Gramsci in Africa:
The Relevance of Gramscian Concept to a History of Mozambique.

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The Project:

− The aim of this project is the development of a history of Mozambique encompassing what I deem its modern ‘period of struggle’ from the 1940s through to the mid-1990s, taking into account the complex interactions of local, national, regional and global dynamics. As a history, this project will be empirically grounded in historical and ethnographic details which have a strong evidential basis, but I also aim to interpret this history through a Marxist theoretical framework, and particularly to utilise Gramscian categories of analysis to illuminate processes working at these ascending scales.

− Antonio Gramsci\(^1\) was one of the most important Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century. An Italian writer, philosopher, political theorist, and a leader of the Communist Party of Italy in the 1920s and 1930s, he was imprisoned for eight years by Benito Mussolini’s fascist government, dying shortly afterwards but leaving more than 3,000 pages of analysis written during his imprisonment.\(^2\) Tens of thousands of books and articles have since been published regarding his work.\(^3\)

− This paper is essentially a prospectus concerning the viability of applying a Gramscian framework to the analysis of Mozambican history – a combination that I believe will be effective and enlightening.

Key Questions:

− Some key questions will be important for this historical analysis, most of which are already addressed in the historical literature, though not often from a Gramscian perspective. These include:

  − how Portuguese colonialism was effected by its place in the global political economy during the 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries;

  − how Portuguese colonialism impacted the development of classes and ethnicities in Mozambique during this period;

  − the class nature of the anti-colonial movements that challenged Portuguese rule, and the development of their ideological and strategic outlook in the context of the Cold War;

  − the character of national independence, and the class nature and ideological outlook of the FRELIMO government that ruled Mozambique from 1974 onwards;


\(^3\) See the International Gramsci Society, [http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org](http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org), and Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, [http://www.fondazionegramsci.org/5_gramsci/ag_bibliogramsci.htm](http://www.fondazionegramsci.org/5_gramsci/ag_bibliogramsci.htm).
the implementation of FRELIMO policies within Mozambique, and how these interacted with local political structures (essentially the nature of the 'Mozambican Revolution');

− the class nature and ideological outlook of the RENAMO rebel group that challenged FRELIMO rule from 1980 onwards, and the dynamics of the Mozambican Civil War;

− how the context of political, military, economic and ideological changes in the global political economy throughout the period impacted upon these dynamics;

− the impact of specific superpower policies in Southern Africa throughout this period;

− the place of regional superpower South Africa within the global political economy;

− and, how the interests and policies of Apartheid South Africa impacted Mozambique.

Theoretical Influences:

− The answers to these questions will be informed by Marxist theoretical perspectives on the nature of economic classes, the state, and the global history of the twentieth century. Despite (or perhaps because of) the collapse of the Soviet Union over twenty years ago, there is today a vibrant culture of debate and analysis of key issues of global history and international relations within Marxist academic circles.

− Exuberant debates are currently driving research in key areas such as the relationship between capitalism and the international state system, the nature of neoliberalism, global American hegemony, ‘uneven and combined development’, and the nature of social revolutions. My work will be heavily influenced by theorists such as David Harvey\(^4\), Giovanni Arrighi\(^5\), Alex Callinicos\(^6\), Neil Davidson\(^7\), Jamie Allinson and Alex Anievas \(^8\), and Julius


Rosenberg\textsuperscript{9}. Marxist examinations of modern African conditions are also being continued by analysts such as Patrick Bond\textsuperscript{10}, Peter Dwyer and Leo Zeilig\textsuperscript{11}, to whose work I also look. And a more specific Gramscian framework will be informed by the work of authors such as Adam David Morton\textsuperscript{12}, Anne Showstack Sassoon\textsuperscript{13}, Mark McNally\textsuperscript{14}, Mark Rupert\textsuperscript{15}, and Peter Thomas\textsuperscript{16}.

