BOOK REVIEWS

Capitalism’s Continuing Disguises


In December 2016, Standard and Poor’s downgraded South Africa’s credit rating as one notch above junk, reducing the country’s financial outlook from stable to negative, with annual economic growth at 0.5% and unemployment at a 13-year high. In May 2017, with inequality in South Africa reaching ‘world’s best/worst’ levels, the leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance in South Africa’s parliament asserted that the ‘ANC has changed from liberator of the people to the enemy of the people’ (Maimane 2017). After decades of struggles, sometimes open warfare (as in the Cuban military’s defeat of the South African army in Angola), how have things come to such a condition?

These two books deal primarily with the period since the end of colonialism in Tanzania and Mozambique and of the National Party government in South Africa. All the authors agree that something better should have resulted and major changes should have occurred even if there is no great clarity on what the change(s) might comprise. (As will be shown below, the current confusion stems in considerable part from a continuing distorted vision about the nature of the anti-apartheid struggle.) Whether viewed from the perspective of South Africans who still engage domestically in post-apartheid tussles or Canadian academic John Saul with an impeccable anti-colonial, anti-apartheid pedigree, it is the sense of an opportunity lost and the need for continuing tussles which unites all the writers. Paradoxically, however, it is also the difference of vision which derives from active participation in unfolding events in South Africa, on the one hand, and viewing “southern African liberation” from afar that makes reviewing both books together worthwhile. While Saul, for example, employs such grandiose terms as “taming a revolution” to describe post-apartheid politics in South Africa, those closer to the scene more...
realistically see the moment as a period of contested reforms, mainly along international social democratic versus neo-liberal lines.

*Contested Transformation* is a collection of 12 essays plus an introduction and conclusion by the editors. At the time of writing the contributors were participants in as well as researchers/writers about the events which followed the 1994 election that brought to power the Nelson Mandela-led African National Congress (ANC) government in South Africa. While the major political differences between the contributors are on display so too are their combined disappointments that the end of apartheid has not brought major beneficial changes to the bulk of the population, particularly the black citizens previously repressed by an especially brutal regime. As much as the ascension of successive ANC governments has been associated with a sense of failure, nevertheless the courage and determination of those who continue to struggle is an encouraging message which permeates the Dawson and Sinwell collection. If the end of apartheid meant one form of transformation, near-continuous strikes, protests, “insurgent citizenship” social movements, victories at local government and national elections show the extent of the popular dissatisfaction with that regime change. Opposition to ANC rule has been met with a mix of incorporation and repression. The latter has sometimes been as brutal as that meted out by the National Party-headed apartheid regime.

The essays also show informed activists in South Africa struggling to come to grips with what the opposition represents and how it can be best described. Labourism, as in the strikes and opposition to industrial repression? Social movements mobilised to contest local government elections? Community protests, deliberately constructed outside the governing framework of the ANC – Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) administration to increase their popular appeal? Class formation is occasionally employed to describe the unity of actions which oppose wage reductions and job insecurity, unemployment, impoverishment and reductions in the availability of public facilities. However, what the “class” is remains unclear, especially when the essays also acknowledge the disparate membership and objectives of the various organisations. Wage workers, intermediate strata of lower level management, the unemployed, the precariously employed in occasional wage work, and petty traders may comprise a class in formation, but how needed to be explained not just asserted.

That there is nothing on the character of the ruling class, despite the extensive literature devoted to the formation of a dominant class, and the
place of an African bourgeoisie within that class, is one major deficiency of all the essays in the collection. Consequently, and despite the differences of political focus among the two editors and the 13 other activist contributors, the character of class power and its role in accumulation by a capitalist class is rarely present. Resistance appears as primarily an issue of welfare, rather than accumulation as a social process which constantly mystifies and disguises itself as one of race, ethnicity, tribe, and nationality. Even Dale T McKinley, a prodigious writer and activist concerned with the political economy of South and southern Africa, does not attempt to identify “the left’s” class opponents in a process of accumulation, rather than in party and other organisational terms (the ANC, COSATU and the South African Communist Party [SACP]). All have become (p.24) ‘sub-agents of …class rule’ rather than forms of representation, political expressions of the process itself. As shown below, for example, the ANC has been a representative organisation of the black African bourgeoisie “in formation” since at least the 1920s.

