a less serious problem in West Africa than in Southern or East Africa.

(7) The whole situation is made much more dangerous by a strong reluctance to identify and discuss the existence of AIDS in the family. Indeed, the existence of HIV is rarely known because of a resistance to undergoing blood tests or a lack of access to them.

(8) There is a similar silence at the level of the state. Uganda (and Kaunda's Zambia) have been exceptional in the level of continuing strong leadership from the top. Politicians rarely address their constituents in strong urgent terms in relation to HIV/AIDS; they see more loss than gain in doing so.

(9) Because most of the above factors were common to all parts of sub-Saharan Africa they do not explain the very different levels of HIV across the region. Suspicion began to fall on the catalyzing effect of lack of male circumcision. The latter part of the program was disproportionately devoted to consolidating this thesis by examining vast amounts of information on different ethnic groups' practices with regard to male circumcision. This does not mean that the failure to practise circumcision is the sole or even the major factor in the spread of infection. It does, however, mean that given all the circumstances listed above, it can be the additional tipping factor in determining a major epidemic. Certainly, a map of sub-Saharan Africa by ethnic group showing where male circumcision is not practised closely resembles the pattern of HIV infection.

Three final points might be made.

The first is that, although ulcerating STIs, especially chancroid, can increase the chances of infection, their existence has not determined the pattern of HIV infection. For instance, a high level of STIs (but perhaps not chancroid and syphilis) has resulted in a major area of infertility in the Congo and surrounding areas, but there has not been a high level of AIDS there. [Warfare may either assist the spread of disease or cut people off from contact].

The second point is that it now appears probable that HIV infection has plateaued in much of East and southern Africa and that

epidemics of such intensity will not be experienced in most of West Africa, let alone in the rest of the world.

The third and final point is that one factor in this recent behavioural change has been the provision of huge funding by the US government, international agencies, and private foundations. It is to be hoped that the American emphasis on sexual abstinence, and little stress on condom use, will not be self-defeating, although there is evidence now emerging from Uganda suggesting that it might be so.

Acknowledgments

This work could not have been carried out without funding and institutional support from the Swedish government agencies SAREC and SIDA, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, the Australian National University's Demography Program and its National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health Research, and a range of African universities.

Pat Caldwell and I have been involved throughout the program. The 1960s' work on Ghana was supplemented by Samuel Gaisie. Later work in Nigeria involved Chukuka Okonjo and Adenola Igun. The Changing African Family project also had as principal investigators Francis Okediji and Helen Ware. The AIDS program of the 1930s and 1990s had as principal investigators in Nigeria, I.O. Orubuloye; in Ghana, John Anarfi and Kofi Awasabo-Asare; and in Uganda, James Ntozi and Jackson Mukasi-Gapere.

At the ANU in Canberra co-editors of the *Health Transition Review* and supplementary volumes were Gigi Santow and Shail Jain.

In the Shadow of War: Australia's Relations with Sudan from Gordon to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Beyond

Wendy Levy

Wendy.Levy@anu.edu.au

This paper looks at the history of Australian involvement with Sudan, in government, non-government and community arenas. It begins with the 1885 Australian Contingent sent to support Kitchener, then touches on the memoirs of an Australian missionary from 1950s-70s, an Australian Government trade mission in 1975, aid and other inputs and Sudanese-Australians. It notes that much of our engagement has taken place in the shadow of conflict, including the recent influx of Sudanese to Australia as refugees. It looks to the future and Australian involvement as peacekeepers and in business ventures.

The Australian Contingent

In 1885 Australia was merely a collection of colonies talking about federation. In Sudan, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium was under threat from the Mahdi and his forces. Governor-General Charles Gordon had been under siege in the Sudanese capital Khartoum for months and a British relief mission arrived too late to prevent his death on 26 January 1885. Gordon had been a favourite of the Victorian era and the news of his death reverberated around the British Empire via the new-fangled telegraph lines and fast steamers. The colonies joined in the cry of the motherland: Gordon's death must be avenged.

Less than four weeks later, on 3 March, Sydneysiders gathered at the docks to farewell a hastily-assembled force of around 700 men and

200 horses. The volunteer force had been offered to Britain, free of charge, by the Premier of New South Wales, William Dalley, and the British thought it a splendid idea. The *Sydney Morning Herald* – and public sentiment – backed the move and so many people were keen to enlist, the army had to turn away streams of would-be soldiers from the recruiting grounds at Victoria Barracks.

The story of the contingent's trip to Sudan has been well documented in books such as *The Rehearsal*, prepared in 1985 by historian Ken Inglis to mark the mission's centenary.

Inglis notes that so quickly was the force deployed, that the contingent had been on the high seas for two weeks before the New South Wales Parliament could assemble to consider whether or not it should be allowed to go. Premier Dalley told parliament that "we prefer, thank God, slight constitutional improprieties to the abandonment of duty, the neglect of great opportunities and the glory of giving noble examples."[1]

Under British Command

By 29 March, the force was anchoring in the Sudanese Red Sea port of Suakin. Here the men came under British command, swopping their red jackets for khaki and a variety of duties. They marched across the desert in a large hollow square formation, took part in skirmishes with the Arabs, rode as part of a camel corps and cleared scrub to help build the railway. They endured fever, dysentery, sunstroke and debility – and the telegraph[2] and steamers sped home accounts of their exploits, written both by Australian journalists and the soldiers themselves. For people at the time, it gave an immediacy to the conflict that was echoed years later when the Vietnam war was beamed into Australian lounge rooms. In Australia, patriotic funds raised money for the soldiers' families. Musicians composed stirring melodies - the sheet music for works such as *The Soudan March* and *Welcome Home March* can be found in the National Library. Two of the force died, one of dysentery, they were the first people to die overseas while serving in an Australian expeditionary force.

[1] Hutchinson & Myers: 1885, p15
[2] Hutchinson & Myers: 1885, p104

Although Britain's Gladstone had warned the Sudanese were gallant fellows fighting for their independence, little was heard about Australian opinions of their foes.

Instead, it was all about the Empire - the Australians competed with the British soldiers and did not find themselves wanting.[3] In May 1885, they set sail again, by June, the khaki-clad men were back in Sydney, standing to attention for a heroes' welcome in the pouring rain. Brogden says "the men of the Sudan Contingent were the first diggers and they went overseas to announce the fact that Australia was a nation."

First Contact, Soon Forgotten

This was also Australia's first contact as a nation with Sudan. For my parents' generation, that is, those in their eighties, this contingent was very well known. There are reminders of those times in street names all over this country – for example there's a Khartoum Road not far from Macquarie University.

But as time wore on, the story of Gordon and Sudan and the Australian contingent was put aside for stories from Gallipoli. My generation of New South Wales school students was more likely to hear about Sudan at Sunday School, through the accounts of the missionaries working in the south and in the central Nuba Mountains.

Muriel Pickworth, Missionary

In the 1950s, a young churchgoer in Victoria called Muriel Pickworth was captivated by the missionary tales and joined a support group called the Friends of Sudan. She trained as a nurse, studied at Bible College and at the age of 35, she was accepted by the Sudan United Mission and set sail for Sudan. Packed in her trunk was a damask tablecloth and six serviettes she had embroidered with

[3] Brogden: 1943, p 64

Australian wildflowers – she had been asked to bring such a cloth for use when the Governor came to tea.

Muriel lived in the Nuba Mountains and later in the south, studying Arabic and local languages. Bicycles and feet were the usual method of transportation, although some missionaries had vehicles and occasional access to the Missionary Aviation Fellowship plane. Muriel ran a dispensary and taught villagers literacy, but most of all she was there to spread the gospel. When Muriel retired to Australia in her sixties, she named her home Itfaddalu, the Arabic word for welcome.

Her Australian supporters had kept prayer cards featuring her photo and a verse from the Bible – but few would have seen, met or talked with anyone from Sudan. Our impressions of Sudan at that time were shaped by people such as Muriel, who had a love of the country and its people, but whose relationships with Sudanese were based on the idea of delivering enlightenment rather an exchange of knowledge among equals.

While missionaries provided one type of contact, at the government level countries were gaining independence and relationships changing. Sudan achieved independence in 1956 and was embroiled in its first civil war from then until the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement.
Australia's contact with Sudan was managed then, as now, through our embassy in Cairo, with occasional visits to Khartoum as required by officials and, more rarely, by the Ambassador.

Trade Mission

Today's reports of missions to Sudan are often full of gloom and doom, so it was refreshing to come across a glowing report of a 1975 mission to Africa on behalf of the Trade Development Council. The mission visited Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya and Sudan in May and June 1975 and their report was published in August of that year. John Debenham led the group, which included the regional director of the

then Department of Overseas Trade, the president of the Queensland Grain Growers' Association and the general manager of Waldorf Appliances. The group was "impressed by the potential of the Sudan both in terms of developments to date and possibilities yet to be realised."[4]
It noted that little was known about Australia and even less about us "as a possible source of supply of capital equipment, yet the similarities in climate and in the needs and solutions for dry land farming are apparent." "Considerable interest was displayed in Australian agricultural equipment, water-boring equipment and irrigation methods. One make of Australian agricultural product is in the country and is regarded as the best in the world."[5]

Training was another area where they felt there was "obvious scope for Australia's assistance both within Australia and on the job in the Sudan." The report found there was an urgent need to support the Sudanese government's planned rapid development of the country's resources and our aim should be to "contribute to progress in areas where we have the most to offer."[6]

They even somewhat unrealistically recommended basing an Australian trade representative in Khartoum to develop our trade relationship. "Sudan looks to Europe, the USA, China and Japan and increasingly to Arab countries for its needs," the report found." There is thus a communication problem that would be considerably helped if there was an overseas trade representative located in Khartoum."[7]

By the late seventies and early eighties, there were Sudanese students, mainly post-graduates, here on AusAID scholarships. Conversely, in the eighties, there were also Australians working in rural Sudanese high schools as part of a Sudanese government scheme run out of Britain to bring in graduates to teach English.

[4] Australian Department of Overseas Trade: 1975, p35
[5] Australian Department of Overseas Trade: 1975, p35
[6] Australian Department of Overseas Trade: 1975, p35
[7] Australian Department of Overseas Trade: 1975, p36

Ordinary Sudanese and Australians were now in contact on an equal basis, developing friendships and a knowledge of each other's history and culture.

Conflict Brought Aid Workers

However, as the trade report also foreshadowed, the political landscape changed quickly in Sudan and as the second civil war took hold, thoughts of trade were replaced with calls for emergency aid. Australia sent aid workers and emergency funds to Sudan, rather than agricultural equipment and sugar cane experts. It is difficult to calculate how many Australians are working in Sudan with aid organisations at any one time, as most work under the umbrella of international or other countries' organisations, such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent and various United Nations agencies.

Community Aid Abroad, now Oxfam Australia, ran a Sudan office for a while in the famine years of the 1980s and I recall that in the afternoon, when white Landcruisers lined up outside the British Club, the CAA rep came and went by battered yellow taxi.
Funds were limited and their vehicle had been sent where it was needed most, to the field.

Sudanese Arriving in Australia

For many Sudanese students in Australia, the political situation made a return home difficult, even dangerous. Thus some students stayed on, making their professional contributions here in Australia, including as senior members of the Australian Public Service. More Sudanese started to arrive in Australia, in particular the Sudanese Coptic community started to grow as they fled increasing discrimination conducting business in Khartoum. In Adelaide, a Sudanese restaurant opened called Umm Rakouba – the shelter.

Marianno Ngor became the representative of the new Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement in Australia. However although the group was officially recognised in 2000 by the Uniting Church of Australia, it

never achieved the profile here of say, the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front with Fessahie Ibrahim or the Timor independence movement with Jose Ramos Horta as spokesperson. Meanwhile, another Sudanese restaurant opened in Sydney's Oxford Street, called A Taste of the Nile.

More aid

By March 1993, John Kerin, then Minister for Trade and Overseas Development was saying that the "situation in war-torn Sudan represents a textbook case of how to ruin a promising country." Australia provided money for Operation Lifeline, the World Food Programme, UNICEF and non-government organisations on a regular basis and the war dragged on.

The Australian Embassy in Cairo continued to send staff to monitor events, especially aid projects, in northern Sudan and also made diplomatic protests about reports of human rights abuses as the war hotted up. In Nairobi, our High Commission staff – including AusAID staff, until those positions were withdrawn – monitored the aid program in the southern war zone.

In October 2001, the Australian Council for International Development made a five point policy resolution on Sudan, calling for a halt to bombing in the south and Nuba Mountains, a halt to oil exploration and for more help through AusAID. There was a rare demonstration outside Parliament House in Canberra, by southern Sudanese calling for peace, strongly supported by the Australian Greens, among others.

Darfur and Downer

In July 2004, the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers issued a rare joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Sudan, saying they were appalled and outraged by events in Darfur. Alexander Downer had already expressed his grave concern directly to the Sudanese Foreign Minister and called on the Sudanese

government to "fulfil its responsibility for the well-being and security of its own people."[8]

An editorial on 28 July 2004 in *The Age* said that if an international intervention force was sent, Australia should contribute troops. They asked why the Howard Government, which had been so insistent Australia's small contingent remain in Iraq, appeared "to have little interest in making even a similarly modest contribution to Darfur." By 6 April 2005, Mr Downer was speaking again, this time supporting the UN Security Council's decision to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.[9]

ADF and AFP contingents

Two weeks later, in response to a request from the UN, Downer and then Defence Minister Robert Hill announced a 15-person ADF contingent to support the United Nations Mission in Sudan, contributing air controllers, logistic support and military observers.

So, 120 years later, Australian forces were headed back to Sudan

In March 2006, they were joined by ten Australian Federal Police who had studied Arabic language and cultural awareness with Sudanese-Australian trainers at the Canberra Institute of Technology. Sudanese-Australian relations had come full circle – war had brought Sudanese to Australia and the flow of knowledge and enlightenment was officially passing in the other direction.

Sudan in Top Five Immigration Source Countries

[8] Downer & Goff: 25 July 2004
[9] Downer: 6 April 2005

In recent years, the numbers of Sudanese in Australia has boomed and there are now Sudanese communities in every state and territory capital and many regional centres.
Of the 12,000 people granted humanitarian visas in 2004-05, more than 5,000 were from Sudan. The top five source countries for settler arrivals in 2004-05 were the United Kingdom, New Zealand, China, India and Sudan.[10] Sudanese formed the third highest group of settler arrivals in South Australia, the second highest in the Northern Territory and the largest group in Tasmania

Many of these new arrivals have been plucked from refugee camps in Kenya, especially Kakuma, others came via Cairo. They are often, but not always, from the south, they speak Arabic, English and numerous Sudanese languages, especially Dinka and Nuer.
As the numbers of Sudanese have grown, so too have the community associations and also community support groups – and in the ACT, at least, they receive bipartisan support from all political parties. Notable work is performed by the migrant education services around the country and by innovative groups such as SAIL – Sudanese Australian Integrated Learning and the related Sudanese Online Research Association.

This year, for the first time, the Australian Bureau of Statistics produced census information in Sudanese languages – and it is interesting to note that there is a worldwide resurgence in these Sudanese languages as the disapora converses through websites and chatrooms.

While some struggle to come to grips with a life outside the war zone or refugee camps – issues involved include driving without licences, driving under the influence and domestic violence - others are achieving at school, on our tertiary campuses, on the basketball field and running tracks.

[10] Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: 2006, p109

Australia has had the first visit from a delegation from the fledgling Southern Sudan government. In August 2006, Lieutenant-General James Wani Igga, speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, visited Australia and appealed for increased involvement in Sudan with aid and investment. Wani Igga highlighted opportunities for Australian companies to invest in uranium, diamond and gold mining, oil and agriculture.
He said Sudan needed help to rebuild the country's infrastructure and to repatriate millions of refugees after more than 20 years of civil war.

Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report

Some options for future Australian assistance have been canvassed in a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). The report notes our contribution to the UN Mission in Sudan and says that "like other western countries engaged in the war on terror, Australia has an enduring interest in not seeing another failed state in an already unstable region, so it's very much in our interest to help in whatever way possible with the reconstruction of the country, whether in Darfur or in the south."[11] ASPI also notes our aid contribution to date and suggests the Australian Government provides extra funds or emergency aid, "particularly during this very delicate period of transition to a UN operation."[12] ASPI recommends that "for longer term assistance, Canberra should consider funding projects in education, dry farming and road building – three projects that will require special attention in Darfur, as well as in the South, once the reconstruction begins, and in which we have demonstrated expertise."[13]

If Australia needs to talk further, the government could contact people like Canberra's Abdon Agau, a Sudanese-Australian who has returned to Juba to head the new Southern Sudanese civil service. Abdon is one of many Sudanese-Australians, both here and in Sudan, who are keen to use their expertise to build a new and just nation.

The United Nations TOKTEN project is seeking to recruit Sudanese (or dual) nationals living overseas for assignments in Sudan. The potential exists for the Australian government to take this idea a step further and set up an innovative scheme to support Australian-Sudanese professionals to work in Sudan for a period. This could be as simple as providing top-up funds for secondments out of our public service to positions with international or non-government organisations in Sudan. Australia could also facilitate a Sudanese consular office here in Australia rather than relying on Khartoum's distant outpost in Jakarta. The government might even consider trade representation in Juba and Khartoum.

Conclusion

However as Darfur boils and Sudanese President Omar El Bashir considers his government's options, what is actually being debated in Australia is whether or not to send peacekeepers and if so, how many. It is an appropriate debate, but it is also timely to take a step to one side and look at the breadth and depth of the Australian-Sudanese story.

Our relationship with Sudan was born in colonial times out of war and racism.

In the century and more that has followed, successive Australian governments found Sudan to be a continent too far away and in many ways it was left to missionaries, volunteer teachers, aid workers and the occasional enthusiastic trade mission to strengthen ties.

Racism and neglect have fanned years of civil war in Sudan and now war once again has brought Sudan and Australia together, this time through our immigration program.

[11] Rakisits: 2006, p13
[12] Rakisits: 2006, p13
[13] Rakisits: 2006, p13

Australia's Sudanese community, in all its forms, is already a recognisable feature of our society. Sudanese-Australians now have the numbers and increasingly, the momentum, to shape and positively impact on the ways our countries interact at both local community and national political levels. Let us embrace our shared future and make the most of what is destined to be a very close family relationship.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The University of New England has a unique artefact reflecting Australian interest in the Sudan at the turn of the nineteenth century: a three-storey high stained glass window depicting scenes from the life of Gordon of Khartoum including his final days amongst the Sudanese. Made in England by Pre-Raphaelite Herbert John Westlake, at the request of Frederick Robert White, one of Nobel novelist Patrick White's forebears, it was installed in Booloominbah, White's home in 1901. The homestead, in its day possibly the largest private house in Australia, is now the University's administration and reception centre but the window may be seen by visitors to Armidale or virtually at http://www.une.edu.au/about/une/gordon.php. Scenes include Gordon negotiating with slave traders in Darfour in 1877 and in Khartoum in 1885, unarmed but defiant to the end.

African Political Thought and International Relations Theory: Challenges and Prospects

Christopher LaMonica

E-mail: Christopher.LaMonica@vuw.ac.nz

Overview:

This paper is a response to a visibly declining interest in African area studies over the past two decades and the continent's ongoing marginalization in international affairs. Particular attention is given to the widely debated commentary of Gavin Kitching and an argument made by Africanists Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw in their book, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*.[14] In June 2000, Kitching famously announced his formal withdrawal from African area studies as it was, in his view, "depressing." Dunn and Shaw argue that: 1) IR theory is inappropriate for the African political context due to the ambiguity of the African "sovereign state"; and 2) IR theory systematically marginalizes Africa due to its "Western bias" and assumptions. William Brown challenged Dunn and Shaw on theoretical grounds arguing that "problematic issues in IR theory do not simply appear when one moves one's focus to Africa, they are there to begin with."[15] In support of Brown's thesis, the author takes the argument one step further by suggesting that the ideas of African political theorists can and should be integrated into the *corpus* of IR theory. The reasons why *African* political ideas have generally not been integrated into IR theory are demonstrative of, *inter alia*: 1) A broader challenge to African theorists, more due to the logistics of participating in social science debates than to any "Western" desire to marginalize African ideas and 2) A lack of professional motive or desire among IR theorists to alter the (admittedly Eurocentric) intellectual framework established by E.H. Carr and Morgenthau.[16] In the coming years, these circumstances are likely to change, and in the conclusion possible avenues for integration of African historical experience and ideas into the ongoing debates within IR theory are proposed.

[14] Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
[15] William Brown, "Africa and international relations: a comment on IR theory, anarchy and statehood," *Review of International Studies* (2006), 32, 119-143.

Recent Marginalization of Africa: Theory and Practice

In a remarkable June 2000 contribution to *African Studies Review*, Gavin Kitching, Associate Professor in Politics from the University of New South Wales in Sydney explained: "In a word, I gave up African studies because I found it depressing."[17] Kitching had originally entered the field at a time when "hope and optimism in and about Africa" had dominated; these had now been "replaced by pessimism and cynicism."[18] A few years earlier Immanuel Wallerstein, reached a similar conclusion:

> When I first set foot in Africa, in Dakar in 1952, I came in contact with an Africa in the last moments of the colonial era, an Africa in which nationalist movements were coming into existence and rapidly flourishing everywhere. I came in contact with an Africa whose populations, and particularly its young people, were optimistic and sure that the future looked

[16] E.H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (1948).
[17] Gavin Kitching, "Why I gave up African Studies," *African Studies Review & Newsletter*, vol. XXII, 1 (June 2000): 21-26.
[18] Ibid: 21.

> bright... In 1952, Africans were not alone in such sentiments... similar sentiments pervaded the peoples of Europe. And the general optimism was shared even, perhaps especially, in the United States... [yet] the optimistic, positive language the world used in the 1950s and 1960s was exceptional and, it seems, momentary.[19]

These were some of the sad testimonies available to me as a graduate student of African politics from 1995-2000 and they are indicative of the intellectual climate of the time. In fact, Kitching's piece entitled "Why I gave up African studies" was written just months prior to my own doctoral dissertation defense on local governance in Zambia. During my *séjour* at Boston University's African Studies Center, it was hard not to notice the sleepy atmosphere, and the general pessimism that pervaded this once vibrant part of political science study.

To the few students pursuing study in this area today, some of whom are in the process of contemplating their future teaching careers, the message seems clear: African area studies is no longer popular. Whereas the previous generation of scholars had worked in an atmosphere of "optimism and hope," today's generation is presented with an Africa that is given the option of "participate or fall off the face of the Earth." As a result, many of the Federally-funded centers for African area studies throughout the US (some of which were established in the 1940s and 1950s) are now virtually empty.[20] Obviously there is little incentive for those employed within the remaining centers to complain about these new circumstances but they are real and worthy of careful consideration. Unlike the medical profession, where doctors are always required to address the needs of the sick and ailing, social science is largely guided by individual interest and, say some, areas of "national interest." Clearly, for the majority of social scientists today, this does not include Africa.

[19] Immanuel Wallerstein, "What Hope Africa? What Hope the World?" in *After Liberalism*, (New York: The New Press, 1995): 46, 48.

[20] A full list of African Studies Centers in the US and elsewhere is provided on: http://africa.msu.edu/ascs.htm

Indeed, the very notion that a social scientist should take an interest in Africa out of humanitarian interest is largely viewed as wrongheaded, patronizing, and foolish. The prevailing wisdom seems to be that African states are now "mired in history," as suggested by Francis Fukuyama, and it is ultimately up to Africans to make the appropriate liberal choices.[21] Now that Cold War ties with Africa are no longer needed, "aid" – to include humanitarian aid – is often viewed as detrimental to African interests.[22] In other words, "to help is to hurt" and it is in this new environment, hostile to what is now seen as patronizing investigations of Africa, that Kitching and Wallerstein reached their conclusions.

Much of the pessimism about Africa is based on Africanists' new doubts of their long-held views on Africa and/or "solutions" to Africa's woes. Often remarked, particularly in US contexts, is that many of the Africanist professors that continue to work within these environments are, like Kitching, avowedly Marxist in their orientation. While these former advocates of nationalization and other politically leftist ideas are begrudgingly altering their lecture notes, any remaining Marxist logic used in the classroom tends to only further alienate the largely conservative student body that now

[21] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *National Interest* (1989).

