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CONTENTS

Note from the Editor 3

AFSAAP 2005 5

Articles
‘Variant Fortune’: The Livelihood Plights of Two Families in Rural Zimbabwe
John Louis Moore 8

The Empowerment of Women in Museveni’s Uganda: Who Benefits?
William Muhumuza 25

Review Articles
Towards the Rebirth of African Universities
Lalage Bown 41

Understanding the Rwenzururu Movement: An Autobiographical Account
Martin Doornbos 48

The Past, Present and Future of African Politics
Scott MacWilliam 54

Book Reviews
Ronald Labonte and Ted Schrecker, with David Sanders and Wilma Meeus, Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
Peter Annear 59

Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1985-97

Els De Temmerman, Aboke Girls: Children Abducted in Northern Uganda

Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and The Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda

World Vision, Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in
Northern Uganda
AVSI, GUSCO, Red Barnet, UNICEF, World Vision, Where is My Home? Children in War
Cherry Gertzel

Shirley Ardener (ed.) Swedish Ventures in Cameroon 1883-1923: Trade and Travel, People and Politics, The Memoir of Knut Knutson E. M. Chilver and Ute Roschenthaler (eds), Cameroon’s Tycoon: Max Esser’s Expedition and its Consequences
Caroline Ifeka

Thomas V. McClendon, Genders and Generations Apart: Labor Tenants and Customary Law in Segregation-Era South Africa, 1920s to 1940s
Joan Wardrop

George E. Brooks, Eurafri cans in Western Africa. Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century
Graeme Counsel

Carol Summers, Africans’ Education in Southern Rhodesia: 1918–1940
John Louis Moore

Dan Brockington, Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania
Lochran Trail

Eric Gilbert, Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar: 1860-1970
Iain Walker

Research Matters
Old Crop, New Crop: Contracting Out Oil Palm Production in Ghana
Paul Huddleston

Women and Empire: Primary Sources on Gender and Anglo-Imperialism, 1750-1930
Liz Dimock

Notes
Namibia’s Arid Lands Research Institute: Combining Desert Ecology with the Search for Community Development
Robin Burns

Arabian Africans or African Arabs?: The Dynamics of Islamic African Identity in the Arabian Peninsula
Iain Walker
Mission Statement

*The Australasian Review of African Studies* aims to contribute to a better understanding of Africa in Australasia and the western Pacific. It publishes both scholarly and generalist articles that provide authoritative, informed, critical material on Africa and African affairs that is interesting and readable and available to as broad an audience as possible, both academic and non-academic.
I would like first of all to offer my apologies to subscribers, contributors, to all readers and to my colleagues on the AFSAAP Executive, for the essentially unavoidable delay in the publication of this issue. I do so not least because I have no doubt that readers will find much of interest to them once it arrives.

One of the most fascinating aspects of editing this journal over a good number of years has been the way in which, notwithstanding the wide range of material that comes in from contributors, there is usually some coincidence of concerns about Africa, historical as well as contemporary, that comes through, even if indirectly, in the articles, book reviews and notes that are offered at any time. In this issue it appears to be the question of education. I am particularly grateful to Lalage Bown, who draws on her long years of experience of higher and adult education across primarily but not only East and West Africa, to review the changing situation of African universities through the late twentieth century (pp. 41-47): their progressive impoverishment through the 1980s and 1990s and the grounds for renewed optimism for the future offered at present by among other developments, the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. It is especially refreshing to be reminded of the long historical tradition of universities as institutions of learning in Africa; and that ‘the oldest such institutions with a continuing existence at present are in Africa’ (p. 42). But the interest is not only in the past. John Moore’s book review (pp. 78-80) provides us with reminders of the importance of education for the emergence of an African elite in this case in Southern Rhodesia through the 1920s to the 1940s. His article on rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe which also is included in this issue is a reminder of the continuing importance of access to education for African livelihoods today. William Muhumuza in his analysis of contemporary policies for the empowerment of women in Uganda also makes clear the significance of education in that respect. Scott MacWilliam’s comments on the ‘new liberal order’ in his very positive discussion of Tom Young’s Readings in African Politics (pp. 54-59) suggest that we might also consider education in that context.

This being my last issue as editor of ARAS I would like with considerable pleasure to thank Professor Helen Ware for taking over the job. Helen is presently chair of the International Agency Leadership Programme in the Peace Building at the University of New England. She has long and varied experience in and of Africa, both during her years with the Australian aid agency in its successive incarnations, and as Australian High Commissioner to Zambia (covering Angola, Malawi, Namibia and the ANC). She was also for a time at the...
University of Ibadan where she collaborated with social science researchers in eleven other African countries from Senegal to Sudan. While I have always thought of her as a demographer she tells me that she trained originally as an historian while her wide range of interests in development make her an ideal person to take over ARAS.

The changeover comes at a time when the production of ARAS has become more than a single person can handle. The time has passed for a ‘one woman show’ and so we have established the position of Review Editor and am delighted that Dr Jeremy Martens, of the History Department at the University of Western Australia, has agreed to take on this role.

Both Helen and Jeremy will bring a range of new networks and links, institutional as well as personal, to the journal which can only be to its advantage. So all I can say is that I wish them very well. I am sure also that they will receive the same support that I have received over the years and hopefully more so. From an editor’s viewpoint one of the encouraging aspects of this particular issue is that it includes a number of new contributors, including one or two from African universities. So may I also use the occasion to remind readers that ARAS is a good place to publish your scholarly and also your more generalist writings!

Finally I must thank all those who have enabled this Review to grow through the years to its present status. This includes my former colleagues in what was then the Politics Discipline in the Flinders University of South Australia, and above all the secretaries who in the years before I acquired even a minimum of computer literacy typed and then word-processed the journal with great skill. At Curtin University I received the same valued support in the then School of Social Sciences. Curtin University has also since 1993 supported the production and distribution of the journal for which AFSAAP as well as myself has always been grateful. Since the change to the status of a peer-reviewed journal I appreciated the support of a very helpful Editorial Advisory Board whose experience I have not I am aware always sufficiently exploited. I must also thank Uniprint at the University of Western Australia who have produced the journal in its new form since 2001 and especially Graham Harvey for his continuous support. Last but not least I have been over the past three years indebted to Karen Miller whose professional skills and scholarly approach have ensured the continuing high quality of the final production of ARAS and with whom I have found it a great pleasure to work.

Cherry Gertzel
Editor
Africa: Peace, Progress, Passion and Sustainability

Friday 25 November to Sunday 27 November 2005
University of New England - Armidale, NSW

FIRST CALL FOR PAPERS

The twenty-eighth Annual Conference of the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) will be held at the University of New England, Armidale, New South Wales from 25th to 27th November 2005. The conference convenor is Professor Helen Ware.

The theme of *Africa: Peace, Progress, Passion and Sustainability* reflects the broad and diverse interests of AFSAAP members and others concerned with Africa whilst also highlighting key issues for a continent which needs peace, a new deal for its citizens at the grass-roots and a renaissance of effective governance. Contributions that address current dilemmas from an historical framework of reference or a focus on particular regions, or specific issues and bilateral relations including Africa-Australian relations in, for example, economic aid, health and migration will be particularly welcome.

The *Postgraduate Workshop* will take place immediately preceding the Conference on Thursday 24th November.

This Conference will place a special emphasis on bringing together all those in Australia who have an interest in Africa: academics; African immigrants to Australia; businesses with African links; diplomats (both Australians and Africans accredited here); NGOs with projects in Africa; refugees and their supporters etc.

Armidale is a historic city, accessible by bus, rail and air, almost mid-way between Sydney and Brisbane. It has a splendid range of restaurants and on-campus accommodation of motel standard, a wide range of motels and cheap student accommodation. The Conference will be accompanied by exhibitions of African art, books, dancing and music.
Regular updates on the conference will be posted during the next few months on the AFSAAP website http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.edu/global/afsaap/

Offers of papers and panels on all topics relating to Africa are welcome. Please send by May 31st to:

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AFSAAP Conference Convenor,
Peacebuilding, School of Professional Development and Leadership,
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‘Variant Fortune’: The Livelihood Plights of Two Families in Rural Zimbabwe

John Louis Moore

When I was a school teacher in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s I befriended a number of rural families through the hospitality of my work colleagues. Little did I know then that I would return several times in the mid and late 1990s to research a PhD about the impact on family livelihood of an IMF and World Bank sponsored macroeconomic reform strategy called the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was introduced into Zimbabwe in 1991. With this quest in mind, my supervisor, Dr. Jock McCulloch, and I thought it a worthy exercise to trace – historically - the real-life fortunes of families over the period 1950 to 2000. I thus interviewed my willing Zimbabwean friends, their siblings, parents and relatives including traditional leaders - chiefs and headmen - local business entrepreneurs, government officials and Church clergy. I present here the livelihood plights of two rural families, which I call after African totems1, namely, Shumba (i.e. lion) and Mukanya (i.e. monkey), located – respectively - in the Sanyati and Hwedza communal lands of Mashonaland West and Mashonaland East provinces.

In a country where over half the population (six million people plus) live in Communal Areas and rely primarily on family agriculture to meet survival needs, these household portraits are not microcosms of the peasantry's historical experience; nor are they samples. They can only serve to provide pointers to the determinants of family livelihood over time which shed some light on the experience of other rural households and, therefore, the factors underlying the increased spread of absolute poverty during the 1990s. In this vein what becomes apparent from these accounts is that notwithstanding the differences in geographical region, macroeconomic performance (i.e. employment opportunities, the cost of food, clothing, farm inputs, health care and education) seems to have held central sway over family livelihood. Yet, the depth of impact seems to have accorded to a specific combination of local and family factors: pre-eminently, the capacity of local institutions to manage the

1 Totems indicate a hereditary line or clan and are usually named after an animal. All members of the two households are given a fictitious first name.
environment and family population relative to land allocated and employed breadwinners. First, though, to put the plight of family agriculture in historical context, the structural setting inherited from colonialism and the important role of macroeconomic policy should be outlined.

After the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893-1894 and the first Chimurenga* of 1896-1897 the Rhodesian state enclosed the prime cropping areas and vast tracts of ranching land for capitalist development. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 officially divided the country on the basis of race. A minority of Europeans and multinational companies, about five percent of the population, gained exclusive access to about fifty percent of total agricultural land, mostly located in the fertile regions. The majority of African farmers were relocated to reserves (now Communal Areas), comprising initially about twenty percent of total agricultural land and mostly located in the driest regions, remote from rail and other infrastructure. Although more land was later added to the reserves demographic pressure and environmental decay relentlessly coincided so that African rural livelihoods was constantly and generally undermined.

By independence in 1980, after a fourteen year second Chimurenga, the Lancaster House agreement restricted until 1990 land redistribution to market transactions at market value and state expropriation of land to payment in foreign currency. The Government managed to resettle some 52,000 families during the 1980s, largely upon forfeited European land, however, and to expand Communal Areas to 43.5 percent of total agricultural land. Yet the majority of the population continued to languish in drought-prone areas while a minority - fewer than 6,000 farmers (4,500 of whom were white) and a handful of multinational companies - owned the best land available. Although by the 1990s the Government acquired full sovereignty over land redistribution the adoption of an export or market-led macroeconomic strategy in the form of the ESAP militated against any major overhaul of property rights by the state particularly given the role of the European agricultural and mining community who created up to seventy percent of foreign exchange reserves.

To help sustain livelihoods in Communal Areas macroeconomic performance and the quality of local governance have been crucial elements. The last colonial regime led by the Rhodesian Front relied mainly on African traditional authorities to enforce land conservation; the Church to deliver the bulk of health and education services; and a state-led macroeconomic strategy through price subsidies and trade controls to maximise employment opportunities and

* Chimurenga is the Shona word for war of liberation.
the provision of cheap essentials (food, clothing, farm inputs etc). After independence the ZANU-PF Government retained the state-led macroeconomic regime; recognised the role of traditional authorities but introduced elected Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) to help with land conservation; and greatly expanded the reach of state health services and agricultural production and marketing infrastructure. While living standards improved, within an inadequate land space, the Government’s commercial push hastened environmental decay, particularly where local institutions were ineffective. Then, from late 1990 on, the dismantling of the state-led macroeconomic regime under the ESAP witnessed the onset of a chronic stagflation crisis (i.e. high inflation and low growth), which alongside environmental decline caused a generalised rural livelihood crisis.

As to the depth of the crisis from one household to another this depended on, to repeat, the quality of environmental management by local institutions and family population relative to available land and employed breadwinners. In these respects, the Mukanyas of Hwedza fared much better than the Shumbas of Sanyati. With the advent of macroeconomic hostility in the 1990s the Mukanyas, apart from better fortune in regard to the marital fate of daughters and employment of sons, had a far healthier subsistence economy to fall back on than did the Shumbas. Over the years a strong kin-based chiefship and allied village bodies acquired a pro-active reputation in land management and resistance to relocating displaced people in the village. The Sanyati chiefship and village institutions, on the other hand, seem to have been overwhelmed not only by an ever rising influx of settlers but also, being a middle to low veld area, a more powerful commercial assault spearheaded through cotton.

The tragedy of the Shumbas
Along the Kadoma road, about opposite the Sanyati Baptist mission but three or so kilometres inland, lies the Shumba household in a village I call Baobab. The mission, established in 1952, is run by American Baptists and consists of a hospital and boarding school. In the southwest corner of Sanyati communal lands lies the growth point Arda, which is about four kilometres from the Manyati River. The soil, like the beaches along the river, is a sandy white and extremely dry.

Once opened for settlement thousands poured into Sanyati including chief Who’chele’s and headman Lozane’s band in 1952 of which Mr and Mrs Shumba were a part. Many like them were victims of the ‘belated enforcement of colonial laws restricting black tenancies in areas designated for white
In what was then virgin country the Shumbas set about practicing shifting cultivation. Bush was slashed and burnt, crops sown in the ash and then left to fallow while the family moved on to a new area. The Government’s belligerent attitude to this method was revealed in the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 which required residents to settle in one place, fence and contour ridge their arable plots, invest in soil productivity, demarcate grazing land and keep a minimum of livestock.3

Mr Shumba’s first cousin was the Baobab kraalhead which carried some weight over land allocation because the headman and chief usually acted on advice from below. In a site of their choosing, the Shumbas gained at least seven hectares of arable land. The virgin soil bore good harvests of maize, sorghum and millet but small farming was not yet commercially viable. The nearest market place was Kadoma, over 100 kilometres away, and the transport of a bag of maize cost £4, which destroyed profitability. The livestock the Shumbas owned proved more promising. At one point, during the 1950s, the family owned thirty head of cattle which by selling one or two beasts provided ready cash.

As can be seen from the family tree Mr and Mrs Shumba went on to have ten children, five daughters and five sons, the first born in 1947 and the last in 1975. Given these numbers, a sole dependency on rain-fed agriculture was a sure ticket to poverty. With the steady inflow of settlers the size of the common grazing and the natural fertility of the soil were already diminishing. The Shumba cattle herd had peaked and would halve in size by the end of the 1970s. And the chance of supplementing the menu with wild game such as impala, gudu or guinea fowl had gone. The neighbouring commercial farm owned by a white man nicknamed Nyoka served as a sanctuary but this was strictly out of bounds. Fortunately Mr Shumba found a job at the nearby Sanyati Baptist Mission as a cook which provided the expanding family with a lifeline.

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Mr Shumba’s employment foreshadowed a time of relative prosperity which coincided with Prime Minister Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Contrary to today’s orthodoxy a highly protected economy averaged a nine percent growth rate until 1974, led by an explosion in local manufactures from some 600 products to 6,000. In Sanyati the trickle down of transport improved the commercial viability of agriculture, which enabled households with a regular wage income like the Shumbas to hire workers at harvest time. During the UDI period the household managed to purchase farming equipment and consumer goods, such as a plough, scotch cart, sewing machine and radio.

Mr and Mrs Shumba also invested in the education of their children. In this respect, compared to the four sons born in the 1960s, the four daughters born in the 1950s were more exposed to the inequities of colonial rule and gender. The Rhodesian Government overtly discriminated against African secondary education while a patriarchal culture conditioned females to be mothers and field hands. The four daughters completed primary education at the local state school but none attended secondary. Places were too rare and expensive. As the family tree indicates, the two eldest, Mandy and Chipiwa, were mothers by the 1970s and the younger two, Tecla and Kuda, had children by the 1980s. Time and gender, on the other hand, favoured the four sons, all of whom reaped the explosion in education after independence. Before then, though, the liberation war visited Baobab and the Shumba household, which is another story.

The 1980s
The first decade of independence brought mixed fortunes to Sanyati. While the expansion of health and education services offered clear rewards the promotion of commercial farming through the state marketing boards, such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) seemed to encourage a ‘tragedy of the commons’. The term refers to the demise of community livelihood following environmental decline resulting from too many people and livestock in a fixed land area. Given the general resort to a family mode of production, that is, a

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6 The concept originates from T. R. Malthus’s *Essay on the Principle of Population* [1798]. In theory, the process of decline can be countered by technology that replenishes soil fertility and arrests falling
reliance on wives and children to meet labour requirements, a greater commercial orientation was a sure way to heighten population pressure. In Sanyati the ‘tragedy’ manifested by way of deforestation and cultivation of unsuitable land, such as water catchments and grazing areas. Some relief though was provided by Nyoka’s abandoned farm - the fences were pulled down and people gained access to wood fuel, grazing and building materials.

Another contributing dimension was ineffective local governance. New legislation sent confusing signals as to the position of traditional authorities vis-à-vis the newly created VIDCOS. The Land Tenure Commission noted that most people ‘gravitated’ towards traditional authorities to resolve land issues.\(^7\) In Sanyati the rapid influx of settlers between 1950 and 1980 went beyond the ability of the chief Who’chele and headman Lozane to properly control land use. Indeed, these two remained hard-pressed to protect the interests of their own direct clan let alone give attentive counsel to numerous ‘stranger’ clans outside their royal lineage.

Mr Shumba’s wages were not adequate to support four sons away at boarding school plus the family at home which included divorced Mandy and her five children. Maize and cotton farming would help meet food and cash needs. By now, the soil was depleted in nutrients and a decent yield depended on fertiliser. State marketing channels provided a key advantage because they bypassed middlemen who sought to buy below official prices. In the early 1980s the GMB and CMB offered reasonable prices and the Shumbas invested in a cultivator and planting machine and opened an account at Standard Chartered Bank in Kadoma. As the decade progressed however producer prices decreased as the deficits of the state marketing boards increased. The IMF/World Bank sponsored ESAP promised to restore producer prices through commercialising/privatising the boards and subjecting them to the competition of private traders.

Mr and Mrs Shumba; their two youngest children; Mandy and her offspring; and the four sons during school vacations met household labour requirements. Kuda contributed as well when she returned home with two children – also as a single mother. By pulling the plough, the cattle stock, numbering fifteen in the early 1980s, shared a huge part of the labour burden and remained vital to productive capacity. Although the opening of Nyoka’s farm provided extra yields. On the whole though, besides compound fertilisers, not much was on offer to compensate for the devastating impact of clear felling, particularly in dry areas like Sanyati.

grazing, being thickly wooded, the area fell short of requirements, particularly when considering the whole of the Sanyati communal area and recently established resettlement schemes nearby.

The unsuccessful marital fate of two daughters, despite the extra labour gained, was a misfortune for the Shumbas not least because the household missed out on lobola or bride price. Unsupported mothers constitute a chronically poor group in African society - before, during and after colonisation.\(^8\) The state-led macroeconomic regime kept inflation at an average of fifteen percent and offered subsidised health and education services, which were crucial links in their livelihood. Although barefoot the offspring of Mandy and Kuda were at least well fed, healthy and being educated. The family hoped that the secondary education of the four sons would pay off in the form of gainful employment and assistance toward the education of their nieces and nephews. By decade end Wilson had found a temporary post as a primary school teacher and Richard was studying for an agricultural certificate.

By the end of the 1980s, despite the promise of their sons’ employment and the fact that the household had remained overall self-sufficient in grain, Mr and Mrs Shumba were worried. Their cattle herd had dwindled to just seven head. A few beasts went as lobola for the wives of their sons, a few were sold to the CSC but several because of disease and death. Lack of feed appeared to be the main problem which apart from droughts reflected a degraded grazing area. From inside and outside, people had settled there and cleared land for their fields, even along stream banks. Some said that ‘strangers’ had ‘bought their way in’ by illegally bribing traditional authorities or the VIDCO.

The 1990s
The Government launched the ESAP officially in 1991 to ‘improve living conditions, especially for the poorest groups’.\(^9\) In a liberalised market the savings gained from withdrawing subsidies on food items, farm inputs, education and health expenditure were expected to help finance a private investment surge. Households would benefit from increased employment opportunities and higher producer prices. The world of praxis, however, quickly belied the abstract policy model. Once the economy was deregulated, inflation accelerated; the value of wages and the currency fell; and employment opportunities contracted. Besides macroeconomic hostility two

other factors secured the Shumbas’ descent into abject poverty: the advent of more single mothers and environmental decay partly propelled by drought.

Tecla returned home in the early 1990s as a single mother with four children and Chipiwa followed her as a widowed destitute with five children. The youngest daughter Askina also became a single mother and she left her two children at home, as did Wilson with the daughter of his first marriage. And with the return of unemployed Manuel, his wife and two children, the two children of Mandy’s eldest daughter, Sarah (another single mother) and the wife of Andrew, Chipiwa’s second born, the population of the household suddenly increased from twelve to thirty-four. These extra numbers assured that the household had crossed the threshold when a large family becomes a burden rather than a labour bonus.\textsuperscript{10} Seven tonnes of maize plus the relish would be required annually just to feed everyone. And such assumes timely rain, the availability of cattle and sufficient possession of inputs - seeds, fertiliser and insecticides - without which production was not possible.

