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About AFSAAP
Back in 2000 Gavin Kitching sparked a major debate about giving up African Studies, in these very pages of ARAS, which soon spread to online journals from the USA, and eventually made its way to the mainstream media in Australia. His main argument was that African studies had become depressing, because the leaders he had supported during anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles had become the tyrants, keeping their countries and peoples subjugated and in poverty. His departure from the field of African studies flowed on the tide of Australian academics moving toward more mainstream fields of study including Asian studies, keeping job prospects open rather than closed. A rational choice in the face of an irrational Africa!

Since then, there has been a dearth of African studies and research in Australia. However, with the demise of the Howard years and a shift in international strategy from the Rudd Labor Government, a focus on Africa has been acknowledged as ‘necessary’ for a number of reasons, but mostly because of big business opportunities in the mining sector, and the possibility of securing support from African nations for Australia to get a seat on the UN Security Council. Indeed the Minister for Foreign Affairs has only just recently on 21 October 2009, called an “Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with the Countries of Africa,” and given organizations (such as AFSAAP) and individuals until 11 December 2009 to make a submission. However, while this remains a fairly short and narrow focus in Canberra and in the boardrooms of the multinational miners, it is interesting that at least this Parliamentary Committee is planning to “consider both the current situation and opportunities for the future.” Senator Michael Forshaw, the Chair of this committee stated that, “The last major Committee inquiry into Australia’s relationship with Southern Africa was back in 1996. It is timely that the Committee now

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4 Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.
undertake this broad ranging inquiry given the significance that Africa and issues affecting the continent have in international affairs.”

It would be unsurprising if the impact of African issues upon ‘international affairs’ had something to do with the consolidated surge of interest in African studies in Australia. However, this interest appears to be not on and in Africa, but on Africans in Australia. Prior to this foreign affairs inquiry, the current government also commissioned “African Australians: A Report on Human Rights and Social Inclusion Issues,” having released a discussion paper on 16 March 2009, with the aim to gain feedback from the community about these issues. Consultations ended on 30 June 2009. It is hoped that a final report will be available for critical review before the next issue of ARAS in June 2010.

If the number of papers presented at the recent AFSAAP Annual Conference on the issue of African migration and settlement issues in Australia, can be the gauge of anything, then it does suggest that Australian scholars are more able to focus on the problems facing Africans once they get here, rather than being mobile and active researchers across the Indian Ocean, researching Africa. Despite the perceived lack of focus on Africa in Africa, this current issue of the Australasian Review of African Studies nonetheless demonstrates that there is a keen local talent for African Studies. In particular this edition focuses on a range of themes arising from the colonisation of Africa, through to the impact of colonisation in the post-colonial period, which includes the flow of migrants out of Africa, either forced as refugees or voluntarily as part of the skilled ‘brain-drain’. The difficulties facing Africans relocating to Australia, another country and culture, are also explored in this issue, hence the theme of ‘Africa in/and the world’. The first contribution below is by the historian Roger Scott. He provides a detailed account of the Governor of Uganda, Sir William Gowers. This is a unique and personal story of a coloniser in Africa. The colonisers are more often than not, those blamed for everything bad in Africa today, so it is timely to assess their personal experience and role in the colonies from the vantage point of today. Scott’s archival research has ‘rescued’ Gowers from historical anonymity. Matthew Doherty also takes us on an historical journey through the violent colonial experience in central Africa, with his analysis of 19th century daily life in the Lopori-Maringa basin. ‘Subsistence amid turmoil’ captures the resilience and resistance of the

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7 Although, it is a noteworthy exception that the recent past-president of AFSAAP David Lucas was conducting research in Morocco, while the Treasurer of AFSAAP Graeme Counsel was conducting research in Guinea- although dramatically cut short due to recent civil conflict - and the recent past postgraduate representative of AFSAAP Sam Balanton-Chrimes was conducting research in Kenya, all at the time of the 2009 AFSAAP Conference.
population in the face of colonisation and violent resource extraction from the region. Basil Eko’s contribution from Nigeria provides an important analysis of the difficulties with ‘Conflict, Religion and Ethnicity in the Post-Colonial Nigerian State’. He examines the implications of the legacy of colonial rule in Nigeria where religious conflict has been encouraged by ethnicity and the politics of identity. Then, Tanya Lyons brings the discussion of colonisation into the post-colonial discourse of globalisation and argues that ‘globonalism’ occurs when pharmaceutical companies trial new drugs in weak states in Africa, without ethical consideration for participants. Thus continuing the processes of colonisation in Africa to ensure resource extraction, in this case of human bio-data.

Reaching across the Indian Ocean, Temesgen Kifle’s research article on Eritreans in Australia analyses the impact of remittances sent back to Eritrea from Australia, and the conditions for Eritreans in Australia making it possible to do so. He argues that the Eritrean government needs to allow “domestic private foreign exchange bureaus to operate in money exchange activities” in order to provide security for these transactions and to assist in subsistence and development in Eritrea. Jackbeth Mapulanga-Hulston then provides a timely article on the impact of skilled human resource extraction from the African continent to developed countries. Her research focuses on “The Migration of Health Professionals in Sub-Saharan African Countries and the Impact on People’s Right to Health,” arguing that serious attention is required to public and health policies in order to curtail this brain drain from Africa.

Continuing with this theme of the flow of people from the African continent Ignacio Correa-Velez and Gerald Onsando’s contribution to this edition examines the “Educational and Occupational Outcomes Amongst African Men From Refugee Backgrounds Living in Urban and Regional Southeast Queensland.” Their research among this cohort of refugees from Africa now living in Australia provides important data for government and service providers for migrants on education and employment issues in relation to integration. Importantly, Jay Marlowe’s article provides a theoretical analysis for understanding refugee experience in settlement in Australia, in particular focusing on the issue of trauma. “Conceptualising Refugee Resettlement in Contested Landscapes” focuses on the experiences of Sudanese men in South Australia and should also be considered an important study for service providers and government departments interested in African migrant settlement issues in Australia. Finally, Surjeet Dhanji provides a timely analysis of the major issues facing former refugees from Africa in settling in Australia, in particular through a discussion of the media debates about so-called ‘integration issues,’ combined with interviews with former refugees from the Horn of Africa region. In her article “Welcome or Unwelcome? Integration Issues and the Resettlement of Former Refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan in Metropolitan Melbourne” Dhanji demonstrates the failures of
resettlement programs and highlights the concerns for integration among this vulnerable cohort of humanitarian entrants to Australia.

Kifle’s, Correa-Velez and Onsando’s, Marlowe’s and Dhanji’s research here all demonstrates the ‘tip of the ice-berg’ in relation to the current research being conducted on Africans in Australia, in particular on those from refugee backgrounds. It is noteworthy that much research has been done in this area previously, and caution is warranted to researchers in this field, not to work on isolated projects and to ‘re-invent the wheel.’ While researchers may be working in different fields and disciplines, from different perspectives - the subjects are the same – Africans in Australia. Liz Dimock has published an extensive bibliography in these pages of ARAS on Africans in Australia, and in the same edition Kirk Zwangobani’s article on African-Australian youth in Canberra is also published. Furthermore, Temesgen Kifle and Parvinder Kler contributed an article on the “Financial Satisfaction of African Immigrants in Australia,” and an article on Ethiopian-Australian secondary School students was also published. Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe, who is profiled below, has also contributed a number of articles on Africans in Australia that should be considered, not to mention the various contributions from David Lucas in the form of statistical profiles of Africans in Australia.

A decade has passed since Kitching’s ‘depressing’ announcement, and if only for the sake of assisting in the resettlement of former African refugees and African migrants in Australia, we need to engage with Africa and in particular conduct research and analysis of African issues in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the experiences and conditions in Africa today.

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Bibliography


The Role of AFSAAP and African Studies in Australia

Fernanda Claudio
University of Queensland

2010 will be a great year for our organisation. We have a stupendous amount of talent and expertise amongst our ranks, and a growing number of members from a variety of disciplines. Never has the AFSAAP held so much potential for engagement with Australian society and such a dynamic and varied membership. Our members constitute a cross-section of the very best of African studies and expertise: individuals with long-standing experience in Africa-related disciplines, including foreign affairs, and younger people representing disciplines, such as business, health, and education who are actively engaged in organisations that attend to the requirements of the new African migrant population in Australia.

At present, Australia’s relationship with Africa and African affairs is in flux and AFSAAP is uniquely positioned to participate in events surrounding these changes. On the domestic front, African migration to Australia has increased dramatically over the last several years. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics between 1976 and 2006 there was a total of 197,947 migrants (by country of birth) from the sub-Saharan region (Many of these migrants arrived as refugees and asylum-seekers, while there has also been an important portion that arrived as economic migrants. For those individuals and families who came out of refugee camps, there are important education, health and resettlement issues to address in Australia. All states have made initiatives to design resettlement policies to meet the specific needs of these populations, however, more and better-targeted programs are required. For one, African is a large and highly socially differentiated continent with many languages and customs. At the same time, the experience of migrants is not all the same. Some people have emerged from circumstances of war, social disruption, poverty and disease, while others have arrived on the migration points system. There is an urgent need for studies of African migrants that depict and analyse actual circumstances faced by these communities. Much of the social science and health literature is problem-oriented rather than ‘normality’ focussed. It is true that some Africans may arrive with diseases and, often, they have been hurt and traumatised by the unfortunate events that led to their displacement. But they are here now, as part of the changing social landscape of Australia, and it is misrepresentative to suggest that they simply bring problems for Australia to solve. Along with their pain, Africans also bring talent, hope, strength, language and culture, and children that can add immensely to the human wealth of Australia. Through our experiences, expertise, and goodwill the AFSAAP membership is uniquely placed to depict and represent Africans and African issues to the Australian public and key institutions.
In terms of foreign policy focus, Africa has not traditionally been a place of great interest for the Australian government. However, with increased migration to Australia, conflict and the production of refugees, the international scramble for natural resources, and Australia’s interest in a seat on the United Nations security council, greater attention is being paid by the federal government to the continent. AusAID annually gives aid to South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, mostly for health and food security. In the past, AFSAAP has successfully lobbied the Australian government for assistance to Zimbabwe in the wake of the urban clearings (Operation Murambatsvina) in 2005. In his speech to the Australian Council for International Development on 28th October 2009, Foreign Minister Stephen Smith stated that the federal government intended to carry on “focusing on Asia and the Pacific, while also increasing our efforts in Africa and South Asia.” A country that has received a great deal of Australian aid in recent times is Zimbabwe, with $28 million worth of aid provided since February 2009, including $8 million for food, agriculture, and education (see http://www.ausaid.gov.au). From these and other engagements, it is clear that Africa is firmly on the agenda for the federal government. AFSAAP is uniquely positioned within Australia to inform and advise not only the federal, but also state and municipal governments on various aspects of African issues in a timely and representative fashion.

In my view, no issue so well represents the intersections between foreign and domestic African affairs in Australia as education. For one, education is a key issue in the proper and fruitful resettlement of African migrants in this country. Education is crucial to integration into the workforce and to future participation in the economy and political life of Australia. At the same time, African students who travel to Australia for tertiary, particularly postgraduate studies, play an important part in this country’s engagement with Africa. Not only do they return with qualifications and skills acquired from an Australian point of view, their experiences here will also influence the attitudes of their countrymen (and its leadership) toward Australia. In my view, African students play a key role in Australia’s foreign policy toward Africa, and we at AFSAAP are well-placed to advise both governments and educational institutions about how best to host these students.

Traditionally AFSAAP’s aims and objectives have centred on the promotion of African studies in the region and contribution to greater understanding of Africa and Africans amongst Australians and other populations in the Asia-Pacific region. We are now governed by a group of Executive officers comprised of a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Postgraduate Representative and the Editor of the Australasian Review of African Studies. The Executive also includes a number of Ordinary Members nominated for their particular expertise and whose counsel is sought as specific issues arise.
This structure has functioned well and enabled AFSAAP to play important educational and advisory roles throughout its 32-year history.

The role of Africa in Australasia has changed. Africa is on the regional agenda in terms of education, migration, economy, politics and foreign policy. In light of these changes, it is time to re-consider adding to AFSAAP’s structure to better enable us to address the changing landscape of African affairs. This year, Dr. Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe of LaTrobe University was entrusted with the Chairmanship of the AFSAAP Futures Sub-Committee to review and analyse the role of our organisation at the present time. He was aided in this important endeavour by expertise from Dr. Chika Anyanwu, Peter Wakholi and Kudzai Matereke. The sub-committee arrived at four recommendations:

1. Development of an institutional framework to carry out joint/team research projects to attract funding and create the proper structures for ongoing research;
2. Greater engagement with issues pertinent to Africans in Australia;
3. To develop continuous processes around the key issue of education;
4. To enhance our capacity with regard to response to media requests as experts on various Africa-centred issues.

These recommendations can be addressed in a number of ways and I welcome the suggestions of AFSAAP members. As the new President, I would like to take the liberty of making a few suggestions of my own. First, I suggest the creation of a number of working groups aimed at addressing key issues such as migration, education, health, economics, foreign policy and others. If feasible, regionally-based working groups would be another possibility. These working groups would advise the Executive with up-to-date and regionally-relevant information as circumstances unfold. We could also expand the capacity of our website to include interactive features where our members could submit their ideas.

In past years our conferences have been the focal point of our activities where members and individuals from external agencies have typically liaised for academic and other purposes. There has always been an international dimension to participation and this is one element we must strive to maintain. The 2009 Conference at the University of Queensland attracted participants from Indonesia and Macau.

Similarly, the Australasian Review of African Studies (ARAS) is a key instrument in the dissemination of Africa-centred research in Australia, Asia and the Pacific regions. It is a peer-reviewed multidisciplinary publication that well-represents the breadth of knowledge of our members. Winners of our post-graduate essay competition are invited to publish in this journal and are assisted by the editor and the panel of expert judges. I encourage all members and others to submit articles to the ARAS editor, Tanya Lyons.
Our strengths, as an organisation, are many, however, there are ways in which we can improve our reach. We can do better to communicate the breadth of expertise of our members to the wider Australian community so that views espoused in the Australian media of African affairs are representative. We also need to have ready information and advice to proffer to the Australian media as events in Africa and in Australia unfold. For example, this year media in Queensland produced a number of stories about violence and African youth. It is important for the AFSAAP to be ready to address issues such as these to pre-empt the production of negative stereotypes within the media and to add to constructive debate.

Lastly, I would like to sincerely thank the members of AFSAAP for the trust they have placed in me this year. Africa has been a ‘key symbol’ in my family for two generations. My uncles were conscripted into the Portuguese armed forces and sent to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau to fight in the colonial wars. Those struggles were brutal for all sides and the men in my family never once spoke disrespectfully of the people they encountered. Through their stories I came to view Africa as a place of wonder and power. With this curiosity, I chose to travel to Zimbabwe for PhD studies. Whilst conducting fieldwork from 1991 to 1993, I observed the fortitude and grace with which people faced the greatest drought of the 20th century. The brilliance of these individuals as they experienced the worst of circumstances has never left me. The respect and kindness with which I was accepted (and protected) has similarly stayed with me.

Fernanda Claudio
President, African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific
1 November 2009
Gowers of Uganda: The Public and Private Life of a Forgotten Colonial Governor

Roger Scott
University of Queensland

The purpose behind this article is to add to the historical record of the distinguished but chequered career of Sir William Gowers which peaked during his years as Governor of Uganda. Historians have shown that important things happened in Uganda and East Africa during his governorship between 1925 and 1932, but, in striking contrast to his peers in the other territories, no-one comments on the personality and the individual role of the Governor.

One of his associates contributed a glowing obituary in *African Affairs* (1955) which suggested that “he would long be remembered by those who worked under his leadership in Africa as a man of brilliant intellect, possessed of a reliable memory, and the knack of seeing through to the root of a problem, which he could tackle with confidence and resolution”.¹ I was motivated to establish why he was barely remembered at all.

I conducted biographical research which turned up relatively little among scholarly secondary sources and then examined family records and visited the major colonial history archives held at Rhodes House Oxford and Churchill College Cambridge. These primary sources² give testimony from, among others, the Prince of Wales and his aide-de-campe, to the fact that Gowers was outgoing, entertaining, and full of bravado as well as personal bravery. The same files also reveal that his personal life became a source of widespread scandal among the East African Europeans, especially missionaries, and it required the intervention of his mentor Lord Lugard to fight off his dismissal by the Colonial Secretary. William was in other words a prototype of the cliché of the romantic literature of his era: the ‘Black Sheep’ of the family.

This article has the modest aim of rescuing Gowers from anonymity and in particular reporting on the social milieu within which colonial governors of the time functioned. It makes passing reference to contemporary events because it is not intended to be a treatise explaining historical complexities and controversial policies. Serious historians have grounds for complaint on this account, but I have at least provided them with the signposts leading back into a set of original documents which seem to have escaped their attention to date.

² Files examined were located at the Churchill Archives (Amery Papers), Cambridge, and Rhodes House (Lord Lugard, Lugard-Perham and Sir William Gowers), Oxford.
William and his brother Ernest were the grandchildren of a successful small businessman, a bootmaker who moved from Suffolk to ply his trade in the higher society of London. His son, William senior, secured a grammar school education and then an apprenticeship with a country doctor back in Suffolk. He was obviously a man of great talent as he rose rapidly in the profession, occupying senior positions in the London hospital system and writing the definitive textbook of his era on the human nervous system. He was knighted and became a member of the Royal Society.

He shared the Victorian reverence for education and also for public service, identifying for his offspring the route to the senior ranks of the bureaucracy sketched out in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. So William junior and Ernest both attended Rugby and then Cambridge, studying the classics.

William caused difficulties at Rugby through unapproved absences seeking female companionship while Ernest was diligent and joined debating and literary societies with future eminent leaders. At Cambridge, William won a scholarship to the social pinnacle of Trinity College and mixed with the elite while Ernest went to Clare and scholarly anonymity. Afterwards, William headed off to Africa while Ernest settled for the domestic civil service and duties towards his family (and became one of the leading public servants of his generation).

Perhaps William was attracted to the colonial rather than the metropolitan civil service because of his adventurous spirit and opportunities for advancement. He may have gone to Africa because of encouragement from his entrepreneurial father who was a personal friend of Rudyard Kipling. What is certain is that he joined the British South Africa Company in 1889, during the last stages of the Boer War. He then joined the Colonial Service and relocated to Northern Nigeria, functioning there as one of Lord Lugard’s ‘young men’ who went on to careers as senior administrators and ultimately colonial governors.

In 1906, he demonstrated that his schoolboy sense of adventure had not been entirely satisfied by civilian administration. He negotiated a posting to the army as guide and intelligence gatherer for a British force engaged in a punitive expedition against a recalcitrant local tribe. He was mentioned in despatches and on his return received a significant promotion. Part of his usefulness to the...

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3 The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1855) laid the basis for competitive entry by examination as part of a series of civil service reforms which were implemented in 1870.
4 R.H.Tawney was a major social philosopher and political activist in the Labour Party; William Temple was Archbishop of Canterbury and a prominent social reformer during the 1930’s.
army was his facility with African languages, drawing on his skills as a classicist. In later life, he was still competent enough in the northern Nigerian language of Hausa to act as a translator for a visit of Nigerian emirs to the London Zoo, where his role as a Director linked to his interest in wild-life, another great enthusiasm sustained in East Africa. In his time in Uganda, he was an avid hunter of elephants, an enthusiasm he shared with the Prince of Wales. He took the photograph which appears below in a rare book reporting on the Prince’s visit to East Africa in 1928 and 1930. This publication was compiled by a leading British sports writer of the time from the diaries of the Prince and of Gowers. Unlike the Prince, Gowers also had a scholarly interest in elephants and published an article in a classical studies journal speculating about the continental origins of Hannibal’s elephants on the basis of numismatic evidence.⁶

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that time, he had been promoted to Resident First Class (1910), held the key post at Kano (1911) and became Chief Secretary to the Northern Region (1912) – reinforcing the close link to Lugard.

There is no record of his social life during this period. The file note composed by the archivist at Rhodes House indicated that he married Maud Lorraine on July 19, 1904. They had met in Nigeria where she also was employed in the colonial service and shared his interest in linguistics. The archivist notes dryly that it should be noted that with effect from the 1936 Edition of ‘Who’s Who’, no further mention is made of Lady Gowers (nee Maud Lorraine).

This article deals first with Gowers’ public life as Governor of Uganda. After his senior experience in Nigeria and with his distinguished military record, Gowers would have regarded Uganda as a logical promotion, moving from one Protectorate dominated by Frederick (later Lord) Lugard and his philosophy of indirect rule to another with a similar history. The Rhodes House files show that Gowers was consulted extensively by Lugard (and later Margery Perham) in the preparation of subsequent editions of his master-work, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa,7 and that Lugard in turn offered advice to Gowers about East Africa.

They both based their policies on assumptions about the appropriateness of the concept of the Dual Mandate to predominantly African states. One difference from Nigeria was of course the proximity in Uganda to the presence of white settled next door in Kenya, enjoying the relative autonomy of Colony status and a direct influence over the conduct of their own affairs. A second difference was that Lugard’s deal negotiated in the name of Queen Victoria related to the Kabaka or traditional king of Buganda, the richest and most advanced territory within the wider Protectorate of Uganda but still a minority in terms of total population. The consequent empowerment of the chiefly elite supporting the king was a cause for resentment by other inhabitants inside and outside Buganda.8

When the Provincial Commissioner for Buganda confronted the chiefs over concern for the rights of other social groups to own property, Gowers backed

7 Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, London, 1922. This highly influential book advocated the allocation of the maximum responsibility to existing traditional authorities which was consistent with maintaining the overall accountability of the colonial administrators to the metropolitan government in Britain. This was sometimes termed “indirect rule” in contrast to direct rule which bypassed or minimised traditional authorities in favour of an external administrative hierarchy of colonial administrators. The distinction was first drawn in India.

8 David Anthony Low and Richard Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Over-Rule, London, 1960 This book deals with two historical periods, at the dawn and then the middle of the twentieth century, when the powers of the Kabaka became politically controversial.
him in keeping with his general assumption that the role of colonial administrators was to administer the protectorate on behalf of all Africans.

The Rhodes House files also make reference to a land dispute between the chiefs privileged by the ‘mailo system’ (analogous to private property ownership) and the claims by lower-status clan leaders against chiefs’ exploitation of their monopolisation.\(^9\) Gowers was clearly in sympathy with the former, and suggested the introduction of a native land court system used successfully in Nigeria for similar disputes, but no action was taken. The significance of the issue typified the policy emphasis on agricultural development during Gowers’ period in office.\(^10\) Ingham noted that:

“Grievances over land in Uganda centred upon the relationships between chiefs and the people rather than the fear of European domination such as troubled Kenya.”\(^11\)

Gowers similarly defended local interests in the developing cotton industry (in one case through allowing Asian-managed plantations breaking down the monopoly claimed by the European missions through the Uganda Company they founded in 1906). He resisted the missions, as he did on a number of other issues, as well as the external pressures exerted on the Colonial Office by users of the cotton crop in Manchester, India and Japan.

But he remained clear about the paramountcy of African interests, as interpreted by the Governors. Cranford Pratt refers to:

“The odd mixture of trusteeship values and prejudice which was apparent in the Government’s attitudes towards Asian representation in the Legislative Council, based on an assumption that they could be regarded as impermanent immigrants from another homeland.”\(^12\)

The non-official members of the Legislative Council had been typically held by two Europeans and one Asian although these in theory at least were chosen to represent the total community of non-African interests. When the Asians pressed for parity, even though the Legislative Council held only advisory

\(^9\) Rhodes House (S 1150, file 9, ff 1-25).
powers, Lord Passfield\textsuperscript{13} raised the issue as Colonial Secretary during the short period of the first Labour Government. Pratt suggests that:

When Gowers met Passfield’s queries with a denial that the existing representation was racially based, he must have realised that this denial did not sound convincing, for he went on in his despatch to give what was in effect a defence of the European majority on the unofficial side of LegCo – ‘I think there is much truth in saying … that the people of Uganda in accepting the British protectorate accepted the protection of the British race.’\textsuperscript{14}

So Gowers took a strongly instrumental view of the role of the protecting colonial authority, similar to the proclamation by Donald Cameron in Tanganyika of a doctrine of ‘mandate’ asserted to be held by the British to advance the interests of Africans through the promotion of economic modernisation rather than political advancement.

It was consistent with this that Gowers should push strongly for the extension of the railway from Mombasa to Jinja. This construction had originally been justified on strategic grounds which linked the source of the Nile to British interests in Egypt and the Suez Canal. The need for the line to cover its costs had then been used to promote the alienation of land for use by white settlers and they had no interest in its extension beyond the existing railhead at Jinja on the eastern edge of the Nile. Gowers pressed hard for its extension across the Nile to reach the main city in Kampala as well as the administrative headquarters at Entebbe, which occurred in 1927, and then on towards the Congo border in 1929, where it assisted in the later development of copper mines at far-western Kilembe.

This modernisation was supported by both racial groups within the Legislative Council, who also formed common cause behind Gowers in resisting Kenya on a range of economic issues. Pratt notes that when either minority community wished to block a policy which the Uganda Government supported they tended to be successful when acting in concert.

Acting alone, neither minority had the political power which was needed to influence government policy in a major fashion. The government could with little political embarrassment ignore their occasional protests against its ‘West Coast’ preoccupation with African affairs.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Lord Passfield was the title taken by Sidney Webb when he was elevated to the peerage to continue his activism as a prominent social reformer by direct engagement in the political process. On this period, see Robert Gregory, \textit{Sidney Webb and East Africa}, Berkeley, 1962.
\textsuperscript{14} Richard Cranford Pratt, 1965
\textsuperscript{15} Richard Cranford Pratt, 1965, 519.
Railways were one area where Gowers saw potential for closer collaboration with the other British colonial possessions of Kenya, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. This was based on an assumption about the potential for collective action and economies of scale to advance the interests of all Africans. For different reasons these moves were resisted by two groups emphasising the separateness of their political and cultural objectives – the white settlers of Kenya and the Baganda\(^{16}\) (and the Kabaka’s supporters in particular) who did not wish to be submerged by the 60% of other Africans living inside Uganda and the even larger majority of Africans within the four jurisdictions.

In 1929, Lugard wrote to Gowers suggesting that there was a need for concerted action by the colonial authorities because the white settlers had come to realise that, if political advancement was linked to educational achievement – as it was in India – then their political hegemony was finished. He expected Kenya’s whites to resist and drew parallels with the successful resistance of whites in southern Africa.\(^{17}\)

The story of the failure of the Closer Union initiative has been documented elsewhere.\(^{18}\) Basically, the initiative recognised the range of administrative, economic and political benefits which could flow from strengthening ties among the various territories administered in different ways by the British Colonial office – Kenya was a colony, Tanganyika was a trust territory, Zanzibar was a protectorate with the Sultan advised by a British resident and Uganda was a protectorate with a Governor and varieties of agreements with different traditional authorities. Some lasting progress was made with respect to railways, customs, currency and education but the crunch issue was any extension of political decision-making. Kenyan Europeans were resistant to any scheme likely to undermine their current local autonomy but would have supported any change which added to the range of their influence; Buganda traditional authorities were sceptical and almost everyone was suspicious of the Kenyans. Initially the Colonial Office pushed the idea very hard but it proved impossible to find common ground on the central political issue.

The Rhodes House files contain a poignant address from Gowers to the local Caledonian Society, which noted with regret the death of Closer Union proposals and contrasted the high level of inter-racial civility in Uganda compared to Kenya. He seemed to blame the nature of politicians for their wilful disregard for the demonstrated benefits of ‘Closer Union’:

Some statesmen – very few – have a real appreciation of what research means. Major Ormsby-Gore is one of them. Walter Elliott, another

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\(^{16}\) “Baganda” is the collective noun for the tribal people governed by the Kabaka of Buganda.

\(^{17}\) Lugard to Gowers, 9.4.1929, (Rhodes House, mss.afr.s1150, box 2, 97). Note Lugard’s later pessimism leading to his own support of partition in 1931.

Scot, is another. Politicians and those who are concerned with limited and parochial interests have none.\textsuperscript{19}

There is a theme of continuing hostility by Gowers towards Kenyan public servants and their total identification with the interests of the white settler community within which they operated. This was typified by his resistance in a letter to the Kenyan governor to a proposal to raise pay rates of Kenya-based civil servants to equate with Ugandan rates, presumably originating in the differential needed to compensate for the less attractive social environment but justified on the grounds of exposure to greater health risks:

It would surely be an argument that should appeal to Kenya elected members that whereas Kenya is a white man’s country and Uganda definitely is not, there is no injustice in putting a small tax on the salaries of the men who live in a white man’s country to meet an emergency in that country and leave untouched the pay of the men who live in the black man’s country and blackwater fever country.\textsuperscript{20}

Gowers favoured expanded public health provisions for Africans rather than reliance on missionary health workers. Testimonial letters on his retirement praised his support for vocational training of African nurses –”not excluding male nurses and not excluding races other than the Baganda” - as he pointed out in a letter to Mrs Cook, head of the training college.\textsuperscript{21} He also was praised for promoting the writing of a nurses’ training manual, which he had required to be translated into Kiswahili for use in Kenya and Tanganyika “and those parts of Uganda where Kiswahili may become the lingua franca”. (He also expressed hope it would be translated into Hausa for Nigerian use.)

In promoting education at higher levels for Africans, especially technical education, Gowers was also out of step with attitudes in Kenya and among his own small European commercial class. Ingham\textsuperscript{22} records the resistance of the Uganda Planters Association to the amount of revenue spent on education in 1927, just as there was resistance to the increased levels of taxation impacting on non-Africans. But the effect of widespread increase in agricultural productivity as well as the emphasis on peasant production of cash crops placed Uganda in a favourable economic position when there was a general collapse of agricultural prices which particularly affected the more capital-intensive white settler communities.

The issues of Closer Union overlapped in Gowers’ mind with his continuing interest in language issues and specifically the promotion of Kiswahili, a derivative from Arabic. Swahili was spoken in its purest form on the Kenya

\textsuperscript{19} Gowers address to Caledonian Society (Rhodes House, mss.afr.s1150, box 2, 253).
\textsuperscript{20} Gowers letter to Governor of Kenya (Rhodes House, mss.afr.s1150, box 2, 243).
\textsuperscript{21} Rhodes House, mss.afr.s1150, box 2, 168
\textsuperscript{22} Kenneth Ingham, 149
and Tanganyika coast and had progressed with Arab slavers and traders across the inland. Gowers saw this as a potential tool for forging an African identity – again a policy resisted by Baganda in particular who preferred their own language – luganda, as well as by Christian missions preferring to maintain a direct association linking tribal vernaculars and English.

His significance on this issue has recently been recognised by a number of scholars, including Ali Mazrui and Pio Zirumu, in an article with a typically Mazruian title, “The secularisation of an Afro-Islamic language: church, state and marketplace in the spread of Swahili”.23 This makes specific reference to a decisive memorandum by Gowers discussed at length by another African scholar:

Gowers in his memorandum, ‘The Development of Kiswahili as an Educational and Administrative Language in the Uganda Protectorate’ formulated the most definitive languages policy of the period. He prescribed Kiswahili for all elementary and normal schools in non-Bantu areas – in Bantu areas where mother languages were already in use at elementary level, Kiswahili was to be introduced at high levels, in lieu of English. The government committed itself to providing resources and incentives to support this policy and to discourage the teaching of Luganda. The missionaries who controlled 90% of the education institutions resisted this policy. They continued to implement the policy of teaching the gospel in mother languages and using English at higher levels.24

Gowers was clearly a zealot on the issue. When Major Hanns Vischer sought his support for research on East African languages, he got short shrift because, compared to Swahili, Gowers dismissed other languages as mere local dialects:

I am inclined to regard all other languages of East Africa as interesting curiosities with no practical importance for the future.25

Vischer was entitled perhaps to more co-operative treatment. Margery Perham has identified Vischer (later Sir Hanns) as having “a career of brilliant service to Africa and to Britain and a forty-five year friendship with Lugard”.26 Lugard had met this somewhat eccentric religious zealot when he was working for the Church Mission Society in 1901 and presented himself to Lugard for

more constructive appointment as an administrator. After rising to be Director of Education in Northern Nigeria, he served as secretary to the Colonial Secretary’s Education Committee through the inter-war years. Gowers had been a protagonist against Vischer’s policy of favouring the expansion of education in English to replace the use of Arabic in Northern Nigerians schools.27

Gowers also corresponded with the High Commissioner for Egypt and Sudan on the topic and a letter on file acknowledges his advice. In the Southern Sudan the issue was the use of Arabic supported by English or of tribal vernacular. Gowers urged that the missionaries not be given a free hand and thus allowed to repeat mistakes made elsewhere in Africa. He remained engaged with educational issues after his retirement, serving for many years on the governing body of the London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies.

Gowers’ Private Life

This record of Gowers’ public life needs to be set beside the unreported events in his private life which probably damaged his public standing, particularly among his more conservatively-minded peers, especially the missionaries for

whom he had little sympathy. The papers of Leopold Amery in the Churchill College archive contain parts of a four-way correspondence involving Amery, as Colonial Secretary, the aforementioned Ormsby-Gore, Lord Lugard and Gowers. It is clear that the need for some form of disciplinary action was considered against Gowers but the advice of Lugard was enough to save him. Amery comments at the end of the investigation that “I can’t help thinking that this has been a timely warning.”

William’s family back in Britain were concerned enough for Ernest’s wife and daughter to make an emergency visit to spend time at Government House, remembered in the family as a mission to set things right in the vice-regal household. The precise behaviour in question is not identified, for example whether there was more debauchery involved than the unconventional relationship formed between Gowers and the person who became successively his Principal Private Secretary, his mistress and then, on the death of the first Lady Gowers, his second wife.

Winifred Paul was known within the Gowers family circle as ‘Cinderella’ because she disappeared at midnight on formal vice-regal occasions. Until the relationship was regularised after Maud’s death in 1947, they feature in visitors books under separate names but a shared address. Correspondence in Ernest Gowers’ archive reflects the warmth and affection with which they were both cherished by the family throughout the whole period.

Even though this extra-marital conduct now seems hardly reprehensible, the behaviour was obviously seen to threaten Gowers’ authority as Governor, as is clear from the detailed correspondence found in the Lugard collection held at Rhodes House. Gowers had apparently been accused not only of ‘womanising,’ but also gambling and not paying his debts – in one formulation it was asserted that his female race-horse trainer in Kenya was also his mistress. In general, there was concern expressed about the licentious atmosphere at Entebbe Government House. Gowers forcefully denied accusations about gambling and not paying his debts and he was backed up in these particulars by Lord Lugard, whose opinion was sought by Ormsby-Gore.

For the rest, he blamed one E.B. Jervis and his wife for providing the original grist to the rumour mill, based on a single dinner party. E.B. Jervis seems to have been an influential member of the local community, holding the senior administrative post of Chief Secretary from a period pre-dating Gowers’ arrival.

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29 The correspondence appears in Rhodes House archives, Lugard, box 74, file 42 and 174/4, pp 3-19, dating from August 1927 onwards.
and functioning as Acting Governor during periods of interregnum and gubernatorial absences.

Lugard showed Ormsby-Gore the letter Lugard had received from Gowers defending himself against these accusations. Ormsby-Gore in turn provided the following response to Lugard, suggesting there was more to it than just the opinion of the Jervises:

There were tales from Khartoum to Benin, from Hattersley, from other missionaries, from General Davidson etc. Gowers implies it was all Jervis and his wife. Personally I am inclined to think he gets accused on account of the goings-on of his private secretary Cavendish Bentinck who has been most indiscreet in his social behaviour and in the type of woman he seems to prefer.

It is really important that G should go out of his way to be circumspect both in his general manners towards women, his guests at Government House – especially from Kenya; and he had better give up card games other than bridge for the moment. There were severe criticisms of Coryndon playing poker at Entebbe.

There is no doubt that G has shocked CMS opinion which is strong among missionaries and natives in Uganda. It is a country where more concessions to puritan traditions must be made by any governor who is really respected.

I personally don’t like Jervis and his wife – but if a quarter of what he says about the Governor’s social atmosphere is true, it is very embarrassing.

If you reply, I hope you will issue a friendly word of warning. Gowers is a good man but slightly intolerant of Victorian views. His quarrel with his wife is most unfortunate in the circumstances. He has got himself ‘talked about’ not only in Uganda but in Kenya and the Sudan. His nickname ‘naughty Willie’ has become widespread. I am sorry for him but there it is.

Governors, especially in a place like Entebbe where all are his subordinates and he is ‘the Excellency’ must take extra care. The ‘tales’

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30 One of Gowers’ predecessors, Governor 1917-1922.
31 The Church Mission Society was in fierce competition for African souls with the Roman Catholic White Fathers. In Uganda, this reached the heights of religious wars in the period before the proclamation of the Protectorate and the agreement between the Kabaka and Queen Victoria at the turn of the century. The CMS promoted a peculiarly Victorian version of Christian morality, including the adoption of voluminous all-encompassing dresses of that period which continued to be worn by Baganda matrons until recent times, adding a bizarre feature to the local landscape.
have not reached Buckingham Palace yet – but knowing how strong the feeling is there on such subjects I sincerely hope they will not.32

In fact it had reached the Palace, as is clear from the only published source referring to the matter, the diaries of Alan Lascelles, ADC to the Prince of Wales. Lascelles repeats an incident which was also recorded in the Prince’s own diaries and elsewhere, demonstrating Gowers’ sangfroid and bravery in the face of a charging elephant which was endangering the life of the Prince.

Lascelles then qualifies his admiration for Gowers as “a good chap but with a weakness for women which is dangerous in a governor, especially when his wife is permanently resident in Paris, as was the case here.”33 (Lascelles later gave up his own post at the Palace when he became aware that his own ‘governor’ was similarly compromised.)