[22] Literature critically assessing the need for aid goes back to at least the University of Chicago debates of the 1960s. See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 1962): 301-309 and, more generally, the works of Milton Friedman, including: *Capitalism and Freedom*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). These arguments gained tremendous popularity in the 1980s during the Reagan and Thatcher years. With regard to a recent – and quite convincing – critique of humanitarian aid see, e.g. Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*, (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2002) and Thomas G. Weiss, "Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2001): 419-428.

seems to shun discussions of African politics.[23] This highly visible *lack of interest* is a remarkable reversal from previous decades.

The very fact that a Marxist orientation remains popular among Africanists past and present should not come as a surprise; it is difficult to argue the merit of debating "ideas" when discussing African realities that are so often dominated by poverty, greedy elites and other materialist concerns. Put simply, historical materialism strikes a chord for many in African area studies, whereas debating the merits of ideas in political philosophy seems to be little more than a luxury reserved for "ivory tower" elites. Ironically, this is precisely what many Western students say about Marxist-Africanists in a post-Cold War world. As one observer wrote on the *Chronicle of Higher Education* web-site, Marxists like Kitching are now: "ineffectual, insulated and irrelevant."[24] And it is perhaps this perception, more than any other, which explains Kitching's decision to move to other areas of political study. That is, it may have been more than just the subject that was "depressing" to him.

Throughout the 1990s African leaders who had historically expressed some support for Marxist views went on believing that the pattern of Cold War patronage would continue in some form. In June 1993, for example, the then presidential hopeful Nelson Mandela expressed his vision for some form of Marshall Plan for South Africa: "What we expect," he told *Time* magazine, "is that the Western world, led by the US, should ensure that massive measures of assistance are given to the people of South Africa."[25] But, of course, this did not occur – especially from the US. From 1960 to 2000, the US stance on aid changed dramatically; similar patterns of declining ODA can be seen with regard to virtually all of the OECD, including the UK, Australia

[23] Kitching's piece, and the statement that he remained avowedly Marxist, led to extensive debate on "a discipline adrift" in the years that followed. See, e.g. http://chronicle.com/colloquy/2003/adrift/

[24] See comments posted on ibid by Brad Geltapfel.

[25] Mandela interview in *Time*, June 14, 1993, quoted in Anthony Sampson, *Mandela: The Authorized Biography*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999): 507.

and New Zealand. Exceptions to this pattern include Scandinavian states such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, yet they have been far from consistent. **Table 1:**

Net ODA to 'Third World' States as a Percentage of GNP (OECD): US vs. Total (1960-2000)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
US	***0.53***	***0.31***	***0.27***	***0.21***	***0.12***
OECD Total	*0.52*	*0.34*	*0.37*	*0.33*	*0.25*
(UK)	0.56	0.37	0.35	0.27	0.32
(Australia)	0.38	0.59	0.48	0.34	0.30
(New Zealand)	0	0	0.33	0.23	0.21
(Denmark)	0.09	0.38	0.74	0.94	1.06
(Norway)	0.11	0.33	0.87	1.17	0.80
(Sweden)	0.05	0.37	0.78	0.91	0.80

Sources: OECD, *Development Cooperation* (various years), cited in Theodore H. Cohn, *Global Political Economy* (2006); Sachs (2005b): 87.

The logic for devoting 0.12% of GDP to Official Development Assistance, while other OECD states have continued to provide ten times that proportion, is another clear demonstration of today's prevailing stance toward providing "assistance" to developing

regions of the world, including Africa: "to help is to hurt." If anything, the promoters of the "Washington Consensus" would like to convince other donors of the need to reduce aid. Like "well-intentioned" social science inquiry, the logic is that it is more likely to hurt than to help Africans. According to this view, the Cold War "African state" had been a place of corruption and inefficiency; to remove the politically motivated flow of funds is the path toward better governance, less corruption, and more accountability. Similarly, aid is said to have only distorted economic development, reducing the drive and motivation of the local entrepreneur. All of these developmental distortions, and presumably also the Marxist logic, should ultimately "wither on the vine," leading to a more prosperous Africa. With this new mindset, it should come as no surprise that the majority of students – particularly those within the US – tend to take an interest in areas other than Africa.

For those who bother to look, statistics on Africa's marginalization in world affairs are not difficult to find. Political economist Theodore Cohn reminds us that the developed market economies of the world account for 92 % of outward stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 72% of the inward stocks. Thus, in practice, there exists a "triad including the European Union, North America, and Japan" as the main sources *and* recipients of FDI.[26] In fact, mutual support within this triad was the stated objective of the highly influential Trilateral Commission, established in 1973:

> [To] seek a private consensus on the specific problems examined in the Trilateral analysis. Consensus-seeking must be a central element in the Trilateral process... the commission will seek to educate audiences in the three regions, so that public opinion in Japan, North America, and Europe will come to reflect private consensus.[27]

[26] Cohn (2006): 309.

[27] Gerard C. Smith, cited in Holly Sklar (ed.), *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, (Boston: South End Press, 1980): xii.

Much has been written on the self-interested motives of the Trilateral Commission vis-à-vis the developing world and this need not be repeated here. Suffice to say that, since the 1990s, the term "triadization" is used by some to describe a new kind of hegemony, dominated by liberal policies, and shared by three dominant countries/regional blocs: the US/North America, Germany/EU and Japan/East Asia.[28] Critics of developed state dialogue within the Trilateral Commission, or a developed state organization like the OECD, fear that this can only lead to the virtual exclusion of "the Rest" which includes Africa.

Diagram 1: Triadization and Africa



For Marxists, these kinds of disproportionate benefits in the global economy were often portrayed in terms of rich-poor or core-periphery, whereby the developed world had disproportionately benefited from the historical development of capitalism. In the 1980s – considered a "lost decade" for Africa – even proponents of

[28] Tim Allen and Alan Thomas, *Poverty and Development: Into the 21st-Century*, 2nd Edition, (Oxford University Press, 2000): 252.

laissez-faire capitalism began to question the direction of development in some regions of the world. In 1982, John Ruggie argued, for example, that the post-World War II period of decolonization was dominated by "embedded liberalism" which led to "lending and investment in the peripheral areas that has been both relatively lower [than under laissez-faire liberalism in the 19th-century] and positively correlated with core expansion..."[29] In other words, liberal practices of the 20th-century were leading to a concentration of wealth in the core developed states, as the reverse was occurring in peripheral underdeveloped states. And the statistics of the past few decades appear to back-up Ruggie's argument: when one considers inward stocks of FDI into Africa, as a percentage of the world total, they have declined from 7% in 1975 to just 2% in 1995.[30] By contrast, developed market economies (Western Europe, the US, and Japan) maintained between 73% and 80% of the world total during the same period.[31] The point here is that the practical realities of FDI flows within the triad, the three-decade-long pursuits of the Trilateral Commission, and the cooperative policy-making of OECD states, all have clear parallels with the theoretical discussions that take place in the political science classroom: interest in Africa is on the decline.

Economist Jeffrey Sachs, working as Special Advisor to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has in recent years fought against both the marginalization of African concerns in international affairs and, in particular, the idea that OECD development assistance should be kept to a minimum. In his best-selling book, *The End of Poverty*, Sachs states that the Marshall Plan provided "more than 1 percent of US GNP, on average, from 1948 through 1952 to rebuild Western Europe, around ten times the current effort as a share of GNP."[32]

[29] John Gerard Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 1982).
[30] Cohn (2006): 283.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Jeffrey Sachs, *The End of Poverty: How we can help make it happen in our lifetime*, (Penguin Books, 2005): 342. Critique of a Marshall Plan for Africa is certainly more prevalent. *Economist* writer Robert Guest suggests, for example: "Africa has already received aid equivalent to six Marshall Plans." Robert Guest, *The Shackled Continent*, (Pan Books, 2005), p. 150.

Sachs also argues that Africa and other underdeveloped regions of the world are a crucial part of US national interest - "development aid is just as fundamental as military spending to US national security."[33] Critics of Sachs' previous work on structural reform in the transitional economies of the world might well argue that Sachs' new focus on Africa is equally misguided and, quite possibly, detrimental.

The Essentialists' Argument:

One recurring argument among Africanists is that Africa is somehow essentially different from the rest of the world. In the recent literature on IR theory, this is perhaps most vividly expressed by Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw in their book, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*.[34] Dunn and Shaw argue that: 1) IR theory is inappropriate for the African political context due to the ambiguity of the African "sovereign state"; and 2) IR theory systematically marginalizes Africa due to its 'Western bias' and assumptions. The primary challenge to IR theory, in their view, is the inappropriateness of the historical development of the "sovereign state" in Africa. In other words, IR theorists do not take into account the uniqueness of the African continent. William Brown, Lecturer in Politics at the Open University, challenged Dunn and Shaw on theoretical grounds in a recent article in the *Review of International Studies* (2006). Brown argues that "problematic issues in IR theory do not simply appear when one moves one's focus to Africa, they are

[33] Jeffrey Sachs, "The Development Challenge," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (March/April 2005): 86.
[34] Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

there to begin with."[35] That is, notions such as anarchy and sovereignty – which Dunn and Shaw suggest are challenging IR theory due to Africa's uniqueness – have been challenged and debated from the very beginning of IR, before Africa was a significant concern.

In support of Brown's thesis, one can take the argument one step further by suggesting that the ideas of African political theorists can be integrated into the *corpus* of IR theory. Thus far there has been resistance to doing so, largely based on essentialist logic. Edward Said famously and rightly warns of the dangers of essentialist thinking toward the Middle East in his seminal book *Orientalism*; Dunn and Shaw, and a great many other essentialist Africanists, may well be leading us down a similar path when it comes to Africa. As with the Middle East, Africa is certainly not one monolithic place that is essentially different. It is still inhabited by fellow human beings who share similar hopes, fears and desires to other human beings elsewhere. How quickly we forget that *homo sapiens* all came from the same place, in northeast Africa, only some tens of thousands of years ago. Africa reminds us of our common genesis and that IR practice should involve a renewed encounter with our fellow man.

Beyond an essentialist bias among many Africanists, the reasons why *African* political ideas have generally not been integrated into IR theory are demonstrative of, *inter alia*: 1) A broader challenge to African academics, due more to the complex logistics of participating in social science debates than to any "Western" desire to marginalize African ideas and 2) A lack of professional motive or desire among IR theorists, throughout the world, to alter the (admittedly Eurocentric) intellectual framework established by E.H. Carr and Morgenthau.[36] This author rejects the essentialist argument

[35] William Brown, "Africa and international relations: a comment on IR theory, anarchy and statehood," *Review of International Studies* (2006), 32, 119-143.

[36] E.H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (1948).

of Dunn and Shaw and suggests that parallels of political thought and historical experience do exist; the problem is that the work remains to be done. For the moment, Eurocentric and Afrocentric theorists alike tend to emphasize *difference*, as is expected in mainstream social science. But as Said has argued, difference was not the only objective of Enlightenment thinkers; stressing our common human experience was also, rightly, one of their worthy lessons to the world. Cartesian thinking does have its strengths but one must not lose sight of the subject, which is human life, nor should one get caught in the trap of "nationalist" logic that seeks out one or another national source of "brilliance." Here, possible avenues for integration of African historical experience and ideas into the ongoing debates within IR theory are proposed. Before doing so, a brief presentation of the historical development and resulting framework of IR theory is required.

The Intellectual Origins of the Academic Discipline Known As 'International Relations'

International Relations was originally a theory-based discipline.[37] Indeed, the continued prominence of theoretical discussions remains so central to the study of IR that the ever-popular "IR major" at university, as it is now generally known, is often combined with other, more "practical," academic disciplines such as business, communications, environmental studies, languages, and the like. While a growing number of students clearly enjoy the study of IR, and understand its practical relevance to various other fields of study, there remains a clear understanding of – and sometimes disappointment with – its theoretical "social science" orientation. When one considers the foundational texts that make reference to "International Relations," it quickly becomes clear that political theory predates international relations theory. In fact, early scholars of IR (notably E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau) drew on the lessons of political theory to establish the lessons to be learnt from

[37] See: Burchill, et al. (2005): 1.

history. Their concern, and the concern of many politicians of the early twentieth-century, was with the growth of international cooperative ventures, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, which some (moralists, idealists, or international liberals) argued should be based on shared normative values, ethics or a sense of morality. Underlying the debate was the prospect of international organization and, most importantly, of having one global authority. As Brown argues, from the very start the notions of anarchy and sovereignty had its proponents and challengers; African politics is, therefore, far from presenting a new challenge to IR theory.

At universities around the world, such issues are dutifully introduced to the growing number of IR majors, as are the foundational texts of the field; notably E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (1948) – albeit in an excerpted or summarized form.[38] What many students are told is that the study of international relations which, again, began as a theoretical discipline, is generally divided into two major schools, or "frameworks of analysis:" Realism and Idealism.[39] Admittedly the discipline of IR has since expanded to include other paradigms including Liberalism, Historical Structuralism, Feminism, Constructivism, and Critical Theory, to name a few, but the "fundamental rift" of politics is between supporters of the *status quo* and of change; in IR this rift is expressed as a political struggle between Realists and Idealists.

The foundational texts of Carr and Morgenthau introduced a framework of intellectual contributions to political realism that has

[38] E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (Harper Perrenial, 1964, originally published in 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* 7th Ed., (McGraw-Hill, 2005, originally published in 1948).

[39] Burchill, et al. (2005). The term "Liberalism" is often used instead of "Idealism" as the latter is considered to be somewhat pejorative. Further, in the US context, the term Liberalism is used to denote a more impractical Idealism, rather than what "classic" European thinkers, such as Adam Smith and John Locke had in mind, respectively: Economic and Political Freedom.

since become known as the canon of Realism in International Relations Theory, i.e. the intellectual basis for supporting a global "system" of sovereign states in a world of anarchy. And it is this realist perspective that has, ever since, played a central role in the study of IR theory. Accordingly, the first chapter of any IR text will generally stress the centrality of realism to the study of IR. Political realists are portrayed as dominating IR practice throughout history and, although realist practice has always dominated state power relations, the Treaty of Westphalia (1638) is deemed by many to be the formal start of IR.[40] It is this realistic argument in IR, based on the dominance of power politics, anarchical assumptions and the role of sovereign states that Dunn and Shaw are seemingly most concerned about.

Ever since the 1930s, the study of international relations has been framed as an ongoing struggle between Idealists – who Morgenthau referred to as Moralists, who emphasize the centrality of ethics, justice, and change to IR – and Realists, who remind us that the primary concern of any state is survival – therefore focusing on the centrality of *power* and *order*. By drawing lessons from history, what was especially important to Carr and Morgenthau was to demonstrate that traditional (usually military) strength, or *power* was crucial to understanding outcomes of relations between states. Again, these foundational texts relied on lessons from within the West. The intellectual framework for the study of IR started with Thucydides (now considered the "Father of Realism"), and following a pattern of Western intellectual thought, skipped the "Dark Ages," to continue with the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and a handful of others, including, perhaps, Otto van Bismark. Nowhere is there any serious consideration given to historical events in other parts of the world and, most importantly, to any political theory or practice from outside the West. To this day, the study of IR is largely presented as if the West had a historical monopoly on realist theory and practice.

[40] As the principle of state sovereignty is said to have been established at the Treaty of Westphalia, it is now considered, by many, to be the formal start of International Relations.

In twentieth century the dominance of political realism in IR theory was seemingly supported by state practice. Leading into the Second World War, for example, political realists had been successful at halting the activities of the League of Nations, established at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.[41] By the 1940s, realists like Morgenthau were well aware, and wary of the new institutional arrangements being made in the name of "international cooperation" as outlined in the United Nations Charter in 1945. Indeed, the rapid declaration of UN resolutions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948) were viewed by realists as being of little practical use and, even, potentially dangerous.[42] Such declarations, in their view, had to be backed by an ability to enforce compliance and this the UN lacked. The UN Security Council was neutered by the ability of any one member to veto any decision to use force. For them, a more realistic and effective approach to international conflict was to have individual sovereign states take responsibility for their own affairs, including the "rational" pursuit of one's defence, or the pursuit of one's own "national interest." And this, again, required the acquisition and maintenance of state power. Morgenthau's definitive list of the six principles of realism have been a classic of international relations ever since.[43]

The opposing view is presented by (in what are often considered pejorative terms) Idealists, Moralists, or Liberal Internationalists who contend that cooperative international arrangements are indeed the best path to world peace. In their view, the establishment of new networks of communication, possible through transnational

[41] The League continued to function during World War II, although its security operations were halted in 1941. It was formally disbanded in 1946.
[42] This was certainly true of critics of the League, including Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. A more recent realist position on this point is to be found in Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1995) or Patrick Buchanan, *A Republic, Not An Empire* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2002).
[43] Hans J. Morgenthau (1948), *op cit.*, Ch. 1.

endeavors (such as the League of Nations or the UN) is one of the best guarantees of avoiding future conflict. Certainly this was the view of the "idealist" US President Woodrow Wilson who, in his effort to convince others of the need for a League of Nations, stated:

> There is only one power to put behind the liberation of mankind, and that is the power of mankind. *It is the power of the united moral forces of the world, and in the Covenant of the League of Nations the moral forces of the world are mobilized.* For what purpose? Reflect, my fellow citizens, that the membership of this great League is going to include all the great fighting nations of the world, as well as the weak ones.[44]

The political realists of the time, with the same enthusiasm and sense of urgency, argued the exact opposite. US Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, one of Wilson's fiercest opponents to the League of Nations argued:

> No doubt many excellent and patriotic people see a coming fulfillment of noble ideals in the words 'league for peace.' We all respect and share these aspirations and desires, but some of us see no hope, but rather defeat, for them in this murky covenant. For we, too, have our ideals, even if we differ from those who have tried to establish a monopoly of idealism. Our first ideal is our country, and we see her in the future, as in the past, giving service to all her people and to the world. Our ideal of the future is that she should continue to render that service of her own free will. She has great problems of her own to solve, very grim and perilous problems, and a right solution, if we can attain to it, would largely benefit mankind. We would have our country strong

[44] President Woodrow Wilson, September 25, 1919. Emphasis mine.

> to resist a peril from the West, as she has flung back the German menace from the East. We would not have our politics distracted and embittered by the dissensions of other lands. *We would not have our country's vigor exhausted or her moral force abated, by everlasting meddling and muddling in every quarrel, great and small, which afflicts the world. Our ideal is to make her ever stronger and better and finer, because in that way alone, as we believe, can she be of the greatest service to the world's peace and to the welfare of mankind.*[45]

The debate over the virtues of transnational organizations continues to this day. The conservative American politician Pat Buchanan recently went as far as to suggest that the United States should kick the United Nations headquarters out of the country, adding "If you have trouble leaving we'll send up 10,000 US Marines to help you pack."[46]

By contrast, in the 1970s, Princeton University Professor Richard Falk considered transnational networks of communication to be so important to the prospects for world peace that he helped to establish what he termed the World Order Model Project (WOMP), through which he and others published many articles and books.[47] Like Morgenthau before him, Falk argues that the other group – in his case the political realists - is wrongheaded and their focus on *power* potentially dangerous. Not only does Falk believe that realists "do not understand," he goes further, arguing that it might well take someone from the southern hemisphere to lead the way. In his view, we in the West are simply too entrenched in our discussions of power to consider alternatives. Any consideration of alternatives to power politics takes place in a kind of "shadowland" of academic

[45] U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, "Against the League of Nations," Washington, D.C., August 12, 1919. Emphasis mine.
[46] "UN Dismisses Pat Buchanan's Call for US to Kick Them Out," *Associated Press*, September 20, 2000.
[47] Richard Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds*, (New York: Free Press, 1975).

marginalization where for Westerners it can be "dangerous intellectual work that often engenders rejection..."[48] Some would coumter that certain Western scholars, notably Noam Chomsky, have built their careers on critiquing power politics.[49] Nevertheless, Falk argues:

> Grotius came from an independent state in the Protestant north of Europe that was the setting for revolt against the holistic domination of all Europe by the Catholic south. One would similarly expect that *our Grotius, if he or she emerges, will come from the Third World rather than from the advanced industrial countries.* The shadowland is more accessible to those who are victims of the old order, apostles of the new order, but who yet see that the hopes for a benign transition depend on the success of an ideological synthesis.[50]

Political idealists are generally concerned with wrongs associated with the existing order and looking for answers. They argue that answers to global woes necessitate change, often in the name of "justice."

The debates among IR scholars have created an intellectual framework that, to this day, barely includes perspectives from non-

[48] Richard Falk, "The Grotian Quest," *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective*, (R. Falk, F. Kratchowil, and S. Mendlovitz, eds. 1985), pp. 36-42, cited in Burns H. Weston, Richard Falk, and Anthony D'Amato, *International Law and World Order*, (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1990): 1087.
[49] See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, *The Umbrella of US Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of US Policy*, (Publishers Group West, 2002); Focusing largely on the Vietnam era, see: *For Reasons of the State*, (New Press, 2003); *Rogues States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs,* (South End Press, 2000); and Chomsky's ever popular *Deterring Democracy*, (Hill and Wang, 1992).
[50] Falk (1985) in Weston, et al. (1990), p. 1091. Emphasis author's.

Western regions of the world. If Africa is mentioned, it rarely figures as a source of political ideas. In his book *But Not Philosophy: Seven Introductions to Non-Western Thought,* George Anastaplo surveys the political literature from non-Western parts of the world to argue this very point.[51] Given the method of using pre-existing political philosophy as the intellectual basis for IR theory, one could easily conclude that without non-Western political philosophy there could not possibly be any positive development of international relations theory in the non-West. Indeed, Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya are currently working on a book entitled: *Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory.*[52] The consensus among international relations theorists matches that of many political theorists; both are presented as entirely Western intellectual enterprises. The resulting framework is typically presented as follows (Table 1.2):

[51] George Anastaplo, *But Not Philosophy: Seven Introductions to Non-Western Thought,* (Lexington Books, 2002).

[52] The promise of a book follows the presentation of a conference paper under the same title in Singapore, July 2005.

Table 1.2
Paradigms of International Relations

	REALISM	IDEALISM	LIBERALISM	HISTORICAL STRUCTURALISM	CRITICAL THEORY
Focus	'What is'; History; Status Quo.	'What ought to be'; Alter status quo.	Freedom (Political and Economic); Gradual evolution of status quo.	Exploitation	Includes: Feminism; Race & Ethnicity; Green Perspectives; Postmodernism ; Etc.
Assumptions	Belief in *universals*: Self- Interest; Power. Order is desirable.	An objective understanding of morality is possible and worth striving for	Comparative Advantage (we all have something to offer); Principle of Self-	Limited global wealth; individual workers (*proletariat*) and LDCs are poor due to the exploitative	May alter all other perspectives on IR theory and practice.

		(international law); Unless the existing order is just, change is warranted.	determination.	behavior of elites (*bourgeois*).	
Key Terms	Power; Order.	Justice; Change.	*Laissez-faire*; Individualism.	Historical Materialism; Determinism; Imperialism; Class struggle; Core-Periphery Analysis.	Gender; Discrimination; Tragedy of the Commons; Discourse; Etc.
Solutions	Balance of Power; State Sovereignty.	Philospher Kings (Plato); International Cooperation; International Law; Trans-national solutions.	Free Market; Bretton Woods Institutions: IMF, WB, WTO.	Revolution; UNCTAD and other UN General Assembly aims; NIEO demands.	Education; Policy Change; Methodological Change.
Critique	Does might make right? In a world where weapons of mass destruction, i.e. 'power,' can be hidden in a vial in someone's top pocket, is this still a good organizing principle?	Proposed solutions are too far removed from actual political practice, i.e. 'impracticality;' Fundamentalism; Religious fanatics; Utopian goals.	Distributional flaws.	Zero-Sum Logic.	Often as in Idealism; Neglecting the subject of politics which is "life and death."
Contributors	Thucydides Hobbes Machiavelli Bismark Morgenthau Kissinger	Ancient Greeks Hugo Grotius Wilson Falk	Locke Jefferson Rawls Smith Ricardo Friedman	Marx Lenin Prebisch Dos Santos Wallerstein	Tickner Said Foucault

Perhaps Falk is right that the force of change will come from outside of the West; but even within Western academic institutions there is a growing recognition that the study of IR is clearly Western-centric and that *something* needs to be done to alter this. To argue that African political ideas and practice have no relation to the paradigms of IR is inappropriate, inaccurate, and alienating to a growing number of students from Africa and throughout the non-West. While there may well be non-Western political ideas that fall outside of this traditional framework, a good starting point for improving dialogue among IR theorists would be the inclusion of realist, idealist, liberal and structuralist ideas into this existing framework. The first *something* that needs to be done, therefore, is to seek parallels from among the arguments within African political thought, and examples of African political practice – as, indeed, from all non-Western parts of the world. This could be a take off point for making the subject of "international relations" more internationally oriented, rather than dominated by the priorities and perspectives of the West.