In any case the entire death of the Shumba cattle herd by the mid-1990s spelt doom. The droughts of 1991 and 1992 and again in 1994 and 1995 played a decisive role but prolonged dries have always been an accustomed feature. At a deeper level the death of all seven beasts from lack of feed and disease raised serious issues about environmental management and the appropriateness of an unbridled commercialism in a congested area. The loss of draught power for cropping, manure for the vegetable garden and nutrition from the milk was disastrous. The herds of most households were similarly decimated, which destroyed the chance of borrowing beasts from kin or hiring at a reasonable price. The hand-held hoe offered the only course, which meant a focus on maize production for subsistence, perhaps supplemented with a few bales of cotton.

In the deregulated economy however the hyper-inflation of basic necessities put subsistence out of reach. Fundamentally, as I have argued elsewhere\textsuperscript{11}, the source of inflation related to supply rather than demand; specifically, a profoundly concentrated and heavily import-dependent production base. The state macroeconomic regime had previously kept the menace in check through price, exchange and interest rate controls but once dismantled, whether propelled by rising import or debt-servicing costs, state cost recovery or ‘profit-push’, inflation took on a life of its own in a spiral of price reaction.

\textsuperscript{10} Iliffe, \textit{op cit}, p. 6, 273.
Year on Year Inflation of Basic Necessities, December 1996 – May 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>% change Dec96/Dec97</th>
<th>% change Dec97/Dec98</th>
<th>% change Oct98/Oct99</th>
<th>% change Dec99/Dec00</th>
<th>% change May00/May01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread and Cereals</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk, Cheese, Eggs</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits and Vegetables</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Food</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Clothing</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>61.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Medicines</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>122.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Medical Fees</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>46.0</td>
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<td>School Fees</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>66.1</td>
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<td>School uniforms</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
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<td>Public Transport</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>100.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent, Rates, Fuel and Power</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Office (Zimbabwe), Prices, various years.

Meanwhile, the Shumbas remained powerless—without the means to keep abreast. Mr Shumba’s wages were absorbed simply purchasing the nitty-gritty essentials. Without cattle or any other collateral the family could not obtain credit. In fact, Standard Chartered Bank closed the family account. And in an economy that created less employment than the numbers retrenched\textsuperscript{12} the hope

\textsuperscript{12} Over 1991-1995 employment creation amounted to 41,500 new jobs, which was one-third less than average formal job creation during the 1980s. Over the same period, 51,510 workers were
of gainful employment also faded. Only Richard and Elias managed to secure employment as a Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) extension officer and Anglican Church trainee pastor respectively. Yet, as average real wages fell by one-third between 1990 and 1997, the capacity of these two to send remittances deteriorated.

In contrast to the 1980s the educational and health prospects of the four sisters’ offspring diminished. None completed their secondary education due to a lack of cash. Likewise, they could not afford health care. Some managed to scrape a living from the ‘informal sector’ – a cul-de-sac of survival activities. Others joined Manual in registering for resettlement in hope that virgin soil would guarantee a better livelihood. Many of the younger children appeared gaunt. Kuda herself died in late 1999 most probably from malaria – she just grew weaker and weaker.

Although the CMB was privatised and other traders entered the market the Shumbas could not engage them because they were out of the production game. The impact of the ESAP formed an integral part of the family’s descent into poverty; the cost of living increased too suddenly while employment opportunities contracted. Other factors, of course, were at work in their downfall: land shortage, ineffective local governance and gender inequity. Yet, even so, as a development strategy, the ESAP offered little to halt the crisis of livelihoods. Life only became worse for unsupported mothers and their children while the exploitation of the environment accelerated. According to the Baobab kraalhead people came in droves looking for stands to help them escape poverty.

The strength of Mukanya kinship
To the heartland of the Zimbabwean plateau – Hwedza Communal Lands are situated south east of Harare, about half way to the Chimanimani Mountains on the Mozambican border. This is the territory of the mbire people who belong to the Svosve royal dynasty. In the valleys the soil is more fertile than in Sanyati but then, being high veld (above 1200 metres), cotton growing is not a cash

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option. Jesuit priests established a mission called St Mary’s which consists of a secondary school and hospital.

The Mukanya family originally hailed from Marondera to the north. The colonists had possessed the prime farming land there and pushed the people into a small communal area called Svosve. In the 1930s a proposed relocation caused a split in the chiefdom. The then Chief Svosve refused to move south to present-day Hwedza while about half the community left including the forebears of our Mukanya family. The Svosve chief ship was then rotated between the two communities until 1943 when the Government allowed the Hwedza community to have its own chief Svosve. Meanwhile Mukanya kin permeated the southern corner of the Hwedza communal area such that the village carried their namesake.

The move southward paid off. In June 1998 a group of Svosve villagers from the north made the front page of The Herald when they squatted on four Marondera large-scale commercial farms. In Hwedza, however, there seemed a greater contentment which partly stems from a tradition of strong village governance and land management, evident in tracts of forestland and permanent grazing areas. The source of good management has not come from the state but from the tight accountability inherent in kinship with an authoritative chiefship at the pinnacle.

From its inception agriculture in Mukanya village took on a subsistence character. Mr Mukanya obtained a building certificate in Marondera and his consequent employment on building sites all over the country served as the main source of family income. The casual nature of the work suited him as he could attend to farming during the agricultural season. The straddling of town and country was an effective way to support his family, which as the family tree indicates totalled nine children - three daughters and six sons - the first born in 1963 and the last in 1983.

The household managed about twenty head of cattle on well-maintained grazing land. Apart from endowed land quality the healthy commons reflected Chief Svosve’s defiance of the colonial administration’s plan to settle more people and his keenness to impose punishments on anyone who let stock transgress, cultivated a stream bank or cut down trees. ‘People were content during UDI’, Mr and Mrs Mukanya claimed. Minor cash needs could be met by selling to private traders; consumer prices were stable; and there seemed to

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14 See The Herald (Zimbabwe), 23/06/98, 28/06/98.
be wage employment for those who wanted it. St Mary’s Mission provided 
basic health care and although no secondary school yet existed a state primary 
school which all nine children attended offered a ‘high standard’ education. 
The slumber of the village soon changed, however, when the ‘freedom 
fighters’ paid a visit in the mid-1970s.

The 1980s
In the light of the Government’s commercial push and reforms to local 
governance the Svosve chief ship emerged strong enough to regulate the 
environmental impact of the former and incorporate the VIDCO within the 
overall kinship structure. In turn the strength of village governance paid off in 
the form of foreign NGO and Government interest to conduct environmental 
development projects, such as tree planting and tso tso stove campaigns.15 
Apart from mobilising villagers behind the projects Mrs Mukanya, as elected 
village representative on the VIDCO, along with Chief Svosve, kept a close 
eye over environmental transgressions.

The Mukanyas reduced their cattle herd from twenty to eight due to the natural 
expansion of village population and the allocation of stands to male heirs. To 
finance the secondary education of the first four children and relieve pressure 
on Mr Mukanya’s wages, the household focused on maize production. 
Sunflowers and groundnuts, although cash options, were too land extensive and 
labour intensive. Contrary to the 1980s norm the nearest GMB depot was 
beyond a ‘scotch cart ride’, located some forty kilometres away. St Mary’s 
Mission, however provided villagers with transport to ferry their maize to the 
depot. Like the Shumbas the Mukanyas found that producer prices declined 
over time.

Overall the 1980s was a comfortable decade, especially as the first two sons, 
Oliver and Doubt, secured permanent formal employment, which in turn 
improved the education and employment prospects of their siblings. Indeed, 
steady employment was crucial, as the basis of the household’s livelihood had 
not been from agriculture but from Mr Mukanya’s cash wages. On three 
hectares of land with limited labour and declining producer prices, household 
agriculture was best suited for subsistent food production. The efforts of village 
governing bodies to conserve the communal resource base would be a critical 
factor in the hard times ahead.

15 The tso tso is a slow combustion stove – the mass adoption of which would conserve wood fuel and 
reduce demand. Most households in the village, however, could not afford the building costs and the 
government did not fulfil its promise to provide the iron grills.
The 1990s
As elsewhere the ESAP greeted the village with rising inflation and shrinking employment opportunities. Mr Mukanya’s building contracts completely dried up, which forced the household into a main reliance on small farming. Yet, as Mr Mukanya was to discover, the impact of cost inflation discouraged a commercial orientation and only affirmed the subsis tent role of agriculture. A spiral of poverty threatened to engulf the family but the Mukanyas avoided the depth of the slump the Shumbas experienced. In terms of village environmental management and the marital and employment success of their daughters and sons, the Mukanyas were more fortunate.

The decisive blow to a commercial agricultural orientation came immediately after the ESAP commenced: St Mary’s Mission cancelled its transport services due to ‘unsustainable cost pressure’. Being quite isolated from the GMB depot, the action exposed villagers to the exploitation of transport and private traders. As it was, however, the drought of 1991–1992 put production completely on hold. Several of the village wells ran dry and the Mukanyas lost three beasts, which reduced their herd to five head. Without the Government’s drought relief scheme, people would have starved. The VIDCO administered the drought relief and in 1993 launched an Under Five-Feeding Project, which consisted of a vegetable garden and crèche.

The liberalisation of agricultural markets was supposed to bring financial benefits through greater competition. The family embarked upon the 1992–1993 season in the hope of a recovery in both maize and cash supplies. Like others the Mukanyas negotiated with the private traders. Yet the prices offered - in the range of Z$220.00 to $300.00 per tonne of maize - barely covered the cost of production. The amount of fertiliser required to produce that tonne, that is about five 50 kg bags, cost about $250.00 alone. The GMB offered $550.00 per tonne but the problem, as mentioned, remained transport. In the end Mr Mukanya begrudgingly sold to the traders and thought ‘never again’.
Meanwhile with the last six children still at home, the family endeavoured to keep abreast of accelerating secondary education and health costs. Fortunately the two employed sons, Oliver and Doubt, accommodated and sponsored the education of Raphael and Stephen respectively. Doubt even found Raphael
employment at a Mutare packaging factory. After completing ‘O’ levels, the two daughters, Dinah and Keddy, married into other households. The same forces of patriarchy that gave women relatively less choice over their lives were at work on both the Shumba and Mukanya daughters. The coincidental but critical difference was that the latter struck better fortune with the men they married. In harsh economic calculus their departure relieved financial pressure and to an extent replenished household savings through lobola. Only the last two sons, Alban and Godfrey, were left on the parents’ hands and even then, lest he sell one or two beasts, Mr Mukanya was forced to ask his sons to help out with their education.

As with most, the livelihood of the Mukanya household under the ESAP deteriorated into a hand to mouth existence. Inflation and reduced employment opportunity eroded the household income base while cash cropping offered no viable recourse. Yet poverty in Hwedza did not reach the proportions of malnutrition, disease and death as was the case in Sanyati. The fact that the Mukanya household retained five head of cattle through a terrible drought attests to a capacity for sustainable subsistence, thanks to the strong chiefship of Svosve and an effective VIDCO. Oliver and Doubt recently received a stand of two hectares each in the village and the prospect of resettlement did not entice them. Nor did it the women’s group who maintained the Under Five-Feeding Project – ‘life is best in Hwedza’, they said.

Conclusion
The advent of increased macroeconomic hostility in the 1990s immediately heightened the exposure of household livelihood to factors of family-specific fortune and the condition of the local natural resource base. Between the households of Shumba and Mukanya material fortune seems to be ‘blind’ or at least, ‘fickle’, when it comes to the marital status of daughters and employment remittances. For reasons unknown to the author these critical factors favoured the Mukanyas and conspired against the Shumbas. Perhaps what is more under the control of a household, particularly as part of a broader community, is how effective village institutions are in managing the demographic and environmental pressures courted under colonial land distribution. If, for example, the local authorities in Sanyati had resisted more the influx of settlers; encouraged a stronger subsistence orientation; and better maintained the commons, then, despite all, the Shumbas may have retained a few beasts to pull a plough and their poverty descent may not have reached such depths.

Under a given macroeconomic regime and associated performance, across geographical regions and Communal Areas, the foregoing determinants of
livelihood can apply to other households. In combination with ‘variant fortune’ over marital and employment success, family livelihood fates under the ESAP tended to be severest in places where village institutions were weak and the depletion of the community’s land resource base had been great. The Shumbas were not alone. Between 1991 and 1996 households below the food poverty line unable to properly feed themselves more than doubled from 16.7% to 35.7%.16 While much can be said about the suitability of a commercial vis-à-vis a subsistence orientation in Communal Areas, some implications can also be drawn on the causes of Zimbabwe’s turmoil over the land question. Without any notion of destroying what many commentators regard as the basis of a ‘prosperous’ economy, the temptation to squat on the relatively lush, mostly white-owned farms seemed to be too great for many ‘hungry’ communal dwellers to resist.

The Empowerment of Women in Museveni’s Uganda: Who Benefits?

William Muhumuza*

Introduction

Gender discrimination in Africa has not only attracted world-wide attention but has also stimulated policy efforts to ensure greater gender equity at the local, national and international levels. In Uganda the general objective of the gender policy strategy introduced in 1987 by the NRM regime which is the subject of this paper was to empower women and in doing so to bring about equitable and sustainable development.¹ Women had made a substantial physical and material contribution to the National Resistance Army/National Resistance Movement’s (NRA/NRM) success in the civil war of 1981-1986.² Now they became an indispensable force in Uganda’s politics which could not be ignored. The paper finds that this policy strategy has been double edged. In empowering women the NRM regime was also seeking to use the women constituency for legitimacy reasons: given that the NRM had forcefully taken over state power it now sought to expand its power base. The paper analyses NRM empowerment policies from this dual perspective. It concludes that while top-down reforms are theoretically beneficial to all Ugandan women, elite women have in practice benefited more than ordinary women and looks at the implications of these policies for the future of women’s empowerment in Uganda.

Empowerment can be defined as the process of challenging existing power relations and of gaining greater control over the sources of power. It is

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manifested in a redistribution of power between class, race, gender or individuals.\(^3\) It is about giving power to marginalised individuals or groups.\(^4\) It can also be defined in terms of the ability of individuals, community associations, interest groups and other organisations to participate in and influence the decisions that affect their lives, as well as the creation of an environment that facilitates such outcomes. It involves increasing the authority and control of the people themselves over the resources and decisions that affect their lives.\(^5\) Put differently empowering people, including women, means expanding their asset base as well as capabilities to participate in, negotiate with, and influence both formal and informal institutions that affect their lives.\(^6\) Empowering women therefore means *inter alia* protecting women under the law, their access to education and economic opportunities as well as access to property rights.\(^7\)

While the pertinent question of what is required to empower women can be easily answered the real challenge is to ensure that such empowerment is durable. In Uganda the debate on the appropriate strategy has been characterised by a dichotomy. One perspective of Ugandan women activists (moderates) subscribes to the view that women can be empowered through top-down government reforms (affirmative action policies) such as those undertaken by the NRM regime which change the relationship between the state and women as well as their organisations. The other perspective is that of radical women activists who argue that a realistic and durable empowerment of women can only be achieved through the formation of an autonomous women’s movement. Their argument, premised on the fear that state-driven empowerment for women may compromise their cause, is that the regime will use their women’s movement as an instrument to pursue political objectives that may jeopardise their future. Their other suspicion is that the regime may attempt to politicise and consequently divide and disorganise the women’s movement; fears not necessarily unfounded given the Uganda women’s movement’s past experiences with earlier regime changes.\(^8\)

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6. Ibid.


African women and empowerment struggles
The notion of empowerment was popularised by third world feminists in their struggle to address the issue of gender differences that exist in the control and distribution of resources. African feminists in particular and Third world feminists more generally have been influenced by socialist and liberal rather than radical feminism. The strength of socialist feminism lies in the fact that it is a synthesis of Marxist feminism’s economic oppression and radical feminism’s gender oppression. Whereas African feminists are critical of liberal feminism’s individualistic approach and its view of society as an open market where rewards are a result of free competition, they subscribe to its notion of equal opportunity and equal rights for women. The main problem with the liberal feminist perspective is that it is opposed to interest-defined groups and emphasises individualism. Yet, as Tamale argues, such thinking is not only incompatible with African societies where democratic philosophy is underpinned by the notion of plurality but also inconsistent with the principle that lies behind affirmative action. A further difficulty with this perspective is the tendency to treat all women as having the same problems irrespective of other structural differences and so to a bias towards relatively privileged middle class women.

Radical, marxist and socialist feminism largely attribute women’s subordination to structural constraints. Through the 1970s and 1980s they opposed the Women in Development (WID) approach of most international development agencies and national governments which assumed that gender inequality could be remedied by integrating women into ‘mainstream’ development and which as a result was largely abandoned. Their major criticism of ‘integration’ was its failure to differentiate between what women require in order to fulfil their roles and tasks and what they require in order to overcome their subordination; and the absence of women’s perspectives in planning and policy-making which perpetuated their marginalisation.

17 See Anita Anand, ‘Rethinking Women and Development’ and Karl Marilee, ‘Women and Rural
Today they contend that empowerment should instead involve building an infrastructure in which women can have control over their lives. Hence the need to transform the structures of subordination through changes in law, property rights, and other institutions that reinforce and perpetuate male domination.

The marginalisation of women in Ugandan society
African women’s struggles against discrimination in Uganda cannot be analysed in isolation from other women struggles elsewhere. Indeed there are clear linkages between the global women’s movement against discrimination and African women’s efforts to achieve empowerment. It is also important to recognise the existence in Uganda of the many autonomous small, multi-purpose and voluntary women organisations, some with a long history, at the grassroots level. While such autonomous women’s organisations in the past reflected and served vital interests of rural women they nonetheless were unable to influence policies at the national level and had a negligible impact on the empowerment of women.

Contemporary gender discrimination in Uganda thus has to be situated in its historical setting but especially in the colonial period when colonial economic relations transformed the traditional division of labour as well as gender power relations. Colonialism brought with it Western conceptions of gender relations and responsibilities at a time when these allowed only the most restricted public role for women. A combination of ‘Western’ conceptions of the proper role of women and the organisation of family life, as well as the creation of colonial economies tied to the international capitalist economy substantially subordinated women in Africa in new ways. Gender discrimination can also be attributed to the negative attitudes concerning the status of women exported to Africa including by Western and Islamic religious heritages. The debate on the Domestic Relations Bill of

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19 S. Batliwala, Op cit.
1997 for example showed that women’s rights are infringed today by religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{23}

Uganda today is an agrarian economy the backbone of which are the peasants. Women contribute seventy percent of the agriculture labour force and produce over eighty percent of the food\textsuperscript{24} in a country where they constitute fifty-one percent of the population of which 88.7 percent live in rural areas.\textsuperscript{25} Despite their contribution to Uganda’s economy only seven percent own land and only thirty percent have access to and control over their production.\textsuperscript{26}

Unequal gender relations leading to gender imbalances in access to and control over resources can be explained in large part by the patriarchal nature of Ugandan society.\textsuperscript{27} Decision-making in Uganda is male-dominated even though women shoulder reproductive, productive and community management responsibilities, many of which are neither remunerated nor reflected in national statistics. Women’s productivity is further hampered by inadequate access to credit, a general lack of skills and appropriate technology due to high levels of illiteracy, poverty and inadequate flow of and access to information.\textsuperscript{28} Few women access loans from formal financial institutions because they lack collateral security. A survey of women’s participation in the Rural Farmers Scheme of Uganda Commercial Bank revealed that for the period 1987-1991 of the 27,233 women who applied for assistance as individuals 5,117 only were assisted; and of the 1,616 women who applied in groups, only 355 women groups were assisted. Also, of the mixed groups consisting of fifty percent women, the bank assisted only 727 groups out of 2,116 that applied.\textsuperscript{29} These figures confirm that women who constitute the majority population of Uganda are marginalised.

The condition of Ugandan women is further aggravated by high illiteracy rates throughout the country with forty percent of women illiterate as

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\textsuperscript{23} See \textit{The Monitor}, March 29 and April 7, 1999. Also S. Batliwala, \textit{Op cit}.


\textsuperscript{26} Aili Mari Tripp, \textit{Op cit}, pp. 101-128.


\textsuperscript{28} The Republic of Uganda (1997), \textit{Op cit}.

compared to sixteen percent of men.\textsuperscript{30} The problem is compounded by the low educational enrolment of females at all levels with female school enrolments as a percentage of total enrolment averaging at forty-nine percent with forty-four percent at the primary and secondary school level respectively and thirty-five percent at the tertiary level.\textsuperscript{31} Similarly the dropout rate has been higher among girls than boys\textsuperscript{32} and is further reinforced by household poverty which in some cases forces parents to make choices when they prefer to educate boys rather than girls.

The NRM and affirmative action: political representation and economic empowerment

NRM policy to uplift the status of Ugandan women has recognised women’s rights and powers legally and politically and entrenched them in the national constitution and also put in place institutional mechanisms to redress existing gender imbalances. The legal guarantees on gender balance and fair representation of women are provided for under the national objectives and directive principles of state policy, namely VI, XV, XIX and Articles 21, 31, 32, 33, 36, 40, 44, 78, 180.\textsuperscript{33} They protect women in the areas of equal rights, marriage, dignity; reserve thirty percent of the membership at each local government council for women; and prohibit retrogressive laws, cultures and customs.

Women have also been elevated to influential government positions in top decision-making organs and given a platform to organise and air their views. This began in 1987 with the creation of the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development and was followed by the special representation of women in the National Resistance Council (NRC) (National Assembly) in 1989. Whereas men openly contested seats at the county level, women were indirectly elected through electoral colleges at the district level. The fact that Uganda had thirty-nine districts automatically resulted in thirty-nine women legislators in the then NRC, an act that became a landmark in the history and


politics of Uganda. This was a reversal of the previous practices that politically marginalised women as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Apart from the mandatory provision that women constitute thirty percent of the local councils in both the 1995 Constitution and Local Governments Act of 1997, women also achieved a range of other concessions including the creation of the Department of Women Studies at Makerere University in 1992 and the provision of a bonus of 1.5 points to all girls joining Makerere University.

