Security Frontiers in the African Great Lake Region: 
Exploration onto Grassroots Peace Networks

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Bibliography

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Abstract

Most studies in political violence focus on sate sponsored dissidents or insurgents. This chapter deviates from this traditional approach in the study of insurgency and present a discussion of how state and rebel factions has collaborated in armed insurgent activities in postcolonial countries deepening this theoretical lines of arguments the study use secondary research method. The study develop a conceptual framework using selected theories in security studies. This theories are
also used in discursive arguments to build theory. The chapter establish that
clientelism between the insurgents and statesmen dominating most insurgen
cetting in the African Great Lake Region and is fueled by abundant natural
resources.

**Keywords:** insurgency, multilayered security frontier; grassroots peace networks; clientelism

**Introduction**

This chapter is envisioned to contribute to the study of political violence with focus on relations between insurgence, statesmen, natural resources and political clientelism within the context of colonial legacies in Africa. Its purpose is neither embracing consequential security practices nor demystifying colonial legacies but to explore the evolutionary nature of insurgent behavior in the African Great Lake Region. The chapter is limited to reviews on case studies reflecting on relations between insurgence and statesmen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well as grassroots peace networks. The central contention in the chapter purports that armed conflict in most African countries are rooted in colonial legacies as evident in continuous exploitation of abundant natural resources and recalcitrant social disintegration at grassroots level while benefits accrue to privileged individuals as opposed to public good. The author argues that the armed conflict in the African Great Lake Region can be positioned within multilayered security frontiers that cut across multiple security domains and grassroots networks. The point of convergence between these security domains and grassroots networks defines coalitions of expediency (based on clientelistic relations) between insurgents and statesmen within recurrent and entangled frontiers lines – the environmental, social, political, military, economic and individual boundaries. In deepening these theoretical lines of argument, the author begins by providing extant descriptions necessary in the conceptualization of insurgence, multilayered security frontiers and clientelism. This is followed by the reflection on historical evolution of insurgence and clientilism in the DRC. The third section is selected perspectives on political violence and theoretical explanations on the case under study. This section is followed by discussions on relations between insurgence, multilayered frontiers and clientelism in the DRC. The final section is conclusions and recommendation for future research on political violence and possible policy directions.

**Linking Insurgency, Clientilism and Security Frontiers.**
Much has been written on relations between insurgence and security using interchangeable concepts like uprising, terrorism, rebellion, banditry and revolution. Issues underlying the study of insurgence and security have been the subject of debates in both academic circles and public policy practice focusing on the public sphere of governance (Martin 2003, p.6). Definitional problems and conceptual issues (Marsella 2004, p.11) in these debates are clustered with the truism that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” (Martin 2003, p.22). In the absence of any incontrovertible definition on insurgency, the author purposively selects characterizing feature in describing insurgency and are:

- “Revolusion against the inequities of modern industrial societies, poverty, hunger and exploitation in the Third World” (Laqueur 1987, p.235);
- “Activist seeking to build a new society on the rubble of an existing one” (Martin 2006, p.157);
- “Official government support for policies of violence, repression, and intimidation … directed against perceived enemies that the state has determined threatens its interests or security” (Martin 2006, p.111);
- “Used by different groups or government for very different ends” (Harmon 2000, p.44);

Given the current debates on the meaning of the concept of insurgency, the foregoing characterizing features provide the operational meaning of insurgency as used in this paper. In supplementing the above characterizing features, Buzan and Hansen (2009, p.14) would support the notion that insurgency may be described in the context of strategy, deterrence, containment, identity, power, peace or risk. For example, the charactering feature provide by Martin above suffices to contextualize insurgency as strategic response or deterrence mechanism from government. Buzan (1991, p.134) also provides various types of security threats or deterrent domains relevant in developing theoretical line of arguments later in this paper and are: military; political; societal; economic; ecological or environmental. The socio-ecological environment is central to the primary contention in this paper as it underpins the natural resource domain.