Integrating African (and other Non-Western) Ideas into a More Global Framework of Inquiry: Are there lessons from other Disciplines?

Efforts to integrate non-Western ideas into Western academia are not new but they continue to be met with resistance. In his seminal book, *Orientalism*, Edward Said suggested that the process of separation between West and East (the Orient), was a vast distortion of the suggested path of many of Europe's Enlightenment writers whose primary aim was to prioritize the lessons of all of *humanity* and of *humane-ness* in all intellectual discussion.[53] Thus Said stated in the preface to the 25th-anniversary edition of *Orientalism* that, he considered himself a *humanist*. Like Idealism, Moralism, or Liberal Internationalism in IR theory, the term Humanism is generally shunned in favour of more power-oriented views of political

[53] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (Vintage, 1978).

questions; perhaps in fear of being thought of as naïve. A scholar of comparative literature, Said nevertheless suggests that individual contributions to intellectual thought should be considered as contributions of ideas to all of humanity, not as isolated pieces of thought, confined to geography, culture, or other spheres. Said argued that the portrayal of "the Other" as "different" leads to the objectification of fellow human beings that can, ultimately, lead to policies that neglect our common humanity. Said focused on the over-simplification of Western understandings of Islam within the media, which he saw as being greatly harmful to resulting international practices. He was a scholar who sought ways of "stepping back" from vital political debates to remember our common humanity.

Canadian writer, John Ralston Saul, has similarly argued (notably in *Voltaire's Bastards*) that the lessons of the Enlightenment are all too easily forgotten.[54] Saul's argument is that *rationality* has overtaken *reasonableness*, and it is the latter which the Enlightenment writers had in mind. With Said, Saul argues that "rational solutions" to problems tend to objectify others and thus what is so easily forgotten in the making of state policy, is the "human factor" which would not be ignored if the original lesson from the Enlightenment – *reasonableness* – was kept in the forefront of our thoughts. Saul reckons that the Western method of dividing all knowledge, or epistemology, into separate categories of thought, or areas of academic inquiry, leads to the development of "experts" within largely isolated disciplines. The Cartesian method is usually identified with this kind of "parts analysis", as is the typical structure of academic departments within universities. Thus rationally determined *efficiency* overpowers other values that are otherwise valued by society, including: equity, fairness, and the like.

The Anglo/American dominance of political theory has become increasingly apparent to the growing number of non-Western readers

[54] John Ralston Saul, *Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West*, (Vintage, 1992).

of "traditional" texts, in both popular and academic contexts.[55] Among those reactions is that of Claude Ake, who argues that the present structure of academic inquiry is directly linked to the priorities of capitalism (e.g. greed, selfishness, competition). Like Saul, Ake argues that human societies hold other values dear; the difference is that Ake seems to blame the West, and the Western domination of the social sciences, for the degradation of other values such as caring, compassion, community.[56] A recent letter from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to US President George Bush expressed similar concerns.[57] Caring, compassion, and community are values that all human societies do share to a greater or lesser extent, and have shared throughout history. Western sociologists, such as Robert Putnam, have famously emphasized the importance of such values to the proper functioning of democracies.[58]

Another reaction to Anglo/American dominance has been to introduce "new ideas" that are usually from a "Non-Western" geo-cultural or religious source. To the extent that the field of political science considers these alternative ideas at all, they are usually relegated to "area studies." Accordingly, the student of IR who might be interested in pursuing Asian or African ideas is left with little alternative but to enroll in the course of an area specialist and, understandably, this leaves many students with the clear impression that such ideas are essentially peripheral to the subject of IR. Neither of these responses to Anglo/American dominance aims at integrating intellectual ideas; that is, the dominating stance is one of essential difference. Amongst academic disciplines, political science is not unique in this respect but it presents an especially clear-cut case.

[55] The Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake, for example, has suggested that the current structure of the social science disciplines is nothing short of an extended form of imperialism. See: Claude Ake, *Social Science As Imperialism,* (Ibadan Press, 1979). See also: Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (Vintage, 1994); Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism*, (London: Routledge, 1994).

[56] Claude Ake, *op cit.* Similar arguments have been made by many "Non-Western" state leaders, such as Fidel Castro, and most recently in a letter from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran to US President George Bush. In the letter President Ahmadinejad wrote, for example: "The people of many countries are angry about the attacks on their cultural foundations and the disintegration of families. They are equally dismayed with the fading of care and compassion."

[57] The full text of this 18-page letter can be seen at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12984.htm. Reference to these "other" values is on the last page.

[58] Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone," *Journal of Democracy*, 6:1 (1995): 65-78.

The writings of at least some mythologists, psychologists, and anthropologists, demonstrate a willingness to contemplate parallels of thought, based on a common human experience.[59] It is when one begins to venture into the realm of political philosophy that the resistance seems to be the strongest. Yet, in an age when IR theory was still in its early development, German philosopher Karl Jaspers made an important contribution to the development of a global framework for the study of political philosophy. Jaspers' idea – that there was in history an "Axial Age" (800 BC to 200 BC) during which an intensity of philosophical thought took place, with interesting parallels, in China, India, and the West (Occident) – has, thus far, been almost entirely neglected by IR theorists.

Perhaps most controversial of all is the (ongoing) argument presented by Martin Bernal in his series entitled *Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization.*[60] Bernal argues that the Western tradition was developed by the European writers who were influenced by entrenched anti-Semitic and anti-Black (African)

[59] Again, not without controversy, in 1958 anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss *Structural Anthropology* (Penguin, 1968) famously proposed a structure for the study of anthropology. One of the main critiques of Levi-Strauss' ideas, among anthropologists has been that the structure he proposed came *before* any observation and that his idea was, therefore, unscientific.

[60] Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, (Rutgers, 1987).

views that had developed by the 17th and 18th centuries. He claims that the writings of the Ancient Greeks were not as isolating as later writers interpreted them to be. In the "Ancient Model" of Greek thought, there was more of an understanding of the influence of Mediterranean neighbours to the south and north on Greek ideas and culture, than was later acknowledged. If true, this would bolster the existing arguments that say that the Western inclination is to "separate" out "inconvenient" information.

Outside of anthropology, a few preliminary efforts to understand African political thought were conducted during the brief period of post-independence optimism but tragically, much of this inquiry was influenced by the prevailing logic of the Cold War. Writing for *World Politics* in 1966, for example, Kenneth Grundy suggests that "judged by volume, the most frequently discussed subject in the analytical literature is African economics, particularly socialism."[61] For decades, scholarly contributions to journals on African studies including the *Journal of African History* and the *Journal of Modern African Studies* were dominated by investigations of socialism on the African continent. Similarly, when African politics was mentioned in the leading journals on international affairs, such as *Foreign Affairs*, it was to emphasize the role of Marxism-Leninism in Africa and, in particular, the influence in Africa of either the Soviets or the Chinese.[62] Even the highly influential Zbignieuw Brzezinski, political advisor to several US presidents during the Cold War, published a 1963 study on the policy aspects of Communist influence in Africa.[63]

During most of the Cold War, African political thought was clearly viewed as being sympathetic to various forms of Marxism-Leninism and/or socialism. To government leaders such as Brzezinski,

[61] Kenneth W. Grundy, "Recent Contributions to the Study of African Political Thought," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966): 679.
[62] See, e.g., Walter Z. Laquer, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (April 1962): 152-169.
[63] Zbignieuw Brzezinski, *Africa in the Communist World* (Stanford, 1963), cited in Grundy (1966): 682.

Kissinger, and others, this mattered because it might impact on the global ideological battle to defeat Communism. Grundy also asks: "Is there such a thing as a distinctive African personality and distinctive African patterns of thought?" He concludes: "Those who have tried to analyze African ways of doing things invariably answer these questions positively."[64] Over the past few decades there is a documented history of scholars who view Africa as being essentially different including Dunn and Shaw, their unique insight into Africa's role offers little more: Africa is essentially different. Indeed they see this as Africa's challenge to international relations theory.[65]

Conclusion: Challenges and Prospects

Remaining Challenges:

In 1997 the author attended a health planning meeting in Zambia. During the discussion among "development practitioners," a Zambian participant suggested that what was being forgotten was "love" and that, if all of those in attendance could prioritize this thought, all would go well. After an awkward silence, the discussion continued as before. Had there been more acknowledgement of the popularity of Zambian Humanism, a philosophy introduced by former President Kenneth Kaunda, perhaps this idea would have fared better. Although it is a philosophy that recognizes the real and practical hardship that most Zambians are facing as local cultures and traditions are challenged, it is largely ignored by outsiders. The overarching idea: "We are in for a hard time, so let us be nice to each other..." would likely be placed under a heading such as Idealism. Examples of the use and maintenance of power to achieve desired results can also be found in the sub-Saharan African context as

[64] Grundy (1966): 683-684.
[65] Bernal, *op cit.*, would suggest that the process of *essentializing* Africa, as distinct from a Western project, began *not with the Ancient Greeks,* but with later European interpreters of Greek thought who had developed anti-Semitic and anti-African views; in other words, moreso than was the case in the Ancient world, a materially developed European world began to develop modern notions of race.

throughout the world. To argue that Realism and Idealism are solely Western phenomena is clearly wrongheaded. Moreover, it runs counter to historical facts and the very nature of the subject which is, after all, global in reach.

The portrayal of Africa and much of the non-West as Marxist (Historical Structuralist), and little else, is similarly unhelpful. Latin American *dependencistas*, Maoists, and a great many other theorists have been structuralist in their orientation, but to conclude that the non-West engages in international politics with only structuralist ideas in mind would be false. Realist and Idealist ideas are always part of one's "intellectual tradition," even if this is not the emphasis within the prevailing literature. There is certainly a longstanding tradition of African appeals (of varying degrees of sincerity) to the ideals of African unity. If anything, the intellectual battleground of the future may well be over various interpretations of liberalism. Kim Dae Jung, for instance, has argued that "long before Locke" notions of liberalism were to be found among the classic writers of Asia.[66] Quietly, but surely, the works of scholars, such as *The Liberal Tradition in China*, by William Theodore de Bary, are being discussed in university classrooms.[67] Assuredly, there are liberal ideas on the African continent, if only as new interpretations as to what 'freedom' might entail. Yet the task of categorizing African ideas remains largely unaddressed. In the table below Nelson Mandela is proposed as a leading proponent of democratic liberalism on the African continent; Jomo Kenyatta, Museveni, Houphouet-Boigny and others have maintained an open-ness to capitalism or free-market liberalism, but should not be portrayed as classic political liberals. During the Apartheid era the South African government was economically liberal but certainly not politically liberal. Such distinctions matter in discussions of IR theory, but the

[66] Kim Dae Jung, "The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994.

[67] William Theodore de Bary, *The Liberal Tradition in China*, (Chinese University Press, 1982).

political thinkers and practitioners cited are mostly Western and *virtually none* are African.[68]

Scholars who have endeavored to introduce political ideas from cultures outside the "West" into the dominant framework of political theory "classics," as they are presented in university curricula, are met with a host of challenges. Even a cursory look at the texts on political theory leaves the observer with the view that it remains a very Eurocentric area of academic inquiry. Yet the standard course on "Political Theory" in Western university contexts pretends to offer a comprehensive survey of political ideas. Time and again, such university courses survey the Ancient Greek classics, followed by a host of European Enlightenment thinkers, and other "Western" writers. Many universities have introduced "core curricula" that emphasize the significance of these Western classics with the largely unspoken assumption that the only real political ideas worth knowing come from *within* the Western heritage. "Eastern" or other influences on the Western tradition are scarcely, contemplated; the few writers who discuss them are systematically marginalized.

Progress at becoming more geographically, culturally, and linguistically *inclusive* has been painfully slow. Even the most basic task of identifying Realists and Idealists in non-Western contexts remains elusive. For a variety of professional, practical, and logistical reasons, the majority of the world's population has not yet dared to question the dominance of Western "classics" of political science inquiry as they are taught in academic institutions. Several scholarly exceptions have been mentioned in this paper; some have fought against the notion of separation, others have emphasized the importance of remembering our common human experience. Yet, despite their calls for change in the social sciences, the task of globalizing the subject of international relations remains incomplete. Students who are aware of the Western dominance are, understandably, more concerned with completion of their degrees,

[68] Africanist Peter Schraeder is among the few who make distinctions of this kind in the African context but he uses "Liberal vs Critical" traditions and speaks, predominantly, of Western contributors to these ideas.

than with addressing the problem and university professors are not rewarded for the *inclusion* of non-Western texts within the established curricula. The links between power and knowledge have been documented by writers such as Antonio Gramsci, and few dare to step outside of the traditional framework for presenting "intellectual contributions" to the study of IR. Is it a fear of being thought of as naïve or, as postmodernists might contend, of simply referring to the "right" classics to maintain professional credibility? Whatever the reasons today, the problem of Euro-American dominance in IR theory remains overwhelming for most Africanists. Specialists in non-Western thought and practice can help by moving away from monolithic essentialist arguments and toward more nuanced discussions of conservative and progressive ideals within their chosen area of study.

Prospects:

African scholarship is often portrayed as being at a crossroads. The first, most visible and perhaps most logical option is for African scholars to continue along the path established by earlier generations. The overwhelming majority of Africanists and African scholars have understandably emphasized the subversive role that capitalism played in African history. Now the increasingly visible choice of liberalization is generally portrayed as a positive step for African development. The policies of the past, including nationalization of industry, are quickly being dismantled. From this socialism vs. liberalism perspective, leaders like Mandela are heralded as African heroes, leading African citizen down the path of liberalization. Yet IR theory is not only about socialism and liberalism; the "fundamental rift" is between Realists and Idealists. The prevailing question in IR was never: Are you Communist or not? As Brown argues, IR theory, from the start, was preoccupied with such notions as anarchy, sovereignty, the challenges of international organization, and so forth. Yet the Cold War legacy still remains influential in how scholars think of African political thought and practice.

Twentieth-century scholarship on African politics has also emphasized: 1) The celebration and glorification of an African past that is based on age-old traditions (e.g. Mobutu's *Zairinisation*), empathy for fellow man, sharing and community (e.g. Nyere's *Ujaama*); and 2) The domination of capitalist culture and values, in politics, the social sciences, and elsewere. These arguments, again, are to be found throughout the world and Africans and/or Africanists should be careful when making essentialist generalizations. Of course, unlike "African" values, capitalist values are often portrayed as celebrating selfishness, greed, materialism, and exploitation. In his book *Social Science As Imperialism* (1979), Ake makes a strong case that the social sciences are dominated by these capitalist values.

One must also strive to understand, as many Africanists did in the 1960s, the post-independence appeal of Marxism-Leninism in African political contexts. A great many Africanist scholars joined colleagues elsewhere in viewing the historical development of capitalism as being harmful to the weak. Like the *dependencistas* of Latin America, many Africanist scholars emphasized the *underdevelopment* of Africa and the structural biases of the global economy that kept the African continent, like other underdeveloped regions of the world, in a dependent or peripheral state. Such perspectives are likely to remain popular in underdeveloped regions of the world, including Africa. There will be no shortage of Historical Structuralists to add to the Table of IR paradigms below. But there will also be more Realists and Idealists in African politics. The battleground of the future, among political theorists throughout the world, will be over the theory and practice of liberalism. Interpretations as to what "freedom" entails will be influenced by local geographies, histories, cultures, and priorities. African political thought is, and always has been much more nuanced than is so commonly supposed. The traditional categories of political thought, as they inform IR theory, can be an excellent place to start exploring the breadth and depth of these nuances.

Table 1.3
Paradigms of International Relations

	REALISM	IDEALISM	LIBERALISM	STRUCTURALISM	CRITICAL THEORY
Focus	'What is'; History; Status Quo.	'What ought to be'; Alter status quo.	Freedom (Political and Economic); Gradual evolution of status quo.	Exploitation	Includes: Feminism; Race & Ethnicity; Green Perspectives; Postmodernism; Etc.
Assumptions	Belief in *universals*: Self- Interest; Power. Order is desirable.	An objective understanding of morality is possible and worth striving for (international law); Unless the existing order is just, change is warranted.	Comparative Advantage (we all have something to offer); Principle of Self-determination.	Limited global wealth; individual workers (*proletariat*) and LDCs are poor due to the exploitative behavior of elites (*bourgeois*).	May alter all other perspectives on IR theory and practice.
Key Terms	Power; Order.	Justice; Change.	*Laissez-faire*; Individualism.	Historical Materialism; Determinism; Imperialism; Class struggle; Core-Periphery Analysis.	Gender; Discrimination; Tragedy of the Commons; Discourse; Etc.
Solutions	Balance of Power; State Sovereignty.	Philospher Kings (Plato); International Cooperation; International Law; Trans-national solutions.	Free Market; Bretton Woods Institutions: IMF, WB, WTO.	Revolution; UNCTAD and other UN General Assembly aims; NIEO demands.	Education; Policy Change; Methodological Change.
Critique	Does might	Proposed	Distributional	Zero-Sum Logic.	Often as in

	make right? In a world where weapons of mass destruction, i.e. 'power,' can be hidden in a vial in someone's top pocket, is this still a good organizing principle?	solutions are too far removed from actual political practice, i.e. 'impracticality; ' Fundamentalism; Religious fanatics; Utopian goals.	flaws.		Idealism; Neglecting the subject of politics which is "life and death."
Contributors	Thucydides Hobbes Machiavelli Bismark Morgenthau Kissinger	Ancient Greeks Hugo Grotius Wilson Falk	Locke Jefferson Rawls Smith Ricardo Friedman	Marx Lenin Prebisch Dos Santos Wallerstein	Tickner Said Foucault

***African* Political Thought:** **Historical Experience:**	'Successful military leaders' 'Political survivors of the Cold War'	Zera Yacob Walda Heywat Kaunda (Humanism)	<u>Political</u> Mandela <u>Economic</u> Kenyatta Houphouet-Boigny Mbeki	<u>African Socialism</u> Nyere Nkrumah Cabral (Lumumba) …	*Negritude* 'Black Consciousness' Biko Samir Amin (Fanon) Wangari Maathai

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Urban Development and Environmental Implications: The Challenge of urban sustainability in Nigeria

Felix Olorunfemi and U.A. Raheem[69]

E-Mail: felixba2000@yahoo.com

The impact of rapid urbanization has become a major threat to the quality of urban environment, human health and urban productivity in Nigeria. The living environments in most cities in Nigeria are 'life and health threatening'. Today's urban environment in Nigeria is at best described as unsustainable. This poses a serious challenge to urban administrators, planners, other professionals as well as urban residents in the country. Poorly managed urban growth as in Nigeria creates irreversible environmental and natural resources degradation with a concomitant increase in poverty. In resolving the environmental implications of rapid urbanization in Nigeria,, there is the need to apply sound principles of environmental management through the integration of environmental planning into development.

Introduction

In most countries of the world, especially in the developing world, urbanization has become an integral part of the growth and development process. Unfortunately, many developing countries, including Nigeria, are still experiencing dramatic rates of urbanization and its associated problems, which they hardly have the capacity to control or manage. This situation is made worse by the

[69] Felix is with the Physical Development Department of the Nigerian Institute of Social Economic Research in Ibadan, U.A. is with the Department of Geography of the University of Illorin

decreasing economic fortunes and spiraling external debts of many developing countries as well as the attendant fiscal austerity or budget constraints which compound most governments ability to bear the burden of expanding and upgrading infrastructural facilities and relevant urban services. Infrastructural resources remain largely elusive because populations are growing much faster than the capacity of the public sector to finance the massive investments needed to support rapid urban growth. Added to this is the faulty nature of the general 'top down' approach towards 'developing planning' in the last four decades (UNCHS, 1996).

The impact of rapid urbanization has become a major threat to the quality of urban environment, human health and urban productivity (Leitmann *et al*, 1992; Abbott, 1996). The living environments in most cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America where more than 600 Million people currently reside are 'life and health threatening' (Editors' comments, Environment and Urbanization, Oct. 1992). Many basic services still remain unmet, while existing facilities continue to deteriorate both in quality and extent of distribution.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, deep urban crisis prevailed across Africa largely because of the declining or stagnating economy (UNCHS, 1996:89). During this period, the most serious environment-related problems associated with urbanization, commonly referred to as the "Brown Agenda" were aggravated (Leitmann *et al*, 1992). The problems include lack of safe and sufficient water supplies, inadequate drainage, waste management and pollution control, insecure tenure, inadequate and substandard housing stock, as well as overcrowding, degradation of sensitive lands and the overburdening of public transport systems. All these constitute a serious threat to the urban dwellers especially the poor, who are often at the receiving end. Hence, the challenge of urbanization is how to sustain economic growth, while solving environmental and social equity problems.

Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, presents a classic case of rapid urban population growth and explosion. Lagos has one of the fastest rates of growth between 5 and 8 per cent per annum, and

so has become one of the 15 largest agglomerations in the third world. According to UN data (UNCH, 2003), Lagos is expected to be the third most populous city in the world by 2015. According to Onibokun (2004), urbanization (city growth) is not bad *per se*. It is in fact an inevitable process and it will continue to happen as part of the natural process of development in any nation. A strong correlation exists between the rate of urbanization and most indicators of development - energy consumption per capita, the contribution of the industrial and manufacturing sectors as percentage of GNP, survival indicators (life expectancy at birth, infant and under five mortality) and the human development index in general (UNDP, 2003). The sheer magnitude of urban problems in Nigerian towns and cities and their seeming intractability have brought to the fore the very important tissue of how to plan and manage our cities, with a view to making them liveable and sustainable.

The problems of urbanization in Nigeria are summed up in the prologue to the 2006 National Urban Development Policy (NUDP) thus: "the problems and challenges posed by the rapid rate of uncontrolled and unplanned urban growth are immense. Nigerian towns are growing without adequate planning. Millions of people live in sub-standard and sub-human environments plagued by slum, squalor and grossly inadequate social amenities. The result is manifested in growing overcrowding in homes and increasing pressure on infrastructural facilities and rapidly deteriorating environment. Low level of awareness on the part of the people, absence of effective advocacy and inappropriate programmes of development has further compounded the problems of urban growth and development" (FMHUD, 2006)

From the foregoing, rapid and uncontrolled urban growth and its associated problems have continued to overwhelm and outstrip the capacity of successive governments in Nigeria to tackle them, thus resulting in a situation where the supply expansion and maintenance of services, utilities and physical infrastructure were terribly affected. Today's urban environment is Nigeria is at best described as unsustainable. This poses a serious challenge not only to urban administrators and planners, but also other professionals as well as urban residents in Nigeria.

Conceptualizing Urban Sustainability: The Nigerian Example

The goal of improving the social and economic conditions of an increasingly urbanized population while preserving life systems and maintaining environmental quality has become subsumed under the rubric of "urban sustainability". The ideal of sustainability widely but loosely defined as meeting today's needs without compromising future generations – is used to justify and legitimate a myriad of policies and practices ranging from communal agrarian utopianism to large-scale, capital-intensive market development (NSF, 2000).

The ideal of sustainable development relies on the contention that major global environmental threats can be addressed by measures that place environmental concerns at the centre of development. Also that the environment should be seen as a complex system that can geared to productive requirements in such a way that our current utilization of it for development does not compromise its potential to meet the needs of future generations. To this end, sustainable development promotes a development process in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.

Physical planners have long been faced with the challenge of ensuring that urban settlements are both economically and environmentally sustainable. Urban sustainability is highly correlated with the capacities of the natural resource environmental system. Poorly managed urban growth creates irreversible natural resources degradation with a concomitant increase in poverty.

It is in this context that the Sustainable Cities Programme of The World Bank/UNCHS/UNDP is based on the following principles:

- that the environment is a resource to be managed on a sustainable basis;
- that there is a bi-directional relationship between the environment and development;
- that urban environmental problems are complex, cross sectoral and require inter-organizational approach; and

- that environmental problems affect all people (the "stakeholder"); therefore there is a need for a ***broad-based community participation*** and a ***bottom-up problem solving approach*** (SIP, 1995).