Saul’s book is a collection of essays written over some years, with parts having appeared elsewhere. Although ostensibly directed at “rethinking Southern African Liberation” there is little new from a person who has been actively involved in some of the notable events which have occurred in the region. The first chapter in Saul’s collection sets the tone for his subsequent examinations of South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique; countries and peoples with which he has had lengthy and deep connections. He was present in the early 1970s when the Tanzanian TANU government led by Julius Nyerere began to show its repressive character. In 1982, Saul was nearby when a parcel bomb sent by South African government agents killed Ruth First in her office at the University Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo, Mozambique.

The collection is largely an autobiographical display of how one person has tried to update and adjust the lens he employed to understand conditions before the fall of apartheid and end of colonial rule in the region, rather than purchasing a superior camera to capture what has occurred subsequently. Saul’s admiration for Frantz Fanon (1963, 2001), especially his best-selling, highly influential Les damnés de la terre/ The Wretched of the Earth, remains with a minor tweak. So too (pp.132-134) his respect for Amilcar Cabral, leader and ideologue for the anti-colonial struggle in Bissau-Guinea and Cape Verde, and other countries. White minority/colonial regimes, Saul’s favoured descriptions for the previous forms of rule in southern Africa, have been displaced by ‘the Empire of
Capital’ superintended by a comprador class or classes.¹ Recolonization, rather than Fanon’s neo-colonialism, represents for Saul (p.7) ‘(S)poils for the global centres [of the Empire] and for their local intermediaries. For the rest: a singularly limited decolonization indeed’. Saul explains (ibid.) that ‘…this latter form of imperialism is being enacted by capital itself rather than primarily – as in the past – by some specific national (western) centre of empire or another’.

While the description ‘Empire of Capital’ is commonly associated with another York University academic Ellen Meiksens Wood (2003), Saul does not appear to have read more deeply into her work. Meiksens Wood (1991, 1995, 1998) was a leading scholar of the class structure of western Europe, especially in the early days of industrial capitalism, concerned with the “renewal of historical materialism”. Instead Saul attempts to combine Wood’s over-arching description of capitalism’s global advance with the 1960s and 1970s categorisations which examined conditions in terms provided mainly by Fanon and Cabral.

In his introductory essay “’Globalization Made Me Do It” vs “The Struggle Continues’” Saul tries to update this intellectual tradition. Now (pp.7-8) the ‘Empire of Capital’ provides more space for: local states to manoeuvre ‘on behalf of their own domestic ruling classes’ interests’, for ‘national bourgeois classes in various settings to find some “national capitalist”/entrepreneurial space within which to grow and prosper’, and even room for some states, ‘working in conjunction with capital’ to ‘guide certain “sub-imperialisms” of their own devising’. All this occurs within the dependency framework, which (p.9) secures an ‘extremely limited brand of development that may offer some wealth and power to the fortunate local few but does not do so to the vast majority of the impoverished population’. Hence recolonization and a ‘flawed freedom’.

Trapped in his white minority/settler colonial characterisation, Saul has been unable to deal with the origins of the ANC and of the National Party in South Africa. In the early 1970s, simultaneous with a parallel debate about capital in Kenya, there began an extended argument about capitalism in South Africa. Research which fuelled this debate proposed that

…between 1924 and 1948 …an Afrikaner bourgeoisie developed through a politically driven economic movement, first to represent the nationality of capital against an

¹ Saul is not consistent on how to describe ‘the compradors’ but he is certain in framing their subservience to ‘the Empire’.
“imperialist interest” and later, after 1960, to serve towards the “interpenetrations” of different fractions of capital in South Africa (Cowen and MacWilliam 1996, 83).2

As occurred in Kenya, a counter-argument following the lines of the fashionable dependency thesis soon appeared. So too did a major study by Dan O’Meara of the formation of Afrikaner capital which made the ‘challenge against imperialism emphatic’ (Cowen and MacWilliam 1996, 86). ‘Nationalism or imperialism’ became the catch-cry of this challenge. L.J.Du Plessis, senior official of an important Broederbond faction, explicitly rejected any form of ‘economic collaboration’ with ‘cooperative Imperialism’ (Ibid.). Anglophone capital was equated with imperialism. So much for the simple and simplistic ‘white settler colonialism’s accommodation with English capital as imperialism’ formulation espoused by Saul and others.

