THE SOUTH AFRICAN FRONTIER REVISITED

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A paper to be presented at the African Studies Conference, Burgmann College, Australian National University, Canberra, 24-26 August, 1985
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From the studies of the South African Frontier of a number of historians including W.M. Macmillan, J.S. Marais, C.W. de Kiewiet, Eric Walker, I.D. MacCrone, P.J. van der Merwe and S.D. Neumark, together with the available published source material I gathered what seemed to me a consistent and convincing picture of the dynamics of frontier expansion in South Africa and its significance. I expounded this in a number of publications including 'Colonial South Africa and its Frontiers' (chapter 10 of the Cambridge History of Africa, volume v). The pattern as I saw it was as follows. With the development of increasingly capitalised agriculture based on slave labour in the wine and wheat growing areas of the western Cape and with the very limited local and export markets for the produce, it became increasingly difficult for relatively impecunious young farmers to establish themselves. As the role of manual worker was performed by slaves, increasing numbers of young whites turned to the alternative of stock ranching in the interior. This required less initial capital (although wagon, guns etc. were not insignificant items). The stock rancher could hope to attract Khoi in to his service and so avoid the considerable cost of purchasing slaves. His cost of living could be kept down by providing himself and his dependents with a good deal of their food from the produce of hunting. Away from the social demands of Capetown society there would be far less need for expensive clothes etc. The stock farmers'produce could walk to market instead of requiring expensive transport.

Young whites, therefore, sometimes acting as agents for richer Cape land owners or merchants, sometimes working on their own account, moved away from the vicinity of the Cape to establish themselves as stock ranchers. To do this, however, required the use by each rancher of a very substantial land area. The normal size of a cattle run recognised by the Dutch East
India Company's government as a loan farm was measured by walking a horse for half an hour in each cardinal direction from a central point. Because of the lack of permanent water in some areas, the seasonal unsuitability of grazing in others, many stock farmers utilised several such areas. A small number of ranchers thus occupied a very large area and as the white population continued to grow and employment opportunities for whites other than farming were few, each new generation of white stock farmers would press beyond the existing limits of white land ownership to find land for themselves. So the frontiers of settlement of the colony continued to expand, driven outward by the determination of every young white lad to remain a baas and by the economic opportunities provided by the market at the Cape for meat and animal produce.

The expanding white stock farmers (vee boers), however, were not just looking for farms. They were as much or more in need of labour to work them. The expansion of the frontiers of white settlement thus went not with the expulsion of the indigenous population but its conversion to a class of herdsmen on the white owned ranches. The expansion of the white stock farmers indeed was not so much the expansion of one race replacing another as the expansion of a new economic system or 'mode of production' at the expense of the communal subsistence economies of African peoples. This new 'mode of production' was the creation of the economic conditions at the Cape which in turn depended on the articulation of the local economy with the world wide mercantile system. For the indigenous peoples this expansion meant the expropriation of their land, loss of freedom and reduction to the status of servant to a white baas. It naturally met with resistance.

This was initially mounted by the Khoi and the San. In response to the resistance of these communities which reached a peak of intensity from about the middle of the eighteenth century, the white farmers developed and employed the commando system of military organisations. They conducted an exceptionally brutal
war of extermination against the San and those Khoi who, having lost their own cattle, joined the San in raids on the farmers' herds. As this approach failed to eradicate the hostile bands and proved costly in lives and in valuable horses, the frontier farmers varied it with a more conciliatory approach. They provided stock and food for the hunger stricken San and Khoi, so stabilising them and eventually absorbing them into the farm work force.