**Table 1: The Chronological Representation in Uganda’s Legislatures by Numbers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Legislature</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of Women Legislators</th>
<th>Total no. of Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
<td>1955-58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>1962-66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>1966-71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Council</td>
<td>1971-79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Council</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>1980-85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM Historicals</td>
<td>1986-89</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resistance Council</td>
<td>1989-94</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>1996-2001</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled from Research Findings on Uganda’s Parliamentary Representation 1955-2001. The ‘Historicals’ are the original small group under Museveni’s leadership who went to the bush in 1981.

The NRM regime has also attempted to empower women economically in a number of ways. Credit has been extended to women through state-managed credit programmes such as *Entandikwa* Credit Scheme (ECS), Poverty Alleviation Project (PAP), and the Programme to Alleviate Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA). *Entandikwa* refers to ‘start-up capital or seed money’ set up by government to assist vulnerable groups to engage in productive economic activities and consequently improve their welfare. The
1995 ECS operation guidelines\textsuperscript{34} stipulate that women and youth be allocated thirty percent of the fund. These government efforts have been supplemented by national and international NGOs such as the Agency for Co-operation in Research and Development (ACORD), Action for Development (ACFODE), Feed the Children-Uganda (FTCU), Uganda Women’s Finance and Credit Trust (UWFCT) and Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) which also sponsor women projects and extend seed money for micro-enterprises.

Assessing NRM’s women’s empowerment process
While the NRM initiative to empower women should be recognised and applauded it has not been accepted uncritically in Uganda. The assignment of quotas to women in local councils which was intended to mobilise women for grassroots development for example has increasingly been viewed as an NRM strategy for its own political consolidation. Nor has the economic support outlined above made a significant impact. Empirical findings from a study on four NGOs that target credit at women in Uganda (ACORD, ISSIA, Feed the Children, World Vision) show that credit has had no significant impact on the welfare of women generally and has made others highly indebted as a result of the stringent terms attached to loans and the small size of the loans themselves most of which are equivalent to US$28.\textsuperscript{35}

Whereas the constitutional guarantee of a quota for women’s political representation is important some radical women activists doubt whether the mere placing of women in positions of leadership is tantamount to affirmative action.\textsuperscript{36} The gist of this scepticism is that this approach promotes already privileged middle class women who have the required qualifications, money, exposure and influence to vie for such positions. The current legal provisions have made it very difficult for those without education to vie for election to higher offices.\textsuperscript{37} Yet, the Local Governments Act, 1997 (Article


\textsuperscript{37} For instance, Parliament had actually resolved that one had to possess minimum qualification of an Advanced level certificate or the equivalent to vie for district chairmanship and for Parliament. Similarly, an Ordinary level certificate was being prescribed as a minimum requirement for the chairmanship of a Sub-county. President Museveni refused his assent to this bill, one reason given being that the minimum educational qualification would put women at a disadvantage since many of them are less educated than their male counterparts, and it was returned to parliament. The President’s
80, clause 2(b) reserved one-third of the positions of each local government council. are reserved. This scenario suggests that more women in leadership positions does not necessarily elevate the status of the majority of women. It can be compared with liberal feminism’s ‘add-women-on and stir’ concept that does not question the origins and differences in inequality between women and men, and amongst women themselves, and ends up benefiting upper-middle class women.

Experience has shown in addition that the presence of women representatives in top leadership positions, however many they are, is no guarantee that they will voice the views of their electorate or at least fight for their cause. Some women legislators in Uganda are considered to have failed to use parliament as a platform for mobilising and organising grassroots women and in some cases charged with using it instead to serve their selfish interests. Women legislators who are elected on a gender ticket appear all too often once they are in parliament to organise on the basis of class, ethnic and political affiliations as opposed to women’s interests. The process of empowerment needs therefore to go beyond mere numbers of women in top decision-making positions and to mobilise the majority of ordinary women in the task of identifying their own needs and appropriate assistance.

The fact that women in Uganda constitute a heterogeneous group, in terms of class, religion, ethnicity, age and political cleavages undermines the possibility of unifying under shared interests since it appears very difficult for those women leaders elevated by the NRM’s affirmative action to reconcile their conflicting loyalties. While genuinely devoted to the women’s struggle they appear to be constrained in taking action that would antagonise the system that propelled them to the top. In addition, the NRM expects women leaders to mobilise fellow women to support the regime without any conditions. Tamale observes that Uganda’s affirmative action has proved to be class-centric largely benefiting a minority of an educated elite group of Ugandan women and concludes that the policy perpetuates elitism and the marginalisation of the rural women masses at the grassroots.

reservations were stated in his letter referenced PO/32 and dated 18th February 1997 rejecting the Bill that prescribed educational qualifications.
39 See ‘Elections and Dead Women – All is not Lost’, The Monitor, May 22-24, 1996.
From this perspective the policy decisions granting 1.5 points bonus to all female entrants entering the University and the creation of the Department of Women Studies at Makerere to produce the manpower needed to incorporate gender issues in socio-economic development planning are worth looking at more closely. While women’s enrolment at the university increased to forty percent, the policy remained elitist in so far as it benefits a few privileged young women at a time of increasing poverty levels for most rural people.\textsuperscript{41} A broader impact required a holistic educational approach that extended the policy to the other education levels as well. Moreover had the overall policy addressed the underlying structural factors that continue to hamper women’s economic advancement then there would be no need for the government to intervene at that level. Assuming that the policy-makers had solicited the views of the ordinary women, there is a high possibility that the issue of giving bonus marks to the girls entering the University may not have arisen as their immediate and pressing need.

While institutional reforms pursued by the NRM regime such as legal and political empowerment may provide a supportive environment for promoting gender equality, there appears to be a contradiction between government policy and practice while the gap between policy and its implementation remains the main obstacle to genuine reforms in places long accustomed to practices of female inequality.\textsuperscript{42} Given women’s low literacy levels in Uganda,\textsuperscript{43} it would be fantasising to expect them to take advantage of legal opportunities particularly when they conflict with custom. The lack of awareness about their rights among women which is pervasive despite the fact that there exist laws to protect them denies them an opportunity to know their legal rights.\textsuperscript{44} A case in point is the Inheritance and Succession Act in Uganda as amended by Decree 22 of 1972 which guarantees a wife fifteen percent of the share in a husband’s estate as well as a right of occupancy to the matrimonial home until she remarries or dies. Lack of awareness of this law by relatives of the deceased has meant nevertheless that there has been little reduction in the widespread cases of eviction and the grabbing of property.

Similarly a relevant law exists regarding the criminal aspects of domestic violence against women for which women do not yet take appropriate action

\textsuperscript{43} See Kikampikaho and Kwesiga, \textit{Op cit}, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{The Monitor}, November 13-15, 1999.
because the culprits are relatives or bread-winners and because of the cultural and economic dependence of women on their husbands. Women’s precarious position is also exacerbated by the Ugandan law enforcement procedures which are long, tedious and expensive. It would be expecting too much from women constrained by high illiteracy rates, heavy workload and poverty to pursue legal actions against offenders who are close to them and upon whom they depend for survival. The government indeed conceded this policy flaw and accepted that most women are not aware of their legal rights, and that where customary law conflicts with statutory laws, women tend to be highly disadvantaged. It has also argued that women’s low status, high illiteracy levels and heavy workload tends to make them discouraged by the law enforcement procedures which are long and tedious. The Ministry of Gender’s legal division also took positive steps in the mid-late 1990s to overcome this problem by translating simple booklets on the laws governing marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child ownership into local vernaculars. Their distribution has however remained limited especially in the countryside. Alternatively, mobilisation campaigns of women to explain the law could make a difference as exemplified by the role of ACFODE in the mid-late 1990s. While attempts have been made on radio, newspapers, seminars, conferences and the television to explain the law, they have not however been persistent. Many of the women’s NGOs involved in this exercise depend on donor funds while the relevant government departments are poorly funded.

The NRM’s economic empowerment strategy has also suffered from weaknesses. While the women’s NGOs set up to assist women in areas of credit, legal aid and general empowerment have initiated good programmes these have not translated successfully into tangible benefits for the many women in the countryside. Although the stated aims of such projects and programmes are the empowerment of rural women the NGOs’ preconceived programmes may not always reflect the local conditions and priorities of the intended beneficiaries while the grassroots women end up being excluded from design level to evaluation phase. Many of the NGOs’ activities have been urban biased. For instance, out of the seventeen districts in which the documentation of NGOs was carried out Kampala City alone accounted for


46 Refer to the Government Statement on Women in Uganda Prepared by Women’s Programme Department, Ministry of Gender and Economic Development as an input for the President’s Speech on Women’s Day, 8th March 1996, Kampala.
sixty out of a total of 122 NGOs raising questions as to whether or not urban-based and formal NGOs are basically elite institutions with limited and/or no linkages with the majority of rural women. Some of them were formed to take advantage of the political spaces created by the NRM regime and it can also be argued that they are established by shrewd elite women as a means of accessing donor funds. Many such NGOs would fit into the category which Dicklitch described as ‘briefcase’ NGOs. Economic empowerment has also largely benefited the urban-based middle class elite women who dominate the management of formal women’s projects and programmes while some national-level women NGOs and their leadership have been turned into bureaucratic elite clubs which do not necessarily represent the interests of rural women. Above all grassroots women do not own these programmes.

The result has been not only the persistence of pre-NRM local-level women organisations or community-based organisations (CBOs) in rural areas but a proliferation of newly created ones which are independently owned by the rural women themselves. Such CBOs include rotating savings clubs, community development associations, digging and burial societies as well as lending clubs. These are genuine local women’s groups because of their operational simplicity and suitability to the local circumstances and needs. Their informality renders them more appropriate than the formal-legal ones in urban areas to serve the needs of the rural women. Some of them arose earlier to fill gaps created by the collapse of the state and the subsequent effects of SAPs. Rural women fiercely defend the independence of the CBOs and often deliberately keep them small, invisible and unregistered to make sure that sophisticated elite women do not infiltrate them. They also fear to lose control over them to government authority. Although the rural-urban dichotomy reflects the socio-economic and socio-cultural differences among women, formal NGOs need to be sensitive to the needs of rural-based women. It is only when these formal NGOs transform their approach to a participatory one that they will be relevant and embraced by grassroots women.

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49 Tamale, Op cit.
51 Tripp, Op cit.
The women’s movement and the state
The NRM regime’s initiative to empower women has also to be seen in the context of its tendency to view the women’s movement, as did predecessor regimes, as an appendage of the state.\textsuperscript{52} In 1978 President Amin through Article 4 of the Military Decree created the National Council of Women (NCW). Although Amin’s regime along with other developing countries was required by the 1975 conference setting up the UN Decade for Women to set up national women’s councils the regime had identified women’s organisations as vital instruments to access women for purposes of political control.\textsuperscript{53} The state controlled the council rigidly and no women’s organisation was allowed to operate outside the council framework.\textsuperscript{54} Amin’s regime also restricted the freedoms and activities of women who were to be guided by Moslem principles.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly the second Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) regime under former President Obote also deliberately controlled and weakened the National Council of Women. The Obote regime was also suspicious of the powers of mobilised women and deliberately wanted to use women organisations for political purposes. The government through the UPC women’s wing politically interfered with the women’s council to the extent that the UPC women wing could overrule the council’s decisions.\textsuperscript{56} Past experiences thus suggest a tendency for regimes to fear women’s organisations that are outside state control. Nor is the Ugandan experience in this respect isolated there being similarities with many other African countries such as Tanzania, Ghana and Zambia.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly the NRM regime’s relationship with the National Association of Women’s Organisations in Uganda (NAWOU) seems to repeat the practices of the 1970s and 1980s when they attempt to manipulate and control the Association within the NRM political framework; leading the radical section of women activists to argue that women’s autonomy would be better preserved from political manipulation and co-optation if women’s


\textsuperscript{53} Tadria, \textit{Op cit}, pp. 79-90.


\textsuperscript{56} Tadria, \textit{Op cit}.

organisations were left to operate independently. The consequence of state co-optation is that women’s empowerment is sacrificed for regime interests.

Although elite women leaders have tried to mobilise women their activities are concentrated in urban areas and less linked to rural areas.\textsuperscript{58} While factors such as inadequate funding could be responsible for this there appears to be a lack of effective co-ordination and strong linkages between the national machinery, grassroots organisations and other civil society organisations. There is also a lack of transparency at the top since grassroots women are kept out of the activities of the women’s council. The lack of transparency and selfishness of elite women at the top came to the limelight in 1995 during the Beijing preparatory process. Whereas the in-country preparation of reports was supposed to get inputs through a participatory process, the reverse was the case. According to Winnie Byanyima, a leading woman activist and former chairperson of the Women’s Caucus in the 1995 Constituent Assembly, the majority ordinary women were neither informed about nor involved in discussing issues related to the Beijing conference.\textsuperscript{59} The women’s delegation to Beijing was also dominated by a handful of elite women at the national level (women’s organisations in Kampala, government bureaucrats, and politicians). This golden opportunity was squandered and the interests of a few middle-class elite women were substituted for those of the majority ordinary women.

\textbf{Conclusion}

While it is important to recognise that Ugandan women’s efforts to mobilise and organise in groups began as early as 1946\textsuperscript{60} it can still be argued that the NRM regime has not only provided a conducive environment but also put in place progressive policies\textsuperscript{61} to empower women. The NRM regime recognised that Uganda’s women were marginalised because of structural impediments such as cultural, religious practices as well as in economic, legal and political institutions and proceeded to empower them using the top-down policy process. The regime also understood that a timely intervention would win over the women’s constituency and therefore guarantee the NRM a secure political support base. Therefore the overriding interests of regime consideration cannot be ruled out as part of the NRM’s women’s

\textsuperscript{59} Winnie Byanyima,‘Thoughts from a Woman in Beijing,’ \textit{The Monitor}, Monday, September 11-13, 1995, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{61} Refer to The Republic of Uganda (1997), \textit{Op cit}.
Uganda’s current empowerment policy heavily relies on the benevolence and good will of the NRM regime. The problem with this policy perspective is that it can be easily reversed in the event of a change of political attitude or regime.

While the creation of institutional space for the pursuit of women’s interests was a step in the right direction it is one thing to have state sponsored institutional mechanisms in place and another to ensure that they benefit all women. Today the majority of women in rural areas remain behind in the empowerment process. Their involvement and influence in the decision-making process both at the household and public level is still constrained by retrogressive cultures and religion, illiteracy and poverty. Some of the key factors that facilitate the organisation of women include easy access to education, information, good laws and resources to ensure the presence of well-informed and organised women at that level. While appreciating the concerns of radical Ugandan women activists we remain sceptical about the ability and capacity of autonomous channels to empower women in Uganda in the absence or insufficiency of such strategic needs at the grassroots level.

While we recognise the positive contribution of elite women to the cause of women’s empowerment in areas such as agitating for the political representation of women, special consideration for females entering tertiary institutions and legal reform which are no mean achievements they are yet to be taken advantage of by the grassroots women. The underlying structural factors that disadvantage poor women have not been concretely addressed by current policy which needs to be supplemented with policy innovations that directly target grassroots women. In other words these innovations need to focus on programmes that mobilise and educate grassroots women on how to take advantage of available opportunities and to create more economic opportunities for themselves. This latter area is one where government has been less enthusiastic as its lukewarm handling of the two women-friendly Bills (the Domestic Relations Bill, 1997 and the Land Bill, 1998) which remain unresolved have shown. While these two Bills aim at redressing household gender inequalities the sluggish nature with which they have been handled by the government has raised serious concerns among women.

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There is also a need to integrate the activities of the urban-based middle class elite women more with those of the grassroots women and so strengthen the Ugandan women’s movement in relation to the state. To follow the suggestion of Made that urban-based women struggles need to be linked with those of the majority of Africa’s ordinary women who still live in rural areas a truly representative women’s movement must take the initiative to remove the rural-urban dichotomy. Finally as Winnie Byanyima has observed women need to appreciate that:

[t]here is a need to mobilise men to make the ‘women’s cause’ a shared cause. It is through the mainstream, and not in isolation that we can prove that the advancement of women is not a zero-sum game where men must lose out.

The bottom-up strategies of women’s organisations are still deficient in Uganda because of underlying socio-economic and cultural constraints as well as the existing gap between grassroots women and the middle class elite women. Pragmatic women’s empowerment in contemporary Uganda requires a cross-fertilisation of top-down interventions and bottom-up strategies. This requires neatly linked State policies directed towards building the capacity of women’s organisations at both the grassroots and national levels to operate independently of the state and in a sustainable disposition. The state also needs to guard against such programmes being hijacked by middle-class women elites.

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65 *Ibid*.
Towards the Rebirth of African Universities

Lalage Bown


‘The entire continent remains at risk until the African university, in the context of a continental reawakening, rejoins its soul’.
President Thabo Mbeki, ACU distinguished lecture, November 2004.

Mbeki’s rallying cry signals a recent very great change in the attitude to African universities of both national and international policy-makers.

The last decades of the twentieth century saw African universities marginalised and desperately battered, economically and politically. The World Bank in the 1970s questioned the need for universities, provoking an angry retort from Prof. Walter Kamba, then Vice Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, that without universities ‘We would remain colonies for all time’. National politicians in the ‘80s and ‘90s, prompted by the imperative of Education for All (EFA), developed an either/or mindset; either resources were devoted to expanding primary education or they were applied to higher education. Very few were able to see the education system as a whole, with interlocking parts, so that primary education of any quality required tertiary agencies to train the teachers, monitor performance and develop appropriate curricula.

Arguably, the general lack of interest in these and other roles of universities was a result of the ingenuous faith of multi-lateral and national aid agencies
that one size could fit all and that (especially in an era of globalisation) international experts could be enlisted to provide the services to schools in Africa which elsewhere would be supplied by indigenous institutions. To see how absurd that is and how right Walter Kamba was, one only has to imagine the government of Australia relying on ‘experts’ from Britain to shape the whole school system, setting criteria for quality and determining appropriate management, or perhaps ‘experts’ from China who had limited acquaintance with the language and culture of Australia’s peoples and who didn’t understand the way in which its government worked.

Other factors which I shall come to later were also responsible for the disastrous decline of African universities in the late twentieth century. However, it is important to mention the fallacies about higher education in Africa which were fashionable – that is, the detachability of universities from the rest of education and the possibility of substituting or buying in foreign expertise – in order to see how profoundly different the new viewpoints about education are, viewpoints which are heralded by the major World Bank publication, *Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise* (2000) and symptomatised by the books under review. The discourse of these texts is not the same as that of President Mbeki, but they share the conviction that Africa’s future is bound up with the success of its universities and there is common talk of ‘regeneration’ and ‘renewal’. Many of us may have doubts about prescriptions for renewal and the dangers of an overly instrumentalist approach, but we must not lose sight of a general convergence on the desirability of that renewal.

Before directly addressing the three case-studies sponsored and published by the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, a longer historical perspective is helpful. Universities, as institutions of learning, comprise a very ancient human phenomenon and have developed over time in various cultures in Asia and Europe. The oldest such institutions with a continuing existence to the present, however, are in Africa – the Quairouine University of Fez in Morocco (founded AD 859) and the University of Al Azhar in Cairo (AD 970). As the public orator declaimed at the inauguration of University College, Ibadan, in 1948: ‘When the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome had become memories in Europe, the tradition of learning was alive on the banks of the Niger’.

North African Islamic tradition of scholarship had a profound influence on the universities of medieval Europe in medicine and sciences and was sufficiently internationalist that as late as the nineteenth century, a German traveller came
across an old man in what is now Northern Nigeria who was familiar with the philosophy of Aristotle.

In more recent times, the first universities of the Christian tradition appeared in Sierra Leone and South Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Government inspired colleges were founded in British-ruled countries in the early twentieth century – Gordon College, Sudan, Makerere College, Uganda, Yaba Higher College, Nigeria. This thumbnail sketch reminds us that universities in Africa have their own history and are not just recent implants. If there is to be renewal, the universities of Africa have the chance of inspiration from a rich indigenous past as well as a choice of styles from Europe and elsewhere.

Issues of inspiration, choice of model and indigenisation of curricula were properly debated in the middle of the twentieth century when new foundations were established at the end of the colonial era. Nationalism and relative affluence gave new universities in West and East Africa a high status in their countries and the opportunity for a good deal of experiment in fields such as cultural studies, history and medical research. The institutional pattern in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century is largely as it was laid down at the end of the colonial era. The key universities are, however poorly, the recipients of some government funding and are seen by governments as instruments of policy in achievement of major economic goals. A new feature on the higher education landscape has been the recent arrival of private universities, but the numbers of students they attract are few compared to the publicly funded ones. In the small countries there may only be one national university, expected to fulfil all purposes. (The situation in South Africa is sui generis – several well-resourced institutions, traditionally for whites and more meagrely-resourced ones, traditionally for non-whites; now the challenge is to reframe them all as part of a single higher education system).

While the present pattern was largely laid down in the ‘60s, the context and basic consensus at that time were rather different. The World Bank and international donors, including the great American Foundations, invested heavily in universities in Africa, seeing them as the producers of leaders for the ‘new’ nations of Africa and relating them to social and economic development within a broad vision of scholarship and learning. Thus, Africa was affected by the concepts of universities prevalent internationally at the time – as agents of nation-building and diffusion of ideas.
The hiatus of the 1980s and ‘90s, when policy-makers withdrew their interest from higher education, was actually quite short but it has had indelible effects. The institutional frameworks have indeed been little changed, but the nature of African universities has in many ways shifted. The combination of the need to take in ever more students, together with the decline in resources, has rendered the preoccupation of university governors and individual staff and students one of survival. The need is to find what pays and put it to the best use – a far cry from the kind of questions asked at the last Association of Commonwealth Universities Congress held in Perth, Australia in 1988, when the theme was *What Can We Do For Our Countries?*

Against this background, the three case-studies here provide a helpful picture of what is happening now.