**Key Gramscian Concepts:**

- Some of the key concepts Gramsci developed, such as ‘hegemony’ and ‘civil society’, are today relatively familiar to political theorists, though are often mainstreamed and emptied of their critical content by removing them from the context of Marxist political economy and the overall structure of Gramsci’s analytical framework. Others remain less well-known. The following concepts will be central to my Gramscian framework:

**Uneven and Combined Development:**

- The theory of ‘Uneven and Combined Development’ attempts to unravel the complex dynamics of interaction that unfold across and between regions of the world with differing levels of economic development. Leon Trotsky wrote in 1928 that “the entire history of


\textsuperscript{14} Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel (eds), *Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance*, London: Routledge, 2009.


mankind is governed by the law of uneven development. Capitalism finds various sections of mankind at different stages of development, each with its profound internal contradictions. … Capitalism gains mastery only gradually over the inherited unevenness, breaking and altering it, employing therein its own means and methods”.

- So uneven development is a historical phenomenon arising from the different specific development paths of societies across the world. Morton describes Gramsci’s categorisation of this uneven development by the 20th Century as being dominated by the core capitalist states of the West, led by the Anglo-Saxon states; then states in their immediate periphery of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean (including Portugal); and, Gramsci writes, “the colonial populations become the foundation on which the whole edifice of capitalist exploitation is erected”.

- Neil Davidson explains that the concept of ‘combined development’ then arises from the fact that different stages of development do not simply coexist alongside each other, but are driven by capitalist dynamics to interact and cross-pollinate, giving rise to new ‘combined’ social formations which embody new internal social tensions. “The theory of uneven and combined development explained what occurs when the … ‘overleaping’ process takes place in the colonial or neo-colonial world, where it is impossible to fully ‘catch up’ with … the developed West, but to do so instead in a fragmentary or partial way. But the resulting combined forms, because of their inbuilt social instability, paradoxically made revolutionary outbreaks more likely than in the developed world”.

Hegemony:

- Hegemony (from the Greek hēgemonía, meaning leadership and rule) is another core Gramscian concept, referring to the position of supremacy within the social system. Giovanni Arrighi notes that, “Whereas domination rests primarily on coercion, the leadership that defines hegemony rests on the capacity of the dominant group to present itself, and be perceived, as the bearer of a general interest. … Hegemony is … the additional power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the dominant group’s interests, but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest”.

- As Frédérick Dufour writes, Hegemony thus “depends on the capacity to articulate and orient common sense at the national and global levels through powerful international institutions and material capabilities … [and] relies both on coercion and consent”.

- At a national level this struggle for hegemony occurs politically and culturally within what Gramsci called the ‘integral state’, a fusion between political and civil society. Bieler and Morton explain that Gramsci’s ‘integral state’ is not just the government, political parties, the judiciary and military, but also includes civil society institutions such as churches, the media, and education, through which hegemony functions. “It is through state-civil society...
relations, then, that particular social classes may establish hegemony over contending social forces. By constituting a ‘historical bloc’, that represents more than just a political alliance but indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests, hegemony may be propagated throughout society”.

The Historical Bloc:
− This brings us to Gramsci’s concept of the ‘historical bloc’ which he defined as “the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures [that are] the reflection of the social relations of production”\(^{24}\), which encompasses what Marxists have termed the economic ‘base’ and the ideological ‘superstructure’ in a dialectical relationship – thus uniting the elements that classical social sciences have divided into ‘economy’, ‘culture’ and ‘politics’.\(^{25}\) Some might thus classify the contemporary global historical bloc as ‘neoliberal’, and highlight how this is variously embodied not only in economic relations, but in government policies, social institutions, ideology and culture.
− Rather than representing a vulgar Marxist model of economy simply determining social structures, Morton writes that Gramsci, “acknowledged that so-called ‘superstructural’ factors have a degree of independent autonomy. ... There was a ‘necessary reciprocity’ between the social relations of production and ideas within the realm of state–civil society relations”.\(^{26}\) “A historical bloc therefore indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests and forms of identity within a ‘national–popular’ alliance ... Only when hegemony has been established by a social group across the domain of state–civil society relations, ... ‘can it represent a fully developed and maximally extended historical bloc’”.\(^{27}\)
− The hegemonic relationship within the historical bloc is constantly contested and reconstructed, as the state imposes various concessions on the dominant classes in order to ensure their long-term domination against counter-hegemonic forces.\(^{28}\) Thus Morton argues that the history of subaltern classes can also be studied by identifying how their mentalities and ideologies have been co-opted and their counter-hegemonic contestations contained within the structures of the historical bloc.\(^{29}\)

