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EDITORIAL

Human Security in Africa

Tanya Lyons
Editor, Australasian Review of African Studies
President, African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific
School of History and International Relations, Flinders University
Research Fellow, Centre for Africa Studies,
University of the Free State, South Africa
editor@afsaap.org.au

This 38th volume of the Australasian Review of African Studies is published at a time when Africa has once again fallen off the map in terms of Australian foreign policy. Submissions to the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper have closed, and although we are yet to see the final report, a preliminary review of these submissions (from DFAT, 2017), which aim to inform and guide how Australia will engage with the rest of the world in the years ahead, clearly demonstrates a dearth of interest in Africa (although further research on these submissions is required). This is an unsurprising trend since 2008, the heyday of Stephen Smith’s and Kevin Rudd’s driving force behind Labor’s re-engagement with Africa - documented most adequately by Mickler and Lyons (2013).

However, this all came to a disappointing end with Tony Abbott’s Liberal-Coalition electoral victory in 2013, resulting in the demise of Ausaid, and the effective end of the Australia-Africa Awards, which saw up to 1000 African scholars studying in Australia in 2013, among other Africa policies. Thus, there was a massive change of focus away from Africa and back to our nearer ‘more important’ regions. As to the Liberal’s Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop, and her enjoyment of the spoils of Rudd’s obsession - to win a 2 year seat (2013-15) on the United Nations Security Council (which justified his re-engagement with Africa, as it depended on their votes to win, in the first place) - the irony of this has been noted elsewhere (see Bourke, 2014). What is important for AFSAAP here is that
despite the geographical topsy-turvy of Africa’s place on Australia’s global map, Africa remains a significant area of research for postgraduate students in Australia, and a number of academics continue to focus their research on Africa – from a variety of disciplines. The forthcoming (2017) Directory and Audit of African Studies in Australia and New Zealand will no doubt, continue to support this claim (AFSAAP, 2014). Indeed, we need to go no further than the recent PhD completion of our very own book’s review editor at ARAS, Nikola Pijovic (2016), to realise that the history of Australia’s relations with Africa, while often neglected, is always present (even if volatile) to some extent in our foreign policy dealings. The 2016 AFSAAP Annual Conference at the University of Western Australia is a further case in point. A significant proportion of presentations were from postgraduate researchers in this region (AFSAAP, 2016), and a number of excellent initiatives have emerged from this meeting, including the creation of African Narratives, which will make a significant contribution to communicating research and ideas on Africa. The forthcoming 2017 AFSAAP Conference will continue to support this emerging research, but asks the question, what is the future of African Studies in Australia and New Zealand, especially in this current climate (see the Call for Papers at the end of this issue).

The university sector continues to move the goal posts, and challenge the rationale of researchers, in particular the ‘if and where’ they publish. ARAS is the official publication of AFSAAP and remains independent from the corporate publishing world, but the so-called ‘listed’ journals that universities demand their academics only publish in, remain steadfastly connected to the corporate domain. Yet, ARAS is the logical journal for the publication of research on Africa and the African diaspora in this region. Indeed, ARAS continues to receive a high volume of article submissions, which have allowed us to expand and develop our publication outputs. We now have a team of editors working towards each issue and communicating with prospective authors. We cannot publish everything we receive, but we encourage all researchers with a focus on Africa to send their submissions to ARAS first.

This issue of ARAS focuses on the issues of human security in Africa, and begins with an examination of the devastating problems facing South Sudan. In his article “Why South Sudan’s problems stem from the abuse of sovereignty: The case for co-governance,” Samuel Makinda reveals that the main issue is with South Sudan’s sovereign statehood, and that a system of co-governance is required to restore sovereignty, and thus create security and stability. Makinda argues that this would not be neo-colonial, but would involve the African Union and the United Nations. International
society, claims Makinda, should have predicted and prevented these failures
of the world’s newest state, but ultimately the blame must be shared with
South Sudan’s leaders.

Terrorism is the most obvious threat to human security globally and how
states respond to the terrifying actions of non-state actors such as for
example, Islamic State, al Shabaab, or Boko Haram, will determine their
ongoing presence or hopeful demise. On this point, understanding such
groups’ motivations and impacts requires further research, and as such
academics and researchers will need to go into the field to explore these
threatening issues. Here, Iro Aghedo explores the relevance of ethics
requirements for academic research(ers) in such a field – in particular
where Boko Haram is operational in North Eastern Nigeria. Aghedo is an
expert on the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and has published widely, yet
in this article “Ethics and Its Discontents: Evidence from Terrorism
Research in North-Eastern Nigeria”, he reflects on the role of the researcher
and their ability to precariously balance the requirements of the academy,
and the safety of participants and the researcher in the field. Aghedo is
based at the University of Benin, and has developed here a manifesto for
ethical research on the impact of terrorism in North Eastern Nigeria.

Human security also requires access to health care, and where the state
can provide this, it must. Kwadwo Adusei-Asante contributes a fascinating
account of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), using
ethnographic research to explore the motivations behind individual’s
choices to join or opt out of this scheme, in his article entitled “Beyond
Minimisation of Personal Healthcare Financing Risks: An Ethnographic
Study of Motivations for Joining Ghana’s Health Insurance Scheme in
Daakye District.” Daakye District is a pseudonym for the research location
in Ghana. Adusei-Asante found that self-interest and family responsibilities
motivated individuals to maintain their NHIS membership, but that
collectivism was favoured, thereby requiring a review of the NHIS, such
that it might include a ‘family package’ subsidised by the government.
Furthermore, the recommendations include a specific focus on ensuring
women have “unhindered access to medical assistance,” for all of the
obvious reasons to do with their maternal health and responsibility for
dependents.

Access to education is another element of human security, because it
provides individuals with the keys to their own future. Lois Kidmas, Greg
Ashman and Megan Short, all from the University of Tasmania, have
conducted research on the experiences of Nigerian migrants to Australia, in
particular focusing on the teenage children of these migrants and how they
have adapted to their new local high-schools. This article compares the
pedagogical styles of both the Nigerian and Australian system, exploring the social, academic and cultural factors of the secondary schooling content in Australia, in the state of Tasmania in particular. The quote in this article’s title says it all – “‘My Friends Were There for Me.’ Exploring the Pedagogical Adaptations of Secondary Nigerian-Australian Students in Tasmania.” Having the opportunity to feel safe, develop friendships, and experience positive individual and group learning both in the classroom and through extra-curricular activities, were identified by these researchers as the key to adaptation. Kidmas, Ashman and Short’s report here should be essential reading for teachers and educators in Australia and across Africa.

Migration patterns globally reveal the erosion of human security. These pages of ARAS have previously shared much research on the settlement issues facing the African diaspora in particular in Australia and New Zealand. In this contribution Hanna Jagtenberg from the University of Adelaide, presents her research on “Afrikaner émigrés in Australia: Perception vs. Reality in Human Decision-Making”. This article was awarded the 2016 Cherry Gertzel/AFSAAP Postgraduate Prize for the best postgraduate research presented at the AFSAAP Annual Conference. Her ethnographic research, based on interviews with Afrikaner immigrants who came from South Africa to Australia after 1994, examines their reasons and motivations for leaving at the end of apartheid. Jagtenberg’s research is both sensitive and revealing as to the fears and perceptions of reality experienced by this cohort. She has conducted extensive fieldwork in Australia for her PhD, and this article provides a glimpse at her initial conclusions. One of the main focus points here is on the reactions to post-apartheid South Africa’s affirmative action policies, which seem to have encouraged many Afrikaners to migrate from South Africa for the sake of the survival of their offspring, despite the interesting fact that it was apparently based on ‘perception’ rather than actual experience of discrimination.

Finally, this issue ends with a discussion of the objects in which a child’s security is focused, and yet as Russell McDougall so beautifully illustrates, is no longer simply child’s play. In his analysis of the appearance of ‘Teddy’ Bears in Africa, McDougall takes us on a fascinating journey into the psychology and politics of the famous stuffed bear into and out of Africa. From the origins and spread of the Teddy Bear, through to the saga of the teaching and learning bear in Khartoum - not to mention the African adventures of Winnie the Pooh and Paddington Bear, and the creation of the Taurina bears in Cape Town – this article makes a valuable contribution to the globalization of human security discourse and literary studies.
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ARTICLES

Why South Sudan’s problems stem from the abuse of sovereignty: The case for co-governance

Samuel Makinda
School of Business and Governance, Murdoch University
S.Makinda@murdoch.edu.au

Abstract
The continuing political crisis in South Sudan has been explained almost exclusively in terms of internal power dynamics. This article goes beyond the domestic focus and examines the manner in which the imbroglio has exposed weaknesses in South Sudan’s sovereign statehood. It argues that it was the failure to uphold empirical and popular sovereignty that, in part, precipitated the problem. Therefore, it suggests that a resolution ought to involve a re-examination of the relationship between popular, empirical and juridical sovereignty. This article posits that a renegotiation of South Sudan’s sovereignty, involving co-governance, would deliver good governance, strengthen economic management, facilitate state-building, and enhance regional security.

Introduction
As I completed this article in early 2017, a large section of South Sudan’s population was facing serious famine, which partly stemmed from bad governance and the long-running civil war in which many people have been maimed, displaced from their homes or lost their lives (Prendergast 2017). The civil war has created political uncertainty, undermined confidence in the economy and destroyed some public institutions. Despite concerted efforts by leading African and international actors to end the conflict in the United Nation’s newest member, which achieved independence in July 2011, there are no indications that South Sudan will

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1 Fieldwork was conducted in January and July 2016 in East Africa, which included conversations with journalists, people who have worked with the South Sudanese government, and African as well as western diplomats.
enjoy peace soon. The regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN) have been involved in South Sudan’s political imbroglio since December 2013. Even the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and China have played various roles in mediating between the warring parties. These intensified diplomatic efforts produced an agreement on the resolution of the conflict in August 2015, but the major political players in the country, including President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Riek Machar, have not honoured this agreement (IGAD 2015). If the South Sudanese conflict was a human disease, doctors would have concluded that it was not responding to the medicines administered and suggested that those concerned look for a different approach.

Given the severity of the political, economic and humanitarian conditions in South Sudan, why haven’t international society and the country’s leadership found a lasting solution? Moreover, given the fact that the UN, the US, the EU, and other international actors have injected huge amounts of resources into South Sudan and yet nothing positive has come out of it, how should international society continue to be engaged with it?

Addressing these questions adequately requires a proper diagnosis of the problems. Based on some of the literature, South Sudanese conflict has been attributed to various domestic factors. For example, de Waal (2014b) has explained the crisis in terms of a militarised and corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance. A little earlier, Johnson (2014) had explained the crisis in terms of the tensions within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In addition, Pinaud (2014) has explained how strategies used by SPLA senior officers to constitute themselves into a new aristocracy, contributed to the generation of the crisis. All three articles are informative, well researched, and insightful. They deal with the impact of neo-patrimonial relations, the lack of transparency and public accountability, and the high level of corruption in the country, which have led to considerable public dissatisfaction with service delivery. In addition, they explain why the crisis is due to various weaknesses, including the

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2 As for the definition of the society of states, I refer to Bull (1977: 13) who argued: ‘A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions’. Unless stated otherwise, this is the definition of international society that I use in this article.
absence of transformative leadership, uncertainty over the future leadership of the SPLM, and the mismanagement of the state. At the same time, they rightly dismiss claims that the political imbroglio is predominantly a tribal fight between Kiir’s Dinka, the largest ethnic group in the country, and Machar’s Nuer, the second largest ethnic group. The above articles shed light on important sources of the crisis, but they are so focused on the internal dynamics that they pay little or no attention to South Sudan’s position in the global society of states.

This present article makes an original contribution to the debate on South Sudan’s problems through two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the most effective way of understanding the political crisis in South Sudan is through an analysis of the leaders’ mismanagement and abuse of the country’s sovereignty. As a member of international society, South Sudan has certain responsibilities, and its political leaders are expected to respect international norms, rules and institutions, including sovereignty and human rights. This article takes into account the internal power dynamics addressed by de Waal (2014a), Johnson (2014), and Pinaud (2014), but it posits that most of South Sudan’s continuing problems cannot be explained fully without reference to the abuse of sovereignty. There have been consistent and widespread attempts by South Sudan’s leaders to abuse the bases of sovereignty when they are expected to respect them. The second hypothesis is that South Sudan’s sovereignty could be resuscitated only through co-governance for a specified period. Co-governance would involve South Sudan and international society, including the UN and the AU, but it is not a form of neo-colonialism. A former US Special Envoy for South Sudan, Princeton Lyman, and a former director of USAID in South Sudan, Kate Almquist Knopf, have expressed similar views (Lyman and Knopf 2016). This hypothesis might be condemned by those who have been responsible for the abuse of South Sudan’s sovereignty, but it is a kind of bitter medicine, which they have to swallow, if South Sudan were to recover. As Lyman and Knopf (2016) have argued: “While a morally bankrupt and predatory elite will falsely characterise such an initiative as a violation of sovereignty, it is this very elite that has put the country’s survival at risk.”

Johnson (2014: 301) criticises the “fly-in-fly-out journalists” some of whom have described South Sudan largely in negative terms, claimed the country “became independent too early” and blamed this early independence on the USA. While I agree with the thrust of Johnson’s argument, I understand why anyone would claim that South Sudan got independence too early, but I would not blame it on the USA alone.
International society, including state and non-state actors, bears part of the responsibility for this development. Indeed, some of those negotiating for peace in South Sudan, including the AU and the UN, played roles in facilitating independence for South Sudan when its leaders were not ready to handle the responsibilities that came with independence. The former SPLM leader, the late John Garang, was circumspect about independence, but Kiir was determined to go for independence following Garang’s death in a helicopter crash in July 2005. Due to several decades of neglect under Khartoum’s rule, coupled with many years of civil war, and the unreliability of political leaders including Machar, the country had not built the human and institutional capacity required to govern a modern state (de Waal 2007). It lacked the capacity to exercise its sovereignty adequately. The leading political figures, including Garang, Kiir, and Machar, were more experienced in fighting wars than in building state institutions or crafting a political consensus outside the neo-patrimonial system (de Waal 2014b).

It could be argued that several generations of the South Sudanese population have seen more war than peace since the end of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the mid-1950s. They witnessed the Anya Nya guerrilla war of 1956-1972 when the south sought to secede after its demand for a federal system had been rejected (Johnson 2011; and Woodward 1989). They enjoyed a certain level of autonomy between 1972 and 1983. And then, there was another civil war spearheaded by the SPLM and its military wing, the SPLA, from 1983 to 2004. The fighting ended after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was negotiated between the Khartoum government and the SPLM in Kenya, and was concluded in early 2005. The CPA, which demonstrated some readiness on the part of the AU to interpret sovereignty more flexibly, established a political-legal framework within which Khartoum and South Sudan could negotiate their future peacefully, but some of its provisions have not been honoured, thereby generating some uncertainty. There are, indeed, three sets of variables, which, among other tribulations, have combined to weaken South Sudan’s sovereignty: bad governance, outstanding CPA issues, and the mismanagement of natural resources. South Sudan faces many problems, which cannot be resolved in a few years, but if these three sets of variables were addressed satisfactorily, the country would be stable, secure, and genuinely sovereign (de Waal & Mohammed, 2014).

To answer the questions raised earlier and elaborate on my hypotheses, I have divided the remaining part of this article into four sections. In the first section I discuss the nature of sovereignty and explain how it could be
applied to South Sudan. In the second section, I look at bad governance in South Sudan and explain how it has contributed to the undermining of sovereignty. In the third section I examine the CPA and explain how it relates to sovereignty, while in the fourth section I address issues relating to state-building and natural resource management. I conclude that a lasting peace might require a renegotiation of South Sudan’s sovereignty and co-governance arrangements for a limited period.

Explaining sovereignty

Writing in the 1990s, Francis Deng, who later became South Sudan’s ambassador to the United Nations, with colleagues, defined sovereignty in terms of state responsibility, legitimacy, good governance, accountability, and the protection of citizens. They, for instance, argued:

[S]overeignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are accountable not only to their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by effectively discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its national sovereignty (Deng, et al 1996: 1).

A year earlier, Deng had argued: “In most cases, the collapse of the state is associated with humanitarian tragedies resulting from armed conflict, communal violence, and gross violations of human rights that culminate in the massive outflow of refugees and internal displacement of the civilian populations” (Deng 1995: 207). Most poignantly, Deng (1995: 207) added: “It is the lack or loss of capacity to cope with the crisis that leads to the collapse of the state and necessitates the intervention of the international community…” Much of what Deng and his colleagues claimed in the 1990s came to be reflected in the crises that engulfed South Sudan nearly two decades later.

Sovereignty is considered an important aspect of any state’s internal governance and international relations, but it has no single or scientific definition (Weiss & Chopra, 1995; Jackson 1999). While some scholars imply that it is one of the least contentious terms in political science (Walker 1990), others have argued that it is one of the most confusing concepts (James 1984; Kratochwil 1995). Whatever controversies exist, sovereignty is universally recognised as the primary constitutive principle of the modern state, but its history has not been properly explained. Since the 1648 treaties of Westphalia, sovereignty has evolved in response to the expansion of international society and the changing norms of global
governance (Krasner 1999). In absolutist Europe, sovereignty was interpreted in authoritarian terms because the political leaders, who were not accountable to anyone, were believed to have been ordained by God (Philpott 2001; Makinda 1998a). However, in Africa, where all states achieved sovereign statehood through self-determination (Bruce-Wallace 1985), absolutist sovereignty has had no normative basis. Unfortunately, leaders of some independent African states have acted as if they were operating in absolutist Europe or some precolonial African societies. South Sudan is among few countries in which the constitution states explicitly that sovereignty belongs to the people. Its Constitution (2011) states: “Sovereignty is vested in the people and shall be exercised by the State through its democratic and representative institutions established by this Constitution and the law.” A little more than a decade before South Sudan’s independence, Christopher Clapham (1996) had explained meticulously how African political leaders had subverted the conventions designed to uphold sovereignty with a view to pursuing their own selfish ends. As recent developments have demonstrated, South Sudan’s political leaders have violated these conventions many times and left people wondering whether sovereignty resides with them or with the rulers.

To demystify sovereignty in Africa and the way it would apply to South Sudan, I would like to delineate three dimensions of sovereignty, which should be viewed like a three-legged traditional African stool. If one of the three legs breaks off, the stool will not serve its purpose unless the broken leg is restored. The first dimension of sovereignty is juridical, which is based on the notion that the state has no other authority over it except that of international law. South Sudan is a member of the UN and other international organisations by virtue of its juridical sovereignty. It is juridical sovereignty that has enabled it to establish diplomatic relations with other countries. It is also juridical sovereignty that makes it possible for President Kiir to be accorded respect by other states around the world. This juridical sovereignty was conferred on South Sudan at independence by international society. The inter-subjective understandings that accompany the conferring of juridical sovereignty to any state include the implicit message that the state in question would consolidate the other two dimensions of sovereignty. Moreover, international society continues to reinforce South Sudan’s juridical sovereignty every time it acknowledges this country as an independent entity. If, for any reason, international society decided that South Sudan, or any state, should not remain juridically sovereign, it could take away that state’s sovereignty. This happened in the early 1970s when the the US and the Soviet Union masterminded the denial
of juridical recognition to Taiwan in terms of its loss of status as the official representative of China at the UN. (Makinda 2009; de Lisle 2011).

The second type of sovereignty is empirical, which is based on the notion that states have the right and ability to control the people, resources, and other entities within their borders. Empirical sovereignty is not directly conferred on states by international society. It is demonstrated through a country’s political, economic, and military capacity to manage its internal affairs. One African country that has been deficient in empirical sovereignty for decades is Somalia (Bruce-Wallace 1997; Makinda 1993). South Sudan’s claim to empirical sovereignty is highly doubtful. By failing to protect its own citizens when they were massacred in late 2013 and the time of this writing, South Sudan demonstrated that it lacked empirical sovereignty. Thus, one of the three legs of its stool appears to be broken. Whenever political leaders and government representatives refer to ‘state sovereignty’, they imply both juridical and empirical sovereignty. Jackson (1986) once referred to state sovereignty in Africa as ‘negative’ or quasi-sovereignty because many African states, which were juridically sovereign, lacked the empirical dimension to sovereignty.

The third dimension of sovereignty is popular, which is predicated on the claim that all citizens are equal and entitled to fundamental freedoms, and that governments control them only with their consent. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the General Assembly in 1999 that by popular sovereignty, he meant “the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties” (UN Press Release 1999). While some commentators have associated the origin of popular sovereignty with Annan and his predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, this dimension of sovereignty can be traced back to John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Paine, among others. Moreover, before Boutros-Ghali and Annan, former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar had claimed in 1991 that sovereignty needed to be re-assessed in response to “the shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents” (UN Press Release 1991). Thus popular sovereignty rests on the recognition of human rights (Mutua 1995; Makinda 2005). It is about the ability of citizens to hold their governments accountable. This suggests that human rights and state sovereignty need not be antagonistic; they should be regarded as parts of the same entity. On this issue, Makinda and Okumu (2008: 17) have observed: “As African states achieved independence on the basis of self-determination, which is universally recognised as a collective right, it is
popular sovereignty that produced African independence.” Thus, it is popular sovereignty that underpinned South Sudan’s sovereign statehood and any time the South Sudanese leaders undermine human rights, they weaken their sovereignty.

On the basis of the above explanations, it is plausible to argue that South Sudan’s current crisis has undermined empirical and popular sovereignty. Only juridical sovereignty, which is conferred by international society, has remained intact. Most of the damage to empirical and popular sovereignty has stemmed from bad governance.

**Bad Governance**

Good governance is crucial for the management and maintenance of sovereignty in any state, while its corollary, bad governance, has the potential to undermine and retard empirical and popular sovereignty. Recent political developments in South Sudan have demonstrated that in this country bad governance is the norm rather than an exception. While I have strong reservations about the way Riek Machar has gone about seeking political power, I agree with a statement he made in an interview with *Asharq al Awsat* on 2 January 2014, where he said: “…a lack of good governance is at the root of our problems” (Sirri 2014). Unfortunately, Machar and Kiir are among the main perpetrators of bad governance in South Sudan. They perpetuated a patron-client structure and repeatedly demonstrated that they are incapable of providing transformative leadership. Good governance is often a result of strategic vision, transformative leadership, effective institutions, and clear mechanisms to ensure that the rule of law and human rights are respected. Kiir and his ministers often issue platitudes about unity, development and peace, but there is no substance to what they say. This lack of a shared strategic vision has, in turn, resulted in poor and misguided policies. Kiir was elevated to leadership, following Garang’s death in 2005, on the basis of his martial prowess, not political acumen. Fighting a war is one thing, but building a state and ruling it for the benefit of its people is another. Kiir, who spent more than two decades fighting a guerrilla war, could not manufacture a liberal democracy out of nothing. It is Kiir, Machar and other senior members of South Sudan’s political elite that have presided over the abuse of sovereignty.

African nationalist leaders who assumed power after independence in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, were not under global scrutiny and could mismanage their countries without major voices in international society protesting (see
At that time, what counted most were territorial integrity and juridical sovereignty. Empirical and popular sovereignty were ignored. This was partly because international society defined sovereignty primarily in terms of the territorial norm (Barkin & Cronin 1994). However, since the end of the Cold War, international society has increasingly defined sovereignty in terms of the democratic norm (Makinda 1998b). This is why Franck (1992) hypothesised about the global impact of the emerging democratic norm in the early post-Cold War period. Thus, South Sudan became independent when democracy was regarded as an entitlement for everyone and political leaders were expected to meet certain standards of accountability. Moreover, the AU adopted the charter on democracy, elections and governance in January 2007. Unfortunately, leaders who have no experience in democratic rule, or who have known little but war for two decades, would find it difficult to meet the governance standards expected of them. In this case, international society needed to provide South Sudanese leaders with some guidance prior to allowing them to handle the responsibilities that were placed on their shoulders. The majority of the South Sudanese population have not experienced liberal democracy and have not been given opportunities to exercise many of their rights and responsibilities. Had South Sudan been placed under an international administration for a few years, similar to that under which Timor Leste operated from 2000 to 2002, the political outcome would probably have been different (Martin 2001). The South Sudanese people would have had a chance to build democracy from the ground up. This would, in turn, have buttressed empirical and popular sovereignty. Instead, these two dimensions of sovereignty have repeatedly been damaged by various factors, including the ruling party, the military, and rampant corruption.

One way in which the ruling party, SPLM, undermined empirical and popular sovereignty in South Sudan was through its failure to transform itself from a national liberation movement into a political party with the core values of democracy, justice and nationalism. The SPLM still appears to be guided by the guerrilla approach to issues, and this is one of the sources of the political crisis. In relation to SPLM dynamics, de Waal (2014a: 348) argues that South Sudan’s neo-patrimonial system condones conditions in which “political office is used primarily for personal and factional advantage”. Democracy, which underpins good governance, is possible only if the structures, processes and institutions through which the people’s will is expressed have been internalised (Makinda 1996). There is no evidence that the SPLM has sought to involve the South Sudanese people in governance. Kiir’s appointment of Taban Deng Gai in July 2016
to replace Machar as senior Vice-President illustrated the lack of accountability in the political system.

Like the SPLM, the SPLA, led by Paul Malong Awan since April 2014, has not transformed itself into a modern military force (Pinaud 2014). It remains an umbrella of warlords and armed groups who are loosely controlled from the top. Many of these warlords have been leasing their troops in return for rent for several decades. Now that they are part of the SPLA, they needed to demonstrate full commitment to a united South Sudan. The SPLA undermined empirical and popular sovereignty through its weak structure and its lack of cohesion, which, in turn, made it possible for various warlords to withdraw their contingents from the SPLA and declare themselves autonomous, after which they may be able to renegotiate a better deal before being reincorporated into the SPLA. On some occasions, SPLA factions have undertaken cross-border operations without approval from the government in Juba. A case in point was the unexpected invasion of Heglig in Sudan by one of the SPLA factions in March 2012 while Kiir was in Beijing (Shaib 2012). This was done without Kiir’s approval, and their intention was not necessarily to hold onto Heglig, but to make it one of the bones of contention. South Sudan and Khartoum agreed in March 2013 to withdraw troops from the border area and establish a demilitarised zone, but it was not clear whether all factions within the SPLA would respect it. As de Waal (2014a: 348) has explained, the neo-patrimonial system in South Sudan is militarised, thereby enabling the “contending members of the elite… [to] use force or the threat of force as an instrument of bargaining”.

The way the SPLM and the SPLA have operated has illustrated two factors in relation to empirical and popular sovereignty. The first is that the top leadership in the government has had very little control over two key national institutions: the ruling party and the military. The second is that the mechanisms through which the people of South Sudan could hold their government accountable are absent.

Another way in which bad governance has undermined empirical and popular sovereignty is that public institutions remain weak and some have no institutional memory. It is common for senior civil servants to work on important projects and leave no records behind for their successors. This approach has led to two undesirable consequences. The first is that the elevation of individuals above institutions has made South Sudanese civil servants align their office tenure with key individuals in the government. Once these key individuals, such as Machar, are removed, those who are
aligned with them begin to feel vulnerable. This practice has destroyed the ground on which empirical and popular sovereignty would be anchored.

With the ruling party, the military and major public institutions in disarray, it is not surprising that senior public officials have frequently abused the power entrusted in them and used government resources for private gain. According to various sources, including Transparency International, corruption in South Sudan has permeated all sectors of the economy and all levels of state and national government (U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre 2013). Corruption in South Sudan has been an indicator of the abuse of empirical and popular sovereignty, and of the failure to build a viable and functional state. The institutionalisation of the corruption culture has reached the point where citizens are commonly asked for bribes when they seek access to various public services, and they have come to expect it. This practice is largely due to the greed of political leaders and underpins the weakening of empirical and popular sovereignty.

Kiir underlined the rampart nature of corruption in a letter dated 3 May 2012 and addressed to 75 former and serving government officials, in which he complained that US$4 billion had been stolen and promised to give amnesty to those who returned the money (Holland 2012). He stated how corruption undermines popular sovereignty when he stated: “We fought for freedom, justice and equality… Yet, once we got to power, we forgot what we fought for and began to enrich ourselves at the expense of our people” (Holland 2012). According to various sources, most of the revenue from oil does not end up in Juba, but in the foreign bank accounts of the ruling elite (de Waal 2014a). This is made easy by the fact that a very high percentage of South Sudan’s government officials have their families in neighbouring states and other foreign countries. Another way of stealing government resources is to pay salaries to ‘ghost’ workers. It is a system through which some civil servants draw the second salary through a ‘ghost’ employee. This issue is so serious that in 2010, a South Sudanese cabinet minister told a workshop organised jointly by the South Sudan government and USAID that ‘ghost’ workers were a major factor in corruption (DFID 2013).