When the white farmers advancing up the East Coast came in contact with the advance guard of the Xhosa vicinity of the Fish river the resulting tension led to the start of a long series of frontier wars between the two communities. These conflicts deepened the race consciousness and strengthened the prejudices that had developed to rationalise and support the race/class hierarchy that had grown up in the colony with the importation of slaves to perform menial roles and the subsequent absorption of Khoi and San to supplement the slave work force. After the Afrikaner vee boere, long held up by the Xhosa resistance on the Eastern frontier burst out of the colony to the north on the great trek, they took the economic system developed in the Cape with them. The pattern of continuous pressure for territorial expansion, absorption of the indigenous population as farm workers and periodic military conflict accompanying this process, was thus extended over a huge area. The sanguinary struggles with the Zulu, Ndebele, Sotho, Tswana, Venda and Pedi further hardened colour feeling and so prepared the way for the opposition of the two Boer ex-Republics as well as the Natal English to the extension of the Cape franchise/the whole of South Africa at the time of the Union.

The process of incorporation of African people in the pastoral farming economy as servants on white farms, however, was complemented by a rival process from an early date. This was consciously pursued and advocated by the missionaries. It involved encouraging the indigenous people to become regular producers of goods for the market on their own account rather
than as workers for white masters. This alternative method of
drawing Africans into the world mercantile system promised
worthwhile profits for merchants in Britain as well as at the
Cape and was supported by politically important pressure groups
in England. Its development conflicted, however, with the
interests of the vee boere. It threatened to deny them labour
that would otherwise be available. Mission reserves like
Bethelsdorp and Theopolis were constantly denounced as havens of
idleness. It also threatened to break down the clear hierarchy
of colour which the frontier farmers were committed to uphold.
When the British government under pressure from the missionaries
and their supporters in Britain gave open support to this
alternative approach to the 'civilisation' of the indigenous
people, the antagonism aroused among frontier farmers combined
with frustration over availability of land pushed them on the
great trek.

In 1970, however, Martin Legassick submitted a most
stimulating discussion paper to Shula Marks' Seminar on the
Societies of Southern Africa in the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies of London University. The paper entitled 'The Frontier
Tradition in South African Historiography' was a formidably
cerebral piece of work and was recognised at once as a major land
mark in the historiography of pre-industrial South Africa.\(^2\)
Indisputably brilliant, it is, however, far from easy to fully
understand. Intended to provoke discussion it ranges very
widely and raises very many issues. Its treatment of these is
often highly elusive culminating as often as not in a throw away
question. While it is usually possible to see what Martin is
querying, therefore, it is often much more difficult to be sure
what alternative proposition he is advancing.

He takes as the declared target of his attack a rather
extreme view of the role of the frontier which he found expressed
most fully in some of the writings of Eric Walker and C.W. de
Kiewiet. He attributed it also to I.D. MacCrone, who in turn
he believed, derived it from F.J. Turner's frontier thesis,
expounded in his essays on 'The Frontier in American history'. In this interpretation the trekking Boer was seen as 'the most active maker of South African history' and the frontier in isolation from the settled areas of white South Africa as the crucible within which South African racism was formed.\textsuperscript{3} The subsequent adoption of segregationist and ultimately apartheid policies was then seen as the triumph of the frontier and the frontier spirit over the liberal civilisation of the Cape. Thus de Kiewiet had argued 'the Union Constitution, in Native policy at all events, represented the triumph of the frontier, and into the hands of the frontier was delivered the future of the native people. It was the conviction of the frontier that the foundation of society was race and the privileges of race.'\textsuperscript{4}

Attacking this view Legassick rejects the idea that race prejudice in South Africa was born in the frontier situation alone. Following van den Berge and Winthrop D. Jordan\textsuperscript{5} he maintains that 'the essential matrix of ideas from which institutionalised racism grew already existed in Europe - perhaps more prevalently in Protestant Anglo-Saxon Europe - at the early stages of overseas expansion.'\textsuperscript{6} What is more, the race class divisions of frontier society in South Africa were not sui generis within the frontier zone itself but had their base in the system of non-white slavery developed in the settled areas of the colony. Frontier society, far from being cut off from that of the settled areas, was closely linked to it as 'The Western Cape provided the only market, the legitimation of land tenure and baptism and marriage, the home of one's kin (if one was white, at least), and in numerous cases the home of the owner of the land one occupied.'\textsuperscript{7}

He thus denounced the dichotomy set up between frontier and
settled society but extended this to include 'the dichotomy of missionaries and officials versus colonists .... of Afrikaner nationalists against their (largely British) opponents, of Cape Liberalism against Republican frontiersmen.'