Common Sense:
− The subjective consciousness of the subaltern classes is heavily influenced what Gramsci calls ‘Common Sense’. This describes the disjointed systems of analytical approximation and myth that often dominate the understandings of subordinate social groups. Hegemonic narratives must be coherent however, Kate Crehan writes, “for Gramsci, the cultural worlds

\(^{27}\) Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci*, p97.
\(^{29}\) Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci*, pp174-175.
of subalterns are anything but systematic. ... [He] saw subaltern culture as an incoherent jumble that had piled up over time in a piecemeal fashion”.  

− Augelli and Murphy explain that the coherent hegemonic ideology does not in itself become ‘Common Sense’, but gradually permeates Common Sense, combining in a heterogeneous fashion with the ‘stratified deposits’ of previous beliefs and values. “Common sense, to Gramsci, is therefore not only the product of the competing philosophies of the moment, but also the result of fragmentary, incoherent sedimentation of the historical philosophies which follow each other in succession within the specific cultural environment of the social group considered. ... [It] reflects a synthesis of all the prior social relationships that have bound people together”.  

Organic Intellectuals:
− Common Sense must thus be transcended to create a viable counter-hegemonic ideology that is itself coherent. This role would fall to the strata of the subaltern classes that Gramsci defined as ‘organic intellectuals’. Gramsci saw all individuals as possessing intellectual capabilities, though only traditional intellectuals such as “priests, professionals, academics and others” were categorised as being professional intellectuals, and he believed these traditional intellectuals would often play the conservative role of supporting existing socioeconomic and political forms.
− His category of ‘organic intellectuals’ included others beyond the professional intellectual strata who were also involved in forming or contesting hegemony. Morton notes that these strata of organic intellectuals “therefore play an essential mediating function in the struggle over hegemony between social class forces, by acting as ... instruments of hegemony, or by performing a valuable supporting role for subaltern classes engaged in promoting social change”.  
− Thus, Augelli and Murphy write, “Gramsci believed that the passivity of the masses could be overcome by the catalytic role of intellectuals helping the popular masses acquire consciousness of their position in society and by offering workers and peasants alternatives to the present state of affairs”.  

Passive Revolution:
− Finally, Gramsci’s concept of ‘Passive Revolution’ is extremely important, and returns us to the context of ‘uneven and combined development’. Gramsci formulated the concept of ‘passive revolution’ in reference to the Risorgimento movement that unified Italy in 1861, and the rise of Fascism in Italy following the social upheaval of the First World War.  
− According to Partha Chatterjee, passive revolution encompasses “the ways in which capitalism is forced to revolutionise itself whenever hegemony is weakened or a social formation cannot cope with the need to expand the forces of production”. Thus the state takes the leading role in reconstituting capitalist class relations during these periods of

33 Augelli and Murphy, *America’s Quest*, p23.
crisis, which come about due to either domestic contradictions of capital accumulation, or
pressure from the international system.