In a 2013 report on anti-corruption in South Sudan, the UK Department for International Development cited a perception survey conducted by the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission in 2011. The survey concluded that 96 percent of respondents felt that corruption was common, with 97 percent of them regarding it as a ‘serious’ or ‘very serious’ problem. Many international partners of South Sudan directly spend their money rather than giving it to the government, and this reduces the chances of donor funds
being stolen (DFID 2013). Such a practice also underlines the point that empirical and popular sovereignty have been undermined. The weakness in sovereignty has been exacerbated by the seriousness of outstanding CPA issues.

**Outstanding CPA issues**

Several issues connected with the CPA had a major impact on both the weakening of sovereignty and the continuation of the political crisis. One of them was the failure by both Khartoum and the SPLM to honour some of the key provisions of the CPA. Another was the failure of international society to ensure that both parties to the CPA provided an enabling environment for its implementation. The CPA was negotiated under the auspices of IGAD, with considerable input from the UN, the US, the UK, Italy, and Norway. The document was revolutionary in light of African diplomatic practice in at least two senses. In the first sense, it legitimised the suspension of the then sacrosanct 1964 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Cairo declaration, which prohibited the change of African state boundaries as they existed at the time of independence. It provided room for all those involved to contemplate the reconstruction of Khartoum’s sovereignty. In the second sense, the CPA illustrated that if there was political will on the part of international society, the juridical sovereignty of African states could be reconsidered in efforts to enhance popular sovereignty.

The CPA was premised on universal values and norms that are crucial for the realisation of empirical and popular sovereignty: peace, justice, security, stability, and development. Every chapter and section of the CPA reiterates these norms and emphasises why they are important for the people of Khartoum and South Sudan. To the extent that the CPA promised empirical and popular sovereignty explicitly and suggested juridical sovereignty for South Sudan only implicitly, it could be argued that for South Sudan, empirical and popular sovereignty were primary goals. In the context of the CPA, juridical sovereignty for South Sudan was a secondary goal. For this reason, international society would be acting irresponsibly if it honoured South Sudan’s juridical sovereignty without question after its leaders have betrayed the empirical and popular sovereignty promised in the CPA.

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3 Eritrea also gained independence from Ethiopia in the early 1990s under similar circumstances.
The CPA was also predicated on specific issues: power sharing between the Khartoum government and the SPLM; wealth sharing; the resolution of the Abyei conflict; the resolution of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile conflicts; and security arrangements. These issues also reinforce the above values. For example, section 1.4.5 of the power sharing agreement refers to the “Pursuit of good governance, accountability, transparency, democracy, and the rule of law at all levels of government to achieve lasting peace” (CPA 2005: p. 12). Very few of these issues have been fully addressed, with both parties to the CPA blaming each other for the stalemate.

Regarding security sector reforms, the CPA called for the incorporation of other armed groups into Khartoum’s armed forces or the SPLA, but some militias still remain outside the two military organisations. Moreover, Khartoum and South Sudan have signed non-aggression pacts and pledged to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but their armed forces exchange fire frequently. However, given the fact that Kiir’s government does not have full control over all elements of the SPLA, it has not been easy for observers to tell whether the SPLA units firing at Khartoum’s forces have officially been authorised by the government or not. Under these circumstances, South Sudan is unlikely to achieve internal stability and pay attention to its development agenda unless it pursues security sector reforms successfully. The inability to pursue security sector reforms successfully is partly due to the weakening of empirical sovereignty.

This weakness in empirical sovereignty has been demonstrated through South Sudan’s failure to control militia groups that operate across the border into Sudan, especially in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. It is generally acknowledged that several militia groups, especially the Nuba, in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, fought alongside the SPLA between 1983 and 2004. However, the CPA placed them in Sudan. Moreover, under the CPA, the Khartoum and Juba governments agreed that they would ascertain the views of the people of these states through popular consultation. Due to cross border attacks, the Khartoum government has accused South Sudan of supporting rebel militia groups in the two states, but the South Sudanese government has repeatedly denied the accusations.

One of the most contentious CPA outstanding issues relates to the region of Abyei, which is on the border between South Sudan and Sudan. It produces oil, but that is not its main significance to some South Sudanese policy-makers. Abyei is home to nine influential Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, which were transferred to Kordofan by the British colonial authorities back in 1905. Some of South Sudan’s most influential politicians come from the
region. The CPA specified the boundaries of Abyei and called for a referendum to determine whether Abyei should be part of Sudan or South Sudan. The region was expected to hold the referendum in January 2011, but Khartoum and South Sudan disagreed over several matters. The referendum has been put off indefinitely, a fact that illustrates how Khartoum and South Sudan have frustrated efforts to achieve popular sovereignty. Disagreements over voter eligibility revolve around Abyei’s two major ethnic groups: the farming group, namely Ngok Dinka, who would like to join South Sudan and the nomadic cattle-herding group, Misseriya, who would like to join Khartoum and be located in Sudan. South Sudan claims that the Misseriya, who graze their cattle in the region only during the dry season, should not vote. However, Khartoum insists that this group has to participate in the referendum. Although the CPA guarantees the grazing rights of the Misseriya irrespective of where Abyei would go, the Misseriya have threatened war if they do not participate in the referendum.4

This problem and other CPA outstanding issues result from bad governance in both South Sudan and Khartoum (Young 2012). They also serve to weaken empirical and popular sovereignty. As long as these problems remain, the South Sudanese leadership is unlikely to give adequate attention to the development agenda, economic management and the effective use of its oil revenues.

State-building and the management of natural resources

South Sudan’s sovereignty has further been weakened by the lack of serious attention to state-building, coupled with misguided policies in resource management. In recent analyses of African economic performance, various authors have argued and provided statistics to prove that African economies are rising (Economist 2013; Swaniker 2013; Scott 2016). Unfortunately, South Sudan’s is not one of the rising African economies. South Sudan faces a daunting task of building the nation and harnessing its resources to benefit the people. Due to many decades of marginalisation that go back to the colonial period, the country has a shortage of teachers, classrooms, doctors, nurses, and expertise in many areas of the public

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4 Some South Sudanese politicians disagree with their counterparts in Khartoum over the original boundaries of Abyei. They also have a different view of the span of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms in Abyei. These divergent positions occasionally served as a source of friction between Khartoum and South Sudan, especially following the signing of the CPA.
service. Despite the oil revenues, the country remains among the least developed in Africa. South Sudan relies heavily on agriculture, but it has been estimated that less than 5 percent of the country’s arable land is under cultivation. The territory has few industries that can generate jobs, and as a result, unemployment is high and still rising. It needs huge investments, especially in infrastructure and agriculture, but many international investors are reluctant to go in because of high political and security risks compared to its neighbours, particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. It is hard for South Sudan to attract investors into the country while the political elite is grabbing whatever resources are available and investing them in the neighbouring countries (see The Sentry 2016).

The country’s major export commodity is oil, but the fall in oil prices since 2014 has reduced government revenue considerably. South Sudan has the third largest oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa, but continuing disputes over it have hindered further investments in the sector. There have been continuing disputes between Khartoum and South Sudan, between the South Sudanese government and the oil companies, and between the central government in Juba and various state governments. Since Chevron discovered oil fields near Bentiu in the Unity state of South Sudan in 1978, the Khartoum government and South Sudanese politicians have disagreed on how to develop, refine and export the commodity, and on how to share the revenue from it. The South Sudanese leaders were opposed to the construction of refineries in the north and of a pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea for the export of crude oil. About 75 percent of the oil comes from South Sudan, but all the pipelines run through Sudan. Since its independence in July 2011, South Sudan has been exploring the possibilities of exporting oil through its other neighbours, including Kenya, Djibouti and the Central African Republic, rather than continuing to depend on a hostile Khartoum government. One could argue that it is in the interest of South Sudan to diversify its relationships with neighbours. However, such a move would require considerable investment in infrastructure, which is unlikely to take place under the present circumstances. In addition, the abandonment of Khartoum’s pipelines would have serious legal implications, which might require South Sudan to compensate both Khartoum and the corporations that constructed the pipelines (see Kibe and Kimenyi 2013).

The CPA stipulated that oil revenue would continue to be shared equally between Khartoum and South Sudan for the duration of the agreement. However, South Sudan lacks the capacity to ensure that the oil revenue benefits its citizens. Since independence, the South Sudanese government
has renegotiated with Khartoum over the distribution of oil revenues. The fact that Khartoum benefits from South Sudan’s exportation of oil has narrowed the range of foreign investors in the sector. Due to US sanctions against Khartoum, US corporations have not invested in South Sudan’s oil sector for fear of benefiting the Khartoum regime and thereby violating the sanctions. As a result, the main investors in this sector are from China, India and Malaysia. While it is tempting to focus on the future oil production when assessing South Sudan’s prospects, it is hard to see how oil revenues will benefit the people of South Sudan under the current circumstances. In the light of recent financial scandals, and given the lack of accountability on the part of senior government officials, most of the oil revenue will continue to be misappropriated. The answer lies in the enhancement of empirical and popular sovereignty through state-building and effective resource management infrastructure.

In the meantime, it is unrealistic for international society to expect South Sudan to address its multiple-layered problems with its current infrastructure and human resource base. The current political crisis is a demonstration of South Sudan’s inability to establish an enabling environment required for nation-state building. It is also a signal that now is the time to renegotiate the country’s sovereignty.

Conclusions: co-governance could work

Many of South Sudan’s problems may not be addressed satisfactorily without reference to the serious weakness in the country’s sovereignty. The political crisis that erupted in December 2013 and which continues to the time of this writing in 2017, is partly a reflection of the failure of international society to ensure that South Sudan was appropriately guided to the stage where it would become a viable and functioning state with the capabilities to protect its citizens and provide them with essential services. It is also partly a failure of the South Sudanese leadership to build a new nation-state and govern it well, to negotiate seriously outstanding CPA issues, and to manage the oil wealth as a public good. Above all, it is a failure by South Sudan’s leaders and international partners to place the people of South Sudan at the centre of their strategies. Ultimately, it is a call for the renegotiation of South Sudan’s sovereign statehood and the creation of co-governance arrangements (which cannot be prescribed in this short article), which should be worked out between South Sudan’s representatives, the AU, IGAD, the UN and South Sudan’s international partners. Whether Kiir and Machar remain in political leadership should depend on an assessment of their potential contribution to good governance.
The root causes of South Sudan’s political crisis comprise poor political leadership, a malfunctioning state, the lack of an enabling environment, and the complicity of international society in the practices that are taking place there. The political crisis has given international society an opportunity to take bold measures, including the construction of co-governance arrangements. As it has already been demonstrated, South Sudan lacks empirical and popular sovereignty. It has juridical sovereignty only because international society has consented to it. Renegotiating sovereignty and creating co-governance arrangements would not constitute a recolonisation of the country. Neither would it mean a UN trusteeship, which would be prohibited by Article 78 of the UN Charter (UN Charter 1945). Renegotiating sovereignty would entail establishing co-governance arrangements designed to ensure that the South Sudanese people enjoy security and popular sovereignty while the country’s public institutions are reconstructed.

In a recent article, Lyman and Knopf (2016) argued that the most effective way for international society to help the people of South Sudan is to “put South Sudan on ‘life support’ by establishing an executive mandate for the UN and the AU to administer the country until institutions exist to manage politics non-violently and break up the patronage networks underlying the conflict”. These two former US officials are primarily prescribing co-governance arrangements, which could see South Sudan build the institutions it needs for peace, security and development.

The AU would need to take a leading role in the co-governance of South Sudan. While the framers of the Constitutive Act of the AU (CAAU) did not anticipate that there would be a need for co-governance in any of its members, if there was political will on the part of the AU leadership, the Union could establish such an arrangement utilizing some sections of the CAAU. For example, Article 4(h) of the CAAU gives the Union the right to intervene in a member state “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. Moreover, Article 4(j) of the CAAU gives member states the right to request intervention from the AU ”in order to restore peace and security”. On the basis of these two sections of the CAAU, the South Sudan government could request the AU to intervene. If it does not do so, the AU could invoke Article 4(h) and intervene. Just as the AU interpreted its Constitutive Act flexibly to allow South Sudan to secede, it could interpret it again flexibly to establish a co-governance arrangement in South Sudan.

There have been cases elsewhere in the past few decades where sovereignty has been renegotiated and co-governance arrangements
established. A good example is Cambodia whose sovereignty was renegotiated in the early 1990s after it had previously been split into two, with the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime exercising empirical sovereignty while the exiled and Western-backed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which included the notorious Khmer Rouge, exercised juridical sovereignty. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was part of the co-governance arrangements. A senior member of UNTAC told me at the time that had it not been for UNTAC, certain important democratic measures, including the preparation of the electoral roll, would not have been accomplished. By the time UNTAC concluded its mission in 1992, peace had been restored and all dimensions of Cambodian sovereignty had been united. This was made possible by the compromises of Cambodia’s political factions as well as the key roles played by regional and global actors (Doyle 1995; Makinda 2001).

Renegotiating South Sudan’s sovereignty, and creating co-governance arrangements for a limited period, would deliver good governance, strengthen economic management, facilitate state building, and enhance regional security. It might be the best way to break the cycle of violence and restore power to the people in this oil-rich country.

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Ethics and Its Discontents: Evidence from Terrorism Research in North-Eastern Nigeria

Iro Aghedo
Department of Political Science, University of Benin
iro.aghedo@uniben.edu

Abstract

Terrorism and other forms of political violence have become a huge threat to human security, livelihoods and property in Nigeria in recent years. Though pervasive across the country, the North-East Geopolitical Zone has been the worst hit by insurgency since Nigeria’s re-democratisation in 1999. This article examines the role of the researcher and their participants in areas affected by terrorism, and uses ethical principles as the framework of analysis. Following fieldwork-based experiential dilemmas in the terrorist environment (that is, where terrorists operate), this article argues that even though ethical principles are framed in general terms, their applicability is largely situational and context-dependent. Therefore, this article argues for a pragmatic situational ethical framework that gives ‘voice’ to respondents in North-Eastern Nigeria and similar terrorist environments.

Introduction

State-society relations in Nigeria have been violently conflictual in recent decades, especially during the country’s tortuous transition from military dictatorship and since its return to civil rule in 1999. Although such violent relations are not totally new—as evidenced by similar cases in the First Republic (1963-1966), Second Republic (1979-1983), and during the aborted Third Republic (1992-1993)—their scale and frequency have increased in the Fourth Republic (1999-present). Across the country’s six

1 The author would like to thank ARAS Editor Tanya Lyons for her very useful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Thanks are also due to Professors S.I. Ebohon and M.I.M. Abutudu of the Department of Political Science, University of Benin for their advisory role in the research. I am also grateful to my contact persons and research participants in the North-East of Nigeria.
geopolitical zones (South-West, South-South, South-East, North-Central, North-West and North-East), ethnic militias and other violent non-state actors have emerged with different motivations and strategies to challenge state authority (Mustapha, 2009). The operations of the rebel movements have been concentrated within these geopolitical zones, rather than within particular states in the Nigerian federation.

In the South-West, the militancy of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) was triggered by the alleged marginalisation of the Yoruba ethnic group in national politics, particularly as signaled by the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election, which was believed to have been won by Yoruba business magnate, Chief M.K.O. Abiola (Nolte, 2007). In the South-South, the Niger Delta insurgent movements were motivated by grievances over the human and environmental insecurity engendered by the oil exploration activities of multinational corporations, and the injustice inflicted on the region by the state’s inequitable distribution of oil wealth (Aghedo, 2015; Anugwom, 2005). The South-East is also not immune to violence, as exemplified by the activities of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Supreme State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), as well as the intractable clashes between the Aguleri and Umuleri communities whose actors have sworn to continue to fight one another “even when they meet in heaven” (Onwuzuruigbo, 2013, p. 129).

Like the South, the sprawling Northern region has been enmeshed in multiple conflicts in recent years. In the North-Central region, especially in such hot-spots as Benue, Taraba and the Plateau States, violent ethno-religious fault lines have been drawn between indigenes (native or autochthonous people in a state) and settlers (migrants from other states), Christians and Muslims, and even between herders and farmers, over which group has the right to what territory and control over socioeconomic resources (Harnischfeger, 2004).

The emergence of the Boko Haram terrorist group in 2002, its subsequent radicalisation of local populations from 2009, and its rapid movement across the region has heightened insecurity in the North-Eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, and in several other states beyond the zone, including Kano, Kaduna and Katsina in the North-West and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, in the North-Central. Boko Haram’s violent attacks include the use of arson, bank raids, mass abduction, hostage-taking, planting of landmines, detonation of improvised explosive devices, beheading, and suicide bombing, among others. The targets of the group’s terrorist violence are wide ranging, including combatants and non-combatants, women and children, and private and public properties. In a
well-known example, the group abducted 276 Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014, and have since deployed several women and teenage girls as suicide bombers (Aghedo, 2016; Agbiboa, 2014).

Although exact casualty figures are hard to come by, Boko Haram-related violence has claimed lives wantonly (Agbiboa, 2014). Besides the grisly killings, the terrorism has also destroyed an enormous amount of private and public infrastructure. In Borno State, which has been the worst hit, a recent assessment carried out by government across 27 local councils revealed that Boko Haram insurgents have destroyed: over one million private homes; 5,335 classrooms and other school buildings; 201 health centres; 1,630 water sources; 665 municipal buildings, including council offices, prisons and police stations; 726 power distribution substations; as well as poisoned several ponds, river basins, and lakes (Vanguard, 2016). The core political motive of Boko Haram has been to make the government accede to its demands for the establishment of a theocracy based on Sharia laws and the abolition of symbols of modernity including Western education, democracy and the mass media (Aghedo, 2016; Agbiboa, 2015).

Unlike the low-intensity conflicts in the South, Boko Haram’s terrorist activities have posed the gravest threat to Nigerian sovereignty since the 1967-1970 Biafran Civil War, prompting current President Muhammadu Buhari to make counter-terrorism a key public policy. Besides the risk to Nigeria’s internal stability, the jihadist violence has also been a source of insecurity for neighbouring states especially Niger, Chad and Cameroon. This growing ‘internationalisation’ and ‘territorialisation’ of the conflict could foreshadow danger beyond the sub-region, as captured and ungoverned territory could be penetrated and used as a launching ground for more devastating attacks by other terrorist organisations, such as those linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Terrorism in the region has also triggered terrible internal displacement and a massive refugee crisis.

The pervasiveness and huge cost of Boko Haram’s terrorism has generated enormous local and international media coverage aimed at understanding the motives and drivers of the group. Although terrorism research is relatively new in Nigeria, academic interest in the subject has been impressive, albeit polarised between scholars who see terrorism as a product of religious extremism, including political Islam, (Adesoji, 2010) and others who emphasise the role of human insecurity, such as poverty, unemployment and poor education (Forest, 2012). However, while Boko Haram-related threats to the Nigerian state and sub-regional security have by necessity attracted the interests of media professionals (Johnson, 2011), policy analysts (Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act, 2013) and scholars
(Sulemana, 2014), the challenges posed by the violence to researchers and those researched have received little or no attention thus far.

This article attempts to fill this gap by shedding some light on the dilemmas involved in applying ethical principles (those usually required of academics when doing research with human subjects) while undertaking terrorism research in North-Eastern Nigeria. The article argues that even though ethical values—such as those emphasising the physical security of the researcher and participants, informed consent, objectivity, anonymity, confidentiality and justice—are framed in general terms, their applicability is largely situational, context-dependent and varies across cultures. As a result, despite rhetoric regarding the universality of ethical values, total adherence to such norms affects the research and sometimes renders ethical conduct terribly problematic. This article therefore challenges mainstream thinking about ethical research.

Clearly these concerns are not peculiar to the North-East of Nigeria as shown by fieldwork challenges in the Niger Delta (Oriola & Haggerty, 2012); apartheid South Africa (Goduka, 1990); Northern Ireland (Lundy & McGovern, 2006); the Middle East (Romano, 2006); and the West Bank and Occupied Territories (Chatin, 2003) amongst others. However, I demonstrate that the experience of North-Eastern Nigeria is peculiar because of its cyclical sectarian conflicts; high rate of civilian victimisation; and abysmal levels of mass poverty, illiteracy and lack of basic social amenities which are higher than the national average (Suleiman & Karim, 2015; Sodipo, 2013). These debilitating realities accentuate the researcher’s dilemma.

For this article, I draw on my own research experiences in the Northern Region of Nigeria, which involved undertaking informal interviews with victims of violence, especially the *almajirai* (itinerant Quranic pupils) and *talakawa* (the downtrodden) (Aghedo, 2016; Aghedo, 2014). The aim of the studies was to ascertain the motivations behind Boko Haram’s rebellion and the affinities between the group’s activities and the Maitatsine urban revolt of the 1980s that resulted in over 10,000 fatalities. Furthermore, I was involved in conducting two survey studies in 2012 (for two weeks) and 2013 (for six weeks) on Boko Haram terrorism (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Aghedo & Osumah, 2014). During these research engagements, some of the norms of the scientific approach were difficult to observe, as revealed in the few cases discussed below.

At the University of Benin, where I work as a lecturer, all research is filtered through a Research and Publication Committee, which regulates and ensures compliance with ethical requirements. In line with this, I
applied for and received ethics approval for this study. After my initial application for ethics approval, I was invited to defend my research proposal before the Committee. They questioned different aspects of the proposal and finally warned me not to engage in any unethical practice that would present the University in a bad light. There is no issuing of certificates of approval or ethics approval numbers as in many western universities. Nonetheless, individual researchers such as myself, do ensure strict compliance with universal ethical norms. During my research I also sought the expert advice of colleagues in my university department for further guidance while in the field, as well as relied on the advice of a number of contact persons in the North-East for practical exigencies.

**Ethical Research: Meaning, Principles and Discontents**

Social scientific research represents a special and unique way of expounding on group life and is crucial in knowledge production. Further, ethics play a fundamental role in the success or failure of social research. As a philosophical concept, ethics is principally “concerned with matters of good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation, and moral responsibility” (Hospers, 1967, p. 566). Sometimes concerns and conflicts arise over the proper way to conduct social research. In response to these ethical dilemmas, there are certain norms that guide the research process from its initiation through to data collection, analysis and finally to the publication of findings. The rationales for ethical research are varied, including to: protect participants’ rights and privacy; guarantee the rights of others, including the public, to know; protect the researcher against litigation and keep the “doors open for future generations of researchers” (Harrison, 2001, p. 103).

The history of research ethics dates back to the Nuremberg Code, which was adopted as a result of Nazi war crimes during the Second World War, in particular, the cruelty that characterised experiments in concentration camps. Following the Nuremberg Code, certain ethical principles were designed as a guide for any research involving human subjects. According to Smyth and Williamson (2004), following the declaration of these principles “non-therapeutic research could not be conducted without the informed consent of the individual, irrespective of the benefits to wider society” (p. 6). While it is the case that issues in clinical research ethics are determined by consequentialist outcomes, those in social research are largely context-specific and thus the risk to human subjects in social research are of a different order to those in clinical studies. Nevertheless, they remain ethically problematic and relevant (Lyons, 2009).
Research ethics has evolved in the last few decades in the West where ethical research issues are now discussed ‘up front’, especially in the clinical and social sciences. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has been at the forefront of the crusade for ethical research. In 2005, the ESRC drew up a framework of six fundamental principles that should guide the complex and often conflicted relationship between the researcher and the researched. The core principles included those of: integrity and quality; full disclosure about the research to research staff and subjects; confidentiality and anonymity; voluntary participation; avoidance of harm to participants; and disclosing conflicts of interest (ESRC, 2005). Many universities across the world now have their own research ethics policies and committees through which research is filtered before it is carried out. However, while there may be differences across institutions, ethical codes have been far more developed in the Global North than in the South. For example, while most first-generation universities in Nigeria have ethics committees, they are largely unable to control research processes thoroughly.

The six ethical principles discussed and analysed below are drawn from the British code as encapsulated in the 2005 ESRC framework. While the British code is by no means exhaustive, it does contain some of the most problematic principles to apply in conflict zones. Another justification for the analysis of these six principles is that they are also the primary ones applicable in most Nigerian universities, perhaps because of the country’s colonial links to Britain. I juxtapose these six ethical principles with my practical research experiences in North-Eastern Nigeria, with the aim of highlighting the dilemmas inherent in their application in terrorist environment.

(i) Principle of safety or security: This ethical guideline admonishes that social research must avoid harm to those studied, the researcher and those affected by the research. Therefore, social research must be initiated, designed, conducted and disseminated in a way that manages risk to life, thereby guaranteeing the physical security of all those involved (Smyth, 2001). Thus, the researcher must adequately consider both the benefits and harms that may accrue to all stakeholders. This is particularly crucial for terrorism studies, because conducting research in conflict zones entails enormous risks for all involved, and the researcher must be conscious of likely dangerous areas before venturing into the field. Those who conduct such research must be diplomatic, honest, or non-committal on sensitive issues knowing full well that “conflict zones are not places of free
intellectual debate and objective discourse” (Romano, 2006, p. 440). In addition, such researchers should avoid carrying or disseminating compromising documents in order to ensure their security and that of their informants.

(ii) Principle of informed consent: According to Goduka (1990), three dimensions are inherent in the principle of informed consent, namely, knowledgeable, voluntary participation and competent choice. This means that research participants must be given all necessary information about the research project so that they can participate in the process freely and make informed choices (Thorne, 1980). The issue of informed consent goes beyond data collection and includes research participants being given an opportunity to review interview transcripts and delete or anonymise anything they do not want to be included (Smyth, 2004). To ensure informed consent and mitigate concerns about deception and possible litigation, research participants should be made known of their rights, including the fact that they can stop or even withdraw from the research project at any time.

(iii) Principle of objectivity: In conformity with the demands of positivism, social researchers are enjoined to be open and honest in the research process, whether in selecting respondents (sampling), getting information from them (for example, using survey methods) or analysing their views. Social researchers must manage sensitive information objectively and without any bias. Researchers must consciously work to avoid prejudice because their identity—including their religious and ideological leanings—could have “implications for the way the research is conceptualized, carried out, analyzed and subsequently used” (Smyth, 2001, p. 7). Some people believe that it is more difficult for insiders to carry out objective research in their own environment than it is for outsiders, who are contextually detached by virtue of their identity. Such distinctions usually take the form of race, regionalism, nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, etc.

(iv) Principle of anonymity: This relates broadly to concealing the identity of research participants for their own safety. The researcher has an ethical duty to protect his/her sources. Usually, anonymity is achieved through the use of pseudonyms, aggregation of responses, use of percentages, etc. Anonymisation can also take the form of altering biographical details so as to conceal the identity of participants. Transcripts of interviews can be sent to respondents for approval and whatever they request as ‘off-the-record’ be
so treated. Related to anonymity is the issue of confidentiality, which relates more to privacy and especially how data is used (Wiles, Charles, Crow, & Heath, 2006).

(v) Principle of neutrality: This principle bids researchers to maintain a certain level of detachment from their informants or those they study. That is, like natural scientists, social researchers are largely believed to be able to examine the objects of their inquiry from an “external vantage point” and with a great deal of alienation (Hermann, 2001, p. 78). The insistence on neutrality is informed by the fact that its absence could result in identification with the research subjects, a situation that could have a detrimental effect on the validity of the research. To ensure neutrality, researchers, and especially those working on sensitive issues such as conflict, refugee crises and terrorism, are normally admonished to have a certain detached positionality and avoid taking sides on national debates in the field (Oriola & Haggerty, 2012). In addition, the language of such researchers must be neutral and devoid of labelling because, in a volatile society such as Nigeria, ethno-religious and sectional sentiments could be read into a researcher’s viewpoint by out-group members.

(vi) Principle of justice: This norm is anchored on the ‘unspoken contract’ between researchers and the researched. It entails ensuring that research participants are not disadvantaged by their involvement in the research process. Indeed, those researched sacrifice their time, energy and sometimes even risk their lives in the research process. Rather than being seen as partners or co-participants, they are often unrewarded and neglected. The principle of justice raises the issue of fairness and enjoins the researcher to fulfill his/her side of the bargain in research collaboration by taking the subjective needs of research participants seriously. According to Kappler (2013):

…there is a need to embed a concern about the productivity of knowledge for those helping to produce it in our disciplines and institutions. Knowledge should not only build a researcher’s career or improve the publication output of a university, but it should yield benefits for our partners in the field (p. 137).

Since most people in conflict zones lack influence, the researcher is enjoined to give them a voice. Also, research outcomes and findings usually
have more benefits if they are published in outlets that guarantee a widespread readership so that people, including policy makers, will have easy access that may help create awareness and mitigate further violence. As Smyth (2001) stated, it is ethically questionable to conduct research on human beings without a consideration of their “subjective needs and the impact of the research on their situation” (p. 5). Thus, the researcher should endeavour to consider the needs of research participants in addition to their academic goals.

These six principles of safety, informed consent, objectivity, anonymity, neutrality and justice are crucial guidelines for most research projects. Adherence to them is particularly important in terrorism research because of the largely insecure environment in which studies take place. In fact, any breach of the principles could endanger the lives of both researchers and their collaborators.