The frontier, he went on to argue, far from being the unique source of race prejudice was rather a zone within which racial roles were less clearly defined and the identification of race and class less rigid than in the more settled districts. Thus the mixed race stock farmers, known as Bastards or Griquas, squeezed out of the settled areas by rising race prejudice, found it possible in the more racially ambiguous society of the frontier to co-exist with white neighbours. 'Clearly such people were not regarded by white frontiersmen uniformly as equals, and their claim to land was increasingly challenged; but they did hold it and on occasion gave help and protection to destitute whites.'

Within the frontier zone, moreover, whites did not encounter blacks only in the roles of servant or enemy. In the outer reaches of the frontier zone where the stock farmer's involvement in market economy was at its most tenuous, the pattern of his relationships with his non-white dependants assumed much of the characteristics of personal clientship typical of the African communities of the area. The role of the Baas tended away from that of capitalist style employer towards that of an African chief. This was the environment which saw the emergence of the so-called frontier ruffians, men like Coenraad Buys, the Bezuidenhout family, the Prinsloos, Lucas Meyer, Carl Trigard, Christoffel Botha and others. These men at times played the role of champions of the frontier settlers against British imperialism. They sometimes apparently took the lead in defence of the principle of white race privilege against the more liberal attitudes of the British administration. For example, Frederick Cornelius Bezuidenhout was the hero of the Slagters Nek rebellion, the man who stood up to the impudent British who claimed to tell him how to treat his dependants.
Yet these men also lived at times in African occupied territory under the authority of African chiefs and in their conflicts with British authority were sometimes not above attempting to employ African allies against their white enemies. Contact between African communities and whites on the frontier was not characterised exclusively by conflict. Co-operative relationships as, for example, in trade were just as much a part of the frontier situation as the periodic outbursts of strife. Where there was conflict, however, (at least until the British altered the situation in 1812) it did not take the form of a clear cut struggle between whites and Africans but rather between particular groups of whites and the followers of particular African chiefs. In these conflicts white protagonists were often allied with other African chiefs against their particular enemies. They likewise often employed African allies in their conflict with fellow whites. This approach has subsequently been further developed by Hermann Giliomee in 'The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812' in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee edited The Shaping of South African Society 1652-1820 (Cape Town 1979). It can also be seen very clearly from the perspective of the Xhosa side of the frontier in J.B. Peire's study of The House of Phalo (Johannesburg 1981). This situation, Legassick argues, was replicated in the new frontier situations created by the great trek. '... it is surprising how often Trekkers - more particularly Potgieter and Pretorius - were willing to try and obtain the assistance of African societies not only against other Africans but against whites, thus continuing the pattern of the Cape frontier rebels.' Thus Pretorius tried to use Moshweshwe against the British. Potgieter also apparently tried to use the forces of the Pedi chief Sekwati against the Andries Ohrigstad volksraad.

Legassick's article, however, was not really directed solely towards attacking exaggerated views of the isolation of the frontier or over-simple pictures of the pattern of conflict and race/class relationships in the frontier zone. It was an
important early salvo in a much more extensive intellectual war. This was the 'revisionist' attack on the idea that apartheid was an atavistic policy, an irrational imposition on the natural development of capitalist society in South Africa. This view, widely held by liberal historians, saw apartheid as an anti-capitalist and fundamentally irrational system imposed on society by the strength of political feelings which had their origin in the pre-industrial phase of South Africa's history. Instead of this the 'revisionists' sought to demonstrate that apartheid was a creation of capitalism itself as it developed within South Africa. Its main basis was to be found not in the pastoral past but in the economics of the gold mines and industries of the twentieth century. The villains of the piece were not to be sought only in the secret meeting places of the Broederbond but in the board rooms of members of the Chamber of Mines and of overseas companies with investments in South Africa.