Lugard, in turn, showed Ormsby-Gore’s response to Gowers. In a letter of 27 September 1927, barely a month later, Gowers expresses pleasure at the resolution of his problem even though he wrote previous letters to Lugard without expecting anyone else would see them, but he was glad now that they were seen by Ormsby-Gore. He again suggests that he was a victim of “malicious gossip” and that the other names respondents were retailing hearsay from a single source, especially his reputation for pursuing women – this could only have related to a single incident during Gowers’ break-up with his first wife Maud and Gowers was absent for six months immediately after that.

Gowers regarded the Ormsby-Gore letter to Lugard as “very nice and reasonable but reliant on hearsay and offers no particulars”. He denied any involvement in cards apart from bridge and in gambling, apart from a trivial delay in covering two small cheques dealt with by his ADC. Gowers claimed that he was now behaving circumspectly, including getting rid of Cavendish-Bentinck, his poor quality private secretary, and replacing him with Winifred Paul.

The correspondence was obviously widely circulated, as in the meantime Gowers’ response was rebutted in part by his accuser writing to one of Gowers’ fellow-governors and arch-protagonist, the redoubtable Donald Cameron.

Dear Sir Donald Cameron,

I asked Nicolson regarding the report that he was responsible for the non-payment of Sir W Gowers’ debts and he states there is not the

32 Lugard Collection, Rhodes House, 27 August 1929.
slightest vestige of truth in it. He is simply furious. I thought you might like to know. We are just off north and return on the 10th of October.

With kind regards, yours sincerely, E Jervis.

Cameron’s notation on the letter (while forwarding it to Ormby-Gore presumably, or perhaps direct to Lugard who kept it on file):

This is unsolicited, of course. Nicolson is the late ADC. He has small abilities but is a gentleman. Gowers did not pay his tradesmen either before he went off on leave the last time.  

How reasonable was this harsh judgement? Cameron had shared many of Gowers’ background experiences in Nigeria and his reservations about the attempt to entrench the interests of Kenyan white settlers, facilitated by links between Governor Grigg and Lord Delamere. But Cameron was also a difficult person to get on with, especially for any competitor. Philip Mitchell, his deputy in Tanganyika at the time and a great admirer, characterised him as less severe than his self-image as a strong harsh man, but “he had, certainly, strong dislikes and about people he disliked he would say the most outrageous, even apparently ill-natured things”.  

Perham has remarked on similar characteristics, having stayed with him for extended periods:

Sir Donald is the exact opposite of Sir Edward Grigg who, whatever his faults, seems to be lacking in malice; Sir Donald is full of it. Perhaps he exaggerates a little his condemnations, spicing them with a rather wicked humour. He has disparaged most other governors I know or know of, except I think Sir Hugh Clifford. Even Lord Lugard! But Gowers, Maxwell and Grigg are his special prey.

Cameron seems to have mortally wounded his prey, even though Gowers remained as governor for several years. In the byzantine negotiations over Closer Union, Gowers became reconciled to Grigg when both embraced the Lugardian concept of a dual mandate as applying to each of their territories: Kenya for the whites, Uganda for the blacks. There seems to have been some discussion, at least within the Gowers family, about William moving on to Kenya to succeed Grigg and taking his new son-in-law with him as ADC but the ADC chose to resume his military career in India.

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34 Rhodes House (S1150, file 9, ff 1-25): 17
37 During the visit of Ernest’s wife and daughter Peggy, romance had blossomed between Peggy and the ADC; they married before he returned to India – perhaps it was something in the Entebbe air.
In the end, Gowers returned to England as Crown Agent for East and Southern Africa, an appointment applauded by the local Ugandan business community during the farewell celebrations. Perhaps they were less aware than people in London about the growing limitations associated with the commercial role of an organisation deeply rooted in colonial history. David Sunderland’s substantial works on the Crown Agents suggest that by the mid-twentieth century, the Agency had grown inefficient:

> The position of Crown Agent began to be seen as a reward for long years of service and as a dumping ground for individuals who were incompetent or could not adequately perform their duties because of ill-health, lack of drive or ‘uncongenial personalities’.  

There is some indication that this disparagement of Gowers’ reputation was either not widely known at the time or was regarded as undeserved. Certainly by 1931 when a nervous mother was concerned about the safety of her seemingly over-adventurous daughter, she sought Gowers’ assistance and was pleased when he offered her the protection of residing at Government House. Or perhaps this particular mother with her links to the London School of Economics and the notoriously permissive Bloomsbury Group regarded Gowers’ behaviour as par for the course.

The Rhodes House files contain an exchange of correspondence which starts with a letter of 13 August 1931 from Jessie Mair, Sir William Beveridge’s secretary at the London School of Economics and later his wife. It was addressed to Gowers’ sister-in-law, Kit Gowers, known to Mair because of Ernest’s working relationship with Beveridge:

> My eldest daughter Lucy has been awarded a Research Grant by the Rockefeller Foundation to enable her to some investigations in Uganda into problems of colonial administration and I think Sir William Gowers is your brother-in-law. …I am hopelessly ignorant about Uganda and do not know how completely civilised it is.  

On 6 November 1931, a letter was sent to Sir William from Arthur Bottomley at the Colonial Office asking for similar protection and pointing out that Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield was also taking a keen interest in the project. (While still humble Sidney Webb, Passfield was active in the Fabian Society and at Toynbee Hall with Beveridge). Bottomley noted that Jessie had written also to the Crown Agents.

> She is afraid that Lucy will be too adventurous and will get into remote districts where she may incur undesirable risks. Mrs Mair hopes that the

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39 Rhodes House (File ref mss.afr.s1150, folio 2 ff).
The authorities will keep a very watchful eye on Miss Lucy’s movements and not let her go anywhere unaccompanied by some British protection.

Bottomley however distinguished between danger and fear of danger:
It is most desirable that Miss Mair should have the utmost freedom in making her investigations for herself. The value of her work ["in the minds of the Rockefeller Foundation” is inserted in pencil in the margin] would be ruined if she were merely shown things by government officials instead of finding out things for herself….. I think you will have no difficulty in finding a means whereby Miss Mair will not in any way be hampered, and yet will run no risk of getting into difficulties.

Gowers replied a fortnight later (19 November 1931) and assured Bottomley that there would be plenty of social contacts and indeed she would be offered hospitality at Government House.

I cannot imagine that there are any undesirable risks awaiting her in Buganda. I suppose she won’t want to go hunting elephants or buffalo. Otherwise it seems to me that a girl is as safe or safer in Buganda than she is in London…..As you know my private secretary is a girl and she works alone accompanied by porters only in much more remote uncivilised country.

Lucy Mair’s first book, An African People in the Twentieth Century, was published by Collins in 1932. She went on to a distinguished career as an academic social anthropologist.

Margery Perham, equally distinguished in later life, was another who braved the perceived moral danger posed by staying with Gowers at Entebbe. She refers to Gowers in her own memoir of a visit to Kenya and Tanganyika in 1929-30. In her preface she records that the material she gathered in her visit to Uganda was excluded for reasons of length and because Uganda with its special features of a strong native kingdom and very few white settlers had escaped the main pressures of the Closer Union controversy. Later on, she records discussions with Cameron where “Sir Donald made it clear that he holds Sir Edward Grigg and all his works in disapproval, almost in detestation.”

Perham reflected later on the breakdown in the relationship between the different governors:
Grigg was the only one who did not depreciate his colleagues to me while officials in general are almost all bitter about the administration

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40 Lucy Mair, An African People in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1932)
42 Margery Perham, East African Journey, 45.
beyond their own frontiers. My approval of Uganda here was received with stony silence…. Mutual suspicion is bred out of ignorance.43

On the same page, she records the social end to a day of discussions:
At night, the Jardines came to dinner and his Excellency gave us full details of that recent controversial Governors Conference in London and many revelations about another governor who shall remain nameless...I might add that I had some furious arguments with Mr Jardine (Chief Secretary) who was, or pretended to be, horrified (a) at my having stayed unchaperoned with the Governor of Uganda and (b) at my having liked him.44

The significance of the Gowers governorship is difficult to evaluate, partly because he tends to be overshadowed in the scholarly literature by more dominant characters working beside or after him, nearly all of whom he would have known and served with in Northern Nigeria but may have been hostile witnesses. Perham recognised in a generally complimentary obituary that Cameron could be a powerful enemy:
Close up he had blemishes. Though a mostly kindly and generous host and quickly sensitive to selfishness and injustice, his humour could be too mordant, his dislikes too violent.45

Philip Mitchell provides an interesting personal insight into the hostility of all the other governors towards the Kenya governor, Edward Grigg. He asserts that it was Amery’s private intention to appoint Grigg as a putative Governor-General for all three African territories as the instrument for creating Closer Union but he did this in a clumsy way:
If Amery ever in fact had such an intention, he made it infinitely difficult of realisation when he chose as Grigg’s colleagues in Tanganyika and Uganda, two men of such exceptional ability, force of character and individualism as Cameron and Gowers.46

In his visits to East and Central Africa in 1925, Ormsby-Gore found the administrative structure “out of date and creaking,” and George Schuster reported in 1928 that:
It is astounding to find each little Government in each of these detached countries working out, on its own, problems which were common to all, without any knowledge of what its neighbours were doing and without any direction on main lines of policy from the Colonial Office.47

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44 Margery Perham, *East African Journey*, 46
Gowers was governor of one of these little detached countries and an enthusiast for Closer Union to overcome isolation and the diseconomies of scale. It is ironic perhaps that one of Gowers’ major disabilities was created by the local social grapevine: the one area where in all the territories there was certainly “knowledge of what its neighbours were doing.”

But, like his brother Ernest, William did not seek publicity or write about his life and times – although his views were sought and communicated to historians like Perham. Each of the other major actors in East Africa ensured their own place in history on their own terms by producing autobiographies, usually written at some distance from the events they described: Cameron published My Tanganyika and Some Nigeria in 1939; Mitchell published African Afterthoughts in 1954; Edward Grigg (by then Lord Antrincham) published Kenya’s Opportunities in 1955. In terms of secondary sources, Lugard had Perham’s two volume biography, Cameron was the subject of Gailey’s posthumous biography in 1974 and Mitchell was the subject of one by Frost in 1992.

Gowers neither wrote at length about himself nor was written about by others, another instance of “forgotten deeds” created by his family’s habitual reticence. The main difference was that some of William’s deeds were unforgettable for the wrong reasons. One former diplomat told an eminent Ugandan historian that Gowers was still remembered in recent times as “the only colonial governor to have declared his wife a prohibited immigrant”.

48 Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika and Some Nigeria (London, 1939).
49 Philip Mitchell, African Afterthoughts.
51 Harry A Gailey, Sir Donald Cameron, Colonial Governor (Stanford, 1974).
53 Personal correspondence with Professor Michael Twaddle, 22 December 2008.

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Subsistence Amid Turmoil: 
Daily Life in Central Africa During the Rubber Plunder¹

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The Red Rubber Scandal that swept through the equatorial forests of Central Africa at the close of the 19th century resulted in enormous devastation for millions of people. The people at ground zero of the industrial world’s thirst for rubber adapted as best they could to a world of dramatic changes. In this paper I examine the socio-economic system of, and daily life as part of subsistence in the Lopori-Maringa basin at the end of the 19th century. I argue that continuity was as strong a theme as change as the local population at the time sought to engage the newcomers on their own terms, and at the same time maintain much of what was fundamental in local pursuit of the good life.²

The population of the Lopori-Maringa was integrated into the new imperialist system where the primary strategy was the brutal extraction of the natural riches of the area. The new economic paradigm imposed resulted in tremendous suffering and catastrophic loss of life in the early colonial period. The Congolese were forced to toil in the forests to capture the valuable rubber sap.³ The new economy represented dramatic rupture for some yet there were many individuals who steadfastly pursued older economic dictates.

¹ This paper is drawn from research into the Congo Balolo Mission (CBM) archives that the author is conducting for his doctoral thesis: mcdoherty@students.latrobe.edu.au
² The evidence I draw from here are the archives of the Congo Balolo Mission (CBM), as well as secondary literature on Central Africa. The CBM Record was the journal from the field of CBM missionaries (from 1904), while the Regions Beyond was the journal (from 1878) for the CBM’s parent organisation The Regions Beyond Missionary Union, London which included reports from the Congo and elsewhere. The CBM set up a number of stations on the Lulonga, Lopori and Maringa rivers from 1889, the first being Bonginda on the Lulonga. Many studies of (pre-colonial) African labour and trade take their data from the earliest periods of European penetration in 19th century: see Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch and Paul Lovejoy, eds., The Workers of African Trade, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, c1985), 13. This study of the Lopori-Maringa basin is subject to similar limitations; the boundary between the ‘pre-colonial’ and that of the society extant upon the arrival of the CBM is not delineated by a clear and simple line. My comments are on the society extant on arrival of the CBM and this implies an historicity from the period prior to colonisation. Considerable research has been undertaken in relation to pre-colonial Africa, and a good introduction to the evidential challenges across different fields is John Edward Philips, ed., Writing African History (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005). Work on the (pre-)history of the Congo includes Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa (London: Currey 1990).
³ For an excellent overview of the economic dictates of the colonial era see Jacques Depelchin, From the Congo Free State to Zaire: how Belgium privatised the economy 1885 – 1974 (Oxford: Codesria Book Series, 1992); Estimates of depopulation - from multiple causes - range into the tens of millions, although this article will not be entering into the numerical controversy surrounding this question. In colonial historiography there developed large
Indigenous communities in central Africa pursued a mixed subsistence economy in the pre-colonial era. The great majority of the population practised shifting and overlapping occupations with emphasis on the food economy. Trade, metalwork and other tasks occupied significant time for many. Yet in the Lopori-Maringa basin, men and women, were engaged in farming and fishing, while hunting and gathering activities were also important for many. Much of the work done was dependent on the vagaries of the local environment, with much of the Upper Congo basin being subject to great variation in the equatorial climate. The basic principle was that no one should be separated from the central task of food production.\(^4\)

Control over labour was the basis of African wealth in the pre-colonial era, and kinship (whether real or fictive) often set the terms for this direction.\(^5\) Authority regularly divided according to age, so the elders of a community had significant control over labour. Questions of gender were most marked in tending the agricultural fields and in the many tasks of domesticity. Insight into the lives of women in pre-colonial times is gained from the fragments of evidence available in missionary archives and elsewhere as to women’s productive roles. Social histories of the region allow us to perceive the stories of locals without recourse to familiar tropes on ‘great man’ (here perhaps ‘big man’) history.

**Red Rubber and the people at ground zero**

In 1885 the Congo Free State (‘EIC’) of the Belgian King Leopold II was recognised by the European powers at the Conference of Berlin. Yet the Association Internationale Africaine (with its traders and adventurers) had been formed by Leopold in 1876 to lay the groundwork for his colonial state. And missionaries had followed hot on their heels, with the CBM’s forerunner, the Livingstone Inland Mission (LIM), establishing stations on the Lower Congo from 1878. The peoples of the Upper Congo basin, encountering European Anglo-Saxon and Belgian schools on these atrocities; commenting on these debates over responsibility for the Red Rubber Scandal, and the veracity of particular incidents and complainants, Lagergren points out that “However repulsive the custom of mutilation [here Lagergren refers to the infamous practice of severing hands by agents of the EIC] and the European connection with it may be, the fact that so many people were killed [through the colonial State, directly and indirectly] must be seen as a much more serious matter”: David Lagergren, *Mission and State in the Congo, 1885-190*, (Lund: Gleerup, 1970): 129. For more recent examinations of the Red Rubber Scandal see Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), especially at page 233 where Hochschild cites the work of Vansina. See also Jean-Luc Vellut, ‘Jan Vansina on the Belgian Historiography of Africa: Around the Agenda of a Bombing Raid,’ 1 November 2001, for a more nuanced view of Belgian historiography. Available at [http://www.h-net.org/~africa/africaforum/Vellut.htm](http://www.h-net.org/~africa/africaforum/Vellut.htm) (accessed 20 July 2009).


strangers for the first time in this early colonial period, had nevertheless indirectly felt the presence of the outside world over many decades through the encroachments of different slave trades.\(^6\)

In 1889 the EIC decreed that natural products from the area between Bolobo and the mouth of the Aruwimi River (thus covering most of Equateur Province and all of the Lopori-Maringa) could be exploited only by people receiving concessions from the state.\(^7\) By 1900 rubber and ivory contributed ninety-five percent of the total value of exports from Leopold’s Free State.\(^8\) The pressures generated by the rubber trade, with its associated violence, intensified in the mid-1890s, initially being centred on Bolobo, Irebu, Lukolela and Tchumbiri on the Congo River in Equateur.\(^9\) The Lopori-Maringa basin was at the heart of operations in the concession of the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (‘ABIR’) from the early years of colonial rule.\(^10\)

The rubber companies focussed on tapping the Landolphia vine, using forced labour, to extract rubber latex. The methods employed to this end by European traders and their African sentries were brutal; the suffering and depopulation occasioned by the rubber scandal was immense. Innumerable means of violence and intimidation were employed. In addition to the direct and indirect killings of the period, a general anarchy reigned in the Lopori-Maringa basin: “wars and fightings between the State and the natives [are] of frequent occurrence, [with] hundreds of houses reduced to ashes, and maize plantings

\(^6\) Different forms of slavery were common in some societies of the Congo basin yet qualitative differences existed between many such institutions and the western notion of ‘chattel slavery’: see below. A note of caution is here sounded by Congolese historians Mwa Bawele and Kivilu, to the effect that great particularity is required in describing African societies. The changes of the colonial period need to be looked at as part of an extended process that was specific to each local cultural and geographic milieu: Mumbanza Mwa Bawele and Sabina Kivilu, ‘Historical Research in Zaire’, in Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David Newbury, eds. African historiographies: What history for which Africa? (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1985): 232.

\(^7\) Notwithstanding the EIC’s incomplete effective control of many such regions: Harms, 1981, 225


\(^9\) Harms, 1981, 227; it is to be noted that forced rubber collection existed in other parts of Congo also, most notably in Kasai district; see Pagan Kennedy, Black Livingstone, (New York: Viking, 2002).

\(^10\) Robert Harms, ‘The World ABIR Made - The Maringa-Lopori Basin, 1885-1903,’ Journal of African Economic History, Issue 12, (1983): 126; in 1892 the Compagnie des Produits du Congo, itself dating from 1889, founded three other companies including the Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo (‘Anversoise’) and ABIR: Depelchin, 194; these were the two principal concession companies operating in the rubber-producing regions of Congo. Harms has described ABIR as “the largest rubber concession company in the Congo”: Harms, 1983, 126. On 26 November 1911 the Compagnie du Congo Belge was created from the merger of ABIR and Anversoise; a further name change in September 1960 (post-independence) led to the Compagnie de Commerce et des Plantations: Depelchin, 202.
and manioc fields scorched and blackened, with pots, pans and baskets broken by the hundred.”

Hostage-taking by State forces and rubber collecting agents was common. Mutilation was widely reported. Few could close themselves off to the dramatic changes that accompanied the colonialists.

Thus the abandonment of villages, with women and children ‘fleeing in terror,’ was a frequent response to the approach of strangers, African or European, in the Lopori-Maringa during the early period of the EIC. In 1893 the locals were “ready to fly to the woods on the least provocation.” The chaos and terror struck directly at well-established norms of food production in the Lopori-Maringa, greatly reducing the population’s ability to withstand times of hardship. Practices of subsistence did not of course disappear, and their resilience in the face of these dramatic pressures is examined below.

**Food production in the Lopori-Maringa Basin**

*Farming*

Farming was the centrepiece of village life in the Lopori-Maringa in the late 19th century. A “tangled growth of the tropical forest is cleared away in their settlements and the fertile soil sown with maize and manioca by their industry.” A mixed subsistence economy dictated daily labour requirements. Descriptions of foodstuffs and the work involved give us insight into the daily lives of Congolese on arrival of the CBM missionaries. Plantain trees, pepper bushes, maize and kwanga (bread made from fermented cassava) greeted the missionaries on arrival at Lulanga, the location of the second CBM station, in 1889. Local staples included manioc (aka cassava), the oil palm and the yam.

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14 ‘Our New Mission to Central Africa,’ *Regions Beyond*, (March 1889): 73. Whether this report was indicative of pre-colonial patterns is unclear. The evidence comes to us from before the establishment of the CBM’s first station on the Upper River (in fact the first party was about to leave for Africa at this point). Possibly it is from LIM missionaries with some experience of the Upper Congo. Yet irrespective of the timing of this report and the identity of the crops grown or gathered it is reasonable to assume from this and from the sociolinguistic arguments of Vansina, that agricultural clearings in the equatorial forests of Central Africa were not uncommon in precolonial times; see Vansina, 1990: 84 for his discussion of proto-vocabulary as it relates to agriculture and cultivation.
16 From his use of glotto-chronology Vansina identifies yams and oil palms as among the earliest of crops to be cultivated on the Upper Congo: Vansina, 1990, 49. Also indicative of links with distant regions was the cultivation of (West African) rice in Central Africa, although this was not prominent among the farming that the CBM encountered on arrival in the Lopori-Maringa from late 1889. See also Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel* (London: Vintage Press, 1997): 388.
Areas under cultivation were described from the earliest days of the CBM, but the degree to which these areas remained unchanged upon contact with the forces of colonialism is not always clear from the archives. For example, the dramatic relocation of the towns of Bolando and Boukando from islands on the Lolanga River to the mainland near Lulonga station occurred in the CBM’s first year in the field, apparently independent of mission if not state influence. Very soon another large town sprang up, with “the ground all dug up and planted with manioc and vegetables.”

The methods of cultivation used in pre-colonial African agriculture are less clear from the mission archives. Comment is made on the gender-specific nature of much cultivation work below. Clearing of land for agriculture was sometimes performed by both men and women, sometimes only by women. The tools utilised for this and for cultivating the land included hoes. The production of yams, often confused with sweet potato in the mission literature, entails the clearing of new fields on a regular basis.

The story of Bemanga, one of the early members of the Bongandanga church and a key figure in the early development of Christianity, gives us a glimpse of female agricultural work. Strenuous manual labour with baskets and metal tools from early in the morning was the norm for these women:

Early in the morning, soon after sunrise, the women are up and start off to work in their gardens before the sun gets too hot. … Bemanga and Bowangali [wife of a local evangelist] would gather other women together on their way to the fields … and out in the midst of the manioca [sic] and maize and plantains, with their baskets and knives ready to set to work [they would pause and one of their number would take the lead in asking the Lord’s blessing].

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17 Evidence for pre-colonial food cultivation in the Congo basin is also drawn from ethno-botany, and shows us the kinds of foods eaten on the Upper Congo in pre-colonial times: see Dorothea Bedigian, ‘The Importance of Botanical Data to Historical Research on Africa,’ in John Edward Philips, ed., Writing African History, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005): 152-168; ethno-botany has helped reveal the spread of non-indigenous crops in the Congo.

18 This relocation was allegedly due to the expressed fear of ‘Bula Matadi,’ the colonial state: ‘Congo Balolo Mission – Progress of the Second Party,’ Regions Beyond, (July 1890): 278-82 at 282.

19 D. McLaren describes the gardeners at Lolanga station “working busily” clearing paths using hoes: ‘A Day in the Life of an Artizan Missionary,’ CBM Record, (3rd Quarter 1907): 35.

20 Bemanga was baptised in April 1895: Lily Ruskin, ‘Life Stories – Bemanga: A Mother in Israel,’ CBM Record, (October 1904): 9-10 at 10.

Late in the afternoon Bemanga and her cohort would go to the spring to collect water for their families.\(^{22}\) Then followed many other domestic duties at the home including preparation of meals, often a communal endeavour.

The banana, originally introduced to Africa from Asia some centuries previously, held great importance for the societies of central Africa. Bananas and plantains were reported by the CBM from the earliest stages.\(^{23}\) They grew abundantly alongside villages, although the degree of continuing cultivation necessary here may have been limited. A large cleared space containing a grove of plantains was observed at the town/district of Jombo, on the Lopori River, in May 1890 “such as generally betoken native settlement.”\(^{24}\) Also near Bongandanga sugar-cane is described among the ‘abundant’ provisions available, although no information is provided with respect to its collection or harvesting. Presumably this involved large knives and the ‘matchets’ that are regularly referred to elsewhere in the archives.

Another indication of the changing labour demands in the Lopori-Maringa was the description of the town of Bondo in the mid-1890s. A ‘floating population’ there consisted of men away for several days at a time procuring fish and rubber. They were required to provision the State post at Coquilhatville (Mbandaka) with plantains, maize, and fish. This described, in addition to hints as to local diets, of course, the chaos of the mid-1890s as the rubber terror intensified on the Maringa River.\(^{25}\) The diet of local populations deteriorated and resistance to disease was much reduced. The dramatic loss of life that accompanied rubber collection was due to, among other things, the conditions in which people were forced to live, with dramatic impacts on food production. Yet both continuity and change are highlighted in the very foods delivered to the State Post and in the new power represented by such demands.

_Fishing_

Fishing was an important aspect of local diets in supplying proteins for the peoples of the Lopori-Maringa. The many tributaries of the main Congo river,

\(^{22}\) Lily Ruskin, ‘Life Stories – Bemanga: A Mother in Israel,’ _CBM Record_, (October 1904): 9-10 at 10.

\(^{23}\) ‘The Congo Balolo Mission,’ _Regions Beyond_, (February 1890): 71; of the three main genetic families of banana, types AAA and AAB are found in Africa, each type with many varieties. AAB contains mostly plantains to be baked or made into flour and is the dominant banana in central Africa, including Congo. Although the evidence is imprecise, botanists have indicated that bananas must have been introduced into Africa in remote times: Vansina, 1990, 61; Vansina further describes an “era of great [Bantu] expansions [throughout Central Africa that only] ended when the … colonisation sparked by the adoption of the banana died out.” Vansina, 1990, 68.

\(^{24}\) Dora McKittrick, ‘Up the Lopori – Prospecting,’ _Regions Beyond_, (November 1890): 390

\(^{25}\) “but [reflecting the chaotic times, the foodstuffs and rubber] have been practically bought out.” ‘The Congo Balolo Mission,’ _Regions Beyond_, (February 1896): 120.
including the six rivers of ‘Lololand,’ are rich in edible marine life. Few locations in the Lopori-Maringa are distant from a navigable waterway. Gustav Haupt, part of the first CBM party in 1889, described “the most extensive fishing establishments I have seen in Africa” on lagoons near Lulanga in 1890: a kind of fence, high, and made of tall strong poles, [was drawn across a broad sheet of water] with an opening to let canoes pass. At intervals square cages, each about six to eight feet square, with one open side, were built, a big net hanging like a door in the opening, and so arranged that by connection by means of creeper-ropes with poles at some distance, the net could be lowered so as to close the net chamber when the fish were driven into it. It was a most elaborate arrangement, and on a big scale, sufficiently evidences the industry of the people.

The methods used in fishing thus included trapping. Fishermen employed other methods too. In an illustration (reproduced here left) from the May 1890 issue of Regions Beyond there is depicted a fisherman standing in a small canoe, holding aloft what appears to be a catfish (still common on the Congo today). The figure grasps an implement that resembles a net on the end of a pole. Fishermen may also have used spears. The problem of storing fish was met through local means. When caught in large numbers the fish were often smoked; this facilitated longer-distance trade in fish. A fishing settlement where fish was being cooked was

28 The illustration accompanies ‘Life at Lulongo’ by Lily M. de Hailes, Regions Beyond, (May 1890): 176.
described in 1895, and the missionary notes ‘our boys’ helping themselves.\textsuperscript{29} The possible interpretations are numerous; the occasion is put down to ‘the hospitable customs prevailing’ on the river.\textsuperscript{30}

Fishing activity implied certain social relations. Social institutions of the fishing society emphasised flexibility and fishing lifestyles reflected a symbiotic relationship with the riverine environment of Central Africa. Due to the need for geographic mobility fishing peoples may have had shallow lineages that embraced small numbers of persons.\textsuperscript{31} In referring to the river people generally,\textsuperscript{32} Robert Harms has stated that membership of fishing camps changed constantly and that there were no fixed rules. Decisions were often based on luck in fishing and compatibility with other members of the camp, although major works necessary for fishing might be performed by many in the community beyond the fishermen.\textsuperscript{33} There is evidence of temporary fishing posts in the early CBM reports.\textsuperscript{34} Their ‘temporary’ nature may have been more apparent than real, with unoccupied land or human structures easily being construed as ‘abandoned’ by the missionaries, given both cultural assumptions and the context of the general anarchy that marked the region in the first decade of the CBM. Also relevant here is the shifting nature of many tasks and occupations, the notion of enduring vocation being unknown for most local peoples - fishing was but one more component of the local food-producing economy.

\textit{Hunters & Gatherers}

Meat, from a variety of animals, was much sought after in the Lopori-

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\textsuperscript{30} ‘The Congo Balolo Mission,’ \textit{Regions Beyond}, (December 1895): 521; one alternative view is that the party of paddlers and other Christian workers may have shared some kinship ties with the local fishermen.
\textsuperscript{31} Harms, 1981, 11.
\textsuperscript{33} Harms, 1981, 118. In his study of labour on the Congo river, Samarin notes that “one cannot think of all the activity that went into the construction of fishing weirs [or the elaborate arrangements near Lulongo discussed above], the catching and smoking of fish, and its sale without imagining a network of social relations.” Samarin, 22. The suggested “shallow lineages” of Harms may in truth testify to the great diversity of local communities.
\textsuperscript{34} “Small fishing villages or camps built on piles” on the Lulongo River were reported by Peter Whytock: ‘The Congo Balolo Mission,’ \textit{Regions Beyond}, (March 1890): 92.
Maringa. The chicken was important among domestic animals reared. We learn that fowls are numerous and cheap during a CBM journey to the town/district of Ikuce near Bongandanga in 1891. Eggs were commonly traded both before and after contact with colonists. In addition to the fowls tended, there is evidence that goats were a common animal on the Upper Congo in pre-colonial times. It was reported in 1891 and subsequently that “in all Balololand … the flesh of the dog is a favourite dish.”

Yet indigenous hunting was being restricted from the earliest days of the EIC. By a decree of the King Leopold dated 25th July 1889 elephant-hunting was forbidden throughout all the territories of the EIC without special permission. Further, penalties were to be attached to elephant-hunting without a licence. Among the effects of this policy was the removal of a famine reserve for agricultural peoples of the Congo. This exacerbated the challenges of diet in the Lopori-Maringa, and in the context of the rubber-collecting turmoil of the 1890s, this was to have particularly severe effects.

The Twa pygmy (hereinafter ‘Twa’) of the forest were the noted elephant-hunters in Equatorial Africa. Yet there is little mention of them in the CBM literature regarding the Lopori-Maringa basin. Rather we learn in 1895 that the Bafoto [Mongo], are “the great elephant-hunters of Lolo Land.” Due to the high price that meat commanded, they were very wealthy and this shaped their relationship with outsiders: In 1895,

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35 7 monkeys, 2 antelopes, a 14-foot boa constrictor, 260 large bats and various dogs are reported as consumed by the crew of one evangelistic expedition in 1908; Cartwright, ‘Region Beyond,’ CBM Record, (1st Quarter 1908): 4.
36 Regions Beyond, (January 1892): 44; references to chickens (fowls) in the CBM literature are regular: “the fowls supplied by [the locals] are not well-fed, [being] scarcely larger than a pigeon”: Regions Beyond, (June 1895): 282.
37 Exchanges of goats and sheep on the Lulonga river were reported from the outset of the CBM: ‘Balololand at Last: Tidings from the First Party of the Congo Balolo Mission,’ Regions Beyond, (January 1890): 37; see also ‘Introduction’ in Philips, 6-7: “[linguistic evidence] inform[s] us of long traditions: a Niger-Congo protoword for ‘goat’ tells us that Niger-Congo peoples possessed goats since the earliest time of their language family.”
38 Whytock, ‘Among the Ngombe Savages,’ Regions Beyond, (February 1892):76; the point was reiterated a decade and a half later by the Rev. Ernest Cartwright, itinerating from Baringa station. Following the gift of a dog to his party “my men were overjoyed … dog just surpasses!” Cartwright, ‘The Voice of the Beyond,’ CBM Record, (3rd Quarter 1907): 31.
40 ‘News from the Dark Continent,’ Regions Beyond, (September-October 1889): 327
42 ‘The Congo Balolo Mission,’ Regions Beyond, (September-October 1895): 425; Missionary Logie also states that the Bafoto, known as Lofembi from the town of Bondo, were renowned as elephant-hunters: ‘He Knows – In Memoriam, John C. Logie,’ Regions Beyond, (November 1896): 471.
the king of the Ngombes … [called an important palaver on the occasion of the mission visit to Bokutela (near Bonginda)]. The Ngombe king had come to declare peace. ... To this the Bafoto people readily agreed, as they have long wanted to trade [elephant meat] with those on the river banks.43

Together with describing the importance of the trade in meat in the Lopori-Maringa, this was an example of the Mongo and Ngombe using the presence of the missionaries for local political ends.

Hunting was done individually and in groups. A hunting party of Ngombe with ‘nets and game’ was described on a journey north of Bongandanga in 1896.44 The nets are evidence that trapping was involved; Twa hunters would often use strategies of forcing scared animals into nets, and this may also have been the case with the Ngombe.45 Unfortunately we only learn on this occasion that, upon sighting the mission party, the Ngombe hunters flee into the forest; description of the charred remains of a burnt out town then follows, in the context of the anarchy of the 1890s.46 Other passages also help illuminate the centrality of the hunt; it was another important foundation for the local food economy.

Various fruits and nuts were gathered from the forests, and some of these have been described above in the context of agricultural production. One product gathered in the wild was honey, combs of which would be wrapped in plaintain leaves before being transported from hives.47 Food products of the forest may testify to a relationship, either social or commercial, between the Bantu Africans of the Lopori-Maringa and the Twa forest-dwellers.

A Changing Local Economy?
From the different systems of food production used we can draw some conclusions on social relations. This paper argues that control over labour was the most important form of wealth in pre-colonial Central Africa. Age was central in the allocation of labour in the Lopori-Maringa.48 The dominant local figures reported in the CBM archives were usually older men. The exploitation of the labour of sons, nephews and other dependants, and above all that of

43 The words attributed by missionaries to the Ngombe king are: “Hitherto … our people have had many wars; your people have not been able to pass through my country, or my people through yours. Now we have heard the ‘Words of God,’ that he hates fighting and murder, and we want to obey Him and cease our anger.” The Congo Mission, Regions Beyond, (September-October 1895): 426-427.
45 Turnbull, 138.
47 The honey was “eaten with maize [and was] delicious”: Dora McKittrick, ‘Life on the Lulongo,’ Regions Beyond, (September-October 1890): 347.
48 See for example Coquery-Vidrovitch and Lovejoy, 15.
women, in Central Africa was regularly orchestrated by elders, lineage heads, and chief merchants. The role of tradition and values lay in reinforcing the authority of the elders.

As part of this control over labour, the institution of slavery was important for every society in the Lopori-Maringa. Slaves provided a substantial part of the economic and labour force for many local communities. Slavery derived from different sources, including indebtedness, but the large numbers seen in the Lopori-Maringa in the late 19th century may largely have been due to warfare and strife. Intensification of the slave trades, through both foreign and domestic impulses, was one product of Central Africa’s encounter with the external world. Slavery in its indigenous forms was the target of eradication by the EIC authorities. Yet continuity was here prominent too as colonial labour, on the mission station or for EIC authorities, might appear little different and sometimes a good deal worse than the ‘slavery’ it replaced.

Women’s work throughout Africa was frequently the more labour-intensive, low-status work. According to Robertson and Klein the dominant sub-Saharan pattern in the 19th century was for women slaves to do the same things that most free women did, which meant most of the agricultural and virtually all of the domestic work. Women also performed much of the work involved in local subsistence markets. This might have offered some degree of autonomy for women in daily life. On market day at Baringa in the new century:

women and children from neighbouring villages may be seen trooping in for the market. The women usually carry on their backs huge baskets containing their garden products for sale, such as manioca roots and leaves, plantains, pine apples, maize and pine nuts, while the stock in trade of others may consist of leaves to cover cooking pots, knobs of ngola (cam-wood), small baskets or pieces of native cloth. The women [also] often carry their babies. Generally the husband walks in front of the wife and carries nothing.

The value of women slaves in Congo was based on the sexual division of labour in the larger society. Estimates of the proportion of agricultural labour performed by women in sub-Saharan Africa today indicate a preponderance of

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49 Although this paper does not specifically address the question, there is a substantial literature on African slavery and the qualitative differences with trans-Atlantic ‘chattel slavery.’ See for example Bogumil Jewsiewicki and Mumbanza Mwa Bawe, “The Social Context of Slavery during the 19th and 20th Centuries,” in Paul Lovejoy, ed., The Ideology of Slavery (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, c1981): 72-98.
50 Samarin, 91.
51 Robertson and Klein, eds., 10.
52 Kate M. Butler, ‘We tend them, God heals them,’ CBM Record, (3rd Quarter 1909): p34-5 at 34.
female labour in the fields.\textsuperscript{53} There is no reason to suspect that in precolonial times women did not also perform much of this work.\textsuperscript{54} Increasing production throughout society depended primarily on acquiring control over female labour.