Agenda 21 of the UN 1992 Earth Summit Programme of Action recognizes that human society needs to work collaboratively if the quality of life is to be sustained for all. Towards this, end, stakeholders are supposed to strive for a balance between nature's values and the demands of urban dwellers in pursuance of both economic development goals and the built environment that agrees with residents' perception of a good life. The latter encompasses a high standard of living, economic development, economic efficiency and social equity. Sustainable development is found where community economic development, deep ecology and conservation are juxtaposed (i.e. the nexus).

The goal of sustainability in a city is to reduce the use of natural resources and production of wastes along with the improvement of its livability, which will cause the city to fit within the capacities of the local, regional and global ecosystems. The main challenge for the public sector in the area of urban growth and development is to ensure sustainability of urban development and manage urban growth to meet the needs of growing population, in an orderly and sustainable fashion (NSF, 2000)

The majority of the population in Nigeria, approximately 64 per cent, live in the rural areas, but the urban population is growing rapidly and has increased significantly from 19 per cent in 1963 to 36 per cent in 1991 (NPC, 1998). The most urbanized states in Nigeria are Lagos (93.7 per cent), Oyo (69.3 per cent), and Anambra (61.9 per cent) while the least urbanized are Jigawa (6.9 per cent), Taraba (10.4 per cent), Akwa Ibom (12.1 per cent) and Kebbi (12.4 per cent). The South-west is the most urbanized region (Table 1), with 20 per cent of Nigeria's 329 urban centres (with populations of over 20,000) located in the region.

Due to a high rate of rural-urban migration, the overall population growth rate for Nigerian urban centres in 1991 was 4.5 per cent per annum compared to a rural growth rate of 1.7 per cent and a national rate of 2.8 per cent. Lagos, the commercial and industrial capital of

Nigeria, is believed to be one of the 15 largest agglomerations in the world in year 2000 (UN, 1995). Wth a projected population of 24.4 million, Lagos is expected to be the third most populous city in the world by 2015. The implications of these demographic trends for employment, the provision of food, housing and social services as well as the protection of the environment are staggering. As far back as 1981, approximately 58 per cent of the then 4.1 million inhabitants of Lagos were recorded to be residing in slums and informal settlements (Obenyai, 1993).

As evident from Table 2, while Nigeria is estimated to be at 44 per cent level of urbanization in 2000 (as compared with about 36 percent for Ghana, 33 percent for Kenya, 57 per cent for South Africa, 57 per cent for Malaysia), this figure is expected to rise to 68 per cent by 2020. Lagos has one of the fastest rates of growth in the world – between 5 and 8 per cent per annum, and so has become one of the 15 largest agglomerations in the world (Onibokun, 2004). According to UN data (UNCH, 2003),

Table 1: Distribution of States by Size of Population of Urban Settlements

Geo-Political Zones	Ranking of States		
	High* (1-10)	Medium** (11-21)	Low*** (22 and above)
North-West	Kaduna (9)	Katsina (18)	Sokoto (27), Kebbi (28)
North-east		Kano (11), Borno (13)	Bauchi (26), Yobe (22), Jigawa (31)
West central	Kwara (7)	Kogi (14), Abuja (19)	Niger (23)
East central		Plateau (21)	Adamawa (24), Benue (25), Taraba (30)
South-west	Lagos (1), Oyo (2), Osun (4), Ogun (6), Ondo (10)		
South-east	Anambra (3), Edo (5), Enugu (8)	Abia (12), Delta (15), Imo (16), Rivers (17), Cross River (20)	Akwa Ibom (29)

* High rank group: At least $0% urban population

** Medium Rank group: At least 25% urban population but less than 40%

*** Low rank group: less than 25% urban population

Source: National Population Commission, 1998

Rapid urban growth has led to a host of environmental, economic, political and social problems in most of the major urban centres, which has impacted negatively on the development of the nation (Onibokun, 1998). The population explosion in Nigeria is like

putting a new wine into an old bottle, thus resulting in unmanageable urban crises and challenges (Onibokun, 2004).

Table 2: Urbanization trends and growth of urban Population in Nigeria and Selected Countries – 2020

Countries	Level of Urbanization %		Estimates and Projections		Annual Growth Rate %	
	2000	2020	2000	2020	2000-2010	2010-2020
Africa	37.2	47.9	295,228	269,408	3.66	3.26
Algeria	57.1	67.5	17,311	27,301	2.54	2.01
Ghana	36.1	45.3	6,963	13,021	3.15	3.15
Kenya	33.4	50.8	10,234	21,710	4.38	3.14
Nigeria	44.1	58.3	50,175	107,428	4.23	3.39
S.Africa	56.9	69.6	24,629	30,624	1.63	0.55
Asia	37.5	48.7	1,375,519	2,231,108	2.6	2.24
Malaysia	57.4	68.0	12,758	20,325	2.68	1.98
Europe	73.4	77.6	534,061	539,532	0.04	0.07
Germany	87.5	90.5	71,798	72,303	0.11	0.04
Brazil	81.2	88.9	138,287	187,281	1.75	1.28

Source: UN-HABITAT, 2003b, p252

Urban Environmental Problems in Nigeria: Causes and Implications

Urbanisation brings both benefits and problems for humans and the environment. If well planned, urban centres generate economic growth and prosperity. However, if cities are not properly managed, they can generate major environmental problems that impact negatively on development. Also, the structure and location of economic activities in and around cities affect the prevalence and severity of particular environmental problems. According to Leitmann (1994), this explains much of the variation in environmental issues between and within cities.

The way in which our physical environment and in particular land use is planned (or is not planned) greatly influences the quality of the environment and indeed the quality of human lives (Perloff, 1973). Normatively, a city plan should precede a land-use zoning ordinance which sets out the method of its achievement. In practice, specifically in Ibadan, land use zoning has replaced any city plan. The process of zoning in the city was non-participatory and took little cognizance of environmental resources or the effects of developmental activities (Adesanya, 1999). A major outcome is the city's organic growth with inadequate infrastructure, a poor economic base, poverty, natural resource depletion and deteriorating environmental quality.

Urban environmental impacts stem from the use of resources, including land, water and energy; waste and waste water treatment and disposal practices; and, both industrial and domestic uses of chemicals all of which are problematic in Nigeria (UNEP, 2000). According to the Draft National Urban Development Policy (FMHUD, 2006), the two most important factors determining the quality of the urban environment in Nigeria are the increasing concentration of population in the cities and their pervasive poverty. Urban environmental issues include liquid and solid waste management, unplanned and blighted settlement, air pollution from increasing motor vehicle use (most of which are poorly maintained and use leaded fuel), water pollution, poor urban transportation, urban land degradation, lack of open spaces and poor management of the urban informal sector.

The urban areas of Nigeria are on the pathway of decay. Air pollution and environmental degradation from poor refuse disposal are the order of the day in Nigerian cities, while unchecked industrial activities are resulting in increasing level of air, water and land pollution. Nigerian cities are reputed to be some of the dirtiest, the most unsanitary, the least aesthetically pleasing, the least safe and secure and most poorly governed cities in the world. Environmental degradation is noticeable everywhere with waste littering the roads (Mabogunje, 1996). According to Olokesusi (1999), Nigerian urban settlements are afflicted with a growing list of problems, such as poor environmental quality, traffic congestion, quantitatively and

qualitatively inadequate housing, uncontrolled growth, inadequate building setback, poverty and encroachment on environmentally sensitive and marginal lands.

Nearly all cities and urban centers in Nigeria manifest glaring qualitative and quantitative deficiencies of housing, roads, municipal services and urban infrastructure. In 2000, access to water supply in urban areas stood at about 78%, while sanitation access was 66% (UN-Habitat, 2003). As a result of rural - urban migration drift and rapid natural population increase, the cities and urban centers are congested. Homelessness, overcrowding and unemployment are serious problems.

The reasons are threefold. First, is the absence of physical development plans to serve as the basis for growth management. Second and closely related is the weak local management capacity especially in the areas of development control and municipal management. Third is the inadequate consideration given to integration of environmental and equity concerns into municipal management and development control.

The European origins of physical planning lay in the concern for human health improvement, safety and visual quality of the physical environment. Thus, Ratcliffe (1981:39-40) says that town and country planning in the United Kingdom had its roots in the public health and housing legislation of the late nineteenth century (see Coke (1967) on a similar situation in the United States). In Nigeria, the 1946 Town and Country Planning Ordinance No. 4 of 1946, had an eye on human health through sanitation practices and orderly physical development.

Formerly, the local town planning authorities conceived of physical planning in a parochial and environmentally neutral way. Consequently, emphasis is not on growth management with sensitivity to environmental issues, but on the physical layout of human settlements and often there is indiscriminate issuance of development permits without resource to the Act. The problems of urban floods in Lagos, Ibadan and Benin are attributable to poor development control practices and environmental insensitivity. Since physical planning is often perceived by local town planners in terms

of ad hoc physical solutions it has tended to accentuate the problem it is supposed to ameliorate (Izeogu, 1986).

The problem of solid waste disposal has become one of the most intractable environmental problems. In recent years, there has been a phenomenal increase in the volume of wastes generated daily. Most of the urban areas in Nigeria lack effective systems of refuse collection. Most urban households resort to open dumping of refuse, although a few engage private refuse collectors or burn or bury solid waste. In the very few urban communities where a system is in place, management authorities collect refuse from households and public containers on a regular basis. Unfortunately, the operation of the waste management authorities is ineffective as evidenced by mounds of decomposing rubbish that are fast becoming part of the regular landscape in the urban areas. The management authorities often lack adequate manpower, adequate equipment and operational funds for the size of the population they are mandated to serve. The reluctance of Nigerians to pay for waste disposal services, as well as relatively low cooperation between state and LGAs authorities in waste management further reduces any chance of success together with the poor management of landfill sites.

Solid waste disposal creates environmental problems in two main ways. First, much of it is not collected in major cities, and the rate of waste collection is generally between 30 - 50%. The remainder is usually burned or dumped haphazardly in illegal landfills or streets, where it creates health hazards and block drains, contributing to urban flooding. Secondly, because of the inability to sort waste at source, household and industrial wastes, including toxic ones, are often handled together, leading to soil and groundwater pollution (UNEP, 2000).

Another major environmental implication of uncontrolled urban growth is the increasing vulnerability of urban areas to disasters. According to Olokesusi (2004), a closer analysis of what transforms a natural event into a human and economic disaster reveals that the fundamental problems of development are the very same problems that contribute to its vulnerability to the catastrophic effects of natural hazards. The principal causes of vulnerability in urban areas include rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, widespread urban and

rural poverty, weak socio-economic infrastructure and inefficient public policies.

The vulnerability to frequent environmental emergencies in Nigeria is largely determined by two variables: (a) *the vulnerability of the elements at risk contained within them.* That is, the ability of the built physical environment of buildings, site improvements; and infrastructure to withstand the stress imposed by natural hazards. (b) *The hazards of their locations.* Furthermore, the roots of the urban vulnerability lie in human beings and their actions. The urban population in the country has been growing at the rate of between 2-5 per cent per year since the 1990s (Olokesusi, 2004). About 45 per cent reside in urban centers, with highest concentration in the large metropolitan areas such as Lagos, Ibadan, Kano and Port-Harcourt. Large contingent of low-income migrants have settled on the poorest, most vulnerable land in cheap, dilapidated and over-crowded houses constructed on land subject to floods and landslides. Poverty and lack of innovative approaches to urban management contribute to acute shortage of social infrastructure services in the urban areas in general, and in the low-income neighbourhoods in particular. The combination of physical development on unsuitable lands such as wetlands, slopes, flood plains and other environmentally sensitive areas, and over-crowding, all exacerbate environmental degradation and vulnerability to environmental and anthropogenic hazards. Blocked drainage channels in urban areas worsen the externalities associated with flooding.

Nigeria is a disaster-prone country. In 2000/2001, more than 200,000 people were displaced by anthropogenic and environmental emergencies, including more than 1,000 deaths. Homes, farm crops, fishing sites and businesses were destroyed. In the flood disaster events in Kirfi local government area in Bauchi State, more than 11,000 were displaced while 500 were displaced in Osun State (Orebiyi, 2002).

The Challenge of Urban Management in Nigeria

The Management of urban environmental problems is a complicated business due to: (a) the large number of actors per problem area; (b)

cross-jurisdictional conflicts; (c) central-local conflicts; and (d) tension between forces for centralization and devolution of authority. There is often little relationship between spatial scale or the nature of urban environmental problems and the design of institutions or policies. Thus, the processes of planning and implementation can only address partial aspects of environmental problems. For example, there may be an ability to handle waste collection within municipal borders, but solid waste disposal often requires a metro-level authority to plan, co-ordinate and execute a waste disposal programme, without it conflicts and suboptimal results are likely to occur. Similarly, Land use policies often fail to prevent building in flood or earthquake-prone areas. Different measures taken by government to better the urban sector are highlighted in Table 3.

Table 3: Categories of Measures taken by Governments in Nigeria on Urban Sector Issues, 2004

Legislative/Policy	Institutional Building	Direct Action
In 1904, ***the Cantonment Proclamations*** led to the segregation of European Reservation from the Native Areas	In 1924, ***Town Planning Committees*** were established for the Northern and Southern Provinces to vet planning schemes and initiate new ones where necessary.	In 1974, FGN commissioned ***Studies of twenty major urban centres in Nigeria*** to identify critical areas of urban infrastructure needs.
In 1914, ***Ordinance No. 9*** was enacted to empower government to acquire land compulsorily for public reasons.	During the First National Development Plan period, ***State-owned Housing Corporations*** were created to provide planned residential and industrial estates.	1975 to 80, the ***World Bank-Assisted Nigerian States Urban Development Programme*** was initiated.
In 1917, ***the Road and Township Ordinance No. 29*** provided for different grades of urban settlements, established broad physical layouts of towns and classified Nigerian towns into first, second and third class categories, with Lagos as the only first class town.	In 1992, ***Urban Development Bank*** was established to focus on urban infrastructure and public utilities.	In 1985, FGN, in collaboration with the World Bank, introduced the ***Infrastructure Development Fund (IDF)*** to finance urban development projects.
In 1928, ***the Lagos Town***	1979 ***Federal Ministry*** responsible	In 1984, the monthly National

Planning Act created the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB) and the Board was empowered to carry out slum clearance, land reclamation, residential and industrial estates.	for Housing, Urban Development and the Environment was created (it was scrapped in 1983)	***Clean-up Exercise*** was introduced.
In 1946, ***the Nigerian Town and Country Planning Ordinance No. 4*** authorised Town Planning Authorities to prepare planning schemes. In 1978, FGN introduced the ***Land Use Decree (1978)*** as a regulatory tool to control the use of land and ensure equitable access to it by all Nigerians.	In 1992, Decree No. 3 of 1992 was enacted to establish ***National Housing Fund*** as a source of funds for housing finance.	Between 1996 and 2002, FGN, in collaboration with UNCHS and UNICEF, the ***Sustainable Cities*** Programme, the ***Urban Basic Services*** programme, ***Community Upgrading*** Programme, ***Safer Cities*** Programme and the ***Campaign on Good Urban governance*** were introduced.
In 1985, ***A National Housing Policy*** was adopted.	In the 70s, the concept of ***New Towns*** was introduced, as a strategy for decongesting the major urban centres and of creating new growth poles. This concept, for example, gave birth to the relocation of the Federal Capital from Lagos to	In 1972 to 75, FGN planned to build 59,000 housing units over the federation. the number was subsequently increases to 202,000 units in 1997. The states also launched their housing programme each planning to built

	Abuja.	4,000 between 1977 and 1980.
In 1986, the ***Rolling Plan concept*** was introduced.	In June 2003, a new ***Ministry of Housing and Urban Development*** again re-established.	
In 1988, ***National Policy on Environment*** was enacted.		
In 1991, ***National Urban Development Policy*** was prepared.		
In 1992, the ***Nigerian Urban and Regional Planning Decree No. 88 of 1992*** was adopted.		
In 1996, ***National Plan of Action*** to guide human settlements development in the twenty-first century was prepared as part of the background papers for the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II).		
In 1998, the ***Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA)*** was created		

under Decree No. 58		
In 1971, ***the National Council of Housing was*** adopted.		
In 2002, a new *Housing and Urban Development Policy* was scrapped.		

Source: Onibokun (2004)

One of the major goals of the new National Policy on Urban Development (FMHUD, 2006) is to improve the environmental situation in the urban areas. Specifically, the goal is to make the urban environment in Nigeria safe, clean, healthy and aesthetically pleasing for all the urban residents. To achieve this, the government will employ the following strategies:

i. Encourage Local planning and Health Authorities; as well as the Local Government Environmental Agency to exhibit greater vigilance in the discharge of their responsibilities;

ii. Government should protect and enact appropriate legislation to back up the various environmental protection conventions is has signed;

iii. Government should promote co-operation among urban households to take interest in the maintenance of a high standard of environment and to embark on campaigns to alert the public, especially the urban poor, to the increasing range of health hazards in the urban environment;

iv. Ensure participation in promoting high environmental standards in our cities;

v. Enforce Development Control measures in order to reduce environmental hazard such as deforestation, oil spillage, desert encroachment, flooding and erosion;

vi. Ensure greater coordination among different agencies involved with the environment at the local level such as Town Planning Authority, local Health Board, Local Education Authority and Local Works Department.

There is need to guide land and infrastructure investments in such as way as to encourage growth away from threatened or vulnerable area of cities.

- **City-Specific Strategies should be guided by the configuration of key economic variables**. These variables are: (a)

the level of **industrialization** (focusing on the exposure of different populations to high-risk emissions and the extent to which effective pollution -control policies are in place); (b) the composition of the energy balance and its dynamics, as an indication of energy-related emission; and (c) the positive and negative environmental roles of the informal sector.

- **Enhanced public awareness, consultation, and participation can improve environmental management**. The divergence between public and analytic priorities indicates that environmental education may be needed to raise public consciousness about hidden problems. Participation in implementing environmental solutions, particularly for problems that manifest themselves at the neighborhood and community level, was important in several of the cities.

- **Pay careful attention to the relationship between problem areas, their spatial scale, and institutional capacity when designing interventions**. The impact and importance of different problems will vary between cities and over time. Empirical evidence may lead to different conclusions than public opinion seeks. The spatial dimension of problems may not correspond to jurisdictional or sectoral alignments, and impacts can extend well beyond metropolitan boundaries. The availability of financial and human resources will condition local capacity to manage environmental problems.

- **Involving stakeholders** Experience has shown that many environmental plans have failed due to the non-participation of the major actors in the preparation of the plans which meant that plans were not implemented (Duruzoechi, 2001). The involvement of stakeholders, potential funders and non-co-operators in the identification, assessment, clarification and prioritization of urban environmental issues is vital.

The stakeholders are those whose interests are affected by the environmental issues; those who possess relevant information and expertise; and those who control relevant implementation instruments (legal, financial, political, etc. resources). They include

government ministries and parastatals, local governments, community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private formal sector, the private informal sector, research institutions, media houses, external support agencies, etc.

In clarifying environmental issues, the stakeholders diagnose and analyse identified issues to create better understanding among them. The essence of this clarification is to facilitate better understanding of the roles of agencies and organizations which have major stakes in the issue. If there is no prioritization of issues, there will be no focus and scarce resources will be used up without achieving much success, thereby adding to a lack of credibility for the environmental management plans.

Conclusion

There is increasing awareness that environmental precautions are essential for continued economic development. Thus, the goal of sustained and healthy economic growth requires careful attention to the environment. Environmental issues should be approached and realistically in the planning, management, and coordination of urban projects. The most common environmental problems in cities in developing countries, according to Lee (1995), are similar to those in developed countries, except that they are usually more severe. Consideration of environmental issues should also identify long term costs and adverse impacts that are likely to occur some years in the future.

In conclusion, while an increasing rate of urbanization is inevitable in a country like Nigeria, the circumstances under which the urban population is growing have wiped out most of the gains that should be associated with growth. Urbanization is creating a host of problems far beyond the managerial and fiscal capacity of the municipal governments. The need to apply sound principles of environmental management remains unaddressed. This is the challenge to urban planners and administrators in Nigeria.

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A Note on Tensions in African-Australian Families and the Australian Family Court

Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe,

A.Nsubuga-Kyobe@latrobe.edu.au

Introduction

Africans who come to live in Australia are understandably concerned to protect their 'Family Values' which they consider to be crucial in determining the character of every day life. In general Australian multiculturalism adopts a live and let live approach to cultural variations within the law. However, problems can arise either where the African tradition involves behaviours which are illegal in Australia such as female circumcision or polygamy or where some members of the family wish to observe the tradition whereas others do not. Refugees and other Africans have often experienced traumatic transitions before coming to Australia – in some cases these experiences strongly reinforce the desire to preserve traditional cultural values and behaviours- in others they weaken ties to the past.

The Family Court of Australia is fully committed to providing a service free from discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or gender. The Court also aspires to operate in a manner that takes account of the multicultural nature of Australian society (i.e. being sensitive to cultural diversity). Certain situations face judges with difficulties in the interpretation of the legal provisions where they may conflict with cultural demands. Conflicts can arise in recognising cultural practices of African-Australians and other cultural groups. In some cases it is possible to recognise and

incorporate African concerns – in others a choice has to be made and the Court tis obliged to follow Australian law.

Background

Established in 1975, the Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction over all marriage-related cases in Australia, including applications for declarations of the validity or nullity of marriages, divorces, custody, access and property settlements (CCH 1999). It has jurisdiction over custody and access in the breakdown of de facto relationships, but jurisdiction over property settlements in de facto relationships resides with state courts.

The *Family Law Act* 1975 abolished fault as a relevant factor in divorce proceedings and the only ground for divorce is now that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and there is evidence that the parties have been separated for 12 months. Ignoring fault goes against the tradition of some cultures including many African cultures. All one needs to apply for divorce in Australia is:

- Evidence of having been married (marriage certificate)
- Evidence of having separated from the spouse for 12 months
- Evidence of Australian citizenship, permanent residence or other proof of domicile in Australia for at least 12 months before the divorce application.

The other important consideration is that if the parties have children, the court must be satisfied that proper arrangements have been made for the care of the children before the divorce can be granted.

In general, Australia evidence shows that the mental health of married men and women is better than that of divorced men and women (de Vaus 2004). It is less clear just what the cause and effect relationship involved is. Many Africans living in Australia believe that trauma, refugee culture and other negative psychological and physical experiences endured before arriving in Australia are contributing to a high level of marital breakdown after arrival. Their

perception is also that Australian culture does not put enough effort into trying to rescue marriages which have encountered difficulties. In someAfrican countries, family law provisions require that those involved are obliged to attempt reconciliation or work within the family structure for the preservation of the marriage before divorce processes are advanced. However, in Australia, it is presumed that people go to the Family Court when their relationship has already broken down. Nevertheless, attempts are made to see whether the parties have gone through the "Mediation" process (i.e. whether they have tried to work through their differences). Generally, divorce may be sought simply because the marriage has broken down or specifically because one or both partners wishes to remarry with new partners. African traditions in which marriages are more unions between families/clans than unions between individuals may not match situations where individuals wish to remarry. In those areas of Africa where polygamy is legal, men do not need to divorce in order to remarry and some African husbnds in Australia continue the informal practice of polygamy. It also needs to be kept in mind that even in Africa, African traditions are often overlaid by imported religious traditions, be they Christian or Muslim, which further complicate the acceptability and forms of divorece.

In compiling this note, he author has used a participatory approach based on thematic analysis founded on structured observation and listening. The author's participatory roles in various community engagement activities- for example as the immediate past president of the Eastern and Central Africa Communities of Victoria Inc. (EACACOV), member of the Victoria Diversity Committee of the Family Court of Australia, Chief Justice's Advisory Committee on Ethnic Issues of the Family Court of Australia, Secretary of the Ethnic Council of Shepparton & Districts, and researcher in the provision of settlement services to the African-Australians in Victoria have facilitated the collection and interpretation of the data. In applying structured listening and observation during participatory involvements, the researcher would ask the meaning of the term "family", then move to "what is a family conflict?", and seek to understand how this comes about (process), analyse the responses by

the parties (this would reflect each party's understanding of the extent of the problem), try to conceptualise what could be termed 'family values in their context' and suggest possible solution(s) expected by the parties, then evaluate the extent of cultural or cross-cultural value elements in the premises employed and the conflict itself. These approaches generated a wealth of rich data, part of which is used here.