This, it should be remembered, was not just an academic conflict. It was a struggle over important issues of policy. The view of apartheid as an anachronistic imposition on the capitalist system provided support for the arguments beloved of British Conservatives as well as would be bridge builders in Australia and New Zealand, that the development of capitalism would eventually break down the irrational barriers of racism and create an open, non-racial, freely competitive society in South Africa. Economic sanctions against South Africa were thus likely to be counter productive and the best policy would be to encourage investment and capital growth which would inevitably transform the society for the better.

Legassick's article was thus not only an attack on a particular interpretation of the role of the frontier but also on the importance of the entire topic as a central theme in the history of the development of South African society. It set out explicitly to challenge the view that the great trek was 'the central event in South African history' ... 'all that had gone before led up to that; most of what has happened since
has been a commentary on it. Instead of the emphasis which MacCrone and others had laid on the eighteenth and early nineteenth century development of Cape society as the cradle of future white racism, the emphasis should be on the pattern of twentieth century industrialisation.

Legassick's arguments have, it seems to me, disposed effectively of the idea of the frontier as the isolated autonomous source of institutionalised racism in South Africa. It is probably fair to add, however, that this extreme version of the frontier thesis is something of a caricature, as Legassick half admits. The role of the frontier in the history of race relations in South Africa can only be understood by seeing it as the expanding periphery of a racially stratified settled society.

It is in drawing our attention to the ambiguities and complexities of race relations and intergroup conflicts within the frontier zone that Legassick (and those like吉利米和Peires who have further developed this theme) has made the greatest contribution. He has destroyed the simple picture of the frontier as a clear line of contact between two racial communities and two social systems. He has equally disposed of the idea that contact along this line was marked exclusively by conflict and that such conflict was always a simple self-conscious racial struggle between white and black. Instead of this over-simple model we have been made very aware that the frontier was no clear-cut line of contact but a broad zone of varying and largely indeterminate breadth. Near its outer extremity white traders and hunters periodically penetrated a land still dominated by African communities living in accordance with their own social and economic systems, only marginally modified by contacts with these outsiders. Here and there in this outer periphery the occasional white stock farmer might be established or even a small community of such farmers (like Trigardt and his relatives in the Xhosa country before his departure on the great trek). Living at the extreme limits of
viability of market oriented pastoralism the way of life of white stock farmers in this peripheral area and their relationship with their non-white dependants approximated to patterns prevalent among their African neighbours. This was the area in which the frontier ruffians with their ambiguous lifestyle and relationships emerged and thrived.

It was also the area in which the Khoi or part Khoi practitioners of the Cape stock farming system, the Bastards and Griquas, were able to maintain themselves. From this peripheral fringe as one approached the Colony, the number of white stock farmers would be found to increase till at the inner limits of the frontier zone few, if any, independent African communities persisted, most land was owned by whites and their relationship with their dependants approximated more to that of master and servant in a capitalist society than chief and client in African communities. In the context of this picture of the frontier and of the interpenetration of the two racial communities and their economic systems in the outer reaches of the zone, the fact that black and white did not always consciously confront one another in clear racial hostility is easy to understand.