The consequences of this accommodationist depiction were, and continue to be substantial. When long-time ANC official and later second post-apartheid president Thabo Mbeki oversaw policies which in the 1990s and early 2000s were dressed up by critics, including Saul, as empowering a new black middle class a longer view of South Africa’s history would have helped anticipate what was to come in the development of national capital. More importantly, seeing the ANC for what it was rather than what opponents of apartheid wanted it to be might have at least tempered the enthusiasm for joining forces under the ANC-SACP umbrella. This dilemma still haunts activists in South Africa, as most of the essays in Contesting Transformation attest.

From the 1912 founding of the South African Native National Congress, precursor to the first ANC, to the 1927 actions of the latter organisation, the ambitions and aims of black African business were foremost. As Alan Cobley (1990, 156-158) noted, in the 1920s the ANC put forward a commercial and industrial programme for the advance of this business. While over subsequent years the political power of Afrikaner business became dominant, the commercial ambitions and activities of some Africans did not disappear. In short, the ascendancy of Afrikaner capital was not only aimed at English capital’s prior dominance, but also against the possibility of African capital taking the lead in the formation of a layer of national capital. From the late 1960s onwards, the legitimacy of the claim for national commercial leadership began to be contested more

2 See also Davies, Kaplan, Morris and O’Meara 1976, 4-30, and O’Meara 1983.
openly, including through the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (Cowen and MacWilliam 1996, 95-102).

What apartheid rule made certain was that the racial mask would remain over this intra-bourgeois battle, and cement the alliance between African capital, would-be bourgeois, African workers and intermediate strata. The ANC leadership, spear-carriers for the African bourgeoisie, had even before apartheid officially ended in the 1990s made clear that their objective was not socialism, nor even social democracy, but more room for their advance within a capitalist South Africa. The importance of keeping a broad, popular front together, with domestic and international wings bearing anti-colonial and anti-racial banners was stressed by ANC activists and their supporters. Revolts, such as that in 1976 at Soweto, threatened the front as ANC leaders strived to present their campaign as respectable and acceptable in the major capitalist countries (Mandela 1995, 575-580).

Despite the particularities of post-apartheid and post-colonial circumstances in the countries examined in both books, what strikes this reviewer is how similar conditions are to those in much of the rest of the world. Corruption, inequality, unemployment and impoverishment of many countries’ populations, as well as accusations of “bad” governance and repression of dissent: what’s new? Rulers wallowing in obscene wealth: Jacob Zuma is hardly alone in his so-called lifestyle. And the same proposals for reform appear almost universally, along the lines echoed by those who fight for improvements in South and southern Africa. There is even some clinging to an idea of socialism as it could be rather than how it was. Others aim for more modest improvements – safety from fires in public housing and factories, striking workers not shot at by the police and military. And still, in a world of affluence unimaginable to previous generations, the sources of human misery remain obscured in southern Africa and beyond. Penetrating the various disguises detailed here –

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3 Saul A Flawed Freedom p.83 cites Mbeki as pronouncing in 1984 that the ANC “is not a socialist party” and wouldn’t become one “for the purpose of pleasing its “left” critics”. As Saul further notes (p.93), in June 1996, when launching the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, Mbeki pronounced “just call me a Thatcherite”.

including race, ethnicity and nationality – remains to be done in politically effective forms everywhere.

References


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Do you believe that you belong – in your family, your workplace, your birthplace, community, country? What makes you feel included or excluded? How do we negotiate or strengthen belonging and how do people adapt when persistent and violent exclusion forces them to seek refuge in neighbouring and far-flung countries?

In this book, Melanie Baak explores the ways in which people negotiate belongings by presenting stories from six women in Australia who have a deep connection with Mading Aweil, an area in South Sudan that is home to the Jieng (often known as Dinka) people. Four of the women were born in or near Mading Aweil to local families, while the fifth was born nearby and married a local. The five lived there until war propelled them on long and winding journeys to new homes in South Australia. Using an interpreter, they tell their stories in their mother tongue, Dinka, as well as in constrained English. The sixth woman was born in Australia to white Australian parents and married a man from Mading Aweil who had resettled in Australia. That sixth woman is the author, Melanie Baak – she is a student of Dinka language, but her story unfolds in English.

Baak’s involvement with the Jieng began in Adelaide as a volunteer working with new arrivals. At a Jieng home, she met her future husband, a valued member of the local community. As their relationship deepened, instead of drawing Baak into the group, the Mading Aweil community reacted by excluding both Baak and her partner (p.107). The phone stopped ringing, the community had sent a message: you do not belong.

