## An Examination of  Radicalisation in the Context of Migration

**Yvonne Rowa Woods**
*The University of Adelaide*
*yverowa@yahoo.co.uk*

**Abstract**
The piecemeal attainment of durable solutions has increasingly led to the indeterminate confinement of refugees and placed them in a state technically referred to as protracted refugee situations (PRS). The Somali refugees in Kenya, the focus of this paper, are an archetype of PRS. Protracted refugee situations not only present humanitarian concerns but also raise complex security challenges as a result of conflict spill-over into neighbouring countries (Loescher et al 2008; Milner 2011). While camps are conceived as safe havens for vulnerable refugee populations and are as such perceived as neutral spaces, they are also a hotbed for politics, extreme views and militarisation (Ek & Karadawi 1991). The host country and other actors sometimes respond through securitisation, which implies politicising and transforming issues into matters of security. This approach can potentially interact in a complex web with other contextual factors to motivate (non)violent radicalisation. This paper briefly conceptualises the dynamics of radicalisation within a refugee camp microcosm and its interaction with other subsystems at national, inter-state and regional levels. The paper relies on primary data sources namely reports, $10^{th}$ moment data sources, government policies and legislation, and applies soft systems thinking to highlight the interactive dynamics of radicalisation.

**Introduction**
The existing scholarship on the nascent field of radicalisation can be described as conceptual rather than empirical (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). While most literature has focused on why radicalisation happens, there has been less focus on how individuals progressively adopt beliefs and behaviour that support and in some instances, culminate in acts of terrorism and other forms of political violence. A preponderance of research on terrorism has grown to currently include group, network, organisational, mass movement, socio-cultural and international contexts. However, the dynamics of that process remain poorly understood while the pursuit of a single theory is misguided (Crenshaw 2000; Silke 2001; Laqueur 2003).

Discourse on refugees does not occur in a political vacuum and is often informed by a range of constraints and priorities, ranging from security and the state's internal capacity to govern. In exploring the dynamics of radicalisation in a refugee camp microcosm, this paper underscores the interconnectedness of elements at micro, meso and macro levels. The paper conceptually condenses  a chapter of the main thesis  on the interplay between actors, instruments and interventions in a refugee camp context. Subsequent sections of this  paper allude to  but do not exhaustively discuss broader regional dynamics, an area that remains poorly understood in the province of security (Loescher *et al* 2008; Milner 2011). As an initial process of making the case for the complexity of radicalisation with the camp as the epicentre, the paper demonstrates the importance of examining contextual factors permissive to radicalisation. This is achieved through a description of the deplorable conditions at the sprawling Dadaab Refugee Complex in Kenya, which predominantly hosts Somali refugees. The text further animates the policies of the host state and exposes the contextual paradox of

Kenya as a safe haven. Suffice it to say that the complex confluence of a multiplicity of factors and actors in the process of radicalisation and how radicalisation emerges in inter-group dynamics is not necessarily a singular refugee experience. While certain groups are often profiled as predisposed to radicalisation and/or acts of terrorism, other actors including government, media, scholars, and the general public among others, can precipitate radicalisation and can also be violently or non-violently radicalised in their response to acts of violent extremism (Schmid 2013).

The paper advances the central theme of liminality in situations of protracted displacement and the resultant coping mechanisms. Within the context of protracted refugee situations, a liminal state captures the period when 'the past is momentarily negated, suspended or abrogated and the future has not yet begun' (Turner 1982). It references a refugee's interminable camp entrapment in a state of limbo. Existing evidence (Woods 2016) suggests the need to review this definition to reflect motion and capture the inter-connectedness in the present, past and even future refugee lived experiences in time and space. In this context, 'momentarily' may denote a freeze that may be singular in nature. Therefore, the paper suggests the adoption of a working definition of liminality as "the intermittent negation, suspension or abrogation of the past (Turner 1982) and an uncertain, erratic yet ongoing future". This paper draws inspiration from prevailing global developments in the field of migration and terrorism and attempts to establish transnational linkages to strengthen the discourse between the two fields. The underlying argumentation for the rejection of reductionism justifies the adoption of a systems analytical approach that transcends the camp context. This paper, nestled within a broader thesis attempts to fill the gap of ahistoricity, acontextuality, acomplexity and adynamism by analysing radicalisation within the broader context in which it incubates and ultimately (or not) emerges alongside the dynamic and evolutionary character of historical and other contexts.