Nevertheless, despite the dynamic evolution and significance of research ethics, they have often come under attack. Some scholars have argued that the social sciences are low risk and therefore do not need to be regulated by research ethics committees (e.g., Dingwall, 2006). Some have been totally dismissive of ethical frameworks, labelling them as ‘empty ethics’ (Corrigan, 2003) which “impose silly restrictions” (Schrag, 2011, p. 122). Despite the criticisms, the social scientific community has remained committed to the applicability of ethical codes. In fact, Neuman (2003) admonishes that “the researcher has a moral and professional obligation to be ethical, even when research subjects are unaware of or unconcerned about ethics” (p. 116). Against the backdrop of incessant conflicts in Africa, Osaghae and Robinson (2005) rightly emphasised the need for research ethics on the continent when they noted that “ethical considerations ought to be central to conflict research in Africa, but so far they have not received the attention they so clearly deserve” (p. 3). However, adhering to the ethical norms is challenging in some environments on the continent as North-Eastern Nigeria exemplifies.

**Ethics and the Dilemmas of Terrorism Research in the North-East**

In this section, I reveal some of the dilemmas I faced in applying the above ethical principles to my terrorism research in the North-East region of Nigeria. To ensure clarity, I have done the analysis systematically in relation to the principles discussed above.

(i) Principle of safety or security: As stated earlier, this principle enjoins the researcher to avoid bringing harm upon themselves and those researched.
Avoiding harm in the North-East of Nigeria is problematic because Boko Haram insurgents deliberately target persons (including researchers) who subscribe to modernity, secularity and an open society. For example, the terrorists victimize those who gather information as evidenced by the suicide bomb attacks on the offices of *This Day*, *The Sun*, and *The Moment* newspapers in Abuja and Kaduna in April 2012 which killed seven people (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Several journalists have also been killed in the line of duty in northern Nigeria including: *Channels TV* journalist Enenchi Akogwu in Kano on 20 January 2012; *Highland FM* journalist Nansok Sallah in Plateau State on 18 January 2012; and *The Scope* journalist Samson Boyi in Adamawa on 5 November 1999, amongst others (Olatunji, 2014). While academic research and journalism are different, they are nevertheless similar with respect to information gathering and harm exposure (Rafferty, 2004).

Another source of risk emanates from government security forces who sometimes mistake academic researchers for terrorists. In 2012, I was taken in for questioning by two undercover police in Kano when I began research on the similarities and differences between the Maitatsine urban revolt, which broke out in the city in December 1980, and the contemporary Boko Haram movement (see Aghedo, 2014). The police identified themselves and led me to the station where I was interrogated over the motivations for my research for approximately two hours. It took the telephone intervention of my contact person and well-known retired police officer in the state before I regained my freedom. I was later told by one of the undercover police that it was my identity as a Southerner and especially my mode of dress that attracted their attention. Although I was wearing a pair of black trousers and a shirt made of *asoke*—a traditional cloth largely produced and worn by Yoruba people in the South—membership of the terror movement rarely included southerners. Also, though familiar with the North, I was unaware that my mode of dress could lead the police to mistake me for a terrorist. In any case, since this experience, I have been wearing the *kaftan*—a dress worn by most male Northerners—during my research visits.

In addition, harm to research participants could be indirect and difficult to handle. Considering the horrors perpetrated by Boko Haram, part of my research in the North-East necessarily involved participants revisiting past sorrowful events which made some of them break down in tears. Such harmful experiences often lead to what Lundy and McGovern (2006) have described as “secondary traumatization” (p. 56).

I experienced a dilemma as to how to handle the psychology of my distressed research participants, especially in remote areas where there were
no counselling services. Since I had no skills in counselling, I had to rely on common sense. For example, I referred the student who told me that he was orphaned by Boko Haram terrorism in Damaturu, Yobe State, to the state ministry of education for guidance on how to get a scholarship to continue his schooling. For the middle-aged man who lost his only child in Bama, Borno State, I assured him that Allah would provide another child. However, for the inconsolable Igbo woman who lost her husband at the Nyanya bomb attack in Nasarawa State, I considered it best to stop the interview.

(ii) Principle of informed consent: This ethical principle enjoins researchers to inform research participants of their rights, including their freedom to withdraw from the research process at any time, as well as to seek their agreement in all issues related to their participation. Some of my respondents were illiterate, so they did not know much about informed consent. In fact, some of them told me that they had not heard of the principle before. To enable them to make sense of the research and their rights, I had to rely on interpreters who spoke to them in their mother tongue (Hausa or Kanuri). Despite the financial burden imposed by the use of interpreters, I was heartened that the participants were able to understand their role in the research exercise.

(iii) Principle of objectivity: In line with this principle, researchers are bidden to be open and honest in every aspect of the research process. However, such openness could also be used against the researchers in ethno-religiously segmented societies as my experience reveals. A lecturer at the Bayero University, Kano, asked me about my religious identity during an interview. I told him that I was a Christian. Having introduced myself earlier as a lecturer from the University of Benin, he knew I was from Southern Nigeria. In the course of the interview, he blamed the emergence of the terrorism on the inadequate economic development of the North. After agreeing with him, I pointed out that some analysts believed that religion also played a role in the radicalisation of the conflict. He retorted, “you are talking that way because you are a Christian Southerner”. Implicitly, he saw me as biased because of my identity. I explained to him that as an academic researcher my identity had no influence on the objectivity of my research.

Obviously, labelling me as a ‘Christian Southerner’ was a reference to the intractable tension between the predominantly Christian South and the primarily Muslim North in the Nigerian federation. My experience shows
that it is not only foreign researchers (those from other countries or races) that can be seen as outsiders. Even as an insider (Nigerian) researcher, my regional and religious identity positioned me as biased and untrustworthy in my own country. This also confirms the findings of Ergun and Erdemir (2010) and Oriola and Hergerty (2012) that in a violently segmented society a researcher’s status in the field can be fluid and therefore negotiable; that one can be an insider in a foreign land and an outsider in one’s own country. Indeed, Paden (2015) noted that the politicisation of ethno-religious identity of individuals is a major precipitant of conflict in Nigeria and, as my case reveals, a source of challenge for Christians who research Muslim areas.

(iv) Principle of anonymity: Broadly, this ethical value is aimed at protecting the research participants’ identities to ensure confidentiality. Besides the argument that excessive anonymisation of original viewpoints could “weaken the scientific value of the researcher’s evidence and arguments” (Schnabel, 2005, p. 33), my experience in the North-East shows that while some research participants want their identity concealed, others want theirs known. This situation placed me in a dilemma because I knew that their lives could be endangered if their identities were made known. Therefore, I used interpreters to explain to them that their names would not be reported. I then expressed some sensitive views in the third person and aggregated others statistically in percentages.

(v) Principle of neutrality: To avoid taking sides, researchers are asked to maintain a certain level of distance from those they study. But as explained earlier, maintaining professional neutrality in the face of stories of the horrific attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram can be challenging. For example, while I empathised with the victims, I felt my primary responsibility as a researcher was to explain the terrorism and not necessarily to assess its rightness or wrongness, and for this reason I reckoned that maintaining a certain level of distance was critical. Further, in line with the saying that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’, I felt that the perpetrators could also have their own stories to tell about why they did what they did. With this balanced mindset, I was able to listen to some of the heartbreaking stories of victims’ trauma and pains.

(vi) Principle of justice: This ethical value is aimed at ensuring fair treatment for research participants, who sacrifice their time, energy and sometimes even risk their lives to participate in the research process.
Following Neuman’s (2003) call for researchers to ‘give voice’ (telling the story of a specific group in order to enhance its visibility) to marginalised groups in society and Kezar’s (2003) admonition that action research should “challenge [the] power structures” (p. 395) that circumscribe the humanity of poor people, I felt the need to use my research to influence public policy in a way that could ameliorate the sufferings of the almajirai (itinerant Quranic pupils) and talakawa (the downtrodden). Indeed, as Lundy and McGovern (2006) rightly argue, “in situations where political violence has occurred and marginalized groups have experienced social injustice, it is ethically impossible and morally reprehensible for social researchers to remain detached and silent” (p. 49). As an academic researcher, however, I had neither political connections nor the resources to alleviate the deprivations of my research participants. Therefore, to achieve the goal of giving voice, I appeared on six national television shows (including on the Nigerian Television Authority and Edo Broadcasting Service) to highlight the plight of the almajirai and talakawa and their vulnerability to terrorist radicalisation.

Certainly publishing research findings in outlets that guarantee a large readership is also part of giving back to research participants. Even though many of my research participants are barely literate, I nevertheless carefully targeted free-access journals or those whose readership is mostly African for publication of my research findings. Though these journals are published abroad, their readership includes foreign governments, donor agencies and international civil society organisations. As such, publishing in them is crucial for creating awareness, attracting foreign aid and ultimately helping to reduce further violence against my research participants.

**Conclusion**

This article has revealed some inherent contradictions in applying ethical principles to terrorism research in North-Eastern Nigeria. The lessons gleaned from the ethical dilemmas arising from my fieldwork experiences can be encapsulated as follows. First, I have learnt that even though research norms such as ethical principles are framed in universal terms, their application is largely situational as they are influenced by contextual socio-economic conditions. Also, harassment and security threats faced by both the researcher and the researched can emanate from insurgents and state troops alike. I have also learnt that those researching the terrorist environment should not take their familiarity with research sites
for granted as they still need a lot of information on local culture (for example, appropriate styles of dress).

Be that as it may, research ethics remain vital despite the practical challenges involved in keeping to the guidelines. As a result, this article argues for researchers’ self-regulation and pragmatic situational approaches to come to terms with ethical dilemmas, especially ‘giving voice’ in order to enhance researcher-respondent rapport. As Neuman (2003) rightly notes “researchers face pressures to build a career, publish, advance knowledge, gain prestige, impress family and friends, hold on to a job, and so forth” (p. 118). Despite these pressures, this article recommends a balance between the researcher’s academic goals and the overall positive impact on those studied.

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Beyond Minimisation of Personal Healthcare Financing Risks: 
An Ethnographic Study of Motivations for Joining Ghana’s Health Insurance Scheme in Daakye District

Kwadwo Adusei-Asante¹
School of Arts and Humanities, Edith Cowan University
K.adusei@ecu.edu.au

Abstract
This article discusses the manner in which local contexts influence people to join health insurance schemes. The text is based on an ethnographic study that explored the modes of use of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in the Daakye District, Ghana. The content is drawn from the author’s Master of Anthropology thesis and the themes that emerged from participant observation and interviews with thirty respondents. Five reasons why people joined the NHIS in the research locality are presented. The findings show that 1) the prevailing socio-cultural realities of Daakye District—where individuals saw themselves as being part of families, with socio-economic obligations—influenced how the local people received and used the NHIS; 2) people bought health insurance policies to minimise the healthcare financial risks for themselves and their families and other strategic reasons and 3) the conceptual framing of Ghana’s NHIS policy was biased towards the individual rather than families. The study recommends a review of the individual focus of the NHIS to improve its cost effectiveness and operational efficiencies.

Introduction
Health insurance is considered the best way to promote community involvement in healthcare financing, while maintaining access to virtually free healthcare at times of illness, especially for the poor (Arhin-Tenkorang,

1 Thanks to Professor Birgit Meyer who supervised my thesis; the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the Vrije University of Amsterdam, Holland, which provided the scholarship for this research; and Mrs Tamara Findlay for proofreading this text.
In most developing countries, where poverty impedes access to quality healthcare, health insurance is considered key to removing financial circumstances as a barrier to healthcare access and utilisation. In the case of Ghana, Asenso-Okyere (1995, p. 87) has argued that:

In the search for a suitable option for financing healthcare … health insurance has been widely discussed. It has often been anticipated that health insurance will provide the funds for improving healthcare delivery and increase access to healthcare, especially for the poor and vulnerable.

Political expediency and various academic research recommendations spurred the Government of Ghana to implement a ‘pro-poor’ National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2004 (Adusei-Asante & Doh, 2016; Arhinful, 2003; Blanchet, Fink, & Osei-Akoto, 2012). The policy replaced the existing system in which ‘out-of-pocket’ fees were required at the point of service use. The government’s objective in setting up the NHIS was to assure equitable and universal access for all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality package of essential healthcare (Agyepong & Adjei, 2008; Ministry of Health, 2004).

Previous studies on the reasons people buy health insurance policies appear to have focused on the somewhat simplistic view of the unpredictability of medical spending and the degree of risk aversion of the individual at the time of receiving healthcare (see Agyepong & Adjei, 2008; Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto, Anum, & Appiah, 1997; Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000; Arhinful, 2003; Dixon, Tenkorang, & Luginaah, 2011; Blanchet, Fink, & Osei-Akoto, 2012; Lagomarsino, Garabrant, Adyas, Muga, & Otoo, 2012). These studies did not consider the health insurance buyers’ motivations to minimise their healthcare financing risks from a cultural anthropological perspective.

This article attempts to fill a gap, by unpacking the manner in which socio-cultural nuances drove people’s decisions to buy, keep or opt out of Ghana’s NHIS. The research conducted in 2009 in the Daakye District of Ghana (for the purposes of protecting the identity of the research subjects, the name of the locality where data was collected, its hospital and other local not-for-profit organisations that provided relevant information have been de-identified with pseudonyms), found that the country’s NHIS tended to consider its clients on an ‘individual’ basis, ignoring the local reality that these individuals formed part of families involving members with mutual socio-economic obligations. Within this ‘collective context’, people who
joined the NHIS contradicted the ‘individual bias’ of the NHIS; thus, clients exploited the policy in ways that affected its operational efficiency and cost effectiveness.

**Background to Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme**

Ghanaians enjoyed free medical care following Ghana’s independence from British colonial rule in 1957. From the 1980s, individuals’ healthcare requirements had to be paid for by patients, and many Ghanaians were unable to afford these costs (Senah, 1997; Agyepong & Adjei, 2008; Arhinful, 2003). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Program became a major feature of Ghana’s economic policy in the 1980s, leading to health sector reforms that ushered in the introduction of user fees (‘out-of-pocket’ payments) in public health facilities, as well as the ‘full cost recovery’ of prescription drugs (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997; Agyepong & Adjei, 2008). The program’s objective was to raise revenue and deter ‘frivolous’ use of scarce health resources in Ghana. Even though the measure was believed to have led to some improvements in the public health sector, potential patients were often precluded from healthcare because of their inability to pay for services. There was also the challenge of identifying genuine paupers and indigents, who were exempt from the ‘user pays’ system (Arhinful, 2003).

An initiative adopted by African health ministers in Bamako in 1987 was expected to improve the availability of essential drugs and health policies of sub-Saharan African countries. The initiative stated that the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization (WHO) should purchase drugs and sell them to communities at affordable prices. A community could then use the savings to upgrade its basic healthcare system (Kanji, 1989; McPake, Hanson & Mills, 1993). However, Ghana did not make progress with the initiative and abandoned it in 1990 (Arhinful, 2003). The government returned to the ‘cost recovery’ system for drugs in 1992, known as ‘cash and carry,’ which meant that health institutions had to pay for the drugs they collected from medical stores. The rationale behind this policy decision was to make health institutions more efficient in the management of drugs at the sub-district level (Asenso-Okyere, 1995; Arhinful, 2003; Agyepong & Adjei, 2008). Some successes were recorded, but concerns were raised about affordability for low-income patients, paupers and indigents, and for emergency treatments (Asenso-Okyere 1995; Arhinful, 2003). Following this development, the National Democratic Congress government under President Jerry John Rawlings
(1992-2000) piloted health insurance in four districts of the Eastern Region of Ghana in 1997. However, as Arhinful (2003) argued:

The project stalled in 1998, although this was not officially admitted. Rather, the state maintained a deceptive public image that the schemes were progressing well, and results were being studied, when in fact there was no intention of actual implementation taking place (p. 62).

In 2003, John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor’s government (2001-2008) passed the National Health Insurance Act, 2003 (Act 650). The Act sought to replace the ‘cash and carry’ system and improve access among Ghanaians—especially the poor and vulnerable—to basic quality healthcare services. The Act also made it mandatory for all Ghanaians to join the various district mutual health insurance schemes (DMHIS) (Boakye, 2008; Agyepong & Adjei, 2008). Act 852 replaced Act 650 in 2012, classifying all DMHIS under the NHIS (Blanchet et al., 2012). Ostensibly, under the NHIS, ‘the rich’ help subsidise ‘the poor’, ‘the healthy’ subsidise ‘the sick’, and ‘the economically active’ pay for children, the aged and indigents. As Osei-Akoto (2004) noted:

It is a social policy; a kind of social re-engineering that caters for the most vulnerable in the society through the principle of equity, solidarity, risk sharing, cross-subsidization, re-insurance, subscriber / community ownership, value for money, good governance and transparency in the health care delivery (p. 6).

Ghana’s NHIS operates as an indemnity policy. In this model, the insurance pays a fixed amount of money for particular illnesses when individuals become sick. Arguably, no resources are wasted because there is ‘no more and no less’ assistance made available than a patient needs to ‘consume’. For each disease, the policy reimburses an amount equal to the cost of treatment (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000). Formal sector workers, Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) contributors, indigents, and people below the age of 18 (the legislative instrument states that before a minor under 18 can be registered, at least one parent must join the NHIS) or over 70 (called the exempt group) do not pay premiums; although in some mutual health insurance schemes they pay varying sums as ‘administrative costs’. The benefits package includes primary care and
hospital care (outpatient and inpatient care), oral health services, eye care services, maternity care and all emergencies. The NHIS covers 95 per cent of all diseases in Ghana, including the top 10 health concerns that make up 80 per cent of the disease burden in the country. There is also no ceiling on how many times clients can visit health facilities (National Health Insurance Authority [NHIA], 2016); however, a gatekeeper system is in operation that ensures that patients access healthcare offered mainly through primary health centres (district hospitals, polyclinic health centres, clinics, maternity homes, Community Health and Planning Services, and pharmacies). At the time of data collection in 2009, Ghanaians who had joined the NHIS could not practically use it everywhere in the country, although the policy allowed this in principle.

Healthcare providers operate under contract with predetermined tariff structures (based on the Ghana Diagnostic Related Groupings). They must file claims in a timely manner and adhere to specific guidelines to obtain reimbursement for contracted services. Payments are made within the limits of a defined benefits package, and patients bear any costs that go beyond the stipulated limits (NHIA, 2016). In 2009, new clients joining the scheme had to wait for three months before their membership could be activated. Within those three months, although they were registered, new clients could not benefit from the scheme and were still required to make ‘out-of-pocket’ payments if they visited a health facility. Existing clients had to renew their policies annually.

The NHIA oversees the various mutual health insurance schemes, coordinates related activities and manages the National Health Insurance fund. The National Health Insurance Regulations, 2004 (NHIR) guide the continued operation of Ghana’s NHIS. Under the NHIR, healthcare providers are obliged to apply for and pass accreditation appraisals to qualify for service provision under the scheme. Health facilities have specific requirements to fulfil, which include having a functional quality assurance program that ensures professionals working in the facilities are legally qualified. The NHIA is also mandated to institute a performance monitoring system for accredited healthcare facilities. Monitoring activities include: periodic inspections of health facilities and other offices; collection of data from services rendered; periodic data analysis to check the quality, cost and effectiveness of services and adherence to accepted and known standards of practice; peer review; and mandatory reporting approved by the NHIA (Yeboah, 2008; Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 1809, 2004; NHIA, 2016).
Daakye District

The Daakye District (‘the District’) is located in the Central Region of Ghana. In 2009, at the time of fieldwork, over 150,000 people resided in the district, with 95 per cent living in very rural settings. The district had more than 700 communities (towns, villages and hamlets), with one-third on islands accessible only by boat. Only 10 per cent of the entire road network in the district was coal tarred, while only 32 communities had electricity. The main languages spoken were Akan and Ewe. Local ethnic groups comprised the Tali (48%), Buru (27.5%), Northerners (22.3%) and other groups (2.2%). The District had 151 primary schools, 44 junior secondary schools, two secondary schools, one technical/commercial school and two vocational institutes. Daakyekrom, the district’s capital, had a population of almost 8,000 people at the time. The diverse cultural backgrounds of residents were reflected in the variety of local churches, including Orthodox, Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal faiths. Muslims comprised almost 30 per cent of the entire population of Daakyekrom (Daakyekrom Development Organisation Annual Reports [DDOAR], 2006 to 2008).

Daakye District remains one of the most undeveloped, deprived and poverty-stricken districts in Ghana (DDOAR, 2006 to 2008). Vast water resources for fishing and fertile land for farming and livestock mean that food production (mainly yams and maize), fishing, charcoal burning and cattle rearing are major economic activities. Trading in fish, livestock and foodstuffs has become very important for economic productivity. Economic activities tend to be concentrated around Daakyekrom, and the financial situation of most communities is one of economic deprivation. Indeed, barter trade still exists in the Daakye District (DDOAR, 2006 to 2008).

In 2009, the entire District had only one referral hospital (the Daakyekrom Mission Hospital [DMH]), three clinics and thirteen Community Health Promotion Services (CHPS). On most of the islands, there were neither clinics nor CHPS, with people forced to cross the Odo River (sometimes taking eight hours) to access the nearest health facility. Daakyekrom and a nearby community, Adeemmra, were the only communities in the district furnished with a piped water system. Sources of water supply for the other communities included lakes, rivers, boreholes and rain harvest. Prevalent health issues included malaria, hernias, respiratory tract infections and typhoid fever. Due to the paucity of health facilities in the area, most people relied on pharmaceutical outlets (drugstores) and traditional medicines (DDOAR, 2006 to 2008).

As poverty has always been a barrier to healthcare access in the Daakye District, a Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme (CBHIS) had been
in operation before the NHIS was introduced. The district’s Director of Health established this initiative in 2000, supported by international donors. Operating at the DMH, the CBHIS sought to address preventable deaths in the district through helping the local people access healthcare at a subsidised cost. Even so, many people could not afford even subsidised healthcare at the DMH, resulting in some absconding from the facility when ‘half-fit,’ to avoid the payment of medical costs. As a result, the CBHIS incurred significant debt and was short-lived. The government introduced the NHIS in the district in 2004 to replace the CBHIS (DMH Reports, 2006 to 2008; personal communication with Daakyekrom District Director of Health Services). One would have expected that, being ‘poor’, most of the local people in the Daakye District would join the NHIS and fully use it. However, the data showed evidence to the contrary.

Methods

The findings presented in this paper have been extracted from the author’s Master of Anthropology thesis. The fieldwork for the thesis took place over a three-month period in 2009. I worked mainly in Daakyekrom, its environs and on the Reda Islands. Being a male researcher working in a patriarchal environment, conscious efforts were made to mitigate power asymmetries between the female research participants and myself. For example, I wore only casual clothes in the field and took part in local activities such as church activities and communal labour. Participant observation and interviews were the main research instruments used.

I closely observed and participated in the activities of the DMH, drugstores, traditional medicine, faith healing and other relevant activities. At the hospital, I observed the general conditions, outpatient day activities and the procedures that patients experienced before and after attending the consulting room. I sat with medics to participate in the diagnostic process, which took place at different times on market and ordinary days. Tuesdays were market days in the locality, bringing together many traders from inside and outside the district. The number of outpatient visits to the DMH on market days was high and allowed me to observe many events and interact with many patients. My presence at three drugstores as an observer and a participant brought me into contact with people in Daakye District from various social strata and geographical locations, particularly on market days. I visited and observed the activities of traditional medical practitioners. I attended the services of two faith healers and observed their healing procedures, and teachings on causes of illness and listened to prayers.
intended to heal the sick. I also witnessed the activities of the main mosque and interacted with the Imam and some Muslims in Daakyekrom.

Apart from the Reda Islands, where a translator was used, most of the interviews were conducted in the Akan language, in which I am fluent. A total of 30 interviews were conducted with people (half women, half men) between the ages of 22 and 80 years, representing different social strata. Formal interviews were conducted with medics, drugstore operators, traditional medical practitioners and faith healers. Interview questions focused on the health situation in the Daakye District, both before and after the introduction of Ghana’s NHIS, how the policy had influenced their work, and what they believed the future may hold for them. Some individuals in Daakyekrom who had insights about the Daakye District were also engaged in formal interviews. These included the directors of various non-government organisations (NGOs) and the District Director of the Ghana Health Services.

The remaining interviews were informal. I engaged with individuals on the Reda Islands as well as in the streets, homes and workplaces of Daakyekrom. I interacted with and interviewed the users of drugstores, traditional medicines and faith healers at their respective centres. In the process, I encountered former and current users of the NHIS. They were asked ‘why’ they had joined the scheme, if they had received any benefits since enrolling and, where applicable, why they had opted out of the scheme after receiving treatment.

Data analysis began in the field with categorisation of the data sets and transcription of all interviews. The data was manually coded after being read closely in three rounds to establish themes, as well as the extent of convergence between the data sets (Liamputtong, 2013). While five major themes were identified in the final Master of Anthropology thesis (Adusei-Asante, 2009), the ‘motivations for joining the NHIS’ is the particular theme and focus of this article.

**Why people joined the National Health Insurance Scheme in Daakye District**

The local cultural context and patterns of family obligations in Daakyekrom influenced how people related to the NHIS. As in most Ghanaian rural localities, Daakye District was androcentric, meaning it had a cultural belief system requiring ‘men to look after women.’ Most people in Daakyekrom identified as either Christian or Muslim and, in both faiths, women/wives were required to ‘submit’ to their men/husbands, who were supposed to protect and provide for them. Faith aside, men were expected to
take care of their wives, children, parents and other relatives, especially younger family members in school and aged individuals (Adusei-Asante, Hancock, & Oliveira, 2015). In some cases, husbands were also expected to provide support for their in-laws. While in the field, I witnessed a traditional marriage ceremony in Daakyekrom, which confirmed these patterns of family obligation. Before the bride was ‘handed to the man’, the traditional leader moderating the ceremony declared that:

If you marry a woman, you marry her whole family. If she and her family are in debt, you are in debt. If she gets anything good and valuable [children], they belong to her family. If you beat her, we will come for our daughter and do not dare to ask for your dowry back; because it will be her compensation.

Most women in the Daakye District worked in the informal sector as traders, farmers and seamstresses. Even though married women depended on their husbands for support, they (along with single women) were also expected to look after their parents and sometimes other relatives. Thus, husbands were expected to pay NHIS membership not only for themselves but for their wives and children, parents and their wives’ parents (if poor and aged, but generally only in extreme cases). Single males and husbands in the district had been socialised to accept these responsibilities and often remarked in Akan during interviews with the researcher that: ‘Se yewo wo barima a, 3y3 asem’, meaning ‘if you are born a male, you have lots of responsibilities’. Many Daakyekrom men joined the NHIS to meet the healthcare needs of their dependents and minimise the responsibilities culturally associated with manhood in the local district.

This research reveals that the main reasons for joining the NHIS in Daakyekrom are related to family. The following section discusses these reasons. The data shows over 70 per cent of respondents joined the NHIS to minimise risks related to financing healthcare for themselves should they fall ill and need money to pay for medical services. For these respondents, the NHIS provided a form of ‘security’. This was not surprising as it is the main goal of health insurance service providers and customers.

However, several other dimensions of the use of Ghana’s NHIS were also revealed, leading the researcher to categorise several subgroups of NHIS users, specifically those who: 1) aimed to minimise healthcare financial risks for themselves and/or others; 2) enrolled only because of their dependents’ (potential) health needs; 3) joined to have a specific illness
treated, subsequently opting out of future NHIS renewal payments; 4) were ‘sponsored’ NHIS holders; or 5) held ‘double’ NHIS policies. These are discussed in turn below.

1. Minimising the healthcare financial risk for oneself and others

To reiterate, the people of Daakyekrom lived within a social context that places specific family obligations and responsibilities on males, who are expected to take care of themselves, their families and any in-laws. Therefore, for most men (and especially husbands) in Daakyekrom, the NHIS was viewed as a financial necessity for themselves and their dependents. For example, one interviewee, Jonathan, was a 42-year-old farmer, businessman and driver. He frequently travelled to the city to sell charcoal and yams in trucks. He accessed the NHIS personally, while also paying enrolment costs for his two children, his wife and her parents. His reasoning was as follows:

I have two children and [am] married to a lady whose parents are poor. For us, the NHIS is a saviour because my wife’s parents look up to her, and she looks up to me, even though she also works. So we joined the NHIS not just because I travel a lot, but because I may not have money readily available to pay the medical bills of my kids, my wife, and her parents when they fall sick unexpectedly.

He further explained that his children and in-laws had benefitted from the scheme immensely. When asked if he had renewed their premiums in the year, he said:

Yes, particularly for myself. You see this thing? [He points to his truck] It’s a machine and can be involved in an accident anytime and anywhere. I understand that if you have the NHIS, you can go to any hospital in Ghana and be treated. So being a man on the road, I need the NHIS so that in case of an accident, I can be looked after at any health facility.