The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa includes four major US foundations, three of whom have had an honourable track record of assistance to African higher education in the past and who now clearly, in the new mood, wish to re-engage. They say that the Partnership began as ‘an affirmation of the ability of African universities to transform themselves and promote national development’. They hold ‘a common belief on the future of African universities’ and have commissioned a series of studies to promote wider recognition of the importance of universities to Africa in the hope that they will ‘support the movement for university reform’. Perhaps their underlying agenda is in that word ‘reform’, expressing the present-day passion for new planning systems, new techniques of financial management and new practices of governance.

All three of these texts conform to that basic agenda and are short and factual. The Mozambique study is about the country’s higher education system, while those about Uganda and Tanzania are each focused on a single institution (thus the Tanzania book is mis-titled). The commissioning foundations have learnt from the past, so that all three have some African authorship. Perhaps it is not accidental that the Makerere book, which is entirely authored by African academics, shows most understanding of the inherited predicament and, while adhering to the pattern of objective retailing of facts, allows some intimation of drama and occasionally a sardonic comment. The impact of impoverishment in the ‘80s which had Makerere ‘teetering on its last legs’ at the beginning of the 1990s is graphically described: ‘poor facilities, limited access to publishing facilities, a limited research data base, low output and the absence of a research culture’. There was also a ‘lack of appreciation of the importance of research, lack of skills to undertake research, lack of experience in research, low priority
given to research…’ (pp. 150-2). Later the authors say in a sardonic tone: ‘Given the importance of students to the existence of the university, it is remarkable how little attention has been paid to their welfare, compared with that devoted to their capacity to provide the university with an income’.

That said, all three books are well-written and well-researched, with useful data and statistics which would not otherwise be available. The authors of all the studies are well aware of the major challenges of access including an imbalance in the gender of students in some subjects and in Mozambique across the board, as well as between different geographical areas and socio-economic groups. In Tanzania, there is also concern about the limited participation of ‘non-Christian’ religious groups. They are all aware of the potential of ICT in widening access, but all report that computer use is limited by both financial and technological problems. The Tanzania authors note the presence of the African Virtual University but say that, although change is expected, the fact that the satellite dish is ‘receive-only’ means that inter-active learning is hampered (p. 51).

All are concerned with issues characterised by the Mozambique authors as ‘quality, quantity and reference’. The latter is not defined, but employment tracer studies seem to indicate a connection with employers’ demands. The Tanzania case shows a major shift from working for government to working in the private sector. While national development is paid obeisance, the kind of broader demands mentioned by President Mbeki are not much in evidence.

‘Governance’ is well discussed. There are honest if restrained acknowledgements of the problems of relations with government. For example, in Mozambique a student strike in 1990 is said to have woken the government up to university problems, while in Tanzania the university’s new position is said to stem from the disappearance of the ‘hegemonic state’. But inevitably the focus is on internal management. The most striking story is that of Makerere, showing the significance of personality in academic leadership (and of continuity when the right person is the leader). The long-standing Vice-Chancellor is described as capable, imaginative and democratic, with an open-door policy and an interest in the participation of academics and students in decision-making. Academic governance is not the same as private sector corporate management and I would suggest, on this and other evidence, that in Africa as elsewhere, leadership rather than domination will enable a university community to progress peacefully.
All three books converge on the main problems/challenges. Finance obviously comes near the top and there are hints in the texts that the struggle for economic survival has caused distortions and some acrimony, as in the jealousies engendered in Dar es Salaam by a successfully entrepreneurial dean of engineering.

The authors ask for continuing attention to students’ ‘ability to learn’ and to staff development, particularly for the promotion of a research culture. All agree that there is no room for ‘complacency’ (Mkat e et al, p83) and at the same time they all leave an impression, explicitly stated by the Makerere authors (p. 63), of the extraordinary resilience of these universities in the face of tremendous battering. Perhaps the rather cool-blooded narratives with their limited acknowledgment of context do not fully underline this resilience and the stubborn will to survive. While the authors justly criticise the ‘conservatism’ of some academics, it is those academics’ consciousness of a historical tradition and of values beyond neo-managerialism which have kept them going.

What is missing from these studies? As hinted, there is, disappointingly to this reader, an absence of social analysis – though the authors can properly argue that this was not in their remit. What should have been within their remit includes: a sense of the academic staff’s working schedules (and hence workloads) and how much time has to be devoted to outside income-generating activities; a picture of the roles and attitudes of the non-academic staff (hardly mentioned at all); some enquiry into the composition of university networks, such as student unions and clubs; a greater delineation of engagement with civil society, including outreach in the broadest sense; and some acknowledgment of international connections.

The role of foreign students in enriching institutions both culturally and financially is relevant here as is the role of international associations in strengthening African universities as a trans-national constituency as well as in staff development and quality enhancement. The Dar study mentions international links programmes and among the three there is one mention of the Association of African Universities, one of the Association of Commonwealth Universities and none of international disciplinary associations (valuable both for morale and for quality).

Perhaps this lack of international awareness is the fault of those of us in the international university community. Because we too have our own difficulties of declining resources and status (and the World Bank has not told our
governments that universities are valuable!), we have mostly ignored African colleagues and African institutions – especially as their poverty makes them unattractive as a source for international students for our institutions.

We need to welcome the work of the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, but should not leave ‘reform’ to them. We should help our African colleagues by encouraging a broader internationalism. At the time of writing, several organisations have recognised the opportunity offered by Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa. Lobbying seems to have resulted in some understanding of the critical value of higher education to Africa’s future, but the final report is not yet out. For Australia, there are other arenas, not least the ACU. Messages about Africa’s challenges in higher education should be framed now for the next Conference of Commonwealth Education Ministers (CCEM) in 2006.

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Understanding the Rwenzururu Movement: An Autobiographical Account

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Among the many social movements aiming to redress institutionalised ethnic inequality in post-colonial Africa, that of Rwenzururu in Western Uganda so far has been receiving less attention than it deserves. The Rwenzururu movement was a case of sub-nationalism emerging in the early 1960s and seeking liberation for the Bakonzo and Baamba people from Batoro overrule. It soon gave rise to a highly complex and in some respects spectacular situation which would endure for decades to come. This makes Tom Stacey’s ‘autobiographical study’ highly relevant to an understanding of several episodes of the Rwenzururu saga where Stacey has come in as a participant observer.

The Rwenzururu movement originated on and around the alpine Ruwenzoris, alternatively known as the Mountains of the Moon, on the borders between Uganda and Congo (DRC). At the establishment of British rule in the early twentieth century, Bakonzo and Baamba had been included in the Toro Kingdom, which itself became incorporated as a district within the Ugandan colonial set-up together with the other (neo-traditionalised) kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole and Bunyoro. Within Toro, the Batoro formed a majority with about fifty-five percent of the population of about 350,000 at the time of independence in 1962, while the Bakonzo and Baamba constituted sizeable minorities, together estimated to comprise just under forty percent of the population. The Bakonzo, living on the Ruwenzori and in the lower plains and foothills around the mountain, were the more numerous of the two groups.

Throughout the colonial period Bakonzo and Baamba had been treated as second-class citizens by the dominant strata of Batoro within Toro kingdom. They lacked equitable representation and were subject to frequent derogatory treatment by Batoro. In terms of educational opportunities and elementary government services they had been seriously neglected. Unsurprisingly, as independence approached and a possibility of redrawing of district boundaries seemed in reach following the precedent of Sebei in Eastern Uganda, the two
groups joined hands in a movement of protest, Rwenzururu, which first sought recognition of equal status within Toro. When this was refused they demanded a separate district which, at the micro level at that time, was perceived almost as the same as attaining independence. As these demands received negative and rather high-handed responses from the Toro district government and the central Uganda government, protest soon gained momentum, and in subsequent years led to numerous violent encounters with Batoro militias and Uganda government troops. One wing of the movement, consisting of Bakonzo with a base on the higher spurs of the Ruwenzori, took the more radical step to secede from Uganda and set up its own, albeit rudimentary government. Its leader Isaya Mukirane first became President, later King of Rwenzururu. Upon his death in 1966, his young son Charles Wesley was nominated to succeed him, first under a regency arrangement. The other wing of the movement, representative for the more numerous lowland Bakonzo and Baamba population, continued to struggle, under considerable hardship and harassment from both Ugandan army and police forces and from Rwenzururu militias, for equal recognition within the Uganda political framework by way of a separate district.

This background should help to better appreciate the book *Tribe* that Tom Stacey has written on his contacts and engagements over time with the Rwenzururu movement, in particular with Mukirane and his son. Stacey, a British journalist cum novelist, had first come to the Ruwenzori region in 1954 with a publisher’s contract on a two months mission to write a book about a little known East African region. Arriving from the Congo side to engage in ‘exploratory journeying’ he initially had little clue as to what to expect or do but soon became thrilled with the idea of setting foot on some of the higher altitudes of the Ruwenzori, where only few Europeans had gone before him. Indeed, in his account Stacey makes frequent references to his predecessor Henry Stanley who had earlier been traversing the area but had never managed to come as high as to get a glimpse of Ruwenzori’s snow tops.

Soon after his arrival in Bwamba Stacey came in contact with Isaya Mukirane, a Mukonzo schoolteacher suspended for insubordination. Mukirane was very willing to accompany Stacey on his explorations. For several weeks the two travelled on foot from mountain spur to mountain spur, engaging in what appears to have been an insatiable interest in just about everything concerning the region and its people, the Bakonzo and their habitat and culture. The first part of *Tribe* recounts much of this joint endeavour and the budding fraternity between the two men which it prompted. While it remains rather unclear exactly what kind of questions were asked about what, to whom and with what
purpose, according to Stacey the common interest stimulated the setting up of a body to study Bakonzo culture, the Bakonzo Life History Research Society (BLHRS)\(^1\). Over the next several years while Stacey had left for altogether different journalistic pursuits elsewhere Mukirane was found busy setting up branches of the BLHRS in different parts of the Ruwenzori which, in the early 1960s, provided a ready-made organisational basis for the Rwenzururu movement.

In *Tribe*, a rather anachronistic title chosen to convey sentiments of community and togetherness supposedly shared by all Bakonzo, Stacey recounts three different episodes of his engagement with Ruwenzori/Rwenzururu. The first was the 1954 visit which materialised in a novel, *The Brothers M.* The second came, unexpectedly, eight years later in 1962 when the Rwenzururu movement had erupted and Mukirane had already split off seeking seclusion and independence on the higher mountain spurs. The new Uganda government, at the suggestion of its High Commissioner Timothy Bazarabuza after a chance encounter he had had with Tom Stacey in London, was prepared to invest in some kind of reconciliation attempt by inviting Stacey to Uganda to make an effort to re-establish contact with his fellow traveller Mukirane. The idea was to try and persuade him to agree to talks, in some fashion, with Uganda government officials. The plan failed, partly because the Ugandan armed forces had already been given instructions to move in to the area by the time Stacey could hope to be of some relevance and in the end also because Mukirane proved to be quite adamant in wanting to remain withdrawn with his followers in his ‘other’ world of the high Ruwenzori, a world offering him unrestricted sovereignty of sorts. Stacey offers a vivid account of his efforts to contact Mukirane in the second and (to the present reader) most interesting part of his book.

The third episode came, once again years later, in the 1990s following a whole series of major changes with regard to the Rwenzururu movement and the Uganda and Toro contexts. As for the latter in 1967 the Uganda government of Milton Obote had abolished the (neo-)traditional kingdoms within Uganda, thus removing the Toro kingship which had been one of the sources of discontent and envy to Rwenzururians. The next government, that of Idi Amin,

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\(^1\) According to Axel Sommerfelt, a Norwegian anthropologist researching on the Bakonzo in the late 1950s, the BLHRS had already existed, founded by Samwiri Bukombi, an elderly Mukonzo chief and father in law of Isaya Mukirane who had begun recording the history of the Bakonzo in the early 1950s. Mukirane had become active in the organization once it got established and before long would take over its leadership. (Axel Sommerfelt, ‘First Impressions from Bukonjo’, mimeo, 1958, Makerere Institute of Social Research Library).
resolved another key source of frustration by granting the Bamba and Bakonzo a separate district each. Then, after the toppling of the Idi Amin regime and the (controversial) return of Obote as president in the 1980s, the secessionist Rwenzururu kingdom, now with Mukirane’s son Charles Wesley as its leader, showed itself responsive to overtures for reconciliation and agreed to a settlement. The deal involved the ceremonial laying down of arms by Rwenzururian forces and the resignation of Charles Wesley as ‘king’ in return for promises of development funds for social welfare and education. For the ex-king himself there were material incentives including a bus, a shop, and a government scholarship for study abroad, which was to materialise in the United States.

The Rwenzururu saga continued however for mainly two reasons. One was that not all secessionist Rwenzururians were supportive of the idea of reconciliation and some who had initially been in favour slipped back into armed resistance, lured by larger profits and powers offered in an environment ideally suited for contraband and guerrilla activities. Second Uganda in 1986 once again saw a change of regime with Yoweri Museveni taking over. Having its power base in the National Resistance Army his new government in due course felt it had to accommodate pressures from Buganda pleading for restoration of its kingship. As it is legally difficult to restore a single kingship where four had been ‘banned’ parliament in 1993 passed an ‘un-banning’ order allowing the restoration of ‘cultural leaders’ provided ‘the people so wish’. On that basis Buganda’s kingship was restored followed by those of Bunyoro and Toro but not Ankole, a relevant point which has escaped Stacey’s attention. In Ankole fierce resistance was mobilised against the possible restoration of the monarchy as large numbers of Bairu, forming the majority of the population, saw it as a historical symbol of ethnic subordination. In emulation of the restoration of Toro’s kingship and out of a strong wish to be at a par with that Rwenzururians claimed that their own kingship, albeit a novel institution, should also be restored. Thus a popular movement grew to have Rwenzururu’s ex-king, Charles Wesley, return from the United States where he still lived and be recognised by Museveni’s government. He did indeed return for a visit in 1998 accompanied by Stacey who had proposed to accompany him if he so wished, and facilitated by the Uganda government (which apparently hoped it might help quell growing dissent), but this was not followed by official recognition. That in fact seems unlikely to happen, given that it would put Museveni’s government in rather an awkward position given its refusal to date to support restoration of Ankole’s monarchy (in Museveni’s own and politically sensitive home-ground). Stacey does not appear aware of this dilemma and tends to see
Museveni’s decline as a lack of support for a ‘just cause’. Charles Wesley himself preferred to return to his job in the United States.

Stacey writes in glowing terms about this episode in the third part of his book linking past memories to the present and future of ‘his’ people on the Ruwenzori. Stacey certainly has had a unique life experience in coming into contact with Mukirane and his son at different intervals. As a highly skilled journalist and novelist with a strong personal engagement he describes these encounters with great eloquence and an often romantic enthusiasm, especially when reflecting on the prospects of a Rwenzururu kingship coming into being. Reflecting upon his life-long engagement and identification with the Bakonzo and Rwenzururu, Stacey’s book belongs to the genre of ‘ego-document’, in which he freely mixes bits of narrative and travelogue, fragments of recorded history, and above all personal reminiscences of his encounters.

But Stacey goes one or two steps beyond this and that makes the book problematic from a more detached, historical perspective. Stacey not only links his three episodes of encounter with Rwenzururu as if these followed an inherent dramatic logic, but in doing so describes his own role as one that has had a significant influence on the turn of events. Connecting different episodes he clearly figures as the main actor in the book and evidently cherishes the title Musabuli (Saviour) which people on the Ruwenzori once bestowed upon him. One key question that emerges in this regard however is whether Stacey as he suggests had indeed, even if inadvertently, laid the groundwork for the Rwenzururu rebellion through his one-time association with Mukirane, thus playing a role in bringing Bakonzo together and stimulating the establishment of Bakonzo kingship. That appears doubtful. Stacey’s contacts (and identification) had been with what was yet to become Mukirane’s Rwenzururu and consequently with the myths of kingship, autonomy and more that could emerge within the secessionist wing of the movement. But Rwenzururu involved much more than that. Many or most other Bakonzo and Baamba, living in the more accessible plains and on the lower mountain spurs, were equally strongly engaged in ‘Rwenzururu’ without subscribing to the idea of secession or the newly invented royalty. Associating Rwenzururu mainly with the secessionist wing and its (indeed spectacular) history amounts to a narrowing of perspective and leaves underexposed the struggles fought at another level, and with altogether different objectives, by a majority of Bakonzo (and Baamba) for whom secession was no realistic option or target.

More broadly, looking back at the conditions in the region at the time the Rwenzururu movement emerged, there can be little doubt that these were then
just ‘ripe’ for a rebellion to break out and would have spurred that in one way or the other, just as they did elsewhere in Uganda at the time – in Sebei, Ankole, Kigezi, in particular. Stacey has not taken note of such parallel movements and their inherent dynamics, nor of their pursuit of seemingly contrasted objectives in the light of the different ways social inequality had been structured – for or against a separate district, for or against kingship, etc., depending on what the specific context seemed to demand as a logical choice of strategy. Such social dynamics are of crucial importance in understanding why a protest movement emerges and what course it takes. Thus, if Mukirane (and his one-time comrades Kawamara and Mupalya) had not taken the initiative, conditions were such that one can safely say that others would have done so in their place. Without reducing or negating the stimulating association that Stacey and Mukirane once had in 1954 it is difficult therefore to view his stay at the time as a necessary factor in triggering or preparing the ground for the movement’s emergence.

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The Past, Present and Future of African Politics

Scott MacWilliam


This collection neatly tracks some of the most important changes in the study of African politics over the last four decades. The twenty-six articles and extracts from previously published books and journal articles, plus an introductory essay by editor Tom Young, begins with the optimistic tone of the mid-1960s, outlines the faltering mood of the 1970s and 1980s and concludes with the uncertain hopes of the present for ‘a world in which we all drink Coca-Cola, but it “means” different things to different people’ (p. 6).

Young’s Introduction begins with the enthusiasm for reshaping political power through the forces of African nationalism and the end of colonial rule. As Young summarises the optimism, ‘if the state was the vehicle then nationalism was the fuel of modernisation’ (p. 1). While the intervening years have seen increasing authoritarianism and widespread poverty there has also been a disciplinary shift, away from the primacy of politics and political science toward forms of thought which emphasise the local and the particular, as well as the continuing strength of identities rooted in the combination of both. Young provocatively asks if this shift against modernisation might also be seen as anthropology’s revenge.

However the remainder of his Introductory essay makes it clear that for all the objections to the original modernist project which attended decolonisation, modernisation has returned in a new form, a form which is liberal in important ways. These include the need to construct states which are both weak, not limiting individual freedoms, and strong, disengaged from particular ‘social interests’ but also capable of ‘imposing and maintaining a certain kind of social order, essentially a liberal capitalist order’ (p. 3). Young’s choice of articles and book sections shows the outlines of this new liberalism in an African context, and how developments among the continent’s peoples shape the particular forms liberalism is to take. Africa and Africans become both local
and global in the revitalisation of liberal politics, so that Young can speak of a ‘liberal project for Africa’ (p. 5) as well as indicate how the dilemmas facing liberal reformers elsewhere have similar characteristics.

As any reader of the volumes published by international and national development agencies is well aware, Young has captured precisely the most important theme of global efforts at poverty reduction. Gone are the now denigrated ‘one size fits all’ programmes associated with structural adjustment. In are concerns that poverty is deepening in just a few regions of the globe, particularly Africa, which can only be addressed by focusing upon the specificities of particular countries and areas within countries. It is the inequality of poverty rather than any homogenous global impoverishment which captures the headlines. Consequently attention has shifted to the regions and countries where poverty is worst and probably deepening. It is repeatedly claimed that local opposition to reform can only be overcome by mobilising popular support for strategies to increase economic growth, reduce poverty and extend democracy. Thus the World Bank and other organisations, multilateral and bilateral, incessantly trumpet a universal strategy and need for developing civil society to curb, even crush, the mendacious self-serving elites and commercial buccaneers who hold and exercise state power through the ‘politics of the belly’.¹

Young’s achievement is to show in a chronological form how studies of African politics have lead to rejection of the post-colonial ‘disorder’ and also to proposals for new directions for a revitalised liberal order. He skilfully includes contributions from intellectuals who are not liberals, and lets the collection show how the latter too contribute to global efforts to find ‘African solutions’ for international poverty reduction programmes. Thus the general conclusion summarised by Young (p. 3) that ‘what is really needed in Africa is a genuine civil society and real democratisation involving popular participation as the means to a rekindling of the nation-state building strategy’ of the late colonial-early post-Independence period. Change from below rather than from above is to be the principal direction, a direction which can be embraced locally as well as globally.

Some who espouse this line even resurrect important features of the anti-colonial nationalist opposition of the twentieth century to provide signposts. Thus Mahmoud Mamdani, in the Conclusion to his influential 1991 book *Citizen and Subject* uses Uganda and South Africa as paradigmatic instances of an oppositional politics which linked urban and rural, while defusing interethnic tensions by brandishing class identifications. Mamdani claims: ‘The political impetus of the [militant nationalist movement that followed the Second World War] came from the disenfranchised native strata of the towns’. Regardless of country this strata, according to Mamdani, ‘shared a common social position: they lay beyond the reach of customary law and yet had few entitlements to civil rights. Though in civil society they were not of civil society’ (p. 49).

Whether or not there is agreement with Mamdani’s emphasis upon the importance of ‘the disenfranchised native strata’ in anti-colonial nationalist politics, it is now clear to most that the ‘fruits of Uhuru’ did not fall to either the lumpen-proletariat or the working population of town or country. In nation-state after nation-state it was an indigenous strata, to use Mamdani’s quaintly neo-Weberian language, which captured state power and became ascendant in all the major forms of property ownership. This point is not weakened by acknowledging the continuing tussles over how the indigenous wealthy are to be described. They are everywhere and clearly the victors of decolonisation, whether this involved a militant nationalist struggle, as in Kenya and Zimbabwe, or not, as in Uganda.

