Statebuilding and Non-State Actors in Rwanda, 1994-2012
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Abstract
As intrastate conflict proliferated across the African continent in the post-Cold War era, the international community promoted democratic institutions to engender state stability in post-conflict states. Through an analysis of Rwanda's post-conflict political restructure since 1994, my research illustrates how, in the absence of geo-strategic interest, this political restructuring was largely left to non-state actors. This coincided with a call for 'African solutions to African problems' which progressively infused the continent's political landscape. By exploring the role, motivation and impact of the United Nations, the African Union and the Commonwealth on Rwanda's post-conflict political environment throughout the past two decades, this paper highlights how non-state actors have shown lack of commitment to their stated goals of democracy and good governance. Demonstrating vulnerability to manipulation and self-interest, it must be questioned whether non-state actors are effective agencies for democratic change in post-conflict states.

Introduction
This paper reflects the inability of non-state actors to engender successful post-conflict state reconstruction in Rwanda since 1994, which supports my argument that in a post-conflict environment, non-state actors are ineffective agents of democratically driven statebuilding. The post-Cold War rise of the United States (US) witnessed increasing western dissemination of democratic ideals and institutions, to generate stable states after conflict. However, in states which command little western geo-strategic interest, such intervention was increasingly assigned to non-state actors which I argue are ill-equipped to do so, due to their own structural and conceptual shortcomings. The United Nations (UN) defines a non-state actor as "any actor on the international stage other than a sovereign state,"[1] and Rwanda, since 1994 received unprecedented amounts of multilateral aid from a variety of non-state actors, aimed at rebuilding a strong democratic state. Much economic aid has been underwritten by the enduring guilt felt by the international community over inadequate action during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 Rwandans, and the displacement of over 2 million refugees.[2] Western economic support for the post-genocide Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government disregarded its undemocratic behaviour and increasing authoritarianism, marked by constitutional manipulation, increasing human rights abuses, and electoral fraud.[3] Analysis of institutions designed to stabilize states after conflict, and imposed by the UN, the African Union (AU) and the Commonwealth, will demonstrate their inherent weaknesses. The paper will conclude by showing how the sub-optimal mechanisms implemented by these non-state actors in Rwanda's experience, perpetuated an enduring and deceptive image of

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[1] Andrew Clapham, "Non-State Actors." In *Post-conflict Peacebuilding; A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009): 201.
[2] Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide* (London: C. Hurst, 1995), 304, 312.
[3] Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship." *African Affairs* 103: 411 (2004): 177-210.

democratization and political liberalization, exemplified by its acceptance into the Commonwealth in 2009. Thus state reconstruction mechanisms implemented by the UN, the AU and the Commonwealth calls into question whether non-state actors are appropriate agencies of state stabilization following civil war.

Rwanda's post-conflict environment and its interaction with non-state actors is a valuable relationship to explore. After the conflict, Rwanda attracted large amounts of relatively unconditional aid from a remorseful international donor community, whose belated acknowledgement of the genocide led to widespread reluctance to criticize the incoming government, who became to be seen not only the victims of the conflict, but also the state liberators. This led to the international perception that political altruism defined Rwanda's post-conflict environment, and thus Rwanda's ensuing political development went largely unchecked. Non-state actors have a unique role in influencing political development in this setting. As they are not constrained by the limitations faced by intervening states such as sovereignty issues, non-state actors may wield important influence in post-conflict state reconstruction. Examination of the success of Rwanda's post-conflict democratization and the influence of non-state actors may provide insight into the implications of non-state actor engagement in the post-conflict environment, providing implications for non-state actor-influenced state reconstruction in a broader context.

The United Nations
The UN in 1945 was designed to promote the liberal aims of global unity and state stability.[4] Representing 193 member states, the UN has been the most active organization involved in post-conflict statebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War. It adopted a revised 'Peace Operation Model' in its 'Agenda for Peace' in 2002 which called for "action to identify and support structures which would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[5] In keeping with western interests, peace operations promoted political institutions designed to stabilize the state over the long term. In post-conflict states, UN driven political and social structures such as electoral institutions, capacity building programs and justice and reconciliation mechanisms promote democracy and good governance. However, structural incongruities exist in the UN framework, undermining its goals and challenging its potential to stimulate democratically driven state stability.