Even though Jonathan appeared unaware of the administrative burden of using the NHIS outside the Daakye District, he had joined the NHIS to minimise risk for himself, his immediate family, and his in-laws. It is worth noting that at the time of data collection, the practice of seeking healthcare
under the NHIS outside one’s district was a complicated process. Although it was possible in principle, it required administrative processes that some Ghanaians found excessively bureaucratic. These administrative processes have been improved, allowing people to access healthcare with the NHIS in all parts of the country with relative ease (see Fenny, Asante, Arhinful, Kusi, Parmar, & Williams, 2016).

2. Minimising healthcare financial risks exclusively for dependents

The legislative instruments underpinning the NHIS indicated that minors below 18 years of age were exempt from paying premiums, even though in the Daakye District they were required to pay GH¢4 (approx. AU$2) in administrative costs. Until the beginning of 2008, pregnant women in Ghana could only receive antenatal and postnatal care if they were NHIS members or made out-of-pocket payments. Before this, many women who delivered babies and had no money to pay were kept at the hospital—with their newly born babies—sometimes for months. This resulted in debt accumulation until a relative or a philanthropic organisation paid to release them following a public appeal.

In 2008, the Government of Ghana secured a £42 million (approx. A$71 million) loan from the British Government, which was used to establish a free, national maternal care system. Under this arrangement, regardless of whether they were members of the NHIS, mothers were not required to pay medical fees after the delivery of their child. However, new mothers were expected to either enrol in the NHIS or make ‘out-of-pocket’ payments to seek postnatal care for themselves and their babies. This initiative led to a rise in the number of deliveries at public medical centres around the country (Kajsa, 2008; Ghana News Agency, 2009; Dogbevi, 2011). The 2008 DMH annual report shows that the free maternity policy influenced the number of deliveries at the facility. Specifically, the hospital recorded 496 births in 2006, 540 in 2007 and 751 in 2008.

Some women interviewed in Daakyekrom who had just delivered their babies claimed to be healthy and stated that they would rely on herbal medicines for their postnatal healthcare needs. However, they were still concerned about their newborn babies:

Do I look sick? If the delivery were not free, I would not even go to the hospital to deliver. I have delivered all my children at home with the help of a traditional birth attendant. My husband registered me in the NHIS because of our baby.
This respondent joined the NHIS in 2008, but only after her husband enrolled. She explained that she did not have plans to renew her NHIS membership. Even so, because of their baby, it was likely that her husband would renew the NHIS for another year at least and then opt out until another pregnancy. The DMH annual reports from 2004 to 2007 revealed an interesting picture in this regard. In 2004, 11,244 children and minors were registered in the scheme along with 6,581 adults. In 2005/6, the numbers of children and adults were 19,370 and 10,085 respectively. By 2006/7, it had grown to 24,306 children and 12,973 adults registered. This matches the pattern observed in the current study, that most parents (and adults in general) deemed it important to register their children, viewing it as both their responsibility and a way to minimise their health financing risk.

3. Exclusively for medical condition(s)

Those who joined the NHIS exclusively for medical conditions fell into two groups: people who had been diagnosed with covered diseases and could not afford the ‘out-of-pocket’ hospital payment; and those who, by the nature of their jobs, expected to contract a disease in future, but feared they might not be able to pay ‘out-of-pocket’. Among men in the Daakye District, developing a hernia was one such (predicted) disorder. A doctor at the Daakyekrom Hospital explained to me that hernias were the main surgical conditions among adult male patients in the Daakye District, due to it being a farming community requiring primarily manual work. Some respondents had joined the NHIS simply because they had been diagnosed with a hernia and required treatment. At the time, it could cost patients almost GH200 (approx. A$70) to remove a hernia, but they were treated free of charge under the NHIS. The DMH annual reports from 2006 to 2008 showed a steady yearly increase of 30 per cent in surgical cases at the facility, with hernias being one of the top four causes of admission after malaria, child delivery and anaemia (DMH Annual Report, 2006 to 2008).

Abu was an unmarried, 35-year-old Muslim male, who lived in Bease. I ran into Abu while he was performing one of his many manual labour jobs and, after obtaining his consent, I interviewed him. He had lived in Daakye and smashed rocks by hand for almost 10 years to earn a living. Abu explained that he only joined the NHIS in 2006 because he needed to get rid of a hernia he suffered in 2005. Abu had the hernia removed under the NHIS in 2006 free of charge. Abu explained that he would have paid GH200 out-of-pocket if he had not joined the NHIS. Tellingly, Abu did not renew his NHIS membership in 2007, and when asked why he did not his
response was “I have got what I wanted”. Abu’s remark suggests that he joined the NHIS only to get the hernia removed and opted out when he had no medical condition to treat under the NHIS.

Apart from respondents like Abu, who had already benefitted from the NHIS, there were others who had joined pre-emptively because of their jobs. These were mostly manual labourers who had not been diagnosed with a hernia or any serious condition as yet, but felt that the nature of their jobs made a future diagnosis a likelihood. For these men especially, the NHIS was the cheapest means of treating one’s hernia or other surgical problems, be it actual or anticipated.

A similar, but nuanced, trend was reported among some women in the district. In fact, the annual reports of the Daakyekrom Insurance Scheme (2006-2008) indicated that women joined the policy and sought healthcare (in general) at a greater rate than men. During a three-day participant observation in the consulting rooms of the DMH, I recorded 69 women among the 100 adult patients who came to see the medic. Two categories of women who used the NHIS were found. The first category consisted of women who (a senior nurse at the DMH told me during an interview) had been operated on for female-specific conditions (such as fibroids) under the NHIS and were never seen again at the hospital. The senior nurse explained that while fibroids were common with women in the district, most of them could not afford the treatment out-of-pocket. As a result, the NHIS provided women with the opportunity to treat the condition, after which they would opt out of the policy until they needed treatment for a different health condition.

Aside from the case of the ‘opt in and opt out’ category above, I encountered people in the field who perceived the NHIS as a necessity for women even if they did not visit hospital very often. In the Reda Islands, I interviewed a 57-year-old man who had previously joined the scheme but had since opted out. He had five children and had not renewed his personal NHIS membership at the time of data collection, but had re-enrolled his wife and children:

Well look at my age; I’m almost gone [dead] so why worry … it is not that I cannot afford ... for the past 20 years I have never been to the hospital, it is the woman and children who matter.

He went further to explain why he felt that caring for women was important:
We men are strong and can deal with a lot of things in our bodies even if we are old. But women cannot. They are complex in everything and need doctors and clinics. From the day they get pregnant to the time they deliver, they need medical assistance. I want to have more children so my wife needs the NHIS so that she can attend antenatal and postnatal services free of charge.

On the physiology of women and the socio-cultural perception that they need greater medical attention, a lady in the Reda Islands revealed the following:

I joined the scheme in 2007 when I became pregnant. My pregnancy was complicated, and I needed medical help. It was not easy travelling [to the] Daakyekrom clinic, but it was worth it. Traditional herbs did not help much after trying it over and over. It was the hospital that saved me, and if we did not have the NHIS, it would have been very expensive.

This respondent also implied that if her husband no longer renewed her premium, she would register (herself) because she needed to go the hospital for regular abdominal and medical reviews. The general feeling among women was that the NHIS was important. Thus, they impressed upon their husbands the necessity of enrolling and renewing payment of their NHIS costs for themselves (family members).

4. Sponsored National Health Insurance Scheme members
This category comprised mainly high school students and individuals sponsored by not-for-profit organisations. When asked why they had joined the scheme, most students stated, ‘my parents registered me.’ It was clear during interviews with the students that many of them did not have a good understanding of the policy and how it worked. The students tended to regard the NHIS as the responsibility of their parents so could not really be bothered about it. The other cohort of the ‘sponsored NHIS holders’ included those subsidised by the Daakye District Development Organisation (DDDO). The DDDO was established in 1986 to ‘work in partnership with and for poor and vulnerable community members to realise their potential and make progress towards local poverty reduction’. Concerning helping individuals enrol in the NHIS, the DDDO’s Executive Director argued that:
The GH¢4 as administrative fee kept a lot of people from enrolling in the NHIS, so we have currently sponsored 2,350 people in different locations of the District —comprising the aged above 70, the very sick, widows and widowers and people with disabilities.

The Daakye District’s NHIS manager also suggested that in 2008 the scheme sponsored almost 100 indigents. He argued that individuals that received sponsorship were vulnerable and, if not for the DDDO’s assistance, they would have had no financial means to seek medical treatment in health facilities in the District.

5. The double NHIS holders

This subgroup encompassed teachers, health professionals, civil servants and bankers who had been transferred to work in the Daakye District. Most had joined the NHIS in their respective districts. They were aware of the paucity of health facilities in Daakye; with some travelling to the big cities every weekend to access healthcare. Many joined the scheme in Daakye District because they were uncertain about what might happen to them and where they should go if injured or ill. Although money was not necessarily problematic, they were concerned that they may be involved in an accident or fall ill while in Daakye District and because of transportation difficulties be unable to leave the locality to access better health services in the home districts in which they had originally registered. As a result, they joined the NHIS locally to minimise their health financial risk while living in Daakye District.

This category of NHIS holders paid two premiums to two different district health insurance schemes. Clients of the NHIS could access healthcare in other districts provided that they transferred their registration to the district in which they were staying. However, this involved bureaucratic administrative processes that some respondents found frustrating. I asked a 30-year-old male junior secondary school teacher, who was transferred to Daakye from the Greater Accra Region, why he preferred paying multiple premiums rather than transferring his registration to the Daakye District scheme. After laughing sarcastically, he said, ‘It’s frustratingly bureaucratic. I would not bother’.

On the same issue, Akyaa, a 28-year-old woman, remarked during an interview:
Some succeed in transferring their registration, but it can be tiresome … and one may have to bribe her way through. Corruption everywhere, even in health. I would rather pay the double premiums and save myself the stress of commuting to and from my home district to get my NHIS transferred, as well as the embarrassing compromise of paying bribes for what should rightfully be done for me free of charge.

It would have made logical sense for Ghanaians to register once for the NHIS and be able to use it anywhere in the country. However, the administrative process of transferring one’s NHIS policy to another district was undesirably bureaucratic making the NHIS operationally inefficient.

**Conclusion**

This article has explored the subjective reasons for people in Daakye District to join and maintain enrolment in Ghana’s NHIS. Five separate but overlapping reasons were identified. These included people who joined the policy: 1) to minimise healthcare financial risks for themselves; 2) specifically because of their dependents’ (potential) health needs; and 3) to treat specific illnesses and opt out afterwards. The last two categories consisted of 4) those who had been sponsored by not-for profit-organisations; and 5) people who held ‘double’ NHIS policies due to difficulty transferring their policy from another district.

Ghana’s NHIS was conceived as an alternative to ‘out-of-pocket’ payments, which had precluded especially the poor and vulnerable from accessing quality healthcare. It was expected that people would join it exclusively to minimise their personal healthcare financial risks and so it was designed with an individual focus. However, this ethnographic study has shown the dynamics behind patients’ motivations and, as such, was able to identify several subgroups of NHIS clients. Although the reasons for joining the NHIS and the types of clients overlapped, the data indicated that most of the people in Daakyekrom generally related to the NHIS in terms of how it could be used to assist others (rather than themselves solely) to treat their personal health in a manner that differed from the policy’s design and principal focus, which considered clients primarily on an ‘individual’ basis.

Theoretically, this paper confirms the findings of previous studies that people purchase health insurance policies because of what Arhinful (2003) refers to as ‘self-interest’ and the need to avert healthcare financing risks. However, the key point of departure is the insight presented in this text on
the manner in which socio-cultural nuances inform people’s ‘self-interest’; in this regard a desire to cater for one’s self and one’s immediate relatives. Men were the ‘breadwinners’ in Daakye District. They took care of their wife(s), children, parents and sometimes other relatives. Healthcare was just one of their many responsibilities; thus, the NHIS provided them with the means to minimise the risk of incurring unexpected medical expenses. Although some of these ‘breadwinners’ did not access the scheme—or if they did, it was rarely used—most deemed the NHIS to be ‘a must’ for their dependents, even if the latter did not find it necessary. However, it should be noted that many women interviewed also intended maintaining NHIS renewal payments for their children if their husbands decided not to renew their NHIS membership. Apparently, such reasons reflected a pattern of family responsibility evident in Daakye District.

The NHIS’ focus on its clients as ‘individuals’ has not changed since 2009; necessitating two policy recommendations. First, the findings have shown that the research participants related to the policy within a cultural context that favoured collectivism. As a result, the individual focus of the NHIS made the scheme operationally inefficient, with many clients opting in and out to exploit the policy to meet their specific personal needs. Reviewing the individual biases of the scheme to suit localities such as Daakye District—where people view themselves as part of families—is therefore critical. A recommendation would be to introduce a ‘family package’ option in the NHIS, allowing people to purchase a subsidised family NHIS facility to cater for a specified number of those they look after. Second, the subtly gendered undercurrents shown in the data deserve attention. The implementation of the free national maternal care system showed that women can access medical assistance themselves (without seeking men’s approval) if such initiatives are backed by policy. Yet, Ghana’s health policy makers will still need to embark on a strategic campaign to encourage women to purchase the NHIS directly for themselves and their dependants so they have unhindered access to medical assistance on issues that involve their personal healthcare and wellbeing.

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**My Friends Were There for Me: Exploring the Pedagogical Adaptations of Secondary Nigerian-Australian Students in Tasmania**

Lois Kidmas  
*University of Tasmania*  
KidmasL@lcs.tas.edu.au

Greg Ashman  
*University of Tasmania*  
greg.ashman@utas.edu.au

Megan Short  
*University of Tasmania*  
megan.short@utas.edu.au

**Abstract**

This article explores the experiences of migrant Nigerian secondary students and their observations of teaching and learning within the Tasmanian context. These students and their families had migrated from Nigeria to Australia and their parents were skilled migrants serving as professionals in different fields (Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2011). Australia’s skilled migration program encourages professionals from various countries to seek employment opportunities where there are shortages. A particular focus of this article is the way in which students from these families have adapted to the pedagogical context of secondary schooling in Tasmania. In interviews, the students were encouraged to reflect on their prior schooling in Nigeria and to compare their experiences in Nigeria with their current schooling in Tasmania. A qualitative methodology was employed utilising semi-structured interviews and an analysis of written responses via a journaling exercise. The results suggest that three areas of adaptation (the social, the academic and the cultural) were important to the students’ successful school experiences in Tasmania. The active role that the students played in their successful adaptation was also identified. Some recommendations for teachers, based on the literature and the findings of the project, are offered.
Background

Migration is an age-old phenomenon and people move around the world for different reasons (Manning, 2013; Marsella & Ring, 2003). Relocating to a new country presents many challenges for migrants. These challenges all involve integration into the new culture and responding to the demands of change. Hall’s (1974) ‘iceberg’ model of culture (as cited in Hanley, 1999; Lambert & Myers, 1994) suggests that there are multiple layers of culture that affect adjustment to that culture. Challenges may be heightened for a student whose initial learning experiences took place in a different country with differing cultural norms, teaching styles and expectations, and this may impact upon the student’s learning.

It can be argued that, due to the growing multicultural nature of Australian society, and indeed the classroom, it is necessary to ensure that all students are adequately catered for in order to engage with and enhance their learning (Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority [ACARA], 2014; Ashman, 2012; Department of Immigration and Border Protection [DIBP], 2011; Habgood, 2012). DomNwachukwu (2010) offers two views of teacher approaches to their roles: that of assimilator or that of accommodator. Teachers who adopt the role of assimilator believe that culturally diverse students need to shed their ethnic backgrounds and adopt the new country’s culture. DomNwachukwu argues that such an attitude indicates a lack of respect for the students’ cultural identities and creates feelings of rejection and low self-esteem among migrant students. Teachers who adopt the role of accommodator make room and necessary adjustments for the non-mainstream students.

Darder and Miron (2006) call for teachers to embrace the role of “cultural workers tasked with the cultural and social transformation of schools and society” (p. 17). Habgood (2012) encourages the ‘accommodator’ role and argues that teachers in a multicultural society should promote equality and “ensure that all students are given the opportunity to succeed” (p. 36). This highlights the significance of taking into consideration the specific cultural background of each student and accommodating this within teaching practices in order to adequately cater for individual learning needs. Oikonomidoy (2011) suggests that catering for diversity commences with an understanding of the history of the migrant student’s country and a consideration of their specific cultural background in order to fully appreciate where the student is coming from and how to accommodate and meet their learning needs.

This article explores the experiences of Nigerian migrant students in adjusting to learning pedagogies in Tasmanian secondary schools. The
Nigerian students interviewed in this study migrated to Australia with their parents. Their parents had come to Australia as skilled migrants, with many of them working as professionals in various fields. It also explores students’ observations of teaching practices in their immediate schooling context. Pedagogical adaptation refers to the process by which students adapt to pedagogical contexts and strategies (Marsh, 2010). It could be said that in all teaching and learning situations there is an element of adaptation on the part of the learner as they encounter new ways of developing understandings. In the context of this research project, pedagogical adaptation refers to the ways in which the subject students have adapted to ways of teaching and learning in the Tasmanian schooling context.

Exploring pedagogical approaches is significant, as approaches may be different in the differing contexts and could benefit or impede the promotion and enhancement of learning (Bitew & Ferguson, 2012; Bitew, Ferguson & Dixon, 2008). This article prioritises the ‘student voice’ and links to the relevant literature to support the discussion.

**Research question and research design**

This article reports on the research question, ‘How do Nigerian migrant secondary school students adapt to pedagogical practices in Tasmanian schools?’ A qualitative phenomenological and case study approach was adopted, with semi-structured interviews and written responses to exercises designed by the researcher utilised as the main data collection tools. The aim was to understand the lived experiences of Nigerian migrant secondary students in adjusting to the learning environment of the Tasmanian secondary school.

A small sample size allowed for the collection of rich, deep and meaningful data. Following an initial open invitation, seven Nigerian migrant secondary school students—four female and three male students—participated in the study. These students had all experienced primary school years in Nigeria before immigrating to Australia with their families. Their experiences of two different schooling systems allowed for pedagogical comparisons. The students involved in this study were aged between 14 and 18 years.

The data collection was structured to occur in three phases, utilising two interview sessions and a journal writing phase. One of the three researchers undertook the role of interviewer (Lois Kidmas originated from Nigeria and has an in-depth knowledge of the Nigerian schooling system so was well suited for this purpose), and established rapport with the interviewees, thus
encouraging the participants to feel relaxed and comfortable and willing to share information.

The semi-structured interview allowed for a degree of flexibility that enabled the interviewer to modify the questions in the course of the interview as necessary. The interviews were recorded using an audio recording device along with written notes. Individual interviews were conducted using open-ended questions in order to provide opportunities to delve into the inner world of the interviewee and gain a deeper understanding of their views and perspectives. Each of the interviews lasted from 45 minutes to one hour per session.

Following the initial interview, participants were requested to write a journal of their experiences of schooling in Nigeria over a two-week period. These journal-writing exercises enabled the students to express/represent their experiences in an alternative mode. A second interview, comparable to the initial interview, was then conducted to provide further supporting evidence which was then discussed.¹

**Findings**

Based on the collected data, significant themes were identified when answering the above research question. Three overarching themes, *social, academic* and *cultural*, as described in the Table 1 below, were identified, based on both the students’ responses to the interview questions and analysis of their written material. Subthemes emerged demonstrating the interrelationships between the students’ academic, cultural and social experiences, which highlighted similarities and differences in these experiences.

**Social**

One of the key themes identified was the importance of social interaction in both the students’ Nigerian school experiences and their pedagogical adaptation to schooling in Tasmania. From the overarching social theme, subthemes of friendships, sport and after-school activities emerged. The value of positive peer relationships is understood to have a protective function in transitions (Hamm & Faircloth, 2005; Smokowskia, Reynolds, & Bezru czkoa, 1999) and the responses from the students

¹ For this research to be carried out, an ethics application was completed and approved by Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. The Ethics approval number is H0013930.
indicated that they recognised multiple opportunities to develop relationships with their classmates as being important.

Protective factors identified by the students tended to have a social aspect and included supportive family environments (all students) and supportive schooling environments (all students). The investigation of psychological protective factors was beyond the scope of this study, but could be an area worthy of further investigation.

### Table 1: Themes and subthemes for pedagogical adaptation

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<tr>
<th>Social</th>
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<th>Cultural</th>
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<td>The role of friendship</td>
<td>Preferred learning styles</td>
<td>Communication</td>
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<td>Sports and extracurricular activities</td>
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### The Role of Friendship

Friendship was identified by all seven students as a key factor enabling them to adjust to their schooling environments in Nigeria and Tasmania. Their voices captured the value of friendship:

*My friends were there for me.* - Female, Age 14

*Although I was shy, I was smart in the science subjects and some of the students will ask for my help and then we became friends that way.* - Male, Age 15

*I was used to a more social environment in Nigeria where I could just go to my friend’s house or they could come to mine.*

- Female, Age 14

*We lived in the same neighbourhood and our parents were friends. We got to meet to study and play together.*

- Male, Age 16
The students described initial difficulties making new friends when beginning their education in Tasmania. Difficulty making friends impacted negatively on their experiences, with some students mentioning that they felt quite lonely and isolated. However, they also reported that learning became more enjoyable as, over time, they began to make friends.

All seven students interviewed found making friends to be more difficult in their new schooling environment in Tasmania when compared to their previous experiences in Nigeria. They all attributed this to the initial challenge of not knowing other students. One of the students expressed this challenge by saying:

*I found it hard to make friends because, after school, I don’t even see those students, everyone kept to themselves.*

- Male, Age 14

The respondents found that initiatives made by other students to talk to them and invite them to join their groups, for example playing team sports within and outside school such as Australian Football League (AFL), basketball and soccer helped them to adjust and make friends.

When probed further as to whether they did anything to make their adjustments easier, some highlighted how they had to be friendlier and be the ones to initiate a conversation in order to get to know the other students. For example:

*I tried to speak like them (with an Aussie accent) to fit in.*

- Male, Age 14

*I had to be more outgoing.* - Male, Age 16

From these responses it can be seen that establishing friendships was important to these students in both their Nigerian and Tasmanian schooling contexts. The students found it less stressful to make friends in their Nigerian schooling environment than they did in the Tasmanian environment. The students attributed this to their familiarity with some of their classmates and the after-school interactions they had with them in Nigeria. It was evident that developing friendships within the Tasmanian schooling environment was more stressful and students had to take a more active role. They felt more settled only after they had established some form of friendship.

Hamm and Faircloth (2005) attest to the role of friendships in affecting adolescents’ sense of belonging in school. They suggest that positive
outcomes occur when students feel included and develop friendships and that there can be negative outcomes when students feel alienated and find it hard to establish friendships. Positive benefits can include peer assistance with schoolwork, as students seem to understand each other better. The social and emotional wellbeing of students is also developed as a sense of companionship develops. Riggs and Due (2010) confirm such findings based on research on newly-arrived humanitarian migrant students in primary schools in South Australia. Further, Sanagavarapu’s (2010) research on Bangladeshi students’ transitions to schools in Sydney identified that friendships play a major role in enabling students to settle quickly within their new school environments. These findings are consistent with those of Irwin (2013) and Towns (2011) following their study of the effects of friendships on the academic endeavours and social behaviours of adolescent boys, and the transitions of primary students to secondary schools, respectively. Friendships form a vital role in enabling students to settle in their school environments irrespective of where they might come from. Oliver (2012), in a study of African high school students from refugee backgrounds, identified friendship as playing a role in students’ resilience and school engagement.

Sports and Extracurricular Activities

Sports and extracurricular activities were highlighted by five out of the seven students and are considered to be of significant importance in developing friendships and maintaining social interactions. Relevant student comments include:

*I like it most when we had friendly sports competitions after school.* - Female, Age 14

*I was part of the soccer team and we played against other teams within the school and outside our school.*

- Male, Age 15

The significance of extracurricular activities in enhancing students’ sense of belonging and personal identity has been highlighted in the literature (Eccles, Barber, Stone, & Hunt, 2003). Students who are able to develop friendships have a more positive attitude towards being at school (Blomfield & Barber, 2010; Davalos, Chavez, & Guardiola, 1999). Further, the literature indicates that students’ academic achievement is also enhanced through such extracurricular activities (Holland & Andre, 1987;
Marsh, 1992). The students’ responses within this research and the findings of other studies emphasise the value of structured out-of-class activities in enabling students to form relationships in a less formal and more ‘natural’ way. Oliver (2012) reported that participation and engagement in extracurricular activities was more difficult for students from refugee and multicultural backgrounds. Whilst sporting and other extracurricular activities were available to the local students, and it is assumed that they provided similar benefits to other students, it is suggested here that these activities were seen as opportunities for the Nigerian students to develop social connections with their peers.

**Academic**

The second theme identified from the gathered data relates to academic matters. Within this broad theme are the subthemes of students’ preferred learning styles, teaching approaches, classroom dynamics, and the nature of the work and curriculum and resources.

**Students’ Preferred Learning Styles**

In response to the question, “What were the teaching and learning styles that engaged you the most?” students provided the following responses:

- *I like it when teachers give you an explanation that you can relate with, something at our level.* - Male, Age 15

- *I like it when I can listen to the teacher and write my own notes.* - Male, Age 16

*When learning is fun, practical and hands on.*

- Female, Age 14

*When I am learning together in small groups with students with similar working capacities.* - Female, Age 14

Research supports the notion that accounting for students’ preferred learning styles is of paramount importance if students are to be engaged, committed and take ownership of their learning (Allen, Humphries, McBurney, & Makushev, 2005; Sloane, 2010). Although students might demonstrate strong preferences for one style, many possess and may use more than one styles. The responses of the students noted above indicate diversity in their preferred styles of learning. An important consideration
for teachers may be to prepare to accommodate a wide range of learning styles when planning for students from differing cultural contexts, including those learning styles developed as a result of ‘teacher-centred’ learning approaches. This is especially important as the learning methods and the types of learning styles used in many African nations are often different from those used in the Australian schooling system. The Nigerian system tends to focus on ‘traditional’ or teacher-centred approaches in which the teacher delivers content directly to the students and assessment tasks are based on testing and exams (Cassity & Gwo, 2005; Oliver, 2012). Some students indicated that whilst they enjoyed the opportunity to learn via a learner-centred approach, they would have perhaps benefitted from some familiar learning experiences, such as individual rather than group work.

**Teaching Approaches**

Teaching strategies may vary depending on the schooling context. A hallmark of contemporary Australian education is the use of teaching approaches that provide opportunities for students to access learning through different pedagogical methods, as outlined in the Australian Professional Standards for Teachers (Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership, 2011). This diversity in approach is due to the way in which individual teachers select methodologies to suit their class, individual students and the subject area.

In response to a question requesting reflections on their teachers back in Nigeria, the students revealed both positive and negative attributes about the teaching styles displayed by their Nigerian teachers. The positive responses provided by students included:

- *Some could teach well, some were funny and made jokes in their class. A few were patient and tolerant.* - Male, Age 16

- *Some encouraged students to do their best.* - Female, Age 15

- *I liked it when teachers were nice.* - Female, Age 14

- *They were forceful but still helpful.* - Male, Age 14

- *Some teachers are friendly—when they are in a good mood—our form teacher was the friendliest.* - Female, Age 15
Students highlighted the following as some negative attributes displayed by their Nigerian teachers:

_They were no nonsense teachers...some were too serious and not friendly. I was afraid to ask them questions when I needed help._ - Male, Age 15

_They were very strict...I think they took education very seriously and they thought discipline was very important especially in schools and they were not lenient in anyway._ - Female, Age 16

_I remember they were always strict._ - Male, Age 14

_It was intimidating to ask them for help sometimes._ - Male, Age 16

Students identified the following approaches to teaching in Nigeria:

_Most times we worked on textbooks ... the teacher will stand in front of the board and write and we were asked to copy notes._ - Male, Age 15

_Some teachers expected you to answer their questions and when you can’t they whip you. I sometimes had to respond just to avoid getting flogged._ - Female, Age 15

Corporal punishment is still practised in Nigeria with the principal or head teacher permitted to inflict such punishment as a form of discipline (Tyessi, 2014). Corporal punishment was banned in both government and non-government schools in 1999 in Tasmania.

The students described the teaching approaches they experienced in Nigeria as reliant on the teacher as the main source of knowledge, with students as the recipients of such knowledge. It can be deduced that, through these approaches, students were expected to remember what the teachers said and be ready to answer questions.

Students also responded to the same question in relation to their Tasmanian teachers. They all thought the teachers were approachable and helpful. One student commented that:
It was easy to adjust to the way the teachers taught because they were teaching in a more relaxed way. - Female, Age 16

All the students thought that most of their Tasmanian teachers explained what they were teaching well, giving simpler explanations and examples and making it easier to develop understanding. The students highlighted beneficial teacher approaches as, for example:

The teacher asked me to share about my country...to locate Nigeria on the map and to say something in my language. It was a good way for me to share about my country and for the students to understand where I was coming from... I felt a part of the class. It was funny how the teacher tried to pronounce some words in my language. - Male, Age 16

The pedagogical approach utilised demonstrates that the teacher was sensitive to the student’s background and valued the student’s prior experiences. Riggs and Due (2010) argue for pedagogical approaches that move away from attitudes of pity or benevolence towards migrant students to approaches that recognise the individual capacities of these students and appreciate their experiences and prior knowledge. In this case, the teacher positioned the student in a place of power, making this student the more ‘knowledgeable other’ or peer (Vygotsky, 1978)

The students also commented on how they appreciated the varying teaching approaches of their Tasmanian teachers.