Beyond the cultivation of agricultural plants much work was involved in preparing these items for consumption. Again this was often gender-specific work. We know of the work involved in the modern age in producing these foodstuffs. For example \textit{kwanga} involves peeling the roots of cassava, soaking the tubers for 2-4 days (the process of fermentation, which also leaches out poisons), removing and straining the tubers to produce a paste or dough, rolling the dough and wrapping a quantity in banana leaves, before boiling it.\textsuperscript{55}

Much work was entailed in preparing evening meals even if European eyes rarely perceived this.\textsuperscript{56} One exception was an early account of Lily de Hailes. Evidence of domesticity was as follows:

\begin{displayquote}
Their fires are like the gipsy [\textit{sic}] fires you see at home, with the large cooking pot hanging in the middle, from three crossed pieces of wood. In this pot is boiled their fish, hippopotamus, elephant, vegetables, or whatever food they have.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{displayquote}

Thus women’s roles were very demanding before and upon the arrival of the CBM. There were certain duties where their labour was not invoked, such as in paddling the canoes. But the great majority of tasks, particularly the less-desirable work in agriculture, were assigned to women. They did not occupy positions of authority within village units, with the possible exception of coercive power over fellow wives junior to them in the same family. Age might ameliorate a workload; yet gender was inescapable.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The ramifications of colonialism preceded the actual arrival of European colonialists (including missionaries), so that daily lives for people in the Lopori-Maringa basin were already changing before the first direct contacts were made, including but not limited to the different slave trades. Social history points us to the complexity of local economic and social life and this plays a central role in explaining local responses to the colonising project. This is particularly evident in the persistence of models of control over the allocation of labour, such as through age and gender, and in control over the different elements of food production.

\textsuperscript{54} Robertson and Klein, eds., 9; see also Samarin, 20.
\textsuperscript{56} Samarin, 14.
The new extractive economy imposed on Congo, and the resulting chaos and suffering in the rubber-producing regions, produced many and varied reactions. This included the oft-reported (and recalled) response of flight into the bush by Congolese, to face untold dangers in the face of the known threat from foreigners. This had dramatic consequences for the mixed subsistence economy, for public health, women and the survival of indigenous society.

Yet notwithstanding the awesome assault of the industrial economy on the Lopori-Maringa, local societies did survive. We have seen the sustained efforts to maintain traditional food production in the face of the new economy. The selective engagement of locals notwithstanding colonial pressures and rubber impositions with the new ways of life promoted by the mission and the state resulted in various adaptations to the new realities. Important continuities with past practices and traditions, notably in the key roles played by food production in the Lopori-Maringa, is evident from the stories of those evangelised by the CBM.

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Conflict, Religion and Ethnicity in the Postcolonial Nigerian State

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Abstract
The political climate of Nigeria continues to exhibit the transformation of ethnic groupings into self-conscious identities that see themselves as different from the others. Consequently, and despite a decade of a new democratic experiment, there is still a clamour for the creation of more and more separatist nationalisms while Nigerian nationalism is being actively de-created every day. This paper examines the impact of religion and shows how religion has been used to foster ethnic nationalism. Having analysed and identified religion as the root cause of conflict and instability in Nigeria, the paper concludes that if Nigeria is to survive as a sovereign state, either each state should have its own constitution where a state is free to include religious laws or religion should be excluded from state affairs. The paper further concludes that religious intolerance and associated conflicts could be curbed in Nigeria if true federalism were allowed to prevail. In a democratic system, especially with the federal system of government which Nigeria is trying to run, people need the freedom to express their true national consciousness. It is this process that will enable each of the states to identify their stakes within the one Nigeria.

Introduction
Nigeria is a country of heterogeneous composition with a cultural diversity of over 250 ethnic groups. Since independence in 1960, ethnic nationalism has intensified within the country. Nigeria is an important country on the African continent, and has assumed the position of a super power in the West African sub-region. This position is bestowed on Nigeria not just because it is the most populous, or because of its rich mineral resources, but because of its human resources and potential. But, sadly, Nigeria has degenerated and deteriorated to an almost unsalvageable condition due to its inability to consolidate itself politically. Nigeria is a divided nation in so many ways. It is ethnic, religious, geopolitical, social, economic and professional in nature. The ethnic and religious conflicts that have plagued the country have posed a challenge to leadership and have undermined the Nigerian will to be a nation.

The Underlying Argument of Ethnicity in Nigeria
Looking at the political climate of the country, the paper highlights the transformation of ethnic groupings into self-conscious identities which see themselves as different from the others. That is, each ethnic group has come to think of itself as a distinct entity with interests and ‘demand’ of its own distinct

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1 Vanguard, August 31, 2009.
from, and indeed in competition with, other groups. Consequently, there is always that attitude of antagonism and lack of trust among Nigerians.

Therefore an important question relating to ethnicity in the country is: what is Nigeria? This is a question that in all ramifications is very loaded, and calls for diligent unpacking. While it may appear simplistic to begin to ask this question after fifty years of the country’s independence, the avoidance of the answer for these number of years has evidently, become a bone of contention. Itse Sagay, for example, gives an answer to the question with a statement that has a biblical tone: “In the beginning, there was no Nigeria.” For him, prior to the British conquest of the different “nations” making up the present day Nigeria, there were independent nations comprising; Ijaws, Urhobos, Yorubas, Hausas, Fulanis, Nupes, Kanuris, Ogonis, Gwaris, Katafs, Jukars, Edos, Ibibios, Efiks, Idomas, Tivs, Jukuns, Biroms, Agnas, Ogojas. The kingdoms were, Oyo, Lagos, Calabar, Brass, Itsikirri, Benin, Tiv, Borno, Sokoto, Bonny, Opobo and the rest. Yusufu B. Usman, on the other hand argues that the above cited entities were not nations until after the British conquest of the 19th and 20th centuries:

Anybody who has read the scholarly writings that have come out of the University of Ibadan from the early 1950s knows that there has never been and there is nothing like Yoruba ‘Race’. Anyone who is familiar with the works of Professor Kenneth Dike, one of the greatest academics of the 20th century, knows that there is nothing like Igbo nation. These, like the Hausa-Fulani, Ijaw, and the other nationalities of Nigeria, came to be formed in the course of the formation of Nigeria in the 19th and 20th centuries…

Judging from Smith’s ‘transformed ethnicity’ theory, Usman seems to have a...

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3 Yusufu Bala Usman, “Ignorance, Knowledge and Democratic Politics in Nigeria,” A contribution to the symposium on Good Governance in Nigeria: The legacy of Mallam Aminu Kano, Organised by the Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano, Tuesday, 17 April, 2001.

4 For Smith, the study of ethnic communities became central to the understanding of why and where particular nations are formed, and why nationalisms, though formally alike, possess such distinctive features and contents. The focus of this analysis was the role of myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols. In a well-argued case, Smith stresses the importance of ethnicity in the discussion of nation and nationalism. In the ancient and medieval worlds, ethnicity played a much larger role than modernists who rightly rejected the conflation of earlier collective cultural identities with modern nations and nationalisms were willing to concede. There were ethnic minorities, diaspora communities, frontier ethnies, ethnic amphictyonies and even ethnic states, states dominated by particular ethnic communities such as ancient Egypt or early medieval Japan. See Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998), 178.
point here. That is, there has been a Hausa-Fulani ethnic group in the area of West Africa which became Nigeria for hundreds of years, but that does not mean that there has been a Hausa nation in that area for hundreds of years. On the contrary, Hausa nationalism (the Hausa nation) - like the Yoruba or Igbo nations - is being created now, and probably began being created only with the anti-colonial struggle. And the problem is that for all kinds of reasons (some intentional, some not) there is a lot more creation of such ethnic nationalisms in Nigeria going on at the moment. That is, there is more creation of separatist nationalisms than there is creation of a Nigerian nationalism (or the Nigerian nation). In fact there is a lot of (again intentional and unintentional) destruction of the Nigerian nation going on.

The situation could not be said to have been the same during the anti-colonial struggle. That is to say, during that struggle both Nigerian and (some) separatist nationalisms were being created, but the former at least as much as the latter. But now the balance has swung, and with every passing year in post-colonial Nigeria more and more separatist nationalisms are being reinforced or created (e.g. the new ‘minority’ nationalisms now joining the regional ‘majority’ nationalisms) while Nigerian nationalism is being actively de-created every day. How the de-creation exercise is eventuated within Nigeria will be clearer as we examine the various ethno-religious conflicts experienced in the country.

We must note from the outset that these conflicts also arose due to the awkwardness of Nigerian federalism. The concentration of power and resources at the centre has been identified as one of the major structural defects of the Nigerian federal system. This concentration has rendered the federating states impotent and powerless, relating to the Federal Government in a dependent manner. In a multi-ethnic society such as Nigeria, such development breeds a sectional monopoly of power and, therefore, lends itself to easy marginalisation of others. It further results in suspicion, lack of trust and tension in the body politic. The argument proffered in Nigeria today is that at least at the state level, there should be some autonomy. Each state should be allowed to operate its own constitution so as to enable them to identify areas of interest within the one Nigeria. Ayoade stresses the point that a certain level of autonomy to the states will remove the continual focus on the centre for assistance:

As long as I have to look forward to a centre to be able to provide breakfast for my people, then the struggle will be higher to get to that centre. I think that is how we orchestrated and fashioned these conflicts for ourselves. To reduce the conflicts, let us reduce the centre and once the centre is reduced, everybody goes home in freedom and participates at the local level. At the local level there is

a better understanding through the same language, the same needs and commonalties with the same goals and aspirations.

The argument is that if the states were allowed the autonomy they deserve then matters affecting the people would be most appropriately addressed. But the bottom line is that so long as people are thinking and acting ethno-nationally, there is no formal set of institutions, including religion, which they cannot or will not manipulate for their purposes.

**Islam and Christianity in Nigeria**

The two world religions of Christianity and Islam came to Nigeria almost simultaneously. With the arrival of these two religions, the traditional religions of the peoples of Nigeria were dislodged although tinges of them can still be found within the country. However, Islam and Christianity are the two dominant religions in Nigeria, and almost the entire scale of social, political and economic relations revolve around these two identity formations. Religion and politics have become bedfellows throughout Nigerian History. The Islamic religion has dominance in the north and Christianity has its stronghold in the south.

The process of amalgamation of the north and the south of Nigeria in 1914 brought the two religions into closer contact as Muslims and Christians began to participate in the affairs of the state. It has been argued that the attitudes of the missionaries of these religions sowed the seeds for these religions’ subsequent politicisation in Nigeria. But both religions had their fundamental tenets. Islam teaches the inseparability of religion and politics in human affairs. On the other hand, it is the belief especially of the Islamic purist that it is

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6 John A. Ayoade, Interview by author 24 January, 2001, Ibadan, tape recording, University of Ibadan.
7 Prior to the advent of the two foreign religions, Christianity and Islam, African Traditional Religion had long been in existence. In most Nigerian societies there are people who still worship God with the traditional African values. These groups of people are not identified among Christians or Muslims. See Patricia T. Williams, “New Measures to ensure an Effective Separation of State and Religion in Nigeria” in F. U. Okafor, ed., *New Strategies for Curbing Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria* (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd., 1997), 188.
11 Toyin Falola, 97.
12 A Muslim who adheres to strict moral or religious principles of Islam. To the Islamic purist, all other religions are either heretical or corrupt. There is no tolerance of any other view. See Ishak Ibrahim, *Black Gold and Holy War: The Religious Secret behind the Petrodollar* (London: The Chaucer Press, 1983), 8.
Allah’s will for all society to come under the Islamic flag, and that Islamic law and religion may take control and under-gird the whole of life for all peoples. Christianity, on the other hand, upholds the separation of religion and politics, church and state, and believes in the mercy of God for all people regardless of creed.\textsuperscript{13} Despite the presence of these two religions alongside the traditional religions, the Nigerian State is to remain a secular state with adequate freedom of worship provided for in the constitution.\textsuperscript{14} But religious extremists have always threatened the secularity of Nigeria, and religion does appear to polarise the north and the south.\textsuperscript{15}

The 1804 Jihad of Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817), a fulani Muslim scholar\textsuperscript{16} and a member of the \textit{Qadiriyya}\textsuperscript{17} sect of Islam has been the focal point of Islam in Nigeria. Not very pleased with the practice of Islam by Hausa rulers,\textsuperscript{18} he had declared a holy war (jihad) that would purge the land of the lax Muslims. On conquering the Hausa states, Usman dan Fodio made his army commanders the emirs (rulers) of Hausaland. Until today, it has become the tradition that the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} These facts are clearly stated in articles 10 and 38 of the Nigerian Constitution that the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion. See \textit{1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria}.
\item \textsuperscript{15} See Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 157.
\item \textsuperscript{16} The Fulani were a light-skinned race of cattle nomads whose original home was in the Senegal River valley. Several Fulani clans, notably the Torodbe, had come under the influence of Islam as early as the eleventh century and from the fourteenth century onwards they had been proselytes of their religion throughout the Western Sudan. In the courts of the kings of Western Sudan, the Muslim Fulani played important roles as administrators. Some of the kings by whom they were employed were themselves ardent Muslims, but the majority were either avowedly animist or mixed traditional practices with their observances of Islam. Under such conditions, the Muslim Fulani were increasingly drawn to the idea of revolt against their ‘pagan’ masters. The aim of these rebels was to establish states governed in accordance with the Shari’a. The importance of these Jihads, taking place so far away from Nigeria, was that they served as inspiration for Usman dan Fodio in his own Jihad against the rulers of Hausaland.” See Michael Crowder, \textit{The Story of Nigeria} (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 71.
\item \textsuperscript{17} The earliest Sufi Order was founded by Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani who died 1166 C.E. in Baghdad, Iraq. The Sufis of the Qadiriyyah Order laid great stress on the purification of the self. According to this philosophy, purification of the mirror of the heart from rust of the carnal, animal and satanic qualities is the essential part of one’s spiritual journey. The Sufis maintained that the human soul came from the world of command and is capable of reflecting the Divine Light, but due to impurities of the self, it does not do so. The Qadiriyyah School of Mysticism is based entirely upon the principles of Shariah. See “The Qadiriyyah Sufi Way”, \url{http://www.sunnirazvi.org/qadiri/main.htm} (accessed 19 August, 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{18} These were the rulers of the Hausa people who occupied most of the northern states (Kano, Sokoto, Gobir, Zamfara, Katsina and Zaria) of Nigeria long before the spread of Islam into that area in the thirteenth century. See J. O. Hunwick, “Songhay, Borno and Hausaland in the sixteenth century” in J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., \textit{History of West Africa}, Vol 1, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (New York: Longman, 1976), 264-301.
\end{itemize}
descendants of these leaders occupy the thrones of northern emirates with their alliance to the Sokoto Caliphate.\textsuperscript{19} The outcome of the jihad, as Udoidem has pointed out, was that what started as a search for religious purification soon became a search for a political kingdom: “Islam has remained the focal veneer for the legitimacy of the northern ruling class, and consequently, its politicians have always prided themselves as soldiers for the defence of that faith.”\textsuperscript{20}

Political parties in the north have always been founded on the basis of religious commitment. For instance, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), a conservative party led by the emirs ruling class, had Islam as its rallying point. Thus, the emirs who are seen as religious leaders also preside over political activities. This became clear in 1951, after the general election, when the Sarduana of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the president of the NPC, became the premier of the northern region: “What emerged, along with political development, was that the religious ideas of the caliphate became incarnate within the ruling party, the NPC and its political manifesto.”\textsuperscript{21} So the objective of the northern politicians in the years preceding independence was to consolidate power in view of the preservation of their faith:

when therefore, by the late 1950s the Southern regions of Nigeria were speaking and agitating for independence, the ruling class in Northern Nigeria were looking forward to a handover of power to the heirs of Anglo-Fulani hegemony. For them independence meant freedom from the rule of non-Muslims and the establishment of an ideal Muslim state.\textsuperscript{22}

At independence, most of the leaders from the north were Muslims and most of the leaders from the south were Christians. As a matter of fact, this was a coming together of people with diverse world-views and values. Therefore, the occurrence of conflicts could not be ruled out. Thus from the early stages of independence religious conflicts have become part of Nigeria’s existence.

\textbf{Religion and Conflict}

Religion can be both an integrative and divisive factor in any society. When the divisive elements of religion are not properly handled and brought under strict control, they create tensions and unrest in a society.\textsuperscript{23} There is no doubt the issue of religion in Nigeria has become divisive rather than integrative.

\textsuperscript{19} Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 156. The Sokoto Caliphate was founded by Usman dan Fodio. It is an Islamic spiritual community in Nigeria, led by the Sultan of Sokoto. Founded during the Fulani Jihad in the early 1800s, it was one of the most powerful empires in sub-Saharan Africa prior to European conquest and colonization.

\textsuperscript{20} Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 156.

\textsuperscript{21} Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 157.

\textsuperscript{22} Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 157

Religion has neither helped to preserve social order nor even to lower individual anxiety. As S. Agi has pointed out:

Religion has contributed in no small measure to the social anomie which has characterised Nigerian national life for so long without an end in sight. Religious fanaticism, bigotry and violence have become an obstacle to the achievement of social harmony and interaction. It is gradually destroying the country’s social fabric; the basis of trust and mutual respect. It has weakened the very foundation of Nigeria’s socio-cultural existence.

Religious conflicts which have engulfed the Nigerian state are concentrated in the north and it is therefore easy to have the impression that since the north is predominantly Muslim, the tension is always between the Muslims and the minority Christian population in the north. In reality, there have been both intra-religious and inter-religious conflicts. For instance, when in 1961, the Sarduana of Sokoto formed the Jamatu Nasril Islam (JNI), an Islamic movement charged with the special responsibility of propagating Islam, it was seen by other Muslims as the religious wing of the NPC. Some of the activities of the JNI were not acceptable to other Muslims, especially those who did not belong to the NPC. As Falola has stated, the JNI also had a significant political dimension. “From the very beginning, it set out to create an umbrella organisation for prominent northerners in the NPC and the civil service.”

In 1964, the reformed Tijaniya, another Islamic movement, was formed by Sheikh Ibrahim Niass. This group for all practical purposes was the religious wing of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) political party and was often used as a means for political protests. The NPC and the northern aristocrats resented the activities of the Tijaniya group. Consequently, hostilities developed between the NEPU/Tijaniya and the NPC (JNI) Islamic movements and became the foundation for the intra-religious crises among the Muslims in Nigeria.

The 15th of January 1966 could be said to be the trigger for inter-religious conflicts. The coup, which saw the execution of mostly Muslim leaders, like Alhaji Abubakar Tafewa Balewa the first and only Prime Minister of Nigeria and Ahmadu Bello, was interpreted by many in the north as a Christian coup against Islam. In addition, the suspicion increased on the ground that Igbo

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25 Toyin Falola, 105.
26 Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 156.
27 The argument by some northerners regarding the coup is that the plotters had a purpose and that is the prevention of a section of the country, the North, from effective participation in the governance of the country. According to this view, the prevention of the north from governance was accomplished through the physical elimination of the entire political and
soldiers from a Christian region masterminded the coup, and the fact that Aguiyi-Ironsi, a Christian, became the Head of State. This interpretation of the January coup led the two opposing Islamic movements in the north to close ranks to face a common enemy. They rejected the rule of a non-Muslim and went on the counter offensive with the July 1966 coup. These events precipitated the civil war (1967-1970) in Nigeria. Arguably, the war was not a religious war, but there is no doubt that it had a religious underpinning. From the onset, the Muslims had never given up their quest for Nigeria to be an Islamic state, and the civil war provided an avenue to conquer and convert the ‘infidel’ in the south. Utterances from eminent Muslims in the north testify to this fact, particularly a statement credited to Tafawa Balewa:

Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914 Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is still far from being united. The country is inhabited by peoples and tribes who speak different languages, who have different religions, different customs and traditions and entirely different historical backgrounds in their ways of life, and who have also attained different stages of development. We would like the world to know that in the Northern Provinces we have got our own leaders whom we have chosen ourselves, to be our rulers and voices. We do not want, Sir, our Southern neighbours to interfere in our development. If the Southern people feel they are representatives for what they are agitating for and demanding, well they must know that the case of the Northern Provinces is different . . . but I should like to make it clear that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea.

In consideration of this, the ‘Biafran’ Christians in the south believed they were fighting and resisting Muslim expansionism. Thus the ‘Biafran’ propaganda to have international support especially from the Christian world was based on the idea that the war was between the Muslim north and the Christian east. In one

military élite of the north, beginning with the top leadership; the Sarduana of Sokoto, Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria, the embodiment of the soul of the north and all that it stood for. See A. M. Mainasara The Five Majors – Why they Struck (Zaria, Nigeria: Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1982), 9.

28 Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 158.

29 The religious element is never ignored as a centrifugal factor in the development of separate and potentially unhealthy attitudes between the northerners and southerners. While a significant portion of the north were Christians, the general idea presented to the outside world was that the north was monolithically Islamic and the south essentially Christian. This element of religion became a factor of propagation by some of the elite in the whirlwind of the civil war. See Emmanuel A. Ayandele, Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1974), 105.

30 Emmanuel A. Ayandele, 106; Two former rulers of Nigeria, Alhaji Shehu Shagari and General Muhamadu Buhari (Rtd), northerners and staunch Muslims publicly expressed their desire to see the Sharia introduced in all parts of Nigeria. From the Nigerian standpoint, this type of sentiment expressed publicly in the face of crisis is bound to generate further crisis.
of the statements, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu (leader of the defunct Biafra) is quoted to have said:

In the context in which the rest of Nigeria was against the East – ‘Biafra’ - the Igbo became an oppressed minority, oppressed because they were Christians; they were not ‘rebels’ but a people, ‘rightly struggling to be free’, pushed out of Nigeria by the much less virtuous others, particularly the Islamic Northerners who themselves were ineducable but were murderously envious of the noble qualities and achievements of the Igbo people . . . Nigeria’s aim was to wipe off for ever the entire Igbo race and dislodge the Christian religion there for Islam . . . \(^{31}\)

This propaganda was to a large extent, successful in winning the sympathies of international organisations, and relief materials were arranged for the people of this region although the opposing camp intercepted most. On the whole, a stage was set for a protracted religious conflict mingled with ethnicity.

The post civil war period in Nigeria that is from 1970 till date, has been characterised by religious conflicts of one kind or another. After the civil war, the then Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, declared the period a time of Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. What this meant was that the government was poised to set up programmes that would usher in healing after the bloody civil war. But the religious face of the civil war persisted even after the war had ended. As Udoidem puts it, conflict continued in the form of a religious cold war:

Following the military successes that the north registered in the civil war, Muslims as never before began to affirm their spiritual identity and to flex their political and economic muscles for the propagation of the Islamic faith. They saw the defeat of the east as the achievement of Allah’s will and therefore the oil fields in the east as the war booty which they had a divine mandate to appropriate.\(^{32}\)

The conquering attitude of the Muslims was further reflected in the tilting of the Federal Government might in favour of the Muslim north.\(^{33}\) Besides the ‘cold war’ disposition, actual religious conflicts have been reported in Nigeria since 1976 until the present day, prominent among which was the Sharia crisis. Because of its protracted impact on the Nigeria polity even in the present

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\(^{31}\) Emmanuel A. Ayandele, 158.
\(^{32}\) Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 159.
\(^{33}\) For example, the structure of federal government appointments was carefully done in such a way that the Muslims were in control. Even though Gowon the Head of State was a Christian, it was clear that the Muslims who staged the July coup and executed the civil war were manipulating him. Also to be noted is the fact that an Islamic scholar, the late Sheikh Abubakar Gumi had consistently maintained that Muslims cannot accept the leadership of a non-Muslim in the country. This was the logic that produced Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the civilian president of the second republic.
dispensation, I shall discuss the Sharia crisis in more detail in a latter section. For the other religious conflicts, and for the sake of brevity, I shall proceed chronologically from 1980 to present day.

**Religious Conflicts**

While there were instances of religious riots in the north, none was as explosive and bloody as the first Kano riots in 1980. These were intra-religious riots championed by Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa who came to be known as Maitatsine (The one who curses). He formed a group constituted of hard core Muslims who were opposed to all factors of modernisation such as television, radio, watches, cars, bicycles, etc., (an approach similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan). They believe that any Muslim who reads any other book besides the Koran is an infidel. Maitatsine and his group, who had an enclave in Kano, launched an attack on all those they considered infidels. In this process, both Muslims and Christians were not spared. This conflict was rooted in the deeply conservative understanding and practice of Islam. It attracted a wide following of the hard core Muslims who unanimously called for an Islamic revolution in Nigeria. On the one hand, Falola opines that Maitatsine violence can be explained as a consequence of Islamic fundamentalism and on the other of the political decadence and economic troubles of the 1970s. Characteristic of Nigerian leadership, the issue was not properly resolved, and the Maitatsine uprising resurfaced in Maiduguri, another northern state, in October 1982. There was violent confrontation with the police by the members of this group, which led to the burning of many Christian churches.

One important factor which has caused religious conflicts in Nigeria up until the present time is the fact that most of the disciples of Maitatsine were drawn from the poor and underprivileged class of the Muslim population which had not benefited from the oil boom, and whose distress was increasing with the high rate of inflation:

The urban Muslim poor were attracted to Maitatsine because he condemned the hypocrisy and ostentation of the nouveau riche and promised redemption and salvation to God’s righteous people. Attracted, too, were the almajirai, the young itinerant students of the Kuran who attached themselves to any learned malam in a time-honoured system of apprenticeship. These also had a very poor and simple life-style and won their daily bread in the cities by begging.

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34 The June 2009 sectarian (Boko Haram) violence in northern Nigeria states of Borno and Bauchi led by Mohammed Yusuf, where members of a religious gang who believe Western education and culture are sinful bear semblance to Maitatsine uprisings.

35 Toyin Falola, 137-155.

It is true that the increasing inequalities which characterised Nigeria have been involved in most of the conflicts in the country. Religious extremism, however, cannot be reduced simply to economic factors. In this case, for example, the zeal for the implementation of Islamic practices had an independent role. Only this can explain Muslims turning their attention to Christians in the north of Nigeria while protesting against government policies. The Maitatsine uprising flared in other cities of northern Nigeria, like Jimeta in 1984, and Gombe in 1985, destroying many lives and causing havoc all over the region.

Government complicity in religious matters has helped to fuel these conflicts. A case in point is the attempt made by the General Ibrahim Babaginda administration in 1986 to register Nigeria as a member of Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). This raised a lot of anxiety among Christians who saw the government move as an attempt toward Islamisation of Nigeria. Muslims argued that membership to the OIC was simply a diplomatic move that would bring benefits to the country. Because of Christian discontent and pressure, the issue of Nigerian membership in the OIC was put on hold. This decision, however, led in turn to a series of religious disturbances in the north. The first of a series of disturbances was the March 1986 clash in Ilorin between Muslims and Christians. These clashes were ignited by a Christian Palm Sunday procession through a Muslim dominated area. The procession angered the Muslims who then attacked the Christians.

Two months after the Ilorin clash another confrontation was reported at Uthman Dan Fodio University Sokoto in May 1986, between Christian and Muslim students. In the same month, there was another clash outside the north at Nigeria’s premier university, the University of Ibadan. The bone of contention in both clashes had to do with the abuse of a Muslim name in the former and a Christian symbol in the latter. A more violent religious conflict

37 The burning of churches in the 1980 religious crisis was discovered by the panel of investigation to have had a political backing. The panel discovered that local Muslims were angry over the fact that the leadership of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was controlled by a non-indigenous Christian. Thus they saw CAN as providing a platform for agitation by the southerners. The religious riots thus served as an anti-south strategy. See Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 168.

38 The Maitatsine uprisings continued to spread from one town to another. Two years after the Kano riot, some of the members of the group who had escaped to Maiduguri staged a comeback in Bulunkutu, and another face of the movement surfaced in Jimeta, Yola north of Nigeria in 1984. Again in 1985, the same Maitatsine movement regrouped and struck in Gombe and Bauchi states of Nigeria killing over 100 people. See Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 169; Tell Magazine, no. 32, August 10, 2009.

39 The up-shot of the alleged OIC deal was that it divided Nigerian political citizens into two major religious camps namely, Islam and Christianity. While the adherents of the former try to throw some light on the benefits of membership, the latter saw the venture as an attempt to Islamize the whole nation. The Nigerian military government refused any categorical official statement on the issue. See Anthony Ekwunife, 25-6.

40 Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 172.
was registered in the north in March 1987 triggered mainly over the alleged misrepresentation of the Koran. A bitter quarrel erupted on the premises of the Advance Teachers College at Kafanchan between members of the Fellowship of Christian Students and the Muslim Students Society. The violence, which spread to the towns of Funtua, Zaria, Kankia, Daura and Kaduna, saw over 19 people killed, 5 Mosques, 152 churches, 152 private buildings, 169 hotels and beer parlours destroyed and about 95 vehicles burnt and/or otherwise damaged. Another conflict was reported at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in 1988 over the issue of student unionism and election into offices. When it became clear that a Christian was emerging as the winner of the student union presidency, the Muslim students took offence at what was regarded as campaign on religious grounds.

Further Muslim and Christian conflicts took place in Bauchi, Kano and Katsina in 1991, and in Zangon-Kataf in 1992. In one of these conflicts, a disagreement over a piece of meat sold by a vendor to another who mistook it for pork was enough to spark off the conflict. Unfortunately, before the truth of the matter was established, many lives were already lost. In the case of Zangon-Kataf, ethnic differences degenerated into a religious conflict because of a series of earlier confrontations between the two communities in the southern part of Kaduna. Kaduna in recent times has become a centre of religious disturbances in the country. The reason is traced to the strained relationship between the Aborigines of the area and the Hausa/Fulani (invaders) settlers who attempt to dominate them. Haruna Abdullahi stated this clearly in an interview:

The issue of the Kaduna crisis, which was a major one the country has witnessed after the inauguration of the fourth republic, was also connected with ethnic differences particularly the Aborigines and the immigrants that came in during the Jihad of the 18th century. The problem had lingered since then because of the increasing awareness of the Aborigines of their dispossession in the management of affairs of the region particularly Kaduna state. They believe they should be treated on equal ground, and if that is not possible, then they should be able to have their separate state. So the Kaduna crisis is interwoven with political, religious bigotry and ethnic issues.

Ethnicity is also involved in many conflicts that have permeated central Nigeria since the inauguration of the fourth republic (1999-2009). For example, conflict broke out in Jos Plateau State in September 2001, between Muslim

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42 In 1992, religious fanaticism reared its ugly head in a tribal conflict between the Zangos and Katafs in Kaduna State. Hundreds of lives were lost and many people rendered homeless. See Tell Magazine, no 32, August 10, 2009.

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Hausa/Fulani and Christian indigenes of Jos North Local Government Area. The crisis, which claimed many lives, was the culmination of rivalry between these two groups. It is said that the Jasawa Development Association, an organisation representing the Muslim Hausa/Fulani issued a statement calling on the people of the area to vote in a Muslim as the council chairman in the next local government election. So when the election result, turned out in favour of a Christian indigene, it became a source of conflict. In addition, the appointment of Alhaji Mohammed Usman, a Muslim Fulani, as the coordinator and chairman of the monitoring committee of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), escalated the conflict between the two groups.44

Ethnic Elements in Religious Conflicts
So far we have seen that there have been sporadic conflicts mostly in the northern parts of the country. Most of them have been religious and others have been as a result of ethnic agitation and communal clashes. Conflicts were reported in the northern Nigeria towns of Jos, Kaduna and Kano as a result of the introduction of the Sharia Islamic law and some pro-Osama Bin-Laden demonstrations. There were also violent conflicts in Benue and Nassarawa states where ethnic tension was rife between the Jukuns (Hausa/Fulani), and the Christian Tiv people. It was argued that these conflicts were expressions of discontent repressed under the military.45 While this argument may have some

44 See *This Day* (Lagos), 11 September, 2001.
45 For instance, most of the people this author spoke to during his field-work identified the present crisis in Nigeria with suppressed agitation of the people by the military regime which democracy has now given them the opportunity to air their views. Here are some extracts of those views: “There were contradictions in the entire system right from independence, ethnic contradictions and contradictions in terms of distribution of resources. The military had to impose themselves on these contradictions by suppressing them but suddenly they burst open again with democracy”. Mark O. C. Anikpo, Interview by author, 7 January, 2001, Port Harcourt, tape recording, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.; “After a long period of repression such crises are expected. All those emotions and grievances and emotions that had been latent under the military would be vented and that is what is happening in Nigeria. People are now able to express themselves without restrain”. Ben B. B. Naanen Interview by author, 8 January, 2001, Port Harcourt, tape recording, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.; “Conflict per se is inevitable in every society. The point to note is not about conflict but how to manage conflict. In an environment of freedom people will vent their grievances especially if these were bottled up over a number of years where you couldn’t say anything without the military interfering”. Okon E. Uya, Interview by author, 10 January, 2001, Calabar, tape recording, University of Calabar, Nigeria.; “Various conflicts in the country are a manifestation of the deep contradictions in the Nigerian State and society. Most of the conflicts had been suppressed under the military but not resolved. In a dispensation that promotes vectors of civil society those conflicts are bound to resurface”. Celestine O. Bassey Interview by author, 10 January, 2001, Calabar, tape recording, University of Calabar, Nigeria.; “The crisis development in Nigeria is consistent with what we are and what we will still find ourselves. It is always like this with every democracy at the beginning. We have had persistent rule of the military ever since we became independent. People were suppressed but now they have an opportunity to express themselves. Conflicts have arisen as a result to correct the corrupt excesses of the military”. Owen S. Ukafia Ede VI Interview by author, 13 January, 2001, Okoroete, tape recording,
merit explaining, it is hardly convincing in the case of ethno-religious conflicts which have been overt in Nigeria since the early years of independence.

The October 2001 conflict in Kano, a strong Islamic state in the north with a considerable minority population of Christians, claimed over 200 lives. This unrest flared after the United States of America started bombing Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America. There were pro-Bin-Laden demonstrations in Kano in which Muslims vented their anger on fellow Nigerians from the south. Kukah comments on these events as follows:

It is assumed that the masses feel so strongly about their faith that they are not ready to trade it off with any talk about democracy. Within Northern Nigeria, for example, and especially within the Muslim populace, there are many who will see democracy as part of a worldly pursuit which they cannot engage in for fear of losing their religious kingdom. Given their low level of literacy and the suspicion with which ideas of the West and secular ideas are held, democracy is often presented as part of the Western conspiracy to undermine Islam.

There is no doubt that the ethnic factor has contributed weightily to most of the religious conflicts in Nigeria. The recent Jos crisis underlines this fact. Over three hundred people lost their lives because of what was seen as the result of local government election result that did not favour some people in Jos North Local Government Area in November 2008. The root cause of this crisis is over who controls Jos North: the Hausa or the indigenes. The two groups are using religion to achieve their aim. Yakubu Mohammed captures the sentiments in these words:

In the year 2008, majority of politicians are still talking of settlers, indigenes and strangers. As others are moving forward and embracing the new technology of globalisation, many of the so called political elite are retreating rapidly into their various cocoons, promoting rapid ethnicity and religious bigotry.

Eastern Obollo, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. On his part, the President of Nigeria then, Olusegun Obasanjo in a press conference in America likened the violence in Nigeria to water boiling in a pot, with the water being long held emotions. The President said pent-up emotions burst forth when the pot (of democracy) was opened, but that what would follow was stability.

For example, the Muslim Council of Nigeria called on the National Assembly to reject the bill presented to it by President Obasanjo concerning women and children issues, which they said, were un-Islamic. They also observed with dismay how Obasanjo ignored the feelings of the teeming Nigerian Muslims with regards to U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.


60 ARAS Vol.30 No. 2 December 2009
The Sharia Issue

The Sharia debate has always provided a dividing line between Muslims who are mostly northerners and Christians who are southerners. The issue engulfed the Nigerian political landscape shortly after the inauguration of the new democratic era in 1999. For Zubair Kazaure, Sharia is simply another word for Islam, which reached Nigeria in the 10th century, an idea that was reinforced by the 1804 Fulani-led revolution, or Jihad, staged to restore discipline and moral conduct within the Hausa-Fulani communities.\(^{50}\) Kazaure states of Sharia:

> This [moral] guidance is the Sharia which is not just a legal system. It helps us to have faith in Allah, prescribes rules for worshipping Him, and sets standards of our moral conduct and manners in private and public life. The Sharia if faithfully adhered to, regulates society, its politics, economy, legal system, physical environment, cultural values and concepts. It is a source of attainment of happiness in this world and the hereafter. Following the Sharia faithfully gives us a sense of spiritual fulfilment and internal peace that we are on the right path. Disobeying it or being subjected to non-Islamic rules of conduct would make us miserable.\(^{51}\)

The British encountered these Islamic rules in northern Nigeria and guaranteed that they would not interfere with the Muslim religion. When the north and the south were eventually brought together in 1914, with a high level of intermingling, the British insisted on the separation of the Sharia court which dealt with personal status and family law from the civil court which dealt with criminal law and applied to all Nigerians. Since independence in 1960, some Muslim advocates have been making frantic efforts to install Sharia rule in Nigeria as a whole.\(^{52}\) Some of the proponents of Sharia argue that English law was transplanted and imposed on the country by the colonial regime and should not be allowed to remain the common law of Nigeria.\(^{53}\) But the problem of course is that Sharia law is no more indigenous to large numbers of Southern Nigerians than the British legal system was.

The Sharia controversy arose during the drafting of the Constitution in 1976. The pro-Sharia members of the committee wanted to have provisions of the Sharia written into the laws providing for the Supreme Court of Nigeria. They argued that it was an exercise of freedom of religion, federalism and democracy, a struggle for judicial reform and an attempt by Muslims to reassert

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51 Zubair Mahmud Kazaure.
52 Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 161.
53 See Matthew Kukah, 1993: 120.
and realise their full identity. Their opponents argued that Sharia applies to Muslims alone whereas the country’s Supreme Court should adjudicate among all citizens irrespective of religion. A compromise position was reached regarding the status of Sharia in the 1979 Constitution with the provision for both Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal for states that desired them. As David Laitin has pointed out, it appears to have been a reasonable thing to do, because:

this issue, not surprisingly, had all the ingredients associated with a symbolic crusade about which no party can compromise. The politics of religion, where there is no room for flexibility, can rock a political system to its very foundation.