Consequently in South Africa, where the President does not see the HIV/AIDS epidemic which is devastating individual lives as well as national productive potential, in Zimbabwe, where an authoritarian ruler represents an especially vicious cabal of primary/primitive accumulators or any one of a multitude of countries where the process of accumulation means not expanded production but plundering state assets, the principal task today is how to civilise the accumulators. ‘The new liberal order’ or preoccupation with ‘conditions of governance’ in Goran Hyden’s phrase, of elections, human rights including freedom of association, of speech, of the separation of executive, legislative and judicial authority, of transparency, accountability and other checks against corruption forms the terms of a manual on how to transform and civilise a ruling class.

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While the plundering, disorder and impoverishment of the last three decades has almost completely reduced the militant potential of labour, there is another, perhaps even more serious shortcoming in so many liberal projections of how to civilise capitalism and capitalists. The shortcoming exists for accounts of many African countries and other parts of the globe where primary accumulators hold state power.\(^5\) Civilising capitalism does not merely require changes in the form of accumulation moving from plunder to production and the formation of the two classes of capital, capital and labour. It also requires the development within the former of the separation into two halves, what was in late nineteenth century Germany described as the *Besitzburgertum* and the *Bildungsbürgertum*, the propertied and the educated bourgeoisie.\(^6\) This distinction followed an earlier separation between the urban middle class which included businessmen, the *Stadtburger*, and the *Weltburgertum*, the ‘cosmopolitan bourgeoisie who were defined by their place in the higher ranks of state service rather than according to relations of production’.\(^7\)

Currently the disorganisation of labour, or the ‘instrumentalization of disorder’ which Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz identify as how ‘Africa works’ (pp. 51-54) is joined to the ‘disorganisation of capital’ or more correctly, the widespread ascendancy of the primary or primitive accumulators. Civilising African capital according to the specificities of each country is now the favoured international strategy promoted in the language of liberalism. However reformers would do well to remember that reform in the now-industrial countries, the ‘old’ liberal nations was born not out of ‘new social movements’ and ‘identity politics’\(^8\) but out of urbanisation and industrialisation which formed the basis for a heightened class politics. The growing realisation among an educated bourgeoisie that a long-term national project involved breaking the power of the previously dominant class and its allies was a central component of this politics to create a liberal nation-state. The jury remains out on whether the ‘uncertain struggle for global capitalism’\(^9\) still has much room within it for the formation and continued existence of such national entities, whether of the old or new variety.

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\(^8\) Young includes essays representative of both these recent fashions; see Sections 4 and 5 of the collection.

\(^9\) Brink Lindsey (*Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism*, New York, John Wiley, 2002) identifies with the anti-liberal tenor of much of the contemporary drive for reform.
Perhaps symptomatically, the paperback volume of the collection is so poorly bound that the pages are parting from the spine after just a few weeks of reading. This reviewer is not optimistic that the political direction encapsulated by the collection will stick together either. There are also more than a few hints that the collection’s editor is doubtful too.

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Book Reviews

The Developed World's Fatal Indifference
to African Health


Introduction

The International Herald Tribune in a recent issue reported that there were more Ethiopian-trained doctors practicing in Chicago than in Ethiopia, and more of Malawi’s doctors are reported to live in Manchester than in Malawi. ‘As Africa tries to fight AIDS, the single most serious obstacle is a desperate shortage of health workers. Yet at the same time, doctors, nurses and pharmacists are emigrating in droves to Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia’.¹ Rich countries average 222 doctors per 100,000 citizens while Uganda has fewer than six, and Malawi has fewer than seventeen nurses per 100,000 citizens. According to the IHT, the United Nations estimates that every time Malawi educates a doctor for Manchester, it saves Britain US$184,000. For the authors of Fatal Indifference too, ‘The haemorrhage of health professionals from African countries is easily the single most serious human resource problem facing health ministries today (p. 186).

Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health is the product of a research collaboration between Canadian and South African scholars in the lead up to the June 2002 G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada². It focuses on the failure of the developed world to respond to serious concerns about progress in health development in the poor countries of the global community, particularly in Africa. The book – which is offered as the first attempt to bring together an analysis of G8 policies on this topic – puts the issue of developing country health, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, into the context of the world economy and associated political relationships. The approach is comprehensive, dealing first with globalisation and macroeconomic policy

² G8: Group of Eight leading industrial countries, comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, USA.
(including structural adjustment and debt relief). As well as investigating health and health systems the authors look at the influence of G8 commitments on health-related fields including education, nutrition, and the environment. The analysis includes a discussion of the effects of these policies on equity and health; it deals with official development assistance, trade and market access. Each chapter draws attention to the way in which the G8 has succeeded or has failed in meeting its commitments. The book will be of great interest to anyone concerned with questions of health and development in Africa.

**G8 commitments**

The authors conclude that twice as many promises made by G8 summits have been broken as those that have been kept. Moreover, even in those areas where the G8 countries (and other donors) have met their stated commitments to health assistance for developing countries, the commitments themselves are generally inadequate. The recent G8 summits surveyed by Labonte and Schrecker in fact pledged to increase the *effectiveness* rather than the *quantity* of their total foreign assistance, which at less than 0.2 percent for the leading seven industrial economies in 2001 remains well below the long-standing UN target of 0.7 percent of donor-country GDP. And only two of the seven major industrial economies (excluding Russia) have increased their total aid for health in the wake of the G8 summit decisions.

While the G8 has delivered on its pledge to provide US$2.1 billion for the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), established at its Okinawa summit in 2000, the funds are ‘woefully inadequate’ and ‘comparatively cheap’. The US contribution of US$500 million, for example, amounts to just US$1.78 per capita annually (p. 42). UN and other sources estimate that US$7-10 billion is needed annually to fight HIV/AIDS and an additional US$2 billion annually for tuberculosis and malaria. Moreover G8 countries have been unwilling, say the authors, to commit specific resources to broader health concerns (such as universal vaccination). The funding required for country-specific interventions against infectious diseases and nutritional deficiencies, for example, has been estimated by WHO’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health at an additional US$22 billion a year by 2007:

> The disparity between the commitments that would be needed even for a minimal package of essential health interventions and current levels of development assistance calls into serious question the likelihood of achieving health-related development goals (p. 50).
**Distributional issues**

An additional reason for this is the increasing collapse of health-care infrastructure in many developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, largely (though not exclusively) as a result of reduced public expenditure. Though it is acknowledged that economic growth and increasing income are key factors in improved health status the relationship is mediated by distributional issues. Sanders and Meeus argue that health is increasingly being seen as a commodity rather than a human right and widening inequalities in the distribution of resources are causing unacceptable levels of hunger, poor health and impoverishment; moreover, health systems (public and private) generally favour the wealthy over the poor. They argue that the gap in mortality rates between rich and poor countries have widened significantly, despite overall gains in life expectancy in recent decades. Equally of concern are the increasing moves towards privatisation of health care and the deeper penetration of foreign direct investment in the private health care industry in developing countries, a consequence of the Uruguay round of trade talks and GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Services).

**Globalisation and health**

Importantly, Labonte and Schrecker tabulate the major ‘processes’ and ‘pathways’ through which globalisation and economic reform influence health. They claim that while ‘Globalisation may improve human health and development in some circumstances … it damages it in others’ (p. 6). They argue that the so-called structural adjustment reforms have led to a significant reduction in health and other social expenditures, principally to provide the funds to service foreign debt. While the G8 have in general met their commitments on debt relief initiatives, Labonte and Schrecker say in the broader sense this would relieve only a third of the burden on the most heavily indebted poor countries.

Criticisms by the WHO of the effects on health of the more recent, though related, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach now imposed by the World Bank and the IMF include: ill health is seen as a consequence of poverty but not as a cause (resulting from the imposition of user charges); PRSPs address health as an outcome of development rather than a means to it; investments in health are therefore regarded as secondary to investments in economic growth; and health expenditures are well below the minimum needed to provide basic primary health care (p. 27).

Doubts about the sincerity of G8 commitments to health are also raised by negotiations over trade rights, particularly in pharmaceuticals, a key issue in
international health since the 2001 Doha WTO meeting (which considered the issue of patent rights for pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS intellectual-property agreements). The issue remains something of a stalemate, due particularly to opposition from the US, where the most powerful drug companies are based.

The G8 and Africa
Sanders and Meeus apply this analysis to the program of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) prepared for the 2002 Kananaskis G8 summit. NEPAD defines good health simply as something that contributes to increased productivity and economic growth, and appears to accept uncritically a neo-liberal economic paradigm. Sanders and Meeus argue (p. 199) that:

- Despite NEPAD’s target of seven percent annual GDP growth, the World Bank predicts that the number of people in Sub-Saharan Africa living below the poverty line will increase in future years, even if meeting agreed UN International Development Goals (IDG) succeeds in cutting global poverty by half.
- NEPAD accepts IDG targets for 1990-2015 for reductions in infant and under-five mortality (each a 2/3 reduction) and maternal mortality (75 percent reduction) that are far removed from reality. In thirty-nine of fifty African countries with available data in 1995, the MMR was more than 500 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. In thirteen of twenty-two countries with 1999 data, percentage of births attended by skilled health workers is below fifty percent.
- Initiatives like the GFATM or the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (supported by the Gates Foundation) are not appropriate to African needs, as they focus on the supply of drugs and vaccines rather than on strengthening the local health system needed to deliver them.
- NEPAD proposals for reversing the brain drain of skilled health workers are poorly formulated and at times inappropriate, such as the proposal for ‘utilizing the scientific and technological know-how and skills of Africans in the diaspora for the development of Africa’.

Failed notions of development
As the authors conclude, ‘At the core of many of our critiques of G8 development policies is their adherence to a set of propositions about development derived directly from neo-classical economics but supported, at best, by weak and highly contested empirical evidence’ (p. 210). Equally detrimental, they argue, is the notion that increased economic growth is the preferred, and possibly only, route to improved health. The authors find it revealing that in its commitment to good governance at its 2002 Summit, the
G8 included ‘freedom of economic activities’ but had nothing at all to say about human rights, labour rights or any other international convention with important implications for health and development.

It is this attitude they argue that reveals the developed world’s ‘fatal indifference’. And it appears that nothing has changed. African NGOs demanded that the 2004 G8 Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, USA, ‘must go beyond empty promissory notes’ because ‘Two years after the Africa Action Plan was announced, G8 commitments to Africa appear buried beneath an avalanche of inaction on core areas such as HIV/AIDS, poverty eradication and debt.’ In a summit dominated by the Iraq issue the demand went unheeded.

The case made by Fatal Indifference is based on a detailed analysis, convincing evidence and graphic illustration. By challenging the G8 to live up to its own commitments Labonte and colleagues have put these concerns back at the door of the world’s leading industrial countries. The results of their work are not encouraging but do focus our attention clearly on the nature of the problem, while they have succeeded in gathering much of the evidence needed to unravel the labyrinthine relationship between structural adjustment, economic growth and health. With valuable data on contemporary Africa this book is an essential resource for all students of health and development particularly those who believe current neo-liberal paradigms of economic policy and development need to be brought thoroughly into question.

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Understanding Uganda’s Nasty Northern War


The primary purpose of this review is to draw attention to the growing literature concerned with Uganda’s violent but undeclared eighteen year long northern war. I call this literature an ‘archive’ in the conventional sense of a body of knowledge to which we can refer for a better understanding of the past and which may include a great variety of material. One of the titles listed above is a sixty-eight page volume of drawings and texts created by abducted, displaced and refugee children in northern Uganda, as part of the process of their recovery after escaping from the rebels; two are reports by local and international nongovernmental agencies which have been working for more than ten years with Acholi communities deeply affected by the impact of the war; and two are studies by an anthropologist and a journalist which reflect close involvement with Acholi society at the district and local level. All of them add valuable material to the archive that has been building up over the years.

Heike Berhand’s book *Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits* takes us back to the beginnings of this war which might be said to have begun in 1986 when a young Acholi woman, Alice Auma, on the order of the spirit Lakwena who used her as his medium, and concerned to renew the moral order in Acholiland, formed the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) to oppose the government of President Museveni who had taken power just six months before. The book is the story of her possession in May 1985 by the spirit Lakwena; of her creation of the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) and its early victories in Acholi itself, when NRA soldiers ran away in fear of the power of her spirits; of its
defeats as well, when confronted by the NRA’s superior technology; and its historic march south as far as Jinja, where it was defeated by the National Resistance Army (NRA) in October 1987, after which Alice fled to Kenya where she remains to the present.

The strength and value of the study derives from the fact that it is written ‘from the inside’. Berhend as an anthropologist had learned ‘to defend the people on whom and with whom (she) was working’ (p. 8). In Gulu this meant countering the mass media images of witchcraft and other stereotypes of Alice and HSM. In an environment of ‘continuing war’ it was ‘impossible for [her] to carry out field work in the classic sense’ (p. 8). Instead she talked with former Holy Spirit soldiers in Gulu and Kampala; with Acholi elders; with women about witchcraft; and with spirit mediums on whose advice she herself became a patient so that she should not remain an outsider. She had access to local historiographies including one by a former member of the Frontline Coordination Team of the HSM who at her request wrote a text about the HSM which ‘gave the past the status of a written story’; and which became the foundation of the book (p. 11). And while this raises important questions about evidence and interpretation, of which she is aware, the result is, as John Middleton points out in his Preface, a fascinating account of the internal organisation of the HSM and of the aspirations and motivations of its followers as they wished them to be known. The book includes a good number of HSM texts and a handful of other texts by members of the HSMF as well as material on religions in Acholi and a discussion of the spirits of the HSM. This makes for some important insights into what attracted and drove Alice’s supporters on; what they expected to achieve; into the crisis that increasingly enveloped Acholi society over those years and of the impact of her claims to spiritual power for the HSMF on NRA soldiers fearful of magic and witchcraft.

Berhend added a chapter to the English edition of her book, published in 1999, which takes the story from 1987 up to 1996, and to Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army’ (LRA) which has now for nearly eighteen years sustained an increasingly vicious guerrilla style war; and which assumed a regional element when in the early 1990s the Sudanese government began to provide the LRA with arms and training support. In addition the LRA entered a new phase in 1994 marked by its increased targeting of civilians, by its escalation of violence and above all by its increasing abduction of children and their forced incorporation into its service as ‘disposable porters’, ‘sex slaves’ and trained fighters. The war thus took on the status also of a major humanitarian crisis for the north, which is the background to the story of Aboke Girls.
Els De Temmerman was Africa correspondent for the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant* and Belgian radio and television between 1992 and 1996, but it was her accidental meeting in 1998 in Gulu with a boy who had escaped from the LRA that introduced her to the plight of abducted children in northern Uganda which as she says in her Preface to *Aboke Girls* ‘seemed too shocking to be true’ (p. i). The outcome is this small but compelling book about the remarkable and courageous journey of Sister Rachel, Comboni missionary teacher and deputy headmistress of St Mary’s School in Aboke, Apac to recover her school girls abducted by the LRA in 1995; a journey which would take her not only to Sudan but eventually to Europe and the USA. It is about the equally remarkable journey of the girls themselves: their abduction, their forced incorporation into the LRA, their lives in the rebel camps, their escape and rescue. It is also the story of the parents who set up the Concerned Parents Association in Gulu, ‘influential and vocal middle class people [who] would not be intimidated’ and would not keep quiet until they had their children back’ (p. 66); and who mounted an international campaign for their release; and of the people of GUSCO,\(^1\) World Vision, AVSI\(^2\) and Unicef staff in Gulu who since 1995 have worked for the rehabilitation of children who have escaped or, increasingly over the past year, been rescued by the UPDF. The book is based on in-depth interviews conducted over two years with two of the Aboke girls who escaped from the LRA, with a fourteen-year old boy who had been part of Kony’s ‘elite troops’, and with Sister Rachel. Temmerman has woven their stories together in the context of the changing war situation through the 1990s in a manner that enables her to offer insights into local community reactions to and interpretations of the larger crisis that has faced Acholi for twenty years as well as of the LRA. Thus for example one of her main characters suggests that what led many Acholi to support Alice was that they ‘believed she was a saint who gave the demoralised Acholi back their pride’ (p. 108). He also emphasises the economic consequences to the Acholi of the almost total loss of their cattle as a result of the war. There are also, in addition to the children’s own accounts of life in the LRA camps, some rare descriptions of the LRA camps in Sudan to which Sister Rachel would go in search of the girls (Ch. 21).

World Vision have also published several small collections of stories of other children who have escaped and now seek to rebuild their lives that are not part of this review. Slowly therefore it may become more possible to establish the cost of this horrific war in terms of lost lives. In *Pawns of Politics* which is directed at the international community as well as Uganda they make an initial

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1 Gulu Support the Children Organisation, a local NGO established in 1994.
2 AVSI, Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale, an international NGO based in Italy.
attempt to cost the war in this way, in social as well as economic terms. They also present the issues raised by the spiritual dimensions that are seen to sustain the conflict, and the question as to whether what is needed is a military or a non-military solution. These issues, fundamental to any enduring settlement of this nasty war, are also central to the concerns of the Refugee Law Project Report, *Behind the Violence* which examines the structural causes that underpin the war. Based on a very large (257) number of individual interviews and thirty-one group discussions, in late 2003, in Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Soroti districts, and other interviews in Luwero, Kampala, London and Washington DC, the authors have concentrated on the more recent developments in what remains an unpredictable conflict, and thus focus largely on the LRA and on the recent (2003) spread of the war beyond Acholi districts into Teso and Lango. They attempt an ‘in-depth’ analysis of Joseph Kony and the LRA (Ch. 3), although they were unable, like other researchers, to interview the man himself. They take up the question of a military as against a non-military, settlement; all questions that no-one has yet been able to settle.

What is surprising is that neither of these two reports in their emphasis, quite correctly, on the need to bring the war between the LRA and the Ugandan government to an end, returns to Berhend’s observation made at the beginning of her study, when she confessed her surprise to find that the original members of HSM were ‘not peasant but soldiers who had fought in the 1981-5 civil war’ and ‘who could not or would not pursue any other occupation’ on their return home after the UNLA’s defeat. They were ‘internal strangers’ in their own villages. Yet in the light of the historical importance of the army to young Acholi men since the days of the Kings African Rifles when it offered them historically ‘the most lucrative form of unskilled wage labour in colonial east Africa’ we need to return to the question as to whether this is a soldier’s war?

Perhaps because the war has dragged on for so long its beginnings have in a sense become part of history rather than an essential element of contemporary conflict that must be taken into account in any peace-making initiatives. Moreover because the war has isolated the key northern districts where it has been fought out from the rest of the country communication between ‘north’ and ‘south’ of the country has been made difficult. At the same time the coincidence of ethnic and district identities has increasingly identified the conflict in ethnic terms while the successive protagonists, the short-lived Holy Spirit Movement and the Lord’s Resistance Army that since 1988 has dominated the insurrection, have consistently asserted a religious and spiritual

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basis that cannot be ignored. At the international level, and notwithstanding the concern at human rights abuses expressed in no uncertain terms by Amnesty International, the northern conflict remains as a result in many respects almost a forgotten war. While the Uganda archive is enriched by these additions, the task of ‘negotiating an acceptable narrative on what actually happened in the conflict’ remains therefore one of the issues on which the archive itself is incomplete. Given the nature of this conflict this is not surprising and is likely to remain so for many years.

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Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Cameroon through the Eyes of European Traders


In publishing these two books Berghahn have done West-Central African studies proud. The authors are highly regarded Cameroonists. Shirley Ardener is known for her work on gender and also for bringing to fruition her and Edwin Ardener’s project to establish the Buea National Archives

comprising intelligence reports, newspaper cuttings, colonial government documents - an invaluable source of information on the colonial period in German and then Anglophone Cameroons. E. M. (Sally) Chilver is well known for her ethno-historical work on the Grassfields, and is treasured by Cameroonists for her unique knowledge of early German and French sources on the area. Her collaborator in the Esser volume, Ute Roschenthaler, an anthropologist, works among the Ejagham, and emulating late nineteenth explorers, has navigated the Cross (Manyu) river from top to bottom.

The two volumes make an important contribution to the late pre-colonial and early colonial history of the Cameroons. Both books are considerably enriched by the authors’ excellent historical footnotes which convey considerable information about European trading and company perceptions of ethnic customs including rituals, sacrifice and cosmologies. Information in the footnotes represents a significant contribution to Cameroonian and West African economic and social history at the turn of the last century. Ardener’s ‘Swedish Ventures’ give a broader picture from a Swedish perspective of early colonial competition between representatives of north European powers in German controlled south-west Cameroon. I will begin my review with that volume and close with an assessment of Chilver and Roschenthaler’s account of the Mount Cameroon and Bali activities of the German adventurer, plantation owner, labour recruiter and business man Max Esser (1880s-1914).

Shirley Ardener’s unexpurgated presentation of Knut Knutson’s memoir, in the original Swedish-English, highlights his life in villages on and around Mt Cameroon, hunting and trading in wild rubber and ivory with the villagers from whom he learnt Bakweri from 1882-1896. The memoir gives a most vivid account from a Swedish perspective of life, from the bottom up, of what Ardener calls ‘the great events of the day in Cameroon’. The Swedes, in common with about 200 other Europeans in the Mount Cameroon area reported by Esser to be in the area (Chilver and Roschenthaler, p. 51), discovered wild rubber vines growing in the forest, saw its potential for commerce and the advantage of acquiring individual land rights from the locals for cocoa, Liberian coffee and fruit plantations. (By 1896 the German administration issued a decree to the effect that all ‘unoccupied’ land was Crown Land, thus creating secure title necessary to plantation enterprise [Chilver and Roschenthaler, p. 46.] and thus paved the way for the Cameroon Republic’s declaration in 1980 that all land is government owned so individuals or communities claiming customary rights of ownership require certificates of occupancy before their rights can be recognised at law.) Once established in the ivory and rubber export trade in Victoria, Knutson and Waldau opened a
number of collecting and trading points, known as ‘factories’ on the beaches and river banks. They recruited fellow Swedes skilled in different crafts – carpenter, machinists, sea captains, bookkeepers and administrators. Ardener notes that Knutson did not wield power and lacked vast resources of the kind that Esser could marshal - whose German perspectives on some local events differed with Knutson’s.