*Fundamental Building-blocks in Conceptual Security Frontier Analysis*
In describing clientelism, the paper takes cue from Robinson and Verdier (2013:264) and observe that under natural conditions, clientelistic politics are relatively important in countries in which economic activities depends on: poor technology; social inequalities; natural resource-dominated state-income, and state-dominating economy. This observations motivate the author in viewing “clientelist relations as dyadic (two-person), voluntary, reciprocal; [and] face-to-face links between individuals of unequal status who exchange non-comparable goods and services in a relationship that may involve affectivity, [a]s based on norms of reciprocity and obligation, and plays out over time and across a broad series of interactions” (Hilgers 2008, p.125). Central to this these observation and narratives on clientelistic politics is the norm of inequitable reciprocity and non-comparable obligations between “political elites” and “clients” as evident within natural conditions (e.g. abundant natural resources, poor technology, poverty and hunger) that govern the exchange of natural resources in the African Great Lake region. In transforming the security study agenda in the post-cold war era, the so called the “widening and deepening” school of thought (School of Copenhagen led by Buzan) provides that security “has expended from exclusively military onto political, economic, societal and environmental sectors” ((Šulovic 2010:2) while referent object or securitizing actors/audiences may includes “political elites” and “clients/citizens” as social groups within security settings. It is on the basis of the forgoing theoretical line of arguments that this paper presents that national governments, political elites and clients in the African Great Lake Region opted “to legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures (insurgency) for neutralization of the threat” (Šulovic 2010:3) within deepened multiple-security frontiers. This security frontiers were stimulated by inequitable exploitation of natural resources that serves as an eminent threat to selected referent social groups in the region.

**Reflection on Historical Evolution on Insurgence and Clientelism in the DRC.**

The protracted insurgent activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) increasingly attract worldwide attention from both academic circles and international security policy practice. This section illuminates on relations between the insurgency and statesmen that shaped the contemporary political landscape in the African Great Lake Region. In doing so, the author takes cue from Vlassenroot and Huggin (2005) and focus on land issues in the DRC. Vlassenroot and Huggin (2005, p.149) address land issues in DRC as follows.

Even when defined [land issues] as an issue of control over agricultural and pastoral land (rather than land containing mineral deposits and other more valuable resources) is multidimensional, with economic, political, social and spiritual aspects.
These authors view the significance of land-based natural resources as: a means of production; a means by which families and individuals maintain social status; a source of feelings of ancestral ‘belonging’ (as ancestors are buried within traditional territories); an area where political authority express and raise taxes; and a means to control labour, technology, capital, markets, trade routes and other related factors. These line of significance channels the chapter to explore historical evolution of insurrection and clientelism related to land use during the rule of King Léopold II, Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The three regimes are discussed in their order. The first is Léopold regime and its’ contact with the DRC is summarized by Twan (2005, p.9-12) as follows:

[T]he violent rule of Belgium King Léopold II ruled over Central Africa [DRC] … a region eight times the size of his native Belgium, in 1885 and rule it directly till 1905 …set in place a bureaucratic-sadistic operations to extract rubber and other raw material … officials worked with a simple premise that the native is always recalcitrant and lazy … only violence will make the native work hard … officials brutalized the people of the Congo, killing them mercilessly, torturing [by] … cut[ting] off … hands … district official received 1308 hands in one day … those who refused to collect rubber or did not meet their rubber quarto, [officials] “made war against them. One example was enough: a hundred heads cut off, and there has been a plenty of supply since …” Rape was routine, but so was the mutilation of the male and female genitalia in the presence of family members … murdered half the Congo’s population in the process … In 1908 Leopold turned over the management of the Free State [DRC] to the Belgium government, and the barbarism continue till the Belgians completed their rail system in 1914 that rationalized the removal of the Congo’s minerals all the way till 1961 and onwards.