General Causes of Tensions in African-Australian Families

During the provision of settlement services EACACOV has noted an increasing level of tension in families, which would sometimes end with children running away to the streets and/or the parents heading for divorce.

Based on extensive semi-structured discussions, the key areas identified as causes of the tensions include:

1. Changing family structures and support; for example the total absence of the African type of extended family structure (thus traditional coping strategies cannot be employed),

2. Changing roles and expectations especially of gender roles, and, in cases where the man was the only bread winner in Africa prior to migration, questions arise as to the way things get done in the home, especially if both parties are working in Australia and responsibilities need sharing,

3. Nature, types, and ways of communication and at times even what is communicated. Changes in communication tend to breed mistrust as a result of filtering or concealing things from the other partner, especially relating to financial concerns. Husbands and wives pooling resources may or may not be traditional practice.

4. During transitions and in changing environments; men tend to stick to their traditional ways since these serve their interests, but women move faster to change because of advantages seen in the changes, even at the level of getting their husbands to change nappies for the babies. In many cases tradition will favour males and older people and therefore tradition is more likely to be protected by them but rejected by women and young people.

5. Religious influences from outside Africa now shape how individuals perceive the world around them,

6. Respect between/of the parties; and being empathetic and understanding where the other party is coming from rather than apathetic is vital. For a number of couples (especially on the side of women) understanding the other party is seen in the Australian context as almost tantamount to being weak. Some partners are considered too submissive to the oppressing behaviours of the opposite party, mainly men,

7. Children growing up in Australia perceive apparent rights and obligations at varying ages and they learn to manipulate each of their parents. This is worse if the parents are already in conflict. Children who side with one parent may accelerate the conflict.

8. Relatively high levels of un-employment & under-employment result in a loss of self esteem and self-worth,

9. Men, even women, can resort to alcohol and sometimes violence or substance abuse,

10. It is difficult to agree on the fair utilisation of resources, especially finances. Some begin with focal support to the immediate nucleus/primary family and then devote more to the extended family later. All need to define and choose priorities. Decisions whether to spend money on children in Australia or on siblings in refugee camps in Africa can cause bitter divisions.

11. Family, cultural and social environmental factors are important in enhancing courage to look for work and put up with difficulties associated with work once found.

12. There are varied expectations and divisions on how separated parents might share time with their children. These include disputes over quantity versus quality time. There may be allegation of violence where one of the parents is denied access yet the definition of what may be termed violent behaviour in Africa may diverge significantly from Ausralian norms.

13. Families from non-English speaking backgrounds daily face immense pressures in their struggles to access the various services on offer to them to assist in finding solutions to their issues. These services are not apparently being well accepted as, apart from very real language issues, their usage is outside the cultural norms of many Africans. Husbands may regard discussion of family issues with outsiders as treasonable.

Various initiatives within the Family Court have sought to improve the tailoring of its services to meet the needs of the diverse members of the Australian community. These have included a partnership with EACACOV to organise a workshop in Melbourne on the theme of *"African Family Values, Family Law, and Conflict Resolution Resources, and their implications for members of the African-Australian communities"*. Keynote speakers included the Hon. Justice Mishin, the then Chair of the Chief Justice's Advisory Committee on Ethnic Issues of the Family Court - a forum EACACOV participates in.

The Workshop's aims included:

- Providing a platform for members of African communities to voice their ideas/views on family values and on strategies for effectively dealing with family conflicts (on both a personal level, and how it impacts the general community level, i.e. deal with the possible incongruences in regard to the different family value systems between Africans and Australians).

- Promoting a better understanding of African family values and settlement needs by/to legal, professional and support services.

- Increasing African communities' knowledge/awareness of the availability of services and programs, which could assist them to resolve family conflicts arising from family breakdown and separation as well as understanding the seriousness of the short and long term effects.

- Hearing experts speak on practical ways of identifying and handling conflicts,

- Learning about the resources available to assist in resolving family conflicts, and, in cases where that is not possible, services available at the Australian Family Court.

- How to apply positive forces to reduce the daily tensions and stresses that African people are experiencing in this new place.

From the African side

Speakers provided overviews from African regions on how to keep our family values and experiences and at the same time cope with change in Australia.

In Australia values are based on the identity of the individual; whereas in Africa, values are community based.

It was observed that Africans generally marry into families (clans) rather than simply the process of joining two people. This process may involve use of a "go-between", generally a highly regarded person respected by the two families, who promotes the interest of all, ignoring self-interest and walking a tight rope between the two families. Often this go-between would be the first point of call in addressing tensions arising after the marriage. The go-between sees any conflicts that arise in the family as a reflection upon him/her; then the family and clan and tribal elders. He/she works hard to resolve the conflict as soon as possible. This arrangement is often lacking in Australia as families migrate individually. It was felt that an equivalent system might need to be developed among the African-Australians. If reconciliation is not possible and living together fails, then the husband will be regarded as continuing to be a son-in-law of the family he married into, with equal access to any children the couple might have had. He also has responsibilities towards his former wife's family, with the 'in-law' relationship continuing onwards in some reduced form.

There is a great need for recognition of and sensitivity to cultural frameworks that exist in the culture of origin (e.g the use of go-betweens). The traditional approach to legal differences in Australian society is essentially adversarial, and this is very different to the African approach. It is important that family ties be recognised when dealing with people from African communities, as even though the secondary relationship has failed, the primary relationship is still in place.

Traditional conflict resolution in much of Eastern Africa is based on mediation and conciliation, with a primary aim of continuing the marriage of the couple with the elders initially intervening to restore peace. The legal system would generally not kick-in unless the traditional processes have been exhausted. In Australia, mediation is more for appropriate provision of care for the children plus division of the joint assets.

In Africa, if the man is at fault he will be expected to make reparation and to apologise to the community for his faults. This is not done confidentially as marriage is a community concern. Then if someone doesn't consult with the community, they are regarded with suspicion.

With high unemployment amongst recent arrivals to Australia from Eastern Africa, these people are unable to maintain 'face' with those back in Africa, as they came here to succeed, but their dreams will be shattered. So the changes associated with coming to Australia may well force the families into a siege mentality. This engenders enormous stress and thus conflict.

There are a lot of African young people here in Australia who are without family support, a situation which is causing a lot of mental health issues and depression. Much of this can be seen as directly related to moving from large extended family environments to a society that has as a norm the nuclear family structure. There is no unified African culture as such, rather there are variations: rural/urban; different religions; different languages; all overlaid with post-colonial influences. African migrants are faced by a bewildering array of possible cultural choices

African-Australians are at turning point when societal values and norms have tended to lose their effectiveness. In the past, as Lamanna and Riedmann (2004) observe, people tended to emphasise the dutiful performance of social roles in marriage and in the family structure. Today people are more apt to view marriages as committed

relationships in which they expect to find companionship and intimacy, not duty to their family or out of economic necessity (i.e. they see marriage relationships as consumable disposable items within a consumer/supplier market).

In the traditional African society family values are all about family togetherness, stability and loyalty. This implies that family tensions, probable causes of family tensions and potential strategies for addressing family tensions are equally important.

It is absolutely crucial to point out that the steady increase in crises and divorce rates among African families is causing considerable alarm in the African community and it is also generating real public concern. As an African, the author believes there are a number of factors that are responsible for family tensions among African families. Paramount among these factors is culture shock. When a family arrives initially in Australia, it is often difficult to integrate into the society essentially because everything is different and strange. The situation is further compounded when there is no one to assist in settling down. Culture shock is sometimes the source of depression which often metamorphoses into anger and unnecessary arguments at home.

Due to the absence of extended family support unhappy couples are not under pressure from their families to stay together and avoid divorce. In many societies in Africa, divorce is still seen as an immoral act, an affront to decent people, but sadly Africans in Australia seem to think it is better to separate than to continue in an unhappy marriage.

Thus the legal aspects vested in the Australian Family Court differ from the expectations drawn from the African perspectives. While the Court in Australia takes a no-fault position and addresses itself to deal with what are said to be irretrievably broken down relationships, many African-Australians feel it should have the responsibility to help in restoration of the relationship with divorce being the last resort.

The *Family Law Act* focuses more on children's issues than the parents' relationships. It encourages parents and other persons interested in the welfare of the children to try and reach mutually acceptable agreements. It is often argued that Australia takes little consideration of the cultural differences in the community and Australia is the worse for it. This was why National Cultural Diversity Plan of the Family Court of Australia has been developed. Neverless, there are limits to the focus on the needs of particular ethnic groups. Interested and informed Africans should organise themselves to work on teasing out legal and other matters of cultural sensitivities to be taken into account for the benefit of their communities. These should include cultural approaches to the welfare of children.

Another challenge to the court is "the extent of family violence that goes on particularly against women. Most of the family violence in the community is perpetrated by males and this has to be recognised. There is need to get to the stage that we are able to talk about family violence in the same way we talk about family values even in connection with ethnic communities. Every time a hand is raised in anger, trust is gone and the self-esteem of the victim is lowered. This must clearly be understood so as to facilitate changing peoples' attitudes including those of African-Australians. There are two issues for these communities. Firstly, African definition of 'acceptable' violence/chastisement may significantly differ from current Australian norms. Secondly, the traumatic experiences of refugees and displaced persons may be a causal factor in high levels of domestic violence.

Addressing the forum, Justice Nahum Mushin was appreciative of the cultural mechanisms which are part of African traditions in dealing with family conflict and he referred to experiences with how the Aboriginal communities deal with such conflicts. He noted that there is a specific reference in the *Family Law Act* which recognises the child's background and culture, including the need to maintain a

connection with the traditions and lifestyle of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture. The court needs to know the cultural aspects that should be taken into account in understanding the family dynamics. Justice Mushin stressed that if there are cultural aspects relating to the child, it is in the child's interests that the court be informed by detailing them in an affidavit.

Conclusion

The workshop emphasised the importance of maintaining the basis of family values and the need to revisit some changes so that they can be grafted within new African-Australians values. Recommendations included follow up to create a group of informed and interested Africans who would explore and follow through on the matters raised. It was agreed that the family is the best social structure to provide basic needs. African families in Australia have to deal with changing economic needs, declining family values, new influences such as a stress on individual rights and issues related with ageing. Everything possible should be done to sustain and support families to hold together. Consultations should take place within the African-Australian communities with the aim of creating a Council of Elders who would submit appropriate cultural and traditional advice on matters such as in deciding what would be in the best interests of the child in separation/divorce situations. The African perspective is to focus on the preservation of the family, both nuclear and extended, which is not the primary goal of the Family Court. Where African and Australian values appear to be in conflict it is necessary to recognise that the problem has usually arisen because some, possibly younger and/or female. African-Australians have found that Australian values better meet their needs

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Education and the Gender Wage Gap in Eritrea's Formal Labour Market

Temesgen Kifle

(t.kifle@uq.edu.au)

One major consequence of investment in education is the benefits that accrue to individuals in terms of lifetime earnings. Investing more in the education of girls can make a significant contribution to the reduction of poverty and narrowing the earnings gap between male and female employees. After reviewing the evidence on African gender wage gaps elsewhere, this study uses data from male and female employees working in the formal sector of the Eritrean economy first to estimate the male-female earnings differentials, and then to find the proportions of the gap due to endowment differentials and to discrimination. The findings show that about 28% of the wage gap is due to discrimination, especially as a result of occupational sex segregation.

Introduction

The continuing incidence of gender inequality in education is a major violation of the rights of women and girls, and also a significant obstacle to social and human development. One of the collective commitments of the Jomtien World Conference on Education for All in 1990 was aimed at universalizing access and promoting equity. Since then good progress has been made towards gender parity in enrolments. In Eritrea, however, gender inequality in access to education is still one of the major educational constraints.

One major impact of investment in education is the benefits that accrue to individuals in terms of lifetime earnings. Human capital theory seeks to explain wage differentials as a consequence of differing human capital stock. The theory claims that all differences in wages and salaries are attributable to human capital, and thus the attempt to break down barriers to women's educational achievement indicates progress in closing the gender wage gap. However, the theory has been criticized because different rates of return on human capital can arise due to outright discrimination. For any country, the survival of a gender wage gap due to discrimination has negative social and economic effects.

The aim of this paper is to estimate gender wage differentials in Eritrea and separate that portion of the wage gap that is explained by differences in human capital from that part which is due to discrimination using the wage decomposition techniques introduced by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) and later extended by Cotton (1988). This paper deals with wage and salary earners who work in the formal sector of the economy. It does not include the self-employed, unpaid family workers and those working in the informal sector.

Findings from the Literature especially for Africa

Generally, average women's earnings are still less than average men's earnings, though there has generally been a reduction in the gender wage gap. Globally, the gender wage gap is narrowing not only because of increased female labour force participation but also due to the increase in the amount of and economic returns to work experience and schooling among women (Loury, 1997). The analysis of the gender wage gap is important because it provides a reference point for measuring the progress of women and assessing the effectiveness of policy initiatives to raise their status. The gender wage gap has both a scientific and a political impact because, intellectually, the gap is seen as inconsistent with conventional economic theories of how labour markets are supposed to work and,

politically, it confirms a pessimistic view of the labour market realities that women face (Smith and Ward 1989).

The first question in examining earnings by sex is whether there are differences in the average pay of men and women, and if so what is the magnitude of the gap and how much of it can be attributed to discrimination as opposed to differences in productivity related factors. If differences in qualifications and behaviour can explain the earnings gap between men and women employees, there would be nothing left to explain as being due to the gender of the employee, and thus the hypothesis of discrimination could be rejected (Bergman, 1989). However, labour market discrimination exists if women with the same characteristics (endowments) as men receive lower salaries and the magnitude of the gap measures the degree of discrimination (Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999). Discrimination is defined as the provision of unequal benefits to people of different ascriptive statuses despite identical qualifications and merit (Cohn, 2000).

Even with the use of extensive lists of control variables, various empirical studies have confirmed the existence of a gender wage gap, despite governmental adoption of policies such as equal pay and equal employment opportunity legislation. Inserting variables that explain human capital, working conditions and household responsibilities into his earnings model, Hersch (1991) found that a large component of the wage gap between males and females was still left unexplained. Lee and Nagaraj (1995) found that in Malaysia the more favourable occupational distribution among males and the concentration of women in subordinate occupations were reasons for low women's earnings. According to Oaxaca (1973), unequal pay for equal work does not account for very much of the male-female wage differential but rather it is the concentration of women in lower-paying jobs that produces such large differentials.

Little has been written on the gender wage gap in Africa from either a theoretical or substantive viewpoint (Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan, 1999). Much of the available evidence shows the existence

of wage discrimination against women. For Botswana, Siphambe and Thokweng-Bakwena (2001) have found that, in the private sector, discrimination against women is a major factor explaining their lesser earnings. For Guinea, Glick and Sahn (1997) found that, in the public sector only a small portion of the gender wage gap was accounted for by sex differences in characteristics. Armitage and Sabot (1991) found a discriminatory gender wage gap in the public sector of Tanzania and in both public and private sectors in Kenya. In Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire, Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) found that the private sector practices more gender wage discrimination that the public sector. For Madagascar, Nordman and Roubaud (2005) have found a higher percentage of gender wage gap due to discrimination. Kabubo-Mariara (2003) found that most of the gender wage gap in Kenya – in both public and private sector - is due to discrimination.

Contrary to the above findings, Glewwe (1990) found no wage discrimination against women in Ghana. For Guinea, Glick and Sahn (1997) found that women in the private sector earned more than men. For Tanzania, Knight and Sabot (1982) did not find a gender wage gap due to discrimination, although the mean wage of males was greater than that of females.

The reasons why women are paid less than men can be seen from the viewpoint of different theories. According to the human capital theory, differential possession of skills is the cause. Human capital theory assumes that marriage and related home making responsibilities depress women's wages because many women leave the labour market during pregnancy, at child birth or when the children are young, during this time men are gaining the training and experience that lead to higher earnings later in life (Fuchs, 1989). Women's efforts to earn as much as men are always handicapped, because the conflict between family and career is much greater for women than for men, for whom marriage may actually improve their career options and increase the time devoted to paid employment.. Thus, women will have less incentive to undertake human capital investment, as they expect fewer total years in the labour market

(Hersch, 1991). Women may also choose to enter occupations which do not penalize interruptions in gainful employment and exclude themselves from occupations requiring expensive and lengthy periods of training (House, 1983).

In viewing human capital theory from the demand side (i.e. from the employers' standpoint), women's high turnover rate and absenteeism are believed to be the cause for their low earnings. Employers perceive that women are more likely to leave work particularly on marriage or child birth; therefore, it is not worth training them for higher responsibility and hence higher earnings (Terrell, 1992).
According to Becker (1971), the reason for discrimination against women is that employers have a "taste for discrimination".[70] Given the existence of a strong and fully competitive free market, Becker (1971) argues that economic forces will ultimately eliminate discrimination from both hiring and wages. Under sufficiently competitive conditions, discriminatory employers will fail to be successful and will at last be forced out of existence (Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 1997).

Another theory to explain gender pay differentials is the overcrowding hypothesis. This theory assumes that women's low pay is caused by occupational sex-typing that crowds women into a limited number of occupations, thereby reducing their bargaining power. Women cannot compete with men for the much larger number of male jobs, as they are largely confined to a few overcrowded female segments of the labour market. Often women are under-represented in professionals and managerial categories and over-represented in occupations in sales and service sector, particularly as secretaries, clerks, shop assistant and cleaners (House, 1983). Besides women's own views, tradition and physical strength also contribute to sex-typing of jobs. Beliefs such as that women are unable to work outside regular hours; women are unwilling to travel

[70] In this context, discrimination is defined as the willingness to pay to avoid working with a woman. It means that employers who don't want a woman are willing to pay for that privilege or to make shareholders pay for it.

alone on official duties affect their job opportunities (Anker and Hein, 1985). Societal and parents' views on the role of women can also shape a woman's occupational aspirations and simultaneously bar women from types of education that would open up male jobs (House, 1983).

The comparable worth theory says that women are underpaid because male employers systematically undervalue women's contributions to production. Women's jobs are viewed as being feminine and are devalued by employers even if their human capital variables are comparable to men (Cohn, 2000). An employer who discriminates against women to gratify his gender bias does not need to hire women in capital intensive work settings, as for him the cost of labour is insignificant and so the extra cost of hiring males can be tolerated. But in labour intensive firms, hiring men at a premium is expensive, and thus women tend to be concentrated in labour intensive firms (Morris and Nott, 1991).

The production constraint theory states that men are paid more than women because men objectively lower female productivity. Patriarchy can force women into situations where their talents and energies are grossly underused, and it can confine women to jobs that are unproductive by their very nature (Cohn, 2000). Unlike the comparable worth theory, which emphasizes employers' underestimation of women's contributions to production, the production constraint theory suggests why productive jobs are restricted to male workers.

Taking Becker's approach to the measurement of discrimination as a basis,[71] this study decomposes gender wage differentials using procedures developed by Blinder-Oaxaca and Cotton.

[71] Becker (1971) defined a measure of discrimination as the difference between the observed wage ratio and the wage ratio that would prevailed in the absence of discrimination.

Education in Eritrea

Before the colonial period, traditional formal education was established for religious purposes, whilst secular education was provided as non-formal education. At that time women were shut out of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and government duties, and religious education for girls was considered unimportant (Stefanos, 1997). During the Italian colonial period (1890-1941), female education in Eritrea was regarded as unnecessary. In contrast to men, who had the chance of receiving education up to a fourth level, women did not participate. After the Italians left, there were better educational opportunities for Eritreans under British Administration (1941-1952). However, the increase in educational opportunities was largely reserved for males. A positive attitude towards women's education only began during the national liberation struggle (Smith, 2001). With independence, crucial importance has been attached to ensure equal access to education and training for girls, but there is still a long way to go.

As can be seen in Table 1, in 2002/3 the value of the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which is used to asses gender differences in enrolment, is equal to one only at pre-primary level. Goal 3 of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which targets the elimination of gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005, has already been missed by Eritrea, and it is unlikely to be achieved by 2015 (see Table 2).[72]

[72] The UN Millennium Development goal 3 aims at eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and at all levels by 2015.

Table 1 Eritrea: Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) and Gender Parity Index (GPI) in Education

	GER	Pre-primary	Primary	Secondary
1998/99	Total	5	53	23
	Male	6	58	28
	Female	5	48	19
	GPI	0.83	0.83	0.68
2000/01	Total	5	57	27
	Male	6	62	31
	Female	5	51	22
	GPI	0.83	0.82	0.71
2002/03	Total	6	63	28
	Male	6	70	34
	Female	6	57	22
	GPI	1	0.81	0.65

Note: GPI measures the ratio of the female to male enrolment
Source: UNESCO, 2005 and author's calculations

Table 2 Gender parity in primary and secondary education, based on data available between 1990 and 2000

Goal already achieved	Mauritius, Seychelles
Likely to achieve parity in 2005	Kenya
Likely to miss parity in 2005 but achieve it in 2015	Botswana*, Ghana
At risk of not achieving parity even in 2015	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia*, Lesotho*, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia*, the Niger, Rwanda*, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda*, Zambia, Zimbabwe*

Note: * Parity achieved in primary but not in secondary education
Source: UNESCO, 2006

The existence of educational gender disparity in Eritrea can also be seen from education efficiency, completion and outcomes. As shown in Table 3, girls have relatively limited access to education. Even when girls do go to school their attendance and performance suffer because of pressures to work at home. The traditional belief that girls are destined for marriage also has a negative impact on their school completion.

Table 3 Education efficiency, completion and outcome in 2004

	Eritrea	Low income countries
Gross intake rate in grade 1 (% of relevant age group)	63	125
Male	52	115
Female		
Share of cohort reaching grade 5 (% of grade 1 students)*	86	63
Male	73	66
Female		
Repetition in primary school (% of enrolment)	21	6
Male	22	6
Female		
Transition to secondary education (% of enrolment in last year of primary)		
Male	85	82
Female	76	83
Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group)	53	78
Male	36	70
Female		

Note: * 2003 data
Source: World Bank, 2006

The problems that hinder female enrolment can be seen from two standpoints, namely out-of-school factors (or demand side factors) and in-school factors (or supply side factors). Out-of-school factors

include the direct and indirect costs of education, early marriage and pregnancy, parental expectations of their daughters, lower remuneration and limited employment opportunities for women. In-school factors include access to schooling, low proportions of female teachers, inadequate school facilities and gender-bias in school.

In Eritrea, although the government provides free and compulsory basic education, students are requested to pay minimal fees for registration, miscellaneous fees related to student activities and service charges for using school books. As a percentage of the total money spent by a family on a primary school child in Eritrea, the expenditure on schooling is estimated to be 7% (MOE, 1999). For low-income households, the opportunity costs of educating children are high, as such households depend more on their children for survival. In Eritrea, girls are more useful than boys as they participate more in household activities, support their mothers in bringing water and wood and assist in other tasks.

Early marriage and pregnancy, especially in rural areas, are self-explanatory because the correlation between early marriage and pregnancies and female enrolment is always inverse. One of the reasons for the educational gender gap in Eritrea widening with increasing age, especially at secondary level, is the high fertility rate (Brixiova, Bulir and Comenetz, 2001). The cultural belief that the role of a girl is nothing more than being a wife and mother reduces parents' investment in their daughters' education. Parents have a strong preference for educating their sons, believing that a daughter, unlike a son, serves another family after getting married.

The availability of schools relatively near to home is often a precondition for school participation, especially for girls. The 1996 Eritrean survey found that the average distance between school and home was then about 14.8 km at elementary and 34.5 km at the middle level of education (MOE, 1999).

Extensive research has demonstrated the advantages that can be obtained by hiring female teachers (Bellew and King, 1993). The

presence of female teachers encourages parents to send their daughters to school (Watkins, 2000). Gender stereotyping in curricula and textbooks, teachers' insensitivity to gender issues and teachers' perception of female students' ability can be taken as examples of the gender-bias in school that hampers female enrolment. Lack of school resources such as lavatories and other hygienic facilities also has a negative impact.

