From resettled refugees to humanitarian actors: Exploring the role and potential of diaspora-led humanitarianism in protracted refugee situations in Africa

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Abstract.
This paper presents early findings from research exploring the role diaspora community-based organisations (CBOs) play in helping their communities overseas. Refugee and humanitarian entrants in Australia often set up small CBOs to raise funds, advocate and implement humanitarian projects targeting displaced populations in other countries. Drawing on transnational social networks, the personal experiences and motivations of individuals involved, and their enhanced mobility and capacity to mobilise resources by virtue of residing in a wealthy country like Australia, diaspora CBOs are unique in the humanitarian arena. In terms of their practices, diaspora CBOs build schools and health centres, fund teachers’ salaries, purchase wheelchairs and water pumps, send material aid and support grassroots community initiatives. In short, they try to fill ‘protection gaps’. Their work has significance in the context of the lack of effective protection for refugees in many parts of the world, and notably in Africa. With over 6 million refugees now living in protracted refugee situations with no durable solution in sight, protection gaps appear only to be growing. While the old ‘care and maintenance’ approach to populations in protracted refugee situations has been shifting towards sustainable livelihoods, the long-term displaced still fit uneasily in both development and humanitarian interventions. Based on multi-sited fieldwork with diaspora CBOs in Australia and humanitarian workers in different parts of the world, this research asks: What can refugee diaspora in Australia do in humanitarian contexts that others can’t?
Global displacement and humanitarian responses

At the end of 2014, 59.5 million persons were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, generalised violence and human rights violations, the highest displacement on record (UNHCR, 2015b). The international refugee regime can be understood as a dominant structure governing global responses to situations of forced displacement. It is a structure that’s ‘solidity in time and space’ (Giddens, 1984) comes in the (legal) form of the United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the institutional form of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its 1950 mandate. Together, the international refugee regime articulates three solutions to forced displacement: the repatriation of refugees to their country at the earliest possible stage, local integration in countries of first asylum, and resettlement in a new country (Isotalo, 2009). This regime is currently dominated by an emphasis on repatriation as the preferred ‘solution’ even while this has become less realisable in the context of the increasingly complex and intractable causes of forced displacement that make return untenable in the short- or even longer term. This situation has resulted in a steady rise in the number of people living precariously in limbo for years and even decades. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the current international refugee regime is increasingly failing to provide any real durable solutions to forced displacement (cf. Banki, 2013; Elliott & Segal, 2012).

A growing body of literature on ‘protracted refugee situations’ highlights that the large majority of the world’s displaced are left waiting—they wait for conditions in their country of origin to improve so they can return, they wait for the country in which they have sought asylum to provide some assurance about their legal status that would allow them to live, work, learn and move freely, or they wait for the small chance that a third country will accept them for resettlement (Ferris, 2008; Kiragu, Li Rosi, & Morris, 2011; Zetter & Long, 2012). The UNHCR define a protracted refugee situation as ‘situations where 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or more after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions’ (UNHCR, 2015b, p. 8). Today, some 6.4 million refugees are in protracted situations, many of which are in Africa (ibid.). Indeed, the average duration of a refugee situation has more than doubled from nine years in 1993 to almost 20 years in 2008 (Loescher, Betts, & Milner, 2008, p. 89). As Frerks (2004) argues, protracted situations of displacement have different implications for humanitarian intervention, challenging the (artificial) lines between ‘relief’ and ‘development’ (Frerks, 2004). While in policy and practice there has been some move away from
the old ‘care and maintenance’ approach of providing humanitarian aid to refugees in protracted situations towards focusing on sustainable livelihoods, the reality is that this requires buy-in from multiple stakeholders (host governments, development agencies and local communities) as well as resources, and humanitarian actors have been limited in both regards (Betts, Bloom, & Omata, 2012; Malkki, 1996).