For the Mading Aweil women, not belonging had been status quo for decades. In their village homes, they were strong, well-centred family and community members, performing their roles according to the Jieng concept of *cieng*, an ideal state of living to which Jieng aspire. However, according to the politics of their birth nation (then Sudan, now South Sudan), these women were outsiders, racially vilified and persecuted for perceived differences to the northern majority. When they sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Egypt, they continued to face suspicion and vilification. In Australia, they may achieve full rights as citizens, but continue to negotiate belongings as they raise their families and establish new lives and networks.

Jieng situate themselves first and foremost through their relationships with others (p.167), achieving belonging by adopting true *cieng* practices. If
you are living in good *cieng*, then you will meet all your traditional family and societal obligations, in terms of how you assist others, how you conduct your daily business, in short, how you live your life. Hospitality is a part of *cieng* (p.71-72), and marriage and procreation are embedded in it (p.88). However, the practice of *cieng* is shifting and changing as community members adapt to different lifestyles and pressures far from their villages (p.107).

In transnational families, immigrants may build new social fields that link country of origin (p.150) with relationships constructed through social need more than an immediate biological connection (p.140). Thus, a distant cousin may act as brother when relatives are needed for marriage negotiations.

In Australia, the societal touchpoints that helped the women practice good *cieng* have evaporated. They come from an agricultural background which values large families, where infant mortality is high and there is little access to contraception (p.102). Here, they can no longer demonstrate their worth by providing for their families through traditional duties such as grinding grain and collecting water, and this can damage self-esteem (p.98). There are frustrations with bringing up children (p.175), they say the Western focus on individualism and independence (p.176) clashes with Jieng family life. The women believe the roles and respect they had as mothers is undermined by Australian service providers and government agencies (p.103-106). *Cieng* requires respect for parents and elders and encourages particular ways of living together, so they are affronted that youth can claim benefits that assist them to leave home before marriage (p.104). The women say “it hurts our hearts to see them living that way” (p.104). They have to negotiate new ways of belonging.

There is pressure from the other side of the planet as well, from relatives in villages and refugee camps. Good *cieng* and warm hearts mean they must help those left behind – not to do so results in shame (p.151) regardless of their own financial situation. There are emotionally-charged international phone calls (p.155), and a deep desire for reunification (p.157).

Add to the mix another concept, mixed-race marriage. Once it would have been scary enough for someone from Aweil to marry someone from nearby Wau – foreigners were seen as less desirable, inferior, bad and dangerous, constructed as the permanent Other (p.120). Now marriage across ethnic lines is “pushing, challenging and shifting the borders of what it means to be and become a Jieng,” a shift that is ultimately uncomfortable for all involved, Baak says. She is keen to explore *cieng*, to understand what the community expects of her as a Jieng wife. Jieng women become a
true member of their husband’s family after delivering the first child, before that, they are observed and judged on ability to perform other wifely duties (p.99). On visits to South Sudan, Baak grinds grain and carries water to show willing – she wants full acceptance by the community, not to live forever on the “edge of becoming” (p.93.) She also discusses the problem of her family’s exclusion with women in South Australia, who cite jealousy in the community as the cause (p.111).

This is an interesting book. By exploring the ways in which we negotiate belonging, it also throws light on an emerging Australian community and the way in which they inform and extend our societal fabric. A range of Australian professionals will garner useful knowledge of the Jieng world from this book, in particular about why certain issues are of concern to these women. If Baak plans further research along these lines, she might note that, at least for this reader, the women’s voices are strongest when they speak in their mother tongue with translations provided. Using multiple quotes in limited English may unintentionally put the women and their voices at a disadvantage on the printed page, just as they have so often been disadvantaged in the wider world.

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A recent exhibition on South Africa at Amsterdam’s Rijksmuseum began with San rock art, continued chronologically to colonial maps and sketches, propaganda from the South African war, then from the anti-apartheid movement, and finished with hand-written placards on the backs of fruit boxes from the 2016 Fees Must Fall protests. Or, to identify the movement by its ubiquitous Twitter hashtag, which at one point attracted 300 tweets per second (p. 247), #FeesMustFall. It remains to be seen whether ‘Fallism’, as the campaign for fully-subsidized and ‘decolonised’ tertiary education has labelled itself, proves to be the significant event the exhibition suggests it is. Booyseen’s collection argues that it might be, noting that the government’s unexpectedly rapid response to the protests
underlines the status of university students as a group the government cannot afford to antagonise. Even those sceptical, hostile, or simply baffled by ‘Fallism’ will find this collection reveals a great deal about ongoing racial, ideological, and generational tensions in South Africa. There is much to be learned about university governance in the context of intersectional inequality, in particular, and about the young and aspiring black middle class.