Indisputably, investment in girls' education brings high returns. Total education benefits increase when women are given equal opportunities to enroll. Generally, countries that promote women's rights and increase their access to resources and schooling enjoy lower poverty rates and faster economic growth than countries that do not (World Bank, 2001). At a micro level female education has the power of increasing household income and reducing poverty.

Participation of Eritrean women in the formal labour force began in the Italian colonial period. Males were employed in cash crop plantations, mines and urban factories. Some women who were abandoned by their husbands also left their villages for the cities to look for jobs. While some worked informally at brewing, handicraft, selling foodstuffs and laundry work, other women worked their way into agricultural industries (Stefanos, 1997). Gradually, some began to work in factories and in Italian households as female servants, cooks and nannies. After independence, the three main reasons for women entering the urban labour market in Eritrea were poverty, autonomy and incentives (Arneberg 1999). The lack of a male breadwinner, the high labour force participation rate among women ex-fighters and the relative improvement in female level of schooling are examples.

Educating girls is highly effective in creating social benefits, as women's education has a strong positive impact on their children's health as well as their own fertility and reproductive health (Jejeebhoy, 1995; Parker and Pederzini, 1999). Brixiova, Bulir and Comenetz (2001) have found that the nutritional status of a child in Eritrea is positively related with his/her mother's level of education.

Women aged 15-49, who completed primary education, also had an average of 2.6 less children than those with no education.

Methodology

The inclusion of a sex dummy variable in the earnings equation seems to be the easiest way to estimate gender wage differentials. However, this method of analysis is not fully satisfactory, as it constrains the coefficients on productivity related characteristics to be identical for both sexes (Chapman and Harding, 1985). The estimation of male-female earnings differentials through one earnings function that incorporates productivity related variables in the right hand side plus a dummy variable for sex fails to take into account the wage differentials brought about by different sex-related endowments (Terrell, 1992).

Using separate earnings functions, if the earnings regressions for men and women have the same coefficients, we can say that there is no gender wage discrimination. Whereas, if the male and female earnings regressions have different coefficients and the average earnings of men are greater than that of women, we can measure discrimination by estimating the extent to which male-female earnings differentials cannot be explained by differences in measured productivity characteristics.

One way of doing this is by applying the traditional wage decomposition's technique originated by Blinder and Oaxaca. Since gross differences in average salaries between men and women do not indicate the presence of discrimination, the basic technique involved in estimating wage differentials adjusted for differences in personal and productivity characteristics is to compare the average wages that would be received by the two groups if they were paid according to the same salary structure. The procedure is to compute a hypothetical earnings ratio as it would be if both men and women had the same earnings function.[73]

[73] The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique assumes that the male or female wage structure would prevail in the absence of discrimination.

Assume that in the absence of discrimination both men and women would face the salary structure applicable for men. If men and women are paid according to the same wage structure, different endowments will account for all the observed earnings differentials. Any wage gap that remains as a residual after adjustment for endowments can be interpreted as evidence of gender wage discrimination. The standard Blinder and Oaxaca decomposition is available in their paper or from the author.

Using this method of analysis we can provide estimates of the overall earnings gap between male and female employees in Eritrea and identify the portion due to differences in productivity related characteristics and the portion due to wage discrimination. This technique, however, has its limitation. In this study, the inability to control for all factors which may give rise to productivity differences - for instance, absenteeism, individual personalities, motivation, taste and etc. - may create "omitted variable bias". If, on average, women are more favourably endowed with the characteristics measured by these omitted variables, the extent of labour market discrimination will be underestimated.

Another method for estimating male-female wage differentials is the decomposition technique that was developed by Cotton. Unlike the above model Cotton claims that neither the male nor the female-market wage will be the prevailing market wage. He proposes a reference wage structure (also known as a nondiscriminatory wage structure) that is weighted averages of the empirical wage structure of males and females.

In this paper the techniques used to decompose the gender wage gap in Eritrea's formal labour market do not consider the issues of selectivity bias. Both approaches only examine discrimination that occurs in the labour market, however, discrimination also applies at point of entry to the labour market. However, it is difficult to estimate the probability of being employed, as information regarding a random sample of unemployed job seekers is not available. Another limitation of this study is that our sample only includes individuals (wage/salary earners) working in the formal sector. In

this study, the reason for not considering the self-employed is because it is difficult to separate their wages from profit income.[74]

Data

The data is drawn from a survey of 363 employees (salary and/or wage earners) working in the formal sector of the Eritrean economy. Data collection was carried out by the author during 2001-2002. The population was first divided into two groups, namely public and private sector employees; then a sample of 212 public sector employees and a sample of 151 private sector employees were drawn randomly and proportionately. Out of the total respondents, 184 were female.

In this study, the dummy explanatory variable for education is categorized as primary (grade 1 to 7), secondary (8-12), post secondary non tertiary (13-14) and tertiary (15+). The mnemonic names that are given for these levels of education are ED1, ED2, ED3 and ED4 respectively. Concerning the occupation dummy, most of the respondents did not know clearly what their occupation is called. Some of them perform different tasks, so it was not easy to find one occupational category. Thus five summary occupational categories have been made. OCC1 stands for legislators, senior officials, managers and professionals; OCC2 for technical and associate professionals; OCC3 for clerks; OCC4 for service workers, agricultural and fishery workers and OCC5 for craft and related trade workers and plant and machinery operators.

[74] It is known that earnings data for self-employed also include returns to physical capital and to risk and uncertainty bearing, which are difficult to disentangle from returns to human capital.

Table 4 Summary statistics

Variable	Male		Female	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
E (Monthly earnings in Nakfa)	1195.5374	667.7263	772.9131	439.6942
lnE (log monthly earnings)	6.9538	0.5192	6.4929	0.5760
ED1	0.2235	0.4177	0.2826	0.7926
ED2	0.2905	0.4553	0.4891	0.4515
ED3	0.2626	0.4413	0.1902	0.5012
ED4 (omitted reference group)	0.2235	0.4177	0.03804	0.3935
EX (years of work experience)	18.2464	12.5455	10.6144	9.0813
TE (number of years of tenure)	9.7508	10.2864	7.2576	8.2975
MOH (monthly hours of work)	195.0654	27.43839	188.7357	44.51529
FE (father's level of education)	3.1397	3.9416	4.7880	5.0282
ME (mother's level of education)	1.0223	2.48581	2.2120	3.8925
SE (dummy sector of employment, 1 for public)	0.6254	0.4853	0.5435	0.49947
OCC1(omitted reference group)	0.2402	0.4284	0.04891	0.2163
OCC2	0.2514	0.4350	0.1576	0.3654
OCC3	0.1899	0.3934	0.4293	0.4963
OCC4	0.1229	0.3292	0.3098	0.4637

OCC5	0.1955	0.3977	0.05435	0.2273

Notes: Nakfa is the standard unit of money in Eritrea. In 2001, 1 Nakfa = 0.0738 USD. In this model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings.

As can be seen in Table 4 female employees earn significantly less than their male counterparts. On average, males earn 54.7% more than females. Log monthly earnings differ by 0.46 points on average between male and female employees. Males had also more work experience and length of tenure. On average, male employees had 7.6 extra years of work experience and 2.5 extra years of tenure. Besides having more years of education, males spend longer hours at the work place. The variable in favour of female employees is parents' level of education. In the sample, approximately 22.4% of males had tertiary education. For the females this proportion was 3.8%. The proportion of males working as OCC1 was 24%, whereas for females it was 4.9%. Females were more concentrated in clerical occupations (around 43%).

Empirical results

The male and female earnings regressions in Table 5 make clear which variables are more advantageous to whom.

Table 5 Log earnings regressions: Males and Females

Variable	Male	Female
Constant	8.8541 (7.55)*	5.9742 (11.40)*
ED1	-0.5872 (-4.41)*	-0.4340 (-2.58)**
ED2	-0.4725 (-4.28)*	-0.3873 (-2.53)**
ED3	-0.2996 (-2.82)**	-0.1717 (-1.12)
EX	0.0170 (2.10)**	0.0350 (3.57)*
X Ask Author	-0.0002 (-1.04)	-0.0006 (-2.23)**
TE	-0.0026 (-0.88)	-0.0048 (-1.05)
lnMOH	-0.270 (-1.20)	0.2112 (2.26)**
FE	0.0078 (1.00)	0.0126 (1.82)***
ME	-0.0160 (-1.27)	-0.0054 (-0.61)
SE	-0.0766 (-1.36)	-0.0093 (-0.16)
OCC2	-0.1723 (-1.68)***	-0.1081 (-0.78)
OCC3	-0.3665 (-3.33)*	-0.3622 (-2.69)*
OCC4	-0.8170 (-6.07)*	-0.9294 (-6.05)*
OCC5	-0.380 (-3.08)*	-0.6717 (-3.82)*

(adjusted)	0.6186	0.6803
F- value	21.62*	28.82*
Sample size	179	184

Notes: Values in parentheses are *t*-statistics. Asterisks indicate level of significance: *, significant at 1 percent; **, significant at 5 percent; ***, significant at 10 percent. The independent variable MOH is expressed in logarithm.

The coefficient for experience (EX) is more favourable for female employees. Holding other explanatory variables constant, the peak wage for females occurs after about 29 years of experience, whereas for males predicted earnings reach a peak at 46 years of experience. This is due to the fact that few female employees in the sample (only 5.2%) had more than 29 years of experience.[75]
A higher value of the constant term for males indicates that an individual with no schooling and potential experience need only be male so as to earn more. For the female regression, the coefficients on lnMOH and FE imply, respectively, that a 1% increase in hours of work causes a 0.21% increase in earnings and an additional increase in father's education increases monthly earnings by 1.3%. Concerning levels of education and types of occupation, it is difficult to make male-female earnings comparisons because the estimated values are relative and so cannot show the absolute earnings differentials.

The results reported in Table 6 demonstrate that the women of this sample earn less than men for reasons other than differences in observable skills.

[75] For more methodological information refer to Mirer (1983) and Wooldridge (2000).

Table 6 Decomposition of the gender earnings gap (the Blinder-Oaxaca procedure)

Component	Equation	Logarith
(1) Males, average earnings	Ask Author	6.9538
(2) Females, average earnings	$\sum b_f \overline{X}_f$	6.4929
Payment according to male monthly earnings structure		
(3) Females, no discrimination	$\sum b_m \overline{X}_f$	6.6232
(4) Overall differential	$\sum b_m \overline{X}_m - \sum b_f \overline{X}_f$	0.46
(5) Endowment differences	$\sum b_m (\overline{X}_m - \overline{X}_f)$	0.33
(6) Residual (discrimination)	$\sum (b_m - b_f) \overline{X}_f$	0.13
Payment according to female monthly earnings structure		
(7) Males, no discrimination	$\sum b_f \overline{X}_m$	6.8122
(8) Overall differential	$\sum b_m \overline{X}_m - \sum b_f \overline{X}_f$	0.46
(9) Endowment differences	$\sum b_f (\overline{X}_m - \overline{X}_f)$	0.32
(10) Residual (discrimination)	$\sum (b_m - b_f) \overline{X}_m$	0.14

Notes: * For equations (1), (2), (3) and (7) Eritrean Nakfa figures (geometric mean of earnings) are the antilogs of the natural logarithms. The remaining Eritrean Nakfa figures are calculated as: (5) = (1) - (3); (6) = (3) - (2); (4) = (5) + (6); (9) = (7) - (2); (10) = (1) - (7), and (8) = (9) + (10). The geometric mean is normally lower than the arithmetic mean because geometric mean places less emphasis on extremely high values.
Source: Author's calculation

Assuming that the male monthly earnings structure applies, 0.13 (28.3 %) of the observed gender difference in earnings is due to discrimination and 0.33 (71.7 %) of the differential can be attributed to the superior endowment in monthly earnings-determining characteristics of the males. Standardizing by female means, the earnings differential that can be attributed to discrimination is 0.14 (30.4 %) and the differential attributed to superior endowments is 0.32 (69.6 %). By using a simple average of the estimates, one can

crudely say that, on average, around 29.4% of the gender gap in earnings is discriminatory.

The log monthly earnings for males were 6.9538, and the corresponding geometric mean earnings were 1047.12 Nakfa. For females the log wage was 6.4929 and the geometric mean wage was 660.44. Thus, the resulting gender log earnings gap is 0.46, and the corresponding mean earnings are 386.68. If we assume payment according to male monthly earnings structure, the log monthly earnings for females will be 6.6232 (X), and the corresponding mean earnings will equal to 752.35 Nakfa. By subtracting 752.35 Nakfa from males' average earnings (1047.12), the Nakfa amount of endowment differences will be 294.77, and the rest that is 91.91 Nakfa is the amount of discrimination (for more information see Table 6).

The results do not show much difference when the Cotton decomposition procedure is used. As can been seen in Table 7, 28.3% of the earnings gap is due to discrimination. In this decomposition, the treatment of discrimination due to overvaluation of male productivity characteristics (male treatment advantage or the benefit of being male) accounts for 53.8% (49.44 Nakfa), whereas the rest 46.2% (42.46 Nakfa) is due to undervaluation of female productivity characteristics .

Table 7 Decomposition of the gender earnings gap (in logarithm)

	The Blinder-Oaxaca procedure		The Cotton procedure
	Male	Female	
Total gender log earnings gap	0.46 (100%)	0.46 (100%)	0.46 (100%)
Endowment differential Discrimination differential	0.33 (71.7%) 0.13 (28.3%)	0.32 (69.6%) 0.14 (30.4%)	0.33 (71.7%) 0.13 (28.3%)
Male advantage Female disadvantage	--- 0.13 (100%)	0.14 (100%) ---	0.07 (53.8%) 0.06 (46.2%)

Source: Author's calculation

Discrimination takes place through the more favourable return to occupation for males. The argument that women are over-represented in lower paying jobs and under-represented in professionals and managerial categories seems to apply in this study. Women in Eritrea usually dominate occupations such as secretarial work, teaching, nursing, typing and other clerical jobs, whereas men are in better positions (Bahata and Isack, 2000). Males have an advantage in terms of their higher level of education, greater experience and superior occupational distribution (see the positive percentages in Table 8).

In Eritrea, labour force participation rates of women are now almost the same as those of men. However, if, due to discrimination, women persistently earn less than do their counterparts, the situation could lead to the inefficient allocation of resources. As a result, females could less likely invest in education and on-the-job training, which in turn, hinders efforts to reduce poverty, as women are among the poorest in the economy.

Table 8 Contribution of variables to the gap due to endowment differential

	Payment according male wage structure (Blinder-Oaxaca)		Payment according female structure (Blinder-Oaxaca)	
Constant	0	0%	0	0%
ED1	0.0347	10.5%	0.0257	8.0%
ED2	0.0938	28.4%	0.0769	24.1%
ED3	-0.0217	-6.57%	-0.0124	-3.9%
EX	0.1295	39.2%	0.2668	83.6%
X	-0.0539	-16.3%	-0.1788	-56.0%
TE	-0.0064	-1.9%	-0.0121	-3.8%
lnMOH	-0.0164	-5.0%	0.0128	4.0%
FE	-0.0128	-3.9%	-0.0207	-6.5%
ME	0.0191	5.8%	0.0064	2.0%
SE	-0.0063	-1.9%	-0.0008	-0.3%
OCC2	-0.0162	-4.9%	-0.0101	-3.2%
OCC3	0.0877	26.5%	0.0867	27.2%
OCC4	0.1527	46.2%	0.1737	54.4%
OCC5	-0.0534	-16.2%	-0.0948	-29.7%
Total	0.3304 (71.7%)	100%	0.3193 (69.6%)	100%

Source: Author's calculation

In contrast with the studies that have found the existence of a large gender wage gap (due to discrimination) in Africa, the findings of this paper show that only some 30% of the gender wage gap is due to discrimination. Our results are consistent with those obtained from the public sector in Botswana and Uganda (see Table 9).

Table 9 Portion of the gender wage gap explained by discrimination in selected African countries

Country	Year	Gender wage gap due to discrimination (%)	Source
Botswana	1995/96	66 (private sector) 33 (public sector)	Siphambe and Thokweng-Bakwena (2001)
Guinea	1990	75 (public sector) 55 (the self-employed)	Glick and Sahn (1997)
Ethiopia Cote d'Ivoire Uganda	1990 1985, 1986, 1987 1992	82 (private); 92 (public) 141 (private); 74 (public) 91 (private); 34 (public)	Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999)
Kenya	1994	78 (full sample)	Kabubo-Mariara (2003)
Madagascar	1998	between 61.3 and 76 (taking actual experience) between 77.5 and 88.6 (taking potential experience)	Nordman and Roubaud (2005)

Conclusion and Recommendations

Most of the available literature on wage differentials between male and female employees confirms the presence of wage discrimination against female employees.

The results indicate that around 70% of the male-female monthly earnings differential in Eritrea can be attributed to differences in endowments and the rest is due to discrimination. Part of the unexplained portion of gender wage differentials is due to occupational sex segregation. Occupational sex segregation can be eliminated by promoting equal participation of women in highly skilled jobs and senior management positions and other measures that stimulate their career development and upward mobility. Neo-classical economics and human capital theory also emphasize policies that address non-labour market factors to reduce occupational segregation. Family planning, and a more equal sharing of child care and household work between the sexes are among the recommended policies.

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'Peace is every child's right': The Machel Report

Christine Cheater

christine.cheater@newcastle.edu.au

> Let us claim children as "zones of peace". In this way, humankind will finally declare that childhood is inviolate and that all children must be spared the pernicious effects of armed conflict. Children present us with a uniquely compelling motivation for mobilization. Universal concern for children presents new opportunities to confront the problems that cause their suffering. By focusing on children, politicians, Governments, the military and non-State entities will begin to recognize how much they destroy through armed conflict and, therefore, how little they gain. Let us take this opportunity to recapture our instinct to nourish and protect children. Let us transform our moral outrage into concrete action. Our children have a right to peace. Peace is every child's right.[76]

This quote is from the conclusion of Graca Machel's *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*. Known as the Machel Report, itwas presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 August 1996 as the result of research undertaken with the support of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights and the United Nations Children's Fund. Machel hoped that by discussing the plight of

[76] Graca Machel, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, UNICEF, 1996, p 73, paragraph 318

children living in war zones, the parental instincts of the world's leaders would be aroused and they would be driven to protect children's rights and, by extension, those of everyone involved in armed conflict. The report covers the results of warfare and its impacts on the lives of children. Topics include the loss of parents and community, conditions in refugee and internal displacement camps, sexual exploitation and the use of gender violence as a weapon, the use of land mines, loss of crops and malnutrition, the destruction of educational and medical services, the impact of sanctions and measures that could be taken to promote psychological recovery and social reintegration. The report was arguably the first comprehensive, world-wide survey of the impact of war on children's lives and their prospects. However, the sections on child soldiers have attracted the most attention

In 1989 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) [77] When drawing up the convention the UN used the right to life, the right to survive, the right to personal development and the right to non-discrimination as its four guiding principles.[78] In principal the CRC covers any person under the age of eighteen and includes the same civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as applied to adults. These rights were adapted to meet the specific needs of children. Namely:

1. The right to access to basic services like education, health care and welfare
2. Protection rights, including. protection against all forms of violence, abuse and exploitation
3. The right to participation, including freedom of expression, religion and association

African nations responded by drawing up the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which as adopted by the Assembly

[77] Although protecting the rights of the child had been on the international agenda since shortly after World War I, it was argued that children's rights were protected adequately by other human rights conventions.

[78] Convention on the Rights of the Child, < http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/crc.pdf > accessed 20 September, 2006

of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity in 1990.[79]

Although not bought into force until 1999, at the time of drafting the African Charter was globally the most progressive declaration of the rights of children.[80] The Charter placed considerable emphasis on the ideals of 'best interest of child and 'views of the child'. It stated that, "In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be of primary consideration" and when implementing these actions the views of the chid will be taken into account.[81] The Charter carried few of the claw-back clauses that have allowed political imperatives to undermine basic human rights in other conventions. For instance, while the CRC contained a proviso to the effect that the term "child" might be adjusted to bring it into line with national or customary laws that in effect could lower the age of majority to below eighteen, the Charter had no such qualifications. Therefore, on the issue of recruiting children for armed combat the CRC allowed the recruitment of children aged fifteen and over as this was legally permissible in a number of nation states. The Charter made no such concession and contained an outright prohibition on the recruitment of children under eighteen.

Three years after the Organisation of African Unity adopted the Charter the UN called on Graca Machel to report on the impact of war on children. Public attention had been drawn to the use of children in combat roles in 1988 when the *World Press Review*

[79] African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, < http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/A.%20C.%20ON%20THE%20RIGHT%20AND%20WELF%20OF%20CHILD.pdf > accessed 20 September, 2006

[80] Geraldine Van Bueren, *The International Law on the Rights of the Child* (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995).402. Also see *International Journal of Children's Rights*, vol 10 (2002) which contains a series of articles on the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Children

[81] African Charter, article IV

published on article titled 'Children of Death'.[82] This article discussed children as victims of Mozambique's civil war and described how children between the ages of four and fourteen were being used as slave labour in RENAMO's guerrilla camps. Using personal accounts the article told of the use of young girls for sex and the training of boys to kill. The *Christian Science Monitor* took up the theme of the use of children in combat and in 1990 Amnesty International deplored the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Also noted were the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda which was kidnapping children from rural areas and forcing them to commit atrocities against their parents and isolated villages. Emotive images of young boys toting machine guns galvanised public interested, leading to the formation of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in 1992.

The Coalition was an international body of concerned individuals who collected data on countries and rebels groups that recruited child soldiers, and worked to raise international awareness of this issue. Machel summed up their concerns in her introduction, pointing to the thirty armed conflicts that raged around the globe in 1995. All of these conflicts occurred within nations states and between factions split along ethnic, religious or cultural lines.

> In the past decade, an estimated two million children have been killed in armed conflict. Three times as many have been seriously injured or permanently disabled, many of them maimed by landmines. Countless others have been forced to witness or even to take part in horrifying acts of violence.
>
> These statistics are shocking enough, but more chilling is the conclusion to be drawn from them: more and more of the world is being sucked into a desolate moral vacuum. This is a space devoid of the most basic human values; a space in which children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited as soldiers; a space in which children are starved and exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated violence speaks of deliberate victimization. There are few further depths to which humanity can sink. [83]

Graca Machel was a logical candidate to be appointed as the UN's expert. In the 1990s Mozambique was coming to terms with the consequences of over a decade of civil war in which an estimated 750,000 children had died and at least 250,000 had been orphaned. RENAMO had used young boys and girls in forced labour camps, and as part of its campaign to liberate women FRELEMO had recruited teenage girls to fight for its cause. As the wife of Mozambique's first president Samora Machel, Graca Machel was involved in programs designed to turn a former colony into a modern nation state. From 1975-1989 she held the position of Minister for Education which earned her a reputation as a leading force in educational reform. In the decade from 1975-85, the number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools in Mozambique rose from about 40% of all school-aged children to over 90%, attendance for males and 75% for females. In 1990 she formed the Foundation for Community Development, which offered technical help and funds to build local schools and clinics. She had also served as Mozambique's delegate to UNICEF , was President of the National Commission of UNESCO, and chaired the National Organization of Children of Mozambique which placed war and AIDS orphans in village homes to reinforce the role of the family and community in the healing process.

Machel was asked to make recommendations in five areas:

(1) the participation of children in armed conflict
(2) the reinforcement of preventive measures
(3) the relevance and adequacy of existing standards
(4) the measures required to improve the protection of children affected by armed conflict

[82] *World Press Review*, Vol. 35, Issue 9, (Sept 88) 23-4

[83] Machel, 5, para 2/3

(5) the actions needed to promote the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of children affected by armed conflict.[84]

Machel's approach to her task went beyond the CRC and reflected the spirit of the African Charter and incorporated the dual ideals of 'best interests of the child' and the 'views of the child'.

Although developments in Africa were a major focus of the report, six consultations were held to determine regional priorities relating to children in armed conflict. They included:

1. The Horn, Eastern, Central and Southern Africa: Addis Ababa, 17-19 April 1995 (co-convenor Economic Commission for Africa)
2. Arab Regions: Cairo, August 1995 (co-convenors Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and UNICEF)
3. West and Central Africa: Abidjan, 7-10 November 1995 (co-convenors African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa and UNICEF)
4. Asia and the Pacific: Manila, 13-15 March 1996 (co-convenor UNICEF)
5. Latin America and the Caribbean Bogota, 17-19 April 1996 (co-convenors Govt of Colombia, Save the Children and UNICEF)
6. Europe: Florence, 10-12 June 1996 (co-convenor UNICEF)

The aim was not only to chart the impact of war on the lives of children but also to highlight the importance of children's rights to the Governments, policy makers and opinion leaders. Those consulted included government bureaucrats, military authorities, legal experts, human rights organizations, the media, religious organizations, civil society leaders and women and children directly involved in armed conflicts.