The above summary is contextualized within the understudying that “[a]t the Berlin Conference of 1884 King Leopold II of Belgium received international approval to appropriate a vast portion of Central Africa which was in 1908 to become the Belgian Congo (when Leopold’s private possession became a colony of the Belgian State” (Fabian 1983, p.166). The statesmen who ratified the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, 26 February 1885 include representatives from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Russia, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden-Norway, and Turkey (Ottoman Empire). While enjoying blessing from the Berlin Conference of 1884, King Leopold II was “a ruler much admired throughout Europe as a "philanthropic" monarch … his
troops … have fought and defeated local slave traders … and for more than a decade European newspapers have praised him for investing his personal fortune in public works to benefit the Africans” (Hochschild 1999, p.ii). Contrary to theses propaganda, empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between King Leopold II and ratified statesmen to the General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa was entrenched in the exploitation of natural resources and supplies from DRC that contributed in the current developments in the European continent. It is this relationship between King Leopold II, as politically violent beneficiary to the General Act of the Berlin Conference and his patrons that need to be examined.

The second is Mobutu regime and is linked to the extreme insurgence waves that engulfed the country during 1960-1 and 1963-5 as they “legitimize” the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko from 1965 (Young 1994, p.260). Young state that Mobutu proclaimed insurgent activities as existential threat to the nation and its economic, social and financial situation, thus required a powerful unitary state as a response mechanism. In doing so, Mobutu used Léopold’s doctrinal approach and is summarized by Young (1994:261-263) as follows: a hierarchical military type administration founded on the principle of unity of command; the 1973 ‘Zairianisation’ project transferred the economy in the mercantile and agricultural domain to Zairian acque’reurs, as presidential patrimony; the 1974 ‘radicalisation of the revolution’ finalized the seizure of most colonial enterprises, bestowing them for a transitory period in the state; gradually ‘authentic Zairian nationalism’ was personalized in parallel with transformation; the public media was prohibited to use the names of any government official other than the President; and the national government was served in Mobutu imagery, by depersonalizing human actors.

Mobutu’s doctrinal approach led to his regime losing its grip on civil society as well as its international standing. His ambition thereafter became restricted to accumulation of personal wealth in preparation for retirement. The rise and fall of Mobutu regime is characterized by the use of insurgence to seize power, proclamation of insurgent activities as existential threat and ambition to establish a powerful (militarized) unitary state as a response mechanism. In doing so, Mobutu closed ranks with former colonial powers and appointed personal friends as government officials. This unique type of patron-client relations also offers the opportunity to evaluate the mutual constitutive nature of patron and client relationship in post-colonial countries.

Finally, the Kabila regime is presented within the context of Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s march across the Congo to consolidate his power in Kinshasa. Turner provides that Kabila was faced with the challenge of their ability as “patrons to control their supposed clients” (Turner 1997, p.25). Turner
states that in fulfillment of this need, Mobutu succeeded in multiplying his external patrons as exemplified by Belgium, France and United States. The divisions among Mobutu’s patrons presented significant indicators on Western patronage and conditionality. The conflicting policies that sought for the establishment of pro-Western central government or support to the secessionist Katanga (Turner 1997, p.25-26) became prominent during Mobutu regime and inherited by Kabila. Young provides that the pro-Western central government policy was partially reinforced during the Angolan civil war of 1975. This was further encouraged by the immediate invasion of Katanga by Angola-based Congolese insurgent frontier that repeated in 1978. In an attempt to shift patronage from Western countries, Turner (1997, p.27) provides that “international forces which assisted Kabila to seize power were from African countries an reflect rivalries in the African Great Lake Region Turner provides that many of these countries are on DRC borders and harbor insurgents. The relationship between insurgency and statesmen in the Central African region is summarized from Turner (1997) as follows.

- Uganda supported Sudan insurgents fight Khartoum regime.
- Sudan supported insurgents attacking Uganda from DRC.
- Uganda supported Rwanda insurgents who overthrew Habyarimana government.
- Angola supported Katanga insurgents who launched an attack in the eastern DRC province in 1977 and 1978.
- Rwanda supported Kabila to eliminate Hutu insurgents in Congo
- Angola supported Kabila to strike a blow against Jonas Savimbi’s insurgents, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Cabina separatists
- Angola-based Katanga insurgents joint fighting on Kabila’s side to eliminate Mobutu.
- UNITA insurgents and Rwandan Hutu insurgents aided Mobutu fight against Kabila.