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55 Prior to the emergence of the British in various parts of what is now known as Nigeria, these various parts had their indigenous methods of governance and administration of justice. The British officials, following their emergence in these various parts, were not oblivious of these customary laws and institutions. For example, with respect to the coastal areas, notwithstanding the establishment of the Consular courts and the courts of equity before the British took over the administration of the area in 1872, indigenous courts were allowed to operate in the administration of justice in this area between the indigenous people. Even with the take-over of the British with respect to the administration of this area in 1872, the British allowed indigenous courts to operate. The same can be said of Lagos even after it was ceded to the British. The Supreme Court Ordinance No 11 of 1863 allowed the customary laws to operate subject to the satisfaction of the rules of natural justice, equity and good conscience and compatibility with the law for the time being in force. Subsequent Supreme Court Ordinances did not change this position. Indeed, when the Royal Niger Company was to be given its Charter, the company was enjoined to pay regard to the “customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation” of its domicile. While it may be maintained that with respect to the Protectorate of the Southern Nigeria by virtue of the Native Courts Proclamation No 9 of 1900 and the Native Courts Proclamation No 25 of 1901 which replaced that of 1900, the hitherto indigenous courts established by traditional authority were abrogated and replaced by Native Courts established by statute, this was done for the purpose of regulating the courts that could be established and the composition of those courts. These laws did not change the tenor of customary law or the permissive expression given to customary law which from the beginning must satisfy the tests of repugnancy. With the emergence of Nigeria as a nation in 1914 following the amalgamation of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria with the Northern Protectorate, and the appointment of Lord Lugard as the Governor General, it became necessary for the British to determine the type of administrative technique it wanted to adopt. The adoption of the indirect rule system gave credence to the recognition and application of customary law and established indigenous institutions. See John Ademola Yakubu, “Colonialism, Customary Law and Post – Colonial State in Africa: The case of Nigeria”, Paper Prepared for CODESRIA’s 10th General Assembly on Africa in the New Millennium, Kampala, Uganda, 8-12 December 2002. http://www.codesria.org/Archives/ga10/Abstracts%20GA%201-5/colonialism_Yakubu.htm (Accessed 28 August 2009).

Subsequent constitutions of the country including the latest (1999) bear these provisions. But the Sharia debate had more to it than religion. As events unfolded, it became clear that it was a political issue with a religious colouring, and a new dimension was introduced into religious conflicts in Nigeria. The debate in the Constituent Assembly was still going while Muslims outside sought to enforce their argument by engaging in threats and riots. Though the riots in the long run did not achieve their goals by changing the agreed position of Sharia in the Assembly, they, in a way, emboldened some Muslims with the conviction that religious riots could be an effective instrument for the achievement of a political goal. And that has been the situation ever since.

It is to be noted that since independence, no state in Nigeria had actually implemented the full Sharia law until 1999. Ahmed Sani the then governor of Zamfara state who introduced Sharia as the supreme law of the land set things in motion. He was quoted as saying, “Whoever administers or governs any society not based on Sharia is an unbeliever.” Many governors of the north who also introduced the Sharia followed his example, but when it came to Kaduna State with half of its population being Christians, the impact became explosive. Nigeria again recorded another bloody religious conflict in February 2000 between Christians and Muslims because of attempt to implement the Sharia. In this conflict, hundreds of people were killed, property worth billions of Naira was destroyed and thousands of people were rendered homeless. The conflict quickly spread to Zaria and Kafanchan.

The Sharia issue has assumed alarming proportions in Nigeria. It is hinged on the problem of poor leadership. There has been a tendency on the part of the government to regard these problems as events that will gradually sort themselves out with time. In fact, the then President, Olusegun Obasanjo refused to take a clear stand on the Sharia issue, dismissing it with the wave of the hand because for him Sharia will simply “fizzle out.” But the problem was not just ‘fizzling out’ as subsequent follow-up religious crises proved, and the Muslims in Nigeria are poised to keep it that way.

Many non-Muslims in Nigeria believe that the constitution makes Nigeria a secular state and prohibits the imposition of any religious beliefs on any Nigerian citizen; states that have imposed Sharia law have done so ultra vires, that is, without constitutional authority. Hence, they expected the Federal

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57 Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 162.
58 Sylvanus I. Udoidem, 162.
60 On February 21 and 22, 2000, riots broke out in Walingo and Kachia cities of Kaduna a northern town Over Sharia and on 28 February, there were riots in Aba in South East of Nigeria as reprisal killing from the Kaduna mayhem. Tell Magazine, 32: August 10, 2009.
61 For example in May 2004, several people were killed at a protest by Muslims in Kano against ethnic crisis in Shendam, Plateau State of Nigeria. This protest was organized by the Islamic Council of Ulama. See Tell Magazine, 32: August 10, 2009.
Government to challenge the action of the Zamfara state governor in the Supreme Court. But that is yet to happen.

Most Nigerians have come to the conclusion that poverty and unemployment are factors responsible for Sharia crises. According to this view, the poor and unemployed youths are easily mobilised for social unrest. While this is a tenable argument, it does not address the overall issue of Sharia implementation in Nigeria. Even when (if at all) the government is able to eradicate poverty and unemployment, Sharia will still remain a burning issue as far as the Christian-Muslim relationship is concerned. The crux of the matter is as Igwara has pointed out:

The Hausa/Fulani control of political power since independence has been a major source of frustration for other ethnic groups in the country. The fact is that Islam in the country is most closely associated with Hausa/Fulani traditional ruling elites or what has come to be known as the northern oligarchy. This group believes that Islam is a useful ideology for maintaining power in the north and subsequently in the country as a whole, and has manipulated Islam for that purpose.

The fact of the ethnic divide occasioned by the Sharia crises is emphasised by Ebong.

the various conflicts in the country are happening as a result of anger in some areas that they have been cheated all along e.g., the Niger Delta region or South-South. Resources are tapped from these areas and yet there is nothing to show for having resources. Also there is counter reaction from the privileged group of the North, hence the Sharia crises in the country.

The bottom line is how to manage a state that ensures religious freedom. It is not enough to have a constitution that declares Nigeria a secular state when it is clear that this declaration is not acceptable to a large section of the state’s population. Indeed some Muslim extremists argue that Sharia is above the Constitution and therefore not subject to it.

63 For example, Bayo Adekanye argues that the issue of Sharia has to do with the unemployed young boys who are mobilised to be ready to die for sharia. Besides, the rising phenomenon of ethnic militias all across the country, the Egbesu boys, the Bakassi boys, OPC, the Arewa present a sense in which these are not ethnic conflicts nor ethnic militias. The coloration according to him is not ethnic and religious but the deep-seated factors involved are socio-economic. Bayo Adekanye, Interview by author 25 January, 2001, Ibadan, tape recording, University of Ibadan.
65 Mbuk Ebong, Interview by author, 7 January, 2001, Port Harcourt, tape recording, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.
The question for Nigeria today is what direction is to be taken regarding religious conflicts. Religious intolerance and associated conflicts could be curbed in Nigeria if true federalism is allowed to prevail. This will be a situation where the component states will enjoy some autonomy within the one federal bloc. In a democratic system especially with the federal system of government which Nigeria is trying to run, people need the allowance to express their true national consciousness. It is this process that will enable each of the states to identify areas of interest within the one Nigeria. In the case of Jos crisis as an example, it becomes ridiculous to find both the federal government and the Plateau state government constituting different panels of investigation into the matter. The consequence of this development is a rift between the federal government and the state.

The point is that each state needs to be allowed to run its own constitution. (The expectation is that with the state constitution, legislations would be made in such a manner that the rights of every citizen within any state in the country are not compromised. It is also to be understood that in this situation, the state constitution does not supersede the federal constitution). The lack of state constitutions has complicated various issues in Nigeria and has not allowed for varieties in the polity. That is why when a state tries to do something its own way, it explodes and the impact is felt in the country and politicians who are very apt to capitalisation would not hesitate to exploit an issue such as religion for their own benefits. Nigeria at this stage of its political history needs to transcend this religious divide. All groups in Nigeria irrespective of religious affiliation should see the country as the main focus.

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Globalisation, Failed States and Pharmaceutical Colonialism in Africa.

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“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”
(George Orwell, Animal Farm)

Within the discourse of failed states, debate is perennial about what makes a weak or failed state. The capacity of a state to protect its citizens from forces both within and outside its borders is one relevant criterion. Another is the economic and social vulnerability of the people. The significance of these two criteria in the age of globalization is that global corporations can take advantage of weak policies and institutions within that state in order to exploit poverty. To be examined here will be the poverty of some African people burdened with disease, but unprotected by their state and being used as ‘guinea pigs’ in clinical drug trials, in many cases for drugs destined for western markets and for western illnesses. The pharmaceutical industry and its operations in developing countries have come to light in the wake of the success of the 2005 film The Constant Gardener, based on John Le Carré’s 2004 fictional novel of the same name, and, following this, the 2006 release of Sonia Shah’s non-fiction version of the same issues in the Body Hunter: Testing New Drugs on the World’s Poorest Patients. It will be argued here that big pharmaceutical companies can exploit the citizens of weak states, because there is a (dysfunctional) marriage between such global corporations and weak states, especially across Africa, which creates - what I shall coin as ‘globonialism’ - a form of ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’ that is enabled by the processes of globalization, and impacts upon the many vulnerable nations and their peoples that once had endured colonization and now must survive a ‘new-colonialism.’ Indeed, the levels of ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’ may in the future become an indicator of weak or failed states in Africa.

The tragic case which inspired John Le Carre’s novel, was the clinical drug trial for Trovan (trovafloxacin), tested on children in Kano state, Nigeria in 1996. This exemplifies opportunities created by globalization for the benefit of pharmaceutical companies to profit from African poverty. The pharmaceutical company Pfizer exploited a poverty induced medical crisis in Nigeria to extract data and profits in a medical experiment that left a number of children dead or seriously ill. This was not however a typically one-way colonial extraction. In

1 Universal Pictures, The Constant Gardener, based in the novel by John Le Carré, directed by Fernando Meirelles, starring Ralph Fiennes and Rachel Weisz, (Focus Features with UK Film Council and Pot Boiler Productions), 2005.
1996 there was an outbreak of meningitis in Kano state Nigeria that affected thousands of children and Pfizer took advantage of this opportunity to test a new oral antibiotic called Trovan (Trovafloxacin). The problem was that “Pfizer arrived several weeks after Médecins Sans Frontières” creating some confusion about their role as doctors and researchers.

The drug was tested on children without parents’ informed consent, patients were unaware of the experiment, and the trial was not approved in advance by an ethical review committee. Out of 190 children that were enrolled in the trial, five receiving trovafloxacin and six receiving the existing treatment ceftriaxone [the injectable Rocephin] died. Others suffered brain damage and paralysis.\(^4\) \[^{4}\] [emphasis added]

As Chippaux has noted, the justifications for the study protocols were weak, because they “overlooked the fact that the cost of the product and the limited chances of its commercialization without state subsidy made its use in Africa highly unlikely.”\(^5\) According to Shah, there were also warnings from within Pfizer about the effectiveness of an oral drug on these particular children who were already sick, not only with meningitis but other illnesses, because the pre-existing injectable drug Rocephin worked more rapidly.\(^6\) Despite the results indicating that the study drug Trovan was no better than the preexisting drug Rocephin, the researchers did not respect the rights of the participants. South African bioethicist Solomon Benetar has argued that this lack of respect is ‘colonial’, because despite the questionable ethical conduct of this trial in Nigeria, and an unresolved class action put by 30 Nigerian families against Pfizer, the US Food and Drug Administration accepted the data from this trial.\(^8\)

The clinical drug trials for Nitazoxanide conducted in Zambia in the 1990s also highlights this lack of respect for Africans by western pharmaceutical companies, where double standard clearly applied.\(^9\) Nitazoxanide was invented in 1993 by Jean-Francois Rossignal from Romark Laboratories, and was particularly useful against the cryptosporidium parasite that causes diarrhea.


\(^5\) Chippaux, 2005

\(^6\) Shah, 2006, 144-145


\(^8\) Shah, 2006, 153.

\(^9\) Sonia Shah’s examination of Nitazoxanide focuses on the ethics of using a placebo to compare an active drug in order to get quicker results on whether a drug works or not. Shah, 2006, 19.
and was aimed at AIDS patients in America. When tested in Mali in the mid 1990s on AIDS patients with cryptosporidium infections, 4 out of 18 patients had positive results. American doctors clamored for the drug under the FDA’s ‘compassionate use’ program, as it was still experimental. However, before any major trials could be undertaken and concluded, anti-retroviral drugs reached the market and were proven effective against similar infections in AIDS patients. Yet, the trials for Nitazoxanide using a placebo control went ahead regardless, but by 1998 only 10 patients had enrolled in the USA and trials were abandoned. The FDA would not approve the drug based on the “uncontrolled data,” and ‘suggested’ to the Romark investigators that they do placebo trials (even though there was no interest in them from participants). Romark argued against such trials because it would be unethical to give patients with diarrhea a placebo for 3 weeks. According to Shah, “the FDA committee wasn’t interested in such dilemmas … perhaps the drug could be tested against placebo elsewhere.”

Romark needed to retrieve its losses from Nitazoxanide, and if it couldn’t be used in AIDS patients, then it could be marketed to children with diarrhea from swimming pools etc. With only $40 million to develop the drug their ‘hunt for bodies began’ in Zambia, where conditions of poverty left thousands of children vulnerable to water borne infections causing diarrhea, and when also HIV infected, often led to death. With virtually no access to the antiretroviral drugs, the sick children brought to the Lusaka University Teaching Hospital created a vast ‘research opportunity’ for Romark to test the effectiveness of Nitazoxanide on children with cryptosporidium infections and diarrhea. In this study the parents agreed to enroll their children, who were ‘dying’ from these infections. Twenty five non-HIV infected children received the drug for three days, and 14 improved within seven days. Eleven were given another second three day course, and improved too. “The drug had arguably saved their lives.” However, of the 22 children in the placebo group receiving only fluids and vitamins (as all participants did), within seven days, four children had died. For those children infected with HIV their fate was worse. They were only given a three day course of the drug “despite the evidence that suggested such a

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10 Shah, 2006, 23
11 Cynthia Sears (quoted by Shah, 2006, 24) a gastroenterologist from Johns Hopkins University said “I think consideration has to be given to the international setting … where HIV is rampant and additional therapies are obviously not available in many instances:” Furthermore, Shah identifies two main problems: firstly, the demand by western science (and the FDA in this case) for randomized controlled trials, and secondly, with a placebo arm, in order to prove a drug’s effectiveness: This is an example of western science colonizing ethical principles, because “it is possible to conduct randomized controlled trials successfully by providing an alternative treatment for subjects in control groups, but [according to the FDA and Romark]…using placebos as a control renders the most unequivocal data” - that is, it is faster, cheaper and requires fewer participants: Shah, 2006, 30, 31, 111.
12 Shah, 2006, 29
short course wouldn’t work.” Five children died. Of the 24 HIV infected children assigned to the placebo arm, four died. The results indicated that for children with HIV the drug was no better than a placebo. Furthermore, the ‘consenting’ parents in Zambia were not aware that parents in the USA refused to volunteer their children for these experiments, even though the intended market was for them. The Zambian parents were also not aware that “their children could have been [treated] with antiretroviral therapy, lengthy treatment with nitazoxanide, or alternative drugs such as albendazole.”

In the end Romark got the drug approved by the FDA in 2002, and it is now called Alinia. It is really effective in clearing up diarrhea infections in American children, but not so in Africa where only 5% of diarrhea is caused by cryptosporidium infections, and there are few diagnostics available anyway. Thus, while it is remarkable that Romark developed a drug for a tropical parasite (and not just for other western diseases), the fact is that Zambian children “shouldered the burden for Nitazoxanide’s development,” but they will not benefit from it at all. The drug is not licensed or available for use in Zambia, and was not given to the trial hospital after the study ended. The Nitazoxanide trials in Zambia are a clear example of pharmaceutical colonialism, where the outsourcing of trials was deemed necessary because American citizens would not volunteer to subject themselves to a placebo trial, when other drugs were available. It is unlikely that there was informed consent and altruistic participation, because access to drugs is limited to poor people in poor countries, and they are more likely to agree to such a study, to simply get some kind of medical treatment.

From these examples, we can ask if the big pharmaceutical companies and their Contract Research Organizations (CROs), are simply exploiting the citizens of weak and/or developing states due to a failure or lack of ethical policies and rules designed to protect citizens against unethical clinical drug trials. If however, the African state supports the interventions and investments by these pharmaceutical companies (ethically or unethically) trialing new drugs in their health systems, is it still simply exploitation? The real question is why would the African state approve of an unethical clinical drug trial that would not be approved of in the western world? The answer is because they can still provide access to something (some drugs) that is better than nothing (no drugs). Does this ‘better than nothing’ approach to health development enable the Millennium Development Goals of Global Health for All? Or does it signify a

13 Shah, 2006, 29
16 Shah, 2006, 35
The concept ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’ surfaces clearly in the literature on these questions and themes, though it is often no more than a simple headline used to capture attention, and more often an accusation flung at big pharmaceutical companies for their alleged unethical practices in developing countries. Companies are also criticized for creating an economic dependence on the west via the creation of a need for life saving drugs against illnesses of poverty, rather than more local remedies or strategies to alleviate poverty. Jean-Phillipe Chippaux’s article entitled “Pharmaceutical Colonialism in Africa” published in Le Monde Diplomatique appeared to consolidate the evidence against pharmaceutical companies in their actions within Africa and other developing countries. While Chippaux was not the first author to use this term, he does appear to be the first to coin the phrase in relation to clinical drug trials in Africa. He refers to the actions of pharmaceutical companies as ‘strategic imperialism’. Either of these terms indicates global power imbalances between developing countries’ peoples and global corporations that seek out the former for exploitation of one kind or another. Chippaux’s argument is straightforward:

the developing world is now a place where pharmaceutical companies ignore ethical considerations and the health of patients. Without the informed consent of their subjects who receive only the most basic information and usually inadequate therapeutic supervision, they conduct clinical trials with limited benefits to specific patients or the local population as a whole.

Nonetheless, it could also be the result of Le Monde Diplomatique’s editors coining this term, as it is only used in the title to his article: Chippaux, 2005.

Contributing to the discourse on this concept included references claiming that the Pill, or oral contraceptives used “to control the population of ethnic others, smacks of pharmaceutical colonialism”. See Sharra Vostral, “Reproduction, Regulation and Body Politics”, Journal of Women’s History, 15 (Summer 2003), 2, 197. Also, an earlier reference from Milton Silverman et al., describes “Drug Colonialism” as “the wanton manner by which the huge multinational pharmaceutical industry openly extracts an exorbitant profit by knowingly trading on the health needs and even the lives of Third World nationals.” See Zachary Gussow’s “Review of ‘Prescriptions for death: The Drugging of the Third World’ (1982)”, in Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 14, (May 1983) 3, 24-25. Further evidence on the discourse of ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’ includes references to the search for new drugs and new biological resources by the pharmaceutical industry as a form of “neo-colonialism”. That is, it is simply a “continuation of the colonial tradition of appropriating indigenous knowledge and resources”, by extracting knowledge and genetic material from the developing world, in order to benefit the west. See John Merson, “Bio-Prospecting or Bio-Piracy: Intellectual Property Rights and Bio-Diversity in a colonial and postcolonial context”, OSIRIS, 2nd Series, Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, 15 (2000) 282-296.

Chippaux’s ‘strategic imperialism’ implies that it is no longer necessary to colonise an entire country, as foreign forces (global pharmaceutical companies) only need to target the specific resource (in this case, poor, sick, treatment naïve populations) in order to extract the profits (data for new drug approvals). Cumbersome colonial administrations have been replaced by the sophisticated and dynamic processes of globalization, which enables corporations (rather than countries) to operate within a nation-state (however weak or strong), with or without official invitation or permission, and certainly with little ethical scrutiny.\(^\text{21}\)

Since 1990 the number of drug trials that have been conducted in developing countries has risen dramatically.\(^\text{22}\) There are a number of factors that have led CROs, on behalf of pharmaceutical companies, to conduct more trials in developing countries. Firstly, because of AIDS, “the first modern infectious disease to strike the developed and developing world simultaneously and to give both a large stake in finding a cure.”\(^\text{23}\) Secondly, because of the rising number of similar diseases and causes of death as experienced in the western world, such as cardiovascular problems, hypertension and diabetes,\(^\text{24}\) CROs can test more drugs relevant to the western markets.\(^\text{25}\) Thirdly, because these locations are cheaper to operate in, and have fewer regulations; and in countries like India and China that do have health infrastructures in place, it makes them very attractive destinations. Finally, the populations in developing countries are not as exposed to other medical treatments – so they are ‘treatment naïve’ – making them ideal participants for various new drug trials. As Shah has pointed out, all of these factors create great opportunities for drug trials to be conducted in those areas.\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{21}\) Ethical considerations and regulations in relation to medical experiments and in particular pharmaceutical testing around the world, have been slow to develop and often only “in reaction to scandals and accidents”: See Chippaux, 2005. For example, the Nuremberg code was only adopted after the horrific experiments conducted by Nazis during the Holocaust: See Rothman and Rothman, 2006. In 1964 the Helsinki Declaration was adopted as the next international regulatory model, and the 1981 Manila Declaration was aimed at clinical trials in developing countries. The problem with any of the recommendations made to ensure participants in trials are informed and give consent, is that they are “only recommendations and no sanctions [a]re proposed”: see Chippaux, 2005.


\(^{23}\) Rothman and Rothman, 2006.


\(^{25}\) Rothman and Rothman, 2006, 69.

\(^{26}\) Sonia Shah, June 2007. Particularly popular are placebo trials that can quickly demonstrate that those given the active drug have fewer adverse events than those who do not (in the
The Quintiles website, for example, boasts of the company’s ability to access patients from ‘non-traditional regions’.

For faster trials, start farther from home: More and more customers are discovering the advantages of conducting trials in the diverse nontraditional regions of the world, where patient populations, well-trained investigators and high-quality communications systems are readily available.27

Despite many African countries being amongst the poorest and most disease burdened developing nations in the world, in 2001 only 1% of clinical trials were conducted in Africa.28 It was the other developing regions that were deemed more suitable, for example, India which has a “1 billion body bounty”.29 However, by 2003, CROs started flocking to South Africa where “cashed starved medical facilities welcomed them with open arms,”30 offering valuable ‘data’ to drug development companies and future profits for the ‘imperial’ pharmaceutical corporations. Chippaux argues that Africa is now being targeted by ‘unscrupulous’ drug companies seeking quick and cheap locations with fewer regulations to test their drugs.31 The view is that African populations have less access to drugs, and while any existing health structures are weak at best, they still create ideal “epidemiological conditions” for clinical trials.32

The major problem and ethical consideration is not so much the number of trials but the relevance of the drugs being trialed on African populations.33 Are placebo arm), and this latter group need to have these events (eg. heart attacks) to prove that the drugs works. Shah also points out that up to and over 40% of volunteers in trials in the west drop out or refuse to participate. This demonstrates that in developing countries where the retention rates are much higher, they cannot be fully aware of their volunteer status, or indeed they are not voluntarily consenting in the first place.

28 Chippaux, 2005.
30 Shah, 2006, 104
31 Chippaux, 2005.
33 While the 1990s and 2000s have seen critics lambaste the unethical conduct of pharmaceutical companies testing drugs in developing countries, the literature and the critics of the pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s tended to focus on the issue of the pharmaceutical corporation’s responsibility in providing relevant drugs to the developing world, and not to allow them to become the dumping ground for drugs not legal or not prescribed in the west. See Mike Muller, The Health of Nations: A North-South Investigation, (Faber and Faber: London, 1982); Dianna Melrose, Bitter Pills: Medicines and the Third World Poor, (Oxfam: Oxford, 1982); Surendra Patel, ed., Pharmaceuticals and Health in the Third World, (Pergamon Press: Oxford, 1983); and also see Shah, 2006, 103.
they drugs aimed for use in the African or western markets? For example, between 1972 and 1997 there were 1,450 new medicines marketed globally, but “only 13 were for tropical diseases.” Most African governments do not have any ability to control which drugs get tested in their countries, since it is the pharmaceutical industry that ‘finances and organises’ these trials. Joel Lexchin has pointed to the obvious, that “the primary obligation of pharmaceutical corporations is to their shareholders, not to the people of the developing world.” It is simply about profit extraction through a ‘strategic imperialism’. According to Chippaux, “by the end of the 1990s the pharmaceutical industry’s global turnover ($480bn) was greater than the GDP of all of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa ($380bn).”

Nundy and Gulhati have argued that this new focus on outsourcing clinical trials to these developing countries is a ‘new colonialism,’ and it seems to be an indicator of a ‘weak state’ in particular, in relation to its health systems apparatus. As Shah argues, often even just the availability of clinical trials in developing countries is perceived as offering better health care than local health systems can provide. For example, a Quintiles Fact Sheet on South Africa claims that,

Clinical trials in South Africa can be a blessing to patients as well as a boon to sponsors. First, they provide access to sophisticated care for a large portion of the population that generally receives only basic medical services and many who have not received previous treatment.

If clinical trials are seen as beneficial to ‘medicine deprived’ populations, and often “the only way they can get treatment,” this suggests that a global pharmaceutical company can provide (strong) services to a (weak) state’s people. Is this considered a type of ‘welcomed’ colonization? Is the global replacing the local in terms of the state’s responsibilities for its own citizens?

However, the reason for conducting drug trials is to test their effectiveness, which is unproven. This means that it cannot be claimed that patients will be

35 Joel Lexchin, “Ethics, Drugs and the Developing World: What we should expect of the pharmaceutical industry?” Seminar presented to the Ethics Centre of South Australia, Adelaide, Tuesday 6 May, 2008.
36 Chippaux, 2005.
37 The drugs being tested are usually either not relevant to the future market setting within those countries, or if they are relevant they are marketed too expensive so become unaffordable to the majority of the population. This lack of relevancy is unethical according to these authors, because it is of no benefit to those societies. See Samiram Nundy and Chandra Gulhati, “A New Colonialism? – Conducting Clinical Trials in India”, The New England Journal of Medicine, 352, (April 21, 2005) 16, 1634.
38 Shah, June 2007.
40 Shah, 2006, 36.
better off if they participate in a drug trial, and thus the ‘service’ cannot replace the role of the (ideal) state. Yet, while the CROs stand to benefit from the data produced during these trials, it is undeniably a new type of colonial exploitation.

If we accept the argument that CROs and pharmaceutical companies are attempting a form of colonization in Africa, whether it is welcomed by locals or not, what are the possible problems associated with that? Firstly, Megan Vaughan offers historical evidence for a perceived ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’ in Africa. She explains one problem as being the resistance to AIDS prevention techniques, such as using condoms. She argues that these theories of ‘colonialism’ emanate from African fears, naivety and misconceptions surrounding vaccinations and other medicines from the west that are promoted for use on African populations. Relevant here is the issue that with the colonization of Africa came a world view about modern bioscience and medicine which was at odds with African culture and ‘primitive’ explanations for disease and subsequent cures. There is no space to entertain the notion of a ‘good’ strategic colonization or imperialism. Thus, claims of a ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’ can cause an anti-western / anti-colonial reaction that is detrimental to the benefits that can be offered by western biomedicine within the ambit of any foreign intervention – such as life saving drugs, the ‘good’ aspect of this perceived ‘colonisation.’ If exposed to media and public scrutiny as in the Trovan case above, an unintended result of these unethically conducted clinical trials in developing countries can be that western medicine is undermined. For example, in the late 1990s the polio vaccine was rejected in Nigeria, and HIV/AIDS drugs were ‘condemned’ by the South African government.

This has led to an account of ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’, which echoes the fears of ‘neo-colonialism’ and is espoused by AIDS dissidents whose views are not supported in the mainstream. The book by Dr. Mathias Rath of South Africa – *End AIDS! Break the Chains of Pharmaceutical Colonialism* - was denounced by medical experts for arguing that anti-retroviral drugs attack and destroy the body’s immune system. It accused the pharmaceutical industry of using poor countries as a market place for their “toxic and often deadly drugs.”

The basic premise of the Rath Foundation book is flawed and reeks of conspiracy theories. It argues that pharmaceutical colonialism is occurring as the continuation of other colonial legacies such as poverty and malnutrition –

41 Shah, June 2007.
and these are the “preconditions” that are “used by the pharmaceutical investment business to conquer and expand these markets for their patented drugs.” Rath emphasizes that Africa is economically dependent on the west, and that pharmaceutical colonialism is disguised as “charity for people in need…suffering from diseases” that has “infiltrated government bodies, corporate structures and civil society in many countries”, and can be “recognized by their common denominator, they all seek to cement and expand the monopoly of the investment business with patented pharmaceutical drugs on global health.”

The authors argue that while there is political freedom in South Africa, “it is still been kept hostage by global economic interests, namely pharmaceutical colonialism.” The book instead promotes the benefits of natural health in combating AIDS, rather than the expensive drugs promoted by the global pharmaceutical industry. Rath argues that AIDS is merely a “giant business opportunity” for foreign pharmaceutical companies, who want AIDS to spread so they can market their drugs, and force African governments to pay for them.

Whilst the text of this book and the evidence cited does not warrant any academic respect, what does need to be examined is the political context in how it influenced government policy to refuse proven drug therapies for AIDS treatments. It led to the now infamous former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and the Member of Executive Council (MEC) for Health in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Peggy Nkonyeni, to believe that HIV does not cause AIDS, that anti-retrovirals are toxic, and that there is no medical treatment for AIDS.

However, the pharmaceutical industry does have drugs that can help prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS between mother and baby, and Africa has a very large market for them. The problem of course is financial and political, with few in Africa able to afford such modern medical wonders. For example, South Africa, arguably the strongest state on the African continent, refused to allow its citizens access to proven western medicines, such as Nevaripine (for

45 Dr. Rath Health Foundation, 32
46 Dr. Rath Health Foundation.
48 See Shah, 2006,104. Trials for Nevaripine’s effectiveness had already been proven in a triple dose strategy, but this treatment was simply too costly for many Africans to enjoy. Therefore, a single dose strategy of Nevaripine was trialed in pregnant women in Uganda to test its effectiveness against a placebo arm and an AZT arm. In this study, the women were not advised not to breastfeed their babies (thereby increasing risks of transmission of HIV), because infant milk formula is too expensive for most of them to purchase, not to mention the associated difficulties in sterilizing bottles: See Luleka Manguku, “Drug Trials Raise Concern”, *eAfrica*, March 2005, South African Institute of International Affairs,
whatever political or economic motivations), due to the costs of this ‘colonialism’ (the costs of the expensive anti-retroviral drugs), and instead subscribed to the anti-colonial views of the Rath Foundation, promoting indigenous and affordable remedies such as micronutrients, garlic, potatoes, lemon, olive oil, and eating fresh vegetables to boost (poor) people’s immune systems. This tells us more about the strength of a state to protect its citizens from pandemic diseases than it describes the role of global pharmaceutical companies in the (re)colonization of, or strategic imperialism in Africa. Bob Marsella summarised the problem when he posited the reason for Thabo Mbeki’s rejection of successful anti-retroviral drugs - it was “more a question of: what are they going to do with all of those orphans and how are they going to support them when their parents both die?”

While overall, the Rath Foundation book and its arguments cannot be taken seriously, it does not mention the practice of unethical drug trials in Africa as a source of the ‘colonisation’, and thus diverges from the debate and definition of pharmaceutical colonialism as put forward by Chippaux. Yet, some of the conclusions are similar in both. For example, it is quite likely that the anti-retrovirals and other drugs designed to combat HIV/AIDS are simply being tested in Africa (and elsewhere in the Third World), so that they can be sold to those who can afford them in the west, either western HIV/AIDS patients, or to philanthropic organizations (who may distribute them within Africa). In practice, there is no incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to colonise Africa to market its drugs (as Rath claims), because there is no profit to be made. Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry now relies upon philanthropic organizations such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to create financial

www.saiia.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=546 (accessed 2 May 2008). The placebo arm was justified because “the current standard of care [in Uganda] involves no antiretroviral therapy … ethically … this study will not deny women access to a proven therapy to which they would otherwise have access” (Shah, 2006, 87). The study concluded that Nevaripine was more effective than a short course of AZT, and it “was easier and cheaper” to administer. However, 36% of the babies whose mothers were assigned to the placebo group contracted HIV, compared to 20% on the short course of AZT, and 7% on Nevaripine. 180 babies were now infected with HIV, who might have avoided the transmission from their mothers had they been given an active treatment. In 2003 it was proven that after 18 months, as many babies died of HIV complications as those given AZT and Nevaripine, proving that Nevaripine was not any more effective than AZT. There were also fears that it produced resistant strains of HIV and prevented any future AIDS treatments.

49 Bob Marsella quoted in Shah, 2006, 108

50 It is not in the financial interests of a drug company to develop a drug that cannot be marketed in the west. Barely 1% of available drugs are designed to combat tropical diseases. If the pharmaceutical industry is setting out to find a cure for HIV/AIDS, or other tropical diseases, they claim it is for the ‘greater global good’, even if only to curtail global health security threats to the west, and not any altruistic good to help poor people.
incentives through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to invest in AIDS drugs development, in order to help curtail the spread of HIV in Africa.\textsuperscript{51}

Therefore, in our attempts to define the concept of pharmaceutical colonialism in Africa, we can now ignore the components of the argument offered by the Rath Foundation, and instead focus our attention on more recent and realistic problems facing the continent in light of unethical drug trials and the relationship with ‘do-gooder’\textsuperscript{52} or ‘missionary’ style colonialism, as foreign interventions to save the ‘heathens’ from their own ‘savagery’ and ‘disease’. However, are these best-of-intentions interventions by global philanthropists such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and other PPPs also part of this ‘colonisation project’? Are their actions patronizing, colonizing or simply caring? Is this ‘do-gooder’ colonialism welcomed by the colonized?

Skeptical opponents to western medicine (such as the Rath Foundation) would reject these interventions as a form of ‘genocide.’\textsuperscript{53} Shah has argued that although the quest for simple solutions driven by the PPPs is noble and could improve the lives of people in developing countries, these actions,

do little to extract the poor from their health care-deprived environments bereft of clean water and electricity. On the contrary, in effect they engineer ways for people to survive them indefinitely.\textsuperscript{54}

A case of damned if you do and damned if you don’t!

However, when the state cannot protect its citizens against encroaching disease epidemics or pandemics (because they are weak states), is there a role for foreign intervention from, for example, philanthropic organizations, even if these interventions result in unethical drug trials, and even if they result in a type of colonization? The dilemma for the drug industry is that while African countries offer a potentially huge market for antiretroviral drugs to combat HIV/AIDS, they simply cannot afford to pay for them, and so they do not invest in the research and development necessary to help them.\textsuperscript{55} Hence, this is the role for global philanthropists: to provide this incentive to continue research


\textsuperscript{53} The Rath Foundation, 80-83

\textsuperscript{54} Shah, 2006, 166

and development into such diseases that affect more people in developing
countries, and to promote the strategies to try and provide cheaper generic
drugs to those populations.

Perhaps part of the problem could arise from one of the hallmarks of the anti-
globalisation tirade, in that these philanthropists and other PPPs are not
democratically elected representatives of any countries, yet their budgets are
bigger (and yes, in some cases their hearts!).\(^{56}\) While the Gates Foundation
donated over $6 billion in 1999, “the entire annual budget of the World Health
Organisation was less than $1 billion.”\(^{57}\) The People’s Health Movement
argues that:

> the Gates Foundation is governed by the Gates family. There is no
  board of trustees; nor any formal parliamentary or legislative scrutiny.
  There is no answerability to the governments of low-income countries,
  nor to the WHO. Little more that the court of public opinion exists to
  hold it accountable.”\(^{58}\)

Do we thus trust or fear these unelected players? If they can, and if it is ‘for
their own good’ then must they intervene and assist, or should they ignore the
plight of millions of Africans suffering from the effects of HIV and other
diseases on their lives, and indeed deaths, simply because their ‘elected’ leaders
reject foreign intervention (on whatever grounds)?

In getting the mixture of good intentions and perceived ‘colonialism’ (or
strategic imperialism) right in this new millennium (nearly three decades after
fears of pharmaceutical colonialism emerged from the third world), can the
Public-Private Partnerships themselves instead be seen as “potentially radical
new systems of global governance,”\(^{59}\) and thus play a central role in improving
global health for all, where states cannot? Indeed, it would seem that the
existence of PPPs reflects a weakness of the state to provide for its citizens, in
which case the fears of pharmaceutical colonialism or strategic imperialism are
based on the concern that these global players are taking advantage of the
weakness in the nation-state with the aim to profit only from the relationship.
Tony Evans argues that globalization has eroded the capacity of the state to
provide for its own citizens and therefore,

> the state may no longer possess the capabilities to support the social
determinants of health. Whereas people once looked to their own state
ordered institutions to provide the infrastructures for organizing

\(^{56}\) See The People’s Health Movement, *The Global Health Watch 2; An Alternative World

\(^{57}\) Nana Poku and Alan Whiteside, eds., *Global Health Governance: HIV/AIDS*, (Palgrave,

\(^{58}\) The People’s Health Movement, 2008, 249.

Poku and Whiteside, 2004, 2.
economic, social and cultural life today the conditions of globalization have seen the creation of a global order where corporate and financial interests prevail over the interests of populations.  

Arguably, many African states have never been strong or successful enough to provide such order (and health systems), either during colonialism or in the post-colonial period. Thus it is a common global order within Africa that foreign, corporate financial interests have prevailed.