In 1994, increasing demands on UN resources were met with out-dated Cold War principles such as non-intervention, and mandates limited to observation and monitoring. It became apparent very early on in Rwanda's conflict that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda's (UNAMIR) mandate was inadequate.[6] UN troops were reduced to 270 at the height of Rwanda's conflict in April 1994. This coupled with their inability to control the burgeoning refugee camps in neighbouring Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo

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[4] United Nations, "UN at a Glance," 2012. http://www.un.org/en/aboutrun/imdex.shtml (accessed 22 August 2012).
[5] United Nations Secretary General, 47th Session, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, Paragraph 21. http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm (accessed 20 November 2012).
[6] United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Guidelines, Principles and Guidelines," 2012. http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (accessed 22 August 2012).

in the ensuing months showed that the UN's role was extremely limited.[7] The UN designed a justice mechanism to promote reconciliation and made repeated calls for international support, however the international community remained disengaged from the Rwandan crisis. As the UN wielded little influence over powerful donor states it initially failed to attract the required financial or human resources required for such an enormous task.[8] Of the estimated 2 million refugees who fled Rwanda during the height of the conflict in April, only 360,000 had returned by October. In November 1994 the UN, despite international disinterest, established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), to encourage refugees to return.[9] As the UN sought to "redefine the relationship between former enemy groups, and, fundamentally, to re-humanise former enemies" [10] this was one of its earliest efforts to implement justice and reconciliation in a post-conflict state.

Justice and reconciliation mechanisms face great challenges in the post-conflict environment. For justice to prevail the process must represent all injured parties, before reconciliation and consequent reconstruction of a democratic state can progress. The population must be committed to justice, the mechanisms must be embraced by state leaders, and the court system must be completely impartial. Although powerful donor states provided more human resources and financial backing once the full extent of the crisis became known, the effectiveness of the ICTR remains in question. Discriminatory prosecutions, lengthy trials and exorbitant costs account for widespread contempt within Rwanda for the ICTR. By 2002 the tribunal had made only eight convictions and one acquittal. It had employed over eight hundred staff, and cost US $540 million.[11] Increased focus on post-conflict statebuilding mechanisms through the 'Agenda for Peace' in 2002 had little impact on proceedings. Ten years later in 2012, forty five cases have been completed, with one case in progress. Of the completed cases, ten were acquitted and seventeen are pending appeal.[12] The annual ICTR budget for 2010-2011 had reached US $257m.[13]

Lack of relevance to Rwanda's population rendered the ICTR peripheral. The international community, initially reluctant to be associated with Rwanda's conflict assuaged its guilt by funding the ICTR's budget, but the relatively few court prosecutions had little meaning for most Rwandans.[14] The ICTR was based in Arusha, Tanzania, over 750 kilometres from Kigali (Rwanda's capital), obscuring the proceedings from the Rwandan population. Furthermore,

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[7] Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 316.

[8] Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis,* 344.

[9] United Nations, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), Section 1," Adopted by the Security Council at its 3453rd meeting on 8 November 1994.
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/955(1994) (accessed 22 August 2012); Stephen Brown, "The Rule of Law and the Hidden Politics of Transitional Justice in Rwanda." in *Peacebuilding and Rule of Law in Africa, Just Peace?* ed. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman (London: Routledge, 2011):183.

[10] Pierre Hazan, "Reconciliation," in *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Vincent Chetail (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009):260.

[11] Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, "Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda," *Global Governance* 9: 2 (April-June 2003): 220.

[12] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2012, "Status of Cases," http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx accessed 22 August 2012.

[13] Jon Silverman. "Ten Years, $900m, One Verdict: Does the ICC Cost Too Much?" *BBC News Magazine*, 14 March 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17351946 (accessed 22 August 2012).