The historical evolution on insurgency and statesmen in the African Great lake Region provide another building block in the analysis of clientelistic relationships. The coalitions of exigency between insurgents and government forces suggest converging at various security frontiers. The data established in these three regimes provides the baseline information in the interrogation of exiting scholarship on political violence for purposes of theory building.

**Selected scholarships on Political Violence and Contextual Explanations**

The chapter begins by exploring how social science literature explains relations between the state, threats and insurgence with the intension to unravel scholarly discussions on the conceptualization of insurgence in African countries. The detailed epistemological debate on
understanding this relations is presented by Buzan and Hansen (2009, p.32-38) and is not the intention of the chapter to repeat those efforts. Instead, the chapter focuses on selected approaches that will assist in surfacing the logic of insurgence and are: the Copenhagen school; post-colonial security studies; critical security studies; critical constructivism. These approaches are selected on the basis of their complementary nature in mapping the concept of security (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p.35). In attempting to develop theoretical lines of argument, emerging concepts are coded and hereafter discussed as presented by prominent scholars.

The Copenhagen School: The concept of social security and the logic of securitization are central to the Copenhagen School (CS). The dominancy of these concepts is evident in contribution of the CS to the debates on widening and deepening security (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p.212-217). The school also reflects on the following key concepts: national security; identity security; existential threat; referent objects; securitizing actors; successful securitization; and subjectivity and objectivity (Waever et al. 1993; Booth 1991; Buzan et al. 1998). As the CS widens and deepens the security threat and referent object, it also deviates from material threat and advances “social processes by which group of people construct something as a threat” (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p.36). Although Buzan is the principal contributor at the CS, McSweeney (1996, p.81) provides that the need to widen the concepts of security and relocate into the social identity domain suggests emanating from external forces as (e.g. post-Cold War dynamics) opposed to particular form of doubts at the epistemological or ontological levels. The author purposely ignores any form of criticisms leveled against the CS and focus on common concepts that are supplemented by other perspectives for purposes of theory building.

Post-colonial security studies: The conception and growth of post-colonialism (PC) in social sciences was the response to the call for critical examination on “Western-centric conception of the state” (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p.200). This authors present that the approach need to acknowledge the specificity of the developing countries. They recommend post-colonialism to reconstitute its referent object and projections of wider and deeper sets of contextualized epistemologies and methodologies. In supporting this notion, some author like Robinson (2012) support the PC agenda that seeks the production of insecurity across multiple sectors – the national, societal, individual, human, political, military, economic, and environmental security issues. Robinson (2012, p16) also introduces the concept of emotional imperialism and account on how it efficiently, and without enforcement, resuscitates and sustains the exploitative logics of colonialism.
Critical security studies: Critical security studies (CSS) developed itself by picking up the critical theory embedded in the Frankfurt School traditions (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p.205-8). The CSS robustly calls for individual humans as referent object for security while arguing that the states are unreliable providers of security as they also generate insecurity (Booth 1991; Jones 1995). These scholars support the notion that emancipating individuals and groups from political, environmental, economic and social constrains will contribute positively at the level of collective security – the widening and deepening approach to security. Criticisms leveled against the CSS are also ignored as the author intends to identify common concepts.

Critical constructivism: Central to critical constructivism (CC) is “[t]he concern with the construction of identity and the link between representations and policy” (Buzan & Hansen 2009, p.199). These authors reflects on Waever (2004), Fierke (2000) and Mutimer (1998) who respectively provides assistance in resolving identity crisis related to the response mechanism in security settings. They present that CC:

- Often examine language games or narratives from a hypothetical or logical perspective rather than the empirical approach.
- This logical deduction offers the language games identified with a self-contained or free-standing quality which makes variations and transition difficult to explain
- Speak about states as actors and not as discursively constituted subjects, as there is sometimes a slippage between “role” and “identity”, i.e. the state possesses identity which it explicitly defines and pursues or a property it may choose to protect or “kill off”. Also that;
- Often establishes identity on the basis of concepts found or explicit words in the text under examination – as the insurgence discourse as “rebel” or “freedom fighter”.