**Trending Refugees and Trendy Global Responses**
As part of its overall mandate of international refugee protection, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is charged with the responsibility to implement durable solutions for refugee situations. The agenda for durable solutions constitutes one of three viable options namely: voluntary return of refugees to countries of origin once safety can be guaranteed; local integration within the host country; or third-country resettlement (UNHCR 2003). Over time, the importance accorded to each of the three durable solutions has changed. Some scholars (Malkki 1995; Verdirame *et al* 2005) have argued that since the 1980s, repatriation remains the most preferred durable solution. However, the nature of conflict habituated systems and high degree of volatility that is characteristic of refugees' countries of origin do not often provide permissive conditions for sustainable return. This effectively rules out the option of repatriation in such situations. The strategic options of resettlement and local integration that were more viable during the colonial and Cold War eras are no longer regarded as such. The end of communism and colonialism, and increase of migration from developing to developed countries have shifted preference to voluntary repatriation especially among industrialised countries. For developing countries, the right to exercise state sovereignty by maintaining borders and regime security conflicts with the obligation to protect refugees. At the same time, impoverished host countries like Kenya are reluctant to bear additional burden of supporting local integration due to their weak capacity to cater for both nationals and refugee populations (Chimni 1999; UNHCR 2006). Yet as state parties to the Refugee Convention, signatories have a duty to comply with the regime.

Evidently, the convergence of these issues implies that the compassion that once distinguished the responsibility to protect is losing traction as host countries continue to make certain strategic considerations on refugee matters.

Indeed, the global dynamism of migratory flows has marshalled an unprecedented, irregular surge of migrants particularly from Africa and the Middle East into Europe. This trend of increasingly complex migration flows has been termed 'mixed migration' and is defined as 'complex population movements involving refugees, asylum seekers, economic and other migrants, as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants' (IOM Glossary 2011). This movement is characterised by massive flows that present rising political significance at national, regional and global levels. Strict border controls and the obvious barriers to resettlement and integration increasingly compel mixed migrants to resort to illegitimate means to migrate. This trend signifies the reality of massive numbers of people willing to migrate longer distances at greater risk to safeguard their physical and economic security. This wave of migration has unwittingly evoked anti-migrant sentiments in transit and host countries (Danish Refugee Council 2014). Such migration crises tend to influence how states respond to refugee flows and operationalise existing refugee regimes. Orchard (2014) suggests that these crises delegitimise the existing protection regime thus triggering a loss of confidence and a search for alternative responses to refugee issues. It is, therefore, not surprising that in light of the current migration crisis, Europe and Turkey have reached a landmark deal to stem the flow of refugees and other migrants by applying a policy of refoulement. (Al Jazeera 2016; BBC 2016). Other European Union (EU) countries have also passed national legislation to discourage immigration. (The Washington Post 2016).

More countries have taken similarly strong positions on migration that include policy proposals that bar the entry or encourage refoulement of refugees facing real threats in their countries of origin. During the 2015-2016 presidential campaign period in the United States, immigration provided a strong rallying point particularly among republican candidates opposed to the ostensibly lax American immigration laws (Time 2015; Politico 2016). Australia on its part has pursued the 'Pacific Solution', which involves the interception and offshore detention of refugees and other migrants through deals with impoverished countries in a bid to curb irregular migration within its borders (Koser 2015). On the African continent, Kenya sensationally claimed that Dadaab, a camp predominantly hosting Somali refugees is a breeding ground for terrorists, and has repeatedly threatened cessation of status and forceful mass repatriation of refugees (The Guardian 2015; Daily Nation 2016). What could possibly have provoked these controversial policy prescriptions that obviously denigrate international humanitarian law?

In early 2015, an advisor to the Libyan government warned that the Islamic State (IS) was exploiting the Europe migrant flow by smuggling jihadists with the intention of setting up terrorist sleeper cells across Europe. Pentagon has also reported that in some cases, IS volunteers blend with migrants and then break away in Tripoli to head to Syria (The Telegraph 2015; The Guardian 2016; The Telegraph 2016; Schmid 2016). At the same time, Islamic State has previously threatened to flood Europe with agents disguised as refugees, while an operative within the organisation has claimed that this threat has already been executed (Jihad Watch 2015; Sky News 2016; Schmid 2016). One of the perpetrators of the spectacular terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 130 people in Paris in 2015 is reported to

have posed as a refugee. Reports indicate that he entered Europe through Greece and registered as a refugee on a fake Syrian passport (BBC 2015; The Telegraph 2016).