Knutson also started a wholesale company importing tropical goods including spices which he sold to local retailers. He and Waldau sold skills and skeletons of the fauna they had collected to a German museum. Knutson and later his son Bertil were pioneers in introducing prefabricated wooden dwellings, a distinctive feature to this day of some south-west Cameroon towns.

In 1885 Knutson and Waldau, on one trip projected to last for thirty days, accompanied only by nine Bakweri armed with Winchesters and Snider rifles travelled in the interior taking major risks and facing challenges from then ‘untamed’ tribal groups. They carried only some quinine, tea, sugar, tobacco, cloth and beads. At that time King Duke of Old Calabar had a ‘slave’ called Yellow Duke at Balundu, who had assisted the former to build up control of some trade routes between Old Calabar (Nigeria) and the river Rio del Rey district: the trade had been based on the exchange of slaves for imported manufactured goods. In the next decade or so German colonisation backed by government’s development of larger plantations and better port facilities than those prevailing in Calabar would reduce the importance of this east-west trade route as European traders profited from the Cameroons import-exchange trade.

Knutson’s lyrical accounts of Mount Cameroon flora and fauna, the views from the crater of the surrounding plains and ocean, make memorable reading. In those days the montane cloud forest below the tree line was thick, encouraging thick fogs to descend throughout most of the year, and heavy rains to fall. (Esser reports that the coastal plain and the approaches to the inland plateaux were then almost completely covered by thick forest, penetrated by rivers, elephant tracks and the narrow footpaths of natives. [Chilver and Roschenthaler, pp. 49-50]). Knutson (and Esser) give us a base line against which to assess forest status today: alas, contrary to some contemporary writers who like to believe that forest loss is either a temporary phenomenon or is a figment of observer’s prejudiced mind, deforestation has been, and continues to be, extensive as remaining forest is felled for timber and cleared for farms, plantations and urban ‘development’.
Knutson made land purchases in his own name through treaties with some Bakweri chiefs. He became unpopular in certain circles in 1884 on account of his ‘sale’ of Buea, on the slopes of Mount Cameroon, to the Germans for a sum in goods valued at less than £25. The German administrators following annexation in 1884, declined to sanction Knutson’s legal claims to his tracts of land. Ardener notes that ‘Perhaps the German’s strict application of the law was reinforced by the Swede’s unpopularity in some government circles as a ‘nigger lover’. (Knutson abhorred slavery and criticised certain German officials and farm managers for their treatment of local people.). This land, now the seat of the bustling town of Buea, became government property, contiguous with extensive plantations managed initially by a colonial parastatal company which subsequently became the Cameroon Development Corporation.

Knutson’s relations with Bakweri and other tribal chiefs were in general warm but he found their ‘greediness’ for commissions or customs duties (‘comey’) unpleasant. However, even though he lived rough in the bush he was a white man of seeming wealth – whites are known today as ‘wallets on legs’. Knutson’s memoir is then ‘reviewed’ as it were by other commentators of the time giving their eye witness accounts of some of the same events, people and places (p. 196); a well known contemporary observer was the famous British diplomat and traveller Sir Richard Burton, included here.

The German ‘tycoon’ Esser set off, in 1896, in the company of two others, one of whom was Dr Zintgraff, the well known promoter of German interests in Cameroon, to ‘investigate whether, and which, particular enterprises would have a prospect of profitable success in our colonies and to indulge in a bit of hunting on their way’ (p. xiii). Esser was involved in the early stages of setting up plantation enterprise on a grand scale. His efforts to encourage labour migration from populous hinterland tribes such as Bali to coastal plantations enabled industrial capitalism to penetrate subsistence economies then linked by coastal middlemen (e.g. the Duala) to western metropoles through European trading companies. In effect, Esser played a significant role in ‘opening up’ rich natural forest and human resources to industrial capitalism and Christianity. (These are among the ‘consequences’ referred to in the volume’s sub title.) Esser’s epitomised reports, highlighted in his well known expedition to Bali to find labour for coastal plantations, give a detailed account of conditions at the time - dress, trade, condition of life, ritual and fetishism as well as anti-witchcraft (poison ordeal) practices.
The Bakundu people, located north-east of Mount Cameroon, were feared for their perceived cannibalistic habits, protected by powerful fetishes and a common secret society said by Esser to celebrate Bakundu unity at an annual feast in the forest of human flesh, dogs and ox-meat that the people regarded as ‘particularly aromatic and delicious’ (p. 73). Esser, in common with others at the time, ‘interprets the presence of trophy skulls and reports of the funerary human sacrifice of slaves as evidence for a festal culinary cannibalism, associated with a secret society’ (f.n. 11, p.105). He wrote that there is a high entry fee so only richer people (traders, middlemen, powerful hunters) can afford to become members. ‘As their badge they wear the (tabooed) red feathers of the parrot in their hair, and no Bakundu dares to wear a shirt, or a hat, or carry an umbrella’ without being a member (Ibid, emphasis in brackets added). Roschenthaler notes: ‘Even today only members of the superior grade of the Leopard Society are allowed to wear hats and trousers at an association meeting’ (Ibid). In Esser’s time a deceased secret society member was cut up, eaten so he could live on in his friends and no part would rot and perish in the earth. When a chief lay dying his butchering had to be postponed until up to forty to sixty slaves had been rounded up in neighbouring slave villages, killed and eaten along with him (p. 74).

Esser’s accounts of cannibalism are of interest less perhaps on account of the gruesome details than for his emphasis on the blood – human as well as human mixed with animal - that must be shed for an effective sacrifice that would guarantee human protection by powerful spirits against malign powers. Continuing belief in the mystical efficacy of blood sacrifices helps to reproduce some rural and urban anti-witchcraft cults associated with reports of children being sacrificed for ‘ritual purposes’, their bodies dismembered and their heads stewed in pots.

In sum, both volumes give a bird’s eye view of developments during the transition from merchant to agro-industrial capitalism: the change over from merchant capital depended on middlemen chiefs to facilitate business between European traders and hinterland suppliers of wild rubber, timber, and earlier slaves. Plantations required free labour – amenable to discipline in the field, educated as clerks and store keepers, converted to Protestant (Basel) Christianity – and considerable capital that the colonial government supplied. Plantations also required a considerable supply of fertile land with secure title. In this regard, both volumes give some consideration to what became known as the Bakweri land question, or Bakweri rights to land appropriated from them for commercial, plantation, mission and government use. The data on Bakweri land is highly topical as the future of the plantation lands are currently under
national and international consideration. As Ardener observes: ‘If the former Bakweri lands are privatized, and come under new foreign ownership, as is rumoured might be the case, we can imagine Knutson turning in his grave’ (p. 10). Note that the Bakweri Land Claims Committee has its own website (www.bakerilands.org).

Readers keen to visualise spatially Knutson’s and Esser’s journeys would have benefited from more detailed maps of the places Knutson and Esser visited. One of the two maps in Knutson’s Memoir is based on an original of the south-west coastal area by Knutson and his colleague Walda. The Esser volume’s map of his routes and the map of the principal linguistic and ethnic groups of the present south-west province are more helpful. Though the editors of both volumes have had to contend with settlement and nomenclature shifts, possible second editions should commission more comprehensive maps to help the interested reader track journeys.

Berghahn and the authors are to be congratulated for making these unusually rich observations by Europeans available to scholars and general readers interested in the history of West-Central Africa.

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Labour Tenancy and Social Change in Rural Natal Society, 1920s-1940s


As a former lawyer, Thomas McClendon brings a particular set of understandings to the area of labour tenancy law in South Africa, particularly in the region now known as KwaZulu-Natal. Curiously, while specifically focussed on rural Natal the title of the volume implies a study of
South Africa more generally. Indeed, the real geographical focus of the study is a comparatively small but carefully chosen and justified area the author calls Central Natal, comprising the five magisterial districts of Estcourt, Lions River, New Hanover, Umvoti and Weenen. That oddity aside, the work sits well amongst the increasing number of regional historical studies in South Africa, and is a welcome addition to the small number of recent works on rural areas. Setting out to explore rural Natal society during the period in which rapid industrialisation was stripping rural areas of their labour forces as the young pursued employment and dreams in the big cities, McClendon perceptively recognises that while the customary law system had been intended to bolster rural patriarchy, in practice its administration ‘ironically provided opportunities for women and youths to challenge patriarchal authority ....’ (p. 3). Here both the gender and the generations of the title open up a dissonant cleft through which the author can explore their internal conflicts and the context within which those conflicts occurred: the massive social changes which occurred as a consequence of the invasions by white commercial farmers.

The research methodology brings together archival material, official accounts such as records from the Natal Commissioner Courts and administrative records, newspapers, and a large body of interview material. The oral history interviews, the memories they represent, and the conclusions McClendon draws from them, are integral to both his research methodology and to the narratives with which he contextualises his central arguments. In interviewing both men and women, for example, he found that the interviews themselves (those present, those giving permission, those allowed to speak) reflected ‘the ongoing intersection of patriarchies’ (n.183, p.131), relationships of both gender and race, usefully playing out the ongoing networks of class and power in these rural societies. The words of the interview participants are further used, very effectively, to frame three of the four substantive chapters. The tables, maps and photographs likewise have been carefully chosen to exemplify and elaborate McClendon’s narrative.

Following a lengthy and comprehensive Introduction, in Chapter 2 (‘Gender and Generation in the Six-Month System through the 1930s’) the author discusses the technicalities of the labour tenancy system under which individual homesteads organised for some of their members (very often young men) to work for the white farmer for six months of each year. The oral accounts of the system which make up the second half of the chapter are remarkably effective in fleshing out the ways in which participants experienced the impacts of a system which had brought considerable change to rural Zulu
society. Chapter 3 (‘Depression, Drought, and the “Drift of Natives”: Crises of Control in the 1930s’), draws less substantially on direct accounts, relying more heavily on official reports and administrative records. Nonetheless, McClendon constructs a competent analysis of the interactions between farmers, tenants and various arms of government in a decade of crisis and economic stress, as more and more young men deserted the rural areas for the cities.

In Chapter 4 (‘Kufanele Ukusebenza Isithupa: Fathers, Sons, and Bridewealth, 1927-1944’) McClendon vividly portrays the inter-generational stresses caused by the departure of the young men, the implications of this for their fathers’ tenure and for their own capacity to marry (because of the impact on the fathers’ capacity to provide lobola): here new social practices crossed traditional understandings of rights, obligations and responsibilities. Using the Native Administration Act (1927) and the records of the Native Commissioners’ Courts, McClendon deftly untangles a complex web of conflicts, of both gender and generation. In the final substantive chapter (‘Courting Tradition, Law, Sexuality, and the Control of Women, 1927-1944’) McClendon confronts the segregation project head on, similarly drawing primarily on legal records for his material but contextualising his documentary analysis through understandings drawn directly from his oral informants. The core arguments again revolve around the central issues of custom, traditional practice, and massive social change.

The sources, documentary, visual and oral, for this work are rich and evocative: the conscious and consistent use of oral history material in careful combination with other more traditional materials has enabled the author to construct a textured account which sheds much light not only on the small place and time on which he has focussed but more widely also on the impacts on African society of tightening segregation practices in the first half of the twentieth century. I suggest that because of the ease of the author’s style, the book would be appropriate for readers from upper-level undergraduates upwards, and further suggest that the sustained use of the direct voices of participants make it something of a model for historians in other areas writing about the recent past.

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The ‘Lifeways’ of Eurafricans: Trade and Social Integration in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century West Africa


George E. Brooks, Professor of History, first conducted fieldwork in West Africa in the early 1960s. In his latest text he examines the ‘lifeways’ of Eurafricans in Western Africa, limiting his study to the earliest era of colonial exploration and expansion in the region, an era initially dominated by Portuguese traders. The complexities of trade and commerce within the nexus of Africans, Portuguese, and Luso-Africans (the children of Portuguese traders and African women) constitutes the bulk of the text, with chapters also devoted to Franco-Africans and Anglo-Africans. Given the historical limitations that the author imposes, Brooks’ primary focus on Portuguese Eurafricans reveals the first examples of trade and social integration between vastly different commercial networks and societies. As these networks grew and consolidated Brooks contends that their interactions established the basic principles of commerce and social organisation upon which later Eurafricans adhered to and followed.

Brooks’ text is set out in a chronological fashion, with the author supplying in the introductory chapters a thorough description of the pre-colonial African states and their commercial networks. His contributions on the Empire of Kaabu are a welcome addition to the literature on the subject, and expand on the works of Gordon Innes and Donald Wright. Kaabu, whose boundaries encompass the modern nations of Guinea Bissau, The Gambia and (the Casamance region of southern) Senegal, was an important trade centre which linked the interior and the coast. Ivory, indigo, ambergris, fish, rice and kola nuts were sought after commodities, and the thriving trade opportunities amongst the coastal and riverine communities created a complex milieu which Brooks reveals. The competition between European traders, trading companies and local interests was at times intense, with bitter rivalries and factionalism rampant. The lucrative slave trade, which surpassed all other commerce, is examined at length in Chapter 8. The trade in slaves lead to violent conflicts and wars between African states as they competed to satisfy the demands of European traders. Brooks situates the lives and roles of Eurafricans within this turbulent period of history, providing a perspective which few other authors have presented.
Of the ten chapters, the author’s contribution on ‘nharaship’ in Chapter 5 deserves attention, as it focuses on the often-neglected role of women traders. ‘Nharas’, a crioulo term, were Luso-African women who had ‘wealth, property, and influence’ derived from their abilities as translators and commercial enterprises. Nharas spoke Crioulo (the language of commerce in the region), were Catholics, and had knowledge of both European and traditional African lifestyles. As ‘invaluable partners in commerce’ Brooks contends that French and English traders chose co-habitation with nharas, rather than African women, as the former offered greater access to commercial networks and elites. Nharas, similarly, chose European traders for their access to commodities and trade outlets. Forming a separate social group, with distinctive housing and clothing, nharas established themselves along Senegal’s Petite Côte and were emblematic of an early example of the integration between African and European societies.

Whilst acknowledging trade as the element which bound the diverse interest groups together, Brooks enhances his text by focusing on the social interactions between the stakeholders. He notes that the fortunes of the Eurafricans were ‘inextricably linked to the vicissitudes of western African societies’, with the Portuguese, for example, ‘constrained to accommodate to the landlord-stranger reciprocities’ that had evolved over generations. This perspective is augmented by ethnological accounts of the region’s major language groups, which include the Mande, Wolof and Fula. The power associations and roles of the craft specialists in these groups are examined, although the author has not made full use of the oral testimonies and histories of the griots, an ‘artisan’ caste within the nyamakala of the Mande. Griots’ oral accounts of the slave trade, such as the narrative Toolongjong, could have provided useful reference material for the author and also contextualised the role of the nyamakalaw. Perhaps, however, this would be stepping too far outside of the focus of the text, for in describing the lives of Eurafricans in West Africa the bulk of the author’s research material was provided from letters, personal diaries, and journals. In explicating the social organisations, however, the author succeeds in providing a cultural paradigm within which Eurafricans lived, with the struggles for control over trade within and between kingdoms and states providing the background and the narrative tension. Whilst a strong focus on Mande social organisations is present, a research area well-represented within the discipline, Brooks provides new historical material, notably the origins of the imposition of tripartite social stratification. In addition, his accounts of the Fula almamates of the Futa Djallon highlands was quite fascinating, with a very complex topic handled concisely.

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Revisiting African Community Leaders in Education in Segregated Southern Rhodesia


This book is a study of African community leaders in education, such as teachers, demonstrators, Chiefs and pastors, or ‘educated African middlemen’ and their search for a role in Southern Rhodesian society in the years between the World Wars of the twentieth century. The author’s ‘very local’ research challenges perceptions that the first generation of leaders born under colonialism were employed agents of white settler oppression and leads to her conclusion that they ‘fully satisfied no one and challenged everyone’ (p. 202). Despite all the constraints education ‘was one of the few spheres of society open to dreams’ (p. 200) and through the experience of schools the author uncovers a ‘colonial interface’ where middlemen pushed racial segregation to the limits, shaped education policy and forged new cultural identities. The book is divided into three parts: conflict over schools; conflict over African professional status; and African cultural innovations. My only criticism of what is a fine book is that the underlying theme of the first two sections, namely, the relationship between education and the quest for African emancipation, is somewhat confused by the content of the third, which to a large extent details how mission clergy exploited Zimbabwe’s ‘communal conversion’ (p. 147) to Christianity for parochial ends. Nevertheless the local material provided in this book is fascinating.

In response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the settler state deepened the inequitable ‘pro-white’ structures of land, employment, taxation and agricultural pricing. Despite a few model government schools and grant allocations, native education was largely the domain of the Church. The school system comprised a minority of ‘first class’ mission schools among a mass of ‘third class’ village ‘outschools’. While some white missionaries and educationalists saw the need to co-opt a native middle class, many advocated that Africans would best heed a practical education and revel in the ‘spirit’ of Christ rather than materialism. Where schools were concerned, however, Summers shows that African communities struggled for nothing less than an education worthy of European society. She contends that because ‘middlemen’ knew that the patriarchal life of land, wives and cattle had gone, they saw...
education as holding the key to the future and especially as a means of appeasing young men. African efforts for better schools usually fell victim to a declining local agrarian economy, particularly with the effects of the Depression amid on-going land dispossession, which in turn reinforced the elite education structure.

In Gutu where the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) controlled the ‘outschools’ by the 1920s, parents demanded that their children learn less Scripture and more English, particularly as the schools benefited from communal land and free labour (p. 11). Meanwhile, Chief Ziki of Devuli Ranch thwarted the expansion of the DRC by recruiting the patronage of the American evangelical board to build a more ‘progressive school’ (p. 19). In 1922, students struck at the Tjolotjo Government School because they wanted to learn how to build square buildings, not round huts (p. 42). At the ‘first class’ Inyati Institute, students forced the resignation of a mean-spirited principal, Mr Brown, as well as a re-think within the London Missionary Society about the lack of academic curricula (p. 38). Prepared to invest their own funds, Umchingwe community leaders enticed the Government to build a school only for it to collapse once it was known that the state-controlled curriculum would fall short of aspirations (p. 68).

Meanwhile, the quest among African teachers and agricultural/community demonstrators (called ‘Jeanes Teachers’) for professional status was itself a challenge to segregation, the author observes, particularly the notion that ‘white power was synonymous with progress and civilization’ (p. 109). Thus, as a professional teacher, the impeccable suits of Mr George Mhlanga, his taste for European food, his purchase of modern consumer goods and elite/stand-offish manner are perceived as affronts to mission patronage and any thought of black servitude (p. 97). Indeed, Mhlanga sought recognition as an ‘independent power’ and later became a founder of the Rhodesian African Teachers Association, which won significant concessions from the Government. Similarly, as a ‘Jeanes Teacher’ in the Zimutu Reserve, Lysias Mukahleyi provoked the wrath of the regional Superintendent of Natives for taking the initiative in land management. At stake was whether black people could wield authority in the Reserves or just remain as ‘supervised underlings’ (p. 134).

In inter-war Rhodesia, the structural barriers to African emancipation through education proved insurmountable – hence the resort to violence in the 1960s by the second generation of black leaders born under colonialism. The content of the third section is a concession to this very reality in that the focus is not on
colonial resistance but on how Wesleyan African clergy within a system of ‘economic subordination’ appropriated the tools of colonialism, such as money and Christian marriage, to forge new cultural identities (p. 146). Again the local research is outstanding. At a personal level, the author details the material aspects of Zimbabwe’s conversion - communion ‘tickets’, uniforms, concerts - and the reconstitution of marriage to a ‘modified form of patriarchy’ (p. 181), all of which helped missionary ‘middlemen’ prosper. Although interesting, I found the variation in theme difficult to comprehend and understand at first.

This is a worthwhile book, which fulfils an important historical need to revise the role of the early African intelligentsia. On the whole the author’s case is convincing: elite ‘educated middlemen’ were far from colonial puppets; they built African status; shaped policy debates; challenged white and black people alike; and laid the foundations for the subsequent emergence of the mass nationalist parties. If only the Rhodesian government had listened to them more, Zimbabwe’s present-day tragedy could well have been averted.

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Preservation in a Fortress or Conservation by the Community?


Dan Brockington’s book addresses the conflict between Western-driven agendas for conservation in Africa and the rights of indigenous people to land and resources. The author was part of a British funded anthropological team which from 1994-1997 examined the livelihoods of local communities and the potential for conflict between conservation and development interests. This case study of the Mkomazi Game reserve in Tanzania is one of the publications that have come out of that project.

Gazetted in 1951, Mkomazi Game Reserve (MGR) was then home to a small number of pastoral families with an estimated 5000 cattle. Residence in MGR facilitated immigration and by the mid-1980s an estimated 100,000 cattle were within the reserve boundary. Tanzanian government officials forcefully evicted
all pastoral families (legal and illegal) and their livestock during the late 1980s, completing the exercise in 1988. Conservation organisations, supported by Western donor funds, have since contributed to the re-stocking of MGR with previously native fauna, including endangered species, and to the ongoing survival of the reserve.

Brockington sets out to highlight the failures of exclusionist conservation policy (fortress conservation) by ‘exploring the histories, environments and societies that have been altered by conservation policies at Mkomazi.’ He challenges politically powerful and well-connected preservation groups, such as the George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust, Tanzanian wildlife authorities and in addition wildlife scientists. He argues that at Mkomazi the preservationist vision is unjust and unnecessary and that the realities imposed on the reserve’s neighbours are harmful. He questions whether in fact the reserve had been degraded by pastoral activity and attempts to show that the economic costs of eviction are not matched by benefits offered. No mention is given to the economic and ecological benefits gained as a result of MGR’s status as a transfrontier park, bordering Kenya’s Tsavo National Park, and little space is given to the viewpoints of the Tanzanian wildlife authorities.