Table 1: The Conceptual Framework Defining Multilayered Security Frontiers and Selected Theoretical Grounding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Concept</th>
<th>Inquiry Character</th>
<th>Meta-theoretical grounding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State security</td>
<td>Epistemological concept</td>
<td>CS; PC; CSS; CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security</td>
<td>Ontological concept</td>
<td>CS; PC; CSS; CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Ontological concept</td>
<td>CS; PC; CSS; CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
<td>Ontological concept</td>
<td>CS; PC; CSS; CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political security</td>
<td>Ontological concept</td>
<td>CS; PC; CSS; CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military security</td>
<td>Ontological concept</td>
<td>CS; PC; CSS; CC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussions on Insurgence, Multilayered Security Frontiers and Cientelism.

The descriptions on insurgency established the role of both the state and civil society in insurgent activities. The insurgent activities initiated by the state are rationalized on the basis of national interests and state security. On the other hand, the insurgent activities started at the bottom, civil society, are reasoned on the basis of unpopular political system and oppressive or repulsive government practices. In both cases, the insurgent-statesmen complex is evident and manifest in coalitions of exigency as exemplified by the Kabila’s insurgent group and involved African statesmen. In our case under study, Uganda (patron-statesmen) is assisting Kabila (client-insurgent) to seize power as the strategy to benefit from the elimination of Mobutu regime. On the other government armed forces (insurgent-patron) sustain war in the eastern DRC by trading in “blood” natural resources with the government of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Burundi (statesmen-clients). The insurgent-statesmen complex continue to shape frontier lines founded on colonial legacies like exploitation of natural resources, cheap and forced labour, family fragmentations through purposeful murders or internal displacements. This political violence is committed equally by both the state and insurgents in the DRC. The study succeeded in grounding these frontier lines or existential threats on various and interrelated levels that include: environmental; political; social; military; economic; and individual issues. The study also established that although both the state and insurgents are equally responsible for these political violent acts, they retain their security identity as referent objects and continue to claim their right to survival. The study further established that most civil societies in the African continent apportion emotional imperialism as opposed to the logic of specificity to colonial legacies as exemplified by complex assistance program offered by European donor countries that render African people to be dependant – a recipe for client-patron relationship. The foregoing theoretical lines of arguments form the basis for conceptualizing multilayered security frontiers central to this chapter. See table 2 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Selected Security Frontier Sector</strong></th>
<th><strong>Logic of Specificity/ Normative Imperialism</strong></th>
<th><strong>Response Mechanism/ Political Machine</strong></th>
<th><strong>Selected Data Source</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Structural organization of land access and control as root causes of local insurgent activities</td>
<td>Insurgent-statesman complex</td>
<td>International Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Internal and local struggles as facilitating foreign exploitation for own frontier advantages</td>
<td>Insurgent-statesman complex</td>
<td>International Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Internal and local struggles as important aspects of the insurgency system- elitism</td>
<td>Insurgent-statesman complex</td>
<td>International Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Manipulation of political formations and identity groups</td>
<td>Insurgent-statesman complex</td>
<td>International Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Direct intervention of foreign powers on Congolese soil</td>
<td>Insurgent-statesman complex</td>
<td>International Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual/spiritual</td>
<td>Access to abundant natural resources</td>
<td>Insurgent-statesman complex</td>
<td>International Security Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The descriptions on insurgence also established the role of both the state and civil society in responding to insurgent activities as existential security threats. The state initiate counter-insurgence measures on the basis of its duty to protect citizens. The civil society initiates counter-insurgence activities on the ground of the right to self-protection in situations where the state fails or is incompetent. Table 2, provides selected categories that frames multi-layered security frontiers from purposefully identifies sources of data. The author argues that this multi-layered security frontiers constitutes avenues for any successful insurgent attack, thus need to be protected. In doing so, table 2 provides response mechanism in line with these security frontiers and are categorized as insurgent-state complex on the basis of established logic of specificity or logic of normative imperialism. The empirical evidence established in earlier presentations suggest that Clientelism model can best explain the underpinnings of political violence in the DRC. The diagram below intends to assist in the mapping of multilayered security frontiers and insurgent-statesmen complex using Clientelism model.