Quintessentially, the currency underlying this thread of discourse is the role played by recent terrorist attacks in advancing the securitisation of refugee issues. Securitisation implies politicising and transforming issues into matters of security. This process involves the social and political construction of threats into national and state security issues. This is for example evident in the use of extrajudicial means as a form of intervention to threat management (Murphy 2007; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998). The non-entree asylum regime of the European Union (Levy 2010) on one hand and the threats of cessation of refugee status by Kenya on the other have seen the thickening of the external borders constructed to securitise the supranational and national polities (Zetter 2014a). The progressive reinforcement of the structure of border control has considerably diminished the quality of protection for asylum seekers. Ultimately, the quandary for most governments remains negotiating the balance between national security and the humanitarian imperative to provide protection to refugees within their borders. Accordingly, important elements that this paper examines include camp make-up and state of human security, the potential for militant infiltration, and to a limited extent, the dynamics of interaction and level of influence among camp dwellers.

**Protracted Refugee Situations and Somali Refugees in Kenya**
As the world grapples with the ongoing migration crisis and the realisation of durable solutions dither, the practice of detention and containment of refugees in camps has gradually become the norm. The interminable spatial encampment of refugees has resulted in what is typically known as Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognises a refugee situation as protracted if 25,000 or more refugees from one country of origin have been hosted by another country for five or more consecutive years with no immediate prospects for durable solutions (UNHCR 2009a). According to the UNHCR, the 25 countries most affected by prolonged refugee presence are in the developing world. The average length of refugee habitation in host countries has gradually increased from an average of nine years in the 1990s to stand at around 20 years at present (Guterres 2010).

Protracted refugee situations arise from extended political crises in the countries of origin and the failure of the host countries to effectively respond to refugee influx. As a response, host countries typically resort to extended encampment of refugees in remote areas and impose restrictions on movement (UNHCR 2004b). Furthermore, protracted displacement is symptomatic of drawn-out intractable regional conflict system dynamics that often culminate in conflict spill-over into neighbouring fragile states (USCRI 2004). The protracted Somali refugee situation in Kenya, the paper's case study, is one such complex crisis.
Somali refugees have migrated to distant destinations like Europe, Southern Africa and the Arab Peninsula. However, the majority are hosted in the Greater Horn of Africa region, particularly in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Kenya is the primary destination of refugees coming from South Central Somalia. While Kenya also hosts urban Somali refugees in the capital city of Nairobi, the majority of Somali refugees are hosted at Dadaab Refugee Complex, established in 1991 (Lindley 2011; UNHCR 2014). Kenya, similar to her neighbours, is affected by internal displacement and small scale refugee outflows as a result of political violence, natural disasters, environmental degradation and forced evictions (IOM, 2015). The country has historically been lauded for its liberal asylum policies that allowed

most refugees to locally integrate until the end of 1980s. However, in the 1990s, the massive influx of refugees from Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia compelled the shift towards a more restrictive policy, a relatively common occurrence when there is a sharp spike in refugee flows (Banki 2004; Campbell *et al* 2011).

North Eastern Province, the province that hosts Dadaab Refugee Complex is semi-arid with average temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius. The area's fragile ecosystem, sparse vegetation and absence of surface water impose exacting living conditions for the local inhabitants and refugees. The province has limited natural resources, experiences intermittent flooding and has a history of cholera and measles outbreaks (Adelman 2005; Lindle 2011; Kumssa and Jones 2014). The region is infested by mosquitoes and has a high prevalence of malaria (Adelman, 2005). It is mostly inhabited by pastoralist Somali Kenyans from various Darood clans who share the same language, culture and religion as the Somali refugees (Horst 2008). Due to the overlapping identity between the host community (Kenyan Somalis) and the refugees, about 40,000 Kenyan "refugees" have encroached the camps (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000; KNCHR 2007; Enghoff *et al* 2010; RCK 2012).

Interestingly, past Somali governments have staked irredentist claims over the host province and recognise it as being part of Greater Somalia (Solomon, 2009). The province has a history of violent repression and marginalisation under both the colonial and successive Kenyan governments. Underdevelopment notwithstanding, the province has historically been unstable and weakly governed with incidents of banditry, cattle rustling and insurgency. The region has also experienced a proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as a result of the conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda. For the most part, when these social, economic and political grievances persist in such refugee hosting areas, marginalisation may lead to radicalisation, which may ultimately lead to violence (Lindley, 2011; UNHCR and World Bank, 2015).