I like it when you get to read, write notes but also do relevant activities. I like the freedom for students to make their own choices. Teachers allow us express ourselves and be more confident. - Female, Age 16

Classroom Dynamics

The nature of the classroom setup was among the questions explored in the interviews for this study. The students shared information about their

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2 The concept of ‘knowledgeable other’ is drawn from the concept of sociocultural teaching practices, originating with Vygotsky’s (1978) theory of ‘scaffolding’ as a way in which learners are supported with incremental assistance from a ‘more knowledgeable other’, or peer, whilst undertaking a task.
classroom environments in both Nigeria and Tasmania. Their responses revealed that classrooms in Nigeria were large, with about 40 students in a class. The seating arrangements were predominantly in rows and columns facing towards the blackboard.

In Tasmania, the students experienced a different, smaller classroom environment, with an average of about 20 students. Seating arrangements varied from small table groups to opportunities for all students to gather for whole-class discussions.

Few peer-to-peer interactions occurred within the students’ Nigerian classrooms unless they were individually organised amongst peers. This accords with previous findings regarding teacher-centred approaches to teaching in Nigeria (Apanpa & Oluranti, 2012; Nwosu, 2014), which found that collaborative learning strategies were not utilised within many of the classrooms, with more reliance placed on expository teaching methods (Akinbobola, 2010).

As indicated above, this was not the case in the Tasmanian schooling environment, where the classroom setup was such that it encouraged peer interaction. For instance, all of the students commented that they worked together in small table groups, were assigned group tasks and shared ideas.

The findings of this study are supported by Victory and Cohen (2014), who suggested that the way the classroom is arranged affects the interactions that occur in the classroom and also affects the process of learning and teaching. The students recognised that the way in which classrooms were arranged in their Tasmanian context was quite different from most of their Nigerian classroom experiences. They found that they took some time to adapt to the new class settings. An implication for teachers is to view the adjustment process to a new classroom setting as occurring over time and to allow students time for pedagogical adaptation to occur.

**Nature of Work, Curriculum and Classroom Assessment**

The students revealed that in Nigeria they studied various subjects, averaging about 10 in primary school, 13 in junior secondary school and 17 in senior secondary school. The students explained that they had three school terms per year in Nigeria and described undertaking three written assessment tests followed by an end-of-term exam. Students also had to sit an end-of-year written examination covering content across the three terms. Their success in these examinations determined their promotion to the next class, otherwise they would have to repeat the class they were in.
The students explained that they found engaging with the work in their Tasmanian classrooms easier. Some of the students mentioned that the learning experiences were the easiest aspect to adjust to. When probed further as to why this was the case, the following is an example of the responses provided:

*I enjoyed the work because of the way the teachers taught.*
*I was easy to adjust to the way the teachers were teaching... they were teaching in a relaxed way.* - Female, Age 15

All participants reported their academic work within their Tasmanian classroom to be significantly different to that in Nigeria. One student highlighted that the work was not challenging enough initially, so the teacher made adjustments in order to provide this student with more stimulating and challenging work.

The assessment strategies utilised within the two contexts differed, with students highlighting the use of more *summative assessments* within their Nigerian classroom context and *formative assessment* strategies in their Tasmania classroom context. While in Nigeria, they mentioned how they disliked the use of exams as the main means of gauging their understanding. When probed further, they attributed this to the tension and stress it caused as they needed to remember a whole term’s work for end-of-term exams and three terms’ work for the end-of-year exams. The reality of test anxiety and its potentially negative effects on performance has been noted in the literature (see Ogundokun, 2011). In comparison, in their Tasmanian classrooms the students did not undertake end-of-term or end-of-year examinations except for the Australian *National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy* (NAPLAN) exams which occurred every other year. The NAPLAN tests were conducted only in years 3, 5, 7 and 9 for the purpose of tracking student progress in comparison to school and national averages. The tests are also meant to assist teachers to develop their curriculum to meet national standards.

**Resources**

In relation to resources available within their schooling environments in Nigeria, some of the students made comments such as:

*We had poor schooling facilities. There was no internet.*
- Male, Age 14
In discussing the availability of resources within their Tasmanian schooling environment, all the students made comments such as:

*We have access to all the resources, such as computers, we need to help us learn.* - Female, Age 14

*Teachers brought in the resources we needed for our experiments.* - Male, Age 16

The availability of basic classroom resources is generally thought to foster student engagement and the enhancement of learning (Hardman, Abd-Kadir, & Smith, 2008). How these resources are utilised may have a significant impact on students’ engagement and outcomes. Within the Tasmanian schooling context, students revealed that resources were readily available and this assisted in making learning more engaging and enjoyable.

Within the Nigerian classroom context, resources were scarce and were found to be inadequate to cater for the large number of students within the classroom (Hardman, Abd-Kadir, & Smith, 2008). Okebukola (2012), in her research into the views of 30 Nigerian primary school teachers on teaching literacy, also identified variability in the availability of classroom resources. She found many classrooms lacked resources such as flashcards, charts and textbooks and offered only limited access to computers, the internet and a library in urban schools, with no access in rural schools. All the teachers identified a lack of adequate resources as being a hindrance to their ability to teach students effectively. This supports the statements made by the students interviewed for this research, who commented on how inadequate resources affected their engagement, enjoyment and ease of learning. However, these students did not reveal any direct relationship between the availability of resources and their academic achievement. Despite the challenge of inadequate resources within their Nigerian schooling contexts, the students indicated that they were capable of achieving success at a high level in their learning in Nigeria. The students’ capacity to succeed without the provision of the range of resources thought necessary in the Australian context indicates that the students utilised more than physical resources to enhance their learning.

Apart from the physical or external resources that are available within the learning environment, students and teachers bring to the classroom internal resources such as problem-solving skills and resilience (Woolfolk & Margetts, 2007). The students interviewed demonstrated resilience, problem-solving abilities, hard work and the motivation to excel.
**Cultural**

The definition of culture is broad and complex. Emmitt, Komesaroff, & Pollock (2006) define culture as “a way of life, as the ideas, customs, skills, arts and tools that characterise a given group of people in a given period of time” (p. 50). As a contested construct, the material, ideological and linguistic elements of culture are not fixed. Rather, they are dynamic and, in some sense, highly subjective. One model of culture is the ‘iceberg’ model (Hall, 1974, cited in Hanley, 1999) which identifies those easily recognised elements (food, festivals, dress) as ‘above the water-line’ and those less tangible features of culture (attitudes towards gender and age, beliefs about the after-life, for example) as the unseen aspects of culture ‘below the water-line’. The working definition utilised in the present study is that culture is a ‘process’ rather than a ‘product’. In this sense, culture and language are connected in complex ways as we strive to construct shared understandings.

Academic and social elements (as discussed above) are also part of the general culture students have had to adjust to. Other cultural elements, such as a difference in the way food is prepared, were also mentioned by the students as differences they found easier to adapt to. One noticeable way that the students experienced the connection between culture and language was in the way in which non-verbal communication differed between Nigeria and Tasmania. The experiences of these students with both verbal and non-verbal communication is considered below.

**Communication**

The link between language and culture is thought to be complex, dynamic and ongoing. It is also an important consideration for teachers who have diverse classrooms (Emmitt, Komesaroff, & Pollock, 2006). Pedagogical adaptation, as a holistic construct, includes adaptation to the language used in the classroom as well as the cultural and social meanings developed via the language used in the school environment. The students mentioned that both verbal and non-verbal communication played a role in their pedagogical adaptation, and this subtheme is divided into these two categories accordingly.

*Verbal Communication*

Although language has been identified as the biggest challenge the majority of migrant students encounter (Bitew, Ferguson, & Dixon, 2008; Chapman, Zilwa, Evans, & McDonald, 2001; Cranitch, 2010; Dyson, 2008), this was not the case for the students in this study. The students’
responses suggest that language was not the immediate challenge to their adjustment as they all spoke and wrote in English in their classrooms in Nigeria. This is an interesting point to consider in light of the current research on issues for migrant students. The seeming assumption that students from multilingual environments may struggle with English as the language of instruction may, perhaps, not quite reflect the lived experience of students who have had initial schooling in countries where English is considered one of the official languages, such as Nigeria.

The spread of English throughout colonised areas of the world has been diagrammatically represented in the ‘World Englishes’ graphic developed by Kachru (1992). Kachru places countries where English is the majority official language, such as Australia, within an ‘Inner Circle’. In an ‘Outer Circle’ are countries such as India, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria, where English is an official language and is often used as the language of instruction in primary and high schools. It is possible that Nigeria’s status as an ‘Outer Circle’ country may not be well known by Australian teachers of Nigerian migrant students, thus the assumption may be made that language issues will be a barrier to learning for students arriving from Nigeria.

One of the issues identified as an obstacle, however, was the difference in accent and intonation encountered in the unique Australian context. The students highlighted how their friends and classmates found it difficult to understand their accent when they spoke and how they, too, struggled to understand their Australian peers.

Non-Verbal Communication

One of the students highlighted the difficulty in adjusting to the expectations of her Tasmanian teachers in terms of non-verbal communication. She had this to say:

*Teachers here expected me to look them in the eye when talking to them but coming from Nigeria, that was a sign of disrespect. I have learned to look teachers in the eye because they think it is rude not to. - Female, Age 16*

Teacher expectations have a significant effect on students’ learning experiences (Intxausti, Etxeberria, & Joaristi, 2014). Such expectations need to be clearly explained to students as they may differ from what students are used to in their previous schooling experiences and in their homes (Chinner, 2014; Victory & Cohen, 2014). For example, as indicated
in the above comment, in Nigeria it is considered rude for students/children to maintain eye contact when talking with authority figures.

The role that non-verbal communication plays in communication is heightened in the classroom context, as the teacher-student relationship is negotiated over time and influenced by cultural context, gender and age. The differences between the Nigerian students’ understanding of particular non-verbal cues and their teachers’ is a small, but initially important, example of the value of understanding the way in which culture, language and context interact. It is also an example of the way in which the students are able to ‘work out’ the non-verbal behaviours appropriate in the new context and highlights the general capacity of the students to try a range of strategies in order to adapt to the complexities of the new schooling context.

**Conclusion**

The comments of these seven Nigerian migrant students indicated that social, academic and cultural elements - in particular, friendships, extracurricular activities/sports, teaching approaches, students’ preferred learning styles, classroom dynamics, the nature of the work, and verbal and non-verbal communication - affected their adaptation and adjustment to their new learning environments. The findings strongly suggest that the success of the adaptation of the students involved in the study is linked to their willingness to look for, and activate, ways to overcome any potential challenges to their adaptation. An example is the way in the students made a conscious effort to be socially outgoing and approachable in order to develop friendships with their peers or to seek opportunities to play sport or engage in extracurricular activities.

An implication for Tasmanian teachers, and indeed other teachers, is to consider the benefit of providing a range of opportunities for students to find ways to develop social relationships through semi-structured sport and extracurricular activities and to support Nigerian migrant students’ willingness to develop individual and creative responses to adaptation. The prior experience of a more traditional or ‘teacher-directed’ learning context in Nigeria meant that some students initially found the ‘learner-centred’ approach of Tasmanian classrooms an area for adjustment. The students reported that the emphasis on peer-to-peer teaching was beneficial, but a suggestion is for the provision of some traditional teaching to aid in the Nigerian students’ transition to a new learning context. These could provide opportunities for students to work individually while still encouraging them to work collaboratively in small groups.
Aspects of language, especially accent and slang, and varying expectations in teacher-student communication, were potential barriers to communication. However, it is worth noting that the Nigerian students used problem solving to overcome these challenges, from focussing on their listening skills and pronunciation to making concerted efforts to overcome their hesitancy in returning eye contact with their teachers.

Overall, students had a positive experience settling into the Tasmanian schooling environment and found the teaching style and teacher-student interaction in Tasmania beneficial. Of particular note is the way the students developed adaptations to potential challenges through targeted problem solving. Their insights are a valuable contribution to understanding the process of pedagogical adaptation faced by students who transition from one schooling system to another and also reaffirm the value of understanding each student as an individual learner who is negotiating a new, and sometimes complex, educational environment.

References


Afrikaner Émigrés in Australia: Perception vs. Reality in Human Decision-Making

Hanna Jagtenberg
Department of Anthropology, Adelaide University
hanna.jagtenberg@adelaide.edu.au

Abstract

Based on ongoing ethnographic research among post-1994 first generation Afrikaner immigrants in Australia, I argue in this article that the majority of them base their decision to emigrate from South Africa on their perception of reality rather than on reality itself. The primary reason why they have left their home country was due to the ‘affirmative action’ policy, which they view as racist leading to ‘reverse discrimination’. They believe that their children did not have a future in South Africa because of the fact that they have white skin. However, the preliminary results of this study show that in reality, only a very small number of participants have had an actual negative experience with affirmative action, and secondary sources demonstrate that white privilege still prevails in post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, the underlying, subconscious reason why Afrikaners are

1 This article was first presented at Africa Moving the Boundaries, 39th Annual AFSAAP Conference, UWA, Perth, 5-7 December 2016, and was published in the conference proceedings http://afsaap.org.au/conference/perth-2016/

2 I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Andrew Skuse and Dr Valerie Liddle - Department of Anthropology, University of Adelaide; Professor John Coetzee - Department of Creative Writing, University of Adelaide; and Dr Carli Coetzee - SOAS, University of London. Furthermore, I am grateful to the ARAS editorial team for their useful comments and suggestions and to the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific for awarding me the Cherry Gertzel/AFSAAP postgraduate prize. This research is based on my PhD research being conducted with financial support from the Australian Government’s Research Training Program (RTS).
emigrating is their fear of the threat that affirmative action poses to their children’s future. As such, it can be analysed according to Maslow’s human needs theory, which shows that they are fundamentally in search of survival.

**Introduction**

Amid the multitude of emigration flows that characterize our contemporary world, the Afrikaner³ exodus out of South Africa forms a distinctive stream, in the sense that it represents a ‘perpetrator diaspora’ that feels victimized. By this I mean that, contrary to general opinion which views them as the apartheid culprits, in their own perception Afrikaners are victims of post-apartheid policies and circumstances which drive them out of their home country, and as we have seen, mostly into Australia.⁴ During my fieldwork in South Africa in 2011,⁵ I noticed that most Afrikaners I met had parted or were parting from family and friends who had immigrated or were immigrating to Australia. I also observed that as a people, especially the older generations, they seemed to express a profound sense of sadness, associated with loss and change. This is what prompted me to do a research project on post-1994 first generation Afrikaner immigrants in Australia, which I am currently conducting as a doctoral study at the University of Adelaide. My engagement with Afrikaners, then, comes from an interest in and compassion for their sadness, though primarily from a deep desire to understand it, and them, not to justify or apologize for the past, but to improve our understanding of it, of how it came to be and of how it continues to shape the present as well as the future, of, in the meantime, both South Africa and Australia.

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³ Defined here as ‘white’ South Africans of European descent whose vernacular is Afrikaans.

⁴ According to official statistics, 10 to 15 per cent of the Afrikaner population has left South Africa between 1994 and 2011, which translates into 300,000 to 450,000 people (Giliomee, 2011, 709; Statistics South Africa [SSA], 2011). Based on statistics from recipient countries, the real figure is estimated to be two to three times as high (Van Rooyen, 2000, 27). Despite a lack of accurate statistical data, using various sources combined (Bornman, 2005; Giliomee, 2011; Oberholzer, 2011; and Lucas, Amoateng, & Kalule-Sabiti, 2006, amongst others), I argue that most Afrikaners have indeed immigrated to Australia. It should be noted that other South Africans are leaving too (see, e.g. Crush et al. 2000), and that many would like to but cannot, due to a lack of skills or finances (Schönfeldt-Aultman, 2009; Young, 1999, cited in Lucas et al., 2006, 46).

⁵ For my MPhil degree in African Studies at Leiden University, I conducted five months of field research in Polokwane, Limpopo.
The main argument set forth in this paper is thus based on empirical research. Carried out within the anthropological discipline, the research strategy is qualitative and the approach ethnographic, i.e. the study was conducted through long-term fieldwork in which participant observation, interviewing and informal conversations were the main methods, complemented by the analysis of texts (mainly Facebook group discussions). The fieldwork was conducted between September 2015 and the end of 2016. Thus far, approximately 150 people have participated in the study, 72 of whom through interviews, which were conducted in Afrikaans. The research sample is drawn from those Afrikaners that emigrated between 1994 and 2016 as adults, and is selected through purposive- and snowball sampling. The majority had emigrated as a nuclear family unit, and the average age of participants was between thirty and fifty years. The main fieldwork location was Adelaide / South Australia, though in total, interviews have been conducted in five different towns and cities covering three different states across Australia.

This article deals with a small portion of my PhD data results so far, in particular the primary reason why most research participants decided to immigrate to Australia: that is, they saw no future for Afrikaners in South Africa. For nearly all interviewees, as well as for most other Afrikaners that I spoke to in an informal setting (at various events), this reason was principally related to their own future generations: whether it was for their (unborn) children or grandchildren, they asserted that ‘white’ children have no future in South Africa, primarily as a consequence of the affirmative action policies of the post-apartheid government. Before discussing this in more detail, I must firstly acknowledge that the views expressed by participants in this particular case study are not necessarily representative of all Afrikaners in Australia.

Definitions of the key concepts and terms are also important here. Following the research participants’ self-definition, the term ‘Afrikaner’ is used here to refer to a South African of European descent, i.e. with white skin, and whose mother tongue is Afrikaans. It is crucial to distinguish between Afrikaans-speaking ‘white’ South Africans and English-speaking ‘white’ South Africans (those of British descent), because the research participants do this: if anything, they are not British. Unfortunately, not

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6 It is therefore important to note that, since both the processes of data collection and analysis were ongoing at the time of completing this article, my research final conclusions may differ slightly from those drawn in this paper.

7 And ultimately, of course, through self-selection: all interviews were held with written consent.
many researchers working on South African emigration acknowledge the importance of this distinction.

‘Migration’ refers to the temporary or permanent change of residence by individuals or groups (Lee 1966, 49; McLean & McMillan 2003, 347), and the sub-terms emigration (from) and immigration (to) are generally used to specifically denote those that have left or have come with the intention to settle permanently.

The ‘Diaspora’ concept, although currently attributed to many migrant groups (Daswani, 2013; Pries, 2013; Tölöyan, 1991) and often conflated with the term ‘transnational community’ (Ong, 2003, 86; Stanley-Niaah, 2009, 756) in its classical meaning refers only to those migrant groups that disperse due to a perceived or actual threat to its survival (Du Toit, 2003, 16; Tölöyan, 1996, 12; for more characteristics of Diasporas, see Clifford, 1994, Kearny, 1995, and Tölöyan, 2007). As I show in this article, Afrikaners indeed do this.

The term ‘affirmative action’ in the South African context refers to an amalgam of policies in different sectors of society aimed at redressing the inequalities resulting from apartheid by ‘affirming’ those population groups that the system oppressed, collectively labelled as ‘black’ (Republic of South Africa 1998). Classifying population groups by the colour of their skin is problematic and arguably racist however, in any work on South Africa it is still largely unavoidable. In its data collection, the South African government continues to use the old apartheid race distinctions of ‘African’, ‘coloured’ (persons of so-called mixed-race descent), ‘Indian’, currently combined with Asians in general (‘Indian/Asian’), and ‘white’. Moreover, it uses these classifications for the very purpose of redress (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 15; Erasmus, 2015, 104). Thus, it appears that until a better alternative is found, we are stuck with these labels. This is not to say that I agree with their use, and since ‘race’ is a socially constructed concept I use quotations marks whenever I use skin colour as an adjective in this article. Skin colour is a physical attribute, not a state of being (it is something you have, not something you are). However, precisely because the idea of ‘race’ is socially constructed, it can be argued that people have become their skin colour. In this regard, having ‘white’ skin, not only in South Africa but globally, has historically become associated with wealth, status, ‘western civilization’ and, perhaps most importantly, with privilege (Hage, 2000; Garner, 2007; Wadham, 2004). ‘White privilege’ is famously defined as ‘an invisible package of unearned assets that [white people] can count on cashing in each day’ (McIntosh, 1989, cited in Garner, 2007, 35-36), and can mostly be seen as a
consequence of European imperialism and colonial conquest. Crucially, and certainly for Afrikaners, who could be viewed as its epitome, white privilege has become so normal to those who enjoy it that they are oblivious to it (Garner, 2007, 34-39; Wadham, 2004, 22). Moreover, it arguably leaves people with white skin ‘racially unmarked’ (Schönfeldt-Aultman, 2009, 121), since they represent ‘the norm’ against which all others are defined.

Finally, then, we come to a definition of perception and reality, two crucial terms used here. ‘Reality’, from the Latin res, meaning ‘thing’ and the suffix –alis, meaning ‘relating to’, relates to facts as they exist in the world (unchangeable), whereas ‘perception’, the process by which individuals become aware of stimuli through the senses (Morris 2012: 192), refers to the way in which facts are interpreted or understood (changeable). Since human beings have an individual mind and a unique frame of reference that is constructed on personal life experiences, they usually have different interpretations of the same thing (reality). In other words, they attach different meanings to the same facts. As human beings live in groups and create meaning to their lives within and through the group they belong to, groups of people often have a collective perception of reality, of which this article provides an example.

Perception: No future for ‘white’ children in South Africa

Most Afrikaners that participated in this research felt that their decision to emigrate from South Africa to Australia was not a personal choice, but one that was forced upon them by circumstances in their home country. The principal reason for this was that they felt that their children’s livelihoods were being threatened, and to a lesser extent their own subsistence, first and foremost by those affirmative action policies implemented by the successive post-1994 ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) governments. From the forty-three research participants of whom the interviews were analysed in full detail at the time of writing, thirty-six stated that they left South Africa because they saw no future for their children, and, to a lesser extent, neither for themselves, due to affirmative action policies. This translates into 83.7 per cent of the research sample. One person came to Australia to join her adult children, who had also emigrated because they did not see a future for their children in South Africa. Four people (9.3 per cent) mentioned crime as their primary motive, though in relation to their children as well: they felt that they were unable to protect their children from violent crime. Lastly, there were two participants, a couple, who came to Australia because of a job offer.
The participants viewed these ANC policies as ‘reverse discrimination’ and they feared that their children, especially their sons, would not have equal access to quality education and/or jobs in comparison with other South African children, namely those often referred to as ‘previously disadvantaged individuals’ (Hoffman, 2011; Mbeki, 2009) and generically termed ‘black’, who form the main recipients of South Africa’s affirmative action policies. Sons (male offspring) were perceived to be most disadvantaged, as they were most privileged during apartheid, and are thus perceived to be targeted more by these policies. Since all research participants believed that South African universities were applying racial quotas to ensure demographically representative student intakes, they felt that their children were being discriminated against because of the fact that they have white skin. They wanted their children to be assessed on merit, not on race, when applying for university. This is illustrated by the following quote from Marieke, who emigrated in 2007 with her husband and sons:

The big reason for us was, I have two sons. They are white sons. With the affirmative actions in South Africa it’s going to be absolutely difficult for a white young man to study and to get a profession. [With the] Affirmative action, I think now, at universities, it’s seventy per cent is being given to black students, and the other thirty per cent is being divided between your other previously disadvantaged, so your Indians, your Coloureds, your Chinese, your Asians are being advantaged even before a white South African, then your white woman, and then the white boy. So this is, [sic] he will be the very last. And even if his points [performance] are the best, first all the other students will get a place at university. And our eldest son had at that stage already shown very good potential, he can go and study something because he has the capacity. And that’s when we realised: “We are OK. We have jobs. We are qualified, our professions are set, we are OK. But for that generation, for our children, we want something different. And this is why we started the whole process and came over [to Australia]” (Interview with Marieke, 2015).  

8 Marieke, interview with author, 2015. All citations from interviews in this paper are my own translations from Afrikaans to English. To protect the identity of research participants, pseudonyms are used. Since there are relatively few Afrikaans names, I
For the next phase in their children’s lives, that is, when entering the job market, the interviewees felt that their offspring would not have a fair chance due to the affirmative action policies. Furthermore, most research participants felt that their children (and, again, especially their sons) would suffer life-long insecurity because of their ‘disadvantage’ of having white skin, in the sense that they are perceived to be prone to losing their jobs. Most male interviewees saw job loss as a very real personal threat as well, and for one of them it had become a reality, which was the reason for his move to Australia. Arjan told me that he was retrenched in South Africa at age fifty-four, and that there was just no way that he would get a job again in that country. “All the [white] men above fifty years of age who lose their jobs do not get another one”, he stated. “You can just forget it. They throw your CV in the paper bin immediately. They don’t even look at it any further” (Interview with Arjan, 2016). When discussing the subject of ‘reverse discrimination’, another participant, Richard, stated:

I always had the risk, if you are above fifty, fifty-five years of age, and you are a white man, and you lose your job, then your chances to get a job are zero, you know. My brother in law has been without a job for a year now, and he’s around our age. But your chance of getting another job there is zero (Interview with Richard, 2015).

Indeed, the overall perception among interviewees is that when a white man loses his job after the age of fifty (and some even mentioned forty), he will not acquire a new position. This will make him and his family extremely vulnerable, because at that stage in his life he will have children in high school and/or at university, and he will not be able to support them anymore, which means that the entire family will get into financial difficulties and, in the worst-case scenario, end up in a ‘white’ squatter camp.

Thus, a majority of participants felt that they, as ‘white’ South Africans, and especially as Afrikaners, are being discriminated against in post-apartheid South Africa, because they felt that as a group, they were being punished more severely for the previous apartheid policies than the English-

have chosen Dutch names as pseudonyms, to prevent Afrikaans people in Australia from being identified by mistake. Dutch and Afrikaans names are generally quite similar. To further protect interviewees’ identities, the exact date, time, and location of the interview is never stated.
speaking ‘white’ South Africans, since it was the Afrikaner Nationalist Party that dominated the apartheid governments. The threat that the affirmative action poses was felt much more strongly for the sake of their children since it was this generation that had not yet received or completed their education, and had yet to settle themselves into the workforce. Participants felt that affirmative action gives jobs to South Africans with black skin at the expense of South Africans with white skin and that the latter group is negatively affected by affirmative action policies in general. Indeed, they argued that ‘white,’ Afrikaner males were the prime victims. Therefore, they indicated that they believed these policies to be wrong because they are based on race. They felt that people should be judged on their competencies and achievements and not on the colour of their skin. In their perception, South Africa has, with affirmative action, continued the use of institutionalised racism - the very policy that should have ended in 1994 - but in reverse. Interestingly enough, most participants stated that it was good to have affirmative action policies in place for some time after the end of apartheid, but that they should have ended by now. Importantly, there was also one participant who formed an exception by specifically stating that she does not believe that ‘white’ people do not have possibilities or that they are being discriminated in South Africa (Carolien, interview with author, 2016).

**Affirmative Action is not ‘reverse discrimination’**

Before I can discuss the perception that affirmative action constitutes racism, I first need to define what the concept actually entails. In general, affirmative action policies are programs designed to tackle a series of inequalities that mainly, but not exclusively, focus on minority groups (Dhami, Squires & Mohood, 2006, cited in Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 23). The term does not so much refer to one single policy, but rather to an amalgam of components of other legislation, policies and behaviour, including employment, education and government contracting, that are undergoing continuous change (Holzer & Neumark, 2000, 484-485). In South Africa, the main legal frameworks for the implementation of affirmative action are the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 (BB-BEE, henceforth referred to here as BEE) (*Republic of South Africa* 2003), with their subsequent amendments (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 15; Mbeki, 2009, 68-69). Both frameworks provide laws aimed at achieving demographic representation in the workplace, with BEE specifically designed for the private sector. As such, it ensures that employers take
proactive steps towards employing or training specifically those who need affirming since they have been disadvantaged in the past, and who would otherwise either not or less quickly be employed or trained. Taking proactive steps principally distinguishes affirmative action from other antidiscrimination measures that only prevent employers or institutions from discriminating against certain groups in society (Holzer & Neumark, 2000, 484). The goal of affirmative action in South Africa is thus to correct the pre-1994 imbalances and to ensure that the previously disadvantaged groups (‘black’ South Africans) enjoy the same benefits and opportunities as the previously privileged group (‘white’ South Africans), and this is now guaranteed to them in the Constitution (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 15, 23).