The inclusion of women and children was initiated by Machel, who knew the importance of giving the victims a voice. Their testimonies gave first hand accounts of what happened to communities during conflict. They had coped with the destruction of their homes, villages and livelihoods, and many had developed successful strategies for

[84] Machel, 6, para 9

rebuilding shattered communities. This ensured that Machel's recommendations were based on schemes that worked. Machel thought that it was particularly important for youth be given a say in the rebuilding of their futures. She said it boosted their self esteem and helped to rebuilt their connections with the community.

Machel personally made field trips to Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Rwanda (including refugee camps in Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania), Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia. During these visits, she made it a point to not only met with Government representatives, non-governmental, community and women's organizations, religious groups, and aid agencies but also with children and their families.

> This direct contact has helped ensure that the present report and its recommendations are firmly based on conditions and priorities within countries. It also ensures that the report reflects not only the experience of those most involved in the care and protection of children, but also the immediate concerns of the affected families and children themselves.[85]

During the two years that it took to complete field trips, read submissions and conduct regional consultations, children were directly involved in armed combat in eight African countries, the Balkan States, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Philippines, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, parts of Indonesia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Colombia. Machel found that children were recruited to serve in armies originally in supporting roles as cooks, porters, messengers and spies but as the conflicts dragged-on adults increasingly began conscripting children to fight. Some commanders thought child soldiers were "...more obedient, do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult soldiers".[86] Most of the child conscripts were adolescents, though numerous child soldiers (usually those found in rebel forces) were 10 years of age or younger. While

[85] Machel, 7, para 14
[86] Machel, 11, para 23

the majority were boys, girls also were recruited (again most often in rebel forces). The children most likely to become soldiers were those from impoverished and marginalized backgrounds and especially those who were separated from their families.

Child soldiers could be conscripted, press-ganged, kidnapped or forced to join armed groups to defend their families. Some countries legally conscript youth at the age of eighteen but, because birth registrations are inadequate, the children do not know or cannot prove their age. Recruiters guess at the child's age based on physical development and enter the age of recruits as eighteen. In many instances, recruits were seized from the streets and in some extreme cases from schools and orphanages. This form of press ganging, was known in Ethiopia as "afesa". It was prevalent in the 1980's, when armed militia, police or army cadres roamed the streets picking up anyone they encountered. Poorer children were particularly vulnerable to press ganging particularly adolescent boys working on the streets selling cigarettes, gum or lottery tickets.

In many cases children joined or were offered to armed groups for economic reasons. Children themselves could volunteer believing that this was the only of guarantee of regular meals, clothing and medical attention. In areas of conflict, hunger and poverty could drive parents to offer their children for service and occasionally armies paid the child's wages directly to the family. Sometimes parents encouraged their daughters to become soldiers if their marriage prospects were poor. Elsewhere whole families moved with armed groups and their children gradually took on the role of soldiers.

As conflicts persisted, economic and social conditions suffered and educational and work opportunities became limited or even non-existent. Under these circumstances, recruits tended to become younger and younger. Some children felt obliged to become soldiers for their own protection. As their world descended into violence and chaos, they decided they would be safer with guns in their hands. Some children joined armed opposition groups after experiencing

harassment from government forces. Sometimes armed forces picked up unaccompanied children for humanitarian reasons. Children who stayed with these groups often identified with their protectors or 'new family' and joined their cause.

Machel found that the lure of ideology was strong in early adolescence when young people were developing personal identities and searching for a sense of meaning. Ideologically inspired children tended to come from societies which glorified war activities and presented military life as an attractive option. Child soldiers might see joining armed combat groups as a way of gaining power and control over their lives. In Sierra Leone, Machel met with child soldiers who proudly declared the number of "enemies" they had killed. Many children proved to be susceptible to indoctrination as in Rwanda, and where children are lured into cults of martyrdom (as in the Middle East). However, despite examples of child exploitation, Machel cautioned that children may genuinely choose to identify with and fight for social causes, religious expression, self-determination or national liberation. In South Africa school children joined the struggle in pursuit of political freedom.

Once recruited, children provided support functions such as working as porters, cleaning, gardening, hunting wild fruits and vegetables, looting food from gardens and granaries and performing guard duties. Children were used extensively as lookouts and messengers, activities that placed all children under suspicion as government soldiers had no way of telling if children were operating for rebel forces. Girls performed the same functions as boys as well as preparing food, attending the wounded and washing clothes. Girls could also be forced to provide sexual services. In Uganda girls who are abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army are "married off" to rebel leaders. If the man was killed, the girl was put aside for ritual cleansing and then married off to another rebel.

Children engaging in combat duties suffered a higher than usual mortality rate because of their inexperience and lack of training. Young children were particularly vulnerable. They rarely appreciated

the danger they faced and a number of studies reported that when the shelling started the children got over excited and forgot to take cover. Some commanders deliberately exploited such fearlessness by plying children with alcohol or drugs before a battle. A soldier who faced children treated in this fashion said that the boys rushed around the field screaming like banshees. "It seemed like they were immortal or impervious, or something, because we shot at them and they just kept coming."[87]

Machel reported that continued exposure to combat and violence desensitized the children and could lead to the further destabilisation of society. The first step towards solving this problem was simply acknowledging the fact that many children had engaged in armed conflict: "No peace treaty to date has formally recognized the existence of child combatants."[88] As a result children's needs were not taken into account when negotiating cease fires or in rehabilitation programs. Peace agreements should contain provisions for the demobilisation of children, a vital step towards ensuring their reintegration into the community.

Machel's interviews with child soldiers showed that re-establishing contact with family and community was a priority but difficult. Children had become older, more independent and often traumatised. Girls had lesser prospects of being re-integrated into their families because cultural beliefs about girls who have been raped lessen their marriage prospects. Also men were uneasy about girls who knew how to fight. Thus former girl soldiers often drifted into prostitution. For orphans a transitional period of collective care was necessary. However, institutional approaches had proved to be ineffective, peer-group living arrangements with strong links with communities worked better.

Factors that improved the chances of reintegration include educational and vocational opportunities for the former child

[87] Machel, 13, para 47
[88] Machel, 14, para 49

combatants and economic security for their families. Without these children were vulnerable to being conscripted into criminal gangs, or to re-recruitment. In South Africa boys who had been involved in the anti-apartheid movements but continued to be frustrated by poverty turned to crime. Machel also noted the re-recruitment of boys in Central America after peace talks had broken down. She challenged governments to look to the best interests of the child and channel the energy, ideas and experiences of youth into contributing to the rebuilding of a post-conflict society. The need for the involvement of adolescent children in the peace process is a strong theme through out Machel's recommendations.

Much of the report was devoted to examining the effects of warfare on children in general. Although not explicitly stated, one of the conclusions that can be drawn is that during prolonged conflicts the use of child soldiers becomes increasingly difficult to avoid.

> War violates every right of a child - the right to life, the right to be with family and community, the right to health, the right to the development of the personality and the right to be nurtured and protected. Many of today's conflicts last the length of a "childhood", meaning that from birth to early adulthood, children will experience multiple and accumulative assaults. Disrupting the social networks and primary relationships that support children's physical, emotional, moral, cognitive and social development in this way, and for this duration, can have profound physical and psychological implications.[89]

War destroys the mechanisms of civil societies. It destroys crops, education and health facilities, forces families from their homes and undermines hopes for a better future.

The simple fact that children were growing up in a war zone meant they were vulnerable to exploitation. Families forced to from their

[89] Machel, 10, para 30

homes and into refugee and internal displacement camps had to deal with loss of community, trauma, hunger, poor facilities and boredom. Coupled with resentment towards the armed factions who had forced them to flee, these camps were ideal recruiting grounds. Unaccompanied children were especially susceptible, both to offers of support and to hate campaigns mounted in the camps. Families who remained in their homes faced malnutrition due to the destruction of crops and declining health and education facilities caused by destruction of buildings and loss of staff. Families would offer their children to recruiters as a means of feeding themselves or providing some security for the child's future. The longer the war the more likely it was that families would give up their children and that the children themselves would see soldiering as their only possible future.

Finally the report examined the adequacy the CRC for the protection of children living in war zones and the importance of meeting the needs of children in the reconstruction and reconciliation processes. For example, how should youth involved in massacres in Rwanda be treated? Machel hoped that throwing the spotlight on the suffering of children living in war zones would be the first small step towards addressing their problems. Her hopes were partially granted.

In response to *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* the UN added an optional protocol to the CRC in 2000. This protocol provides that:

1. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.
2. States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces
3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under the age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that:
    (a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary

    (b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person's parents or legal guardians
    (c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service
    (d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military service

Recognising that many children also fight for rebel groups the protocol also asked that:

1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.

By 2004 more then 100 countries had signed the protocol, including 25 out of the 51 African nations.

More importantly the report has drawn global attention to the plight of children living in war zones. By involving the military, NGOs, government bureaucrats, politicians and the media in the regional conferences Machel obliged local authorities to acknowledge that the problem existed in their region. The conferences also provided an opportunity for aid agencies to share their experiences of working with child soldiers and in Africa a new alliance of NGOs was formed to coordinate action on child development issues. In her second global report to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Machel felt able to say:

> When my report was published in 1996, there was a strong but little acknowledged perception that children were at best marginal to the 'real' security issues of the 'real' world. Now the UN Security Council regularly discusses children and

armed conflict and the long-term protection of children is seen as a cornerstone of peace and security.[90]

Yet media reports each day continue to show how much still needs to be done[91].

[90] Graca Machel, Global Report, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, London, 2004, p 9

[91] The Fifth World Congress on Family Law and Children's Rights was held in Cape Town in March 2005. Several of the papers dealt with children's rights and violence in Africa see http://www.lawrights.asn.au/html/2005_papers.html

Demographic Trends in Humanitarian Arrivals 2001/2 to 2005/6

David Lucas

David.lucas@anu.edu.au

In 2006 the then Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) published the first edition of *Demographic Trends in Humanitarian Arrivals* for each of the six States and the two Territories, covering the financial years 2001/2 to 2005-6. During this period the regional focus of Humanitarian Programme had shifted to Africa, and there were over 26,000 African humanitarian arrivals in this five-year period (Table 1).

The purpose of this paper is to extract and summarize the African data from the eight reports. These are based on DIMA's Settlement Database which contains a total of around 1.5 million records of settler arrivals and permanent residence grants since 1st January 1991. The limitations of the data are described in each report. Roughly the first half of each State report is a standard description of Australia's Humanitarian Programme, with few specific mentions of Africans, while the second half describes the composition of the humanitarian intake to each State or Territory.

In general, arrivals to Australia can be divided into three broad streams, family, skilled, or humanitarian. The Humanitarian Programme is the smallest of the three and includes two offshore categories:

- a Refugee Category for the resettlement of refugees referred by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- a Special Humanitarian Program (SHP) 'to assist people who are not necessarily refugees within the strict legal definition, but are in refugee-like situations..' Entrants in this category may be sponsored by earlier arrivals who came as refugees (2006a:10)

A third category, of onshore protection visas, is not very relevant for Africans since they generally processed offshore, the only exception being seven Zimbabweans in Tasmania (Table 1).

In Table 1 the birthplaces have been roughly divided into three main source areas for humanitarian arrivals: the Horn of Africa, West Africa and Central Africa. As pointed out in the Northern Terrritory report (DIMA 2006h:7) 'country of birth as recorded by the Department's Settlement Database does not necessarily reflect an individual's ethnic, cultural or national background.' Examples given include children born of Sudanese parents in refugee camps in Kenya, Egypt and Uganda.
Similarly, children of Liberian and Sierra Leone parents may have been born in a camp in Guinea. This does not prevent the State reports showing Kenya, Egypt, and Uganda, Guinea, and also Tanzania, in the Figures on 'New African communities' (see for example DIMA 2006a, Figure 41).

Table 2 shows the predominance of Sudanese in the intakes. During this period the number of persons described as 'Sudanese' rather than say, Dinka or Nuer, tended to decline reflecting the introduction of more specific ethnic codes for the multitude of different ethnic groups in West Africa.'(DIMA 2006a:18).

The Northern Territory report does not have an ethnicity table but for 2001/5 it does show 60 Acholi speakers, 33 Somali , 12 Dinka, and 73 other African language speakers with 'non-specific language identification' (DIMA 2006h:9). Acholi speakers are concentrated in Uganda but some are found in southern Sudan.

Table 3 shows that in most States the arrivals go to metropolitan areas. Regional locations given as examples in the reports include Goulburn, Coffs Harbour, Newcastle and Wagga Wagga in New South Wales, Toowoomba in Queensland, and
Launceston and north-west Tasmania (DIMA 2006a:11).

A small decrease in the numbers of humanitarian entrants from Africa is expected in 2006/7 (DIMA 2006a:8). However, it is likely that Sudanese applications will increase over the next few years because of continuing unrest in Sudan, the large numbers of displaced people in camps in neighbouring countries and the growing numbers of arrivals who are eligible to act as SHP proposers (DIMA 2006a:10).

These reports are a useful new resource for those interested in African resettlement; furthermore it is envisaged that the reports will be produced annually.

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Table 1. 2001/2 –2005/6 African Humanitarian Arrivals by Birthplace

Country of Birth	State						Territory		
	NSW	Qld	SA	Tas	Vic	WA	ACT	NT	Total
Sudan	4200	2464	1580	672	6115	1943	188	228	17390
Egypt	458	146	39	15	550	112			1320
Uganda		93	46	19				23	181
Kenya	208	185	245	11	343	179		28	1199
Somalia		93	104		316				513
Ethiopia	159	131	156	126	876	246			1694
Eritrea				26	219	72			317
Sierra Leone	779	218	124	198		264	59		1642
Liberia	378	252	344	38	218	326		70	1626
Guinea	88							61	149
Burundi	146	184	178	46	91	94			739
Tanzania	82	112			74	96			364
DR Congo	87		138		49	179		23	476
Rwanda				12					12

Zimbabwe		*9							*9
Total	**6585**	**3887**	**2954**	**1163**	**8851**	**3511**	**247**	**433**	**27.631**

Notes: For the States, this Table is based on the 'New African communities' Figure in the reports, supplemented with information on smaller numbers from other Figures where shown below.
* Onshore protection visa arrivals

Sources:
New South Wales, DIMA 2006a:18, Figure 41.
Queensland, DIMA 2006b:18, Figure 40.
South Australia, DIMA 2006c:18, Figure 41 supplemented by Figures 19-21.
For Tasmania, DIMA 2006d:17, Figure 38, supplemented by Figures 21,25.
For Victoria, DIMA 2006e; 18, Figure 40.
For Western Australia DIMA 2006f: Figure 40.
Australian Capital Territory, DIMA 2006g: 13, Figure 19.
Northern Territory, DIMA 2006h: 7, Figure 5, covering 2001/5 only. 'Congo' is assumed to be Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Table 2. African Humanitarian Arrivals 2001/2 to 2005/6. Major Ethnicities by State/Territory

	NSW	Qld	SA	Tas	Vic	WA	ACT
Sudan:							
Dinka	2596	998	1156	144	3196	899	147
Nuer		153			993		
Sudanese	1780	1079	335	259	2131	777	
Tigrinya (Ethiopia/Eritrea)		135				202	
Amhara (Ethiopia)				88			
Hutu		232	189				
African (nfd)	1369	1027	930	375	955	1017	87
Other African		148		82		279	
Total	**5745**	**3772**	**2610**	**948**	**6320**	**3174**	**234**

Notes: This Table is derived from the Figures listed below that show the top 10 ethnicities (or in the case of Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory, the top 5) from all sources. The names of the ethnic groups are as given in the reports.

nfd; Not further defined

Sources:
New South Wales, DIMA 2006a:18, Figure 39.
Queensland, DIMA 2006b:18, Figure .
South Australia, DIMA 2006c:18, Figure 41 supplemented by Figures
For Tasmania, DIMA 2006d:17, Figure 38, supplemented by Figures .
For Victoria, DIMA 2006e; 18, Figure
For Western Australia DIMA 2006f: 17, Figure 38.
Australian Capital Territory, DIMA 2006g:16, Figure 33.

For Northern Territory see text

Table 3. Major Settlement Locations (Local Government Areas) of African Humanitarian Arrivals in Each State, 2001/2 to 2005/6.

(a) New South Wales

	LGA			
Birthplace	Fairfield	Auburn	Blacktown	Liverpool
Sudan	228	639	1246	209
Egypt		12	111	24
Sierra Leone		112	51	25
Liberia		52	127	
DR Congo	35			
Burundi	65			
Tanzania	36			

Source: DIMA 2006a: Figures 25-28.

(b) Queensland

	LGA		
Birthplace	Brisbane	Logan	Toowomba
Sudan	1588	229	442
Liberia	217		
Sierra Leone	145		4
Burundi	108	58	
Egypt	108		23
Ethiopia	97	26	
Somalia		37	
Kenya		35	58
Tanzania		31	14

Source: DIMA 2006b, Figures 25-27.

(c) South Australia

	LGA			
Birthplace	Port Adelaide-Enfield	**Charles Sturt**	West Torrens	Salisbury
Sudan	386	291	221	105
Liberia	136	78	46	16
Somalia	68			
DR Congo	62		29	15
Kenya	57	39	16	
Tanzania				24
Burundi	56			43
Ethiopia		32	58	
Sierra Leone		30	28	
Egypt			15	

Source: 2006c: Figures 25-28.

(d) Tasmania

	LGA		
Birthplace	Launceston	Glenorchy	Hobart
Sudan	208	135	145
Sierra Leone	97	39	38
Ethiopia	39	22	22
Eritrea	26		
Liberia	25		
Burundi		23	23
Rwanda		12	12
Uganda			7

Source: 2006d: Figures 23-25.

(e) Victoria:

Birthplace	Greater Dandenong	Brimbank	Hume	Maribynong
Sudan	1979	1303	11	483
Ethiopia	124	105		208
Kenya	118	52		25
Liberia		41		
Somalia		34	19	10
Eritrea			18	35
Burundi				31
Egypt	176	105		29

Source: 2006e. Figures 25-28.

(f) Western Australia

Birthplace	Stirling	Wanneroo	Canning
Sudan	1187	228	187
Liberia	157		31
Sierra Leone	142		25
DR Congo	197	15	14
Ethiopia		17	31
Egypt	80	14	
Kenya	76	37	18
Burundi		14	18

Source: DIMA 2006f. Figures 25-27

David Keen, *Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone*, Oxford, James Currey, 2005. pp. 270. ISBN 0-85255-883-X (p/b).

In *Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone* David Keen seeks to separate his text from similar publications on the topic by examining the sociological and psychological perspectives of the war. The author is wary of assumptions concerning political struggles in Africa, and his study attempts to "blend an analysis of the political and economical functions of violence with an exploration of how violent people see their own violence". Towards this, he focuses on what he sees as several neglected areas of research.

As explored by the author, the roots of the conflict reveal an early ethnicisation of the army, based upon a north-south divide. Presenting a chronological account of events, Keen attributes the ethnic imbalance in the army to the violence and intimidation which marred Sierra Leone's elections after the withdrawal of the SLPP, a Mende-based party. As has been well documented, Sierra Leone's youth played a major role in the civil war, and Keen posits that election violence from the early 1970s onwards set dangerous precedents which were taken up by the youth. The author blames the state for having failed to provide adequate education, especially to young males, many of whom would become combatants in the war. Through the testimonies of informants Keen illustrates the sense of betrayal and rejection felt by Sierra Leone's youth, many of whom were hired by political parties and instructed to intimidate civilians. It was these same political parties, asserts Keen, who whether in power or in opposition failed to provide the young with any real alternative other than political violence. The very word "youth" took on a sinister meaning in Sierra Leone, and a "psychological gap" developed where the youth were left isolated. A sense of betrayal by

the nation's leaders was palpable amongst the young, a situation which would have dire consequences for the country.

With regards to the main causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, Keen dismisses several commonly held beliefs as misconceptions. In particular, the author focuses on the diamond trade, and argues that it was not the prime motivating force behind the conflict. Though all forces, including ECOMOG, mined for diamonds, and indeed ECOMOG traded their guns to the RUF rebels for diamonds, Keen asserts that the violence in Sierra Leone was very widespread and was often centred on regions bereft of rare minerals. The author notes the importance of forced labour used in cash crop production, and posits this as one of the motivators behind the violence, reminding us that large tracts of fertile land were held under rebel control. Keen's strategy is to show that rather than simple greed being the cause of the conflict, there were a host of reasons which contributed to the war. Rather than diamonds, the Sierra Leonean civil war was driven by issues such as education, unemployment, and the failure of local justice.

Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone attempts to discover the "elements of rationality in conflicts that have been dismissed as irrational", and in the text the author reveals the political goals of the parties involved. One example Keen uses is of hostage taking by the RUF. He argues that such actions were designed to counter the military government's assertions that the rebels were disunited and uncoordinated. He points out that the rebels did not seek money for their captives' release, but rather satellite phones so that they could communicate their political objectives to the international community.

The tragedy of the war is also revealed by Keen, especially the suffering of Sierra Leone's civilians, who had to endure years of persecution by both rebel and government soldiers alike. These so-called "sobels", many of them teenage youths, fought each other, the civilians, local kamajor fighters, imported mercenaries, and

ECOMOG forces, in a conflict that few could see any resolution to. Keen points out that to many of those involved, the aim of the war wasn't to win, but to assert the rights of a multiplicity of disenfranchised groups. In trying to understand the extreme nature of the violence, particularly that perpetrated by rebels on civilians, Keen focuses on the absence of democratic politics and the endemic corruption which characterised Sierra Leonean political life. In a world turned upside down, asserts Keen, extreme acts possessed a kind of logic which ultimately drew in successive factions. The author emphasizes the need to understand notions of social exclusion, and his text represents a study which investigates the conflict from a psychological perspective which few authors have attempted. His research is augmented by numerous interviews with informants, including those from senior ranks in the government, military and rebel commands.

Graeme Counsel,

Melbourne University

History for Tanzanian Secondary Schools ?

Gregory H. Maddox & James L. Giblin, *In Search of a Nation. Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania*, Oxford, James Currey; Dar Es Salaam: Kapsel Educational Publications; Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005. pp. xiv+337. ISBN: 0821416642 (pbk).

This collection of 17 essays is the result of a festschrift in honour of historian Isaria Kimambo and was prompted, at least in part, by calls for more relevant historical and historiographical materials from frustrated history teachers in Tanzania's secondary schools; the authors have responded well to the call. Adhering, if perhaps only peripherally in cases, to an overall theme of nationalism and knowledge, the essays that follow the editors' introduction are divided into four groups on a chronological basis: pre-colonial, colonial, independence and contemporary.

In the first section, two articles deal with issues of access to power. Steven Feierman skilfully analyses Shambaa ritual processes that are engaged upon the death of the king, showing how a body of ritual knowledge is held collectively, thus reinforcing social cohesiveness and identity and preventing the appropriation of the totality of the ritual by any one party. Competition and cooperation are both shown to be essential elements in establishing the succession, highlighting the dynamic and contingent character of social interaction. That the value of ritual knowledge lies in its restricted circulation is echoed in the following article, Edward Alpers' teasing out of the convoluted, complex and often contradictory processes by which one specific local ruler used both matrilineal and patrilineal claims to succession to fuse local and Swahili forms of authority, linking the

interior with the coast and an increasingly global economic and political environment. Alpers shows how it is precisely in these contradictions that questionable claims to power may be manipulated and reproduced to claim legitimacy.