**Emerging Systemic Gaps within the Kenyan Security Architecture**
While the prima facie refugee determination process is an imperative for emergencies and has been recognised as the fastest and most efficient way to provide protection, it is not without its shortcomings. In an illuminating book, Rawlence (2016) explores the lives of nine refugees in Dadaab by tracing their flight path and experiences at the camp. He narrates the story of Guled, a man who claims to have been forcefully conscripted into Al Shabaab. As an Al Shabaab operative, he lived in a displaced camp in Somalia where aid agencies operated with Al Shabaab's consent. Guled later fled Somalia on a dangerous journey that involved being smuggled across the border. He eventually finds sanctuary at the camp in Dadaab. What is more interesting is that on arrival at Dadaab, he wanders around the camp before a chance meeting with a former school mate, Nuur. Nuur explains

to Guled that he is supposed to register as a refugee in order to receive a ration card and access other services. Upon arrival at the UNHCR registration centre, an employee enquires from Guled the reason for his flight from Somalia to which he simply replies, "insecurity". The employee does not document further details about his Somali experience and Guled becomes duly registered as a refugee.

This narrative resonates and supports other scholars' acknowledged positions of the limitations that confront the prima facie Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process.

Harrell-Bond and Kagan (2004) decry the lack of transparency and accountability in UNHCR RSD operational procedures. They recommend the reformation of RSD procedures and pursuit of other means of recognising refugees that lessens the burden and high risk of error in prima facie recognition for mass movements. They further argue that the UNHCR conception of prima facie determination in the 1960s regarded refugees falling under this group as temporary in nature. Hyndman and Nylund (1998) advance the argument and posit that this transient view of refugees in camps has permitted the politicisation of refugee determination processes and led to the gradual commitment to weaker standards. These arguments highlight the international community's failure to commit to the realisation of durable solutions, which is comparable to a conspiracy to apathy. This conspiracy has inexplicably led to the passive acceptance of a stronghold that foists a stranglehold on refugees, the antithesis of sanctuary. The indeterminate settlement of a diversity of denizens in structures originally conceived as temporary is now widely embraced as the norm.

On another front, in response to terrorist attacks in Kenya, the government has tightened its stranglehold in the province of refugee macro-policy. Kenya suspended the registration of new refugee arrivals in Dadaab since Kenya's military incursion into Somalia in 2011. During this time, aid agencies scaled down operations due to increased insecurity in Dadaab (WFP 2014). In 2012, the government issued a directive halting refugee reception and directed the closure of all urban registration centres. This directive evoked widespread protection concerns and increased rights violations among refugees (Refugees International 2013). In 2013, the Kenyan government, the Federal Government of Somalia and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement that set out a legal framework for the staggered repatriation of refugees (Tripartite Agreement 2013) to an unstable Somalia. So far, voluntary repatriation has occasioned only a slight reduction in the number of refugees at the camp since 2014 (IOM 2015). Even so, overall donor funding for the Dadaab Refugee Complex has significantly diminished as Kenya deplores the international community's failure to fulfil its financial obligations (The Star 2016).

Kenya has ratified a number of regional and international instruments and passed several legislations governing refugee affairs. Some of these laws including the infamous Security Laws (Amendment) Act (2014), have been described as an assault to democracy. Some sections of these laws are not only in blatant contravention of existing international and regional refugee instruments but are also potentially open to abuse by state structures. It is important to assess the impact the broader policy environment has had on refugees at the camp level. While some sections of these laws duly respond to security concerns, they are equally repressive and infringe on human rights. As such, they present a dilemma for refugee host states. Should considerations on national security supersede the humanitarian imperative or vice versa? In response to this dilemma, the Kenyan government seems to have capitulated to public pressure and has issued yet another threat to shut down Dadaab refugee camp before the next elections in 2017 (Daily Nation 2016). This conforms to the current global trend on securitisation of refugee issues. The insufferable state of human security at Dadaab Refugee Complex is yet another systemic gap within the security architecture. The refugees at Dadaab face a host of human security challenges that encompass the complexity and intertwinement of critical and pervasive threats. These challenges fall within a wide spectrum of military, political, social, environmental, economic and cultural threats that cannot be exhaustively covered in this limited paper. There is an existing body of literature that has extensively documented the deplorable conditions at this camp (See Lindley 2011; UNHCR JAM 2014;

Rawlence 2016; Woods 2016). By way of example, this paper briefly highlights some of these conditions.