The Afrikaners that have participated in this research are not the only ones to be critical of these affirmative action policies in South Africa. Several political parties including the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Freedom Front Plus, and also civil society organisations such as Solidarity and Afriforum argue that these policies marginalise South Africans with white skin (Modisha, 2007). The term ‘reverse discrimination’ used to denote affirmative action policies is widely used, not only in South Africa but also in other countries that have similar measures in place (ie Pincus, 2000; 2003). Does affirmative action indeed constitute (legalised) racial discrimination? Most scholars seem to agree that, yes, it does, but since it is used for the purpose of redressing past injustices, it is ‘fair discrimination’ (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 19) - a clear contradiction in terms given that the very concept of discrimination means ‘unfair’ - or ‘acceptable discrimination’ (Chow, 2009, 355).

For any law to be racially discriminatory in the world today would seem illegitimate, however, in our recent past it was business as usual, of which South Africa is perhaps the prime example. Since ‘white’ South Africans have racially discriminated against ‘black’ South Africans for at least forty-six years (during apartheid) and actually for more than three centuries (during colonialism), it can logically be argued that there should be justice and there should be consequences. In a legal form, this could take the shape of affirmative action. The crucial point here is that the two are directly related to each other and that the relationship is causal: the elevation of one population group came about because of the oppression of another, and intentionally so. The disadvantage of ‘black’ South Africans was not some unwanted by-product or unfortunate side effect of something that was otherwise beneficial: it was purposively created to privilege ‘white’ South Africans. The very concept of ‘privilege’ signifies dichotomy: without the
opposite, it is meaningless. Thus, because of this causal relationship, it is not possible to make contemporary South African society more equal by only focusing on bettering the formerly oppressed and leaving the (previously and continuing) privileged untouched. The latter group has a responsibility to answer to the consequences of their actions by giving up their privileges in order to let those whom they deliberately disadvantaged in order to gain those privileges join the playing field.

Therefore, I would define affirmative action as neither ‘reverse’-, ‘fair’- nor ‘acceptable’ discrimination but as legalised responsibility. If apartheid constituted institutionalised/legalised racism, then affirmative action constitutes institutionalised/legalised responsibility. It means acknowledging a past mistake, accepting the consequences of that mistake, and working towards correcting it. This is not to say that affirmative action in its current form is ideal; there are many valid criticisms on the policies, proved by their continuous adjustment (Chow, 2009; Holzer & Neuman, 2000; Roberts, Weir-Smith, & Reddy, 2010). Also, a lot of the discontent about affirmative action may not come from the policies as such but from their misuse (see, for example, Archibong & Adejumo, 2013), most notably around BEE, which is prone to corruption and mainly serves the interests of a small ‘black’ elite (Bond, 2005; Calland, 2006; Hoffman, 2011; Mbeki, 2009; Naidoo, 2011).

Thus defined, it seems that those Afrikaners and other ‘white’, privileged South Africans who oppose affirmative action and see themselves as its victims, are unwilling to take this responsibility. Furthermore, it could be argued that those who are leaving South Africa because of these policies are fleeing their responsibility. The underlying problem appears to be that this group does not genuinely acknowledge the past mistakes in the first place. Nearly all research participants stated that they felt that apartheid was wrong, but that they themselves were never racists. In other words, they acknowledge the faulty system, but deny any personal responsibility for having created and/or for being part of that system. Indeed, it should be noted that a number of research participants were 18 years of age or younger in 1994, and could thus not have had much opportunity to try and change the system.

‘White’ South Africans are still privileged

The second, and related, general perception, that affirmative action in South Africa is negatively affecting South Africans with white skin and Afrikaners in particular, does not appear to be congruent with reality either,
when looking at the empirical evidence of both primary (my research) and secondary (existing studies) sources.

Concerning the first, of the sixty-eight interviewees belonging to the workforce, only three individuals had an actual, real life experience with affirmative action. This translates into 2 per cent of the present research sample. The three participants in question were all males and in different stages of their careers: Jaap did not get a training place after graduation; Mark was told by his manager that he could not get a promotion; and Arjan (quoted above) was past mid-career when he was retrenched. There was also one participant who owned his own company and decided to leave because he felt unable to find qualified people from the previously disadvantaged groups, which would ensure that his company complied with BEE policies. Next to this, there was only one interviewee who knew somebody close to him (his brother-in-law) that had lost his job due to affirmative action. If we include these two individuals’ accounts, then the total number and percentage of research participants who have had a personal or secondary experience with affirmative action policies comes down to 5 and 3.4 respectively.

Secondly, in sharp contrast to most research participants’ perception, studies on South Africa’s economy and on the effects of affirmative action policies show that overall, white privilege has continued after 1994. In fact, the most important critique on affirmative action policies in the country is their relative effectiveness (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 23) and the slow pace of change (Roberts, Weir-Smith, & Reddy, 2010, 6). Indeed, affirmative action in general is critiqued for doing little for the poor (Sowell, 2004, 166). Data from the South African government shows that since 1994, the unemployment figures for South Africans classified as ‘white’ continues to be the lowest compared to the three groups classified as ‘black’ (Statistics South Africa [SSA], 2016). When comparing the numbers for the most recent years, the statistics show an increase of ‘white’ unemployment in both the highest classes (those with graduate degrees and beyond) and the lowest classes (those without a high school diploma), whereas this number decreased or remained relatively unchanged for the other population groups. However, in the middle- and upper middle classes (those with high school diplomas and tertiary degrees other than university) unemployment within the ‘white’ group actually decreased.

These numbers suggest that affirmative action is successful in both the highest- and lowest echelons of the population, but unsuccessful in the broad middle class. Indeed, by the year 2000, there were about as many African (‘black’) households in the top income quintile as there were
‘white’ households (Seekings & Natrass, 2005, 306), a success largely achieved through BEE. They also help to explain the fact that the great majority of research participants were highly skilled: this is the group that has most reason to feel threatened by affirmative action, as do the most unskilled.

Given Australia’s skills based immigration policy (Hugo, 2014; Louis, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2010; Visser, 2004), it is unsurprising that very few interviewees belonged to the latter category. Of those that did - three out of sixty-eight - all stated that they entered Australia through exceptional circumstances, and that it had only been possible because of ‘God’s will’. What probably contributed to this fact was that they were willing to move to the most rural places (the Australian outback) and, for two of them, to work for less than the Australian minimum wage. In any case, for these two classes of research participants, their perceptions were supported by the statistics. However, for the middle- and upper-middle classes, their perceptions were contrary to the facts. Also, overall, unemployment for ‘white’ South Africans has decreased recently, and, as said, they are still the best employed population group: in 2016, the share of unemployment was 9.1 % for ‘white’ South Africans; 40.9 for ‘black’ South Africans; 27.7 for ‘coloured’ South Africans; and 16.9 for Indian/Asian South Africans (SSA, 2016). As we can see, these numbers are far from equal. Since the South African government does not distinguish between ‘white’ South Africans from British heritage and Afrikaners, it is unfortunately impossible to say whether, in reality, the latter are more affected by affirmative action than the former.

Other studies confirm that the ‘white’ middle class is actually still growing and increasing its wealth - although not at the same pace as the black middle class (Erasmus, 2015, 103) and that, although young ‘white’ men are finding it harder to gain access to jobs, especially the Afrikaans-speaking men from the lower classes, it is still easier for them, than for young ‘black’ men (Morrell, 2002, 311). Thus, all that seems to have happened due to affirmative action policies is that the growth of the white middle class has slowed down. Next to this, the racial wage hierarchy in post-apartheid South Africa remains highly distorted in favour of ‘white’ South Africans (Allanson & Atkins, 2005, 1046) and ‘white’ South Africans are still demographically overrepresented in government (Erasmus, 2015, 107). Furthermore, the country’s corporate sector is still dominated by ‘white’ men, holding 73 per cent of top management positions (Erasmus, 2015, 100), and who have the lowest unemployment figure of all population groups, at 1.1 per cent (Van Wyk, 2014). Finally,
and completely adverse to research participants’ perceptions, ‘white’ women have actually been included as beneficiaries of affirmative action policies since 2008, because these policies have also aimed at redressing existing gender imbalances (Archibong & Adejumo, 2013, 21; Sustainable Placements, n.d.).

Similar to beliefs about employment, the claim that university admission is based on racial quotas appears to be an unfounded perception too. Universities do not use quotas, although they may do so if they wish, since they are not bound by the Employment Equity Act when it comes to the admission of students, since students are not employees (De Vos, 2013). However, many universities are choosing to use stricter admission policies to redress their unequal racial make-up and to mirror South African society better (Jones, 2011). In this sense, a university may, for example, reserve 67 per cent of its places for previously disadvantaged individuals and keep 33 per cent of the places available for any applicant, regardless of race. However, all applicants have to meet minimum criteria for admission (BusinessTech, 2016). Next to those that do, there are also universities that do not use race as a proxy for disadvantage and thus as a criterion for admission (Jones, 2011). This implies that research participants could choose a university for their children in South Africa where they would have an equal opportunity to be accepted. Therefore, it seems that they either do not believe this to be true (i.e. they believe that their perception of things is right), or that they only want their children to go to certain universities that do use race as a proxy for disadvantage and admission. Those universities, however, would only be breaking the law if they would make use of a rigid application of a quota system. To the best of my knowledge, they do not.

From the above it can be concluded that South Africans with white skin continue to be privileged in South Africa, even though it is difficult to determine to which extent the Afrikaners are more, less or equally privileged in comparison to Anglo-South Africans. They are certainly less privileged than before 1994, but, as a group, they are still privileged. Yet, this is not to say that on an individual level some Afrikaners, and especially Afrikaner men, have been hurt by affirmative action policies and are experiencing real troubles. Overall, however, it is clear that the perceptions of the majority of the research participants are contrary to reality. The belief that ‘white’ children, especially boys, and ‘white’ men are specifically victimised by affirmative action proves to be unfounded. In reality, affirmative action policies do not have a large, negative impact on white males, a conclusion also reached by Pincus in his studies of affirmative
action in the USA (Pincus, 2003, 120). If this is not the case, what then, makes Afrikaners really leave South Africa?

**Conclusion: Emigration decision is based on emotion (fear) & human needs**

There are two main conclusions that can be drawn from this article. The first is that most Afrikaners whom participated in this study decided to leave South Africa based on their perception of reality rather than on reality itself. Secondly, they decided to leave not because of affirmative action but because of the fear of affirmative action, and to be more precise, because of the fear of the threat that these policies pose to their children’s livelihoods. That people in general base their decisions on what they believe to be real and not on reality as such is known (ie Damasio 2001; 2003; Lee, 1966; and Rule, 1994). This includes the decision of whether or not to emigrate: as Lee has suggested, for most migrants “it is not so much the actual factors at origin and destination as the perception of these factors that result in migration” (1966, 51). Thus, similar to most, if not all, human decisions, the decision to emigrate is never completely rational and may not even have anything to do with reason at all. In fact, the discovery by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio that people who cannot feel emotions cannot make decisions seems to have ultimately proven that perceptions, since they are based on emotions, are crucial in decision-making. Damasio’s work shows that emotions often operate as a basic mechanism for making decisions without the work of reason, and in doing so he fundamentally redefined Descartes’ famous statement concerning understanding the human condition, ‘I think, therefore I am’, as ‘I feel, therefore I think’ (Damasio, 1996, 2001, 2003). This resonates Freud’s conclusion based on psychoanalysis, ‘Where id was, there ego shall be’ (1933, 80, cited in Roelke, Goldschmidt, & Silverman 2013, 193) and resembles Maslow’s argument that we should not sharply distinguish between cognitive and conative needs because the former are based on the latter (i.e. thoughts derive from emotions) (1943, 385).

Fear is an emotion that can powerfully motivate people’s behaviour. Rather than being shaped by the object itself, emotions are shaped by contact with the object (Ahmed, 2014, 6). That is, people have an idea of the object as something to be feared, and this idea is shaped by cultural histories and memories (Ahmed, 2014, 7, 69). In this case, Afrikaners have an idea of affirmative action as being something fearful, which is based on narratives about what affirmative action constitutes and what it means to them (and to ‘white’ South Africans in general). Ultimately, the fear is a
response to the threat that affirmative action poses to their children’s future livelihood (i.e. survival), and to a lesser extent to that of their own. This threat is shaped by the discourses that have created the perception that affirmative action policies lead to fewer (or no) possibilities for education and jobs for ‘white’ South African children, particularly boys. As such, the Afrikaners’ decision to emigrate can be, like most if not all human behaviour, analysed in relation to human beings’ basic needs, as set forth by Maslow, and specifically to the most fundamental ones, namely physiological- and safety needs. Maslow in 1943 elaborated his theory that beneath all the superficial differences that are culturally determined, human beings are very much alike, and that all of them have the same five basic needs, which are, in order of importance: the need for food and water (physiological); the need to be safe (physically, mentally and emotionally); the need to be loved; the need to be esteemed; and the need for self-actualisation.

This means that, underneath the seemingly straightforward and rational reason for the Afrikaners to emigrate lies the deeper psychological and unconscious need for survival: the research participants, and especially their children, need to have at least food and water and be safe, from an, in their understanding, unfair world. Maslow (1943, 377) states that injustice and unfairness, what the Afrikaners perceive affirmative action to be, seem to make human beings feel anxious and unsafe. He further argues that this does not have to be because of the injustice per se but rather because this treatment threatens to make the world look unreliable, or unsafe, or unpredictable. I believe that this is exactly what is happening to Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa, real or perceived. In this sense, Afrikaners could have become what Maslow calls ‘safety-seeking mechanisms’ (1943, 376), since their behaviour is completely dominated by their need for safety. Thus, where for Maslow’s hungry man Utopia is a place with plenty of food (Maslow, 1943, 374), for the Afrikaner, Utopia is a place without affirmative action.

And thus they decided to leave South Africa and immigrate to Australia. In essence, then, it is fear - ultimately, and unconsciously - of death that motivates them to make this decision.

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“There are NO (Teddy) Bears in Africa!” Discuss

Russell McDougall
University of New England
rmcdoug@une.edu.au

In November 2007 a middle-aged English primary-school teacher in Khartoum named Gillian Gibbons was arrested and jailed for allowing her class of seven-year olds, after due electoral process, to name a teddy bear “Mohammed.” Gibbons might have thought she’d be safe in Khartoum. The Civil War had ended two years earlier; and Khartoum was a long way from the ravages of famine and the fighting in Darfur. But with the Rift Valley Fever epidemic starting up and the terrible floods that year she should have known it would not be a teddy bears’ picnic (BBC News, 2007).1

We know exactly what happened to Gillian Gibbons. She was reported by the school secretary, formally charged under Section 125 of the Sudanese Criminal Act, found guilty of “insulting religion” and sentenced to 15 days’ imprisonment. Ten thousand protesters took to the streets of Khartoum, demanding her execution. A small number also took to the streets in London, demanding Gibbon’s release from prison. After eight

1 The BBC reported the school’s director, Robert Boulos, as saying that Gibbons has been following “a British national curriculum course designed to teach young pupils about animals,” and that “this year's topic was the bear.” Apparently the teacher had asked one of the children to bring her teddy bear to school. Then she has asked the class to choose a name for it. "They came up with eight names including Abdullah, Hassan and Muhammad," Mr Boulos said. The children voted; and twenty of the twenty-three children chose “Muhammad” as the bear’s name. Then each child took the teddy bear home for a weekend, during which he or she had to keep a diary about what they did with the bear. Finally, all the entries were collected in a book with a picture of the bear on the cover and a message that read: "My name is Muhammad." It seems clear that the project was based on a research project reported three years previously that found teddy bears a useful tool to boost the motivation to learning in young children. The children’s befriending and diarising of the teddy bear not only improved their motivation but also had “a positive backwash” on the school, providing it with “a positive interpersonal context.” (Andrews, 2004, pp. 1-18).
days in jail, through the intercession of two British Muslim peers in the House of Lords, however, she was granted a presidential pardon and deported. While the case had no notable effect on Sharia law in Sudan, the British parliament voted subsequently to abolish the blasphemy laws there (which applied only to attacks on Christianity). But what happened to the teddy bear? The media never reported his fate. And that started me wondering about all the other bears in Africa whose fates I had never before even considered.

So, in this article I want to think about teddy bears and their relationship to Africa, and more particularly, I want to think about how they function – what kind of cultural work they do - in the production of literary and political geographies of Africa.

**Objects, Animals, Things**

Contrary to popular belief there were bears in Africa once. Fossils found in South Africa have shown that Agriotherium africanum was in fact the largest bear ever to have lived. It became extinct approximately five million years ago. The Atlas Bear (Ursus arctos crowtheri), which is also now extinct, was perhaps not strictly native, for it is thought to have descended

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2 There is also a question – not the subject of this paper - about what happened (or will happen) to the blaspheming children. If the aim of the teddy-bear project was to improve their interpersonal skills and enhance the motivation to learning, were these skills, for example, damaged by the arrest of their teacher and the surrounding controversy concerning the blasphemy laws? According to developmental psychologist, Robert Kegan, children make meaning based on the differences they perceive between the different objects that they choose or receive to engage with, which they apprehend as having internal lives of their own (Kegan, 1982). And if, as Colleen Goddard points out, “the self-appointed object is refuted, critiqued or denied in any way, attachment difficulties may arise later in life” (Goddard, 2014). It is likely that the teddy bear named Mohammed, once stripped of his name, was also removed from the classroom. Did the parents then remove their children from the school? The Unity High School at which Gibbon taught in Khartoum is an independent school, founded by the Coptic community in 1902, and aims to provide a British-style education to children from ages 6 to 16 years of age, culminating in the IGCSE examinations from Cambridge University. In the neighbouring Islamic nation of Egypt, on March 2016, a juvenile court sentenced three Coptic Christian children to five years in prison and ordered a fourth placed in a juvenile facility for a 32-second video filmed by their teacher mocking the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). They were charged with "mocking Islamic prayer rituals" and "disrupt[ing] public order." Their teacher was sentenced to three years in prison for assisting their crimes. Freed on bail, the children fled Egypt and, with the aid of human rights organizations in Turkey, applied for humanitarian visas to Switzerland (Caballero, 2016).
from brown bears imported by the Romans from the Cantabrian Mountains of northern Spain. Still, it did once range all across Northern Africa. Then, in East Africa, we have the Nandi Bear. But it is a cryptid – a creature reportedly sighted on numerous occasions but which has not been verified by science. The Nandi Bear is ready-made for fiction. It features in the March 1963 Gold Key comic, *Tarzan and the Nandi Bear*, where the wild white hero tricks the rapacious bear into destroying a caravan of Arab slavers, thereby liberating their captive slaves, before he finally kills the monster and saves the cattle herds of the local people as well (Burroughs 1967). The Nandi Bear appears again in the April 1969 Gold Key issue (#28) of *Korak Son of Tarzan* (Shuker, 2016). More recently it has featured in Vered Ehsani’s series of African paranormal thrillers, in the fifth novel, titled *Curse of the Nandi* (Ehasani, 2016).

Teddy bears of course are not real bears but they are not mere objects either. The earliest teddy bears looked more like real bears than they do today. In 1943, however, Konrad Lorenz outlined a “baby schema” (*kinderschema*) of specific physical features responsible for triggering affection and motivating caretaking in human beings - large head, high protruding forehead, large eyes, and so on (Lorenz, 1971; Glocker et al., 1995). Collectively these features generate a sense of “cuteness;” and in the interests of mass-market capitalism they can be applied to any number of commodified objects, including of course teddy bears. This explains the representational shift that has occurred in the production of teddy bears, so that they look more infantile and less bearish.³

Adults encourage children to invest teddy bears with symbolic power; and child psychologists have developed a variety of theoretical perspectives about the teddy bear. They are comfort objects, objects of inanimate attachment, personified instruments of self-expression, proxy parents invested with the symbolic power to protect the child in the parents’ absence. In psychology the dominant ways of thinking about teddy bears derive from D.W. Winnicott’s (2003) ground-breaking theorising of “transitional objects” – that is, objects that the child experiences as part of him-or-herself but also as an aspect of the external world. As Sherry Turkle puts it: “Transitional objects, with their joint allegiance to self and other, demonstrate to the child that objects in the external world can be loved” (Turkle, 2007, p.314). Teddy bears are objects (stuffed toys) in some

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³ Ironically, this might also explain why, in illustrations of bears in children’s literature, they tend to look like teddy bears even when they are not (that is, when they are animal characters rather than toys).
contexts and subjects (comforters, protectors, confidantes, travelling companions) in others. Transitional objects often function in adulthood also. Many adults keep their teddy bears from childhood, or they buy new ones, investing them with ongoing therapeutic power (Hooley & Murphy, 2012, pp. 179-91). A survey for Travelodge in 2012 found that over a third of British adults still sleep with a teddy bear to comfort and preserve them in their sleep (Daily Mail, 2012).

Psychology is not the only discipline to take teddy bears so seriously. In anthropology, for example, the simultaneous human likeness and otherness of the teddy bear make it a paradigmatic figure for negotiating cultural differences (“they are Bears, silly child, and . . . They may look a little like us, but they are really very, very different . . .”) (Fox, 1992, p. 47). Ethnographic research methodologies have also been applied to exploring the quasi-ritual practices of mothers of preterm babies placing teddy bears and other stuffed-animal toys into life-support cribs, in an effort “to animate these prosthetic devices, as veritable cyborg wombs which interpolate mother-child bonding and problematize maternal identity” (Landzelius, 2006, p. 323-44). Sociological enquiries into toys, citizenship, culture, race, religious emotion, gender, sexuality and executive business leadership have all focused at some point on teddy bears (Ball, 1967, pp.447-58; Browne, 2011, p. 25; Gorgy & Orkeny, 1999, pp. 95-114; Hennen, 2005, 25-43; Livingston & Pearce, 2009, pp 1229-36; McFarlane, 2012; Woodhead & Riis, 2012, p. 170). Criminologists spotlight issues like the role of teddy-bear costumes in armed robbery, the failure of the teddy bear’s traditional symbolic powers to protect children from crime and the efficacy as a gift in the healing of traumatised victims of criminal abuse (Ferrell and Saunders, 1995, p. 128, 138). Medical research has raised awareness about teddy bears collecting dust and posing a threat to children’s health. Health experts say the gifting of a teddy bear can help the recovery of trauma victims; scholarship in cultural and communication studies protests the proliferation of teddy bears across multiple sites of suffering and mourning offers only a false promise of closure, mediating

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4 This can be healthy or unhealthy. For example, an over-reliance on transitional objects in adulthood can be symptomatic of underlying personality pathologies such as the Borderline Personality Disorder.

5 In early 2016 the Norwegian Heart and Lung Association released a new advertising campaign featuring teddy bears made to look like Adolf Hitler, Muammar Gaddafi, and Kim Jong-il, with the warning that for children with asthma and allergies stuffed animals were just as dangerous as the worst despots. After protests form the Jewish community the advertisements were banned.
the victim’s sense of disempowerment with a pre-packaged and kitsch sentimentality that forecloses any real historical understanding of the traumatic events he or she has experienced (Moody & Costa, 2006; pp. 38-42; Sturken, 2007; Varga, 2009b, pp.71-96). Religious studies cover some of the same terrain, considering teddy bears in memorialisation and healing, but also as role models for the practice of love and as spiritual directors (Callaghan, 2003, pp.19-32; Grider, 2006, 246-264; Nickerson, 2007).

With the material turn in the social sciences and the affective turn in the humanities, teddy bears are now also important in a variety of new and/or renewed fields of cross-disciplinary inquiry, most obviously those focused on human-object and human-animal interactions. In the field of human-object relations a key question is object agency. If fetishism is the explanation for our personalised interactions with teddy bears, agency is entirely reserved for the human subject. But it is also possible to deduce from those interactions that some objects at least, especially perhaps transitional ones such as teddy bears, are sufficiently evocative to influence who we are and how we develop as social beings. Researchers have found for instance that the “baby schema” extends to real animal subjects; and that children develop a moral schema identifying “good” and “bad” animal figures according to whether or not they possess the distinguishing traits of cuteness (Borgi, Cogliait-Dezz, Brelsford, Mintz & Cirulli, 2014, p. 411; Lee & Kang, 2012, pp. 32-49). Confusing and complicating this moral schema, however, the production of teddy bears in recent years has diversified to include a number of intentionally deconstructive subspecies – killers, terrorists, vampires, zombies, cyborgs and the like. These kinds of teddy bears incarnate a symbolic resistance to the hegemonic anthropocentric culture that places real animals in the colonised domain of “dead” nature - plastic, passive, “completely lacking in qualities such as mind and agency that are seen as exclusive to the human”

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6 As Russell Belk (2015, p. 21) points out, there are a variety of different models for object agency, including: actor network theory, entanglement theory, vibrant matter, alien phenomenology, post-phenomenology, speculative realism, new realism, and assemblage theory. (Bennet, 2010; Bogost, 2012; Deluze & Guattari, 1987; Harman, 2011; Hodder, 2012; Latour, 2005;Sparrow; 2014; Verbeek 200/2005).

7 Terror Toys, Creators of Horror Themed Plush and Horror Dolls, offer a range of one-of-a-kind blood-drenched “terror teddies” – including demons and zombies. Some are self harming or suicidal. One holds a gun to his head, and another has torn his own chest apart to reveal his ribcage. Others are murderous, wielding carving knives in their claws. Another toy company, Terror Teds, offers similarly objects all carefully “horrified” with handmade gore.
As machines with which to think through a new environmentalism and ethics of personhood that does not rely upon human centrality, teddy bears might be considered strategically crucial. A good illustration of this is the satirical film, *Ted 2* (2015) directed by Seth MacFarlane, in which the central protagonist is a teddy-bear subaltern who walks and talks and struggles for legal recognition as a ‘person’ so that he might adopt a child with his human partner. Steve Rose reads the film as a reflection of changing attitudes towards animal rights (Rose, 2015). But in so far as the symbolic rebellion of teddy bears in popular culture in recent years is conceptually affiliated with other forms of colonial resistance, they can also be seen as exemplary postcolonial subjects, shaking off the shackles of their objectification as mere “things” as they rise up against the “the tyranny of the subject” (Miller, D., 2005, p. 38; Fowles, 2016, pp. 9 - 27). The colonising subject, as Daniel Miller identifies it, is human; and the subaltern, as Graham Harman argues, is the Orientalized object (Harman, 2005, p. 240). But as the agendas for environmental and social justice are symbiotically entwined, the “object” could be any “othered” human subject.

In one controversial scene in *Ted 2*, the teddy bear compares himself to Kunta Kinte, the hero of Alex Haley’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel, *Roots: The Saga of an American Family* (1977), a Mandinka man from the Gambia, captured and sold into slavery into Virginia and horrifically brutalised by his plantation owners in punishment for his escape efforts. Manohla Dargis, a chief film critic for the *New York Times*, is one of several reviewers who focuses on this episode in detail as exemplifying the film’s crude “appropriation of black lives” for white entertainment (Dargis, 2015). The satire falls flat. Yet it is possible to see the teddy bear’s struggle for “personhood” as an analogue for resistance to the objectifying imperatives of racialised colonialism. In fact, Ted’s fight for subject recognition accords directly with the manifesto of Franz Fanon’s *Toward the African Revolution* (1968), which was an inspirational text for the American civil rights movement.

While bears abound in the folk tales of Celtic and Northern European cultures, and while they also feature in the story-traditions of many Native American peoples, they were relative latecomers to the written fiction of animals. Of course, real encounters with real bears occur in specific

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8 Shakespeare’s most famous stage direction - "Exit, pursued by a bear" (from *The Winter’s Tale*) dates from 1623. But RobertSouthey’s “The Three Bears” - published in 1837 – is generally considered the first published version of the tale now widely known as "Goldilocks and the Three Bears." And it is not until the publication of Rudyard
geographic and cultural contexts; and the nature of those encounters inevitably influences the literary representation of the animals involved, human and non-human.\textsuperscript{9} More cross-cultural comparative studies are needed to decide whether it also influences the literary representation of teddy bears.\textsuperscript{10} But where there are no bears, teddy bears are perhaps more liberated to diversify and complicate their cultural meanings. In any case, as we have seen already, the meaning of the teddy bear is far from fixed; and it is easy to forget that these ubiquitous stuffed animals have not been eternally present, or that they came into our lives originally in circumstances that were at the outset far from innocent.

**Foundation Myths and Realities**

In 1902, at the end of a long and tiring Mississippi bear-hunt, the US President Theodore Roosevelt found himself confronted with an exhausted creature tethered to a willow tree, run down by hounds and clubbed into submission. The president declined the kill, judging it unsporting; instead, he ordered someone else to put it out of its misery. The cartoon depiction of the incident in the Washington Post a few days later was captioned “Drawing the Line in Mississippi,” and was thought to refer to the President’s opposition to lynching in the South. But a Brooklyn candy storeowner with a sideline in stuffed toys picked up on the cartoon. He placed two stuffed toy bears his wife had made in his shop window with a sign that said "Teddy's Bears." Soon he was mass-producing them.