[14] Uvin and Mironko, "Western and Local Approaches," 221.

over 81 percent of Rwanda's population is rural, and relies on state radio for its communication needs. This meant that most Rwandans remained unaware of ICTR proceedings, because what little coverage there was appeared mainly on the internet. ICTR media coverage was directed at an international audience, rather than at the Rwandans.[15] Research suggests that the Rwandan state itself acts as a bulwark against the ICTR, and is instrumental in the UN's failure to bring RPF members to trial.[16] Bias of the tribunal towards RPF members reflects Rwanda's President Kagame's mercurial relationship with the ICTR, whose ardent support for Hutu convictions is matched by his denial of RPF crimes. The ICTR has been unable to prosecute alleged RPF war crimes committed between 1994 and 1996, as key state officials have transferred such RPF cases to domestic courts, which remain outside the jurisdiction of the ICTR.[17] Drawing on what Reyntjens calls "genocide credits,"[18] the RPF argue that trying RPF atrocities would "wrongly equate the genocide with (their own) less-serious crimes… ."[19] In this way, the RPF have perpetuated the myth that the Tutsi were the sole victims of the Rwandan conflict, and in the process, manipulated the ICTR.

The UN's justice and reconciliation mechanisms, though designed to promote stable state reconstruction, have not met the needs of post-conflict Rwanda. The ICTR merely provides a tool for the UN's increasingly arbitrary post-conflict statebuilding armoury. As Rwanda lacks geo-strategic importance, the UN, bound by international financial and political support has merely provided a symbolic gesture of justice and reconciliation to preserve its own reputation as a dynamic force in the post-conflict statebuilding arena.[20]

The African Union
As western powers sought multilateral solutions in the post-Cold War environment, pressure increased on African governments to find 'African solutions to African problems.'[21] The AU was established in 1999, dedicated to the promotion of "peace, security and stability

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[15] Uvin and Mironko, "Western and Local Approaches," 221: IndexMundi, Rwanda-rural population. http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/rwanda/rural-population (accessed 15 November 2012).

[16] Uvin and Mironko, "Western and Local Approaches," 221.

[17] It has been estimated that many thousands of Hutu refugees have been massacred since the rise of the Tutsi dominated government in Rwanda, both in Rwanda and in neighboring states. These, alongside human rights abuses pertaining to the maintenance of RPF power, in the form of political assassinations, particularly leading up to elections in 2003 and 2010, according to the UNSC resolution 955 are accountable to the ICTR. Charles Jalloch, "Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction," *Criminal Law Forum*, 21 (2010): 1-65; Hintjens, Helen, "Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda," *Ethnicities,* 8:1 (March 1 2008): 5-41.

[18] Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On," 177.

[19] Jean-Paul Kimonto, Noel Twagiramungu, and Christopher Kaumba. "Supporting the Post Genocide Transition in Rwanda; the Role of the International Community." In Democratic Transition in Post-Conflict Societies Project. Netherlands Institute of International Relations: 'Clingdael' Conflict Research Unit, 2004. http://clingdael.nl/cru (accessed 22 August 2012): xviii.

[20] Simon Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations," in *Statebuilding and Intervention: Policies, Practices, and Paradigms*, ed. David Chandler. (London: Routledge, 2009):19.

[21] Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, "The Principle of 'African solutions to African Problems' under the spotlight: The African Union (AU) and the Libya Crisis," Open society Institute, African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project, AfriMAAP, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/AfriMAP_NAfrica_Kasaija_EN.pdf (accessed 22 August 2012).

on the continent… (through) democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance."[22] The union focussed on the integration of African states through continental, political and economic success, bringing together the ideals of pan-Africanism and peer review. The AU works on the basis that its regional proximity and knowledge gives it an edge in their ability to anticipate potential problems within a state, due to its "local knowledge and cultural sensitivity."[23] It was assumed that this would enable them to stimulate state stability through key institutions which fuse African ideals with democratic values. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an example of such an institution, providing a "collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa."[24] A voluntary, self-monitoring process, the APRM was designed to recognise instability in conflict-prone African states, and to propose solutions by fostering democratic values and good political management. Rwanda recognised early on, the potential credit afforded by association with the APRM, and in March 2003 became the second African state to accede to it.[25] The AU claimed that the APRM requires "a commitment from the *governments* to identify their own failures with brutal honesty… ."[26] Desperate to be accepted internationally as an organization capable of creating 'African Solutions for Africa's problems,' the AU sought good publicity through association with Rwanda's respectable international standing. After suggesting some minor changes to its political liberalization process, the APRM gave Rwanda a good report.[27] This report was made in contrast to independent reports at the time, suggesting spiralling human rights abuse and diminishing political space in Rwanda, calling into question the efficiency of the review process, and the AU's commitment to promoting state stability through democratic ideals.