The refugees at Dadaab face a host of human security challenges that encompass the complexity and intertwinement of critical and pervasive threats. These challenges fall within a wide spectrum of military, political, social, environmental, economic and cultural threats that will be discussed in this section. The concept of human security compels a comprehensive examination of threats and shifts analysis from micro to systemic enquiry (UN Human Security Unit 2009). The refugees at Dadaab are the subjects of appalling living conditions in a complex spread over thirty square miles. In the local lingo, the name Dadaab means 'the rocky hard place' due to the presence of boulders obscured by vast sand cover (Rawlence 2016). The camp and its surroundings are served by winding, dusty, murram roads that restrict mobility particularly during the rainy seasons. As a result, stranded vehicles hinder the flow of humanitarian and business supplies (UNHCR JAM 2014).

The camp structure is an open, insecure and transient space with informal housing. The shelters are either temporary tent structures or semi-permanent erections constructed from bricks, steel and concrete (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2014). Other shelters are constructed from mud, twigs, reeds and scraps (Kumssa & Jones, 2014; Rawlence 2016). Most families share a single unit that accord no privacy to couples (Adelman 2005). The poor quality shelters do not provide sufficient protection from sun or rain. In addition, the ragged shelters expose refugees to theft and other risks. The camp is partitioned into sections with shared water and sanitation points, and compounds fenced with acacia thorns. The dilapidated pit latrines and stagnant puddles of sewage are a health risk to the users (Medecins Sans Frontieres 2014; Kumssa & Jones, 2014; Rawlence 2016). Exposure to harsh weather and other environmental conditions in the camps makes the camp inhabitants susceptible to diseases and other risks (Rawlence 2016). Other concerns include erratic water shortages, reports of disturbances during food distribution, and alarming levels of poor nutrition and infant mortality (UNHCR JAM 2014).

Despite humanitarian efforts to meet refugees' basic needs, wretched living conditions continue to afflict Dadaab denizens. Dadaab continues to be overstretched with new arrivals as long-standing refugees remain trapped in a state of limbo. The camp originally established to host 90,000 refugees has exceeded its full capacity and houses over 350, 000 refugees at any one time (Kumssa & Jones 2014; IOM 2015). Consequently, the camp continues to buckle under pressure from infrastructural inadequacies, limited essential service delivery and logistical quagmire. Humanitarian organisations are fraught to cater for basic needs by optimising meagre resources and providing very basic assistance. Notwithstanding this, there is a huge registration backlog, which may pose problems for those who may be asked for identification outside the camp (UNHCR JAM, 2014). The burgeoning camp population implies that law enforcement agencies may not have sufficient capacity to effectively serve the camp. This has implications on security since in order to be granted passage, refugees become extortion targets by corrupt border officers. Admittedly, the arrival of refugees with their own clan tensions has also intensified insecurity in the already restive region (Loescher & Milner 2005).

Refugees in protracted displacement experience onslaughts on physical security both within and outside camp precincts, and Dadaab is no exception. Some host countries have

manipulated refugees as political instruments by galvanising negative public sentiments to advance discriminatory migration policies (Loescher *et al* 2008). Kenya, for example, has conducted security operations at the camps in the wake of past terrorist attacks. This approach is likely to have negative unintended consequences that may impel the emergence of extreme beliefs or violence among refugees. This is an illustration of how mass displacement is both a source and consequence of insecurity (Loescher *et al* 2008). Kenya, in its most recent attempt to quell public security concerns has yet again threatened to shut down Dadaab refugee camp (Daily Nation 2016). Even though the tripartite agreement that guides the voluntary repatriation of refugees becomes defunct in late 2016, this announcement is temporally strategic, because the Kenyan general election campaign period is already on course. A populist response to the refugee problem, therefore, presents an opportunity for the current establishment to gain political mileage on matters of security. Unsurprisingly, the humanitarian and security costs of such a premature, forced and logistically challenging repatriation process may not have been accurately assessed. Within the Kenyan mainstream society, social exclusion among refugees is bi-directional and advanced by both Somalis and Kenyans. On one hand, a challenging economic environment coupled with scarce resources, runaway security and Somali irredentism has elicited fear and suspicion of the 'Other' among Kenyans. Furthermore, refugee antipathy has reinforced a strong Kenyan national identity. Kenyans generally perceive Somalis as lacking the willingness to integrate in mainstream Kenyan society as a result of their distinct socio-cultural background. For these reasons, strong public opinion has animated debates on refugees and influenced government policies on the same.