Consisting of fourteen chapters, a long introduction, a short conclusion, and protest-related appendices, the contributions address a particular moment in a complimentary way. Chapters 2 to 5 are written or co-written by Fallist scholar-activists, complimented by later chapters written in a less urgent tone. The early chapters offer insights into the Fallist movement, including its collective social media addiction, as well as its blind spots, such as the idea the movement speaks for all black students, and the issues Fallists are uncomfortable discussing, notably violence. Several of the latter chapters stand out, such as Lynn Hewlett, et al.’s history of student protests in sub-Saharan Africa, warning that the fully-subsidized, radical education Fallists demand proved incompatible with the mass enrolments they desire.

The chapters by David Everatt, on South African student politics, and Patrick FitzGerald and Oliver Seale, on university management during the protests, are the most challenging dialogue partners for the scholar-activists’ chapters. They address similar issues, such as the outsourcing of support staff and the rhetoric of white privilege, but from different angles. FitzGerald and Seale’s chapter offers fascinating insights into the challenges Fallism poses to university administration. Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh’s activist chapter on Fallist theory and practice explains that students reject responsibility for developing policies to implement their demands, that is for politicians and administrators, and yet ‘Fallism implies immediacy – it means abandoning the politics of gradualism’ (p. 84). While university administrators have been generally sympathetic to Fallism, although not what is described as its ‘often undirected militancy’, FitzGerald and Seale describe the ‘egg dance’ of administrators wanting to endorse Fallist demands while avoiding short term policies, such as fee freezes, with long term consequences (pp. 243-4).

While Everatt’s chapter offers a brief analysis of past South African student movements, the collection reveals two major differences between Fallism and earlier struggles. Firstly, the presence of radical feminist and queer politics, as analysed by Darlene Miller, who notes that older feminist activists are ‘bewildered’ by the importance of personal style for feminist Fallists (pp. 272-4). Secondly, the emphasis on subjective experiences of
alienation in historically white universities. As Gillian Godsell and Rekgotsofetse Chikane’s chapter notes, Fallism has placed ‘the experience and consciousness of young black adults within a white institution’ at the centre of debate about higher education (p. 58). It is this aspect of the movement that demands to be unpacked, theorized, and contextualized, for it requires more explanation and careful listening than debate over black students’ financial problems, which are simple enough to fit on a placard: ‘My mother earns R2 000 a month, where must she get R10 000 for my registration?’ (p. 117). The collection really only gestures towards the importance of these experiences of alienation for the Fallist movement, such as the brief discussion on the politics of ‘shame’ in a chapter by Gillian Godsell and three student activists. Invoking the image of Adam and Eve, made aware of their nakedness, they argue the sudden realisation of financial fragility and inferior prior schooling shames black students who have been accepted into historically white universities on a nominally equal footing with their wealthier white peers (pp. 116-8).

Because of this emphasis on emotional pain and expressive individualism, I think Sizwe Mpolu-Walsh overemphasises Fallism’s ‘unmistakable Southern bent’ and inversion of the ‘global system of knowledge production’ (pp. 82-3). Fallism is comprehensible to student activists in the global north (pp. 79-82), because it speaks the language of American politics of recognition. Often pilloried as ‘identity politics’, the questions Fallism addresses, how one’s cultural identity and the weight of history impacts one’s ability to move with ease in certain societies and spaces, engaged some of North America’s leading political thinkers in the 1990s, from Judith Butler to Charles Taylor. It is disappointing that the collection does not substantially address this aspect of Fallism, which is obvious to any scholar engaging with its modality. Another way of saying this, is that Fallism is a complex political movement; it is likely to survive on and off campus for some time to come, and there will be much more written on the topic.

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Woldeyes’ conceptualisation of ‘native colonialism’ with reference to Ethiopia – the only African state not subject to colonisation by foreign powers – provides a fitting frame through which to appraise Africa’s regional governance architecture. Ethiopia is home to the African Union’s (AU) headquarters. In the language of regionalisation, it is Africa’s capital city. Its enduring legacy as an uncolonised African country has granted it this privilege. However, Woldeyes “use[s] the term native colonialism to explain the development of a colonial consciousness that alters the traditional and historical processes through epistemic and physical violence” (p. 10, emphasis in original). He argues that in contrast to countries that experienced direct (settler) colonial rule and administration, the impact and processes of colonialism in Ethiopia have been driven by “native factors” as national elites have imitated external forms of governance.