The first stage of the APRM requires the completion of a questionnaire by the state under review. Review teams then visit to evaluate state commitment and adherence to review guidelines. The APRM requires that the questionnaire be completed by technical review teams (TRTs) made up of various groups representing private and public sectors, allowing for broad public participation at all levels of the review. Contrary to APRM recommendations however, Rwandan TRTs were heavily weighted towards state officials sympathetic to the government. Sixty percent of Rwanda's TRTs were made up of elite state representatives, whilst the remaining forty percent had some affiliation or job dependency on the state, effectively stifling political engagement at grassroots level.[28] TRTs often reported that they lacked adequate time to fulfil the requirements of the questionnaire,

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[22] African Union, "The African Union in a Nutshell: The objectives of the AU" 2012. http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm#top (accessed 22August 2012); The AU was built upon not only the framework of the UN, but also on the remnants of the defunct Organization of African Unity, which was founded during the first wave of decolonization to promote African solidarity and territorial integrity. John S. Moolakkattu, "The Role of the African Union in Continental Peace and Security Governance," in *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs,* 66:2 (2010):151-165:153.

[23] Moolakkattu, "The Role of the African Union,"153.

[24] Moolakkattu, "The Role of the African Union,"154.

[25] African Peer Review Mechanism, "Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda," November 2005. http://www.aprmtanzania.org/docs/APRM%20Rwanda%20report.pdf (accessed 22 November 2012).

[26] Eduard Jordaan, "Inadequately Self-Critical: Rwanda's Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism," *African Affairs* 105:420 (2006): 333-351:350.

[27] African Peer Review Mechanism, "Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda." 1-13

[28] Jordaan, "Inadequately Self-Critical," 339.

adding to inaccurate reporting.[29] Furthermore, anomalies in the questionnaire allowed for the complete denial of the social and ethnic tension which penetrates every layer of Rwandan society, and masked the RPF Tutsi's monopoly of political and military institutions. RPF officials explained the review's lack of engagement with the security and military sectors was due to a ban on their participation in politics.[30] When specifically asked about the lack of separation of powers between the state and judiciary, TRTs quoted constitutional clauses and official requirements, rather than offering free opinion. Questions regarding involvement in interstate conflict were either completely ignored, or answered by rhetoric of 'genocide ideology' and 'revisionism.'[31] Follow-up visits to Rwanda and reports by AU members led to an overall positive assessment of Rwanda's political and social landscape, praising its commitment to the APRM as "technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation."[32] Claims that Rwanda "demonstrates a good example of political will to adhere to the rule of law and good political governance,"[33] contrast with independent reports of increasing political oppression and authoritarianism in Rwanda, which have often resulted in the expulsion of international humanitarian organizations, journalists and commentators.[34] The APRM was designed to elicit "commitment from governments to identify their own failures with brutal honesty."[35] Its manipulation by Rwandan state leaders demonstrates the AU's lack of commitment to its own values of the promotion of democracy and good governance.

The AU, like the UN, is a victim of its own public relations. Espousing values of peer review and political integrity, it identifies itself as having aspirations of a global scale. However, the APRM in Rwanda demonstrates conceptual and structural anomalies, allowing the state to manipulate the review system, and the AU to take advantage of Rwanda's good (albeit unfounded) international reputation. Post-conflict political restructure is viable only if a free civil society supports a democratically elected leader. Rwanda's APRM process was a participatory process where the general population did not participate, and through manipulation by state leaders, did not reflect Rwanda's true political environment. As accession the APRM is voluntary, a state will only agree to being reviewed if it is assured of a good report, or the opportunity exists to manipulate a positive outcome. In Rwanda's case, the APRM gave Kagame another opportunity to add to the shroud of legitimacy that surrounds his regime, thus shoring up economic support further. Hence, voluntary accession does not reflect a true image of African states' political liberalization.

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[29] Jordaan, "Inadequately Self-Critical," 339.

[30] Jordaan, "Inadequately Self-Critical," 341.

[31] Speech and though laws banning the terms Tutsi and Hutu, in favour of 'Rwandan' have been introduced by Kagame, which he asserts will stem further ethnic division in society. Such laws are likely to discourage the population to support political parties along ethnic lines, which remains an important factor for Kagame, who belongs to an ethnic group which represents a minority15% of Rwanda's population. Hintjens, "Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda," 10; Jordan, "Inadequately Self-Critical," 344.