We can now juxtapose the image of the ‘great white hunter’ from colonial Africa, with the pharmaceutical ‘body hunters’ of today. Pharmaceutical corporations are ‘colonizing’ African countries and other developing regions ‘strategically’ to some extent. Poor and disease burdened people from developing countries are being exploited for resource extraction through the processes of globalisation and pharmaceutical colonialism. Pharmaceutical corporations taking advantage of the processes of globalization have outsourced clinical trials to developing countries, and enlisted as ‘subjects’ the world’s poorest, most disease burdened and vulnerable communities. In the various drug trials that have been conducted (such as for Trovan and Nitazoxanide) participants’ bodies become colonial subjects. Rothman and Rothman note that “abject poverty is harsh enough without having to bear the additional burdens of serving as research subjects,” but that is the harsh reality of globalisation on developing countries.

However, unlike the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in 1885, the pharmaceutical industry these days does not need to colonise any of these countries, because they can still get their data simply through the processes of globalization, combined with a ‘strategic imperialism,’ which “imposes rules upon the poor without their consent.” Chippaux points to the existence of an “unacceptable relativism,” which argues that we cannot “apply the rules of the rich to those who are not in a position to endorse them.” Just because they are poor and susceptible to disease, and living with the absence of a strong state with strict health guidelines and ethical regulations, does not mean that they should be exploited for experimentation and be ‘volunteered’ as subjects in drug trials to benefit others, and indeed drug trials that would not be approved of in the west, and if approved would find no volunteers there.

Ironically, medical research is about improving global health for all, and saving lives. As Rothman and Rothman illustrate, AIDS researchers have argued that

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61 Rothman and Rothman, 2006, 74
63 Chippaux, 2005
64 Chippaux, 2005
AIDS “is so dreadful … [they] must be given a relatively free hand in order to find useful treatments.” Are those researchers who are conducting trials of questionable ethics ‘enthusiastic or reluctant colonisers’? This is the patronizing colonial project – ultimately it is for their own good, that some must suffer. But this has resulted in “exploitation and human rights violations,” where profit driven pharmaceutical corporations can take advantage of the developing world, “not to cure AIDS but to increase their returns.” After all they are businesses, not charities. There is no time to wait for altruistic participants to come forth to develop new drugs. Profits are required now. This is central to the concept of ‘pharmaceutical colonialism’. If the economic conditions were different, and African governments could afford western standards of health care and buy the drugs necessary for the best method of treatment, for whatever disease or illness, would the CROs still prefer those populations to test their drugs?

The concept of ‘globonialism’ could thus be coined here, because it would seem that the relationship between the global pharmaceutical corporations and the potential pool of bodies available to them in the developing world is not just ‘globalised’ nor simply ‘colonial,’ but forms the basis of a dysfunctional marriage. Unlike the one-way colonial extractions of the past, ‘globonialism’ involves manipulative relationships between a network of actors and stakeholders. It can involve the actions of the (weak) local government or associated health institutions, doing deals with the big pharmaceutical companies to invest in their ailing health infrastructure, at whatever costs, to the pool of poor human resources (only rich in human bio-data). If this local government approves of the ‘foreign intervention’ and ‘allows or invites’ the pharmaceutical company to test its drugs on their population (usually in return for something, like access to drugs, a new medical ward, or a Mercedes) then there is a perception of at least a two-way relationship. However, the relationship becomes much more complex, global and manipulative when we factor in the issues raised by the existence of the undemocratic and unaccountable (yet not necessarily unkind) Public-Private Partnerships led by philanthropic organizations and individuals. They operate to deliver health care with “a bias towards biomedical and technological solutions” in weak states that would more likely benefit from “strengthening health systems,” but which is far more politically fraught and difficult. This suggests that weak states that fail to deliver on the health care systems expected of successful states, can rely upon the philanthropy of ‘do-gooders,’ and the questionable

65 Rothman and Rothman, 2006, 73
66 Although the present research could not allow this, perhaps one could ask those Pfizer researchers eventually arrested in Nigeria over the Trovan trials in Kano, 1996, about their own views.
67 Shah, 2006, 175
68 Rothman and Rothman, 2006, 73
ethics of Contract Research Organisations to ‘invest’ in their citizens’ futures – to provide the returns, however meager, from gaining access to their human bio-data, through their ‘voluntary’ (based on an inability to make informed consent) participation in clinical trials. While ‘globonialism’ suggests that there is a combination of globalization and colonialism at work in the activities of the global pharmaceutical industry, it is more likely that Chippaux’s ‘strategic imperialism’ will continue in weak nations, while global corporations gain increased strength through increased profits, based upon resource extraction from the poorest people’s in the poorest regions.

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Far from home but altruistic in nature: Evidence from Eritrean-born People in Australia

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Abstract
The small but growing number of Eritrean-born people in Australia became noticeable in the 1996 Census as a separate birthplace group, after Eritrea’s independence in 1993. One of the important characteristics of these immigrants is the remittances they send to family members and relatives back home for altruistic purposes. There is no doubt that remittances improve the living standards of those who stay behind, however the use of informal channels of remittances (such as cash carried by friends and relatives and ‘hawala’) obscures the true impact of remittances on the recipient country’s economy. To encourage immigrants to use official channels domestic financial infrastructure needs to be strengthened. In Eritrea, this can to some extent be achieved if the government allows domestic private foreign exchange bureaus to operate in money exchange activities.

Introduction
Eritrea is a small East African country that became independent in 1993 after a 30-year bitter struggle for independence from Ethiopia. During the war for independence a large number of Eritreans fled their country and became refugees, mainly in Sudan. There were three waves of Eritrean refugees during the struggle for independence.¹ The first wave was in 1970s, the time when the supporters of the communist revolution in Ethiopia toppled the Emperor. During this time, many Eritreans in fear of imprisonment left the country for Sudan, from where most of them were brought to North America and Europe by refugee resettlement programs. The second wave was after 1982, the time when the Derg initiated a large scale ‘Red Terror’ campaign in Eritrea.² The third wave was at the end of the 1980s, the time when the Eritrean People’s

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² The Derg was a military government that gained power in Ethiopia by ousting the then Emperor of Ethiopian. It is the short name of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and the Territorial Army, a committee of military officers which ruled the country from 1974 until 1987.
Liberation Front (EPLF) strengthened its military power and started to launch a series of attacks on Ethiopia.

The exact number of Eritreans in the Diaspora is unknown. In 2005, the stock of emigrants from Eritrea was estimated by the World Bank at 848,815, and this accounted for 19.3% of the population, the highest percentage in Africa (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Stock of emigrants</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1,213,042</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1,121,758</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>906,698</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eritrea</strong></td>
<td><strong>848,815</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>836,832</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>803,261</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>761,226</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>713,104</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>587,120</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>571,625</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Countries with less than one million population are excluded in this survey.


Between 1994 and 2003 Tewolde reported that around 712,185 Eritreans left the country, with 54% of them heading for Europe or the USA. Koser estimates that approximately 1 million Eritreans (or 25% of the total population of Eritrea) lived outside the country, and of whom 250,000 resided outside of Africa. For those living outside Africa, this figure might be underestimated, as Dessalegn has estimated that in the late 1990s there were approximately 300,000 Eritreans living in the Middle East, Europe and North America. One has to keep in mind that for most Eritrean emigrants (especially those who left Eritrea after independence) neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and Sudan are places of temporary stay and used as transition countries for Europe and USA. Although there are discrepancies between these reported estimates, perhaps due to the difficulties in measuring and calculating the massive numbers of people on the move in tumultuous political times, what is significant is the fact is that the number of Eritreans in the Diaspora is growing.

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The enumeration of Eritrean-born people in Australia as a separate birthplace group began for the first time in the 1996 Census. The number of Eritrean immigrants in Australia is small, but growing rapidly. There were around 1600 Eritrean-born persons living in Australia at the time of the 2001 Australian Census. In 2006, this number increased by 26% to 2015. As can be seen from Table 2 most of these Eritreans settled in Victoria. Queensland experiences a 70% increase in the number of arrivals between 2001 and 2006, however, Western Australia remains the second most popular destination for Eritreans after Victoria. Most Eritrean arrivals to Australia came through the humanitarian programme, and for most of them Australia is not only a safe place to live in but also a prosperous country where immigrants improve their livelihood and help family members and relatives left behind by sending remittances.

**Table 2 Eritrean-born people in Australia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victoria</strong></td>
<td><strong>995</strong></td>
<td><strong>1215</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1598</strong></td>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: At the 2006 Census, the estimated rate of Australian Citizenship for the Eritrean-born people in Australia was 90.7%.*


In its simplest form, remittances are the portion of migrant workers’ earnings sent back from the country of employment to the country of origin. For poor and migrant-sending countries like Eritrea remittances play a significant role in the country’s economy as well as in the livelihood of non-migrant household members. In comparison with other foreign currency flows such as aid and foreign direct investment remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are more stable. Remittances to Eritrea represent a substantial share of the gross domestic product (GDP). Recent data shows that Eritrea receives US$411 million per year from Eritrean migrants living abroad, and this accounts for around 38% of GDP (see Table 3). Eritrea is ranked 3rd in Africa after Guinea-Bissau and Sao

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Tome and Principe, in terms of remittances in relation to GDP, however, when classified by volume of remittances received, countries in North Africa are the major recipients (see Table 4).\(^9\)

### Table 3 Top 10 African countries in terms of remittances as a percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittance flow (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eritrea</strong></td>
<td><strong>411</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4 Top 10 African countries in terms of the volume of remittances received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittance flow (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5399</td>
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Note: In terms of the volume of remittances Eritrea is ranked 20\(^{th}\) out of 51 African countries


For some African countries remittances surpasses foreign direct investment. For instance, remittances to Liberia, Senegal and Seychelles are around 17, 11 and 20 times higher, respectively, than foreign direct investment flows into

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\(^9\) The recent IMF and World Bank reports predict that global economic crisis will have a huge negative impact on Sub-Saharan Africa. One factor that will affect most African countries is the big downturn in remittances sent back by those who work abroad.
these countries.\textsuperscript{10} Though evidence remains scarce, remittances are an important source of income for many Eritrean households. The findings from a household consumer survey in Eritrea show that 75\% of the respondents receive remittances from abroad.\textsuperscript{11} In urban areas, it is estimated that assistance from households in Eritrea and abroad accounts for about 60\% of all transfer income, and almost one out of three households in Eritrea has income from gifts and transfers as its main source of livelihood.\textsuperscript{12}

There have been no studies done on remittance behaviours of Eritrean immigrants in Australia. This paper provides an analysis of the growing number of Eritrean-born people in Australia and the importance of remittances at both a macro and micro levels. It further analyses and compares remittances sent by Eritrean immigrants with their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, in particular taking a case study of those living in Queensland.

The available evidence on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of Eritrean-born people in Australia shows that over the period 2000-2005 around 70\% of the 796 Eritrean entrants to Australia were through the humanitarian program, followed by 29\% under the family stream and 1\% as skilled migrants.\textsuperscript{13} Due to this, around 72\% of the entrants were classified as having ‘poor’ or ‘nil’ English language skills. Since the bulk of Eritrean refugees have spent long years in refugee camps (mainly in Sudan, Egypt and Kenya) before settling in Australia, those children born in these camps have low levels of education. This implies that recent arrivals face employability problems that can only be overcome through investment in education and training.

The incidence of unemployment is expected to reduce as immigrants improve English language proficiency and obtain host-country specific qualifications. A study carried out by Multicultural Affairs Queensland and the Department of Employment and Training found that the two main areas highlighted by

members of an Eritrean focus group were English language skills training to improve proficiency and further skills training to secure qualifications.\textsuperscript{14}

As reported in the 2006 Census the median age of Eritrean-born people was 37.3 years compared with 46.8 years for all overseas-born and 37.1 years for the whole Australian population. When categorized by age, 17% were below the age of 25, followed by 55.9% in the age bracket 25-44, 23.2% in the age bracket 45-64 and 3.9% above the age of 64. The sex ratio of Eritrean-born people in Australia was 96.6 males per 100 females. The evidence further shows that the main languages spoken at home by Eritrean-born people in Australia were Arabic (48.2%), Tigrigna (31.7%) and English (4.2%).\textsuperscript{15} Of those who spoke a language other than English at home, 76.4% spoke English very well or well. When classified according to religion, 58% were Islam, 30.4% were Christian and 11.6% did not state a religion.

Labour force participation rate among Eritrean-born people aged 15 years and above was 57.9% and the unemployment rate was 17.3%. As compared to the 5.2% unemployment rate in the total Australian population the incidence of unemployment for Eritrean-born people is very high. By qualifications, 23.4% of the Eritrean-born people aged 15 years and over had diploma level or higher qualifications and 10% had certificate level qualifications. The average individual weekly income for the Eritrean-born people in Australia aged 15 years and above was $317. This is very low when compared with average weekly income for all overseas-born ($431), for Australia-born ($488) and for the total Australian population ($466).

Despite their low relative income in Australia, they still tend to remit a share of their income to their country of origin.\textsuperscript{16} The cash and in-kind transfers are essential for the survival of those remaining in Eritrea, where 66% of the population are considered poor and 37% extremely poor.\textsuperscript{17} As drought and food insecurity continue to be serious issues in Eritrea, reliance on remittances has both social and economic implications.

\textsuperscript{15} Tigrigna is a Semitic language spoken in Eritrea.
\textsuperscript{16} Though the standard measure of household economic well-being is gross money income, such measures are limited because they ignore other crucial determinants of well-being such as wealth, asset and debt. The data used in this study show that around 96% of the households surveyed owned at least one item that measures wealth and asset. About 40% of the respondents indicated their households had debt in the form of either bank loans or loans from friends and relatives or credit card debt. However, on average, the amount of wealth and assets owned by respondent households was 2.5 times the amount of money owed to them.
The data used in this study was collected by the author (through personal interviews) in Brisbane and surrounding suburbs in 2007. The sample of respondents was drawn from the list compiled by the Eritrean Community Organisation in Queensland, to be representative of the population. Because the mode of survey administration was initiated by personal contact, the refusal rate was extremely low. The survey contained detailed information on both individual and household level demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Generally, survey respondents were household heads; however, some of the questions were answered by best-informed household members, if the head of the household did not know the answer to a particular question.

The survey gathered information from personal interview questionnaires filled out by a sample of 53 households, covering 146 persons. The household survey accounted for around 50% of the targeted population. The average number of people living in each migrant household was 2.8 and the percentage of households having dependants was 40%. The head of the household’s average age was 40, with an average of 13.3 years of schooling, and most, 92%, were employed. While 75% of them were males, only 55% of the heads of households were married.

The percentage of households having closely related family members living in developed countries other than Australia was 49%. During the survey, the average number of years since the household arrived in Australia was 7.5. Almost all of the respondents arrived through the humanitarian programme and 34% had intentions to leave Australia and go back to Eritrea sometime in the future.

All respondents said that they sent remittances (either in cash or in kind) in 2006, and the average total amount remitted by each household was AUD$4,750. In most cases, recipients of remittances were immediate family members living in Eritrea. For the sampled households the average yearly income before tax was AUD$51,079, implying that 9.3% of the average household income was remitted. Respondents indicated that they sent remittances because they care about the wellbeing of their families in their home country. This implies that remittances present altruistic payments to those left behind such as immediate family members and members of large kinship and social circles. Most households use informal channels (travelling friends and relatives or hawaladers) because they believe these channels are

18 In the survey, household members imply all individuals who have shared the same budget during the last six months prior to the survey. Children under the age of 16 are classified as ‘dependants’.

19 In the survey, closely related family members include parents, children, brothers and sisters, and it applies to both husband and wife.

20 In the most basic variant of the hawala system, money is transferred via a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. A customer approaches a hawala broker in one city and gives a sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The hawala
relatively quick, inexpensive, accessible and easy. Besides, the huge difference between the official and parallel market exchange rates does not motivate them to use the official channel.\(^\text{21}\)

Most respondents said that they had no detailed information on the use of remittances; however, they know that remittances generally improve the living standards of these households. Though not frequently, migrants send money to cover major medical costs and expenses related to wedding and funeral ceremonies.

The evidence from my interviews and questionnaires conducted in Queensland show a significant positive association of total remittances sent with years since arrival in Australia and household head years of schooling. That is, my research shows that remittances do not decrease with length of absence from home, and migrants have not lost contact with their close family members or relatives. Another important finding is the positive correlation of years since arrival with total household income and wealth and assets. This is a clear indication of the importance of length of stay in determining economic improvement of Eritrean-born people in Australia. The fact that half of the respondents have one or more close family members living in developed countries does not deter them from remitting because their motivation to remit is basically altruistic. However, a lack of competition in the remittance market may result in high transaction costs and erodes the income of migrants and remittance recipients. While informal channels operate on the basis of trust, it is not uncommon for remitters to become victims of fraud, depriving households of income.

Though it does not usually affect recipients, remittances sent through informal channels cannot be captured in official balance of payment statistics of receiving countries and thus it is difficult for a country to have exact information regarding the health of its economy. Previous studies reveal that a large portion of remittances sent to Eritrea are through unofficial channels, implying that inflow outside the official channel has no direct positive impact on the country’s formal financial sector. For instance, in 1999, the officially recorded amount of remittances to Eritrea was only US$244 million, and this

broker calls another \textit{hawala} broker in the recipient's city, gives disposition instructions of the funds (usually minus a small commission), and promises to settle the debt at a later date. For more information on how a \textit{hawala} transaction functions refer to Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel Maimbo and John Wilson, “Informal funds transfer systems: An analysis of the informal \textit{Hawala} system.”\textit{IMF. IMF Occasional Paper 222}, \url{http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/opp/222/index.htm} (accessed October 25, 2007).

\(^{21}\)Currently, 1 USD = 15 Eritrean Nakfa (ENA) at official exchange market and about 40 ENA at parallel market.
accounted for about 40% of the total amount of remittances.22 A recent survey shows that 66.7% of remittances to Eritrea are transferred informally.23

In 2005, the Bank of Eritrea issued a legal notice 101/2005 that restricts the flow of remittances through unofficial channels and the importation of goods through franco-valuta - a system permitting the private repatriation of hard currency by traders and overseas workers without bank application.24 Before this legal notice entered into force policy towards the free movement of hard currencies had been unrestricted. It was possible for individuals to import goods and services to Eritrea using foreign currency from their own source and to sell and buy hard currencies in free markets, including black markets. Depositors of foreign currency could at any time and for any use withdraw their deposits in hard currency, but under the new regulation depositors who wish to withdraw foreign currency deposits for domestic use shall receive the Nakfa equivalent at the official exchange rate, which is much lower than the black market rate.

The bank assumes that the legal notice will help to address the declining level of foreign currency reserves and solve problems of rapid increase in the use of black market exchange rate and unfair trade practices. However, one can argue that the legal notice per se cannot guarantee the encouragement of remittance flows through official channels unless the government allows private foreign exchange bureaus to operate freely and let exchange rates are determined on open markets under the control of two forces, supply and demand. It has been six years since the government ordered the cessation of all foreign exchange bureaus except the one (Himbol) belonging to the ruling party. By September 2001, 22 licenses had been issued by the Bank of Eritrea and two commercial banks were operating, as well as 14 foreign exchange bureaus in the foreign exchange markets.25

It is clear that migrants do not want to incur considerable losses through the use of official channels so long as the gap between the official and the black market exchange rates remains wide. Data drawn for this study indicates that the majority of respondents use informal channels of remittances, and one of the main reasons for using these channels is because they offer favourable exchange rate. Thus, a free operation of private foreign exchange bureaus

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within an appropriate regulatory environment should be allowed to improve competitiveness, thereby lowering the gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates.\textsuperscript{26} Previous studies have documented that attempts at state control of remittances tend to result in increased informal transfers and thus policy measures that are in the form of incentives generally work better.\textsuperscript{27} There are several ways to increase formal remittances, including a liberalized foreign exchange regime, repatriable foreign exchange accounts, a premium interest rate policy, a premium exchange rate policy, the auction of foreign exchange, and premium interest rate accounts.\textsuperscript{28}

The Eritrean born population in Australia is growing, mostly through arrivals in the humanitarian programme after spending long years as refugees in Sudan, Kenya and Egypt. Settlement in Australia provides opportunities to improve their quality of life, thereby giving a bright future to their children. But these are not the only benefits that accrue from their migration. Remittances sent back to Eritrea improve the livelihood of their extended families, and to a small extent improves the foreign exchange transactions in ‘official’ Eritrea. Remittances thus strengthen the connections between Eritrean-born Australians and their families remaining in Eritrea.

However, because migrants use informal remittance channels, because they are more efficient and offer better exchange rates, a large proportion of workers’ remittances are not recorded in the country’s national accounts, and they are vulnerable to fraudulent transactions. To motivate migrants to use formal channels, however, the government should try to improve the existing banking network to effectively compete with informal market arrangements. The government should also try to incorporate rather than suppress informal operators. This can be partly realised if the government allows domestic private foreign exchange bureaus to operate.

Bibliography


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Abstract
The past decades have seen a continued rise in the global international migration of health professionals. This has raised health concerns, particularly for poor and developing countries who can ill afford to lose skilled medical workers. This is because health professionals are a critical part of the delivery of an effective health system. This article focuses on the sub-Saharan region and examines the impact that international migration has on people’s right to health. It addresses the underlying reasons for this migration and identifies a pattern of migration for the region. Some policy options are explored aimed at redressing the situation and it is suggested that appropriate levels of economic investment and development will be required if this trend is to be halted.

Introduction
The international labour market makes it possible for all kinds of skilled professionals and workers to migrate and seek job prospects outside of their country. This is because international professional mobility becomes inevitable when persons have skills they can sell in the global marketplace.\(^1\) The international migration of health professionals, particularly medical practitioners and nurses, has increased over the past decades\(^2\) and has become a major global health concern. Part of the reason for this concern relates to the fear of shortages of health professionals in poor or developing countries as a result of migration, which has had devastating effects in countries where there are few universities and medical schools and deteriorating health systems. In 2003, at a meeting of health ministers from Commonwealth countries it was stated that, international migration, fuelled by many factors, has grown to such proportions that it is affecting the sustainability of health systems in some countries. While both developed and developing countries are experiencing the negative impact of loss of skills, such loss is more keenly felt in developing countries, which are finding it increasingly

difficult to compete for skilled human resources in the existing global market.³

While migration in sub-Saharan Africa is the dominant form of the movement of people,⁴ it is the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from the region that is the focus here.⁵ This article will address the migration of health professionals from sub-Saharan Africa,⁶ examining their reasons for and patterns of migration, highlighting the impact that such migration has had on the provision of basic health services in their countries of origin and ultimately on people’s right to health as provided for in international human rights treaties. The migration of health professionals from developing countries has worsened already depleted health systems, and has had “particularly serious ramifications in sub-Saharan Africa, where it severely limits the provision of basic health services infrastructure.”⁷ The lack of accurate and updated data and statistics on health professionals’ migration from sub-Saharan Africa and in some cases, doubt on the accuracy, consistency and reliability of some of the available information, makes it a challenge to conduct research on the topic.⁸ However, the pertinent issue here is that there is a trend or pattern that has emerged, from which it is possible to examine the pattern and frequency of emigration. Much of this information is mainly obtained from the receiving or recruiting countries.⁹

Analysis of migration not only takes into account a purely economic approach, but also emphasises the factors or reasons that encourage professionals to migrate. Portes and Rumbaut are of the view that migration is more effectively analysed by considering, not only the reasons given by the migrants themselves for migrating, but by taking a wider approach which takes into account

⁵ Lowell and Findlay, 1998.
⁶ This is the region which lies primarily south of the Sahara desert and normally excludes Arabic countries of North Africa.
geopolitical influences. This approach would consider how states and other organisations influence labour markets. Bach writes that by focusing only on the individual, there is a danger of downgrading the role of other institutions, such as the state. Furthermore, in the health sector, “the influences on migration need to be considered explicitly, rather than implicitly, as part of a wider analysis of health systems and the socio-economic conditions that shape their performance”.

**Reasons for Migration**

There are a number of reasons health professionals choose to emigrate. The most common reason is that recruiting countries offer better remuneration, work conditions, safer environments and career prospects than those offered in their countries of origin. These are often referred to as the ‘pull factors’. However, incomes or salaries are not the only considerations. Poor governance and management in developing countries is also said to be a major consideration to the emigration of health professionals, the ‘push factors’.

However, the underlying reason and major cause of migration is the dire economic situation of the sub-Saharan region and the lack of developmental prospects which have led to the disintegration of local health systems. This is because macroeconomic constraints have discouraged the expansion of personnel and services in the health sector. The negative side effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank supported Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of reducing budget deficits and public expenditure and privatization have contributed to Government expenditure on health to decline and in some countries, this has led to complete freezes on recruitment of certain health personnel. Studies have shown that reduced health expenditure resulted in severe declines in the quality of the health infrastructure, besides limiting medical supplies.

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Indeed an extensive study by Hatton and Williamson on the determinants of international migration in the sub-Saharan region shows that economic reasons are a major factor. Where there was rapid economic growth in the country of origin, the trend was a reduction in the observed rate of out-migration. Where the gap between real wages at home and abroad was very high, the trend was a higher rate of emigration. Lucas however points out that while most evidence points to gaps in earnings opportunities and employment probabilities, the onset of conflict was also a major consideration in some cases.

**Patterns of Migration**

There appears not to be a definite pattern of migration for the sub-Saharan region. Over the past 30 years, patterns of health worker migration from sub-Saharan Africa have changed substantially as migration is now shaped by both market forces and cultural ties, and deeply embedded in uneven global development. Zlotnik states that much of international migration occurred and still occurs outside of a regulatory framework. The majority of countries in the region do not possess any well-articulated policy on international migration while some appear not to enforce the laws and regulations on immigration and emigration rigidly.

A 2004 study on the patterns of migration of health professionals from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States of America (USA) found that of the more than 23% of America’s 771,491 physicians, about 64% of those received their medical training outside the country, mostly in low-income or lower-middle-income countries. The study also found that a total of 5,334 of those physicians were from sub-Saharan Africa. Lucas states that among the countries in the world with the highest coefficient of variation in net migration rates over this half century, the top four and twenty-two of the top fifty are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore by 2000, there were about 2.79 million expatriates from sub-Saharan Africa in the OECD countries and that emigration from sub-

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18 Lucas, 366.
Saharan Africa continues to grow substantially. This pattern of migration will continue to have an enormous negative impact on health systems in the region.

Health Systems and Health Professionals – Impact of the Brain Drain
Health systems have a vital and continuing responsibility which is crucial to the healthy development of individuals and societies. This includes assessing health needs and designing policies and programs to achieve health objectives. It is necessary that these health systems have the required infrastructure, which includes having adequate numbers of trained health professionals, in order to function effectively. Health care delivery and public health are key issues for developing countries.

Health professionals are an undeniably integral part of any effective health system. This is because health professionals are active - not passive - agents of health change and they are the ones that “glue together the many parts of health systems to spearhead the production of health.” They are the human force which drives health system performance. However, due to the massive migration of health personnel from the sub-Saharan region, the objective of achieving effective health systems has been severely hampered. The global health crisis occurs against a backdrop of mass poverty, uneven economic growth, and political instability, civil wars and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It should be noted here that emigration, while not being the main cause of the problems facing the health systems in developing countries, certainly remains a major aggravating factor.

One study found that “the haemorrhage of health professionals from African countries is easily the single most serious human resource problem facing health ministries today.” Other studies have noted that in southern Africa,

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22 Lucas, 353-354.
rapid migration of health professionals has compounded the problems of health systems which were already faced with budget constraints.\(^{29}\) The United Nations Commission for Trade and Development has estimated that each migrating African professional represents a loss of about AUD$218, 500 to Africa.\(^ {30}\) In their study of this problem, Schrecker and Labonte noted:

Of over 600 medical graduates trained between 1977 and 2000 in Lusaka, Zambia, only 50 were still working in the Zambian public-sector health service in 2000. Barely a quarter of Zimbabwe’s physicians trained in the 1990s still practice domestically; while South Africa loses more domestically trained physicians than it recruits from abroad, mainly from Cuba.\(^ {31}\)

In developing countries, the loss of a few doctors can have a significant impact on the provision of health services, particularly in the rural and regional areas.\(^ {32}\) This is because there are usually only a few doctors catering for a large number of people. Ghana, with 0.09 physicians per thousand population, sends doctors to the United Kingdom, which has 18 times as many physicians per capita.\(^ {33}\) While the World Health Organization (WHO) has a recommended standard of one doctor per 5,000 people, at least ten African countries have one doctor per 30,000 or more people.\(^ {34}\) Dovlo adds that migration of health professionals is occurring from countries with physician densities of about 17 per 100,000 population to countries with densities of 300 per 100,000 population.\(^ {35}\)

In an example of brain drain within the country, Kenya estimated that only 600 doctors worked in public hospitals out of more than 5000 registered as the rest


\(^{32}\) Gilles Dussault and Cristina Franceschini, *Not enough Here, too Many There: Understanding Geographic Imbalances in the Distribution of Health Personnel* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank Institute, 2003); Kasper Wyss, et al., *Human Resources Availability and Requirements in Chad*. (Basel: Swiss Centre for International Health, 2002); Tim Martineau, Karola Decker and Peter Bundred, *Briefing Note on International Migration of Health Professionals: Levelling the Playing Field for Developing Country Health Systems* (Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, 2002).

\(^{33}\) Chen and Boufford, 1852.

\(^{34}\) Schrecker and Labonte, 410.

had moved abroad or were working in the private sector.\textsuperscript{36} In South Africa, a third to a half of its medical graduates migrate to the developed world,\textsuperscript{37} while more than 18,000 Zimbabwean nurses\textsuperscript{38} work abroad.

There is a serious health crisis in the sub-Saharan region due to the severe shortage and/or the imbalanced distribution of trained health professionals. This poses a serious threat to the overall provision of health care for the community.\textsuperscript{39} Lucas states that the overall economic consequences of emigration are quite complex and adds that due to the withdrawal of any one factor of production, such as highly skilled labour, there is a diminished return to other factors. Furthermore, there is also the potential loss of tax revenue which may have been raised from the incomes of the health professionals.\textsuperscript{40} It has been estimated that Ghana has foregone around AUD$69 million of its training investment in health professionals.\textsuperscript{41} Thus the financial cost of health worker migration to the sub-Saharan governments has been quite considerable.\textsuperscript{42} As the Deputy Director-General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) stated, it appears as though “the developing countries are ‘subsidising’ the OECD countries to the tune of some $500 million per year, and what is more, largely financed by . . . development aid”.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{The Right to Health}

The right to health has a general content which is meaningful and useful in policy decisions concerning access to and the provision of medical care and treatment. Since the physical integrity and dignity of individuals are recognized in international law, health systems have an additional responsibility to ensure that people are treated with respect and provided with the care, in accordance with human rights. The right to health thus creates entitlements for individuals and corresponding obligations for governments


\textsuperscript{38} Brian Mangwende, “Health Sector Records Massive Brain Drain”, \textit{Daily News}, 10 April 2001


\textsuperscript{40} Lucas, 371-372.

\textsuperscript{41} Martineau and Decker.


\textsuperscript{43} Schrecker and Labonte, 410.
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being, including medical care and necessary social services. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides for the recognition of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Among the steps to be taken in achieving this right should be the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases and the creation of conditions which would assure to all, medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.

The WHO defined health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” While there has generally not been wide agreement as to its definition, the right to health should be that, Every human being has the right to an environment with minimum health risks, and to have access to health services that can prevent or alleviate their suffering, treat disease, and help maintain and promote good health throughout the individual’s life.

The prevailing situation in sub-Saharan Africa is one in which the health of the population is in constant decline, with the migration of health professionals meaning fewer doctors and nurses to attend to patients which has also resulted in a decreased ability to get medication to patients effectively. For instance, some countries have been unable to administer and implement health programs because of too few nurses.

A study found that on average, African countries had about 17 times fewer doctors and eight times fewer nurses than developed countries. The WHO and World Bank report that data from most countries in Africa, including Ghana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe suggest that annual losses from public sector health employment continue at rates of 15-40%. Malawi has one of the worst ratios

48 Liese, Blanchet and Dussault..
with 2.22 physicians per 100,000 people compared to 4.55 in Kenya and 9.09 in Zambia.

Since a health care system is an essential component of the means by which a society recognizes the right to health, states have a responsibility to create certain basic conditions in which this right is protected and enhanced. Basic levels of health are necessary for the well-being of individuals. To enjoy the right to health, the preventive and promotive aspects of health are as important as the curative ones. The situation in the sub-Saharan region is one in which people are not getting even the basic levels of health due to the appalling state of health systems. Because the quality and quantity of health care has been affected, some patients are forced to travel overseas for medical care, but these are the minority as the majority are unable to do so due to lack of finances. Migration has no doubt become an added adverse factor to the enjoyment of the right to health, reducing the ability of people to have access to professional medical care.

**Remittances**

When health professionals emigrate and their earning potential is enhanced, they usually send remittances to their families back home. A World Bank study pointed out that the value of migrant remittances was considerably higher than the value of official development assistance, and that such remittances represent a relatively stable source of foreign exchange. In 2002, sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have received about US$4 billion in reported remittances. Some have argued that developing countries benefit from the remittances as they help offset the costs of training and other losses. Others however maintain that the negative effects of migration are unlikely to be offset by remittances from abroad which are “seriously limited”. It has been pointed out that of the top 20 recipient countries ranked by remittances as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), only two countries, namely, Lesotho and Uganda were in southern Africa. The argument is that the costs related to health professionals’ emigration far outweighs the costs involved in training...

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52 Awases, et al.

53 Fox, 72.


56 Schrecker and Labonte, 410.

57 Schrecker and Labonte, 410; (Editor’s note: See Temesgen Kifle “Far from home but altruistic in nature: Evidence from Eritrean-born People in Australia,” in this issue of ARAS.)
health professionals. This is because the ability of developing countries to deliver efficient and effective health systems is severely hampered with the added emigration of health professionals. This ultimately adversely affects social and economic development goals which are unlikely to be offset by remittances.\(^{58}\)

While not much research has been conducted which differentiates the remittances of health workers from other migrant groups,\(^ {59}\) it is clear that remittances by health professionals are not directly reinvested in human capital for the health system and can therefore not match the losses resulting from the emigration of experienced health personnel from a grossly understaffed health service.\(^ {60}\) For example, one report stated that low health worker density has a particularly marked effect on maternal deaths. A 10\% increase in the density of the health workforce is correlated with about a 5\% decline in maternal mortality.\(^ {61}\) The sub-Saharan region has an estimated 600,000 doctors, nurses, and midwives for 600 million people. However, it requires about one million additional health workers in order to provide services which are consistent with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.\(^ {62}\)

**Global Policy Solutions**

There has been local and international outcry over the effects of the massive emigration of health professionals from the sub-Saharan region. Calls have been made for restraints to be placed on professionals who are migrating while outrage has also been expressed at the recruiting countries.\(^ {63}\) These calls have however been widely rejected as being a violation of people’s basic rights. The

\(^{58}\) Schrecker and Labonte, 410.

\(^{59}\) Kingma.

\(^{60}\) Scott, et al., 175.


\(^{62}\) Chen and Boufford, 1851. The importance of the availability of adequate numbers of health professionals cannot be understated. An extensive 2003 study by Kurowski et al. examined the role and importance of human resources for scaling up health services in low-income countries. This study examined the size, structure, and composition of the health workforces and estimated future human resource availability and requirements. Included in its key findings was the need to know more of health staff attrition rates, particularly as a result of migration as this would have implications for training. It also recommended investigating how staff productivity could be improved through better management and what alternative service delivery mechanisms could be developed. See Christoph Kurowski, et al., *Improving the Health of the Poor: the Human Resource Challenge* (Geneva: 2003). Various other studies have found that there is a link between health labour force density and the provision of an effective health system. See Anand and Bärninghausen; Pascal Zurn, et al., “Planning for Human Resources for Health: Human Resources for Health and the Production of Health Outcomes/Outputs,” *Cahiers de Sociologie et de De´mographie Me´dicales* 45:1 (2004): 107-133.

Democratic Nurses Organisation of South Africa has, for instance, strongly voiced their position on their members’ constitutional right to emigrate.\(^64\) Further, calls for recruiting states to adopt restrictions or controls on entry have been stated as being “largely ineffective and possibly draconian”\(^65\) and would also be almost impossible to enforce.

A number of policy options have been put forth by African governments and international human rights and interest groups on this dilemma. These have included the development of national codes of conduct for ethical recruitment, restricting approaches to recruit staff from developing countries, enforcement of visa restrictions by recruiting countries and the payment of compensation to source countries.\(^66\) For example, at meetings of the World Health Assembly, African health ministers pushed through resolutions calling for urgent action to dampen unplanned emigration of health care workers, and Commonwealth states enacted a code of conduct to curtail unethical recruitment.\(^67\) A health sector strategy prepared under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) called for, an international agreement on migration, especially with regard to ethical recruitment of health personnel from Africa, while putting in place mechanisms to improve the value placed on health workers, to address the adverse conditions of service and to improve motivation and retention.\(^68\)

The devastating effect of health professional emigration is one which does not have simple or obvious solutions.\(^69\) While it is acknowledged that most African countries are not able to pay competitive salaries and thus attract crucial health personnel, this article is of the view that the sub-Saharan region needs to embark on an urgent massive educational and recruitment campaign in the health sector. Such a move would require investment and commitment from African governments and their leaders, but is something which needs to be done and is overdue.

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\(^65\) Lucas, 382.

\(^66\) Scott, et al., 175.

\(^67\) World Health Organization, *International Migration of Health Personnel: A Challenge for Health Systems in Developing Countries*, 58th World Health Assembly (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005); *Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003). Unplanned emigration of health professionals is seen as the emigration not sanctioned by the state and which emigration does not go through the Ministry of Health.

\(^68\) Schrecker and Labonte..