There has been little respite for the legions of refugees trapped in limbo under insufferable conditions at the camp. As a result, refugees have developed an enduring appetency for the single most desired yet least achievable of the three durable solutions. Inevitably, orientation towards resettlement to rich third countries is not only immensely popular, but an actively sought goal among Somali refugees. People are typically compelled to represent their resettlement cases skilfully, which could also imply some degree of embellishment (Lindley 2011). Emergent inconsistencies in refugee stories have bred distrust between UNHCR and Dadaab refugees. UNHCR tends to be suspicious of refugee stories while the latter does not have full trust on the UNHCR to fairly judge their cases against resettlement criteria. In fact, some refugee experiences are adapted along the judgement criteria to fit the more deserving and vulnerable cases for resettlement. There have also been accusations levelled against UNHCR for selling spaces to those with the financial muscle to buy their way out of the camp (Horst 2008).

Resettlement has little strategic value when the negligible annual resettlement cases are considered. While Europe and other Western countries have made significant contributions towards supporting refugees in other host countries, they have abdicated burden sharing with a paltry 1% of carefully selected Dadaab refugees accounting for resettlement in the developed world (Reliefweb 2016). In numerical terms, there are 9, 000 new refugee arrivals for every 8, 000 people resettled every year. While hopes for resettlement diffuses frustrations with deplorable camp life, it also creates "buufi", which is a strong preoccupation with resettlement. This preoccupation continually entraps

refugees in an illusory liminal state (Turner 1982) that precludes improvement and focus on the present (Lindley 2011). Meanwhile, their aspirations suffer a tragic intermission as

timeless uncertainty confronts them. Suffice it to say that the unwitting coalition of the homeland, host state and third country conspire in apathy offering little to no prospects for repatriation, local integration or third country resettlement.

The values and principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights determine the global criteria for inalienable human rights (UNSG 1948). Sovereign states are obligated to ensure the full enjoyment of rights by allowing access to social, economic, political and civil rights. The universality of these human rights guarantees access for all including refugees who seek protection outside their homeland. Clearly, this is not entirely the case with Somalis hosted at Dadaab Refugee Complex. Failure to fulfil these rights may compromise state stability and security. A stateless individual whose rights are violated can become easy prey for recruitment into radical groups seeking to reap from an environment of disaffection (Betts 2009).

**Coping Mechanisms within an Uncanny Stronghold**
Refugees in prolonged camp residency tend to adopt a range of coping mechanisms to deal with previous exposure to violence, forced migration and adapt to their new environment with varying degrees of resilience. Numerous studies have identified factors that act as predictors of resilience that include risk and protective factors, for example: traumatic experiences; self-regard; family cohesion; social capital; caring relationships at family; school and community levels; perception of the world (Cowen & Work 1988; Resnick *et al*1997; Janoff-Bulman 1992); psychological preparedness for trauma (Basoglu *et al* 1997). Research findings have also revealed the creative processes of coping and meaning making that survivors draw upon that in turn provide insightful data into the concepts of risk and reliance (Goodman 2004; Luthar & Cicchetti 2000). Coping mechanisms can be both passive and active and range from effective to ineffective strategies (Colic-Peisker & Tilbury 2003). Some refugees tap into new and existing social capital, strengthened religious beliefs and cognitive coping strategies such as the espousal of positive aspirations and reliance on inner strength. Others resort to more destructive strategies such as self-harming, avoidance and social alienation (Abraido-Lanza *et al* 2004; Halcon *et al* 2004; Goodman 2004).

Among a range of other positive coping mechanisms not discussed in this paper, some refugees tend to adopt active and purposive coping strategies characterised by strong political inclinations. This is manifest in increased political consciousness and open engagement in political activity that is reinforced by ideological beliefs (Basoglu *et al* 1997). As a result, camps become politicised spaces where refugees assert their national, ethnic, political and other forms of identity (Romola 2010). The process of politicisation can progress into the adoption of extreme views and transform into violent or non-violent radicalisation. However, this neither happens in a vacuum nor does it develop suddenly within a camp context but is linked to broader contextual dynamics. As an illustration, the first country of asylum for refugees is usually a neighbouring country that shares similar if not slightly differing dynamics of a conflict habituated system, as has already been discussed in the case of Kenya. Many of the host countries particularly in the developing world face similar constraints of instability, are in post-conflict transition and are themselves fledgling democracies. While these safe havens provide some degree of security and relief from suffering for refugees, they often present new dynamics that interact in a complex web of systems and subsystems that can serve as drivers for radicalisation (Loescher *et al* 2008).