[32] African Peer Review Mechanism, "Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda." 11.

[33] African Peer Review Mechanism, "Country Review Report of the Republic of Rwanda." 12.

[34] Filip Reyntjens, "Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda," *African Affairs* 110: 438 (2011): 1-34; Danielle Beswick, "Managing Dissent in a Post-Genocide Environment: The Challenge of Political Space in Rwanda," *Development & Change* 41:2 (2010): 225-51.

[35] Jordaan, "Inadequately Self-Critical," 350.

The democratic values of the AU were challenged by its own distinctly undemocratic beginnings in Libya in 1999. After only eighteen months, Colonel Ghaddafi, who was a leading advocate of the AU, paid over US$64 million on behalf of forty nine African states that then owed the AU money. In return for his financial assistance, Ghaddafi attracted votes approving his vision for the AU.[36] This saw the organization from its very early stages, dominated by a state leader who ruled his own state with "no parliament, no military institutions, no political parties, no unions, no non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and held no elections."[37] Williams claims that the AU merely provides western states with an excuse for distancing themselves from African problems, and a platform from which state leaders like Kagame can legitimize their autocratic leadership.[38] The AU remains a mere symbol of pan-African aspiration to address democracy and good governance, and its assumption that altruistic African state leaders will put human and state stability before their own personal interests makes it vulnerable to self-interest and manipulation.

The Commonwealth
Rwanda's recent acceptance into the Commonwealth illustrates the unfounded reputation of Kagame as a democratic leader, who has attracted international praise since his rise in 1994. This, in part, has been a direct result of the inefficiency of non-state actors, and demonstrates how the myth of Rwanda's democratization has been perpetuated by ongoing non-state actor inadequacy. The Commonwealth was created in the 1870's to unify British colonies across the world, embracing British culture and tradition.[39] As an ex-Belgian colony, Rwanda was traditionally tied to *la francophonie*, but the rise of the RPF government saw traditional francophone culture replaced by alliances with English speaking states.[40] After accusing the French of supporting anti-Tutsi rhetoric throughout the genocide, the Tutsi dominated RPF cut all alliances with them. Many RPF members were second or third generation Ugandan-born, were English speaking, and had no cultural affiliation with the French. The RPF were militarily trained under Ugandan president Museveni in the 1980's, and were determined to replace French benefactors with British and US alliances. This shored up acceptance, particularly from the British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, with whom Kagame enjoyed a close personal friendship.[41] Pursuing acceptance from the Anglophone world, Rwanda applied to join the Commonwealth. At the time, the Commonwealth had a growing sense of irrelevance in a rapidly globalizing world, and was eager to shrug off its anachronistic image. The Commonwealth's kudos from association

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[36] George B. N. Ayittey, "The United States of Africa: A Revisit," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 632: 1 (2010): 86-102:96.

[37] Ayittey, "The United States of Africa: A Revisit," 96.

[38] Paul D. Williams, "Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why "African" Solutions Are Not Enough," *Ethics and International Affairs* 22:3 (2008): 309-329:310.

[39] The Commonwealth Secretariat, "The Commonwealth: Who We Are." 2012. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086/191247/the_commonwealth/ , (accessed 22 August 2012).

[40] *La Francophonie* refers to the wider global community of French speaking states, which were protected economically and politically by France in a proactive promotion of *rayonnement*, an agenda designed to extend France's influence, particularly in West and Central Africa. The rise of the Ugandan based RPF government saw declining affiliation with *La Francophonie,* and increased interest in pursuing alliances from Anglophone states. Peter J. Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 115:3 (2000): 395-419, 398.