Mapping Multilayered Security Frontiers and Insurgent-statesmen Complex using Clientelism Model

Client Domain:
Insurgent-Statesmen Complex

Patron Domain:
Insurgent-Statesmen Complex

Eminent Threat Interrelations:
Collaborated Armed Aggression

Multiple Frontier Zero-Sum Game

Environmental
Economic
Political
Military
Social
Individual

Resources of Abundance:
Political Machine of Control
In responding to insurgent manifesting from various frontier lines, both the statesmen and dissident will assume either a patron or client position as shall be determined by prevailing political circumstances. The model presents that both the statesmen and the dissident will subjectively appreciate the eminent threat on the basis of the most needed resources as they constitute the political machine of control. The model provides that, the empirical evidence suggest that in situations where the imminent threat demonstrates possible convergences in the relations between the patron and client, then collaboration in armed aggression is a probable response in the insurgent-statement complex setting. The model purports that such collaboration is guided by multiple frontier zero-sum character that manifest in the environmental, economic, political, military, social and individual levels of security. This implies that involved state and insurgent group expect both losses and gains from established frontier lines in the process of a given political violence.

Finally, the descriptions on insurgence establish the significance of revulsion against the inequities of modern industrial societies, poverty, hunger and exploitation and insurgent activities that seek to build a new society on the rubble of an existing one. In satisfying this description, the chapter draw examples from the grassroots peace networks in the Africa Great Lake Region. The author argues that the grassroots peace networks in the Central Republic of Congo represents a unique political setting. Although King Leopold was depended on European officers to stabilize the country, he succeeded in mobilizing local Congolese to participate in his personal security structures. Mobutu lacked organized military structure and remained unpopular to galvanize local political support. He managed to suppress two insurgent attacks through the assistance of European countries. The fall of Mobutu regime led to the partitioning of the country into three local security zones: “one under government-Angola-Zimbabwe control; one under Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RDC) rebels and Rwandan control; and one under the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) rebels and Uganda control (although ‘control’ is an exaggeration in each case)” (Englebert 2012, p.34). For purpose of this chapter, this local divisions along ethical lines are more important than the control aspects as they manifest in frontier lines that trigger insurgent activities at grassroots level. Engelbert provides that this frontier lines are triggered by specific policies that regulates access to land citizenship, and the right to local offices of governance. Engelbert further argues that these frontier lines constitute “multiple and overlapping, local features, widely distributed across the country, which contribute to a fragmentation of identity and networks at the local level and increase polarization of social life” (Engelbert 2012, p.35-6). In the study “Congo” presents that grassroots peace networks offers greater opportunities in resolving insurgence challenges in the DRC. Put differently, any attempt to build a strong and peaceful nation in the DRC requires integrated local or grassroots peace networks enhanced by the closure of ethnicity-based frontier lines and fissures. This means the establishment of enduring peace and long-term democratic stability in the DRC require the building of a, grassroots, bottom-up structure of local organizations that operates within other regional peace institutions.
Clientelism and Political Machine

In above schematic representation, the author attempted to illustrate how multilayered security frontiers and insurgent-statesmen complex manifest in Clientelism relations and less was discussed on the political machine that underpins the Clientelism model. Give the mutual constitutive nature of these three conceptual categories (multilayered security frontiers; insurgent-statesmen complex; Clientelism), it becomes necessary to examine the “political machine” as the causal mechanism in this mutually constitutive relationship. The author takes cue from the statement that African politicians and public official widely use Clientelism to structure their relations with civil society due to high rate of inequality and poverty but also “limited institutionalization of democratic rules inside” (Hilgers 2008, p.123 ) their regimes. The rise of King Leopold II, Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila to power, and the supremacy of their political strategy set their regimes on the path of centralized political authority and personalized interests. As a results of Mobutu and Kabila’s desires to seize power using insurgent means, rather than in the public sphere of governance, both were respectively pressurized to mobilize the masses while already in government. Both were challenged by lack of experience in the institutionalization of regime rules, consolidation of democratic governance, fair allocation of public good, regulating the activities of the regime officials, and facilitating national integration and enduring peace stability - the primary functions of a political machine. Recalling that King Leopold II used his politico-military machine to enforce this functions, the other two political leaders lacked strong military power in this regard and depended on foreign patrons. Regardless of these strengths and weaknesses, the three leaders succeeded in personalizing the appointments of their administrators and foreign alliances, with consequential politico-social divisions and continuous insurgent activities. When both Mobutu and Kabila seize power respectively, these tendencies migrated and permeated the new regime and manifested as “clientelistic relationships with citizens” (Hilgers 2008, p.124). The chapter establish that Mobutu and Kabila succeeded in converting citizens into insurgent and later into their regimes as public administrators, creating frontier lines that perpetuated insurgent activities in the DRC while supported by European or neighboring African patrons or clients.