Over time the teddy bear was disconnected from its original context of African slavery in the Americas; and today most people have no idea that the now-ubiquitous teddy bear was originally a mythological projection of the US presidency, representing compassion - and seemingly bridging the borders of both human and non-human subjects, races and species (Varga, Kipling’s *The Jungle Book* in 1894 that a bear features as a major literary protagonist (Pastoureau, 2011).

\textsuperscript{9} Inversely, cultural beliefs about bears and the symbolic meaning with which they are imbued in literature help determine those interactions. In the controversial Canadian classic by Marion Engel, *Bear* (1976 p. 24) when the protagonist first confronts a real bear in the wild she realises that “years of corruption by teddy bears” have predisposed her falsely to imagine that its nose should be less pointed; and she is surprised by its “genuinely piggish and ugly” eyes.

\textsuperscript{10} Although there is a dearth of cross-cultural research into the literary representations of and human interactions with animals, and no comparative research on the literature of teddy bears, there are some relevant studies in anthropology, psychology, sociology and other disciplines (Akhtar & Volkan, 2014; Haldar& Wærdahl, 2009, pp. 1141-50; Hurn, 2012).
So it is hardly likely they will recognise the irony of that characterisation in relation to Teddy Roosevelt’s 1909 African safari – a year-long trek across British East Africa – during which he and his son, Kermit shot and killed more than a thousand African animals, including 17 lions, 11 elephants and 20 rhinoceros.

Roosevelt’s pardon of one exemplary American bear was a deceiving ceremony of innocence. It spoke of sovereign power, just as the “collecting” of a thousand African trophies in the name of American science did. The bear that he chose not to kill in Alabama was murdered the moment he turned his back, and the animals he killed in Africa were shipped back to Washington, stuffed and mounted for display in the nation’s capital as part of the Smithsonian Institution’s museological dioramas of American education and power.

My reference point here is Donna Haraway’s book Primate Visions (1989), which links the semiotics of diorama display in the US to the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, underwriting the US war against terror and global capitalism today much as it did the expansion westward and subjugation of Native American peoples in a previous colonial period. For Haraway – and a great many other scholars since – taxidermy is a useful label to identify a diverse range of imperialist and capitalist methodologies for locating sovereignty, extending property and maintaining control by means of a kind of suspended animation. That is, by the slowing or stopping of life processes either by applying external pressure or

11 See Vargo (2009a, pp.98-113) for an explanation of the socio-cultural transformation of Roosevelt (“from Great White Hunter into mythical humanitarian”) and of the Mississippi bear (from animal victim of violence into a “childhood innocent capable of redeeming adult life”).

12 The Smithsonian Institution’s summary description of its Roosevelt African Expedition Collection notes the inclusion of 1,000 skins of large mammals and 4,000 skins of small mammals. According to Roosevelt’s own count, he brought back also approximately four thousand birds, two thousand reptiles and amphibians, five hundred fish and numerous crab, beetle and other kinds of invertebrate and plant specimens (Roosevelt, 1909).

13 But this annually recurring event in reality is pregnant with deep and terrible significance. It holds the inner secrets of sovereign power, insofar as those secrets remain hidden in the archaic rituals in which sovereign power is constituted, recreated and perpetuated even in our so-called modern states.

14 These “became some of the most popular exhibits in the new National Museum building, now the National Museum of Natural History. Unveiled to the public in 1913, they remained on exhibit for most of the twentieth century. Today only one Roosevelt specimen, this white rhino, is still on public display” (Smithsonian, nd).
intervening internally. The granting of a symbolic pardon is often a means to divert attention from these actions. A good example of this is China’s cancellation of a large portion of Zimbabwe’s Chinese debt last year, at the same time coercing Zimbabwe into adopting the yuan as legal currency and exempting China from its indigenisation laws, thereby enabling Chinese investors to increase their shareholding and thus to gain increased control over the local economy (Fiskesjö, 2013, p. 53). The pardon serves to boost the taxidermic powers of the pardoner.

There is a competing account of the birth of the teddy bear that comes from the Steiff toy-making enterprise in Germany. Margarete Steiff began by making toy elephants. Her nephew, Richard Steiff, joined the company in 1897, and gave the company its first toy bear in 1902, a prototype based on his drawings of the famous hybrid bear in the Nill'scher Zoologischer Garten in Stuttgart, a brown bear crossbred with a polar bear. Initially the new toy was not well received in Germany. It was seen as a “stuffed misfit” (Pfeiffer, 2001, p. 20). It was not cute, and it was “very dark in colour” – not a teddy bear at all really (Cronin, 2011). But in the aftermath of the Roosevelt’s bear “pardon,” the market for “Teddy’s Bears” in the US had expanded beyond reckoning; and in 1903, to capitalise on that market, the New York doll import company, George Borgfeldt & Co., placed an order with Steiff for three thousand of its toy bears. By 1907 the Steiff factory was manufacturing 974,000 bears! The success of Steiff in the US market was unprecedented – but it was not achieved without cultural sacrifice. The Steiff bear was originally named Petsy, after the German folk-name for “Meister Petz,” originating in the animal fables of Hans Sachs (McClean, 1947, p. 355). But Roosevelt’s campaign managers exploited the link between the man and the bear to such advantage that the made-in-America teddy bear became the president’s mascot; and in his second term the

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15 Magnus Fiskesjö explains the power of the pardon in this way: “The power of pardon signals the location of sovereignty, which finds its expression the decisions placed directly in the sovereign’s hands: the decisions on wielding or resting the executioner’s axe (whether in specific cases, as for fellow humans on death row, or animal by animal), or in the decision to make or avoid war, whether foreign or civil. And sovereign power finds its most obvious expression in—is always reconstituted in—every concrete example of every pardoned turkey or every exemplary teddy bear, as in the case of every death row captive, and, most important of all, in every decision on whether or not to trigger the suspension of normal order, as in that exceptional state of emergency known as ‘war’” (Fiskesjö, 2013, p. 53).

16 This was such a massive order that Steiff had to build a new factory to fulfil the contract. But the first shipment of German bears to the US was lost - and the fate of these bears is still unknown.
market for teddy bears went wild and Steiff was forced to rename its product the “Teddy Bear” (Hendeles, 2009, p. 24).

Precisely when and how the first teddy bear entered Africa is unknown. Clifford Berryman, whose teddy bear cartoons referring to Roosevelt had evolved into a whole series of cartoons since the Mississippi bear hunt, covered the President’s African safari with an image of the eponymous Teddy Bear pondering whether or not to follow him on the trip (Berryman, 1909). But there are no cute stuffed bears in the photographic record of the President’s African safari ‘slaughter’ in the archives. Teddy bears soon spread across Europe, supplied initially by Steiff, and subsequently by other manufacturers, in Germany and in Britain (Bears for Africa, 2008). By 1910 the British press was pleased to report that the teddy bear was the most popular toy ever invented, that there was no monopoly on its manufacture and that British-made bears were “as good as any foreign ones produced” (Dundee Evening Telegraph, 1910, p. 6). By 1917, with German and British enmity at a peak, the teddy bear was so widely manufactured and so popular that it was said to be “absolutely British” (Yorkshire Evening Post, 1917, p.3). British toy companies exported across the Empire; the teddy bear became the mail-order Christmas present of choice for British children both at home and abroad. But there was no really concerted effort to export teddy bears to Black Africa.

There are a number of reasons for this. While the market was potentially huge, there was significant administrative variation among the colonies and later among the postcolonial nations that replaced them; and the former colonising powers maintained their economic advantage well into the postcolonial era. The market too was segmented by a confusing plethora of ethnicities, among which only a small percentage was white; and teddy bears, while mostly brown, were racially white. Blackness was reserved for ‘golliwogs’.

As Donna Varga and Rhoda Zuk (Varga and Zuk, 2013, pp.647-671) have shown, the illustrated children’s literature published in Britain during the first half of the twentieth-century frequently paired teddy bears with golliwogs. Together they enacted the prevailing racial logic of imperialism, a controlling binarism that reduced all ethnic differences to black and white, and which installed whiteness as the dominant category of identity. The

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17 Hendeles notes that the appearance of the bear also altered. “It started to look more as it would appear for some time to come, with very long limbs, oversized paws and feet, a hump on its back, a head with a long snout, sewn nose and mouth, and boot buttons for eyes” (2009, p. 24).
golliwog made its first appearance in *The Adventures of Two Dutch Dolls and a Golliwogg*, a storybook for children in verse by Bertha Upton, illustrated by her daughter Florence Kate Upton, and published in 1895. The dolls in the book are white, while the golliwog is "the blackest gnome," a "horrid sight" (Upton, p. 26), modelled on blackface minstrel tradition; and although he turns out to be kind and courageous and much beloved throughout the next twelve volumes of adventures created by Florence and Bertha Upton, he cannot be contained therein, and he becomes a villain (In Enid Blyton’s books, for example, golliwogs are generally rude, deceitful and untrustworthy.) In his adventures with the white dolls, as Varga and Zuk (2013) point out, the golliwog is a bungler and a scamp, a creature of dubious morality and lesser intelligence; and often the dolls must save him from his own devices. Similarly, in a whole range of other later fictions where the teddy bear stands in for the white dolls to partner the golliwog, the ‘black gnome’ retains its racial coding of subservience in relation to the ursine innocent; and in the material culture of childhood the same cultural codes applied. The artefacts of this racial paradigm spread far beyond Britain; and Steiff gave it a big boost in 1908 when it became the first company to mass-produce and distribute golliwog dolls (*The Evening Post*, 2014; Hamlin, 2007, p.51). But Africa, with its relatively small Caucasian population, was obviously not a market conducive for the export of either the golliwog or the teddy bear. The golliwog was a demeaning and distorted image of the black child and the bear, symbolically cast in the image of the pure and innocent white child, was also potentially offensive. In fact, in 1907 there had been a briefly serious movement in Britain to suppress the sale of both types of toy on the grounds that they were “subversive to the humane instinct in children” (*Western Daily Express*, 1907, p.6). But it was not until the 1970s, when many of the traditional manufacturers had closed down and individual teddy bear artists and artisans stepped into the breach, that the racial coding of teddy bears began to change. In part this may relate to the teddy bear’s decoupling from the golliwog in the wake of the civil rights movement in the US and the raising of public awareness about racial caricature in relation to the African diaspora (Miller, J., 2010).

Foundations myths (myths of origin) are literary constructions. From one point of view, they tell us how things came to be; from another, they tell us about the time in which they were written. So far as I am aware there

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18 Steiff also made a number of non-Western dolls, mainly for export to the US, among which - as David D. Hamlin observes – African dolls were a conspicuous absence (2007, p.51).
is only one published narrative of the coming of the teddy bear to Africa. It was written by Japanese children’s author, Satomi Ichikawa, and published first in France in 1998, with a question for its title: Y a-t-il des ours en Afrique? (Are there Bears in Africa?). The English edition, published three years later, has the more declarative title: The First Bear in Africa! (Ichikawa, 2001). The teddy bear in this instance belongs to a little girl from a tourist family on safari. The narrative is indifferent to the precise geography of origins and destinations. It matters only that she has come from "far far away," and that she has come to Africa, stopping at a small village in the savannah. The animals all have Swahili names, so we may infer that the locale is Kenya. In any case, when she leaves the village she forgets her teddy bear; and the whole of the ensuring narrative concerns the efforts of Meto, a young boy from the village, to return the bear to her before she departs Africa forever. Lost anthropomorphised toys are a staple of children’s literature; and the driving force of many teddy-bear narratives is reunification (Doebelius, 2014). In real-life scenarios often the restoration narrative adds to the commodity value of the object; it also ensures the mental health of the child subject, who might otherwise develop an internalisation disorder of one kind or another. The tourists in Ichikawa’s narrative are satirically exoticised. Meto wonders why they don’t speak his language, dress differently and watch the villagers from behind strange machines called cameras. But he also intuits that the little girl is emotionally attached to the alien animal; and he enlists the help of his African animal friends – a hippopotamus, a lion, an elephant and a Giraffe – to assist him in restoring the teddy bear to her. So both the bear and the girl are saved, in return for which she presents Meto with a ribbon. The purpose of the coming-of-the-bear narrative is Western salvation. It gives the African child the opportunity to prove his moral virtue to the white child, who is surely the book’s primary reader; and it rewards Meto for his

19 See for example: “When Woody Cranmer left his treasured teddy 'Pooh' in Buenos Aires, the eight-month-old thought he would never see his lovable companion again. The toy had been passed down from his father Scott, 30, from Wakefield, who was given Pooh as a baby. Once the family realised he had gone missing during their trip last month they took to social media to try and find their furry family member. And thankfully within days, Mr P Bear - now the owner of a gold executive club card - was located by the British Airways team and flown back to Leeds Bradford Airport, West Yorkshire, to be reunited with his anxious family.”

20 In cases of melancholia, for example, “the ego is unable to accept that such a loss has occurred and, in order to counteract reality, it incorporates the lost object as a living entity within its own psychic topography, ultimately identifying as the object.” (Brisely, 2013, p.256).
services with the usual token of the imperial imaginary, a pretty ribbon from the girl’s hair.

**Teddy Bears to Africa**

We know that the Victorian discourse of darkness was projected onto Africa by Europe as a way of endowing its economic imperialism with the justificatory mission of enlightenment. Even in 1958, when Michael Bond created the now famous English immigrant Paddington Bear, the manuscript he sent to his editor stated that the hero had come to England “all the way from darkest Africa” (Harper Children, 2007). The editor, who was better informed about the geographical distribution of bears, advised Bond that there were no bears in Africa; and Bond changed the text, so that Paddington comes from “darkest Peru” (Bond, 2016, p.3).

This doesn’t really work. There are species of bear native to Peru, yet still it seems somehow absurd to say that Paddington Bear comes from “darkest Peru.” We in the West have been so programmed by the remarkably continuous discourse of colonialism that we read what the author wrote originally without ever knowing that he wrote it. But the Peruvians have adopted Paddington. The Peruvian government has issued him with a passport. Peruvian scientists have named a beetle in his honour; and the Spectacled Bear, which is the only living bear species indigenous to South America, - the Andean Bear, as it sometimes called – is known colloquially as the Paddington Bear.

Of course Paddington is also a global phenomenon. “The Paddington books have sold more than 35 million copies around the world and have been translated into more than 40 languages”(Kirka, 2008). In fact he doesn’t like to travel. Even a trip to the London Zoo has him shivering in fear of the other animals, who seem by comparison so hungry and so fierce (Hull Daily Mail, 1920, p.1). There seems little chance now of his going

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21 The relational system of empire thinking that made Africa the place of darkness also made Australia terra nullius (“nobody’s land”), and the system succeeded not just in parts but as a whole, naturalising all of its geopolitical descriptors, so that really they cannot simply be switched about.

22 The Spectacled Bear of the Andes is one of the most endangered species of surviving bears on the planet.

23 This trope of the white innocent in fear of Africa has a long lineage. In November 1920, for example, the British press reported “a very pretty incident” that had occurred in Belgrave Square as Prince Arthur of Connaught and his family were preparing to depart their London home so that he could take up his position as Governor General of South Africa. Their young son, about eight years of age, discovered in the car outside that he had forgotten his favourite teddy bear and dashed back into the house to retrieve
to Africa. But although Paddington has never been to Africa he does not lack influence there. In 2014 the decision to hold the African premier of the film, *Paddington*, in Zimbabwe was reported in the British press as “a charm offensive” aimed at healing the rift in UK-Zimbabwean relations “by demonstrating a cultural affinity between the two nations” (Smith, 2014). Paddington is a quintessentially English bear and on occasion a very useful armchair ambassador to boot – a figure of “soft power.” But he is also a spokesperson on occasion for immigration, and it is worth remembering that the first publication of *A Bear Called Paddington* in 1958 came at the height of post-war African-Caribbean immigration to London.

Strictly speaking Paddington is a bear rather than a teddy bear. He was inspired by a teddy bear, which his author purchased from Selfridges on Christmas Eve 1956. But Paddington himself did not enter the material culture of childhood in the physical guise of a stuffed teddy bear until 1972. In fact the distinction between bears and teddy bears in children’s fiction is often blurred. Readers – child and adult - frequently disagree as to whether the protagonist is object or subject, a stuffed toy or a real bear. There has been passionate debate on this point for example with regard to A.A. Milne’s creation, Winnie the Pooh (Milne, 1926). Either way, Pooh is the most famous teddy/bear never to visit Africa in his own literary lifetime. Whatever the degree of his agency, it should have been easy enough for him to do so. After all, his human companion, Christopher Robin, spends an entire morning on an adventure to Africa without even leaving the house, though we are not told what he thought of it. But although Pooh never sets foot in Africa, there is at least one critic – albeit a creature of fiction himself - who thinks that he makes no sense without it. The evidence for this ridiculous assertion comes from Frederick Crews satirical critique of postcolonial criticism, which focuses on Pooh’s ill-fated attempt to sneak up on a beehive and rob its inhabitants of their honey, attaching himself to a balloon and disguising himself as a small black

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24 The first Paddington soft toy was created by Gabrielle Designs, a business run by Shirley and Eddie Clarkson, and was given as a Christmas present to their children Joanna and Jeremy Clarkson (best known now as co-presenter of the BBC TV show *Top Gear*).  
25 Pooh first appeared in AA Milne’s *Winnie-the-Pooh*. He was named after “Winnipeg,” a bear at London Zoo, and "Pooh" a swan, the author and his son had encountered on a holiday.
cloud. Too late he realises they are “the wrong sort of bees” (Crews, 2006, p.91), and that he has made no escape plan if they decide to attack, which of course they do. The postcolonial commentary (by the fictive Professor Das Nuffa Dat of Emory University) goes like this: because Pooh has blackened himself for camouflage, it is obvious that the bees also must be black, metaphorically speaking. In other words they are “Africanised” bees, whose defensive action is underwritten by Cesaire and Fanon. A footnote in Crews’ text (alluding to a real-life essay by distinguished literary critic and cultural historian, Joan Dayan, aka Colin Dayan) (Dayan, 1995, pp. 801-813) alerts the reader to the fact that, at the time of writing, there had been widespread racialised panic in the US of late concerning attacks by “Africanized” killer bees. The satire records this as the empirical evidence for the postcolonial professor’s argument that the swarm of bees that attacks Pooh is really nothing more than an hallucinatory vision of the racial hysteria that Pooh himself exemplifies.

But the swarm surfacing through the teddy bear’s colonised Unconscious also has specific historical reference. According to Das Nuffa Dat, it alludes to the 1885 Siege of Khartoum by the Mahdi and his followers. There is only one problem. Is it the defeated British commander, General Gordon, whom Pooh represents, or is it Lord Kitchener, who subsequently re-conquered the Sudan for the British? Das Nuffa Dat resolves this difficulty rather too easily with an ingenious manoeuvre. Pooh, he says, is both Gordon and Kitchener - for as any discerning critic “attuned to the idea of hybridity as camouflage” will tell you Pooh is “a psychological hybrid,” “a would be overlord whose will has been sapped by subliminal identification with the very subjects he has subjugated” (Crews, p. 92). The upshot of this nonsense is that Pooh is cast as a protagonist of central importance in African history.

The film versions of Pooh place him in Africa explicitly as a moral crusader. In Pooh's Adventures of The Lion King (Daniel Esposito, 2008), for example, an evil King usurps the throne from its rightful heir - the orphaned lion cub, Simba - and the Pride Lands turn to desert as a result. Pooh finds Simba unconscious and left to die in the wasteland. He adopts him, and restores him to life; and it is only by this British intervention that Simba survives to reclaim his African birthright and reverse the environmental disaster of the Pride Lands.

There have been two authorised sequels to A.A. Milne’s books about the bear and his friends, beginning with David Benedictus’s Return To The Hundred Acre Wood, in which Tigger dreams of Africa (2009, p. 29). One morning Roo brings out the big atlas that he and his friends have borrowed
from Christopher Robin; and while he and Tigger are jumping over oceans and conquering nations on paper they inadvertently tear off a piece of Madagascar. Tigger pauses in cartographic contemplation, gazing down at West Africa. He blinks a couple of times, and then he lets loose a magnificent burp. Clearly, he doesn't have much of an opinion about the place:

“What’s that country?” he asks.
“It’s the Ivory Coast,” says Kanga.

If we imagine that this novel is set in the same approximate timeframe as the last of Milne’s books about the teddy bear and his friends (The House at Pooh Corner, 1928) the Ivory Coast, was a French colony then, part of the Federation of French West Africa. Slavery had not long been abolished. But the African population had no political rights; and all men of a certain age were taxed to work ten days each year without pay.

Tigger ponders, “Where do I come from?” He dimly remembers “a forest, with trees much taller than the ones in the Hundred Acre Wood. And monkeys” (Benedictus, 2009, p. 29). Of course, there are no tigers in Africa. But the idea that he might be African makes Tigger ill with anxiety; and it is only through Christopher Robin’s persuasion that he is able to accept the idea that, by the power of his own imagination, he can at any moment be wherever he wants, and with that realisation his stripes begin to re-acquire definition. He is again neither orange nor black; and the narcissistic rupture in his self-consciousness is healed.

Of course the instrumental force of an object such as a teddy bear does not always live up to its imagined symbolic power; and in narratives where this occurs the end result is invariably tragic. This is one way to look at the death of the protagonist, Sebastian Flyte, in the quintessentially English novel, Brideshead Revisited, by Evelyn Waugh (1945). Sebastian is a charming but deeply troubled English lord, who seeks solace but finds ruination in alcohol, and who fetches up finally in Tunisia hoping to find redemption through suffering and self-abasement. With him to the end is his faithful friend and protector, a teddy bear named Aloysius (after the patron saint of youth). But the teddy bear’s protective power is not equal to Sebastian’s desire for self-destruction. The novel encourages us to imagine Sebastian somewhere in North Africa, torn to pieces by angels and demons – or if you prefer, by his own contradictions, his devotion to ministry in Africa on the one hand, and his devotion to rum on the other. Aloysius is a proxy for God, and the inability of the teddy bear to save Sebastian signals
the tragedy of Christianity in the modern world, a loss of power underpinned by the general decline of faith. But Sebastian’s tragedy is symbolic in another way, for it is also the tragedy of a misguided missionary. A postcolonial reading of the teddy bear’s failure to save him might argue that the bear’s power only operates in the savage zones, whereas as Sebastian’s sister tells us, he leaves England to escape the savages, not to join them.26

Teddy bears are changing, both in material culture and in literature. They can be evil, treacherous, horrifying. They have morphed into zombies, witches, suicide assassins, concealing drugs or bombs – creatures of dread and bloody violence. Many stick to tradition and are kind and caring. But they are not passive; they have agency. Increasingly, they travel on their own, and quite a few now travel to Africa. Susan Hoy even erases her own identity as an author so that her ursine protagonist, Reginald (“Reggie”) Oliver Smythe, is able to present himself in the first person. It is his name that appears as author under the title, and he tells his story in his voice, in the form of a fictive journal of his adventures on safari in East Africa. Susan accompanies him, and in fact she forces him on safari, knowing that he prefers “still life.” The teddy bear’s story places her as the subaltern, unable to speak in her own voice. She is the subaltern. In one book he travels to the Nile, in another to East Africa. In the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya he is the only bear, and he wonders if he is the first. He studies Swahili. He lists the native animals that he sights and observes: “Fur coats look best on the original owners.” He is emotionally literate too, more so apparently than Susan, who has taken him on safari without regard to his own feelings. He misses the other stuffed animals who are his friends, especially Pansy, another teddy bear, to whom he writes: “I’m falling apart without you!” And he is – literally. His nose falls off somewhere between Nakuru and Nairobi, and Susan has to make “makeshift” repairs. But in the end he’s grateful to Susan for forcing him out of his ‘still life.’ Africa changes everyone . . . even a bear” (Smythe, 1995).

Barrington Bear also goes to East Africa on safari, and although his adventures are told in the third person, a letter to the reader precedes them - in his own hand and voice – introducing the author, Keith Szafranski, as his friend, his travelling companion and his scribe (Szafranski, 2008). As a non-native animal, of course Barrington needs a guide to the game parks,

26 My dissatisfaction with Waugh’s novel, however, is not that I have to infer the fate of Sebastian - for which there are clues enough - but that I am given no indication whatsoever as to the fate of Aloysius.
and who better than another stuffed animal, a chimpanzee named Sokwe. Naturally, as a non-human tourist and stand-in for Szafranski, who is a professional photographer, Barrington also wants to “shoot” the native human animals. Sokwe teaches him the Swahili names of all the non-human animals but also ensures that he meets a Masai warrior whose task it is to guard the human village from those same animals. Like ‘Reggie’, Barrington is a character created to educate as well as entertain readers about East Africa.

Raymond Floyde is an educator of a different ilk. Motivated by the unbearable (sic) knowledge that “there are no bears in Africa,” he wants to educate African animals in person (sic) about bears. (Mrs Moose & Pauley, 1993). He is a kind of performance artist, turning himself into a travelling teddy-bear exhibit.

Teddy Bears from Africa

The “hand-made teddy bear” movement of the 1990s had a significant impact in South Africa especially, and today teddy-bear manufacturing provides full-time employment to women from a number of disadvantaged communities. The Taurina teddy bears from Capetown are a good example. They take their name from the Tswana and Sotho word for a lion (tau) and the acronym NINA (“No Income, No Assets). The idea is that the making of Taurina teddy bears empowers the women who make them to become the ‘lions’ of their own destinies. African teddy bears have become a cottage industry exporting to collectors all around the world.

But what happened to the teddy bear at the centre of the Khartoum Blasphemy case? Initially he multiplied, and you could find him for sale through websites dedicated to spreading the word of Islam or alternatively defending freedom of expression and religious tolerance (at the same time raising money for the congressionally chartered, non-profit United Services Organization – [see for example Truth Booth Online, nd]). For a while he became a kind of holy warrior for hire. Then he disappeared from those manufacturer’s sites. Perhaps he is on the run, like the teddy-bear hero of Clifford Chase’s novel, Winkie, who, finding himself neglected on the toy shelf, takes control of his life by escaping into the remote forest - only to “find[…] himself on the wrong side of the US War on Terror” (Chase, 2006). A whole spate of terrorist attacks has been traced to that forest. So when the FBI arrives, and finds only a tiny teddy bear, they arrest him anyway. After all, he might be a master of disguise: “maybe they were trained for that, in the Near East, the Far East, Africa, wherever terrorists were bred . . .” (Chase, 2006, p. 13).
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Ali Mumin Ahad
*The University of Melbourne*
a.ahad@unimelb.edu.au

Since independence in 1960 and during the functioning of the postcolonial state, the metaphorical she-camel (*Maandeeq*) was shown (by poets first and, by politicians after) as a symbol of the nation-state, a concept that should indicate a cultural homogeneity (ethnic, linguistic and religious) of the Somalis, which itself is the result of the motivated effort by the Somali nationalists. Consequently, the term nation-state is not an empty locution; it is significant as it represents a relationship between a politically dominant culture (which implicitly identifies the pastoralist section of the society with the nation) and the state institution. Therefore, the *failed she-camel* in the title indicates a concept which should not be confused with the other metaphor of the *she-camel* that is more often recurrent in the Deelley poems and which refers to the state as resources and power, whose possession is contended by many, like the camels in the pastoralist environment. Precisely, “the failed she-camel nation state” refers to the nation-state concept that conveniently defined the postcolonial unitary state in the Somali political experience, which has failed as shown by successive momentous events: the independence of Djibouti (1977), the Ogaden war (1977), the civil war and the choice of Somaliland to secede (1991) and the rebuilding of the State on a federal basis (with units that resemble tribal enclaves today).

The book *Somali Oral Poetry and the Failed She-Camel Nation State: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Deelley Poetry Debate (1979-1980)* (Ahad, 2015), is not an anthology of poetry nor a fictitious narrative. It is a critical discourse analysis of a corpus of Somali oral poems, that is, the

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exposure of both the ideology and the opacity within the discourse of the Deelley poetry which otherwise might remain imperceptible to the wider public, including non-Somali scholars. The system of knowledge within which the poetry texts are embedded, and which the texts transmit, is a highly ideological one. Indeed, discourse is the favoured vehicle of ideology and contributes to the reproduction of social structures (Fairclough 2001). It is through discourse that people legitimize or delegitimize particular power relations. Therefore, the Deelley is about society and politics, since (as the late Said Samatar taught) Somali poetry is all about a political message, hidden or overt. Contrary to the expressed opinion of Kapteijns (2016) on the application of Fairclough’s approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), I think the latter would be proud to see such an application of his approach in the cultural context of an oral society in the way the author of this book undertook. As for the grammatical errors in the book, the author dismisses all Kapteijns’ comments. The examples she uses in her ambiguous rhetorical question (about the poetry translation) are merely fragments from complex sentences in verse, otherwise clearly explained in the book. Her difficulty in understanding the meaning of the two separate lines she isolates from their stanzas (one line by Hadraawi in chapter four, and the other by Yasin Ahmed Nur, in chapter six), again shows that she did not carefully read the relative sections in the book where these lines are clearly examined in their context.