[41] Isoko Institute, Promoting Private Enterprise in Africa, "From Downing Street to Kigali," 2012. http://isoko-institute.org/uncategorized/from-downing-street-to-kigali/ (accessed 22 November, 2012).

with the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa two decades previously was fading, and association with Rwanda's post-conflict economic success and perceived post-genocide political liberalization created an opportunity to redeem contemporary relevance. Consequently, Rwanda's application to join was accepted in November 2009.[42]

Rwanda's presidential campaign in 2003 attracted unfavourable reports from the European Union and human rights organizations. Kagame, sensing waning international support, strived to enhance his standing as his exploitation of "genocide credits"[43] and international guilt was diminishing.[44] He needed favourable reports for his 2010 presidential campaign, and as a new Commonwealth member, he ousted European Union electoral observers in favour of the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG).[45] Rwanda's National Electoral Commission invited the COG to oversee the lead up, polling and overall conduct of its 2010 election.[46] The COG made four visits to ensure "necessary rigor of security and due diligence,"[47] and concluded that the 2010 elections, which Kagame won by a landslide 93 percent victory, were "well organized and peaceful.... (allowing for) campaign freedom ...for candidates."[48] Reports made by the COG made no reference to the ongoing arrests, harassment of civilians, death threats and politically motivated murders which were reported whilst it was present in Rwanda.[49]

The symbiotic relationship between Rwanda and the Commonwealth defines how a non-state actor and a state can improve each other's international credibility, and shows how self-interest can undermine core values. In its association with Rwanda, the Commonwealth gains a new 'flagship cause' to increase its contemporary relevance, and adds another layer of legitimacy to Rwanda's autocratic leadership.

Conclusion

Rwanda has little geo-strategic significance in the international community. Post-conflict statebuilding has largely been assigned to non-state actors who have promoted reconstruction through a variety of means, such as capacity building through engagement with the population, electoral structures, and justice and reconciliation mechanisms. This paper demonstrates that the implementation of these structures remains vulnerable to

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[42] The Commonwealth Secretariat, "The Commonwealth : Who We Are,"

[43] Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On," 2004, 177.

[44] European Union Election Observation Mission, "Republic of Rwanda - FINAL REPORT" Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies, 15 – 18 September 2008. http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/missions/eueom_rwanda_final_report_en.pdf (accessed 22 November 2012); Amnesty International Press Release, "Rwanda: Run-up to presidential elections marred by threats and Harassment," 22 August 2003. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR47/010/2003/en/9d0dcd46-facd-11dd-b531-99d31a1e99e4/afr470102003en.pdf (accessed 22 November, 2012).

[45] Kimonto, Twagiramungu and Kaumba, "Supporting the Post Genocide Transition in Rwanda."

[46] Asiimwe Boscore "Rwanda; Commonwealth observers arrive next week," *The New Times* on the web, 8 July 2010, http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201007280585.html (accessed 22 August, 2012).

[47] Amitav Banjeri. "Rwanda and the Commonwealth," *The Roundtable: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs,* 99: 410 485-490 (2010):488.

[48] Commonwealth Observer Group, "Report of the Rwanda Presidential elections," 9 August, 2010, http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/229333/FileName/RWANDAFINALREPORT-PrintVersion.pdf :32 (accessed 22 August 2012).

[49] Human Rights Watch, "Country Summary Report, Rwanda," January 2011. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/rwanda-allow-independent-autopsy-opposition-politician (accessed 22 November 2012).

manipulation by state leaders and the non-state actors themselves. "Electoral processes are necessary in moving beyond civil war…"[50] in much the same way as popular participation and reconciliatory justice. Measures engendered by these non-state actors in Rwanda however, have failed to lay the foundations for a stable state, and have allowed Kagame to methodically remove opposition to his regime. Kagame successfully manipulated the ICTR, the APRM and the Commonwealth, to foster his own international political reputation, whilst consolidating his domestic authoritarian rule. The United Nations, the African Union and the Commonwealth also benefit from association with the Rwandan post-conflict 'success story' based on poorly perceived political liberalization, perpetuated by their own inadequate institutions. Although this paper highlights structural and conceptual flaws in non-state actors, which reflect the contemporary and competitive nature of the international political environment, this does not mean that these actors must remain subject to such limitations. In circumstances where non-state actors were less bound by their own interests and state exploitation, and more aligned to the grassroots needs of post-conflict states, institutions such as the ICTR, the APRM and the Commonwealth could help stimulate essential democratic change to the African political landscape. This in turn would have implications for post-conflict reconstruction in a broader context, however whilst these institutions remain bound by limitations demonstrated in this paper, non-state actors may not be appropriate agents of democratic change in post-conflict environments.

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[50] Timothy D. Sisk, "Pathways of the Political; Electoral Processes after Civil War' in *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, (London: Routledge, 2009):197.

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