The chapter also establishes that Mobutu and Kabila’s insurgent groups succeeded in archiving power superiority under asymmetric conditions in both temporal settings. Hultquist (2013, p.626) support the notion that although these insurgent groups and the then governments were principally different actors at that temporal space, insurgents superiority led to some different expectations that merely inverting the expectation from insurgent inferiority. In doing so, both
insurgent groups were involved in coalitions of expediency with other government forces or insurgents at grassroots and international level to leverage their superiority – another form of clientelistic relationship. In the case of Mobutu, the following passage is appropriate (Schatzberg 1997, p.2).

By the second and third years of independence, new, smaller provinces were being carved from the old ones; from 1963 through 1967, much of the country was engulfed by rebellions against central authority. At their apogee in 1964, these largely uncoordinated revolts covered more than half the country and were eventually put down only with substantial military intervention from foreign mercenaries, Belgium, and the United States.

The linkage between insurgence, multilayered security frontiers and clientelism provides the opportunity to evaluate peace networks at grassroots level. The recurring coalitions of expediency between the state and insurgent groups with expectations for specific benefits is founded on frontier lines created by existential threats in various domains and include: environmental, economic, political, social, military and environmental. It is this coalition of expediencies that seek to define clientelism in the African continent as well as its unique political machine, the statesmen-insurgent complex. Adjacent to this political machine is greed to have preferential access to the abundant resources in the DRC.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Chapter intended to contribute to the study of political violence in Africa countries. In doing so, previous case studies on relations between public leadership and insurgent activities in the African Great Lake Region with particular focus on the DRC were examined. The limited space in the chapter restricts discussion to the linkage between insurgence, multilayered security frontiers, and clientelism. The author began by describing these three conceptual categories while guided by literature on international security studies to develop structured analytic framework from traditionally prominent adjacent concepts (e.g. deterrence, risk and peace) and security threat sectors (e.g. political, environmental, social, military). This conceptual framework surfaces environmental, economic, political, military, social and individual issues in the examination on Leopold II, Mobutu and Kabila regimes, insurgence activities, security frontiers and clientelistic relations. The author use selected theoretical perspectives in examining this linkages and relationships and include: Copenhagen school, post-colonial security studies, critical constructivism and critical security studies. The author purposely ignore limitation in the foregoing perspectives and employed supplementary strengths that assist in leveraging grassroots peace networks necessary in resolving conflict settings in the African continent. Following supplementary arguments from selected preliminary assessments, the chapter established
clientelistic relations between statesmen and insurgent actors as interchangeable in political violence settings - the insurgent-statesmen complex, multilayered security frontiers and clientelism schematic framework. The discussion on this three major categories reveals the convergence of relations between the insurgents and statesmen at various security frontiers. Such security frontiers are also underpinned by the political machine that is dependent on the abundance on natural resources in the DRC. The author recommends that further research in political violence in the African countries should focus on the causal mechanisms at the point of convergence within the multilayered security frontiers. This approach will assist in identifying effective and efficient response mechanism in combating state sponsored or dissident’s insurgence.

References


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1 Great Lakes Region countries consist of members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR): an inter-governmental organisation of eleven member states in the African Great Lakes Region and are, Angola; Burundi; the Central African Republic; the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); Kenya; the Republic of Congo; Rwanda; Sudan; Tanzania; Uganda; and Zambia (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/RegDimConGreatLakes.pdf)