Conclusion
It is debateable whether some of the African governments are aware of (or care about) the full extent of the catastrophe that is arising as a consequence of the migration of health professionals. In fact, the World Bank found that the issue of the availability of health workers was not adequately taken into consideration when setting specific health objectives and addressing workforce shortages. It has been rightly emphasized that each country has to take responsibility to train, retain, and sustain its workforces “through national plans that improve salaries and working conditions, revitalize education, and mobilize paraprofessional and community workers whose services are demonstrably more cost-effective and who are less likely to emigrate”. African governments must also aim to provide an environment which enhances professional growth with adequate funding for research, and the provision of required facilities and resources. Governments have an obligation to take steps to develop health care and improve health conditions. Thus, the promotion and protection of the right to health and the promotion of health are fundamentally linked, as the right to health bestows upon states a duty to provide socioeconomic programmes which improve health conditions. Economic development thus becomes an integral component in fulfilling the right to health and establishing effective health systems.

Governments must commit to investing in future research on how to best address this problem, particularly in creating jobs and retaining health professionals. There also needs to be a coordinated effective migration management by the governments, health ministries and health departments. The way in which developing countries respond to the challenges of health professional migration will require not just financial, technical and professional approaches but will also require the leadership to be politically committed as well.

The migration of health professionals is part of the process of an integrated global labour market. While there is demand for health professionals in developed countries, poor and developing countries such as in the sub-Saharan region, will continue to supply that demand. To be able to provide the people in these countries with effective health systems and uphold their right to health, it is imperative that appropriate levels of resources are invested. Policies and strategies that aim to reduce or halt the impact of migration need to be developed by the developing countries.

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71 Chen and Boufford, 1851.
72 Willis, 204.
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Martineau, Tim, and Karola Decker and Peter Bundred. *Briefing Note on International Migration of Health Professionals: Levelling the Playing Field for Developing Country Health Systems*. Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, 2002.


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Educational and Occupational Outcomes Amongst African Men From Refugee Backgrounds Living in Urban and Regional Southeast Queensland

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Abstract
Over the last ten years, approximately one third of refugee and humanitarian entrants to Australia have been adult men. To date, little research has been done on their health and settlement issues. Many of these men have come from the African continent. This paper reports on the educational and employment outcomes of a group of 173 recently arrived adult African men from refugee backgrounds who have settled in Southeast Queensland. Given the current government policy focus on regional resettlement, the paper compares key outcomes between the adult African men who settled in metropolitan Brisbane with those living in the Toowoomba-Gatton region. The study uses a peer interviewer model and a mixed method approach. Overall, we have found that African men who have settled in regional areas face significantly greater educational and occupational challenges than those who settled in the urban area. They report more negative experiences at educational institutions, are more likely to take jobs that are below their level of skills and qualifications, are more dissatisfied with their jobs, and report greater discrimination and difficulties while trying to secure adequate employment in Australia. A number of policy implications are discussed.

Background
Australia has continued to benefit from the human, social and economic capital contributed by immigrant resettlement over many years.1 Approximately 116 000 people have entered Australia under the refugee and humanitarian resettlement program over the last ten years; around one third have come from the African continent.2 Even though about 30% of all humanitarian entrants to Australia have been men aged 18 years and over, very little is known about the health and settlement issues faced by this population group. This is a significant gap given the emerging evidence from health care and welfare organisations regarding the range of social issues that impact on the wellbeing of men from

1 Carrington, Kerry, Alison McIntosh, and Jim Walmsley, eds. The Social Costs and Benefits of Migration into Australia (Armidale, NSW: Centre for Applied Research in Social Science (CARSS), University of New England, 2007)
refugee backgrounds which are not being adequately addressed by settlement services and programs.  

In response to the 2003 evaluation of the Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy (IHSS), which recommended to seek further opportunities to settle humanitarian entrants in regional Australia, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) has since encouraged regional settlement to “address the demand for less skilled labour in regional economies and to assist humanitarian entrants to achieve early employment.” There is emerging evidence, however, of the many challenges faced by humanitarian arrivals living in regional areas.  

To date, no comparison of settlement outcomes has been undertaken between those refugee and humanitarian arrivals settling in urban areas and those living in regional areas. This paper focuses on the educational and occupational outcomes among 173 adult African men from refugee backgrounds and compares these outcomes between those men living in Brisbane and those living in the Toowoomba-Gatton region in Southeast Queensland.

Methods

Study design: The findings reported here are part of the SettleMEN project, a 2-year longitudinal investigation of the health and settlement experiences of recently arrived adult men from refugee backgrounds living in Southeast Queensland. The study uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Ethics approval was obtained from the La Trobe University Human Ethics Committee.

Participants: The SettleMEN study used a quota sampling strategy, a non-random technique aiming at ensuring that participants were representative (at least in terms of age and region of birth) of the overall population of adult men from refugee backgrounds who arrived in Australia between 2004 and 2008, and settled in the Brisbane and Toowoomba-Gatton regions. The study used a peer interviewer research model, where eligible participants were recruited by trained research assistants from the same ethnic or cultural communities. Potential participants were informed about the study and those who agreed to participate were asked to sign a consent form. This paper specifically compares the educational and employment outcomes of the 173 African participants who were recruited at baseline.

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5 DIMIA (2003: 9)
Data collection: Prior to data collection, research assistants were trained in principles of research methods and ethical conduct of research. Surveys were administered face-to-face to participants either in the participant’s first language or in English if this was their preferred language. The majority of interviews took place at participants’ homes or in community venues. Interview sessions took an average of two hours.

Survey instruments: The SettleMEN survey included five sections: (i) sociodemographic information; (ii) education and employment; (iii) health and wellbeing; (iv) family and social support; and (v) life in Australia. This paper focuses on education and employment issues. A number of items were developed to assess participants’ educational outcomes both overseas and in Australia, whether or not they were involved in any studies at the time of the interview, and their perceived academic performance. A 2-item ‘educational aspirations’ scale was adapted from Rumbaut. The scale assessed the highest level of education the respondent would like to attain in Australia and the highest level realistically expected. Scores ranged from 1 (no more studies in Australia) to 5 (postgraduate degree). The scale reported a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.91. For the purpose of this analysis, the scale was dichotomised into 1 = low educational aspirations (lower tertile) and 2 = high educational aspirations (upper tertiles). A 7-item ‘positive educational experiences’ scale was developed from previous research with African students from refugee backgrounds enrolled in a tertiary education institution in Brisbane, Australia. The items assessed respondents’ learning difficulties including literacy, numeracy, computer skills and English language abilities, interaction with and support from teachers/lecturers, and experiences of discrimination from lectures and fellow students while studying at Australian educational institutions. Scores ranged from 7 (largely negative experiences) to 35 (largely positive experiences). The scale reported a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65. For this analysis, the scale was dichotomised into 1 = mostly negative experiences (lower tertile) and 2 = largely positive experiences (upper tertiles).

The employment section included items assessing current employment status, perceived work performance, whether or not overseas skills or qualifications had been recognised in Australia, appropriateness of current job to the level of previous skills and qualifications, weekly total income, and satisfaction with financial situation. Also items assessing difficulties finding or securing adequate employment such as discrimination, problems getting qualifications recognised, requirement to have Australian work experience, requirement to have referees in Australia, lack of opportunities for work experience in refugee


Onsando, Gerald. “Experiences of African Refugee Students at TAFE: A Phenomenological Study.” (Griffith University, 2007)
camps, breaks in working life, difficulties getting promoted, and necessity of having a car were included. Most of the items about employment were adapted from previous research conducted in Western Australia with recently arrived refugees. Respondents’ satisfaction with their current job was assessed using the 6-item ‘job satisfaction index’, which examines satisfaction with the nature of the work, organisational supervisor, interaction with co-workers, payment, opportunities for promotion, and overall satisfaction. Scores for this index ranged from 6 (very dissatisfied) to 30 (very satisfied). The index reported a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.85. The job satisfaction index was dichotomised into 1 = dissatisfied (lower tertile) and 2 = satisfied (upper tertiles) for the purpose of this analysis.

Statistical analyses: Differences in demographic and outcome variables between the two areas of settlement were assessed using chi-square tests for categorical variables. For binary variables, 95% binomial confidence intervals (CIs) were generated using Wilson’s procedure. Analyses were performed using version 15.0 of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.

Findings

Participants’ socio-demographic characteristics: Of the 173 African men from refugee backgrounds, 116 (67%) were living in Brisbane, and 57 (33%) in the Toowoomba-Gatton region. Overall, 118 (68%) of participants were born in Sudan, 22 (13%) in Burundi, 15 (9%) in Democratic Republic of Congo, 10 (6%) in Rwanda, 5 (3%) in Liberia, and the remaining three were born in Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania and Uganda. All but one participant living in the Toowoomba-Gatton region were born in Sudan. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 69 years (Mean = 30.9; Standard Deviation = 9.0). Their time since arriving in Australia ranged from less than one month to 57 months (Mean = 28.9; Standard Deviation = 14.9). Three quarters of participants reported good levels of English language proficiency at the time of the interview. Table 1 compares key demographic characteristics of participants by place of settlement.

Compared to those participants living in the city, men living in the regional area were significantly more likely to have spent most of their lives (before arriving in Australia) in a rural area (40% vs. 24%; P = 0.046), had lived longer

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12 SPSS, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 15. (SPSS Inc., Chicago)
in Australia (74% vs. 56% had lived in Australia for more than two years; \(P = 0.022\); Difference [95% CI] = 18% [2, 32]), and reported better spoken English language proficiency (86% vs. 72%; \(P = 0.036\); Difference [95% CI] = 14% [0, 31]).

**Table 1: Demographic characteristics of recently arrived African men from refugee backgrounds by place of settlement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic*</th>
<th>Overall N = 173 (100%)</th>
<th>Urban N = 116 (67%)</th>
<th>Regional N = 57 (33%)</th>
<th>P value** Difference [95% CI]***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lived most of his life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City</strong></td>
<td>45 (27%)</td>
<td>35 (31%)</td>
<td>10 (18%)</td>
<td>(P = 0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural area</strong></td>
<td>50 (29%)</td>
<td>27 (24%)</td>
<td>23 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugee camp</strong></td>
<td>75 (44%)</td>
<td>51 (45%)</td>
<td>24 (42%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18 to 39 years</strong></td>
<td>145 (84%)</td>
<td>99 (85%)</td>
<td>46 (81%)</td>
<td>(P = 0.436) 4% [-7,19]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>40 years and over</strong></td>
<td>28 (16%)</td>
<td>17 (15%)</td>
<td>11 (19%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time since arriving in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 years or less</strong></td>
<td>66 (38%)</td>
<td>51 (44%)</td>
<td>15 (26%)</td>
<td>(P = 0.022) 18% [2, 32]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More than 2 years</strong></td>
<td>106 (62%)</td>
<td>64 (56%)</td>
<td>42 (74%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English language proficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor</strong></td>
<td>41 (24%)</td>
<td>33 (28%)</td>
<td>8 (14%)</td>
<td>(P = 0.036) 14% [0, 31]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Good</strong></td>
<td>132 (76%)</td>
<td>83 (72%)</td>
<td>49 (86%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Valid cases; **Chi-square tests for categorical variables; ***Binomial confidence intervals (CI) for binary variables

**Educational outcomes:** The main educational outcomes by place of settlement are shown in Table 2. Approximately half of the participants had completed high school overseas and 12% had an overseas college, trade or university qualification. Thirty eight percent had completed an English certificate and 14% had either a TAFE, college, trade or university degree from Australia. Participants’ educational aspirations were high with 92% of them wanting to obtain at least an apprenticeship or TAFE diploma. Fifty seven percent of the men were currently enrolled at an educational institution in Australia; of the 57%, 45% were undertaking a TAFE, college, trade or university degree. Just above 90% considered their academic performance either average or above average. Of those men who had been or were currently enrolled in an Australian educational institution, 45% rated their educational experiences in Australia as mostly negative.
Table 2: Educational outcomes among African men from refugee backgrounds by place of settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational outcome*</th>
<th>Overall N = 173 (100%)</th>
<th>Urban N = 116 (67%)</th>
<th>Regional N = 57 (33%)</th>
<th>P value**</th>
<th>Difference [95%CI]***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest educational level completed overseas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Primary school</td>
<td>61 (36%)</td>
<td>38 (33%)</td>
<td>23 (40%)</td>
<td>P = 0.045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/High school</td>
<td>88 (52%)</td>
<td>56 (50%)</td>
<td>32 (56%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/Trade/University</td>
<td>21 (12%)</td>
<td>19 (17%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest educational level completed in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Primary school</td>
<td>62 (36%)</td>
<td>39 (34%)</td>
<td>23 (40%)</td>
<td>P = 0.262</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>21 (12%)</td>
<td>15 (13%)</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Certificate</td>
<td>65 (38%)</td>
<td>41 (36%)</td>
<td>24 (42%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAFE/College/Trade/University</td>
<td>24 (14%)</td>
<td>20 (17%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational aspirations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>14 (8%)</td>
<td>12 (10%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>P = 0.147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>158 (92%)</td>
<td>103 (90%)</td>
<td>55 (97%)</td>
<td>7% [-4, 15]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently studying?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>73 (43%)</td>
<td>48 (42%)</td>
<td>25 (44%)</td>
<td>P = 0.827</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98 (57%)</td>
<td>66 (58%)</td>
<td>32 (56%)</td>
<td>2% [-14, 18]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of educational institution currently attending****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school/English course</td>
<td>54 (55%)</td>
<td>43 (65%)</td>
<td>11 (34%)</td>
<td>P = 0.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAFE/College/Trade/University (other than English course)</td>
<td>44 (45%)</td>
<td>23 (35%)</td>
<td>21 (66%)</td>
<td>31% [8, 50]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived academic performance****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing/below average</td>
<td>7 (7%)</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>P = 0.420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/above average</td>
<td>90 (93%)</td>
<td>59 (91%)</td>
<td>31 (97%)</td>
<td>6% [-10, 17]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational experiences in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly negative</td>
<td>56 (45%)</td>
<td>34 (39%)</td>
<td>22 (63%)</td>
<td>P = 0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largely positive</td>
<td>67 (55%)</td>
<td>54 (61%)</td>
<td>13 (37%)</td>
<td>24% [3, 42]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Valid cases; ** Chi-square tests for categorical variables; *** Binomial confidence intervals (CI) for binary variables; **** Only those currently studying

When comparing across place of settlement, those participants settled in regional areas were significantly less likely to have completed an overseas college, trade or university degree (4% vs. 17%; P = 0.045), but more likely to be currently attending a TAFE, college, trade or a university course in Australia (66% vs. 35%; P = 0.004; Difference [95% CI] = 31% [8, 50]). Regional participants were also significantly more likely to have had mostly negative educational experiences while studying in Australia than those living in the urban area (63% vs. 39%; P = 0.015; Difference [95% CI] = 24% [3, 42]).

**Occupational outcomes:** Participants’ main occupations before arriving in Australia and currently by place of settlement are presented in Table 3. The most common occupations prior to arriving in Australia for both urban and
regional participants were building/labourer/trade, community work, farming and teaching. Factory work (mainly in meat factories) was the most common current occupation for both groups of participants. Approximately one third of men living in the urban area and one third of those living in regional areas were working as labourers (building industry) and in farming (fruit/vegetable picking) respectively.

At the time of the interviews, 80 (46%) participants were unemployed (see Table 4). Among those who were employed (n=92), 61% were working more than 30 hours per week, 22% between 21 and 30 hours per week, and 17% were working 20 hours or less per week. Ninety one percent of those employed perceived their work performance as good, and 64% were satisfied with their jobs. Just over half of those who were employed believed that their current job was below their level of previous skills and qualifications.

Although half of the sample reported a total weekly income of less than $400, 57% of participants felt somewhat or mostly satisfied with their financial situation. When asked about whether or not they had experienced difficulties finding work in Australia, 57% of participants responded affirmatively. The most common barriers faced while trying to secure adequate employment in Australia were the requirement to have Australian work experience (66%), requirement to have referees in Australia (65%), necessity of having a car (60%), lack of opportunities for work experience in refugee camps (58%), difficulties getting promoted (48%), problems getting qualifications recognised (39%), and breaks in working life (38%). Only 18% of men had their previous qualifications/skills partially or fully recognised in Australia. Forty five percent reported having experienced discrimination while finding work or working in Australia. The most common reasons for discrimination were their accent (85% of those who had experienced discrimination), language ability (68%), physical appearance (63%), and their name (39%).

Participants living in regional areas were significantly more likely to consider their current job as being below their level of qualifications and skills (70% vs. 46%; P = 0.034; Difference [95% CI] = 24% [0, 44]), were more dissatisfied with their current job (67% vs. 22%; P < 0.001; Difference [95% CI] = 45% [20, 63]), had experienced more serious difficulties finding work in Australia (70% vs. 52%; P = 0.049; Difference [95% CI] = 18% [−1, 34]), had experienced more discrimination while finding work or working in Australia (77% vs. 32%; P < 0.001; Difference [95% CI] = 45% [26, 59]), and were less likely to have their previous qualifications recognised in Australia (0 vs 26%; P = 0.007; Difference [95% CI] = 26% [5, 41]).
Table 3: Occupation before arriving in Australia and current occupation among African men from refugee backgrounds by place of settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation before arriving in Australia</th>
<th>Current occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban (n=116)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional (n=57)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building/labourer/trade 19(16%)</td>
<td>Community worker 9 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community worker 17(15%)</td>
<td>Teaching (school) 9 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming 15(13%)</td>
<td>Building/labourer/trade 6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching (school) 11 (9%)</td>
<td>Farming 6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/sales 8 (7%)</td>
<td>Other 4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker 7 (6%)</td>
<td>Other 11 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security 5 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing 4 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 7 (6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/Not stated 31 (27%)</td>
<td>Student/Not stated 23 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL 124</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Urban (n=65)**                      | **Regional (n=27)**  |
| **Occupation**                        | **Occupation**      |
| Student/Not stated 23 (39%)           | Not stated 6 (10%) |
| Factory worker 19 (29%)               | Farming 8 (30%) |
| Community worker 4 (6%)               | Other 1 (4%) |
| Other 11 (17%)                        |                    |
| Student/Not stated 4 (15%)            |                    |
| **TOTAL 65**                          | **27**              |

*Some participants reported working in more than one occupation before arriving in Australia*
Table 4: Occupational outcomes among African men from refugee backgrounds by place of settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational outcome*</th>
<th>Overall N = 173 (100%)</th>
<th>Urban N = 116 (67%)</th>
<th>Regional N = 57 (33%)</th>
<th>P value** Difference [95% CI]***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current employment status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>92 (54%)</td>
<td>65 (56%)</td>
<td>27 (47%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.275 ) 9% ([-7, 25])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>80 (46%)</td>
<td>50 (44%)</td>
<td>30 (53%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived work performance****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>8 (9%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.689 ) 3% ([-10, 23])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>84 (91%)</td>
<td>60 (92%)</td>
<td>24 (89%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How appropriate to level of skills/qualifications is current job?****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate/Above level</td>
<td>42 (47%)</td>
<td>34 (54%)</td>
<td>8 (30%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.034 ) 24% ([0, 44])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below level</td>
<td>48 (53%)</td>
<td>29 (46%)</td>
<td>19 (70%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job satisfaction****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>32 (36%)</td>
<td>14 (22%)</td>
<td>18 (67%)</td>
<td>( P &lt; 0.001 ) 45% ([20, 63])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>58 (64%)</td>
<td>49 (78%)</td>
<td>9 (33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly total income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $400</td>
<td>87 (51%)</td>
<td>54 (47%)</td>
<td>33 (59%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.156 ) 12% ([-5, 27])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400 or more</td>
<td>83 (49%)</td>
<td>60 (53%)</td>
<td>23 (41%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with financial situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>72 (43%)</td>
<td>47 (42%)</td>
<td>25 (44%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.814 ) 2% ([-14, 18])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>97 (57%)</td>
<td>65 (58%)</td>
<td>32 (56%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties finding work in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all / a little</td>
<td>61 (43%)</td>
<td>48 (48%)</td>
<td>13 (30%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.049 ) 18% ([-1, 34])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a bit / extremely</td>
<td>82 (57%)</td>
<td>52 (52%)</td>
<td>30 (70%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas skills/qualifications recognised in Australia?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not recognised</td>
<td>58 (82%)</td>
<td>36 (74%)</td>
<td>22 (100%)</td>
<td>( P = 0.007 ) 26% ([5, 41])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially/fully recognised</td>
<td>13 (18%)</td>
<td>13 (26%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced discrimination while finding work/working in Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>80 (55%)</td>
<td>70 (68%)</td>
<td>10 (23%)</td>
<td>( P &lt; 0.001 ) 45% ([26, 59])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66 (45%)</td>
<td>33 (32%)</td>
<td>33 (77%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Valid cases; ** Chi-square tests for categorical variables; *** Binomial confidence intervals (CI) for binary variables; **** Only those currently working

**Discussion**

Our research has shown that recently arrived adult African men from refugee backgrounds face a range of educational and occupational challenges upon resettlement. Overall, this group of African men report high levels of educational aspirations with many of them engaged in further studies, reporting good levels of perceived academic performance. However, a considerable number of those who have studied in Australia have had negative educational
experiences because of the unfamiliar socio-cultural environment and teaching methods, inadequate literacy, numeracy and computer skills, and difficulties in their interactions with peers and teachers.

This group also report high levels of unemployment and significant barriers while trying to secure work in Australia, including discrimination, requirements for Australian work experience and referees, and the necessity of having a car. Very few have been successful in obtaining recognition in Australia of their previous skills and qualifications. Most of those who are employed, work in low skilled and low paid occupations. Despite the fact that about half of the men had a total weekly income of less than $400, which was roughly the estimated poverty line for a single person in Australia in the 2008 September quarter,¹ about 60% were satisfied with their financial situation. Moreover, having at least some sort of ‘safe’ income support (from welfare payments and work) can make a big difference if we consider the past experiences of dispossession and poverty during flight and displacement, and the long periods of time spent in refugee camps.

Some of our findings concur largely with the very few studies conducted in Australia to date investigating educational and employment outcomes among people from refugee backgrounds.² Those studies have reported high levels of unemployment, significant structural disadvantages in the labour market including discrimination, and huge loss of human capital and occupational status. When compared with the African respondents (n=50) who participated in the study conducted by Colic-Peisker and Tilbury³ among 150 men and women from three different refugee communities (Former Yugoslavia, Africa and Middle East) who were settled in Perth, our study has found higher rates of unemployment, and a higher percentage of respondents who had experienced difficulties finding work and discrimination in the labour market. Colic-Peisker and Tilbury’s sample, however, had been longer in Australia (80% of Africans had lived in Australia for five years or more), and was skewed towards those with formal skills, functional English language levels, and who were or wanted to be part of the workforce. Our participants, in contrast, were recent arrivals (two and a half years in Australia on average), and our selection criteria did not include skills, language proficiency or workforce participation.

³ Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007)
To our knowledge, this is the first Australian study that has quantitatively compared educational and occupational outcomes between recently arrived adult African men from refugee backgrounds resettling in urban and regional areas. Documenting settlement outcomes among this population group is of particular importance for two main reasons: (i) the African community is one of the main emerging communities in Australia, and (ii) the Australian government is currently focusing on regional settlement of humanitarian entrants. Overall, we have found that although those men settled in regional areas have been longer in Australia and report better levels of English language proficiency, they face significantly greater educational and occupational challenges than those settled in the urban area. A considerable number of these African men living in regional areas are engaged in tertiary/trade education aiming at improving their work prospects, but they are more likely to report negative experiences at their educational institutions. They are also more likely to report taking jobs that are below their level of skills and qualifications, are more dissatisfied with their jobs, report greater difficulties in accessing the labour market, and are more likely to experience discrimination while trying to secure employment in Australia. They are also less likely to have their previous skills and qualifications recognised in Australia than those men living in the urban region.

Our study has a number of limitations. First, we cannot claim that our sample of participants is representative of the overall population of recently arrived adult African men from refugee backgrounds. However, the quota sampling strategy used here has been quite successful in ensuring that our sample closely matches the population of African men from refugee backgrounds that settled in Brisbane and the Toowoomba-Gatton region between 2004 and 2008, at least in terms of age and country of origin. Second, although significant efforts were made to ensure consistency in the administration of the survey across participants from different ethnic and language backgrounds, such as the training of research assistants prior to undertaking the interviews, individual differences in interpretation could have occurred. Third, this is an observational study of refugee and humanitarian arrivals with no control group and therefore educational and employment outcomes cannot be compared with groups from other migration categories. The limited research conducted to date has found that humanitarian entrants face greater challenges in the labour market than entrants from other migration categories. Fourth, the regional component of our study interviewed men living in the Toowoomba-Gatton region and therefore may not be representative of other regional areas of humanitarian

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4 DIAC (Settlement Database, 2009)  
6 DIAC (Settlement Database, 2009)  
7 Richardson et al. (2004)
settlement around Australia. However, previous research across different regional areas has identified similar issues.\textsuperscript{8} Lastly, the current economic downturn and rise in unemployment currently being experienced in Australia and elsewhere may have impacted on the levels of unemployment and on the reporting of barriers to access the labour market. Nonetheless, previous studies conducted during stronger economic times and lower unemployment levels have showed similar findings.\textsuperscript{9}

**Conclusions and policy implications**
The overriding message from these findings is that recently arrived adult African men from refugee backgrounds face serious barriers and disadvantages when accessing the educational and labour markets in Australia. Those settled in regional areas face even greater disadvantages. Meaningful education and employment outcomes are fundamental for the wellbeing and social inclusion of refugee communities. The high levels of unemployment and the fact that about three-quarters of those men living in regional areas felt they had experienced discrimination and difficulties in accessing the labour market provides a grim picture of the viability of regional resettlement. These barriers should be adequately addressed at the host community, policy and service provision levels for a regional settlement program to succeed. Although policy recommendations to address these issues have been repeatedly made over recent years,\textsuperscript{10} the situation in the field seems not to have improved or may be even getting worse. Stronger and more effective policies and programs need to be developed to enhance the role that host communities (including educational institutions and employers) play in supporting the successful settlement of emerging refugee communities. Regional educational and employment services and programs that address the particular needs of men from refugee backgrounds and their families, including issues of discrimination and social exclusion, are required.

A recent review of regional refugee initiatives in Victoria concluded that these initiatives “have the potential to provide ‘win-win’ benefits to refugee communities and host communities if care is taken to ensure a well-planned, well-integrated and well-resourced approach.”\textsuperscript{11} Our findings indicate that, at least within an educational and occupational context, this approach has yet to benefit African men from refugee backgrounds.

\textsuperscript{8} Taylor and Stanovic (2005): Carrington et al. (2007)
\textsuperscript{9} Taylor and Stanovic (2005): Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007)
\textsuperscript{11} McDonald, Brooke, Sandy Gifford, Kim Webster, John Wiseman, and Sue Casey. “Refugee Resettlement in Regional and Rural Victoria: Impacts and Policy Issues.” (Melbourne: Refugee Health Research Centre, La Trobe University, 2008: 8)
Acknowledgments
We thank the participants for generously giving their time and sharing their experiences with the research team. We also thank the research assistants (Sabah Al Ansari, Mach Anyuat, Kiza Omar Augustin, Mark Deng Garang, Kur Achieu Jongkuch, Vivien Nsanabo, Wilson Oyat, Baptist Joe Oyet, Suan Muan Thang, and Stephen Yanga) for their outstanding work and commitment to the study. The contribution of the SettleMEN project associate investigators Prof Sandy Gifford, Dr Adrian Barnett and Ms Donata Sackey must also be acknowledged. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The SettleMEN project is a collaborative effort between the La Trobe Refugee Research Centre (La Trobe University, Victoria) and the Queensland Program of Assistance to Survivors of Torture and Trauma (QPASTT). QPASTT’s significant in-kind contribution and support is acknowledged. The SettleMEN Project is funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council – NHMRC (Project grant No. 487323). Ignacio Correa-Velez is supported by a NHMRC Public Health Postdoctoral Fellowship (Grant No. 380845).

Bibliography


Conceptualising Refugee Resettlement in Contested Landscapes

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Abstract
Understanding the intersection between refugee lives and trauma provides important insights into the impact of political violence and has helped illuminate such concerns to the eyes of the world stage. However, the experiences of trauma are not the only considerations we should embrace. This paper presents two divergent viewpoints on trauma in the refugee literature. The first provides a predominantly biomedical understanding of trauma related to forced migration. Associated with the medical model, this perspective generally uses Western diagnostic categories of distress to understand the negative effects and sequelae of forced migration. The second perspective questions the value of applying Western forms of psychopathological phenomena to groups of people who come from diverse localities and traditions. This medicalised shift can consequently obscure the political, cultural and social realities that resettling refugee communities emerge and highlights the necessity of conceptualising refugee lives beyond trauma dominated perspectives. This review presents refugees broadly and then contextualises this discussion with Sudanese refugees resettling in Australia.

Introduction
There is little doubt that experiences of war, forced migration, life in refugee camps and acts of political violence can expose people to highly traumatic experiences. Much of the literature acknowledges the plight of those who find themselves entangled in conflicts or untenable situations that are beyond their immediate control. However, there is debate surrounding whether those who experience acts of political violence and threats to one’s sense of safety are left with indelible marks on their mental health and well being. After all, not all refugees who survive harrowing experiences develop psychological problems in the wake of traumatic events. This paper examines the understandings and debates around trauma related to the refugee literature by providing a contextual and historical basis of such research.

Addressing concerns of what has been a relatively narrow focus of trauma in refugee related research; this review will present two divergent viewpoints in the academic literature. The first provides a predominantly medicalised understanding of trauma associated with forced migration. This perspective generally uses Western diagnostic categories of distress to understand the negative effects and sequelae of forced migration. The second perspective questions the value of applying Western forms of psychopathological phenomena to groups of people who come from different social, cultural and historical realities. This review first presents refugee experiences broadly and
then situates this understanding with Sudanese refugees resettling in Australia to illustrate the contested landscape that they emerge.

A Focus upon Trauma in the Literature

There is a substantial body of literature that has documented the resulting sequelae of those who bore witness and experienced the atrocities of civil war, conflict, and oppressive regimes.\(^1\) Acknowledged in these associated accounts are common expressions of guilt, sadness, despair, fear, shame and psychological distress. With the formal recognition of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 1980, the refugee related literature has seen a sharp and sustained spike towards understandings of trauma and associated forms of Western psychopathological phenomena.\(^2\) In relation, Ingleby argues that there has been a growing interest in the field of traumatology with refugee populations. He cites that while there were few mentions of ‘trauma or PTSD’ and ‘refugee’ within the bibliographic literature in early 1980s; the growth of articles published since have increased almost exponentially.\(^3\) The diagnoses of PTSD and to a lesser extent depression, anxiety and schizophrenia are now widely acknowledged mental health outcomes stemming from traumatic experiences related to war, conflict and political violence.

However, as McFarlane argues, the difficulty and challenge in ascertaining psychological disorders across cultural, geographic and social localities is establishing whether a person’s reported distress and suffering is a normal and expected response to situations associated with forced migration or is actually

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indicative of a psychopathological condition.\textsuperscript{4} Though the symptoms of PTSD have been noted world wide, Kleinman cautions that it is a category fallacy to assume that because the features or symptoms of a particular psychological disorder are observed in one locality that they necessarily mean the same thing in a different place.\textsuperscript{5} And herein lies an area of major contention: Aroche and Coello identify two primary and diverging viewpoints within the literature that relate to people experiencing forced migration and trauma.\textsuperscript{6} The first places a strong emphasis upon focussing on and treating psychological traumatisation as a key element in post-conflict recovery. The second places privileged Western concepts of psychopathology such as PTSD and depression as another form of cultural imperialism and psychological colonisation.\textsuperscript{7}

As many authors assert, underestimating the negative sequelae from forced migration can disenfranchise and marginalise the mental health needs of those who have lived through such adversity. This viewpoint is contrasted by other studies that argue Western diagnostic categories of distress and pathology come from a dominant medicalised perspective that is inappropriately applied to people from diverse cultural, historical and social backgrounds. As a result, there is a significant corpus of literature with conflicting findings which indicates a necessity to better understand the broad diversity of refugee experiences, trajectories and aspirations. The next section outlines findings in both camps and highlights the contested field that addresses the intersections between refugee lives, trauma and recovery.

**Documenting the Negative Effects Associated with Exposure to Trauma**

Much of the academic literature cites psychological distress and most notably PTSD as relatively common outcomes for people who experience what is commonly referred to as war trauma. For example, Silove notes in a review of recent systematic studies across diverse cultural settings from war torn countries, that the prevalence of psychological disorders surpasses those from non-war affected Western countries.\textsuperscript{8} Fazel, Wheeler and Danesh suggest after


a meta-analysis of large PTSD studies that its prevalence in resettled refugees could be ten times higher than that of the age-matched general population.\textsuperscript{9} Another meta-analysis of 59 studies found that refugees had poorer mental health outcomes than those of the general population.\textsuperscript{10} At the extreme end of the spectrum, a study reported that the prevalence of PTSD of conflict survivors in Sierra Leone was ninety nine percent.\textsuperscript{11}

The increased prevalence of psychiatric disorders is also supported by epidemiological studies where the prevalence of PTSD is higher in those who have experienced torture in relation to comparison groups.\textsuperscript{12} A study of more than 3000 people from four post-conflict countries found that conflict related trauma was a risk factor for the development of PTSD in Algerians, Cambodians, Ethiopians and Palestinians.\textsuperscript{13} Several longitudinal studies also report similar findings. Mollica et al. maintained that Bosnian refugees who remained living in the region after the war still displayed psychiatric problems three years after assessment, suggesting the sustained psychiatric symptomatology over time and highlighting the importance of coordinated mental health intervention.\textsuperscript{14} These findings are supported by another longitudinal study of 240 refugees who reported an ongoing severity and chronic nature of post traumatic stress and psychological symptoms over a three year period.\textsuperscript{15} Overall, these findings show that trauma with respect to dose effect (relating to frequency or number of experiences) and specific type of exposure (i.e. rape, torture, extended stays in refugee camps) are risk factors for adverse mental health outcomes.

While there is a significant body of literature that has examined the prevalence of mental health concerns related to trauma from forced migration, there has

been growing attention placed upon resettlement experiences that include a focus upon housing, employment, integration, discrimination, social inclusion and poverty. Simich, Hamilton and Baya found in their mixed methods study with resettling Sudanese refugees in Canada that stresses associated with resettlement and social disadvantage were risk factors for higher levels of psychological distress. Indeed, refugees resettling in a new country often encounter new challenges that can be as difficult or traumatising (albeit under different circumstances) than those of forced migration. Owing to the past experiences of trauma associated with forced migration, the UNHCR maintains that refugees can be at a higher risk of developing mental health problems; and thus, resettlement programs that support emotional and personal recovery are critical. The UNHCR report on resettlement states:

It is important that integration programs are provided in ways that support emotional and personal rebuilding. As well as promoting the optimal well-being required to deal with the stresses and adjustments involved in resettlement, this approach can help to prevent the development of more serious mental health difficulties.

The aforementioned studies that have documented the negative sequelae of trauma are important in that these findings when interpreted cautiously highlight the risk factors associated with forced migration and resettlement. These findings can provide powerful evidence and justification to advancing social policies, funding programs and implementing interventions specific to the well-being of displaced populations. However, these risk factors are contested in the academic literature and cannot be taken as a priori assumptions (i.e. - someone who has been tortured is traumatised or has PTSD). Rather, these studies provide a helpful foundation to explore the specific concerns, needs and experiences of a particular refugee or community.

**Another Perspective on Trauma: Resilience, Recovery and Growth**

While acknowledging that some refugees and asylum seekers experience ongoing adverse mental health outcomes and that specific forms of trauma can

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be a significant associated risk factor, Silove argues that most research studies have found that the majority of people surviving conflict settings do not suffer from long-term psychological problems.\textsuperscript{20} Summerfield maintains that many studies overestimate the level of psychological trauma that people surviving war zones have sustained.\textsuperscript{21} For example, Silove reviewed several longitudinal studies conducted in North America and Australia and concluded that refugees experienced diminishing levels of psychopathological symptoms as measured through several diagnostic instruments over time.\textsuperscript{22} One such study by Steel et al. followed more than one thousand Vietnamese refugees living in Australia and found that trauma exposure was an important predictor of mental health status and that there was a dose specific relationship.\textsuperscript{23} However, they found that prevalence of mental illness reduced over time and that most of the participants did not have ‘overt mental ill health’. Rosseau and Measham have provided a review of quantitative studies that highlights the resilience of people living through trauma and how these experiences can even be a source of growth and transformation.\textsuperscript{24} This relatively under-explored terrain highlights the need to think beyond the risk factors and pathological outcomes associated with trauma. The following section provides a critique of a trauma focused inquiry often associated with biomedical research. It is important to emphasise that I am not attempting to discredit this research. Rather, it is maintained that the locus of inquiry in refugee related scholarship has been unnecessarily narrow in scope by focussing predominantly on the negative sequelae of trauma at the expense of alternative perspectives.

\textbf{Criticism of Trauma Focused and Medicalised Perspectives- Obscuring the Political, Cultural and Social}

A critique of Western discourses of trauma usually associated with the biomedical model is presented in three different domains. The criticism levied upon (though not discounting of) the aforementioned approach is as follows: (1) it primarily resides in the domain of individual psychology that often medicalise and pathologises people with refugee status; (2) this model often fails to appropriately recognise the structural forces and powerful institutions that directly influence people’s daily lives; and (3) it does not adequately

\textsuperscript{21} Derek Summerfield, (1999).
\textsuperscript{22} Derrick Silove, (2004): 22.
acknowledge local, traditional and indigenous forms of healing. This critique will question the universality and applicability of PTSD and other Western forms of psychopathology to people coming from different cultures and backgrounds.