In situations of forced displacement, the day-to-day lives of refugees and asylum seekers are heavily influenced by interactions with dominant humanitarian actors—UNHCR and national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)—who assume or are delegated responsibility for ‘governing’ those displaced (Agier, 2011). Humanitarian actors play a powerful role in the lives of refugees, particularly in the context of the lack of rights afforded them by many host governments—i.e. many refugee populations are not afforded rights such as the legal right to work, own property, move freely, or access state education or health services (Ferris, 2008; Grace, 2013). Commonly, it is humanitarian actors that step in to fill these ‘protection gaps’. Yet the (dominant) actors in the ‘humanitarian arena’1 are also facing unprecedented funding shortfalls. The UNHCR 2014 Global Report, for example, reveals the extent of this agency’s budgetary shortfalls, with less than half (USD 1.1 billion) of the 2.6 billion budget for Africa funded in 2014. As this report states: ‘In 2014, underfunding continued to be a major constraint. As the majority of resources were dedicated to emergencies and life-saving activities, only 15 per cent of the expenditure went towards solutions and livelihood activities’ (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 160).

**Diaspora-led humanitarianism in Australia**

Against the backdrop of escalating global displacement, the lack of durable solutions for those forcibly displaced and significant humanitarian funding shortfalls, this paper looks at the role, potential and challenges faced by diaspora community-based organisations (CBOs) in Australia in ‘helping their communities’ that are displaced in other parts of the world. This research asks: *What can refugee diaspora in Australia do in humanitarian contexts that others can’t?*

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1 Hilhorst & Jansen (2010) offer an excellent study of the everyday politics of humanitarian aid and the contestation that takes place within what they call ‘the humanitarian arena’ which is embedded in principles (a rhetoric) of neutrality, impartiality and humanity. Hilhorst & Jansen argue that these principles are more ideals than actualities, as actors vie for resources, legitimacy and access to humanitarian spaces.
The field of diaspora-led humanitarianism

This paper is based on early findings from multi-sited research conducted in Australia, Indonesia and Switzerland exploring the role of diaspora community-based organisations (CBOs) in the international refugee regime. I use the term ‘diaspora’ to describe a particular type of CBO that mobilises on the basis of a diasporic identity, with common references to homelands, return, dispersal to many places and representations of (imagined) communities (see Tölölyan, 2007). This research involved semi-structured interviews with representatives from 22 diaspora CBOs based in Melbourne, Sydney and Albury-Wodonga in Australia and 12 ‘professional’ humanitarian workers located in various parts of the world, as well as participation observation with a number of diaspora CBOs over an extended period.

The diaspora CBOs that participated in this research came from a wide range of countries of origin, ethnic and religious communities and interest groups. Diaspora CBOs were selected on the basis of two main characteristics: (1) organisations or groups that were formed in Australia and are led by people who identify as being from the same community as the population targeted by their interventions; and (2) organisations or groups involved in ‘humanitarian interventions’\(^2\) targeting displaced populations outside Australia. Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted with two diaspora CBOs based in Melbourne (case studies) as well as in Geneva, Switzerland, at an annual gathering of UNHCR and NGOs. This immersive fieldwork involved travelling to Jakarta, Indonesia with representatives of one of the case study diaspora CBOs to observe their efforts in trying to help a small group of people that had sought asylum there. As such, the methods reflected the transnational, dispersed and mobile nature of the field under study—the field of diaspora-led humanitarianism.

While this study explored diaspora-led humanitarianism from a number of different perspectives, this paper will focus more narrowly on findings from the perspectives of those directly involved in three diaspora CBOs with links to Africa: two Oromo and one Eritrean.

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\(^2\) Although humanitarian interventions can be said to broadly target ‘people affected by man-made crises and natural disasters’ (GHA, 2014), I am interested in humanitarian interventions that specifically focus on refugees as their object of knowledge, assistance and management. Humanitarian interventions are widely divergent in terms of spaces, contexts, actors and effect, yet we can talk about dominant forms of intervention—such as those applied ‘in the field’ to refugee situations all over the world by dominant organisations and articulated in these organisations’ policies and practice frameworks (cf. Berry, Reddy, & ODI, 2010; Holmes & Bhuvanendra, 2014; UNHCR, 2006, 2013).
General characteristics of diaspora CBOs’ humanitarian work

In an excellent handbook titled *Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development: A Handbook for Practitioners and Policymakers*, the authors schematically show the diverse characteristics of diasporas’ transnational engagement—from individual to collective, direct or indirect, material or social capital transfers, voluntary or paid, and based in countries of settlement or origin (Horst et al., 2010, p. 9). While this handbook explores diasporas’ engagement with their countries of origin—and my study looked at the engagement of diasporas in refugee situations outside of ‘homelands’—the schematic is useful in thinking about some general characteristics of these refugee diaspora CBOs.