The seven essays of the second part deal with the imposition of colonial authority and local contestation. The overall theme is again of knowledge as a source of power: Tom Spear returns to the theme of the invention of tradition, reminding us that local claimants to power were often as interested as the colonial authorities in inventing traditions but were often forced to balance opposing interests in their sometimes liminal roles. Gregory Maddox also reveals the fine lines that colonially-supported local leaders were forced to tread, to the point that those wielding real power avoided responsibility within colonial government structures; his article and those by Jamie Monson and James Giblin tackle in different contexts the British struggles to classify, hierarchise and authorise, with their conceptual tools of 'chief' and 'tribe'; and the varied responses of the colonised peoples who, according to their objectives, embraced or rejected the colonial order. Ralph Austen and Marcia Wright both, in different ways, reveal different layers of belonging—local, regional and national—emphasising that borders are not always colonially-imposed artificial constructs with no local relevance; Atieno Odhiambo emphasises how decisions informing interactions with the colonial state are personal and contingent: people are 'individuals who made choices' and who don't neatly fall into abstract categories of 'collaborator' and 'nationalist'.

In the third section John Iliffe, using archival sources, exposes the colonial behind-the-scenes attitudes and responses to Tanganyikan, and specifically Nyerere's, calls for independence in order to explain how the least prepared of the British East African territories was the first to achieve independence. James Brennan looks at the rise and fall of the ANC during the same period, revealing how this remarkably unsuccessful political party failed in its opposition to TANU by being insufficiently different and thus failing to offer a viable framework for TANU's opposition to work outside the party and, in the process, reinforcing TANU hegemony. The two articles on Zanzibar

highlight, in different ways, the divisions in Zanzibari society. Lawrence Mbogoni sees in the 1954 Al-Falaq sedition trial the first manifestations of the racial polarisation of Zanzibari politics as the Arab Association's newspaper made calls upon its readership to which the non-Arabs among them felt unwilling or unable to subscribe. Thomas Burgess' essay on Zanzibar's Umma party, while also revealing the increasingly racially-based perceptions of political interest in late colonial and revolutionary Zanzibar, suggests that divisions between young and old, and between rural and urban, were equally important as bases for recruitment to the different causes. While there was clearly a developing schism along racial lines, the inference from both these essays, is that analyses that fail to consider other social and political cleavages are unable to fully comprehend events leading to and following the revolution.

The final part includes Susan Geiger's perceptive appraisal of Nyerere's nation-building strategies, based on a 'non-tribal' Swahili sense of identity based on an equality not only between tribes, religions, chiefs and subjects, but also between men and women; and a notion of the household as the focal point of community life, allowing specifically for the meaningful incorporation of women in public and political activities. This, she asserts, was a key factor in the success of Nyerere's programme. Yusuf Lawi, recalling the origins of this collection, traces the somewhat unsatisfactory history of history teaching in Tanzanian schools, critiquing not simply the colonial legacy, but also the doctrinaire emphasis of the socialist period, yet to be fully shrugged off. In the final essay, Kelly Askew competently explores the differences between state-sponsored and private (local) arenas of artistic expression with specific reference to music, explaining how, despite state efforts to create a national culture, locally specific forms of artistic representation persist.

Overall, this volume is an eclectic one. The theme of nation is not always sustained, although that is hardly a fault; and the avowed aim of the collection—to provide texts for the study of history in Tanzania—would appear to have been met. But, particularly reading the first half of the collection, I felt a vague but indefinable sense of dissatisfaction. This may be nothing more than an anthropologist's reading of history (I particularly

appreciated the contributions of Feierman, Geiger and Askew, perhaps more anthropological in their analyses), and certainly does not detract from the value of the contributions themselves; but there seemed to be an overall sense of disjuncture, in which the theme of the collection was unsustained and the individual essays insufficiently contextualised for the uninitiated. That said, this collection is a valuable addition to the library of any scholar of Tanzanian history, and the scope, both geographical and temporal, of the contributions provide something for everyone. It will certainly constitute a welcome collection of texts for local scholars.

Iain Walker
ARC Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Centre for Middle East and North African Studies
Department of Politics & International Relations
Macquarie University NSW 2109

The Effects of Exile on Literature

Lindy Stiebel and Liz Gunner, *Still Beating the Drum: Critical Perspectives on Lewis Nkosi*, Amsterdam and New York, Rodopi, Cross Cultures Series, No. 81, 2005. Pp. xv + 375. ISBN 90-420-1807-0 (h/b).

Lewis Nkosi has been, in many ways, an elusive figure in the South African literary and cultural scene. His rise to prominence as a journalist for the Durban newspaper, *Ilange lase Natal* (the 'Natal Sun') and then for *Drum Magazine* was followed by his exile from South Africa in 1960 when he was forced to take the option of a one-way passport in order to take up a Fellowship to study at Harvard after being banned under the Suppression of Communism Act. His exile in Europe and finally his return to a post-apartheid South Africa in 1994 as a Visiting Professor of English Literature at the University of Cape Town completed the cycle of exile and return. Despite being granted his first South African passport in 2002, he does not return to live in South Africa but continues his peripatetic lifestyle. During these exilic years, he was most well-known for his novel, *Mating Birds*, published in 1986 (originally published in 1983 in Nairobi and reissued in 2004 by Kwela Books) for which he won a Macmillan Silver PEN award and for his earlier critical essays collected in two volumes, *Home and Exile*, and *Tasks and Masks*, in which he writes about the role of the African writer. But his literary production has been unevenly distributed, with his second novel, *Underground People* not published until 2002, nearly twenty years after *Mating Bird*'s first publication, and his most recent novel, *Mandela's Ego* published in 2006, also by Kwela Books in Cape Town. The question that lies beneath the surface of this timeline is what effect such exile

had on his writing. Would he have been more or less productive and how would his writing have been affected had he not been shut out from his land of birth? As the editors suggest, exile was probably a double-edged sword for him, enabling him to be a cosmopolitan figure with the objectivity of distance who is 'primarily at home in his writing' (Introduction, p. xxvi).

This book is therefore a very welcome one, as it not only collects a number of critical essays on Nkosi's work ranging from his literary criticism and his more well-known novels to his lesser-known plays and his almost unknown poems, seven of them in all, helpfully reproduced in full in Litzi Lombardozzi's chapter that introduces his poetry. This substantial volume also includes two interviews with Nkosi and a selection of his own pieces of literary and cultural criticism, with a Bibliography and Timeline. It is a dense publication edited by Lindy Stiebel and Liz Gunner and published by Rodopi in their Cross/Cultures series. With critical perspectives from European, South African and African scholars, this collection fills an important gap in literary scholarship.

Divided into three parts – 'Writing on Lewis Nkosi', 'Lewis Nkosi in his Own Voice', and 'Sources for Lewis Nkosi' – the book presents three sections within Part One, one each on the Literary Critic, The Dramatist and Poet and The Novelist. The three chapters on Nkosi as literary critic review the impact of his criticism on South African literary and cultural production. His critical voice is generally considered to be provocative and uncompromising, with strong views – expressed in such collections of essays as *Tasks and Masks* (1981) and *Home and Exile* (1983) – about the role of African writing and about issues such as Negritude and literary realism. He was never afraid to confront his fellow writers, such as Ezekiel Mphahlele, with his own strong opinions, criticising especially what he saw as Mphahlele's critique of Negritude in *The African Image*, yet he also wrote about the impossibility of excising European or Western influences from African literature in his Preface to *Tasks and Masks*.

In the second section in Part One, the focus is on his plays, including the works for radio comprising 'The Trial' (broadcast in 1969 by the BBC as a short story reading) and 'We Can't All be Martin Luther King' (broadcast in 1971 by the BBC). The courtroom setting of 'The Trial' and its obviously Kakfaesque references were used by Nkosi to satirise the 'farcical yet dangerous and destructive nature of the South African charade of justice' (p. 59) faced by a black South African university student who resists the apartheid state. As in his later novel, *Mating Birds*, the theme of inter-racial sexual relationships, banned by the Immorality Act, is explored. Liz Gunner's chapter on these radio plays, both written and broadcast while Nkosi was living in London, makes interesting reading, commenting on Nkosi's role as 'cultural broker and interpreter' of South Africa and on the nature of the medium itself as vehicle for this. Nkosi's two stage plays – *The Rhythm of Violence* (1964) and *The Black Psychiatrist* (2001) – similarly engage with the 'notion of apartheid as a tragic farce' (p. 68), and Sikhumbuzo Mngadi provides a detailed analysis of the problematic 'left-wing' politics of the play. Two subsequent chapters provide interesting analyses of the trope of the black psychiatrist that appears in a number of Nkosi's works. Both Astrid Starck-Adler's and Therese Steffen's essays on this topic point out that Dufré, the psychiatrist in *Mating Birds*, is an anagram for Freud. Both these critics demonstrate the strategic use of this figure in Nkosi's work and its appropriateness for the confessional mode of many of his narratives.

The four essays under the title, 'The Novelist', deal with Nkosi's two novels, *Mating Birds* and *Underground People*. His most recent novel, *Mandela's Ego*, had not yet been published at the time this volume went to press. Included in this section is the South African Censors' Report on *Mating Bird*, a very useful inclusion as it sharply demonstrates the political and intellectual climate of the times. Irony is identified as a central aspect of Nkosi's prose; an ambiguity that is not always picked up by critics. All of these essays contain valuable insights into the novels' publishing and reception histories as well as providing perspectives on them from Nkosi's own critical writing and from current literary theory.

The two interviews with Nkosi included in Part Two, from 2002 and 2003 respectively, give the reader a less mediated glimpse of Nkosi's 'own voice', the conversational style contrasting with the formal academic prose of the preceding extracts from Nkosi's critical works. The selected critical writings, from his 1966 essay, 'Fiction by Black South Africans' to the more recent 'The Republic of Letters After the Mandela Republic' (2002), provide a representative sample of the development of Nkosi's approach to South African literature, from apartheid to post-apartheid cultural production, with the emphasis always on, in Nkosi's words, 'how literary discourses come to function as one of the tools in the fashioning of subjectivities and the shaping of identities'(327). By also including a Bibliography and a Timeline, the editors have done a great service to scholars of South African writing by collecting in one place the diverse and often hard-to-track primary and secondary sources and by drawing together what could be confusing threads in a chronological order.

In summary, this volume admirably fulfils its intention, stated by the editors in the Introduction, of providing 'both a resource and a critical intervention' (xv). In the light of Nkosi's undoubtedly important contribution to the imaginative and intellectual life of South Africa in apartheid and post-apartheid times, it is also a timely one.

Sue Kossew

Associate Professor

Head of School

School of English

University of New South Wales

A Re-vision of the Languages and Literatures of Africa.

Alain Ricard, *The Languages and Literatures of Africa,* Oxford, James Currey; Trenton, NJ Africa World Press; Cape Town, David Philip, 2004. pp. x +203. Photos, Maps, Bibliography and Index. ISBN 0-85255-581-4 (p/b)

In this book Alain Ricard enriches the study of the languages and literatures of Africa by providing new perspectives which no other authors have presented before. A glance at the subtitles of the study's nine chapters might suggest that his sole focus is on questions regarding the languages involved in African literary creation, but a closer reading offers a fuller picture of his new contribution, for Ricard not only seeks to address these questions but also to revisit his own work. This study was first published in French in 1995 and the revised English edition includes a wider investigation of literary works produced in English and also in African languages in Anglophone Africa. His intention was to include all Africa in this book, but, as he explains in his preface, he had to leave out the northern Arabic- speaking countries because he lacks the necessary linguistic competence.

Many works on African languages and literature, written by critics and theorists from different disciplines with varied approaches and points of view, are available on the academic market. What makes this book outstanding is Ricard's ability to entwine the linguistic characteristics of some African languages with the final outcome of the production of literary creations, with a special emphasis on the linguistic consciousness and awareness of the writers themselves. Firstly, he draws the reader's attention to the way African languages

were conceived, assessed and grouped by non-African colonisers who ignored the aspects of tone, pitch and intonation which alter the possibilities of writing and printing. Secondly, he explains the discrepancy between the definition and description of what has been called for a long time "oral tradition", focusing on the problem of the connection between the original languages and orality and distinguishing the latter from tradition and from oral texts. He regards oral texts as translations and adaptations that belong to the field of literary studies rather than as simple transcriptions which conform to the discipline of linguistics. He also describes how the heroes of orality are captured by writers who adapt them in order to glorify them in oral texts through a play of intertexuality in the world of literature, leaving orality and its famous subjects to oblivion.

Thirdly, Ricard highlights how religious, political and social contexts directly affect the growth or death of an African language. The production of African literatures within given contexts depends on the survival of African languages and the classification of written texts. The example he discusses is the exclusion of Ethiopia, as a country, from the African continent and how its texts were consequently excluded from the bulk of African literature since they were mostly religious writings and did not comply with the definition of literature. Fourthly, the author presents an extensive investigation of the literatures of different languages, including a detailed analysis of Swahili poetry, which explains why Kiswahili poets diverted their works from Arabic poetics and wrote in Roman letters in order to separate their literary production from the Arabic Islamic canon and context. Although some parts of the book might look like an inventory of poets, poems, fictional prose and authors, Ricard insists that he lists these works only to explain and clarify his ideas. In any case, scholars will appreciate the value of this succinct survey of literatures in African languages.

Fifthly, Ricard examines the works of the writers he calls the "go-betweens", whose works were produced during the colonial era. Under the motto of the French revolution, equality meant that

Africans in the Francophone colonies were obliged to learn and produce texts in French. In contrast, the English were influenced by Darwinism and consequently Africans in the Anglophone colonies were not expected to be intelligent enough to learn and write in English. A cornerstone of Ricard's investigation, and one which he claims has been ignored by the western critics and scholars, is his awareness that differences between texts produced in French and English colonies were not only a result of the politics of colonialism but also of the reactions of writers whose linguistic consciousness was one of the main tools to satisfy their intentions and purposes. However, the reader who is not familiar with the works of the Malagasy poet Jean- Joseph Rabearivelo will find the idea of the "trans-written language" (p.126) proposed by Ricard difficult to understand since it is neither illustrated nor exemplified with excerpts from the works discussed.

A sixth important part of this book is Ricard's study of African poetry and poetics. He agrees with Octavio Paz[92] and Eliot's[93] idea that poetry "feeds on the rhythms of daily speech" and "on the music of conversation". Moreover, Ricard focuses on the idea that 'Poetic consciousness is first and foremost linguistic consciousness: the keenest consciousness of the language situation must be sought within poetry' (p.141). He again observes differences between Francophone and Anglophone African poetry, which he, in this case, not only attributes to the factors mentioned above, but also takes into account the situation of *diglossia* and its problems in the colonial and post-colonial context. In his study and description of twentieth century African poetry, he deals with the issues of *métissage*, creolization, cultural heritage, African mythology and the relation between poetry and politics. He is aware of Francophone poetry's handicaps and points out the lack of theoretical and critical texts on its practice.

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[92] Octavio Paz, *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz ou les pièges de la foi.* Paris, Gallimard, 1987, p.636.
[93] T.S.Eliot is quoted in Octavio Paz's quotation.

Before ending his book with a descriptive chapter on African narrative fiction, which is the most popular and international component of African literature, Ricard addresses the question of African theatre. He emphasises the dilemma of defining African theatre without, on the one hand, divesting African culture of its dramatic elements intrinsic to rites and ceremonies; and, on the other hand, without leaving African theatre dispossessed of any traditional representation. At the core of this chapter are the issues of orality, time, space, stage, narrator, actor, dance, masks, and the 'I'. The author shows the importance of J.A Adedeji and Wole Soyinka's style, ideas and theories to African theatre. Ricard's conclusion is more a question than an answer: if African Francophone cinema is internationally successful and recognized, why is its theatre not as well known as the Anglophone African theatre produced by Soyinka and others? The inclusion of African cinema in the last paragraph of this chapter perhaps leaves the question of the relation between cinema and literature open for a future research project.

Violetta Jojo Verge
University of La Laguna
La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain

One Man's Diagnosis

Roel Van Der Veen, *What went wrong with Africa? A Contemporary History* Amsterdam, KIT publishers, 2004. pp. 398 ISBN 90-6832-548-5

In the past 50 years, unprecedented changes have occurred in people's standards of living all over the world. Though poverty has by no means been eliminated, the percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty, that is, on less than one dollar a day, dropped from 30 percent in 1990 to 23 percent by 2000, in spite of a much larger world population. However we define poverty, on average, people's lives have improved, all over the world, on every continent. The only exception is Africa, or, more specifically, sub-Saharan Africa, where the percentage of Africans living in poverty has not dropped, but risen. In nearly all African countries, the average income has fallen since the beginning of the era of decolonisation in the late 1950s.

In this lengthy book, Roel Van Der Veen asks why, despite the rising prosperity elsewhere in the world and the widespread changes that have taken place on the continent itself, Africa has failed to break free from poverty. There is, he points out, a remarkable contrast between the living conditions of Africa's people and its natural bounty of oil, gold and diamonds. With the exception of South Africa, no African economies have managed to convert natural resources into a form of wealth that benefits more than a small elite.

The author examines the implications of the European colonial powers' introduction of new state structures into their colonies, the cultural distance between these structures and the local population, and also the role of the local elites that took charge of the newly independent states. In most of Africa there was no appreciable settlement by Europeans so that when the colonial powers departed,

the original inhabitants were once more able to exert considerable influence on the state structures that had been left behind. In those parts of Africa where Europeans did settle on a fairly large scale, such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, the state structures introduced by the colonial powers were preserved for a longer period in their original form, delaying the Africanisation process by about 20 years in the case of Zimbabwe and 35 years in the case of South Africa.

Postcolonial developments similar to those in South Africa occurred in other former colonies only when there was something of a balance between the strength of colonialism and that of indigenous cultures. If colonialism was too strong or indigenous cultures too weak, then local influence could be extinguished altogether. This situation occurred in Latin America and to a much greater degree in North America and Australia, where the indigenous population was so thoroughly crushed that the situation was hardly recognisable as a form of colonialism. On the either hand, if colonialism was too weak or indigenous societies too strong, as in much of Asia, colonialism had little impact on local structures.

Van Der Veen points out that today's Africanised states are unlike anything that previously existed on the continent. These states are the products of colonialism. The continent's political structures had to adapt to the new situation to survive and existing checks and balances were systematically undermined. As a result of this disruption of the local socio-political balance, local rulers could more easily enforce their will on the population. Van Der Veen agrees with Basil Davidson's contention that European state structures did not fit into African culture and society and therefore stood in the way of development instead of promoting it.

Immediately after independence, the continent seemed to be making a fresh start, free at last of slavery and colonialism. For many African countries, the first years following independence were economically successful. After World War II, the start of industrialisation in Africa led to rapid economic growth and income per capita increased. Africa at this time was no worse off than the other non-Western

continents like Asia and Latin America. All three were made up of ex-colonies and were poor in comparison to the rich West; they were called the Third World and all were felt to have the same potential for development.

Van Der Veen claims that in the case of Africa, the continent's development faltered as a result of internal rather than external factors. Among the most important factors, in his view, is culture and its effect on the political, economic and social relations of these African countries. This book is controversial in that it counters the prevalent view that no culture is better than another or can be assumed to have more or less potential to generate prosperity. Now that Africa's development has fallen so far behind the rest of the world, Van Der Veen holds that there is good reason to question this assumption. He does not come to this conclusion lightly. He admits that Africans faced certain disadvantages from the beginning of independence. It was only in the 1940s that anything resembling a modern state apparatus was attempted by the colonial powers. In addition, democracy was not initially seen as a priority, probably because it was too closely associated with the Western values that had produced colonialism. It was also unclear how to combine democracy with the socialist style development advocated by many African leaders after 1960. The new elite that led these countries after independence lacked any real power base within African society and owed their position purely to their links with the former colonial powers; these links had led to their successful integration into a European style culture but were not helpful in integrating them with their people.

These elites were linked to the population only though the strategic support that they were able to purchase, often corruptly. African economics were traditionally characterised by redistribution mechanisms designed to share wealth. The aim was economic and social security, not economic growth. Redistribution was used as a way of demonstrating affluence and drumming up political support. Colonialism introduced a different economic structure in Africa, but, after independence, cultural and social factors led to a renewed

emphasis on Africa's indigenous economic practices. Clientelist ties began to dominate the whole political and social spectrum. State-owned enterprises, for example, were used for purposes of redistribution, not growth. Various cultural conditions for growth were also absent; for example, work ethic, organisational and managerial capacity and trust.

Van Der Veen argues that these new power structures were not conducive to the support of the agricultural sector and led to its neglect by governments. Per capita food production fell in the 1980s in 25 of the 36 countries for which figures are available. This decline was not offset by the growth in industry or the service sector. In fact, industrialisation began to falter after 1970 and the 1970s and the 1980s became a time of contraction rather than expansion. A period of borrowing then followed. He emphasises that borrowing by developing countries is not inherently imprudent or unusual, as long as the money is used to aid economic growth. In Africa, the money borrowed was used neither to boost production nor to increase productivity. The decline in terms of trade during the 1970s caused by rising oil prices was gradually intensified by other factors. According to Van Der Veen, when some Asian countries were successful in development despite the continued presence of underdeveloped structures and the adverse nature of the global economy, it became clear that the structure of the world wide economy did not have to change in order to give developing countries the ability to pursue the right policies and turn international conditions to good effect. That Africa's problems lay at its own door was also shown by the experience of the African oil-producing nations, notably Nigeria. Despite its extra revenue as a result of rising oil prices, it was soon no better off than African countries with no oil and therefore no oil revenue. The crux of the matter was whether or not the available funds were used productively.

The Africanisation of economies also led to a loss in prosperity. The expulsion of foreign settlers like the Syrians, the Lebanese, Asians in East Africa and white farmers, were all results of Africanisation. This process is exemplified by the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast had

the largest economy after South Africa and Nigeria and was prosperous until it launched a programme to "Ivoritise" its economy, a measure used to reduce the influence of foreigners and of external control. The country's elite misused the program to appoint their friends to well-paid jobs previously held by foreigners. Some of the latter were permitted to stay on and continue managing their companies, but only in an advisory capacity. This Africanisation program also led to investments in state–owned companies that made losses, losses which had to be borne by the treasury. The result was a full-blown economic crisis in the Ivory Coast in the 1980s.

By around 1990 many African countries had lower per capita income than in the period immediately before independence. Basic social services such as health care and education were now under constant threat of bankruptcy. The vast majority of African governments did not keep or bring AIDS under control and the personal and social repercussions of this failure were enormous. The life expectancy of newborn infants fell by seven years in the 1990s. However, Van Der Veen claims that it is important to remember that Africa had strayed from the path of development well before the outbreak of AIDS. The very fact that the disease could spread unchecked for so long was due to the same factors that had stood in the way of development. Once again, state weakness and, more specifically, a lack of commitment by governments and elites to the welfare of the general population was a large part of the problem. In the case of AIDS, matters were made worse by the persistence of certain cultural patterns of behaviour. He maintains that to help prevent the further spread of AIDS it would be more straightforward and presumably more effective to return to seeing AIDS simply as an illness, as a medical problem, which can be brought under control by a change in sexual conduct. South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, is one African leader who does not acknowledge this reality.

Although his conclusions make for depressing reading, the author does point out that the continent now has several former heads of state who have voluntarily relinquished power after losing elections

and can still travel freely without fear of being imprisoned or murdered. A new, milder political culture is starting to emerge in Africa so that rulers will feel less compelled to put their personal interests first (by embezzling state funds) and hence there will be less corruption. They will also focus more on long term policies such as more democracy, less corruption and better governance. In this optimistic scenario, the African state might be ready for a development of the kind that Max Weber considered essential to modernisation. Weber believed that in order for a modern state to emerge, it must be emancipated from society, instead of being tied to society in all kinds of obscure ways (as is now the case in Africa). It must stand above society as a visible institution and only be connected to it in clearly defined ways, as in the holding of elections and collecting of taxes. Only objective factors should play a part in such interactions, not personal ones. Africa's modernisation will require the emergence of this kind of state. It has been said that Africa's failure to modernise is largely due to the state's failure to become emancipated from society in the Weberian sense.

The continent's failure to develop has caused considerable frustration and there is a tendency to blame this failure on external factors and systems, which supposedly have the continent in a stranglehold. For Van Der Veen, it is all too easy to point the finger at Africa's history of slavery and colonialism; African leaders find it especially difficult to break free from these notions, because a supposed legacy of victimisation has the potential both to attract foreign aid and to distract from their own failures. His conclusion is that there is no easy way out of the present situation and few if any of the conditions for improvement are being met.

However, what is more important is that many political leaders are beginning to show the will to solve the huge problems that Africa faces. It is the strength of that will, more than anything else, that will determine whether or not there is an African renaissance.

Mia Roth

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