(1) The domain of individual psychology and pathologised understandings

A key criticism of trauma focussed inquiry is that this approach is primarily situated in the domains of individual psychology and obscures the political, social and historical realities that refugee lives emerge. Sociologist Vanessa Pupavac and anthropologist Lisa Malkki have written insightful contemporary discourses of ‘refugeedom’ and note the historic shift of viewing refugees from a political perspective to that of a medicalised one. Malkki critically reflects upon this process stating:

The quest for the refugee experience (whether as an analytical model, normative standard, or diagnostic tool) reflects a wider tendency, in many disciplines, to seize upon political or historical processes and then to inscribe aspects of those processes in the bodies and psyches of the people who are undergoing them.25

The process of inscribing such processes into the body and psyche reflect a tendency towards medicalisation. Hoffman has provided insightful commentary on the holocaust and critically states, “trauma is the contemporary master term in the psychology of suffering, the chief way we understand the personal aftermath of atrocity and abuse.”26 While trauma focussed research on the individual is valuable when also placed in a broader context, it can lead to dangerous and pathologising identity conclusions if it is a singular perspective used to understand refugee lives. To outline this critique, Pupavac employs Talcott Parson’s concept of the ‘sick role’ where refugees can potentially be seconded.27 Parsons presented the sick role as a form of ‘sanctioned deviance’.28 As such, this role goes beyond simply being sick to actually being assigned rights and obligations based on the norms surrounding it. Pupavac argues that the sick role as an ascribed status moves refugee discourse from that of a political focus to a narrowly medicalised lens of trauma that situates refugees as victims in society.29

A focus upon pathologised perspectives and trauma discourse is alive and well with African refugees whereby notions of the ‘Dark Continent’ come to the

fore. In Australia, almost all media stories that cover Sudan are stories of war and the atrocities that have been committed in Darfur and Southern Sudan. Other notable newsworthy events are those of abject poverty with images of a displaced and emaciated mother clutching a baby next to a derelict and shaky dwelling. Windle’s analysis of the Australian media shows how it predominantly focuses and presents African youth in a racialised and problem focussed manner.³⁰ Robins found in an analysis of top US newspapers that a particular group of Sudanese people famously known as the ‘Lost Boys’ were presented as coming from what she termed a ‘devastated and backwards Africa’ that often relied on reductionist colonial metaphors to generalise and superficially analyse highly complex situations.³¹ While the story of the ‘Lost Boys’ has created a public awareness and sympathy to the manifestations of oppression; often these stories use experiences of trauma as the primary medium to convey Sudanese refugees in resettlement contexts. Consequently, these perspectives become a dominant and pathologised understanding through which the general public acknowledges refugee lives.

As Ryan, Dooley and Benson argue, the bulk of refugee research looking into the psychological well-being has been based on deficiencies usually couched in individualistic domains.³² Thus, the story of a person’s experience(s) of trauma and forced migration and how it has negatively influenced his/her life can easily overpower other aspects of a person’s life which might emphasise something very different about what he or she values. From this exclusive understanding of a person’s experiences of trauma, a ‘thin description’ of the individual is created where other important considerations of identity can easily be lost or hidden.³³ The preferred understanding that an individual might have about their life can become subordinate to the one about pathology, loss and trauma.³⁴ While there is a value in medicalised understandings on the impacts of trauma, these perspectives potentially fail to acknowledge the powerful structural forces that directly influence people’s daily lives.

(2) Fails to appropriately recognise the structural forces and powerful institutions that directly influence people’s daily lives

A focus on individual pathology has the potential to diminish and even obscure

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the political and social reality from which refugee lives emerge, and thereby reinforces a ‘therapeutic culture’ that medicalises distress.\textsuperscript{35} As such, this focus can myopically render or even neglect considerations of how unjust social policies, government agendas and powerful institutions place structural barriers to people’s well-being. These considerations require a macro-level analysis rather than further explorations upon notions of micro-agency. As Silove and Ekbald argue, if refugees are presented to host countries as psychologically damaged, then the debate of asylum can easily move from humanitarian responsibilities to the economic implications and associated fears of accepting them.\textsuperscript{36} Ryan, Dooley and Benson importantly acknowledge these implications stating that the “trauma discourse focuses on high-impact events that occurred in the pre-migration environment. One of the dangers of this focus is that it overshadows basic needs in the present lives of resettled refugees.”\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner maintain that displaced survivors of political violence are often more concerned with daily stressors related to adjusting within a new environment, social isolation and lacking access to basic resources.\textsuperscript{38} These concerns are not always directly related to past experiences associated with war trauma/ political violence and rather present challenges related to the daily practicalities of living and social inequalities in resettlement contexts. Such concerns are present and future focused, rather than dwelling upon trauma predicated in the past.

While trauma discourses can make the wider society aware of the atrocities and difficulties often associated with forced migration, such understandings can also dangerously place and potentially embed people in roles that inhibit agency and equity of access to certain resources in resettlement contexts. As Malkki states:

\begin{quote}
The development discourse on refugees has sometimes facilitated the continued de-politicisation of refugee movements; for instead of foregrounding the political, historical processes that generated a given group of refugees that reach far beyond the country of asylum and the refugee camp, development projects tend to see the whole world in a refugee camp.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

If the outsider’s understanding of a person’s world is limited to the refugee camp, forced migration and adverse mental health outcomes, then these descriptors can adversely influence the roles that refugees can assume. Ingleby also writes about the ‘sick role’ whereby the pathologies commonly associated

\textsuperscript{37} Ryan et al., 2.
\textsuperscript{39} Malkki, 507.
with refugees actually redefine their rights and position in society. He states, “Though the status of ‘victim’ may help in obtaining political asylum, it can create an extra handicap when it comes to social integration.”

A number of studies have emerged which document how social disadvantage characterises the daily experience of resettling refugee communities. In Australia, recent studies have shown the presence of a segmented labour market whereby African migrants are allocated low status jobs, if one at all, regardless of their prior skills and training. Other studies have shown that economic hardship was a risk factor for psychological distress for Sudanese refugees resettling in Canada. These authors note how high unemployment and the non-recognition of previous education and qualifications prevented Sudanese people from being able to exercise a true sense of agency: also one of the most commonly lamented experiences in refugee camps. As Silove poignantly states:

Where refugees have been welcomed and offered opportunities to develop their capacities and to participate in all the affairs of the host country, they have overcome major adversities of the past. In contrast, where refugees are marginalized, victimized, or constrained, they tend to become entrapped in negative stereotypic roles that are self-reinforcing, leading to further persecution and deprivation.

These comments echo Pupavac’s cynical sentiments where “the closeness of the refugee burden, rather than the possibility of a refugee fate, has exercised policy-makers’ minds.” This burden is often informed through medicalised and individualised discourses of trauma. It is then an easy step for policy makers to express the issue of refugee lives through unemployability, adverse mental health, and incompatibility in resettlement contexts. Rather than acknowledging Australia’s role on the global stage to address manifestations of oppression and marginalisation, this perspective fails (whether deliberate or not) to acknowledge the very real and powerful structural and historical processes that influence people’s daily lives.

(3) Does not adequately recognise indigenous and traditional forms of healing and idioms of distress

There is also a growing critique that Western forms of psychopathology may not be as highly salient as other local forms of distress. For example,
Eisenbruch argued that the dominant emphasis of PTSD and associated Western diagnoses in Southeast Asian refugees could be better understood as cultural bereavement that considers the loss of spiritual and social belonging, home and connection of land.\(^{45}\) Others question the value of Western forms of counselling with those who do not come from such backgrounds.\(^{46}\) While there is little argument that refugees often experience very difficult and traumatic events associated with forced migration and difficulties adapting to life in resettlement contexts; the psychological sequelae, associated trajectories and responses to such events are poorly understood. Numerous authors have critically noted how Western approaches call for psychosocial interventions to address the ‘emotional states’ of refugees and others who have survived conflict settings.\(^{47}\) A strong critique of such interventions is that they are ‘expert’ informed and often neglect or subjugate indigenous and local forms of healing which are highly resonant to particular localities and cultures.

Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner introduce a term called ‘trauma focused psychiatric epidemiology’ (TFPE) and criticise the unnecessarily narrow research focus on refugees that employs the biomedical model of psychiatry and the field of traumatology.\(^{48}\) While they recognise the importance of such studies, they also question the dominance that this focus has had upon other important perspectives stating:

\begin{quote}
Reflecting its strongly positivist underpinnings, the TFPE framework has prioritized the identification of universal patterns of distress, emphasizing findings that can be generalized across diverse settings (e.g. PTSD as a universal human response to traumatic events) while minimizing the exploration of local variations in the ways that people understand, react to, and are affected by their experiences of violence and displacement (410).\(^{49}\)
\end{quote}

The TFPE framework as Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner argue, creates the locus of inquiry firmly within the individual and pathological that predominantly legitimises quantitative methodologies, utilises symptom checklists and essentialises universal patterns of distress.\(^{50}\) With refugee populations, checklists used to establish such distress and psychiatric disorders include: The Harvard Trauma Checklist, DSM-IV PTSD, ICD-10 DCR PTSD and the Hopkins symptom checklist amongst various others. These quantitative


\(^{48}\) Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner, 410-413.

\(^{49}\) Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner, 410.

\(^{50}\) Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner.
measures are not without controversy. A number of authors have critiqued the utility of these checklists across cultural and social boundaries and ability to capture what is accurately occurring for people coming from specific localities. For example, a study with more than 1300 participants found that there were significant differences in the prevalence rate of PTSD diagnosis between two main diagnostic instruments for establishing PTSD; namely the ICD-10 DCR PTSD and DSM-IV PTSD.  

A questionable assumption built within such checklists is that these are universally applicable across diverse cultures, societies and groups of people. When treated as such, the same checklist can be used to establish PTSD prevalence whether it is a Sudanese man who was tortured for being from a marginalised ethnic identity or a Afghani asylum seeker who had been separated from her family due to rapidly advancing Taliban forces. For example, an epidemiological survey found that across four diverse cultures from post conflict countries that there was a wide range of PTSD symptomatologies, and that it is essential to consider the contextual differences in the study of traumatic stress. Hollifield cautions the relative dearth of empirically derived instruments that can adequately assess and capture the broad range of traumatic experiences and responses to trauma associated with forced migration. It is maintained that TFPE presents an important consideration amongst a number of other perspectives that more deeply consider a person’s social, cultural, historic, economic and current resettlement backgrounds. When juxtaposed together, these understandings can add depth and sophistication to people’s forms of healing and pathways to responding to trauma- both past and present.

It is acknowledged that many people who have sought and been given refugee status have encountered experiences of overwhelming adversity and that some of these people may need a great deal of support to recover from acts of injustice and abuse that include (but not limited to) Western therapies. The focus of this review is not intended to further polemicise the debate between Western approaches to healing and otherwise. Rather, it echoes the call to critically engage with dominant discourses to examine a number of possible perspectives and pathways towards understanding and working alongside refugee lives.

52 Joop de Jong et al., 555.
Sudanese Resettlement in Australia

Australia grants between 12,000 to 13,000 humanitarian entrants to its shores annually.\(^\text{54}\) According to the most recent UNHCR reports, Australia has been the second highest country of refugee resettlement behind the United States during 2005 and 2006 and third highest in 2007.\(^\text{55}\) There are now more than 24,000 Sudanese refugees who have immigrated to Australia via the humanitarian programme visa scheme since 1996.\(^\text{56}\) Nearly thirty percent of the 13,000 refugees who gained permanent residency during 2005-2006 were Sudanese.\(^\text{57}\) Most of these recent Australian arrivals have come from Southern Sudan due to a 22 year civil war between rebel groups in the South and Northern associated government forces.\(^\text{58}\) With few exceptions, Southern Sudanese refugees have survived traumatic and dangerous experiences associated with forced migration that have been documented in autobiographical accounts\(^\text{59}\) and the academic literature.\(^\text{60}\) Many Southern Sudanese people spent several years in refugee camps waiting to have their applications processed for humanitarian entry into countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia. There are now estimates that more than 24,000


\(^{55}\) United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), “2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons,” [http://www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org) (2008), (accessed 8 March 2009). These statistics report on quota refugees which are people already recognised by UN standards for refugee classification and host states recognize this status before their arrival. These refugees are sometimes referred to as UN refugees and are distinct to asylum seekers. Importantly, asylum seekers are not represented in these data as Australia’s policies towards this group have not been as favourable.


\(^{57}\) Department of Immigration and Citizenship, (DIAC), (2007a).


Sudanese refugees have immigrated to Australia via the humanitarian programme visa scheme since 1996.\footnote{DIAC (2007a).}

As already established in this paper, despite the risk factors for adverse mental health outcomes associated with forced migration many refugees recover from difficulties associated with forced migration. Thus, the other side of trauma focused inquiry highlights people’s resilience, strategies of coping and capacity to heal. Recognising the importance of these perspectives, Australia’s most recent National Mental Health Policy starting in 2008 has created several overarching aims to its strategy that focus upon resilience and healing:

- Promote the mental health and well-being of the Australian community and, where possible, prevent the development of mental health problems and mental illness
- Reduce the impact of mental health problems and mental illness, including the effects of stigma on individuals, families and the community
- Promote recovery from mental health problems and mental illness

To accomplish such goals with refugee populations, it is important to allow humanitarian entrants to voice their own experience and perspective; recognising they are often marginalised by a number of factors that may include past traumatic experiences and difficulties adapting to a new life in Australia. Understandings of not only the effects of trauma, but also how people respond and recover from such situations have never before been so salient within contemporary Australian contexts.

**Current Research and Embracing Alternative Perspectives**

This article is in a large part informed through the author’s doctoral research with Sudanese people who have resettled in Adelaide (an estimated population of three to four thousand residents). This research has looked to document Sudanese men’s responses to trauma as distinct from its effects and reports on twenty four Sudanese men’s in depth narratives and an ongoing ethnographic engagement with their community over the period of several years. The interviews followed White and Denborough’s work on using ‘double storied testimony’ which provides a flexible framework to acknowledge both the
trauma story and a person’s response to it.\textsuperscript{63} Analysis was carried out through a process of initial and focused coding, writing memos, theoretical sampling and using the constant comparative method as per constructivist grounded theory.\textsuperscript{64} In total, seventy interviews were conducted.

Though every participant in this study had arguably encountered traumatic experiences associated with forced migration; often their reported concerns were situated within current resettlement contexts related to the practicalities of daily living rather than from past traumas such as forced marches, torture or life in refugee camps. It is worth noting that participants primarily did not emphasise the negative psychological effects of trauma and rather directed their focus towards the importance of social connectedness (both within and outside the community) and structural considerations of employment, suitable housing and supporting their children in schools as issues when adequately addressed directly led to healing. Overall, participants were critical of what they called ‘Western’ counselling approaches that focussed on talking about trauma in an unfamiliar agency setting. Rather they spoke about the importance of establishing a relationship with the community (often within the community as opposed to within an agency) and how professionals could play an integral role in working alongside them to greater realise practical outcomes related to employment, education and suitable housing. These emphases were expressed both in individual interviews and in community engagements that highlighted the necessity of recognising the broader institutional and social forces in resettlement contexts. In relation, many participants addressed how commentary from politicians such as the former Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews who claimed that Sudanese people were failing to integrate into Australian society\textsuperscript{65} and negative and trauma focussed media portrayals\textsuperscript{66} have limited opportunities for Sudanese people to participate as peers in Australian society.

The findings of this research are not suggesting that negative mental health outcomes are not possibly there or that Western-based psychosocial interventions are not needed. The adverse psychological impacts of trauma arising from forced migration and resettlement were previously established (though also contested) earlier in this paper. Rather, it is after issues such as affordable housing, access to employment, English language acquisition and educational trainings are addressed (often situated in structural considerations

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{66} Melinda Robins, 29; Windle, 566.
\end{thebibliography}
and community capacity building) that the interpersonal work of resolving psychopathological sequelae can be better addressed, if resonant and needed.

A number of other recent studies of Africans resettling under humanitarian auspices have also emerged that elicit the forms of strength, resilience and coping that have helped Sudanese refugees to resettle and live their lives in meaningful ways. Khwaja, White, Schweitzer and Greenslade found in their mixed method study that social support networks, use of religion, reframing past difficulties and focusing upon the future were all helpful coping strategies of resettling Sudanese people in Australia. Such strategies were largely reflected in the three different chronological periods that they examined: pre-migration, countries of first asylum, and post-migration. Goodman’s qualitative inquiry found that Sudanese adolescents strongly identified with having a sense of collectivity as something that helped them cope after difficult experiences associated with forced migration. Likewise, other studies have also documented how the loss of social networks is a significant source of distress for refugees. Westoby conducted an in depth ethnographic inquiry with Sudanese community in Australia, and found that understandings of trauma were often situated within the social milieu and thereby these people’s pathways to healing were social as well. Others have also attempted to elicit the forms of strength, resilience and coping that have helped these people to live their lives in meaningful ways from difficulties associated with resettlement and forced migration. Broader issues related to segmented labour opportunities and educational barriers for Africans living in Australia

67 Khwaja et al., 512.
68 Goodman, 1177.
have been identified by various others.\textsuperscript{73} Such approaches embrace perspectives of Sudanese people beyond their refugee status and associated medicalised understandings of trauma.

Accessing such information from refugee populations highlights the necessities of forming meaningful research questions and approaches with particular communities and documenting their histories carefully.\textsuperscript{74} Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner forwarded the potential of constructivist methodologies that can document the rich local variations of how particular groups or even individuals respond to trauma associated with forced migration.\textsuperscript{75} These authors are not arguing that all research methodologies should embrace constructivist underpinnings; rather, it should be seen as another lens amongst many to shine light in areas of refugee scholarship left unseen by other approaches. Mackenzie, McDowell and Pittaway also provide some helpful perspectives of conducting this research in ethical and reciprocal ways.\textsuperscript{76} This growing body of scholarship (empirical, theoretical and methodological) provides an important and more holistic approach to navigating the complexities around the cultural, political, historical, social and structural domains of refugee lives and trauma.

**Conclusion**

This literature review has presented a broad overview of refugees and trauma focussed inquiry. However, it is also directly relevant to African refugees living in diaspora and more particularly those who have entered Australia as humanitarian entrants. Pathologised perspectives informed through traumatic experiences can easily launch us back to the ‘heart of darkness’ in Conrad’s novel whereby notions of the Dark Continent come to the fore. It is then only a short step towards using poverty, trauma and chronic conflict as dominant descriptors of refugee lives. These understandings can consequently impede the realisations of employment, social integration and equity of access in resettlement contexts. It is as Kohli once lamented in his work with children asylum seekers in the United Kingdom that it seems that outsider’s interests in displaced people’s lives only begins and ends with them as displaced peoples.\textsuperscript{77} Acknowledging refugee lives beyond the camp and associated traumas with forced migration is an important step in recognising them as *peers participating in* rather than *victims surviving within* Australian society.

\textsuperscript{75} Miller, Kulkarni and Kushner, 418-422.
This article has provided a summary of divergent research paths and perspectives used to view refugee lives. The first focused on understandings of trauma and associated sequelae often in Western psychiatric forms of distress, and a second which placed further emphases on local knowledge and approaches towards healing and recognising the political landscapes (both past and current) that refugees emerge. While acknowledging the value of both approaches, it is maintained that the latter has been unnecessarily limited in scope via medicalised paradigms focussed on trauma. The critique of predominantly trauma focussed methodologies looking into the correlates and prevalence of PTSD and other Western psychiatric idioms of distress is not meant to discount the value of such research. Such understandings are needed and can create powerful justifications for advancing social policies and funding programs that can help with the resettlement process: an experience that refugees and migrants often describe as a journey between two social realities. Thus, while acknowledging the effects of trauma in people’s lives and associated impacts on people’s well-being are important areas of inquiry; there is also a greater call to examine refugee lives beyond the purviews of trauma dominated perspectives. This shifted focus helps to render other important considerations visible in resettlement contexts that include: structural inequalities, unjust social policies and forms of healing, resistance and recovery from traumatic experience both on individual and collective levels.

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Welcome or Unwelcome? Integration Issues and the Resettlement of Former Refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan in Metropolitan Melbourne

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Background to the problem

In 2007, the Australian media drew attention to African refugees “having difficulties in integrating” into the wider Australian society. These remarks, made by the Coalition’s Liberal Party Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews, led to a debate over whether the resettlement quotas for African refugees should be reduced due to a lack of integration potential. This controversial statement was not based on empirical evidence and was seen by many as a crude electioneering ploy; mere political rhetoric reflecting a perception held by some factions of Australian society. In the absence of any supporting evidence, the image that was being portrayed was that the African refugees were not fitting in. This political rhetoric had shifted the multicultural policy to

become an issue of ability to integrate.\textsuperscript{2} According to the Refugee Council of Australia:

The public controversy created in 2007 by comments of the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Kevin Andrews, about the settlement of African refugees has caused considerable confusion about how and why decisions about regional targets are made. Over the past year, RCOA has heard many comments from people who believe that resettlement from Africa to Australia has ceased permanently. Others fear that Mr Andrews’ comments have so damaged the cause of African resettlement that African refugees will not get fair consideration again.\textsuperscript{3}

However, within the local and international media, public debate began about ‘integration potential’ as the basic criteria for resettlement of refugees, among groups and individuals such as the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia, the Victoria Police, the Greens Senator Kerry Nettle, the Race Discrimination Commissioner, Tom Calma, the Minister for Finance and Deregulation and DIAC Lindsay Tanner, Amnesty International, as well as the Victorian and federal governments.\textsuperscript{4} This was despite express statements by


the Refugee Council of Australia that resettlement should not only be offered to those individuals who demonstrate “integration potential.”

This article considers ‘integration’ as a complex concept dependent on several variables: first, the policies and services provided by the host government; second, how the host community perceives and receives refugees, and third how the refugees themselves adapt to their new environment. Integration thus operates at the political, economic and social levels. This article will examine the question of how refugees from the Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia (the Horn of Africa and Sudan) who had previously been welcomed by Australia (through the Humanitarian program and a policy of multiculturalism) then became unwelcome (through public criticisms of their inability to integrate into Australian society). It will be argued that the current debate about these refugees’ ‘integration potential’ – whether real or perceived - can be better understood by examining the underlying principles of resettlement and integration policies, how integration operates within the refugee resettlement programs of Australia, by investigating the main problems encountered by these former refugees with integration in Australia, through the lens of their own lived and shared experiences.

**Methodology**

Using personal social networks with Sudanese, Ethiopian and Somali refugee communities, I was able to invite potential participants to become involved in this study. For the purposes of confidentiality, pseudonyms have been used in this article. Qualitative data was gathered through face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews with twelve English-speaking men and women from the

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6 Two informal group discussions were conducted through social networks, to corroborate and triangulate data generated through the individual interviews. The first group discussion involved three English language teachers who have been teaching English to various refugee groups for over five years. Two of them currently teach English through a church organisation program in Clayton and the third one teaches English at Adult Multicultural Education Services (AMES) in Dandenong. The second group discussion was held with a group of Somali elders in Heidelberg West.
Horn of Africa and Sudan, who arrived and settled in metropolitan Melbourne, Australia, during the 1990s under the Special Humanitarian Program. Selection criteria for the sample group comprised of two male and two female participants each from the Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia, aged between 24-45 years. According to data available from Australian Government statistics, a larger proportion of the refugees from this region are within this age group.

Geographically, the Horn of Africa is located in the north-east of Africa and encompasses Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. Sudan borders the Horn of Africa but is, technically, not part of the Horn. Overall, it is important to acknowledge that great ethnic and religious diversity exists within these communities. However, citizens of these nations have often sought refuge in their immediate neighbouring countries and even though their experiences are individual, there is a common thread of shared experiences and histories as refugees.

This initial research was based on a small sample of Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees in Metropolitan Melbourne. This was due to the short time period available in which to conduct a field study, the long distances involved and owing to financial constraints. It is hoped that future research will comprise a larger sample size. Nevertheless, the small sample size enabled a deeper understanding of the integration process through more intimate in-depth interviews which would not have been possible with a larger sample group. The gathered data has been analysed to identify common themes on resettlement and integration.

**Integration indicators**

In the absence of a single established definition or benchmark, the indicators of ‘integration’ used in this research are drawn from (1) the Refugee Convention; (2) Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA, now Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC)) Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy; (3) best practice handbook for resettlement of refugees by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) namely: proficiency in the English language, access to suitable accommodation, the right to employment, health and welfare and participation in community affairs. The UNHCR defines integration as:

a mutual, dynamic, multifaceted and on-going process. From a refugee perspective, integration requires a preparedness to adapt to the lifestyle of the host society without having to lose one's own cultural identity. From the point of view of the host society, it requires ... willingness for

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7 Although Somaliland and Eritrea are breakaway ‘independent states’, Somalia and Ethiopia do not necessarily recognise them as such and these states are engaged in protracted conflicts of independence.
Valtonen, referring to earlier 1970s refugees, identifies a more inclusive definition of ‘integration’:

the ability to participate fully in economic, social, cultural and political activities, without having to relinquish one’s own distinct ethno-cultural identity and culture. It is at the same time a process by which settling persons become part of the social, institutional and cultural fabric of a society.\(^9\)

This article primarily focuses on English language proficiency and access to employment. Competence in English language, the ability to communicate and earn an income directly impact upon access to suitable accommodation, health and welfare which form part and parcel of overall integration.

**Horn of Africa and Sudanese Refugees**

Refugees coming from Africa to Australia in the 1970s and 1980s were mainly White Africans or Indian Africans from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda. They came to settle in Australia following often violent political changes in Africa.\(^10\) Refugees from the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, are relative newcomers to Australia and have little in common with the

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previous ‘refugee’ groups. They have been arriving in Australia since the 1990s under Australia’s Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program. The origins and timing of these latter refugees from Africa has led to them all being labelled as Horn of African Refugees, denoting within Australian immigration discourse that they are a homogenous group, perhaps thus simplifying their integration process.

Homogenising this diverse group into one larger grouping is perhaps a result of their defining characteristics, their ‘visibility’, diversity and vulnerability. They are obviously different to both previous African white and Indian migrants, and they look and sound different to the stereotypical white, English-speaking Australians. They come from non-English speaking backgrounds, and thus have an accent when speaking English. Their skin is black, often they are quite tall, some may dress in African style attire, and they may have different religious and cultural backgrounds. Their visibility is derived from a combination of these ‘differences’. Many of them have come directly from refugee camps, hosted by other African nations, where they lived for prolonged periods of time after having endured the trauma of civil conflicts, violence, family separation and the breakdown of their communities and their countries.

In the 1995-6 period alone, 3,000 refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan came to Australia and settled in Victoria. Data collated from 2001 Australian

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11 They differ in colour pigmentation, come from different language, ethnic, tribal and cultural backgrounds and often have not had access to similar educational and economic opportunities.
15 Val Colic-Eisker and Farida Tilbury, 63.
Census Data and DIMIA Settler Arrivals shows that 7,116 Sudanese, 3210 Ethiopians, 2954 Somali and 1,317 Eritreans settled in Victoria.\(^9\) DIAC’s 2006 community demographic statistics\(^9\) show that this group constitutes a rapidly growing population. Academics and scholars researching Refugee issues in Australia\(^9\) have suggested that the government lacks sufficient knowledge about the backgrounds of Horn of Africa and Sudanese Refugees. There is a scarcity of studies on their initial post-arrival experiences and their ultimate settlement outcomes.\(^9\) DIAC recognises that African refugees are resilient; having survived life-threatening challenges pre-arrival, and notes that “would be doubly ironic if settlement services unintentionally diminished that capacity and encouraged dependency.”\(^9\) Their resettlement and integration thus represent unique challenges for the Humanitarian Program.

Graphs 1 and 2 show that Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees are mostly under 50 years of age, and they are likely to be in good health as they have undergone medical checkups with the International Organisation for Migration and Australian Cultural Orientation in conjunction with UNHCR before arrival in Australia.\(^9\) Graph 3 illustrates from data extrapolated from DIAC’s 2006 community profiles on Sudanese, Somali and Ethiopians, that large numbers settled in Victoria, compared to New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia. Graph 4 shows that the mean income among these refugees is lower compared to the average weekly income for the general Australian population.

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\(^9\) Elizabeth Cassity and Greg Gow; David Cox, Brian Cooper and Moses Adepoju; Trevor Batrouney; Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe and Elizabeth Dimock, 15; and Lawrence Udo-Ekpo.


Graph 1: Comparative Median Age of Horn of Africa and Sudanese Communities in Australia: 2006


Graph 2: Comparative Age Groups of Horn of Africa and Sudanese Communities in Australia: 2006


Graph 3: Geographical Distribution of Horn of Africa and Sudanese communities in Australia in 2006

Graph 4: Comparative Median Individual Weekly Income for Horn of Africa and Sudanese Communities: 2006


Graph 5: Comparative Participation in the Labour Force > 15 yrs - 2006


Graph 6: Comparative Skill Level Participation in the Labour Force for > 15 yrs - 2006

Graph 5 shows that unemployment is generally higher than in the general population, while Graph 6 illustrates that they are disproportionately likely to be employed as less skilled occupation (such as labourers or machine operators/drivers). Importantly, - according to DIAC - many of the Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees are also currently attending an educational institution.

Integration has been examined through the socioeconomic indicators outlined in UNHCR’s ‘Best Practices for Integration Program’ handbook and DIAC’s Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy (IHSS) resettlement program. These programs identify the level of literacy in English language, ability to secure employment and appropriate accommodation as well as access to health and welfare facilities and community participation, as the main criteria to determine whether - and to what extent – refugees are able to integrate into the wider Australian society. These overarching socio-economic indicators affect resettlement and integration. Consequently, using these integration indicators and DIAC’s community profile statistical analysis, the present research sought to investigate whether the theoretical principles of the resettlement programs translate practically into facilitating ‘integration’ or whether a gap exists. Do resettlement programs meet the objectives that they were designed to achieve – integrating refugees - and do the outcomes measure up to the intentions. What follows is an analysis of some thematic findings of the present research: in particular those associated with proficiency in English and access to employment - as part of the resettlement and integration problems faced by the Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees.

**English language as an indicator of integration**

Proficiency in English is viewed as one of the most important indicators for integration for refugees. DIAC views proficiency in Australia’s national language as an important indicator of integration and resettlement.\(^2\) The present research reveals that owing to inherent problems in the delivery of services vis-a-vis provision of English language classes, former refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan found it difficult to overcome the communication barrier. Participants in this study found that the teaching style, content and timeframe of available English language courses inadequate. They did not have textbooks to reinforce their classroom study. Upon completion of the mandatory 510 hours (or additional hours in case of special difficulty)\(^2\) at Adult Migration English Program(AMEP), they can speak only 'cosmetic’ or


\(^2\) Although Centrelink provides Literacy and Numeracy Training of up to 400-800 hours for those between 18-24 years, participants did not mention this program. This could be due to a lack of awareness about this program or a general fear associated with Centrelink.
social English, both of which are insufficient for further education or mobility in employment: “AMEP aims to produce ‘survival’ English language skills. AMEP alone is often not enough to develop vocational language skills that will allow people’ to operate effectively in Australian workplaces.”

There was a strong preference for longer periods for learning English, particularly by Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugee women, Memuna’s views show that groups are not gauged according to their learning capabilities:

Everyone who comes to Collingwood Centre does not speak English. You are all there, the refugees: Sudanese, Ethiopians, Somali ... You hang around with your people. It was not a good way to learn English because in class, you sat next to a Somali. If you do not understand something, you asked the Somali.

Lack of newer teaching materials and treating the former refugees from various countries as one homogenous, non-English speaking group suggests that the AMEP is using ‘one size fits all’ material, emphasising AMEP’s limitations. Noteworthy are the difficulties facing teachers of English as a second language to these particular refugees is that many come from oral traditions, where a written language is not learnt, they may be illiterate in their own language, or have few literacy skills, despite the fact that many of them may speak several languages. Thus, the teaching curricular of English is exceptionally difficult to target the individual former refugees and to harness their potential for language learning skills. Memuna started missing classes in primary school but her older brother’s intervention helped. He helped her to see a different perspective by asking her: how would an Australian cope in Somalia? Having contextualized her difficulties from this understanding, Memuna made a concerted effort and took courage to explain her problem to her welfare co-ordinator. This exchange was a turning point in Memuna’s life: The teachers they tried so hard to help me ... I used to stay back to help ... on weekends, I would go to their house ... I became head girl. I was a volunteer in many different activities. I finished school and went to university. I am now doing my Masters.


27 Apart from Italian (colonial times), Sudan’s national language is Arabic, Ethiopia Amharic and English, Somali, Somali. However, Sudan has over 400 ethnic languages, Ethiopia, over 80 and Somalia more than 30. Some of these are: Dinka, Sudanese Arabic, Cushitic, Chadic, Hausa (Sudan); Afar, Bertha, Oromo, Tigigna, Tigre, (Ethiopia); Garre, Maay (Somalia) and also Swahili, the common language learnt in refugee camps.
Even today, Memuna and her teachers remain good friends. For Abdii, a lawyer back in Somalia, understanding Australian pronunciation was difficult:

*I landed at the airport. First word I heard was “Mike” and this man was looking at me. He pointed his finger. I think he was thinking I was a customer. I was alone standing, and he kept saying “Mike”. My name is not “Mike”, because I did not know the Australian culture... Now I know he was saying “mate”.

Elsa and Irene both teach English classes at different language centres. Elsa is a professional but Irene is a volunteer. Both have been teaching English for over ten years. In their teaching experiences, there have been encouraging and some positive outcomes for some refugees, as Elsa’s statement reflects:

*We have come across a lot of them who are highly motivated. The reward comes in seeing them become more articulate and improve their questioning skills to gain information. English classes are good for all refugees as they increase confidence. The Sudanese, though, have particular learning difficulties.*

These teachers are of the view that communication success in a new language requires a minimum of 1-2 years of regular learning. This is in line with the core concept of integration found within the 1978 and 1982 Galbally Reports. These reports placed English proficiency at the centre of effective settlement, whereby refugees would acquaint themselves with the services, structures and systems in Australia and link into basic provisions. These reports reasoned that access to English language learning opportunities should be availed at any stage of refugees’ lives, and not only upon arrival, thus envisaging settlement and integration as a long term experience. In essence, the policy would provide migrants with English classes until each individual had grasped a functional

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28 Frank Galbally, “Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants Migrant Services and Programs,” (Migrant Services and Programs - usually known as "The Galbally Report"), (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 1978). “For adults, while we see our initial settlement proposals as an important part of the program for teaching them English, there will be a continuing need for special programs for certain groups ... We recommend extensions to the availability of and coverage of full-time courses of instruction, the replacement of the current continuation classes by certificate courses at different levels of difficulty, an extension of the range of advanced courses available, and wider use both of ‘on-the-job’ English instruction and the home tutor scheme” (para. 3.19). “We also recommend better education for teachers of adult migrants, additional funds for conferences and seminars to enable such teachers to keep abreast of the latest developments and additional funds for the provision of teaching materials” (paras 3.23-3.24). “Again recognising the importance of planning and monitoring programs, we recommend the establishment of the adult migrant education program as a rolling three-year program and an extensive survey by the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the needs for English of the various migrant groups” (paras 3.26 and 3.27-3.28).
level of the language. Instead, funding for the program was reduced\(^{29}\) with AMEP providing 510 hours (plus additional hours based on a case-by-case).

Elsa and Irene share the implications of these shifts in policy and funding. They both empathise with former refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan, and their difficulties in learning a new language in 510 hours (or additional). Discerning how much time is adequate to be sufficiently proficient in oral and functional English to access economic opportunities, health and welfare institutions for refugees - whose education has often been disrupted - requires extensive judgement\(^{30}\) and varies from country to country. Ordinarily, to develop oral proficiency in English can take anything between 3-5 years to develop, and for academic English proficiency, anything between 4-7 years.\(^{31}\) Apart from proficiency, there are also other problems such as accents and pronunciation. For instance, for Elsa and Irene, pronunciation of foreign names is equally difficult, as Elsa admits:

> How can we criticise them, we cannot speak Chinese or Arabic for instance ... Even as teachers, we have problems with pronunciation of their names. I remember I always say the name of this student wrong. He would always correct me.

On the other hand, Terefe finds that it is a common assumption that if you are a refugee, you do not speak English:

> When you walk into a shop, the way they look at you, the way they talk to you sloweeerrr louuudeerr ... the assumption people have ... they look at you and think they have to explain.

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The participants, some of whom were literate and professionals in their former countries stated that the English classes neither related to their former occupation nor enabled access to employment or recognition of their skills and experience. Ahmed, a health worker, expected classes to help him find a job or prepare him for job interviews. Abdullah, a Sudanese graduate from the University of Cairo, appreciated the necessity of learning English and made the best of the 510 hours. Like Ahmed and Terefe, he would have preferred to have more classes in English to prepare him for job training. He believes that language proficiency and job training should be on-going concurrently at their places of work: ‘This way, refugees can become independent and integrate at a faster pace.’ Although there are other programs available for improving English proficiency outside of 510 hours – such as Centrelink’s Literacy and Numeracy Training, Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees do not appear to be aware of such options.

The literacy levels amongst many refugee women - from the Horn of Africa and Sudan - are very low. Ongoing civil conflicts over several decades weakened their chances at literacy. “Few people spoke (sic) English. Many are illiterate; they do not even know read the Somali language” states Siad. Affirming earlier literature on African refugees the present research data also demonstrates that women make slower progress in improving their communication skills, complaining that at English classes, they do not have books or adequate educational materials to reinforce their learning. The language barrier has social and economic impacts as well as hindering employment opportunities. These refugee women also tend to have greater difficulties in accessing an education: as Ahmed notes, “the women they have a

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33 Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe and Elizabeth Dimock; Elizabeth Cassity and Greg Gow; David Cox, Brian Cooper and Moses Adepoju; Trevor Batrouney; Refugee Council of Australia, 2008.
double burden; they are illiterate, they cannot learn the language because they have to help their children, look after them”. They also suffer from a lack of child-care facilities. Giada states: “I stayed at home a long time ... there was no one to look after my children ... I could not leave them ... with strangers ...” In part, this is owing to time clashes between English classes and child-care support.\(^{34}\)

Although AMEP provides free childcare to clients with under school aged children during class times, childcare has to be arranged within three months of the refugee registering for the AMEP.\(^{35}\) The chances of a slot for childcare and an AMEP class slot dovetailing are usually difficult. Further, for newly arrived Horn of African and Sudanese mothers, child-care support is a new phenomenon. Traditionally, they have had support from their extended families in caring for children. It is more likely is that former refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan are living in fragmented families in Australia. The Australian government has not given family reunion visas priority since 2002. Thus, many women lack the support from their extended families that traditionally would help to provide care for their children.