This deepened comprehension of the rich complexity of the frontier situation does not, however, require any fundamental revision of our understanding of the dynamics of frontier expansion and the basic process of social transformation that it involved. The frontier zone with its internal gradations was not static. Except where resistance of San and Khoi or of Xhosa held it up, it was always pushing outward and as it did so its peripheral zone was constantly being transformed into a more settled pattern. At the same time marginal people like the Bastards and the frontier ruffians were constantly being pushed further forward. Thus many Bastards squeezed out of Graaff Reinet, moved to the Khamies Bergen and thence to the Middle Orange from where the Griquas of Adam Kok were eventually forced to migrate to Griqualand East. For the frontier ruffians Coenraad Buys after leaving the Eastern Frontier eventually
migrated northwards as far as the Zoutpansberg. The frontier, as Legassick points out, was a social phenomenon, the shifting spacial location of a process of social transformation involving incorporation of African peoples in the market economy of the Cape through the ex-propriation of their land and the 'civilisation' of 'tribesmen' into 'herdsmen'. The complexities of interaction at the periphery of the frontier zone, therefore, should not blind us to the underlying significance of what was taking place. This is obvious once one lifts one's eyes from the details of particular local struggles to look at the scene from a wider perspective.

Between 1652 and the second British occupation in 1806, white stock farmers have extended their settlements from the near vicinity of the Cape Peninsula to the Zuurbveld in the East, the Khamies Bergen in the West and roughly the line of the great escarpment, the Niaweveld, Roggeveld and Sneeuwberg mountains, to the north. In this vast area they had taken over far the greater part of the land and eliminated nearly all independent African communities. In the Zuurbveld where they were in contact with the Xhosa, the first Commission of Circuit reported in February 1812 that 'all the young people of which many of the houses are full, have no other prospects than the breeding of cattle, and to obtain the places for that purpose, nothing else is heard of than of forcing in between other places, in order to obtain new grazing places or clear ground and good pasturage over the Great Fish River and consequently a common inclination to settle themselves beyond the limits in case they could obtain permission thereto.' While progress up the East Coast remained slow in spite of the 1812 clearing of the Zuurbveld by British troops, the expansion of white land occupation in the northeast proceeded apace. Between 1800 and 1824 about 130,000 square kilometres of land, previously the domain of San hunting bands was staked out and by 1825 no single independent band remained in this vast area. Some farmers had already settled near the southern bank of the Orange River by 1820. In 1824
the frontier of the Colony was extended to take them in. The following year, however, saw the first major migration of stock farmers beyond the river. Though this was a temporary migration made necessary by drought and loss of grazing to locusts, it was to be the first of a series of such movements. It soon gave rise to the beginnings of permanent settlement in Transorangia. Then with the great trek the process of expropriation of African land was extended over even more vast areas in Natal, Transorangia and Transvaal. While it adds considerably to our understanding of the complexities of relationships at the interface of racial contacts, therefore, the points raised by Legassick and others do not require a major modification of our understanding of the dynamics of frontier expansion or of what that process involved.

Neither, in my opinion, do they really disprove the view that conflicts in the frontier zone tended to harden race attitudes and contribute to a racist ideology that has been of continuing significance in the development of institutionalised race discrimination in South Africa. The fact that the racial situation in the outer reaches of the frontier zone was by no means clearcut, that whites had sometimes to accept the authority of black chiefs or the aid and protection of mixed race neighbours, does not necessarily imply diminution of race consciousness. What claims to authority and status whites had in this area were still based on the race and the very insecurity of their status would be likely to lead them to cling to distinctions of race more strongly than those whose position was less open to question. While it is impossible to measure the psychological strength of race attitudes at the frontier as compared with the settled districts in any quantitative way, it is unreasonable to ignore the fact that from the rebellion against Maynier in 1795 down to and including the great trek, the Eastern Frontier of the Cape was the scene of a whole series of upheavals in which protests at the 'liberal' policy of successive governments in Cape Town were an explicit
element. Once settled on the Zuurveld, moreover, fear and insecurity were soon to lead the English 1820 settlers to develop even more extreme attitudes than those of the Afrikaner frontiersmen. So in 1844 Thomas Mitford Bowker, addressing a meeting of frontier farmers and reflecting on the decline of the Springbok, remarked '... when I see two or three of them on the wide plains, and know they are the last of their race, my heart yearns towards them and I regret that so much innocent beauty, elegance and agility, must need be swept from the earth. My feelings toward the Kafir are not of that stamp .... I know he has once over-run and destroyed these districts, and I fear him, knowing him to be ready and willing to do it again. .... I know that rapine and murder are in all his thoughts, and I see them in his looks, and hate him accordingly .... and I begin to think that he too, as well as the springbok, must give place, and why not? Is it just that a few thousands of ruthless, worthless savages are to sit like a nightmare upon a land that would support millions of civilised men happily?'.