From interviews and observing the work of 22 diaspora CBOs based in Australia that are undertaking humanitarian work in other countries, the following could be said to be their broad characteristics:

**Actors (individual/collective)**

With the exception of one interviewee (who was working mostly independent of others from her community in Australia), all were examples of collective engagement and involved community participation in both the CBO itself (e.g. executive committee, organisational members) and in mobilising resources (e.g. fundraising from within diaspora communities).

**Method (direct/indirect)**

While the majority of the CBOs that participated in this study were involved in direct action (i.e. transferring resources, implementing projects), some were involved in indirect action to encourage increased support for the target population from other sources (e.g. by focusing on advocacy with the Australian government, UN bodies and other humanitarian actors).

**Kind (material capital/social capital)**

The CBOs in this study were mostly involved in transferring material capital (i.e. financial resources, material aid), but a small number saw the value of their social capital. For example, representatives from the CBO that travelled to Indonesia to help a group of asylum seekers there saw part of their role as supporting the development of community structures (an association) in Indonesia; another group was using Skype to offer psychosocial support to women, drawing on the social capital of community members who had trained and worked as counsellors in Australia.

**Compensation (voluntary/paid/profit)**
Without exception, all of the CBOs that participated in this study were volunteer run. No one that participated in this research was compensated for their time and almost all reported that all or the vast majority of funds raised in Australia were transferred directly to the beneficiaries (i.e. organisational ‘overheads’ were mostly covered through in-kind contributions).

Three cases studies of African diaspora CBOs

The following case studies describe in more detail the humanitarian work of three (African) diaspora CBOs and highlight the different ways in which diaspora try to help in refugee situations.

**Oromia Support Group in Australia and the Australian Oromo Community Association in Victoria**

Two of the CBOs that participated in this study involved Oromo Australians. People from the Oromia region of Ethiopia—the ‘homeland’ of the Oromo—have been displaced for many decades due to what has been described by Amnesty International (2014) as a long pattern of suppression by the Ethiopian state—sometimes pre-emptive and often brutal—of even suggestions of dissent in the Oromia region. The Oromo—with an estimated global population of 25 million people—have been dispersed and formed communities in many parts of the world, with the largest in the United States, Canada, Australia, Kenya, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. The Oromo in Australia predominantly arrived as refugees, asylum seekers and family migrants in a number of waves, starting from the mid-1980s to very recently. Greg Gow (2002) describes some of the earlier experiences of Oromo settling in Australia in the 1990s. Nearly two decades on, while the Oromo community in Australia is larger, more established and now includes many young adults who were born and have grown up in Australia, much of the political struggle for Oromo self-determination and identity described by Gow remained pertinent to the participants in this research. Indeed, some of the younger people involved in this study had never set foot in Oromia, yet were committed through their active involvement in CBOs to supporting ‘the Oromo’ in other parts of the world.

While Oromo CBOs in Australia are numerous and diverse (i.e. formed with various political, cultural, social, domestic and international objectives in mind), my interest was in those CBOs involved in humanitarian interventions—in trying to help Oromo refugees and asylum seekers in other parts of the world. Of the two Oromo CBOs that participated in this research, one was focused
primarily on indirect humanitarian action with a global focus and the other on direct action in a very specific humanitarian context.

The first Oromo CBO – the Oromia Support Group in Australia (OSGA) – is a human rights advocacy organisation, founded in 2001, that advocates for the respect for the human rights of the Oromo people and other minorities in Ethiopia. While much of the focus of OSGA is on highlighting human rights abuses inside Ethiopia, the extensive transnational networks of OSGA has led to its involvement in promoting the rights of Oromo refugees outside of Ethiopia. In 2014 and 2015, OSGA was involved in gathering information from Oromo groups and individuals who had sought protection as refugees in Yemen, Sudan, Egypt and Kenya about their experiences in these countries. Information was gathered, analysed and relayed to the Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) to use in advocacy at high-level meetings with senior UNHCR representatives in Geneva. Issues identified by OSGA through their transnational networks suggest a detailed understanding of protection systems and gaps that, importantly, those directly affected may feel hesitant to raise themselves. For example, issues of corruption and abuse within countries of asylum (including by humanitarian actors) have been identified by individuals in Australia who had been directly affected or witnessed these practices but who were afraid to raise them directly at the time for fear of jeopardising their own (precarious) situation, particularly their case being considered for resettlement. Having reached Australia, many people feel safe to voice their fears, and CBOs such as OSGA are often the mechanism through which this indirect action to improve systems of protection takes place. As Diaspora Action Australia (2014) describes of OSGA’s human rights advocacy: ‘Their information and knowledge is based on first-hand experience and the cases of others who remain in detention [in Ethiopia]. The breadth of their information increases with each new arrival in Australia’ (p.10).