**Employment as an indicator of integration**

Present research confirms that barriers to employment operate at several levels. Lack of proficiency in English and non-recognition of overseas-qualifications and skills together with a lack of Australian experience continue to act as impediments in securing employment. As Alpha stated,

> How to get a job is the most difficult. You want to do something to change your life. You need a job to lead a normal life ... that in Melbourne is very, very hard.

Thus initially, former refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan rely heavily on government social welfare. This can easily be misconstrued or perceived as an inability to integrate as the Minister’s remarks portray. Alpha states that “It is not so hard in the United States ... even if you don’t have English, you get a job straightaway.” He is of the opinion that regardless of proficiency in English, it is easier to find a job upon arrival compared to Australia. Alpha shares his knowledge through his extended family in the U.S.:

> I have sisters in the USA, there the agencies help refugees to interact through social workers, consultants come to your home to discuss what you would like to do, to achieve. This is progressive.

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\(^{34}\) Claire Higgins, 13.

Although this remark was made by a single participant with extended family in the U.S.A., it is worthy for Australian policy makers to take note of such perceptions and expectations. Another impact of poor language skills is the difficulty of understanding the implications of correspondence from Centrelink which often translate into financial constraints. Siad explains that Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees prefer waiting for a literate family relative to come and read the letter rather than approaching the translator and interpreter services offered by the government:

*For example, Centrelink will send you a letter telling you ... you have to submit this and that, there is a deadline ... they do not understand. So they put it aside. So their payment is cut. That is one. Second, the Centrelink will send you a letter and ask you to provide documentation. And they do not understand what the social security requires. So what happens? Same thing ... money is cut.*

Siad explained that Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugee women have a fear of having to deal with these new issues. They also associate their old fear of government officials in Somalia to enquiries from Centrelink. They have not dealt with such issues previously in their countries of origin.

In the early months of resettlement, participants go to Centrelink and Job Network to seek employment. The participants have been variously employed in factories, in the security and building industry, cleaning services, aged care, fruit picking, stacking shelves, in the automobile industry, or loading and unloading jobs at Coles and Safeway. Abdullah shares:

*Regardless of our professional qualifications or work experiences, we are employed in factories, security, cleaning services as our first jobs. In the 1990s I was earning $16 an hour. I did a lot of these jobs at this rate. I am surprised that the newcomer refugees in 2008, earn the same amount even with the rising cost of oil and price of living.*

Consequently financial constraints prohibit participation in ‘bridging courses’ and this ultimately reduces refugees’ living standards, quite contrary to the intended effects of resettlement programs. For recognition of overseas professional qualifications, refugees and migrants have to undergo ‘bridging courses’ which address the skill and knowledge gap between educational institutions overseas and those of Australia. Zahida, now a medical General Practitioner, explains her situation:

*I have enough qualifications [from the University of Cairo, Egypt] ... but my English is not proficient, so I had to take courses for professionals ... Occupational English test ... through the Australian Medical Council ... this costs a lot of money ... my husband paid for this and for private childcare ... all these expenses ...*_
To overcome employment barriers, Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugee women generally tend to choose vocational skills that enable job placement. This helps circumvent the unemployment hurdle. However, owing to financial and domestic responsibilities, vocational studies are often deferred. After the initial job placement, two participants opted to take up paid employment at the job placement institution, postponing their studies: “My husband and I cannot survive on the little money he earns. Rents eat up 50% of what we earn. So I will return next year when my situation has improved a little” (Mimea).

Of the twelve informants interviewed, four professionals opted to be re-trained rather than to continue to be underemployed. They hoped that Australian-based education and training would improve their eligibility and mobility in terms of employment. Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees stated that they appreciate having the opportunity to return to school in Australia and improve their skills. As soon as they become eligible for education, many abandon their lowly paid jobs. Mahmoud, a qualified engineer from Somalia, started off as a pizza-maker with an Italian restaurant. Being proficient in Italian gave him access to this job. After working at several menial jobs, Mahmoud decided to return to university to improve his education and bridge his skills. Undertaking Australian education, however, is no guarantee of obtaining a job. Eight of the twelve participants believe that even with an Australian education, the pace at which refugees find jobs in comparison to their colleagues at university is slow. Mahmoud shares his experiences:

Most of my colleagues from uni have jobs ... others, like me even after completion of degrees at Australian universities, are the only ones continuing to struggle in finding a job. You go underground into invisible networks even if you have qualifications ... you have to have networks to find a job.

The participants acknowledge that they understand neither the job market in Melbourne nor how their Australian friends seem to get employment through social networks that appear to be ‘underground’ and ‘invisible’. They do not know how to negotiate the ‘underground, invisible networks’. With their newfound self-esteem in the land of ‘fair go’, they express disappointment at the gap between their ability and willingness to work and the lack of employment opportunities. This is particularly frustrating since Australia faces a continued shortage of labour and skills, and yet, racism prevents their access to employment. The myth and misconception is that these former refugees from the Horn and Sudan do not want to work, that they are a drain on welfare resources, and therefore they ‘lack integration potential: they do not ‘fit in’. In reality, these refugees - who have undergone enormous hardships and shown resilience - are unable to access employment opportunities because they are socially and economically excluded from the labour markets through discrimination and racism.
The participants liken discrimination in the job market to that of their employment experiences in Egypt and living in the refugee camps of Kenya. They understand that being employed is a mechanism by which they can ‘fit in’ and restore their dignity and self esteem. Thus, the need to access jobs is imperative, contrary to the perception of a section of the Australian community that refugees are a burden. There is therefore a contrast between public perceptions of these former refugees, and the realities of their desire for work. According to Abdullah:

*It is not that refugees don’t want to work, they want to find a job but they are not offered a job. There is a bad need for refugees to work. It is not enough for us to survive on Centrelink. The approach has to be changed, make it different. The attitude towards refugees is that you need help ... that we are here to fill an opportunity hole ... think straightaway that we cannot cope with pressure, we are incompetent or incapable. Give us a chance. We are qualified, we are good workers, we have skills, we are (were) professionals and in business. All we need is a chance.*

Both Abdullah’s and Siad’s comments - based on their experiences in accessing employment opportunities - provide some valuable insights into how the Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees view their unemployment situation. They sense that the host community views them as lazy, not wanting to work but surviving off Centrelink welfare payments (a stereotypical image of refugees) as opposed to employers not willing to give them an opening. The comments also reveal that these former refugees are learning what it means to be ‘democratic’ and what their ‘rights’ are in Australia: they are aware of the inequalities to opportunities and access in terms of employment. They recognise lack of equality to opportunity and access to employment to be the major barrier to their integration and acceptance.

Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees have shown the potential to work and to learn, but need to walk through the doors of equal opportunity and access to be fully integrated. Contrary to them ‘lacking potential’, the real issue is that they are unable to overcome the structural barriers that exclude them from employment. To overcome these employment barriers, they seek advice on further education and jobs through their educational institutions and their social networks. For instance, Ahmed’s university professor found him a volunteering job where he could practice his recent learning.

Other Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees have found volunteering – secured through word of mouth - as a means of getting a toe into the door of employment. Daktari reveals that refugees are caught in a vicious cycle. First, previous overseas qualifications are not recognised so they are not able to engage with the labour market or learn about the Australian workplace culture. Second, even having acquired Australian education, refugees - as job seekers - need jobs to acquire experience but cannot get jobs to acquire such experience. This is one of the most significant barriers: obtaining employment and obtaining job experience. He states that for the Somali, gaining experience or a professional reference is the next most important item to securing employment. Abdullah, a professional in his country prior to becoming a refugee, discloses:

*You are blocked from getting experience. How do you get experience if no job? They say you need Australian experience to operate a machine ... They can teach you on the job ... we are not illiterate.*

Research participants were not aware of apprenticeships open to refugees. Literature shows that the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) has only recently conducted research on how apprenticeships could be fast tracked for non-English speaking background job-seekers with existing skills but non-recognised qualifications with a recommendation that the Federal Government consider implementing a Traineeship program.37

According to the UNHCR,38 Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees are most likely to fall below the poverty line due to lack of access to employment. The ability to integrate is dependent on the opportunities and jobs offered by the government and the host society. Daktari suggests the best way of obtaining an Australian work reference is to work as a volunteer.

*The government must give them something to show off their spirit to do something ... their capability. If you are not hired, no one knows who you are. When you ask for a job, they [employers] ask for job experience in Australia. The government institutions must find a way ... to get voluntary jobs ... because sometimes it is difficult to even get a voluntary job ... so that you can get a reference.*

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Following Kevin Andrews’ media messages, participants alleged there was increased racism and discrimination by employers who focussed more on their weaknesses rather than on their strengths. Several participants were of the view that racism is embedded within the institutions. Keeping HAR out of the job market sends a controversial message to youngsters. Terefe comments:

I teach at TAFE now. I find people are getting educated here. And the kids in our community think ... if Terefe does not get a job, he is a Monash graduate, an RMIT graduate ... what will happen to us? That is the scary part. Because the message they are sending is “go to school” otherwise you are a loser. If you don’t go to school, you are empty. If they tell you clearly there is no need to go to school ... there are no jobs, that is also fine with me ... then you fight for it. But if you are saying “go to school again, get a qualification and you can get a job” ... at the same time the media shows that you have got a shortage (of skilled labour and jobs) but you are not able to get a job...

According to a participant, Job Network and other employment agencies were seen by former refugees from the Horn and Sudan, to exercise discrimination, sending them to ‘dirty, dangerous and dull jobs’ that required long distances of travel even whilst jobs existed in their area.

I got the job through connections. First time, I went online ... then through contractors who supply Safeway ... used my social Sudanese networks, sometimes agents, different ways ... to get a job.

Unemployment and underemployment engender a loss of personal status and identity, and are a waste of human resources. Comments made by Australian Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner confirm the difficulties Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees face in gaining access to jobs:

I am now encountering African-Australians with high level qualifications from Australian universities who can’t find jobs ... Their degrees are from Melbourne, not Mogadishu ... finding it just as hard to find employment.

To overcome systemic barriers to integration and negative media reports, many Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees have been engaged in disseminating accurate information via their community radio stations using vernacular (Amharic, Arabic, Swahili) languages, journalistic articles in multicultural newspapers and joining larger umbrella bodies such as The Horn of Africa Community Network. The strengthening communities of former refugees from...

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the Horn of Africa have thus given voice and visibility to their grievances to alert authorities to these barriers which may otherwise go unrecognised. Abdullah reiterates the importance of raising awareness in the broader Australian community:

*It depends on the mainstream society, their willingness. The will to do, to take off the barriers they set up. If they do, I can say we are fully integrating. I do feel I am an Australian but I don’t feel integration because I don’t have the same job, same opportunity ... For full integration, you give the same opportunities, rights and jobs as our qualifications. This will go far for integration.*

**Conclusion**

Resettlement and integration among refugees from Africa in Australia present unique challenges to Australia’s Humanitarian program. The present research on the experiences of 12 Africans from the Horn of Africa and Sudan in metropolitan Melbourne - has shown that the delivery of resettlement programs does not meet their integration needs. Thus, although the Australian Humanitarian program welcomed these former refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan, the difficulties they have faced in gaining meaningful employment and settling in Australia, has put the blame on themselves for lack of integration – according to the perspective of Kevin Andrews - rather than blaming the government for failing to address the diversity of issues facing these refugees upon settlement. Contrary to the media portrayals, the reality is that resettlement programs – particularly proficiency in English and access to employment opportunities - do not facilitate Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees in overcoming economic and social barriers, becoming self-sufficient and meeting their aspirations. Thus resettlement services unintentionally diminish their capacity to become independent and integrate into the larger Australian community.

There is a danger that if these systemic barriers are not overcome, these former refugees are likely to fall below the poverty line and remain on the periphery of the mainstream Australian society instead of being meaningfully and successfully integrated. This could merely serve to perpetuate the perception that they have difficulty integrating. Resettlement services need to broaden their focus to ensure that their policies are more inclusive: socially and economically thus ensuring that erroneous perceptions such as those portrayed by the media do not marginalise Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees. This necessarily means that there is need for a better understanding of the realities and perceptions: – whether the current programs meet the needs of Horn of Africa and Sudanese refugees – and ultimately, give them a voice in future investigations. Hopefully, such positive steps will enable African Australians to participate fully in the economic, social, cultural and political fabric of Australian society.
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MEMBER PROFILE

Australia Day 2009 Academic Contribution to Community Award
Dr. Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe

As part of Australia Day celebrations in the Goulburn Valley (City of Greater Shepparton, North Eastern Victoria, Australia) Dr. Nsubuga-Kyobe, was named as a recipient of the Academic Contribution to Community Award. Apollo was born and completed all his earlier studies in Uganda and he worked there for several years before arriving in Australia in 1986. Since Dr. Nsubuga-Kyobe completed his PhD in 1996, he has been a lecturer in business management, at the Shepparton Campus of La Trobe University. The award was in recognition for his involvement in academic research, workshops, and seminars that benefit and support integration of marginalised communities, particularly those of Sub-Saharan background, across the Goulburn Valley, and other parts of Australia and internationally. He has made significant contributions to the settlement of migrants in Australia, in particular to refugees, humanitarian entrants, family re-union members, and skilled migrants. He takes part in local, regional, state, and national migrant consultative and advocacy forums for the said cohorts of people in these communities. Among other important roles in his community, Apollo is the Vice-President of the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific, and is now on the editorial board of ARAS. He has presented a number of conference papers and has also previously published a number of articles in the pages of ARAS and other journals, including –


Congratulations to Dr. Apollo Nsubuga-Kyobe on his achievements and recognition in the Australia day awards 2009.
A Happy World

They say milk and honey flows
In the land where it snows
They say it is a happy world
Free from hunger and poverty

Is there any happiness in those old
Wrinkled faces living in isolation?
The bag ladies and the drunks
Who fall by the road side?

Windows and doors must be shut
To stay warm and healthy
I do not even know the neighbour next door
They pass by each other without a word
They are unfriendly and cold
Like the unfriendly cold weather.

I Long To Be Home

From where will I start this story?
For my feelings can I no longer tell
My dialect can I no longer speak
For there is no one to talk to

How I long for the African sun
How I long for the culture I have always known
The naked children playing
Together in the neighbourhood happily

The dutiful wives with heavy loads
On their heads as they rush home
To prepare evening meals
The drumbeats from the village square
When maidens learn new dance steps

How I long to be home.

Poems by Ozowuba Goldlyn Ugonna

A Better Place

Her body is tired and weary
Her face wrinkled and weird
Her life filled with agony and misery
For he has saddled her with many births

When will he stop
Using her as a slave?
When will he stop
Using her as a punch bag?

She is famished in body
She is famished in soul
When will she be free
From this slavery?
When will her world
Be a better place?
BOOK REVIEWS


A new book by Anthony Low is an event in African and imperial studies. His major new monograph from Cambridge University Press, Fabrication of Empire: the British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902, does not disappoint. This is an important work of original and creative scholarship written with not only a deep knowledge of African history, but drawing from the latest international literature on ‘empire’. The very opening words of the book – ‘Many moons ago I published a number of items on the history of Uganda and East Africa…’ – signals that we are in the hands of a master historian of narrative, who also happens to be a consummate social scientist centrally concerned with analysing power within the international history of ‘empire’. For many of us ‘Uganda’ has long been seen through the scholar lens of Anthony Low’s writings. He was among the seminal influences in establishing African history as a history in its own right. Of his eight major books, four deal with Uganda and East Africa in the heyday of empire and after; and his study of ‘Buganda in Modern History’ (1971) is justly seen as a classic in how African history might be written. Anthony Low is also among the very few of us who has also published extensively on the history of South Asia - notably on the 20th century British Raj and Indian nationalism - as well as offering the even rarer comparative historical perspective, on how empires actually worked in African and India. Lion Rampant (1973) and Eclipse of Empire (1991) indicated just why he was such an outstanding incumbent of the ‘Smuts Chair’ at Cambridge.

Throughout a remarkable corpus of scholarship there has been a distinctive voice, one concerned with the role played by local societies and indigenous communities - as well as with the high policy politics of the official ‘imperial mind.’ Low’s penetrating review article on that major scholarly project, the multi-volume Oxford History of the British Empire, justly praised its span and synoptic breadth: but he asked, in his usual measured way, where was the full account of role of Africans and Asians themselves in the grand narrative of Pax Britannica? ‘Fabrication of Empire’ contains Anthony Low distilled wisdom on Africa, and the European ‘Scramblers’ for its resources and polities. The focus is apparently narrow in topic and time: how and why the British were able to dominate the 20 to 30 African kingdoms which sprawled across the interior of East Africa at the turn of the last century. But, he then turns this close analysis into a rich and deeply rewarding work of broad modern history.

He does this in three engaging ways. First, he locates the whole story within a comprehensive and nuanced set of reflections on the historiography of Africa.
and empire, going back to the heyday of the ‘Robinson and Gallagher revolution’ of the 1960s which first conceptualised the workings of ‘the official mind of imperialism,’ through to the more Afrocentric writings of the New History - which aimed to explore social experience from the bottom up, or at least from the ‘periphery’ of the colonial environments (and of ‘area studies’). The very latest scholarship on international or world history is finally surveyed for its insights on how the story might be seen within the global unfolding of Great Power ‘empires.’

Next, Low carefully and helpfully discriminates between the forces of what he calls the agency of ‘large scale imperialism’ (which reflect the interests and power of the metropolitan European states) and that which he evocatively terms ‘ground level imperialism.’ The distinction becomes vital for his narrative and his analysis. It was local external agency, interacting with local indigenous societies, which determined history: here was how empire actually happened in Africa. And it happened, he argues, through a series of discernable and sequential steps, with each open to its own variables. “By the 1890s,” as he writes in his concluding chapter, “with adjustments to meet differing [African] circumstances, this sequential procedure became the stock-in-trade of British ‘ground level imperialism’ in the region. It owed nothing to ‘the official mind’ whose officials never expressed any interest in it, let alone offered any comment upon it. By the end of the decade it had, however, played a major role in fabricating the five principal political entities that set the pattern for the future of Uganda as a whole” (p. 340).

Finally, the Low narrative draws us into the world of the local African kingdoms as he works to reconstruct not only how they were composed, how the leaders operated and what kinds of individuals were involved, but how their ‘external diplomacy’ (my phrase) operated to deal with a changing political landscape within a complex past history of intra-kingship alliances and conflicts. ‘Divide and rule’ becomes far too simple and reductionist explanatory paradigm to explain the subtle and complex shifts in these local polities as African societies dealt with newcomers. Without that complex inner history of the kingdoms, as the book shows with all the power of close argument, it is not possible to offer a satisfying account of the formation of the British Imperial Protectorate over Buganda in June 1894. Nor indeed to understand the modes of imperial overlordship and new African polity formation down to 1902 and beyond.

Here is surely one of the best accounts we have yet had of that ‘ground level imperialism’ as it impinged on African political and social dynamics in the pre-colonial history of the great continent; and also of the complex processes which were involved in African societies as the agencies of the West began their various ‘missions’ of incorporation, conquest and exploitation. The analysis
thus resembles a minutely reconstituted African jigsaw-puzzle of social change and colonial ‘fabrication.’

Yet it is also the most human of narratives. There is the wonderful vignette of Apolo Kagwa’s mission to imperial Britain in 1902 (which included special guest status at the Coronation of Edward VII in Westminster Abbey); but more still, there is the poignant account of what ultimately happened to this key East African leader when he later fell foul of the new British Provincial Commissioner for Buganda. Kagwa protested to the Colonial Secretary in London that, “as the Principal Agent in…introducing the British Government into this country…I naturally expected to be treated by His Majesty’s Government with special and personal consideration.” It was to no avail: “Despite his services he found himself reduced at the end to no more than the ranks of a colonial subject. That left him with no option but to resign. He died shortly afterwards” (p. 345).

Imperial overlordship had increasingly become colonial control: taxes and interventions ultimately denoted the Ugandan experience along with much of the rest of ‘British Africa’. As Anthony Low concludes: “For those caught in its embrace it comprised a state to be endured as well as one could, prior to the means to be rid of it.”

Much of the richness and originality of this study comes from a command of both the voluminous existing historical literatures, as well as pioneering work in the major research collections in Britain and in East Africa itself – ranging from the Uganda National Archives in Kampala, to the less obvious Anakola correspondence in Mbabaru, the Buganda Residency papers, the Nsambya diary with the Mill Hill Fathers Mission (Nsambya), as well as the precious Zanzibar collections, originally researched in the Beital-Ajaib deposit (and now held in the National Archives, Zanzibar Museum). The evocative cover photograph of ‘Sir Harry Johnston, Kabaka Chwa of Buganda and their entourages, 1900’ comes from the ‘DA Low Collection.’ Fine books encourage greedy readers to want ‘more.’ In this case I would have been delighted to find an ‘intra-African’ comparative chapter - where the ‘Low Model’ could be taken to illuminate other dimensions of the famed ‘African Scramble’ and the consequent European partition/occupation. An obvious link exists through Lugard to West Africa and the politics of ‘Interventionist Indirect Rule’ in the decades after the Great War. Less obviously, there is Africa’s Deep South and the workings of empire in settler Africa, where ‘imperialism on the ground’ was rampant. Just how the Nguni and Ndebele kingdoms experienced and handled the coming of the Western agencies has in fact been much explored by historians over recent decades.

Here is a ready dialogue with Anthony Low’s ‘Fabrication’ in East Africa. Those comparisons and connections still await study in the macro history of
African Empire. For those who are not expert in Uganda history on the ground, the volume contains several valuable and expert ‘sketch maps’ drawn by Michael White of the ANU. It also has a compendious Index; and real footnote references at the foot of the page. Apart from the steep retail price, Cambridge University Press has produced an elegant text to match the bold and engrossing quality of this outstanding book in African Studies.

Deryck Schreuder
The University of Sydney


Jok Madut Jok has written extensively on Sudan’s north-south civil wars. In this volume he explores the question of how Sudan’s numerous regional conflicts are inter-related. Jok’s method of analysing the many civil conflicts that have afflicted Sudan since independence employs the lens of the struggle between the northern Sudanese government and the southern Sudan and brings, to the study of Sudan generally, a perspective that illustrates all too clearly how the struggle for power is at the heart of the civil conflicts that have plagued the largest country in Africa. With this framework, Jok is able to make a persuasive argument that the atrocities committed in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and the Northern and Eastern Sudan have at their core the issue of power retention by a narrow Khartoum elite. Jok explores the militarisation of politics as the response of this elite to forestall efforts at widening and nationalising the political sphere to include southerners, westerners and other peripheral groups. Additionally, the study is able to show that the numerous conflicts that afflict Sudan share significant similarities. The descriptions of the southern ‘campaign’ conducted by the Sudanese army and the *murahileen* over the twenty years of the most recent north-south conflict compare closely with the way that the military and the *janjaweed* have operated in Darfur. In fact, as Jok shows, the military strategy employed against the Nuba in the late 1980s and 1990s, and more recently in Darfur, is identical to that employed in the southern Sudan.

However, this study becomes somewhat less persuasive when Jok attempts to explain the conflicts as sharing a common racial and religious dimension. There is much documented evidence that the Sudanese ruling elite has systematically (and institutionally, an important point Jok makes) discriminated against southerners on the basis of their ‘Africanicity’ and the religious divide between north and south. Whether this is true of the relationship between Khartoum and the Islamised Nubians of Northern Sudan and the Muslims of Darfur is less apparent. With little supporting evidence that the violence against the Nubians and the various ‘non-Arab’ communities of Darfur was constructed around racial and religious differences, these sections of the book
are less convincing. The Sudanese government’s attitude towards various non-Arab communities in the northern Sudan is not as clear as it is in relation to the southern Sudan. With much disagreement over the labels of ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ in the northern Sudan the study needed to provide examples of the same motivations of racial and religious prejudice (that reside in the north toward the south) as existing in other Sudanese conflicts. The reason for the lack of evidence is that, in fact, a very complex history of ethnic and religious relations in the northern Sudan exists and these identities cannot be neatly divided into Muslim and non-Muslim or Arab and African, as has been evident in the case of the north-south conflict. The conflict in Darfur is a case in point.

I agree with the author that the conflict in Darfur cannot be separated from racial and religious factors, and that the main causes of the wars in Sudan are politically motivated, but the nature of the racism and religious bigotry employed in the north is different from the south, as are the political causes of the war. Relapses into a simplified view of the alliance formed between the Sudanese government and the janjaweed as determined by shared identity (p.122) does not cohere with a number of the more persuasive passages in the book which argue for a more politically nuanced representation of the conflict in Darfur.

Moreover, omissions from the study are important reminders of the problem of utilising a single lens to tell a story in such a heterogeneous country as the Sudan. Numerous internal conflicts between various factions of the ruling Arab Muslim elite have resulted in brutal repression and bloodshed, including the military assault on the stronghold of the Umma Party by the Nimeiri government in 1970, which left thousands dead including the spiritual leader of the Ansar. More recent repressions of political dissidents and opponents in northern Sudan represent further illustrations of how the racial and religious approach tends to obscure the deeper issues of political violence.

Overall, despite its shortcomings, the book presents a much needed corrective to the literature on Darfur, which has, on the whole, tended to isolate the civil war from the intricacies of Sudanese national politics. The strength of this study is that it continually highlights the tragedy faced by Sudanese minorities dominated by the Khartoum-based ruling elite since independence. This Khartoum ruling elite has used the structure of the colonial state to suffocate the political and economic opportunities of the rest of the country. When the peripheries have rebelled in resentment, brutal repression and counter-insurgency against rebel soldiers and civilian populations alike has been the governmental strategy of choice. It is in the way that these features of Sudanese politics have been highlighted by Jok that makes this book an important contribution to the literature on Sudan.

Noah Bassil
Macquarie University

Raymond Suttner was a long-term underground activist for the ANC in the years of struggle and spent a period in jail as a political prisoner. Since 1994 he has moved to academic positions and written a number of accounts of the struggle period, one focusing on his period of incarceration. Recently he has taken a critical position on the leadership of the ANC, raising concerns about both Mbeki and Zuma, especially in a series of blogging posts. This volume is historical in character and he has largely written himself out of it, but in it can be read some of his recent concerns about the directions the ANC is taking.

The main contention of this book is Suttner’s challenge to the view that the ANC was effectively suppressed after its banning in 1960, reviving only in the wake of the Soweto uprising of 1976. He finds instead that activity continued in many ways during that period, and traces its origins to the M-Plan adopted in 1953 when a period of greater repression was foreseen. The plan (the implementation of which he indeed attributes largely to Mandela rather than the ANC youth leader AP Mda) put in place a structure of cells throughout the country, consisting in urban townships of “roughly ten houses on a street” (p. 25). The plan, and the propaganda activities flowing from it, became “embedded in people’s consciousness and formed the basis for organizing underground units after 1960” (p. 29).

Part of the story thereafter was the forging of alliances at local level between the ANC and the South African Communist party, with Moses Kotane given much of the credit for that; another part was the relationship between Black Consciousness (BC) and the ANC, which Suttner argues convincingly was “much more fluid and coextensive than is generally allowed” (p. 80). Of course these political tendencies competed too, and the reason why the ANC had a better chance of survival than BC “was its emphasis on building structures” (p. 82). Throughout the whole period the ANC “remained a cultural presence in many houses” (p. 82).

Probably the most interesting parts of the book are those dealing with the details of underground activity – the ways in which cells worked to distribute literature, arrange meetings, transmit funds, support MK operations and so on. The role of women is covered extensively and the tensions of subjugating the self to the liberation organisation are well worked over. Revolutionary morality demanded hard choices of individuals. Repression and sexual exploitation were found, though Chris Hani as in other accounts again appears as an exemplary leader with a “conception of the revolution [that] encompassed a real concern for the personal” (p. 146). Suttner is inclined throughout to question dichotomies, and in conclusion maintains that “the assumption of a choice
between externally initiated guerilla warfare and internal political resistance
does not correspond to the way in which resistance politics were carried out”
(p. 168).

Tucked away before this summary point are his glosses on the negative
tendencies that lurked in the exigencies of the liberation struggle; these, he
suggests, have found ongoing life after the winning of the battle. In a rapid
survey of recent South African politics, Suttner characterises the 2007 ANC
conference as “engaged in a contestation not over ideas so much as for spoils”
(p. 137) and denies that the subjugation of the individual required in the period
of struggle can be justified today, as increasingly it seems to be. Suttner relies
much less on published or archival documents than on oral testimony (the book
has no bibliography though it is extensively footnoted), and an appendix lists
56 interviews conducted between 1992 and 2005. He spends some space in
justifying his approach and in dealing with the issues involved (not least his
identity as a white South African) and this is an important part of a volume that
makes a real contribution to our knowledge of a period still to be fully
recovered.

Geoffrey Hawker
Macquarie University

Bronwen Manby. Struggles for Citizenship in Africa. London and New
(paperback).

Struggles for Citizenship is an extensive account of a politically, economically
and socially burning issue - of who belongs to an African state and hence is
eligible to entitlements such as welfare grants, the right to vote, or simply the
right to have legal status within the country of residence. The author, a lawyer
and human rights activist, diversifies the topic not only according to legal rights
within a state’s territory, but by introducing the reader to issues of expulsion
and denationalization. The various case studies on Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire,
Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda, though just a short selection, are an excellent
introduction to the relatively complex topic of an elitist exclusion of humans -
defined by those in power. Manby highlights the difficulties of so called non-
citizens, focusing on gender issues as well as states’ discriminating policies
towards people who have the ‘wrong’ ethnicity, were born at the ‘wrong’
places and so on. Due to the quite intricate settings that originated during
colonial times, and during post-colonial conflicts, millions of Africans are,
according to Manby, officially state-less.

The author's analysis does not, however, extend much beyond legal issues.
Essentially her interrogation of power relations and power distributions in 53
different entities does not enter the sphere of a critical analysis. It is a matter of political, economic and social (anti-) development that, as the UNHCR estimates, 15 million people worldwide are regarded as stateless. But to be stateless is only one part of an overall situation of powerlessness people have to face. And this constitutes a vicious circle; stateless people are powerless and hence voiceless. Exactly at this point, a thorough analysis on statelessness, which earns the title ‘struggle,’ should start! Social relations of exclusion and inclusion, of belonging to a state and of being stateless, are processes which can’t be understood solely from a legal perspective. It is the horizontal process of inclusion, of benefits which also rely on the will to share and distribute limited resources, economic wealth and also of course political participation, which starts in the mindset of humans. Her analysis lacks this kind of an in-depth level of questioning power relations in the ‘African’ context.

One could assume that the book partly oversimplifies these (pre-) struggle settings for citizenship. From a legal perspective it certainly makes sense to argue that being a citizen is a human right, but nevertheless constitutions, courts, and the judiciary in general comprise only one component of the state failure to entitlements, and not only for non-citizens. The book would gain from more in-depth analyses of one state instead of defining overall patterns of why states deny citizens’ rights to many of their residents. From this perspective, Manby shows that many African states have the same policies towards non-citizens. Nevertheless, the struggles of white Zimbabweans to acquire dual citizenship are qualitatively very different from those of black South Africans who cannot even apply for citizenship because they lack the financial means to have their photos taken for their ID books.

Hermine Stelzhammer
Macquarie University
**Book Note**


Funded partly by the Australian government through AusAID, this well illustrated and easy-to-read guide is designed to encourage community-based action on alcohol problems. Examples are drawn mainly from South Africa, though some Australian examples of remedial action are also included, and the authors suggest that many of the ideas can be used in tackling the abuse of other drug substances. The tone is inclusive and practical – thus in working with a local action group “you need to find out what people get upset about, and what they will tolerate. Looking at local attitudes helps you avoid just criticising the drinkers… Sometimes people who drink are not included on committees or groups. You should make sure both sides have their say” (p. 76). The volume is tabbed to its different sections – history, alcohol as a substance, mobilize!, farm action, urban action, services, stories, handouts (for group information and discussion). This is a practice-oriented volume but it gives insight too into current social problems and suggests that government policies have severe limits that can only be made good, if at all, at the community level.
AFSAAP Postgraduate Essay Prize: Guidelines and procedures

(Updated 2009) Any student enrolled in a tertiary institution may submit a paper read at the AFSAAP Postgraduate Workshop or the annual conference for consideration for the AFSAAP Annual Conference Postgraduate Prize. The paper must be related to African Studies. Research proposals are not eligible. Written papers should be submitted as hard copy and electronic copies (in Word format) at the time of presentation to the conference convener, that is, during the course of the conference. The paper submission must be an essay in its complete form. The written paper should not exceed 3000-4000 words and should be written in a style acceptable for publication in an academic journal. Papers should be submitted on A4 paper with double or one-and-half point line spacing and a 12 point Arial font typeface. Standard conventions for academic publishing should be followed. All papers should be accompanied by a declaration that the paper is the student's own work. Revision of work taking account of a lecturer's marking is valid, but papers should NOT have been submitted to formal review by or for an editor of a book, journal or working paper series. Papers will be judged by a panel selected by the Executive Committee, to include, at least, two senior academic members of the Association. The decision of the panel is final, and if in their opinion, no entry is regarded as of high enough standard, they may decide not to award a prize.

Papers will be assessed according to the following criteria:

a) definition and justification of the topic and/or problem within the broader context;
b) understanding of the topic - including use of appropriate references;
c) analysis of key issues - including presentation of argument, discussion and conclusion;
d) level of scholarship - including originality and/or contribution to knowledge;
e) clarity of writing and structure; and
f) accuracy - including completeness and consistency in presentation and referencing.

All entrants will be advised of the successful postgraduate, and a notice will be placed in the Australasian Review of African Studies publication subsequent to a decision having been made by the judges. The winner of the award will be given assistance to publish their essay in the Australasian Review of African Studies (in the first instance), a fully refereed journal. A cash prize of $100 will be awarded.

Submissions: One hard copy must be submitted to the Conference Convener after presentation at the conference, and an electronic copy of your submission should be forwarded to the AFSAAP Secretary secretary@afsaap.org.au at the time of the conference.
ARAS GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Australasian Review of African Studies aims to contribute to a better understanding of Africa in Australasia and the Pacific. It is a fully refereed inter-disciplinary journal that seeks to provide critical, authoritative and accessible material on a range of African affairs that is interesting and readable to as broad an audience as possible, both academic and non-academic.

The Australasian Review of African Studies (ARAS) is published by the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) twice a year in June and December. As the only journal in Australia devoted to African affairs ARAS aims to maintain an accepted and respected focus for the academic study of Africa in Australia. The ARAS is available to all members of the African Studies Association of Australia and the Pacific as part of their membership. Membership is open to anyone interested in African affairs, and the annual subscription is modest.

ARAS will consider for publication:
- Scholarly articles: original, research-based articles between 1000-6000 words. Please include all relevant material such as graphs, maps and tables.
- Generalist articles, opinion pieces or debates between 1000-6000 words, relevant to African studies, African politics, society, economics, religion, literature or other relevant areas of interest to AFSAAP members.
- Field Notes of 1000-2000 words: any African field work experiences or observations that would make an interesting contribution to the field of African studies. Please submit any photos that might be relevant.
- Book reviews between 300-1000 words.
- Review Essays between 1000-2000 words
- Short notes / news / comments on reports 300-1000 words

For all contributions please use the Chicago style referencing system (Footnotes, and include a bibliography in alphabetical order). Full details and guidelines for authors available from www.afsaap.org.au/ARAS/ARAS.htm

The Deadline for Submissions to
Vol 31 No. 1 June 2010 – A Special Edition on Africans in Australia
- Submit articles for peer review before December 31st 2009 and submit all Notes and News before April 15th 2010 to ARAS editor@afsaap.org.au
- All book reviews should be completed and sent to the reviews editor Geoffrey Hawker co-editor@afsaap.org.au before April 1st 2010.

Further deadlines are posted on the AFSAAP website www.afsaap.org.au
The African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) welcomes new members of the association. Formed in 1979, AFSAAP is the Asia-Pacific region’s peak representative body on African studies, with over 150 members from many diverse areas of research and representation.

AFSAAP’s principal aims and objectives are:

- to promote research and teaching of African Studies in Australia and the Pacific;
- to facilitate contact among scholars and students in the field of African Studies through conferences, regional meetings, and publications;
- to coordinate African Studies programs and the acquisition of African materials by Australian and Pacific libraries;
- to contribute towards an understanding of Africa in the community at large;
- to serve as the professional body representing Africanists' interests to governments and the community;
- and to establish contact with African universities and scholars, other overseas scholars and African Studies associations, and to promote interchanges with them.

AFSAAP members receive regular email bulletins advising of conferences, employment and research opportunities, new publications, and events related to the broad topic of African Studies. Members also receive copies of the Association’s peer-reviewed journal, *The Australasian Review of African Studies*, in addition to the regular newsletter, *Habari kwa Uupi*.

AFSAAP’s web site features a range of useful information and links, including downloadable copies of *The Australasian Review of African Studies*, information on forthcoming AFSAAP conferences (including papers and abstracts from previous conferences), a clickable map of Africa with links to AFSAAP members with regional expertise, contact information for the AFSAAP executive members, plus a host of other resources.

For further information and for details on how to join the association, please visit the AFSAAP web site – [www.afsaap.org.au](http://www.afsaap.org.au)