It is likewise difficult to deny the ideological significance for Afrikaner nationalism of historic memories of the killing of Retief, the Weenen massacres, the Day of the Covenant and Blood River. One can fully accept the 'revisionist' view that these historic memories would have been forgotten or at least played no significant role in the twentieth century had it not been for the contradictions and class conflicts generated by the pattern of capitalist development. The importance of ideology as a means of articulating the common interests and developing a common consciousness among Afrikaners of differing social class can hardly be doubted, however. When one considers, moreover, how extremely narrow was the electoral victory of the nationalists in 1948 it is not at all improbable that the availability of such extremely emotionally potent historical memories may have been decisive.

It is, however, in his passing suggestion that 'the dichotomy of missionaries and officials versus colonists ...' is a false
image imposed on South African historiography by a distorted view of the role of the frontier that Legassick is furthest from the mark. 23 It is indeed in the study of this dichotomy and of the alternative process by which African people were incorporated in the market economy that the most exciting progress in our understanding of the expansion of the South African frontier has been made. 24 This process, the incorporation of Africans in the market economy as independently producing peasants was fostered by the missionaries who played an important role in assisting it. 25 Many Africans picked up the idea of producing for the market as well as new crops and new technologies like the plough from them. Others, however, did so as a result of experience working on white farms or simply in response to the opportunities and pressures created by the expansion of white controlled policies after the great trek.

The process could be said to have begun with the emergence of Khoi and part Khoi, stock farmers and the introduction of a partly market oriented approach to production by a few Xhosa such as John Philip's protegee Jan Tzatzoe. It assumed really large proportions, however, after the 1834-5 frontier war brought the Mfengu to settle in the Eastern Frontier zone. It expanded still more dramatically after the great trek in which the trekkers established claims to vastly more land than they could hope to occupy and directly exploit.

As a result of the work of Colin Bundy on the situation in the Cape, Henry Slater on that in Natal, and Stan Trapido on the Transvaal, 26 the tremendous importance of this development in South African history and the complexity of conflict and interaction between this process and the rival one of the incorporation of Africans as workers on white farms can now be appreciated. Among the consequences of the incorporation of Africans in the market economy as peasants was the possibility for absentee land owners to derive income from their land by allowing African tenants to farm it and charging them rent in cash or kind. The possibility of such 'kafir farming'
facilitated the accumulation of titles to land in the hands of certain individuals and of the Land Companies which came to play such a major role in Natal and the Transvaal. This land accumulation meant that in spite of the vast extent of the lands occupied by the trekkers in the first years of the movement it was soon all claimed and landless would-be farmers had to try and extend the frontiers still further. In spite of such expansion from the original areas occupied during the trek, white landlessness steadily increased notably in the Transvaal. Along with the emergence of a land wealthy class of notables went the multiplication of the landless bywoners (client tenants) and of poor burghers living on land subdivided below the limits of economic viability or struggling to make a living as transport riders. The basis was thus laid for the twentieth century problem of the pauperised mainly Afrikaner, poor whites on the Rand.