The sketch diagram below whose elements have been captured in previous sections and will be discussed briefly in the next section is instructive of this dynamic. The open-ended internment of refugees in camps can be counter-productive because it can compound existing security problems and generate new ones. Military raids and direct camp attacks notwithstanding, the culture and organisation of camps create a viable climate for violence. The presence of weapons and bored, disillusioned young men makes the situation more volatile. These factors constitute important precipitants for crime, violence, emergence of ethno-political factions, and increased likelihood of conscription into armed groups or organised crime. Armed elements can hide among the refugee population with camps more likely to fall under the domination of political or military actors. When crimes are organised in a camp context, the human cost it inflicts goes beyond the confines of the camp. As such, encampment policies aggravate rather than address security problems (Jacobsen 2001).

*Stage 1 Conceptual Model of Radicalisation: A Security System Conundrum (SSC)*



*Source: Woods, R.Y. Thesis Chapter 2, p. 13*

## The Greater Horn of Africa Security System Conundrum

The lack of immediate durable solutions coupled with a breakdown of peacebuilding efforts and agreements in countries of origin leads to the indefinite confinement of refugees in camps. This indeterminate warehousing of human beings can pose significant challenges for peace and security not only for the host country, but for the wider region (Loescher *et al* 2008). As an example, the examination of the history of the Somali conflict reveals that the

Somali protracted displacement is a result of the protracted humanitarian crisis in Somalia that shares an intimate relationship with the Greater Horn of Africa conflict system (Healy 2008). Similarly, drawing from the above diagram, the Somali protracted refugee situation is both a source and consequence of insecurity (Loescher *et al* 2008) beyond the Dadaab refugee camp microcosm, engulfing the Greater Horn of Africa region. Over the years, the issue of insecurity at Dadaab Refugee Complex and its environs has been a growing source of concern. There have been incidents of police harassment through arbitrary detention of refugees and forceful return over unlawful entry into Kenya (HRW 2010; RCK 2012). The failure of these measures to curb unlawful entries into the country is noteworthy since refugees have resorted to human smuggling to avoid police detection. In addition, state agents who are custodians of security have perpetuated the existing culture of corruption and impunity in their involvement in financial extortion of refugees. Given this state of affairs, how is the state's security apparatus likely to inadvertently incubate radicalisation?

In September 2011, suspected Al Shabaab militants abducted a Kenyan driver working for CARE, an international NGO with operations in Dadaab (IRIN News 2011). In October the same year, two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) doctors were abducted and their driver murdered (The Guardian 2011). The general security situation at the camp continued to worsen throughout 2011 as the Kenya Defence Forces launched "Operation Linda Nchi" to counter Al Shabaab's incursion into Kenya. In June 2012, four foreign aid workers working for the Norwegian Refugee Council were abducted and their driver murdered (Al Jazeera 2012). By 2013, there was increased reporting of incidents of rape, shootings, assault and murder. Discoveries of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, shootings and the use of remote controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had become regular occurrences at the camps. The threat of abductions affected humanitarian agencies' operations and occasioned the scaling down of interventions (IRIN News 2011). In 2015, suspected Al Shabaab militants abducted a Kenyan teacher, raising further concerns of insecurity at the camp (Daily Nation 2015).

Growing evidence suggests that some youth at Dadaab are becoming radicalised and engaging in violence both in Kenya and Somalia, including indications of Al Shabaab activity in the camp. During 2009 to 2011, the Kenyan government trained and conscripted thousands of Somali youths from the predominantly Somali North Eastern Province of Kenya and Dadaab Refugee Camp to join the Somali Government troops in the fight against Al Shabaab in Somalia (Wikileaks cables 2009; Wikileaks cables 2010; Human Rights Watch 2009, 2012). In addition, other youths were trained in Djibouti, Uganda and Ethiopia. The youths conscripted by the Kenyan government deserted the force following the latter's failure to meet its financial contractual obligations. The government has been unable to trace these youths but emerging reports reveal that a considerable number of youths have joined Al Shabaab while the rest returned to Kenya and are believed to be operating sleeper cells (Standard 2015).[1] At the same time, Al Shabaab was also reported to be recruiting from within the camps (Human Rights Watch 2009, 2012; Danish Refugee Council& UNHCR, 2013) while some youths in Dadaab revealed that a number of their peers voluntarily left the camp to join Al Shabaab in Somalia (Wikileaks cables 2010).