− Gramsci thus wrote that the concept of passive revolution applies “to those countries that
  modernise the state through a series of reforms or national wars without undergoing a
  political revolution of a radical Jacobin-type”.36

− Morton argues that the international state system applied pressure on post-colonial states,
  and that “Imitative behaviour within such states coping with social crises generated by the
  circumstances of uneven and combined development therefore entailed attempts to create
  a modern state as the necessary precondition for the furtherance of capitalism … [involving]
  state-led attempts at developmental catch-up…”37 “Different historically peculiar national
  processes of passive revolution across the postcolonial world can therefore be traced as
  connected variants within the international conditions of world capitalism”.38

Gramsci in Mozambique:

− Gramsci’s theoretical structure thus provides an elegant and comprehensive framework that
dialectically connects the social scales of local, national and international, set within a deep
historical context of uneven global development and modern capitalist dynamics. It links
social, political, economic and cultural structures within nations, and describes the complex
interaction of varied dominant and subaltern forces in those societies.

− What would result from applying this analytical framework to Mozambican history? My
preliminary plan for applying a Gramscian analysis to Mozambique’s modern history
incorporates the following elements:

− In order to understand Mozambique’s own particular social formations, it will be necessary
to describe the deeper historical context of ‘uneven and combined development’ in which
Portugal and South Africa were situated as peripheral, combined states. These two states
were central to the formation of modern classes (and ethnicities) in Mozambique through
their integration of areas of the country into their respective economies, effectively making
Mozambique in the twentieth century a second-order combined state with areas of
industrial proletarianisation, rural proletarianisation, free peasantry, and effective slavery.

− Understanding the interaction of Portuguese colonialism with Mozambique’s existing social
formations will involve detailing: the variations in forms of Portuguese control imposed over
different regions; how these were influenced by the ideological context of Portuguese racial
and civilizational understandings, fascism, and subsequently Cold War bipolarity; the pre-
existing social and political formations within these regions; and the consequent social and
political transformations that resulted. Examining the history of endogenous social
formations and their interactions with these external influences will help to highlight local
sources of power and authority that survived amidst Portuguese control, and social and
cultural components that remained sedimented as ‘Common Sense’ amongst local
populations.

− It will be argued that Portugal’s control of Mozambique was, outside of the indigenous
urban petite-bourgeoisie and the students of Christian missionaries, primarily based on

36 Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, p67.
37 Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, p155.
38 Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, p71.
coercion or the co-option of existing social authorities. There was thus no overall project for ideological hegemony or the formation of a historical bloc which included indigenous elites, and only limited permeation of ‘Mozambican’ nationalism, as opposed to regional and ethnic identities.

– Resistance to Portuguese colonialism must then be situated within the context of external international pressures on Mozambique, such as the Great Depression, World War 2, the post-war boom, Cold War bipolarity, and widespread decolonisation; material assistance to anti-colonial forces from independent African states and communist powers, and assistance to Portugal from South Africa and Western states; and the ideological context of Pan-Africanism, and liberal and communist anti-colonialism.

– Detailing the make-up of Frelimo in terms of class, regional and ethnic background is useful in delineating sociological foundations for the political factionalism that would exist within Frelimo throughout this period. Though the material and ideational backgrounds of individuals are not completely determinate of their political alignment, these categories do help to identify broad trends and interests within the movement. The nature of Frelimo leaders as ‘organic intellectuals’ will be examined in this context.

– Frelimo’s actual ideological positions and factions will be identified and described, and placed within their global ideological context of the interacting conceptual currents of Third World nationalism, Afro-Socialism, Maoism, Trotskyism, and Soviet Communism.

– When Mozambican independence came, it followed long guerrilla campaigns in all of Portugal’s African colonies (and elsewhere), which contributed to revolution in Portugal itself. However, despite Frelimo’s noble projects of peasant radicalisation in liberated areas of northern Mozambique, it could not be said that independence resulted from a national mobilisation – with some areas of the country remaining virtually untouched by the movement and its propaganda. And it could be argued that amongst the population that did support the liberation struggle, much of this support was primarily due to anti-colonial rather than pro-Frelimo sentiment, and much local pre-independence war ‘common sense’ remained embedded. Thus, while domestically undisputed as Mozambique’s new government, Frelimo could not rightly assume widespread assent for their radical political programme.