Brockington writes concisely and it is obvious that a good deal of the fieldwork component was for his PhD completed in 1998. Unfortunately he misinterprets some data and attempts to challenge the findings of ecological research done at MGR without any apparent training in biological science. Two examples: He proposes alternate views on environmental change at MGR (p. 57) such as ‘local hunting does not endanger ungulate populations’ or ‘increases in the elephant population in MGR reflect improved poaching controls in Tsavo National Park’ without either refuting or backing up these hypotheses with hard data. Further, in his assessment of benefits gained through tourism since the 1988 eviction, he cites (low) visitor figures pre-1980 (p. 106), when MGR was home to approximately 80,000 cattle.

The book is structured as a case study, but thankfully remains readable to the layperson. His introduction is an excellent overview of the flaws inherent in the preservationist ideology and the oversights of its advocates and financial supporters. He doesn’t portray community-based conservation as the ‘save-all’ and is bold enough to point out the challenges presented by traditionalist African culture.

Fortress Conservation is principally a political indictment of conservation policy in Africa and thereby fails to tell the whole story. There is a general lack
of scientific rigour and persuasive pleading is sometimes used to promote a message. At the same time the book serves as a useful documentation of the realities of wildlife conservation in sub-Saharan Africa and importantly highlights the desperate situation of the Tanzanian rural poor.

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One Hundred Years of the Indian Ocean
Dhow Trade and its role in the
Zanzibar Economy


Erik Gilbert’s study of the dhow economy during the colonial era in Zanzibar is a welcome addition to the ever-growing body of literature on the history of the Swahili coast. He has clearly used his time well in the various archives, particularly in Zanzibar, to paint a detailed picture of the ‘marginal’ dhow economy as it affected the island, following it from its origins in pre-colonial Zanzibar and the slave trade, through the clove era and the mangrove pole trade, to its final days in the 1960s. He works through the arrival of the steamship, demonstrating how, despite an alleged technological superiority and significant government support, the steamers were ultimately unable to compete with the dhow; and how the dhow, increasingly marginalised by the government, nevertheless continued to prosper both by exploiting neglected niches in the officially economy and by remaining outside the areas of colonial control.

The book is well organised, each chapter devoted to a particular theme. The Introduction situates the text with respect to continued colonial era declamations of the end of the dhow trade in an incontrovertible move to modernity, arguing instead that despite the conceptual construction of the dhow trade in opposition to modernity, the dhow continually subverted the colonial enterprise. This Gilbert asserts was due to the participation of the dhow both in a regional economy that transcended the colonial state and in a local economy that underlay and underpinned the colonial economy.
Chapter 2 explains the embeddedness of Zanzibar in the monsoon economy and how in the pre-colonial period the dhow trade was not constituted as a distinct category. There is a consideration of the growing importance of the Atlantic trade followed by a discussion of the boats themselves (and the great variety of craft subsumed under the name ‘dhow’) and the specifics of the cargoes carried in both in the local and the long-distance trade. Chapter 3 follows logically from this explaining the marginalisation of the dhow under the new colonial administration first as a slaving vessel, then as ‘native’, and thus traditional and inefficient. The local and coastal trade in particular suffered as a result both of increasing restrictions and of the German occupation of Zanzibar’s hinterland on the mainland opposite.

Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the clove and mangrove pole trades respectively, two crucial elements in the Zanzibari economy that dhows were able to exploit most effectively. In the case of cloves (and despite persistent efforts on the part of the administration to exclude them) dhows made the most of their ability to serve areas inaccessible to steamers, to run to frequent and flexible schedules, and to price their services competitively. Dhows were also able to access the shallow waters where mangrove poles were cut and establish an effective monopoly over that trade, too. Mangrove poles were shipped to treeless Arabia where they had long been used for construction.

The final chapter discusses the shift in government policy, particularly as a result of wartime shipping shortages in the 1940s, from control and exclusion of dhows to a recognition of their essential role in the economy of Zanzibar, especially after the collapse of the clove trade. Gilbert concludes that the dhow trade, far from being dismantled by the colonial economy, ultimately supported it and was only finally ended by the disappearance of the mangrove pole market as a petrol-rich gulf turned to concrete in the 1960s. By way of a conclusion, however, the Epilogue suggests that a revival of the dhow trade may be underway in post-revolutionary Zanzibar.

Insofar as I have outlined it, this text is thus a competently produced and straightforward work. However, the epilogistic questioning of two fundamental premises of the book (that repeated declamations of the end of the dhow trade were false and that the dhow trade ended with colonialism) points to the ultimately unsatisfactory character of the text. Gilbert’s assertion that the dhow trade ended because the petrol-rich states of the Gulf no longer required East African mangrove poles is unconvincing to anyone who has strolled along the Deira dockside in Dubai; the remarkable coincidence of this petrol-driven
collapse occurring as the revolutionary government in Zanzibar outlawed both
the long-distance dhow trade and local carriage of cloves by dhow, and of the
dhow trade re-emerging as policies change in Zanzibar, seems hard to explain.
Indeed, prior to the epilogue (where it is already a fait accompli) the revolution
itself gets little more than a mention in passing (p. 159), an extraordinary lack
of treatment of an event which radically transformed the island on all levels.
While it may be true that the book’s potential audience will be familiar with the
history of Zanzibar this cannot be taken for granted and anyone unfamiliar
would be left quite bewildered.

There are further shortcomings in the text. A quite fascinating discursion into
the appearance of a schooner on the coast of Tanganyika in the 1930s not only
seems to have very little to do with the rest of the book, but reminds the reader
that apart from a brief discussion of the occupation of the coast by Germany in
the last years of the nineteenth century, any further analysis of events on the
coast opposite for much of the early colonial period is absent. Were there no
economic repercussions on the dhow trade either of the enemy status of the
colonial territory opposite during the First World War or of the mandating of
this territory to Britain in 1920?

Similarly touched upon but not fully explored and thus ultimately not entirely
relevant is the question of identity. Gilbert devotes space in the Introduction to
the issue of Swahili identity (the hoary old question of the Arab and the
African), but then makes no further mention of the question until the final
chapter. If this were a theme of the book, it would have benefited from a more
explicit development; if it were not (and I suspect not), then the introductory
remarks seem misplaced if not irrelevant.

A more general problem with the work is highlighted in a phrase on page 132.
Here the author states that those involved in this regional economy ‘were more
deeply affected by this trade than the low monetary value assigned to the trade
... would suggest’ but does not further develop this line of thinking. While this
is admittedly an economic history the reader is left wondering if the social
dynamics of the dhow trade have not been overlooked. What sorts of
relationships bound together those involved? Gilbert occasionally refers to
family ties, but in passing, not as something to develop. The work could have
benefited from a discussion of religious or of family ties, reasons for the
persistence (or existence) of the dhow trade that could not be added up by an
accountant.

Finally and on a more technical note it is unfortunate that the text betrays its
origins as a thesis to the extent that it does. In particular this has led to much repetition, some of it thematic, some of it quite specific (the author mentions that slavers would run their dhows aground and flee into the bush with their slaves twice in the space of a few pages at the end of Chapter 2 and at the beginning of Chapter 3). The removal of the specific repetitions could have been achieved by a more thorough editing; the removal of the thematic repetitions would have allowed space for the further exploration of other themes as outlined above. Shortcomings notwithstanding, the central themes are competently explored and this text has much to recommend it.

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Research Matters

Old Crop, New Crop: Contracting Out Oil Palm Production in Ghana

Paul Huddleston

Relevant literature indicates that while the incidence of contract farming is increasing globally, limited research has been undertaken on the economic and social impacts on farmers under contract, their families and their rural communities.\(^1\) Very little is known about the impacts of contract farming on such fundamental socio-economic variables as local economic activity, employment patterns, service and infrastructure use and maintenance, household decision making, investment patterns and a number of other variables.\(^2\) Impact in this context is also defined in terms of economic factors such as farmer income levels and distribution and the economic welfare of both farm workers and farm service centres. In a social sense it takes into consideration the general welfare of the farming family.

The issues facing contract farming do not differ significantly between developed and developing nations.\(^3\) In both cases, the discussion in the literature portrays contract farming as being either detrimental to, or an opportunity for, rural people and their communities and in this sense, much of that literature over the last two decades is highly polarised. Opponents of contract farming argue that rural populations in general have been directly or indirectly disadvantaged through the introduction of contract farming while realising only limited gains.\(^4\) They stipulate that the introduction of contract farming is solely a means by which processors, often multi-nationals, control their raw material inputs based on unequal power relationships.\(^5\) They see

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contract farming as being disruptive to the power relations within the farming households, increasing tensions between male household heads, their wives and children.\(^6\) They suggest that contract farming makes farming households more vulnerable to food shortages, particularly where cash crop production replaces staple crops.\(^7\) Proponents of contract farming in contrast argue that evidence suggests that contract farming has the potential to raise the income of growers significantly, particularly small farmers, by increasing their access to information and technology, credit, access to markets and other services.\(^8\) They see contracts as allowing small farmers to cultivate and market non-traditional cash crops and to achieve a multiplier effect on employment, infrastructure and growth in the local economy.\(^9\) While none of these opposing arguments are necessarily definitive globalisation in the sector has certainly given rise to an increasing focus on a number of environmental and socio-economic issues.

**Ghanaian research**
The aim of my research, conducted in the Kwaebibirem District in the Eastern Region of Ghana during August and September 2004, was to ascertain the extent to which contract farming could contribute to rural socio-economic development by collectively examining and analysing contract farming models and experiences using various case studies and reviewing the key variables or elements of contract farming. The research also addressed the question of whether contract farming is an appropriate vehicle for rural development. The assessments made during the study will carefully weigh the social and economic tradeoffs at the household, communal, regional and national levels.

Following a broad and extensive literature review, the research fieldwork focused on contract farming in the oil palm sector in Ghana. While commercial oil palm production has taken place in Ghana for over a century, there is growing evidence that not only are oil palm production levels in Ghana declining but that there are also signs of fractures in their outgrower schemes including the relationships between the farmers and the processors. The situation in Ghana would provide, therefore, a realistic representation of life under contract.

\(^8\) A. Schejtman, *Agroindustry and Small-Scale Agriculture: Conceptual Guidelines for a Policy to Encourage Links Between Them*, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 1996.
The fieldwork undertaken in Ghana included: 1) Structured and semi-structured interviews with farmers under contract to produce oil palm for the Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC) in the Eastern Region of Ghana; 2) Focus group discussions with selected strata of farmers under contract; 3) Interviews with the management of GOPDC, particularly those who interface with the contracted farmers; and, 4) Interviews with the management of the other three main oil palm producers in Ghana. The research also involved unstructured interviews with local and national non-governmental institutions, tertiary institutions and governmental departments and agencies along with the collection of secondary data.

Preliminary findings
There is documentary and anecdotal evidence that the GOPDC outgrower programme under governmental ownership and operation displayed many of the common negative aspects reported in the literature on contract farming. Contract abuse and the avoidance of contract terms involving pricing, produce collection and the weighing of produce were widespread. These corrupt practices in the system plus general administrative failures including the lack of documentation and the slow payment of farmers for their production (farmers were frequently not paid for months after the collection of their production) led to the general abuse of the contractual system by the farmers who diverted their production to small local oil palm mills. The general malaise led to serious acrimony between the farmers, their organisations and the GOPDC. The situation resulted in social and economic losses by all those involved in the industry: The processor had insufficient produce to maintain efficient levels of production at their mill; The farmer lost access to agricultural advice and other services, transport, quality control, an assured market and to evolving technology; and, the landowner lost access to rental payments.

A reversal in the fortunes of both the outgrowers and the GOPDC has resulted from the privatisation of the GOPDC and its outgrower program by government in 1995. The acrimony that led to the total breakdown of relations between GOPDC and the Farmer’s Organisation, so evident in the early 1990s, was a distant memory by 2004. Farmers, when questioned about the present role of their organisation, were generally unaware of any role that it played

and, in some cases, even of its existence. Clearly, the direct relationship between the private sector GOPDC and their outgrowers has improved remarkably in the last nine years.

In spite of the fact the privatised GOPDC has removed the excesses from the outgrower program, the outgrowers, without exception, reported high satisfaction with respect to the increased professionalism in their treatment by GOPDC staff. The regularity of the collection of their oil palm fresh fruit bunches (FFB), the objectivity and accuracy of the weighing systems and the rapid payment by GOPDC for their product has resulted in greater trust between the parties. The recent introduction of a computerised accounting and reporting system, provided reports to farmers on a routine basis, has been responsible for these improved relations.

As noted, the GOPDC has removed many of the ‘socialised’ aspects of the outgrower programme. They no longer provide clothing and tools as the government owned GOPDC once did and recent years has seen the demise of the farm credit system for the purchase of fertilizer and other on farm requirements. GOPDC, however, still does provide agricultural credit for new outgrowers for the purchase of seedlings and fertilizer during the initial establishment period, usually three to five years. Older outgrowers are left to fend for themselves unless they fully meet their pre-determined delivery targets, at which point they are rewarded with some access to farm credit. The outgrowers are also provided with communal incentives whereby if all outgrowers in the community meet their targets, the community as a whole will receive rewards in the form of social infrastructure such as a health clinic, a road or a school.

In respect to the objectives of the research, a preliminary assessment of the responses received from interviewed farmers indicated that the main benefit of being an outgrower was increased income for their family. Primarily, outgrowers used the additional or increased income for improvements to their housing, their children’s education or investment into other agricultural activities. Most outgrowers reported that they have diversified and ventured into other cash crops such as cocoa and oranges with income surpluses from their oil palm farms. All respondents also indicated that they used technology used on their oil palm farms on their other non-oil palm farms. All reported having achieved a better social standing in their communities as people sought out their advice on both farm and non-farm matters.
In respect of the community, the data and anecdotal evidence suggests that greater employment by both the outgrowers (casual) and the nuclear plantation (full time and casual) has resulted in enhanced income distribution throughout the community. Virtually all outgrowers reported that they employed casual labour for planting, weeding and harvesting of the FFBs. Interestingly, the labourers themselves met periodically to set their own rates that they dictated to the employers. Most outgrowers reported the rates set by labour to be acceptable and certainly, the rates did not deter their use of hired labour.

Outgrower communities showed evidence of newer or improved housing over non-outgrower communities. Beyond housing, communities benefited from additional income in the community with greater investments in business enterprises and in social infrastructure. The increased availability of investment funds has resulted in the establishment of more formalised business structures as compared to non-outgrower communities. Evidence existed in the form of improved agricultural feeder roads, village roads, schools and health facilities in the communities visited by the researcher.

In the final analysis, the presence of commercial oil palm production in the area has improved the welfare of outgrowers, farm labour and their communities. In the case of GOPDC, this affects the communities and the people in an area within thirty kilometres of the nuclear estate oil palm processing mill.

On the negative side, outgrowers and community leaders reported that the increased wealth in their communities has attracted greater levels of thievery by outsiders attracted to their success. Many of the outgrowers, while appreciating the increased respect that they have attracted from their success as oil palm producers, reported that their obligations to extended family, friends and community neighbours has also increased to an unwelcome level.

**Conclusion**
The evidence collected from the GOPDC, their outgrowers and the communities that they live in does suggest that contract farming has the potential to raise the income of growers significantly, particularly small farmers, by increasing their access to information and technology, credit, access to markets and other services. The outgrower scheme established by GOPDC has allowed small farmers to cultivate and market non-traditional cash

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crops. Interviews, anecdotal and visual evidence suggests that that there has indeed been a multiplier effect on employment, improved or new infrastructure and growth in the local economy. In a very real sense, the outgrower scheme has contributed to rural development in the Kwaebibirem District of the Eastern Region of Ghana.

While the success of the GOPDC outgrower program in these terms is evident, one should not extrapolate this to all outgrower schemes or, indeed, even to other oil palm schemes in Ghana. Research elsewhere, however, does indicate that private sector schemes in the oil palm sector have a greater chance for economic success and a greater chance for bring about greater socio-economic and rural development.

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Women and Empire: Primary Sources on Gender and Anglo-Imperialism, 1750-1930

Liz Dimock

This title heralds a six-volume series to be published by Routledge in 2006. The series will consist of anthologies of texts and illustrations, with headnotes and a scholarly introduction. The series includes individual volumes for Africa, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and the West Indies. I am editing the Africa volume.

I have searched archival collections in the British Library, Rhodes House and the Royal Commonwealth Society Library for unpublished or un-examined material for the project, and in November 2004, with funding from La Trobe University, I spent a month in Cape Town. This was a fruitful period. The University of Cape Town has excellent primary resources in the Manuscripts and Archives Collection and rare published volumes in the African Studies library. I also explored Cape Archives, one of the national repositories and an important source of material about slavery, on which there are teams of researchers currently working. The National Library nearby was a further place of work.
One theme that progressed well concerned the networks of women within South Africa who had connections with British women or British organisations; their correspondence provides insights to the imperial connection. I also furthered my own knowledge concerning women’s involvement in anthropology, medicine, education, social welfare and political issues through examining archives on Dorothy Bleek, Dr Janet Waterston, women in the Molteno family, Olive Schreiner and Marie Koopmans de Wet, amongst many others.

The project is now well advanced. However, if anyone has material that they would like to bring to my notice, for any part of Africa that had British connections in the period 1750 to 1930, I would be pleased to hear from you. Please contact me on: E.Dimock@latrobe.edu.au

La Trobe University
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Namibia’s Arid Lands Research Institute: Combining Desert Ecology with the Search for Community Development

Robin Burns*

This note is about the Gobabeb Training and Research Centre (GTRC) formerly the Desert Ecological Research Unit in Namibia. Now an NGO based on a joint venture between the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) and the Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN) GTRC the station began in 1963 as a joint project of the Transvaal Museum, the State Museum of Windhoek and the South West African Administration. Since then it has evolved from a centre for basic research conducted by white scientists and students to a centre for training and research that is oriented to education and problem-solving for Namibia and the wider South African Development Community (SADC). It produced over 500 scientific papers in its first twenty-five years, now attracts scientists world-wide and hosts up to 300 visitors per annum. The only arid lands training institute south of the Sahara, the focus of its work is desert ecology. I have been associated with the centre during my nine years of fieldwork in Namibia.

Physically GTRC consists of a group of buildings on the site of an old ‘Hottentot’ village on the banks of the Kuiseb River, 110 km southeast of the town of Walvis Bay. It is in the Namib-Naukluft National Park and is situated at the crossroads of the three main Namib ecosystems: the gravel plains to the north, the sand sea to the south, and the ephemeral Kuiseb River oasis. The station has recently undergone complete renovation and extension funded by German, Danish and Japanese government development assistance agencies and attempts to demonstrate eco-sensitive principles through the use of rammed earth for construction, water saving devices and solar power.

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1 R. F. Lawrence ‘The Namib Desert Biological Station’, Suid Afrikaanse Joernaal vir Wetenskap 56 4, p. 90; M. K. Seeley Desert Ecological Research Unit, Education and Culture Opvoeding en Kultuur 2, 6, pp. 5, 22, 26, 34.
Gobabeb’s present profile is in part a response to the changing funding basis since Namibian independence in 1990. From early 2005 it must be self-supporting and part of the site development has been to provide conference facilities as a joint income generation and training resource. Other sources of income include training programs for tertiary institutes in Namibia and fees for all visitors including overseas interns. The change also reflects a changing consciousness amongst the long-term staff of GTRC of the fact that they are not an isolated unit but exist side by side with a small community of very poor subsistence farmers. This community consists of a Nama tribe called ‘Topnaar’ by the Dutch. They speak Nama and constitute two groups one of about 400 people who live in twelve small settlements along the lower Kuiseb River and the other lives 500 km to the north. The Nama, the only people living in the harsh Namib Desert, belong to the Khoi-Khoin group which includes the San. They have become centred in the Kuiseb area following pressure from Herero migrations and also movements by other Nama people. The traditional Khoi-Khoin nomadic life is restricted for the Topnaar by the harsh environment of the Namib. It is also constricted by the designation of that area as a national park in 1907.

The Topnaar resisted attempts in 1907 to move them outside the Park, rightly claiming several centuries of occupation but gained residence at the cost of restriction of hunting and herding to the immediate vicinity of the river bed. As a result of their ongoing dispute with the Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism the area was largely neglected under South African administration; for example the first improvements to the water supply were made only in 1979. An unsolved dispute for succession in 1910 deprived them of a ruler for sixty-six years; a new leader was nominated in 1976 and his son was elected leader in 1981. Nor have the Topnaar fared much better since independence. Notwithstanding a new leader to organise and represent them, they did not go into exile during the independence struggle and have therefore been slow to reap any benefits from it. The majority live their traditional subsistence existence based on herding cattle and goats, fishing (at the coast), gardening and gathering the !nara fruit which provides food and water.

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The nearest Topnaar village to Gobabeb is a few kilometers away. Topnaar are employed at the station in general maintenance capacities. The employment structure of the station provides few long-term employment possibilities, and there is a gap between those at the lowest end: cleaners, labourers and workshop personnel, and the administrators and scientific assistants. When I first undertook fieldwork at the station in 1995 the administration was carried out by long-term international volunteers. The MET office dealt with Park matters like permits, now undertaken by the GTRC Administrator. The senior scientist then in residence, a South African, has become the Executive Director. The number of research assistants varies with activities and funds.

Gobabeb has long been a primary weather station, and one of its scientific strengths is the long term monitoring data recorded there. The actual data gathering is allocated to whoever is available: local paid research assistants, or local or visiting interns. The librarian (the Director’s wife) shares her time between Gobabeb and the DRFN in Windhoek. Another strength of the institute is the invaluable collection of arid ecology literature and a new multimedia Community Resource Centre is part of the recent upgrading of Gobabeb facilities.

Over the years that I have been visiting Gobabeb, one of four sites where I am undertaking a study of scientific fieldwork in remote areas, I have followed the relationships between the station and the Kuiseb Topnaar community. This led to a plea from the Director as I was leaving in May 2004 to assist them in developing ‘more productive’ relationships with the local Topnaar community; and in turn I am requesting readers’ input to this.