In fact, a 2013 study commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council and the UNHCR

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[1] The National Assembly Majority Leader, Aden Duale informed a local daily that the government report in question is gathering dust at Parliament's archives.

identified voluntary and forced conscription of youth within the camp into Al Shabaab, and increased criminal elements within the camp as some of the major protection issues. The study further acknowledged the camp security situation as compromised due to the presence of members of Al Shabaab operating under the guise of refugees, and a refugee constituency of Al Shabaab sympathisers (Danish Refugee Council & UNHCR 2013). Notwithstanding this, fears and concerns abound among Somalis over Al Shabaab's possible infiltration of the refugee camp following the unresolved murders of a couple of men seen to have cooperated with the police on security matters (Lindley, 2011). Dadaab refugee camp has also been used as a 'safe haven' for the storage of stockpiles of arms trafficked from Somalia in transit to other destinations in the region (International Peace Institute 2011). Evidently, the civilian character of the refugee camp appears to have been compromised by both the Al Shabaab, the Kenyan Government and other actors with the refugees trapped in the middle. Following the spectacular terrorist attack at Garissa University, the chairman of the Kenya Refugee Affairs Commission, Ali Korane, confirmed that the terrorists stayed and assembled their arms at the camp (The Guardian 2015).

The glaring security conundrum within Dadaab and the interplay of multiple undercurrents have influenced wider security dynamics within Kenya, Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa region. In recent years, the Kenyan government has played a more active role in the reception and registration of refugees due to security concerns. Some of the regional security threats include (see SSC diagram above): the potential spill-over of the Somali conflict; Al Shabaab recruitment and activity within Kenya; the potential union of grievances between Somali Kenyans in North Eastern Province and extremist organisations; dissention within the Muslim minority community (Lindley 2011), and: the proliferation of illicit arms in the Greater Horn region (Wasara 2002). These regional threats tend to have microcosmic ramifications at the camp level.

The disintegration of order during liminality seems to facilitate the establishment of new customs. Protracted confinement under insufferable camp conditions has a galvanising influence and creates an enabling environment for these grievances to transform into radicalisation and or acts of violence. Arendt (1973), while deploring the practice of warehousing refugees, maintains that the global interrelated civilisation is at risk of producing barbarians from its midst by forcing multitudes of people into savage conditions. Additionally, after 9/11, other scholars have suggested a relationship between refugees and terrorism and the potential for militarisation in refugee camps. Makaremi (2010) submits that the Taliban is the product of Afghani camps in Pakistan established by UNHCR, resulting from incomplete humanitarian management. This argument essentially underscores the failure of the international community to address the human  security of forced migrants and poignantly highlights the construction of refugees as both victims and a threat as a result.

**Conclusion**
Dadaab Refugee Complex is the poster child of a botched humanitarian response. This characterisation has been highlighted through the role played by various actors and instruments at the camp microcosm. Notably, the existing legal and policy frameworks that implicitly and sometimes overtly conflate refugees with terrorists have advanced the Kenyan government's belligerence towards the Somali protracted refugee situation. The international refugee regime's failure to sustainably address the needs of refugees, host states' frustrations and deleterious response are palpable. While political actors' pressing concern remains

national security, very little has happened in the way of acknowledging and understanding the humanitarian situation at the camps.

This paper has exposed the collective experiences of insufferable conditions at the camp microcosm. It is evident that conditions at the camp do not meet minimum humanitarian standards as set out in the Refugee Convention. The paper also demonstrates how these camp conditions and the regional context sometimes mirror Somalia, the country the majority of the refugees fled from. The central variable of protracted displacement, which insulates liminality is an overarching theme of this research. As briefly demonstrated, identity-based discrimination, restricted movements and long periods of confinement in camps results in social isolation and impairment. The case presented demonstrates the limitations of refugee instruments, and in particular, the anachronistic 1951 Refugee Convention and the Kenyan government's weak security architecture, that ultimately compromise security. The paper has also highlighted the sources of the state's vulnerability to insecurity and demonstrated a strong appreciation of radicalisation as constituting a significant threat to oft overlooked vulnerable refugee populations.

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