– The ‘Mozambican Revolution’ will be examined within this context, as a dual project of transforming Mozambique’s political and economic structures, and establishing a new ideological hegemony around Frelimo’s modernising radical nationalism. While not disputing the good intentions and radical politics of the Frelimo leadership under Samora Machel, it will be argued that this project was objectively one of ‘passive revolution’ – a state-led project of developmental catch-up with the developed world, and one which remained completely dependent on its connections with capitalist South Africa and the global capitalist economy. This was a transition to state capitalism, rather than a transition to socialism.

– The hegemonic element to Frelimo’s project took a form more ideologically invasive than Portuguese colonialism, and was received with varying amounts of enthusiasm and resistance throughout Mozambique. Frelimo’s attacks on some tribal power structures, which they saw as remnants of collaboration with Portuguese colonialism, also alienated some elements of the population. Detailing how Frelimo’s developmental, political and ideological policies were received in different areas is important for understanding how
effective they were at establishing ideological hegemony, and why the subsequent civil war assumed some of the geographical and social aspects that it did. It will be argued that Frelimo’s hegemonic project would have eventually established Frelimo’s legitimacy and incorporated all areas of Mozambique into a national historical bloc, had it not been for external use of remaining differences to disrupt that project and stimulate the Mozambican Civil War.

The Mozambican Civil War will be examined in detail, drawing on my doctoral research, and subsequent research by myself and others. The role of South Africa in establishing and supporting the rebel group Renamo will be highlighted, along with Renamo’s use of tactics which variously connected with local ‘common sense’ and opposition to the Frelimo government in order to mobilise support, or decimated areas in order to completely disassemble existing social and political structures and replace them with domination through terror. This will be placed in the wider context of: Western support of anti-communist insurgencies, including intelligence agency and private support for rebels in Southern Africa; limited support for Frelimo from communist states; and the regional interactions of South Africa, independent African states, the West, Cuba, and the Soviet Union in the region. This will involve situating Southern Africa within the global perspectives of the superpowers, and examining their specific attitudes and policies in the region and how these played out.

As part of this it will be vital to situate events in Mozambique and Southern Africa within the context of the dramatic global changes that occurred in the 1980s, with the hegemonic economic structures turning towards neo-liberalism – effectively a global class project to re-establish dominance over the developing world, and to attack organised labour within the developed world. This process was overseen by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the core Anglo-Saxon states, and was promulgated throughout the world through global capital markets, commodity price shifts, the regulations and policies of the international financial institutions, and the ideological narratives of financial media and education.

By the mid-1980s the devastation of war with Renamo forced Mozambique to politically submit to the Nkomati Accords, formally abandoning logistical support for South African liberation forces (such as the ANC), and economically submitting to IMF Structural Adjustment policies in order to secure economic assistance. It will be argued that military and economic pressures in the 1980s led to the re-emergence of factional differences which had remained submerged up to this point, and a little-documented power struggle between these forces in the early 1980s. By 1986 the radical faction surrounding Samora Machel clung to power only tenuously, and Samora Machel’s death (perhaps as part of the factional struggle) shifted power to Joaquim Chissano and the faction that would oversee the introduction of neoliberal reforms and the abandonment of radical politics.

In the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition from Apartheid in South Africa, the West could then oversee the peace process in Mozambique, having effectively won the ideological battle and transformed Frelimo into a compliant ‘comprador’ state. With external assistance, Chissano’s Frelimo was then able to take the hegemonic project to a new stage, combining the rhetoric of multi-party liberal democracy with the existing mythology of Frelimo’s revolutionary past.

As an epilogue the complete failure of Western development policies in Mozambique, the corruption of the Frelimo elite under Armando Guebuza, the limited effectiveness of multi-
party democracy, and permeation of Mozambique by foreign capital, demonstrate the true nature of the political and economic changes that accompanied Frelimo’s submission to global ideological and economic hegemony: the destruction of any radical nationalism that attempted to privilege the needs of its own population above those of global capital; and the disempowerment and deprivation that really lie beneath the rhetorical narrative of the neo-liberal road to democracy and prosperity.