The second Oromo CBO – the Australian Oromo Community Association in Victoria (AOCV) – was involved in more direct humanitarian action in a specific local context. The main work of AOCV is on the cultural and community development of the Oromo community in Victoria, Australia. In 2014, an AOCV member travelled to Indonesia and by chance met a group of Oromo asylum seekers outside the UNHCR office in Jakarta. As a non-signatory to the Refugee Convention, the ‘protection gaps’ in Indonesia are significant—i.e. asylum seekers and refugees face arbitrary arrest and indefinite harsh detention, are not permitted to work, face substantial discrimination in terms of housing, and have limited access to health services or education. Access
to any humanitarian aid in Indonesia is extremely limited and refugee status determination (RSD) processes, which are conducted by UNHCR, can take many years. If a person is found to be a refugee, local integration is not considered a possibility and resettlement to a third country can take many years. Upon hearing about the difficult circumstances the Oromo asylum seekers were facing in Indonesia, the AOCV member returned to Australia and spoke to others from the community. What followed was a mobilisation of interest and resources that eventuated in a delegation of five Oromo Australian community members travelling to Indonesia in 2015 to advocate for and support the 200 or so Oromo who had sought asylum there. Over a week, AOCV held a series of meetings to gather Oromo community members in Indonesia, hear their concerns, support the development of the newly-formed (Indonesian) Oromo association, and identify different ways that the Oromo community in Australia and other parts of the world could help. While it was unclear at the time of writing what other actions will or did follow from this visit, the channels of communication that were opened up through the Australian delegation’s visit to Indonesia lay the ground for future collaboration and support. And while small-scale, the material and social capital that was transferred during the visit suggest that the Oromo asylum seekers in Indonesia were able to mobilise (transnational) community support as an additional source of ‘community-based protection’ (UNHCR, 2013).

**Eritrean Australian Humanitarian Aid**

The third case study of diaspora-led humanitarian work in Australia is a CBO established by Eritreans in Melbourne, Eritrean Australian Humanitarian Aid (EAHA). EAHA was formed in 2009 with the mission ‘to provide humanitarian assistance to improve the living conditions, educational and health needs of Eritrean refugees living in camps’ (EAHA, n.d.). EAHA’s work has been focused on one of Africa’s most protracted refugee situations: Eritreans in eastern Sudan. In refugee camps and towns in Sudan, Eritreans who have been living as refugees for four decades reside alongside recent arrivals who are crossing the border in increasing numbers (UNHCR, n.d.). The reasons for the increase in Eritreans seeking international protection has been detailed most recently in a report handed down by the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on human rights in Eritrea (OHCHR, 2015). In response to the protracted and exacerbated refugee situation in Sudan, EAHA has mobilised resources largely from within the Eritrean community in Melbourne to undertake small projects that can best be described as material aid with an education focus. This has included: funding and overseeing the construction and maintenance of school buildings, purchasing
and distributing school stationery and supplies, and supplementing teachers’ salaries in refugee community-run schools. EAHA has identified needs through members who ‘travel back’ to Sudan to visit family and friends and, like the case of the AOCV, hear about needs that they can potentially fill. EAHA’s work is enabled through the mobility of its members in Australia (i.e. their capacity to travel to and from Sudan by virtue of having an Australian passport), their knowledge of local context (many of EAHA’s members spent significant time in eastern Sudan both as refugees themselves or through travelling regularly to visit family and friends) as well as their ‘invisibility’ (their ability to work in ways that are seen as ‘local’ and do not draw the attention and challenges of being seen as an ‘international’ NGO). Like AOCV, while EAHA’s work has been small-scale, it can be seen as a contribution to filling significant protection gaps.