In her effort to decipher Diiwaanka Maansadii Deelley, the Somali volume and reference point edited by Professor A. Puglielli of Roma Tre University, in search of the word ‘internal-colonialism’ Kapteijns misses important clues, references and links to the idea of internal colonialism, revealing a limited knowledge not only of the Somali language, but also of its use in oral poetry. If she hoped to find in the poem to which the author refers the exact phrase ‘internal-colonialism’, she remains empty-handed. Whoever possesses a critical perspective can perceive the meaning of the words of the lines indicated by the author in connection with the lines spoken by other poets, before and after. In fact, intertextuality, together with extra-textual allusions, is an important element of the dialogue between the poetry texts in the Deelley. CDA is also to read between the lines, follow the exchange of jokes in verse among the poets to reveal the concealed, but to do this one should be equipped with background knowledge of the culture under examination. Kapteijns should have seen the internal dialogue among poets that could explain to her the reason for grievances and the internal colonialism, which the book reveals. The author of the book discloses the ideological dimension of the discourse of the
poems but also decodes it and interprets it, as he is equipped with “background knowledge” and “members’ resources”. Metaphors, veiled words, *sarbeeb*, subtext and proverbs are all important components and devices of the discourse in the Deelley poems, which not only deliver a message but also produce a system of meaning and social structures that the author scrutinizes. The field of discursivity of the Deelley poetry debate, the unsaid, the subtle irony of word meanings and their variability, are used by the author to explore and make use of the descriptive approach within Fairclough’s method of CDA. It is important not to confuse critical discourse analysis with language analysis.

One other thing that makes the depth of direct knowledge of Somalia by Kapteijns doubtful in this case, is her rhetorical remark about the presence of camels in the whole territory of the country as a basis for a hypothetical inconsistency of arguments in the book. There is no doubt about the fact that camels are everywhere in the Somali territory (and elsewhere) including the urban setting where the author of the book spent much of his life. The author considers the reviewer’s rhetorical phrase about the presence of camels in the inter-riverine areas to be completely irrelevant. Likewise, the statement that one North-Western poet of the she-camel-Maandeeq has an agricultural background is irrelevant to the discourse of the Deelley and the discursive practice of the Somali *gabay* (poem). One important observation is on the understanding of the reviewer who never realized the fact that the Deelley debate is a highly critical standpoint about power, resource allocation and discrimination, though often in tribal terms. Therefore, this rebuttal is only to respond in order to prevent any misunderstanding that a superficial and misleading review could create for any potential well-inclined reader of the book.

The Deelley polytext, is a corpus of poems and a discourse that has many characteristics that make it uniform, therefore, a specific text to which critical discourse analysis could be applied. In fact, the Polytext which is made up of individual texts by diverse authors, contains a representation of antagonistic sectors of Somali society and opposing views of tribalism and of national identity. The author applies the method of CDA (Norman Fairclough’s approach in particular, which is very appropriate for the sort of study the Deelley polytext requires). In fact, one possible application of CDA is the examination of national identity. The Polytext, which the author explores to reveal clues and hidden subtexts, is the product of a particular discursive practice in an oral culture such as Somalia’s, for which text is a means to convey ideas and preserve a particular way of life. Through that discursive practice, both tribal and
national identities are ideologically created, stimulated and recreated. Moreover, through discursive practice, a power struggle is in process. It is hegemony that transforms the ideological characteristics of the discursive practice into the commonsensical. Therefore, ideology, hegemony and power, naturalization and opacity in discourse constitute the main dimensions on which the critical discourse analysis of the Deelley poetry debate focuses.

The Deelley poetry debate is a contextualized discourse. A discourse cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its social context. Aside from the immediate context of the debate, consider for a moment its broader social and historical context. It was a long time ago when Lewis (1969, 15) pointed out that, from a nationalist perspective, there is a new myth of genealogy that tends to fabricate a common ancestry of the Somali population. However, the hegemonic articulation of identity goes back to the 1960s, as it is traceable in an article by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (1968) who tends to involve two distinct components in a shared common identity, resulting in one of the components losing its original identity. According to Egal, myths surrounding eminent Sheikhs from Arabia who came to Somalia to propagate Islam have developed and become engraved in the minds of the people who regarded them as being the actual ancestors of the different tribal groupings of the Somali people. Consequently, these myths and the belief in one common ancestor for each tribal group have set the pattern of Somali politics (Egal 1968). On the basis of the segmentary social system, every unit is a relatively homogeneous and organized group whose ambition is the exercise of a sort of hegemony over all other parallel units within the social structure. Such an articulation of identity is still ongoing and developing further in recent times as demonstrated by the following passage by a Somali scholar (Samatar 1991, 12):

Th[e] fervent sense of belonging to a distinct national community with a common heritage and a common destiny is rooted in a widespread Somali belief that all Somalis descend from a common founding father, the mythical Samaale to whom the overwhelming majority of Somalis trace their genealogical origin. Even those clan families, such as the Digil and Rahanwayn in southern Somalia, many members of whom do not trace their genealogy directly to Samaale, readily identify themselves as Somalis, thereby accepting, at least in symbolic sense, the primacy of Samaale as the forbearer of the Somali people (emphasis added).
The articulation of this myth (myth in the sense of a distorted representation of reality) is carried out by replacing the term *Sumaal* that derives from the Arabic, with the term *Samaale* that in Somali language indicates a well-doer (Ahad 2008). This particular articulation is mostly from the perspective of the pastoralist component of Somali society. On the other side, the non-pastoralist components who always had their own narrative, though it has not been propagated, challenge the narrative of the myth of common ancestry to emphasize a territorial-identity narrative in defining the social relations and identity. The emerging of one narrative, with respect to the other, is mainly due to two factors, first, the influence of outspoken personalities in politics who were supporting it; and, second, the spreading effect produced by the works of non-Somali scholars, such as Lewis, who had promoted and had given voice to the narrative, since the 1950s. Not only that, but in colonial times, the Italians dominating the predominantly agricultural region of southern Somalia, had every interest in not promoting their colonial subjects. On the contrary, the Italian colonial authority and scholars (with rare exceptions) had created the misleading conception that their agriculturalist subjects were historically enslaved (Ahad 1993).

According to Lewis and Mukhtar (1996), in fact, the non-pastoralist population of Somalia, despite its national economic importance as grain producers, and with its substantial size, has remained since colonial times largely marginal to the traditionally pastoralist sector of the Somali society which has sought to dominate it through its hegemonic articulation of Somali identity. In this regard, Kusow (2004) puts forward a situation of “contested narratives” in regard to the Somali national identity and nationalism. In other words, “a condition of a conflict of interpretation” between two major paradigms which occur simultaneously. On the one hand, a lineage narrative which delimits the national identity to pastoralists and to their clan lineages and, on the other, a territorial narrative which constructs such national identity on territorial and socio-economic priorities and values. The struggle between the two narratives is ideological: both paradigms, as Kusow argues, involve the relationship among people, place, and the history on which nationalism is predicated. Specifically, the contested ways in which the two paradigms (narratives) organize and structure social relations are typical of a hegemonic struggle for shaping the ‘real’ world. In describing the two paradigms, however, Kusow (2004, 1) stresses that unbiased State support goes to only one:

The first paradigm is based on the state-sponsored idealistic images and founding myths that have no practical application to
the everyday realities of the people. This paradigm constructs
the social boundary of Somaliness on the basis of lineage
priorities, or what Ahmed [Ali Jimale Ahmed] referred to as
“imagery reflective of the pastoralist modus vivendi”, otherwise
locally known as Maandeeq, and camouflaged as national
symbols and values. ...The second paradigm (the territorial
narrative) constructs the social boundary of Somaliness not on
lineage/Maandeeq priorities, but rather on economic, moral,
and territorial priorities.

Kusow argues that the lineage narrative, which links to the she-camel
concept of Maandeeq, is none other than an articulation of values
delimiting an exclusive Somali national identity, defined in a pastoralist
perspective, in opposition to an inclusive counter-narrative of the sedentary
perspective, based on territorial, socio-economic and moral priorities.

From these examples of antagonistic narratives and articulation of
identity, one can see (if he/she has the will) how national identity is
constructed discursively in the Somali society. Here, hegemony, ideology
and articulation of identity are at stake. Hegemony is not only dominance
but also a process of negotiation concerning meaning (Phillips and
Jorgensen 2006). The detection of the hegemonic articulation of the
discourse of identity in the Polytext (and in Somali gabay in general) by
establishing the discursive formation, has as its purpose the rectification of
a non-inclusive national identity, at the expense of important components of
the national society. Therefore, it is in such a social context that both the
hegemonic articulation of identity and the concept of the she-camel that
symbolizes one particular articulation of the Somali national identity should
be understood. CDA involves, “not just describing discursive practice, but
also showing how it is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the
constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and
systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which is normally apparent to
discourse participants” (Fairclough, 2001, 12). And sometimes, to
outsiders. In addition, this approach contributes to the rectification of
injustice and inequality in society, part of which derives from external

On one point this author agrees with Lidwien Kapteijns, that the
“discourse of exclusion undoubtedly is of social and political significance”
(Kapteijns, 2016, 126). Indeed, CDA cannot be understood as politically
neutral, but as a critical approach which is politically committed and whose
aim is to uncover the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of
unequal power relations within a society (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2006, 63-64). One last remark on Kapteijns’ critical words about Somali historiography. This author is native to Somalia and is of the opinion that Somali historiography has to be reinstated, free from the encrustations left by colonial historiography. While contributions by every scholar must be appreciated and valued, one also learns the lessons and consequences of a history totally written by external scholars, to externally define the Somali self and identity. However, such a monopoly on culture and historiography can no longer be passively and uncritically accepted.

References

Coming at a time when South Africa appears to be caught between deepening economic stagnation and rising social unrest, Roger Southall has produced an important study of the changing situation of South Africa’s black middle class. Although the voices of members of the new black middle class themselves are noticeably absent, the book makes up for this in the depth of its historical context and the soundness of its overall sociological framework. It offers a necessary foundation for scholars from across the social sciences to move forward with more targeted research to make sense of the lives of this growing but precarious segment of the South African population, which Southall shows to be intimately connected with the post-apartheid order. The book differentiates members of the ‘new’ black middle class, who had to largely ‘start from scratch’ after the dismantling of apartheid (p.165), from the ‘old’ black middle class, which emerged in a very limited way within the constraints of the colonial and apartheid systems. Focusing on this new middle class, Southall recognizes their ‘extraordinary mobility (upwards in class terms, sideways in residential terms),’ such that influential occupations and comfortable suburbs are no longer restricted to white South Africans (p.163). Focused on ‘Black Africans,’ and consisting of nine chapters, the book is roughly evenly divided between analysis of background literature on the class system in abidingly Euro-American sociology, class in South African history (and in Africa more broadly), and more in-depth analysis of the lives of the new black middle class. Above all, Southall emphasizes the role of the state in the formation of the new black middle class, more specifically the ‘party-state’ that the ANC has sought to build over the last two decades, as the party of liberation has become the country’s largest employment agency (pp.70,130).

In emphasizing the role of the state, Southall’s theoretical approach takes from Weberian sociology the idea of a class system constituted through a hierarchy of occupations, and takes from Marxian approaches an emphasis on class as a question of power, and power as a question of proximity to the state and private capital (p.236). The relationship between the state and private sectors is a recurring drama throughout the book, and fundamentally shapes the structure of the new black middle class. Indeed, Southall demonstrates that the creation of the new black middle class has been a ‘necessary accompaniment’ to the consolidation of the ANC’s
political power (p.126). Noting that the state and private capital are ‘locked in a contradictory relationship’ (p.160), they depend upon each other but deeply mistrust and fundamentally misunderstand each other too. In discussing this relationship, Southall observes that upon gaining power in 1994, the ANC pursued ‘broadly social-democratic’ policies, but that 1996 saw the ‘introduction of the familiar neo-liberal mantras’ (p.86). However, I do not think Southall emphasizes enough how rhetorical these ‘mantras’ were. The term ‘neo-liberalism’ is ubiquitous in South African scholarly and political discourse, increasingly detached from anything resembling actual existing neo-liberalism anywhere on the planet. The great strength of this book is that it emphasizes the role of the ANC party-state so strongly, revealing how strange the idea of ‘neo-liberalism’ in South African actually is. For example, proposed privatizations were quickly abandoned, and outsourcing simply became an opportunity for extending the ruling party’s patronage practices (p.131).

The study recognizes that marketing researchers have been more interested in studying the new black middle class than academics, focusing on the consumer profile of a group labelled ‘black diamonds’ (p.xiv). A popular figure of both envy and ridicule in South African culture, this small but conspicuous upper segment of the black middle class is known for their ‘extravagant lifestyles, tasteless “bling”, lavish weddings and over-the-top celebrations and partying’ (p.163), which belies the fact that the typical member of the black middle class is an overworked and undertrained schoolteacher. As the analysis of ‘the black middle class at work’ (pp.125-62) makes clear, the lives of the new black middle class are rarely glamorous, Black professionals remain rare, but with the public service more than doubling since 1994, black semi-professionals abound (pp.157-61). The professional/semi-professional divide is briefly discussed (p.144), but the foundational importance of the self-regulation of the classic professions is understated. This is an important complicating factor in the comparative lack of racial transformation in the private sector, compounded by an attitude amongst job seekers that the public and private sectors are divided by race (pp.79-84). The ‘systematic’ inequalities in the education system also impede transformation of the professions (p.103), and the suggestion, that ‘the salience of race per se is beginning to fall away’, revealing deepening class and regional differences among blacks (p.119), is thought provoking given the multifaceted nature of ongoing student protests in the country.

Perhaps the most engaging section of the book is Chapter 7, ‘the social world of the black middle class,’ for it is here that the voices of the new
black middle class themselves come through. When Southall quotes a focus group participant discussing middle class identity in terms of values and aspirations (pp.168-9), it places earlier discussions of measuring the middle class in an interesting new light. The precarious lives of many of the black middle class are also well illustrated in the discussion on finance (pp.176-82), drawing in particular on the work of Deborah James (2015), and discussing the so-called ‘black tax’ (p.180), the expectation that members of the black middle class will financially support their extended family in the context of persistently high unemployment. Southall also discusses the high indebtedness of many miners at Marikana, the site of the notorious massacre in 2012 (pp.176-7), but could have connected these issues, as the ‘black tax’ is a significant contributing factor to miners’ financial stress. Such concerns aside, and with the expectation that the general absence of the voices of the black middle class themselves will be addressed as scholars begin to make use of this book, this is a very important and timely study that will help make sense of perhaps the key social actors in contemporary South African society.

References

Ibrahim Abraham
University of Helsinki
ibrahim.abraham@helsinki.fi


The book explores how migrants and refugees meet the challenges of ‘becoming Australian’, simultaneously transforming Australia. This book is the culmination of an Australian Research Council Linkage project investigating the settlement experiences in regional Australia. It offers an engaging insight into migration, settlement and citizenship processes, within a wider historical and policy context.

The book is dedicated to Millsom Henry-Waring, a dynamic young scholar whose life and career were cut short before the completion of this
Millsom is missed by the community of migration and race scholars in Australia, and it is fitting that the book is dedicated to her.

The book’s seven chapters are presented as a chronology, from pre-migration, through migration, settlement, employment and citizenship. Some are based on data from interviews with migrants and refugees, offering an insight into their lived experience. Two appendices offer background to the methodology.

The first chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the Australia’s migration history, from issues around race in the constitution and early migration policies. This is recognised as being strongly influenced by Australia’s political economy and the need for particular types of labour. Yet the insistence from the start that Australia should be ‘one people’, culturally and racially is also acknowledged.

The transition between this historical chapter and the next is clunky – rather than a general review of issues related to pre-migration (which is provided in chapter 3), the focus is immediately on the empirical evidence from the particular sample of migrants, many of whom are of refugee backgrounds and whose pre-migration experiences reflect this (over half the sample are humanitarian entrants). However, the chapter does demonstrate some of the challenges faced by migrants, particularly refugees, in the pre-migration process, and also critiques the psycho-social pathological approach of many studies. While the narrative does focus on those of refugee background, the chapter notes the massive differences in pre-migration experiences, depending mainly on visa category.

Chapter 3 provides a summary of migration categories and current intakes, including the more recent categories of temporary, employer sponsored, and regional skilled. This data-less chapter provides an excellent background for understanding the current migration and settlement situation.

Chapter 4 focusses on refugee settlement and services available, and is data driven, but this misleads readers unfamiliar with the fact that most settlement services are unavailable to most migrants. The chapter offers an insight into refugees’ agency and perceptions of settlement challenges and opportunities. The data covers non-refugees as well, although specific similarities and differences are not teased out. The importance of voluntary, religious and civic groups is highlighted, as is the importance of relationships in the settlement process.

Chapter 5 focusses on employment, an indicator of successful settlement, and simultaneously a means to it. What is useful here is the insight into individuals’ perceptions of their employment situation and
acceptance of the structural constraints. This is not to say there are not clear barriers to be overcome, including racism. Yet evidence is also provided of the ways in which employers often step up to fill some of the gaps left by lack of service infrastructure in regional areas, and genuinely assist migrants in a range of ways not necessarily related to employment.

Chapter 6 on citizenship returns to a more wide-ranging historical and theoretical style, offering an excellent discussion of historical changes in emphasis on the civic and cultural, as well as racial, aspects of citizenship. It does miss some recent literature on the implementation of the citizenship test. The empirical data shows how, for many, particularly refugees, ‘being Australian’ means being a citizen. However cultural proficiency, sense of belonging and acceptance are also important. The result is that many migrants continue to feel partly Australian, partly ‘Other’.

At times the book appears to be making a case against the right of migrants to maintain their cultural differences, the ‘strong project’ of multiculturalism. Instead it is seen as a mechanism by which migrants integrate. Citizenship enables ‘shared cultural norms and attributes that migrants and refugees formally embrace’ … to ‘dwarf’ aspects of cultural distinctiveness (p. 2). The concluding chapter, ‘Australia and its people’, is dedicated to demonstrating how integration has worked in practice, cementing the argument that Australia’s ‘benign’ multiculturalism is ‘transitional’ and works because of its strongly nationalist framework. It argues the meaning of the term ‘Australian people’ remains open. It is to some extent critical of public discourses, particularly among government leaders and officials, around diversity and integration, yet it is also critical of the more extreme arguments around supporting diversity. The flow of this chapter is uneven, with a historical overview of ‘national identity’ appearing two thirds of the way through it.

The book has a particular focus on regional Australia and on visibility. These offer a useful remedy to the metropolitan focus of most studies, and recognises that settlement experiences are influenced by the extent to which one ‘looks like’ the majority of Australians and lives in a well-serviced area. Over a third of the sample are from African backgrounds, among the most ‘visible’ of Australia’s recent migrants. But there is a tendency in the book to present their experiences and those of refugee backgrounds as representing the experience of the majority of migrants. The title of the book is somewhat misleading in this respect. However, it does provide a deep insight into their settlement experiences, both positive and negative.

A criticism would be that the two different approaches within the book generally do not ‘talk’ to each other – the analytical historical sections,
which are also more theoretical, do not obviously engage with the data provided, and vice versa. This is a hazard of jointly authored texts, but it is a shame, as there are interesting insights to be drawn from each. For example, how do migrants feel about the ways in which multiculturalism is talked about and enacted, and how does this impact their daily lives? Are they satisfied with the integrationist versions of multiculturalism and citizenship on offer? How does the historical context continue to resonate in their lived experiences? What evidence is there of the ways in which other Australians engage with migrants which can be explained by this socio-political context?

‘Becoming Australian’ is very easy to read, and for a relatively short book, it provides significant insights into the history of Australia’s migration and citizenship programs, and the lived experience of migrants, and particularly refugees, in regional Australia.

Farida Fozdar
University of Western Australia
farida.fozdar@uwa.edu.au


Aili Mari Tripp’s latest book makes an important contribution to understanding the dynamics that can produce greater gender equality within certain countries. Tripp compares the nature and rate of gender regime change (incorporating changes in both gender roles and gender relations) in African countries that have experienced major conflict with those that have not. Her central thesis, strongly reiterated throughout the book, is that a confluence of intense and prolonged conflict, local women’s activism and the exposure to progressive international women’s rights norms have resulted in remarkable changes to the gender regime in a number of African nations. Tripp contends that all three of these elements need to be present in order for significant change to take place, which is why not all postconflict countries have made the same progress towards gender equity. According to Tripp, with very few exceptions, African countries that have not undergone profound conflict are lagging behind those that have in terms of gender regime transformation.

Tripp overturns common assumptions about conflict and the status of women. For example, that there will be a backlash against women after the
end of conflict, requiring them to give up positions they have held during wars. This does not take into account changes that have occurred in many countries, especially since the United Nations Conferences on Women in Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995, both actively participated in by African nations. Changing international gender norms have coincided with the revision of all but four national constitutions in Africa since 1995, resulting in increased provisions for women’s representation in many (p. 171). Women’s activism during the negotiation of peace agreements between 2000 and 2011 has also effected the inclusion of women’s rights language in almost 80 per cent of the resulting agreements, more than in any other region of the world (p. 146). Tripp acknowledges that normative changes, such as constitutional and legislative measures can be aspirational and are not necessarily translated into tangible improvements in women’s conditions, as fundamental progress can be slow. Nonetheless, she concludes that the world has changed in the following ways:

The fact that countries that once refused to acknowledge women’s political representation was important now have large numbers of women in politics is a massive shift in awareness. Practices that used to be upheld such as wife beating, child marriage, and female genital cutting, or denying education for girls, are no longer considered acceptable to defend in public discourse in most countries discussed in this book. (p. 13)

Tripp commences her study in 1990, as this was when political liberalisation in Africa, as described above, created for the first time the conditions for gender regime change in post-conflict countries with strong autonomous women’s movements.

Presenting case studies based on her fieldwork from Uganda, Liberia and Angola, Tripp grounds her theoretical argument on solid footing. She interviewed hundreds of key stakeholders in each of the case study countries, and was also able to draw on primary research she has done in other countries, such as Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tripp explains that this book is built upon a quantitative cross-national study of the relationship between electoral institutions, democratization, and armed conflict that she did with Melanie Hughes (Hughes & Tripp 2015):

We discovered … that postconflict African countries follow a trajectory of women’s representation that is distinct from that of countries that have not gone through major conflict, and that major conflict becomes more important rather than less after
1995 in this correlation. We found that conflict had a significant and independent impact on women’s political representation in sub-Saharan Africa and correlates strongly with the sharp increase in female legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa, which tripled between 1990 and 2010. We also found that incremental changes in civil rights result in increases in women’s legislative presence further down the road. (Tripp, 2015, p. 7)

The combination of extensive qualitative sources with quantitative data make this book extremely persuasive. Tripp argues that the process of negotiating peace agreements has been essential for enabling changes in gender norms, as when one party to a conflict has been decimated, there is less need for fundamental regime change. Thus, Angola did not experience the same level of change as Liberia and Uganda. Angola’s oil-based economic independence from donor agencies also insulated it from the influences of changing global gender norms (p. 141).

It is however too early to conclude whether implementation matches lawmaking in the countries studied. Tripp advocates the use of electoral quotas for women as a way of accelerating change, stating that they are adopted to “sidestep cultural and religious objections to women’s leadership” (p. 215). Given the emergent nature of the study of women’s roles in post-conflict nations, she concludes the book with a call for further research with a special focus on women’s own voices, women’s role as peacemakers and the way in which women’s movements have managed to bridge cultural divides in the struggle for peace. She states that:

One of the most interesting aspects of this study for me was to discover how women who were philosophically, politically, sometimes ethnically, or religiously at odds with one another transcended those differences to articulate a politics of strategic unity in a bid for peace (p. 243).

As this *strategic co-operation* on the part of women activists in postconflict countries was in marked contrast to the behaviour of men, whose peacemaking interests were found to focus primarily upon who would hold which positions of power (p. 145) - frequently resulting in new outbreaks of conflict - there would clearly be great benefit in further scholarship as suggested by Tripp. Her book provides an excellent foundation.
References

Catherine Macdonald
Social Sustainability Services, Albany, Western Australia
socialsustainability@bigpond.com


This book examines some of the consequences of the substantial increases in the output of, and international demand for oil over recent decades, in Angola and Nigeria. Jesse Ovadia suggests different and distinct policy directions for governments which accrued major revenue streams from what became exceptional windfall gains. The author joins the examination and the policy proposals by drawing upon the burgeoning academic and official literature which fits within the rubric of the ‘developmental state.’ In this case, such a state would drive increases in forms of production necessary for the extraction and export of oil, through local content policies.

The problem which Ovadia raises is well-known. Where the location was the already industrialised western European Netherlands the effect of a major increase in oil exports and state revenues became known as the ‘Dutch disease’. Subsequently the dilemma became the ‘resource curse’ for countries which were trying to industrialise or had large proportions of the population living in rural areas occupying small-holdings. Natural resources, oil, gas and minerals in demand internationally were discovered, extracted and exported in such quantities that the revenue streams produced for governments affected all areas of national political economies.

While Ovadia couples the idea of a resource curse with a political-ideological description of where Angola and Nigeria fit within international capitalism as instances of ‘peripheral capitalism,’ he does not accept that any solution to the dilemma could be found by leaving the oil untapped. Instead Ovadia urges for “an alternative in policies which would lead to real capitalist development instead of the further underdevelopment brought
about by peripheral capitalism” (p.11). This alternative is increased manufacturing and industrialisation of a particular limited variety driven by a developmental state.

Central to the form of the developmental state proposed by Ovadia is the localisation of areas of production involved in oil exploration, extraction, processing and marketing. Localisation should be extended to employment, in semi-skilled and skilled labour as well as managerial positions through firms owned by indigenes. State agencies will not only be central to the extension of localisation as well as have a continuing role in overseeing what occurs. Chapter 3 titled ‘The Promise and Pitfalls of Development through Local Content’ shows an awareness of some of the limits to a national strategy, including that it is subject to alliances between indigenous and international capitalists. Committed to a position within dependency thought, Ovadia locates and seeks to check the existence of a comprador indigenous class which has only personal wealth in focus, not national development.

For Ovadia the national developmental state in the cases he examines could make a major contribution where most social relations are ‘pre-capitalist’ or ‘peripheral capitalist’, for changes to something he idealizes as ‘real capitalism.’ This contribution, claims Ovadia, should further emphasise reforming policy to localize dimensions of oil production. While these have so far been in government policies for both countries, though with some distinctions between Angola and Nigeria, Ovadia claims they could be made even more developmental. The existing policies and their outcomes are summarised in the book’s introduction and major empirical chapters, which feature things that are, and could be done using revenues accrued through taxation and other measures to advance local employment, ownership, and production.

One of the major weaknesses of the book is Ovadia’s answer to how reforms will occur, that is who and what are the agents for change. While he indicates individuals and positions within the existing state machineries who are both his sources for information and in favour of local content policies, there is no answer to the question why major reforms have not occurred so far. In short, Ovadia’s argument for both countries should include a discussion of the existing state and class power but this is missing from the book. Pointing to the powerless (Chapter 6), and expressing the hope that in the future ‘civil society’ will have sufficient power to bring changes, merely indicates the lacunae in Ovadia’s account.

Indeed, the extent to which state power in both Nigeria and Angola is directed to other than what Ovadia regards as developmental ends has come
to the fore once again in major cases of corruption. ‘The great oil chase’ involving an investigation of how tens of billions of dollars went ‘missing’ from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is matched by a banking scandal in Angola involving senior MPLA personnel (See Africa Confidential, 58,7, March 30, 2017 for information on both cases).

There are two principal reasons why Ovadia cannot provide this discussion. The first is that he does not seem aware how deeply and for how long both countries political economies have been capitalist. He writes, especially regarding Nigeria, as if there have not been indigenous capitalists in agriculture, trade, transportation and other spheres of accumulation since at least the late nineteenth century. Oil is a recent development, only since the 1970s, and so any shift in state policy would have to deal with already entrenched layers of local capital. The position of the latter, including those with ambitions to be export oriented industrialists, has been already threatened by the effects of oil exports on the terms of trade. Imports cheaper and exports dearer invariably damages local agriculture and manufacturing for international and domestic markets. Did this occur without any continuing struggle? Hardly likely but Ovadia does not even raise the possibility of conflict between sections of the indigenous ruling class and its allies. When the existence of a local, indigenous capitalist class is not acknowledged, it is hardly surprising that Ovadia is unable to systematically explore the character of state power as it exists rather than as he wants it to be.

The second reason Ovadia does not deal with the class and state power of either country lies in his failure to situate conditions where the bulk of the population lives and produces its livelihood. Angola and Nigeria, though to differing extents, still have more than half the population living in rural areas on smallholdings. Oil exports exacerbate and impoverish rural lives: the resource curse is a rural curse in countries where this demographic feature is pre-eminent and preponderant. Unemployment in the countryside is joined with unemployment in towns. No amount of localising content for the form of production which drives immiseration in cities, towns and the countryside will change this situation to any substantial extent.

Scott MacWilliam
Australian National University
scottmac69@grapevine.com.au
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