A shortcoming of Woldeyes’ book is its failure to apply the concept of native colonialism beyond the national context to Africa’s continental governance architecture. Whilst this is due to the book’s particular focus on Ethiopia, a cursory assessment of the regional implications of the concept would have greatly enriched Woldeyes’ arguments. The concept of native colonialism, when applied beyond the national context, allows us to explore the extent to which the AU governance architecture has similarly been a result of native colonialist processes.

Given Ethiopia’s identity as Africa’s capital city, the absence of epistemic independence in that country – as identified by Woldeyes – is significant as it supports this very same absence at the level of the continent’s Pan-African governance institutions. This is because, as Woldeyes himself highlights, “[t]he bitter antagonism among various political groups irrespective of power differences show that achieving epistemic dominance is the hidden goal of political struggle” (p. 19). Moreover, for Woldeyes, epistemic violence “involves the deployment of knowledge which gives rise to a new vision of the world” (p. 11).

Colonialism and the colonisation of African peoples and nations resulted in the institutionalisation of not only arbitrary borders, but new sets of political systems and institutions. Whilst these processes and their enduring legacies are generally acknowledged, critical engagement with the continent’s regional governance institutions is less common. This is
unfortunate, including in the context of Woldeyes’ development of the concept of native colonialism because, as the world undergoes reinvention as part of varied historical processes, “[i]t invents norms, rituals, hierarchies and new interests both from the colonising and the colonised traditions, and brings them together to provide a new ideology that serves the colonial system” (pp. 10-11).

Indeed, colonialism and colonisation concentrated social, economic and political power in the hands of a few Euro-American Western states, the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It constituted a global order that stemmed from the particular and local traditions of these few states and their individualist ethos. The result was the universalisation of these particular values as superior to those of ‘primitive Others’ whose value and political systems had to be superseded by European models.

For Woldeyes, the peripheralisation of Africa despite the rest of the world’s dependence on Africa’s resources and labour for its continuing development and prosperity has had the undesirable outcome of “centeredlessness” in Ethiopia, the continent’s capital. This is important given “[c]entre represents a place within a place, a location of prime significance, a source of moral power and ideals” (p. 40). Woldeyes argues that Ethiopia lost its self-imagination “as the centre of the world whose interest and values cannot be suppressed by the interest and values of other nations and entities” (p. 41).

However, if Africa’s capital imagines itself as centre of the world, then so too is the continent which hosts that capital and services dependent ‘core states’. Woldeyes’ arguments would, therefore, have benefitted from acknowledging that the marginalisation of indigenous knowledge(s) and political institutions in Ethiopia – as in other parts of the continent – has drastic consequences for regional integration and Africa re-centering itself in world politics. Importantly, Woldeyes notes that “[t]he concept of addis, the new, is often considered as zemenawi, which means modern or western”. Moreover, “[t]he first modern capital of [Ethiopia] was named ‘Addis Ababa’, which means ‘New Flower’”. This is significant given Addis Ababa is the home of AU’s headquarters. These headquarters are, therefore, situated in a place that was conceived as “a break from the past, from tradition to modernisation, [and] led to the adoption of new laws that invalidated the old and traditional ones” (p.103).

Addis Ababa, Africa’s ‘New Flower’ is, therefore, situated at the centre of the continent’s greatest epistemic and moral dilemma today and raises the question: how can continental institutions designed to empower African
people build sustainable and resilient futures achieve this goal if they are based on external ideologies, and are imitations of external institutions? The fact that the AU’s Constitutive Act 2000 (see www.au.int/web/en/constitutive-act) notes the organisation’s primary objective as being to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States” (p. 5), a clause that is often used to absolve governments and leaders of their responsibilities to their populaces, highlights the continent’s ongoing attachment to external knowledge(s) and modes of governance.

Woldeyes’ book and concept of “native colonialism” are thus useful and timely critical resources. The only shortcoming is that Woldeyes does not link this concept to regionalisation processes, but hopefully this review has demonstrated the concept’s wider applicability and the need for critical appraisals of the continent’s Pan-African governance institutions.

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