**Challenges and potential of refugee diaspora as humanitarian actors**

Scholarship on transnationalism has expanded rapidly since the 1990s, offering important insights into transnational social spaces (Faist, 2000, 2008; Glick Schiller, 2004; Nyberg-Sørensen, 2007), and more recently elaborating on how mobility and locality combine to influence transnational formations (Dahinden, 2010). Yet within this literature, very little has been written on the ways in which diaspora engage transnationally as humanitarian actors. This is despite a significant and growing body of work on diaspora-led development (see Bakewell, 2007; Turner & Kleist, 2013; Weinar, 2010). The International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute, for example, have identified six key areas of diaspora collaboration that may have an impact on development: (1) financial remittances; (2) direct investments; (3) human capital transfers; (4) philanthropy; (5) capital market investments; and (6) tourism (cited in ECRE, DRC, & DOMAID, 2014, pp. 3–4). While there have been a growing body of research that has provided case studies of diaspora-initiated philanthropy (see Babić, 2013 for Bosnians; Brinkerhoff, 2008 for Coptic Egyptians; Foley & Babou, 2011 for Senegalese; Horst et al., 2010 for general discussion; Ngomba, 2012 for Cameroonians), much of the literature is still focused on diaspora philanthropy targeted at countries of origin—at ‘homelands’. There has been very limited research that has looked at diaspora contributions outside of countries of origin, focusing in the ‘spaces in between’ homelands and hostlands in situations of forced displacement.
Yet what this research suggests is that refugee diaspora can and do play an effective role as humanitarian actors, albeit on a small scale. The knowledge, skills, motivation and networks of those involved in diaspora CBOs are in many ways unique in the humanitarian arena. Indeed, critics have argued that large-scale population displacements have led to ‘bureaucratized humanitarian interventions that leach out the histories and the politics of specific refugees’ circumstances’ (Malkki, 1992, p. 38) and result in more or less similar responses regardless of local context (see also Agier, 2011; Hancock, 1994; Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010; Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2004). When compared to larger (bureaucratized) humanitarian actors, diaspora CBOs seem able to identify and respond to needs that are identified locally with a higher degree of flexibility and contextual understanding. The transnational social space that refugee diaspora occupy give them the power to act as both insiders and outsiders in humanitarian contexts. They are ‘insiders’ because they have *been in the same place* (on the other end of humanitarian interventions) or *are from the same place* (speak the same language, have shared cultural understandings) as the people their interventions are targeting. Yet they are also ‘outsiders’ by virtue of living in Australia and being able to move and mobilise resources in ways that their counterparts cannot. In many ways, the concept of ‘motility’ is useful here. Hannam et al. (2006, p. 3) define motility as the ‘potential for mobility’ and argue that, ‘mobility and control over mobility both reflect and reinforce power. Mobility is a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship’. Indeed, I would argue that there should be greater recognition of the ‘motility effect’ of third country resettlement and how this results in greater protection for a greater number of people as resettled refugees draw on their changed motility to engage in humanitarian work for the benefit of others.

Despite its benefits and potential, it is important to remain cautious and critical of assertions that diaspora-led humanitarianism may provide any sort of panacea for the current challenges facing the international refugee regime. There is no ‘win-win-win’ in the relationship between diaspora and humanitarian response as has been (problematically) argued in the case of diaspora and development.3 The work of diaspora CBOs are a drop in the ocean when we consider the current context of global displacement and humanitarian need. And while the displaced will continue to

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3 Since the 1990s there has been a growing interest and enthusiasm about the positive contribution or potential of migrants to development, not only via financial remittances and human capital, but knowledge flows more generally and social remittances (Faist, 2008, p. 26). Indeed, the migration-development nexus is framed in current policy circles as a ‘win-win-win’ scenario, benefitting both countries of origin and destination, as well as migrants themselves, the latter becoming major players in the development of their countries of origin (Bréant, 2013, p. 101). Putting aside the enthusiasm of policy-makers about the development potential of migration, debates within academic circles are still rigorously contested. As Raghuram (2009) suggests, there are compelling accounts of why migration is a driver of development as well as equally persuasive arguments as to why it is detrimental to development, and much depends on who, where and what context of migration and what idea of development is being talked about.
strive to find solutions to their own situations—drawing on local and transnational community networks—states and other international actors ultimately have a greater responsibility to change or challenge the structures that make the lives of those in protracted refugee situations so precarious.
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