A graph drawn from the opening of the research station to the present would show a stepwise increase in Gobabeb-Topnaar contact. The longest-standing staff are several elderly Topnaar including one couple. But to the best of my knowledge no Topnaar has ever been employed in a scientific or administrative job there. One reason for this is the low educational standards of most black Namibians. Five years before independence, school retention rates were still very low. While reliable retention figures are not available, in 1984/5 Standard I (third year of schooling) enrolments were approximately sixty-one percent of those commencing school, Std VI were thirty-six percent of those in Std I, and a mere fourteen percent were in Std X. Retention rates for the Nama group overall were much higher than the national average and also higher than the Herero, a group of comparable size. The Namas constituted an increasing proportion of all children in school, rising from 2.79 percent at entry and 4.23
percent at Std I, to a peak of 5.89 percent at Std VI and 4.9 percent at Std X. However, these figures were for all Nama speakers and no data are available for the Topnaars. The figures suggest few Topnaars were finishing secondary schooling and I suspect there has not been a big change since independence. Education obviously affects employability at a specialised institute even though it offers on-the-job training. The existence of a Topnaar settlement at Walvis Bay may also drain potential employees towards to town and its services rather than the remote research station.

There have been station-initiated projects directly related to Topnaar livelihoods. A drive to employ Topnaar people and provide some transferable training and resources took place during the recent building program. They were commissioned to make rammed earth bricks and delivered three lots of bricks, using a machine bought for them and donated at the end in the hope that they would establish an ongoing income-generating activity. The bricks were of unusable quality but because the people complained they were poor and their labour had been exploited, they were paid for two of the three lots. The machine appears to have been abandoned.

Another project involved attempts to increase water availability through precipitation collection from large fog screens (fog is the major source of precipitation in the Namib). The yield was small and since the funding ceased fog harvesting seems to have collapsed. A second project investigated factors affecting !nara yields following complaints of falling harvests. Other projects have sought information from the Topnaar on seasonal water use and sources, patterns of use of two major animal fodder seedpods, and an attempt to develop links between the Topnaar and a Nama-speaking group in the South African Richtersveld, who are also inhabitants of a national park. The Topnaar community is now listed as one of the partners of the DRFN and GTRC as well as being one of the stakeholders in the Kuiseb Basin River Management Committee. While training in water management has been available through this project the committee has instigated charges for water usage that has been resented by the Topnaar.

Gobabeb appears to be still perceived largely as a privileged white enclave occasionally contacting the local people when it seems to want something from them. This may have been perpetuated, despite a largely new staff in recent years, by the inability to appoint a black Namibian Executive Director and

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Administrator. In addition, there are three distinct, sometimes competing, groups making it difficult for government as well as the station to know whom to address. And projects which have not achieved sustainability by the time funding ceases contribute to community cynicism about Gobabeb intentions.\(^6\)

The Director wants to be involved with the local community, as do others at the station, both black and white. The Director feels that the Topnaar’s interest in Gobabeb consists mainly in its providing transport to the coast, especially in emergencies. He resists this definition of the GTRC role, having argued earlier from an ecological model that subsidisation impoverishes the recipients.\(^7\) He has not found an area of mutual interest, even scholarships or training opportunities. The fact that the initiative for involvement seems to come entirely from the Gobabeb side does not augur well at this stage.

The issues raised by the GTRC conundrum are at the heart of the whole problematic of community development in the case of research institutes and the local societies within which they are located. What do both communities expect of each other? Do the Kuiseb Topnaar want more contact with the GTRC? What do they expect from such contact? To whom do they look for partnership or assistance? A small population that has had to defend itself from outside encroachments, they were politically isolated under South African rule where each ethnic group was administered by a separate authority, anticipating full Bantustan development. To what extent do the Topnaar consider themselves active players in the new Namibia? How might this be acted out at the local level with an institution that existed prior to independence but which is more likely to espouse the national discourse of development than the Topnaar villagers?

A sub-theme in the development dilemma concerns indigenous knowledge and the sources of community and national direction today. The Swedish-educated inaugural Minister for Education, Nahas Angula, recognised the divisive nature of pre-independence education and espoused culture as a unifying and nation building force, stressing education as a foundation not only for development but for democracy.\(^8\) Whether or not African cultures are a source for contemporary democratic citizenship is open to question.\(^9\) The development of

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\(^6\) Petra Moser, Personal communication, 2004.  
\(^7\) Henschel, Op cit.  
dialogue between the Topnaar and the GTRC must find a common discourse against a background of separation.

In this complex situation I, as a social scientist, have been asked to suggest ways to break the deadlock. I do not speak Nama and have not undertaken detailed community work. I am therefore appealing to others to suggest information sources and steps towards a new approach that will encourage ‘more productive’ relationships between the Gobabeb and the local people.

Arabian Africans or African Arabs?: The Dynamics of Islamic African Identity in the Arabian Peninsula

Iain Walker

The role of Islam in shaping global events is undeniable and Australia is engaged with Islam not only as a result of its alliance with the United States but by virtue of its substantial Islamic population and its relationships with its Islamic neighbours and partners. A newly funded ARC Discovery project will focus on one specific part of the Islamic world, the northwest Indian Ocean, and one aspect of the issue, that of constructions of identities.

In 1998 East Africa was the scene of two terrorists attacks. Several of those responsible were Muslims from East Africa rather than from Arabia, yet they were operating under the aegis of Al-Qaeda, an Arab-dominated fundamentalist organisation. This fact raises some fundamental questions about identity that this project intends to confront. What prompts East Africa Muslims to identify themselves with Arab fundamentalism given that firstly, they are not Arab and secondly, East African Islam is predominantly of the historically tolerant Sha’afi school and not the Wahabi variant practised in Saudi Arabia that has given rise to fundamentalism? The answer lies in the ideology of being Arab: East Africans aspire to being Arab in many senses of the term: it is an ideal identity. This prompts the questions this project will confront: how, why, and for whom do African Muslims construct their identities as ‘arab’? What does being ‘arab’ mean to African Muslims? How far is it desirable to be ‘arab’ and how far is it possible to become ‘Arab’? If one becomes ‘arab’ how completely can one become ‘Arab’, who sets the limits and what do they imply for those concerned? In order to answer these questions, it is essential to explore the processes of construction of identities within the diversity of praxis among East African Muslims.
The theoretical framework for this project centres upon issues of identity in space. One of the principal problems of contemporary thinking on identity is precisely the territorial character of attempts at analysis, and even an appeal to concepts such as ‘transnationalism’, ‘diasporas’ and ‘globalisation’ evoke a quintessentially Western preoccupation with spatial mobility (or lack of it, or supposed lack of it) that has its roots in the historically sedentary cultures of Western Europe. However other societies are less fettered by territorial attachments. In Arabia not only do definitions of political units depend on social allegiances rather than territorial claims but historically long distance movements of peoples (for purposes of trade, religion, education) are quite unexceptional: many attachments that could be defined as ‘territorial’ extend across large tracts of ‘non-territory’ such as ocean or desert.

Transnational movements are not special in the Arab and Islamic world. For more than two millennia an Indian Ocean world, a ‘global’ world, has extended from south-east Africa through Arabia to south-east Asia and beyond. It was and still is an intricate network of social, political, religious, economic and cultural links that have bound together millions of individuals across thousands of kilometres and four continents. Here globalisation and associated issues are far from new: they have been a feature of social dynamics for centuries; here globalisation is historical, transnational links have been in place for centuries, the Western colonial experience is attenuated and Western influence itself is negotiated in a very different fashion. The problems of globalisation as formulated by contemporary anthropological thinking have become an obstacle to research in the region: treating a phenomenon as radically novel and socially disruptive when it is quite the opposite cannot aid in an analysis of the social networks and constructions of identity among the societies in question.

The inherently Western bias in the approach to the study of the transnational, globalisation and diasporas needs to be removed; the focus of attention must be shifted away from the colonial/post-colonial dichotomy to concentrate on the relationships and networks in East Africa and South Arabia as they are constructed through ongoing interaction. This project will be concerned with the social and the affective dimensions of identity formation and boundary construction, analysing the strategies used to determine group membership, inclusion and exclusion in a context where markers of identity may frequently be changing. This fluid, context-dependent character of identity means that Africans in Arabia may be Arabs in Africa, and so it is essential to analyse how potential identities are both internalised by the actors and externalised in the appropriate contexts.
The project will necessarily use the historical to frame the present. Three research sites have been chosen in each region to reflect their different roles in the historical development of the relationships between the two regions. The relationship between Hadramut and East Africa is historically anchored, dating back at least 2000 years with alternating periods of activity and quiescence but with an enduring social permanence. Oman was a colonial power, highly influential in East Africa from the late eighteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, with real political power accompanying the establishment of the capital of the Omani sultanate in Zanzibar in the mid-nineteenth century. Finally the United Arab Emirates is a contemporary point of reference for many East Africans. In East Africa, Zanzibar, like Oman, was powerful in the nineteenth century, while Lamu has been a centre for religious learning for centuries; the Comoros were at the peak of their influence in the era of European expansion and today struggle to participate in the networks.

An historical background provides the basis for the analysis of the present networks of relationships; relationships that are manifested through daily acts and deeds: conversations, use of language (both in a linguistic sense and in a semantic one), economic exchanges and reciprocity in all its forms, teaching and education, travel, political participation, storytelling and myth making, residence patterns and hospitality, cuisine, performance (music, art, song and dance), religious practice, including prayer and ritual, kinship, marriage, birth and funerals. Narratives, genealogies and biographies, personal histories and stories, all reveal both the ‘real’ and the ‘perceived’ in transnational relationships and allow for definitions of ‘Arab’ and ‘African’, how they are perceived, what they imply and how they change.

All these activities (and they are inextricably associated) are fields of social interaction in which identity is constantly being expressed, fixed, negotiated, contested, accorded. Since identity is constantly shifting it is highly important to identify the specific expressions of identity in a given set of circumstances. Who is included and when and how do patterns of activity shift, since such shifts often make statements about those participating? For example, when do bilingual individuals speak Swahili and when do they speak Arabic? Identity is expressed both explicitly (definitions of self or other as being ‘African’ or ‘Arab’) and implicitly or contextually (cultural markers of identity such as dancing a specific dance or using a given language).

Questions also arise regarding the constituent components of identity: to what extent is being ‘Arab’ separable from being Islamic? Given that all subjects are
likely to be Muslim, does education at a *madrasa* in Yemen provide any credentials as an Arab? Given that Hadramut is a seat of Sha’afi learning, is there a specific reaction against the Wahabi fundamentalism of Saudi schools and is this relevant to the issues at hand? Are there any negative connotations to being African (the answer is certainly yes) that prompt self-identification as Arab? Is there genealogical reinvention that can be revealed through data collected in Africa?

The problem of defining the subjects of the project will be resolved not by locating Africans per se, but by working in locations (both physical and social) that may be identified as nodes in networks linking Africa and Arabia and then following networks from those nodes to other (social and physical) locations. This will throw up a wide range of individuals subject to an equally diverse range of influences: traders, students, pilgrims, family members. Some (students) will be more open to Islamic networks, others (traders) to Arab influences. Certain places are more likely than others (Tarim rather than Sana’a), as are certain contexts: individuals who have active links with Africa are likely to participate in networks in which issues of identity along the African/Arab continuum are relevant. However, the environment is essential since the study of identity cannot proceed by identifying members of the desired subject groups; rather, they must constitute themselves as the project unfolds.

The aim of this project is to explain how and why many African Muslims align themselves with the Arab world, thus contributing to an understanding of the diversity of local variants of Islam. This latter point merits emphasis, for despite a fundamental commonality of experience and a basis of shared beliefs, the unvarying Islam of the Western imagination does not exist: Islam is a collection of often locally specific socio-cultural manifestations. In the contemporary context an analysis of the relationships between Islamic peoples is fundamental to an understanding of the development of Islamic identity across social and cultural boundaries.

*University of Sydney*

*Sydney, New South Wales*
AFSAAP Annual General Meeting 2004: Minutes

The AGM of the Association for 2004 was held at the University of Western Australia, the conference venue, on Saturday November 27. The meeting opened at 4.15pm with vice-president Dr Geoffrey Hawker in the chair.


Business arising
(i) Report to AGM on ACFID-African working group – from Wayne Pelling
Some ACFID members are encouraging membership of AFSAAP. ACFID’s policy on Africa and Australia is being formulated. Once it has been completed, Wayne Pelling will be asking that AFSAAP be given a copy, though there may be issues of confidentiality.
(ii) Formal ties established between AFSAAP and the Sudanese Online Research Association (SORA). See Secretary’s report (appended).

Reports
Secretary
The Secretary’s report (appended below) was tabled, discussed and accepted. Arising from this, it was suggested that AFSAAP seek to establish links with DFAT and NGOs. The Secretary will undertake this responsibility. Jeremy Martens, the 2004 Conference Convenor, remarked that all the High Commissioners in Perth were contacted, but none came to the Conference.

Treasurer
The Treasurer’s report for 2003-2004 (appended below) was tabled, discussed and provisionally accepted subject to verification. Some anomalies were discovered, notably the figures in total (B) were inconsistent.

Editor ARAS
The Editor’s report (appended below) was discussed and accepted.
Dr. Hawker commended Prof. Gertzel’s editorship and recognised the significance of the transition. Prof. Gertzel’s efforts over the last seventeen years were recognised by a motion to that effect, which was duly passed, and by a round of applause from the members.

**Election of Officers**

The following officers were nominated, seconded and elected

- **President:** Prof. Deryck Schreuder
- **Vice-President:** Dr Geoffrey Hawker
- **Secretary:** Graeme Counsel
- **Treasurer:** Dr Tanya Lyons
- **Editor ARAS:** Prof. Helen Ware
- **Review Editor ARAS:** Dr Jeremy Martens
- **Conference2005 Convenor:** Prof. Helen Ware
- **Ordinary members**
  - Dr Liz Dimock
  - Dr Christine Mason
  - Wayne Pelling
  - Dr Jonathan Makuwira
  - Professor Cherry Gertzel
- **Postgraduate member:** David Robinson

David Robinson agreed to continue as the Postgraduate member upon such time that a student from the University of New England (the venue for the 2005 conference) is appointed. Prof. Gertzel suggested that the Review Editor of ARAS be included as an Office holder. This was accepted.

**Other business**

(i) The venue of the 2005 conference was confirmed as the University of New England, located in Armidale, New South Wales. Prof. Helen Ware will be the Conference Convenor. The dates of the meeting were discussed, with different dates proposed. Prof. Ware suggested that members with strong feelings on the topic contact her by email. No date has been confirmed at this stage.

(ii) A motion was put forward that Prof. Cherry Gertzel be given Life Membership of AFSAAP. The motion was carried unanimously.

(iii) Conference 2006 – calls for expressions of interest. No calls were forthcoming.
The meeting closed at 5.00 pm with a unanimous vote of thanks by acclamation to Dr Jeremy Martens and his assistants for the successful organisation of the conference.

Secretary’s Report 2003 – 2004

Developments in the year have included:

- The creation of a web page at the Association’s web site which lists member’s interests and contact details. This page has proved popular with the members and has enabled closer links between individuals, the media, and other African-related organisations.


- Responding to enquiries about the Association, including attendance at the 2004 conference at the University of Western Australia.

- The promotion of the *Australasian Review of African Studies* to local, national and international institutions and libraries.

- Advocating AFSAAP’s role and seeking new members. In 2004, for example, the Sudanese Online Research Organisation, a non-government organisation based in Victoria which is affiliated with United Nations development programmes, sought to establish formal ties with AFSAAP. At their recent meeting AFSAAP’s Executive Officers agreed to the proposal. This ‘formal tie’ will likely take the form of links at web sites and other forms of advocacy and promotion of each other’s role.

- Creating electronic copies of AFSAAP documents and maintaining AFSAAP’s database.

- General Secretarial duties, including establishing contact with new members

The Secretary has also been involved in the compilation of the forthcoming edition of the Directory of Africanists in Australasia and The Pacific. Many new contacts have been established and the Directory should be ready for publication in early 2005.

My thanks to members of the Executive and other members of the Association for their support during the year.
AFSAAP Treasurer's Report 01 July 2003 - 30 June 2004

Funds are deposited in the Australian Central Credit Union (Marion Branch, SA)

African Visitor’s Fund (maintained by donations monies transferred annually)
Liberty 12 Month Investment Account Number 61684338
Balance at 30 June 2004 $13,410
CREDITS
Interest $595.59
Total (A) $595.59

Working Account
My Account number 61568472
Balance at 30 June 2004 $8066.35
CREDITS:
Subscriptions (financial yr): $4825.68
Donations/Back Orders: $185***
Interest: $3.63
Total (B) $5014.31
Total CREDITS: (C) =(A+B) $5609.69

DEBITS:
AFSAAP Review and Newsletter (June 2003+Dec 2003): $2851.75
Editorial Assistant (Karen Miller) $687.6
Website Designer (Jenny Clift) $100
Postgrad Prize (Clare Buswell 2002 and Edith Miguda 2003)$200
Govt BAD Tax $16.10
Cheque book fee $3

Total DEBITS: (D): $3858.45

Working balance (E) =(C-D) $1751.24
Total Balance at 01 July 2004 $21,476.35
2003 Conference Accounts Summary*
Debit $5388
Credit $5260
Total - $127.80 (loss)**

Notes
* Conference Summary is included here as the AFSAAP treasurer was also the conference convener.
**Total loss includes $304 postgraduate subsidies.
*** $185 transferred to Liberty Account on maturity 22 October 2004. New balance $13,887.28 @ 5.05% Annual effective yield.

Comments on Subscriptions 2004 Calendar year
As of July 1st 2004 we have 107 paid subscriptions for 2004 (Jan-dec) (equivalent to $3460 in subs), compared to 155 for 2003 (Jan-Dec). Since increasing our membership fees at the 2003 AGM we have managed to maintain a decent working balance. I recommend we keep the current subscription fee structures.

Editor’s Report
This being my final report as Editor the main item to report is that I am delighted to announce that Professor Helen Ware has agreed to assume the Editorship as from the June 2005 issue. I am sure that everyone will be delighted that she is able to take this on.

After some discussions with various members of the executive and others who have followed the development of ARAS over the past three years it has been recognised that given the growth of the journal, especially in its peer-reviewed form since 2001, it is no longer possible for one person to assume responsibility for the whole production. It has therefore been agreed that the position of Review Editor should be instituted, and I am also delighted that Jeremy Martens has agreed to take on this task.

I urge members of AFSAAP to give both Helen and Jeremy the same support that I have enjoyed over the years, and to keep in mind that ARAS is a good place.
Conferences

Africa: Peace, Progress, Passion and Sustainability. The twenty-eighth Annual Conference of the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) will be held at the University of New England, Armidale, New South Wales from 25th to 27th November 2005. The conference convenor is Professor Helen Ware. The theme of Africa: Peace, Progress, Passion and Sustainability reflects the broad and diverse interests of AFSAAP members and others concerned with Africa whilst also highlighting key issues for a continent which needs peace, a new deal for its citizens at the grass-roots and a renaissance of effective governance.

Regular updates on the conference will be posted during the next few months on the AFSAAP website http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/global/afsaap/

Further information from Professor Helen Ware, AFSAAP Conference Convenor, Email: hware@une.edu.au

Middle passages: the Oceanic Voyage as Social Progress. An interdisciplinary conference to be held in Perth, Western Australia, July 13-16th 2005. Sponsored by the International Centre for Convict Studies and the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Western Australia, this conference will be hosted by the Western Australian Maritime Museum in Fremantle (near Perth) Western Australia. The aim of this international conference is to explore the social and cultural transformations caused by the transport of labour, unfree and free, around and across the Atlantic, Indian and pacific Oceans. Conference convenors are Professor Marcus Rediker, University of Pittsburgh, USA and Professor Cassandra Pybus, University of Tasmania, Australia.

Further information from the Institute of Advanced Studies UWA, see their web site www.ias.uwa.edu.au OR Email: ias@admin.uwa.edu.au.

Reclaiming Development? Assessing the contribution of Non-Governmental Organisations to Development Alternatives, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) University of Manchester, 27-29 June 2005. Contact Debra Whitehead: email: debra.whitehead@man.ac.uk

Private Military Companies and Global Civil Society: Ethics, Theory and Practice, University of KwaZuluNatal, South Africa 14-16 July 2005. Further information Deane Baker; e-mail: <BakerDP@ukzn.ac.za>
Note for Contributors

The Australasian Review of African Studies, as the only Australian journal devoted entirely to African affairs, aims to publish both scholarly and generalist articles and other materials that contribute to a better understanding of contemporary African societies and states: authoritative, informed, critical material on Africa and African affairs that is both interesting and readable.

What makes the Review distinctive as a professional journal is its ‘mix’ of authoritative scholarly and generalist material on critical African issues. Each issue includes a number of scholarly and generalist articles on African affairs; short notes on current African issues and events; reports on research and professional involvement in Africa, and notes on African university activities. The journal is inter-disciplinary in scope and welcomes articles across the broad range of African affairs written from different disciplinary and professional perspectives across the humanities and social sciences. Articles that explore the historical context within which contemporary African issues have to be situated are particularly welcome as is comparative material on Africa, Asia and the Pacific and shorter notes that provide critical background understanding of current issues.

Articles should usually be no more than 4,500-5000 words. Articles are peer reviewed and two referees’ reports submitted to the writer. The final decision as to acceptance and publication is made by the editor in consultation with the two referees. Shorter notes and reports should not exceed 2,000 words. We ask that contributors write in a form that makes their work available to as broad an audience as possible, both academic and non-academic.

All contributions should be formatted to be compatible with Microsoft Word and sent electronically as an attachment. If this is not possible they should be sent via the post on a floppy disk.

The journal’s style sheet, as well as a copy of a recent issue of the journal is available on request from the Editor.

All manuscripts and correspondence from January 2005 should be sent to:
The Editor, Prof. Helen Ware
The Australasian Review of African Studies
Peacebuilding, School of Professional Development and Leadership,
University of New England,
Armidale, New South Wales, Australia, 2351.