Apart from encouraging land accumulation the expansion of African peasant production resulted in that apparently unquenchable thirst for cheap black labour by white farmers and businessmen that led John X. Merriman to lament in 1876 that 'In the Cape the Government is called on to survey mankind from China to Peru in the hope of creating and maintaining a class of cheap labourers who will thankfully accept the position of helots and not be troubled with the inconvenient ambition of bettering their conditions.' In Natal it resulted in the importation of Indian indentured workers for the sugar plantations so creating the nucleus of the future South African Indian population. In South Africa in general in the period following the diamond discoveries it produced conflicts between the white states over control and exploitation of migrant labour from the further hinterland. It thus, as Norman Etherington has pointed out, lay behind the abortive attempts initiated by Carnarvon to federate the white states in South Africa, as well as the contemporary linked drive to extend and tighten control over African populations which expressed itself inter alia in the Zulu War and the War of the Guns in Lesotho. The spread of peasant farming
by blacks by providing rent for absentee landlords and land companies, income for missions, hut taxes for governments and profits for wholesale merchants as well as local traders, kept alive a rival interest to that of the labour hungry white farmer. This long prevented farmer sponsored measures intended to push African tenants off the land onto the labour market from having much effect. It also, as Trapido shows, helps to explain the persistence of the Cape Liberal tradition as a significant political force. 29

When the development of the Witwatersrand goldmines altered the economic situation making capitalist commercial farming a more profitable way of using land than the extraction of rent from black tenants, the persistence of the black peasantry posing an obstacle to the interests of farmers and other employers was a major factor in the development of segregation policies. (Most significantly the 1913 and 1935 Land Act). It was also an incentive to the adoption of apartheid and the last gruesome scenes of this drama are still being played out with a continuing deportation of Africans from the so-called 'black spots' to the so-called 'homelands'.

In the light of all this it does seem clear that Legassick's attempt to dethrone the study of the expanding South African Frontier from a position of central importance in South African historiography goes considerably too far. We may accept the revisionists' argument that the development of segregation and apartheid in twentieth-century South Africa is to be explained largely in terms of the material interests generated by the development of capitalism in the country. It cannot be denied, however, that the way that this capitalist development took place and the nature of the class conflicts to which it gave rise was in part at least determined by the opportunities and constraints offered by the social and political situation within which it grew. Such essentials as the political rightlessness of most blacks in comparison with the enfranchisement of almost all white adult males, the extensive expropriation of
African land but continued survival of limited reserves, the
existence of a large class of landless Afrikaners, the presence
of a large population of black peasants capable of resisting
pressures to force them on the labour market, all had their
origins in the processes of frontier expansion.

While discarding the false notion that apartheid is to be
seen simply as an anachronistic irrational, anti-capitalist
attempt to return to the pastoral past sponsored solely by
Afrikaner nationalists with a seventeenth-century mentality,
therefore, we can still find in the study of the twin processes
of frontier expansion which so significantly shaped the society
within which the Chamber of Mines was to operate one of the
most fascinating and important themes of South African history.
Footnotes to The South African Frontier revisited


2. It has subsequently been republished as Chapter Two in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore edited Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, London 1980. It has been the subject of a biting attack by M. Wright in The Burden of the Present, Cape Town 1977, pp. 65-67, but this has done little to help us assess the major issues raised in the original article.


15. Hermann Giliomee's concepts of the open and closing frontier are useful here provided it is understood that the open frontier was always on the brink of closing. See H. Giliomee, 'The Eastern Frontier 1770-1812' in The Shaping of South African Society 1652-1820, pp. 338-351.

16. See M. Legassick, "The Northern Frontier to 1820: the emergence of the Griqua people", in The Shaping of South African Society 1652-1820, pp. 243-244. Martin's suggestion in the epilogue to this chapter that it was the growing investment of capital in wool production in Transorangia that led to the Griquas being forced out is illuminating but does not materially affect my argument.


21. The importance of these in Afrikaner nationalist ideology or what he calls the Afrikaner 'Civil Religion' is very clearly brought out by Moodie in The Rise of Afrikanerdom, Berkeley, 1975.

22. On this see Dan O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, Cambridge, 1983.


25. This was not only true of the Cape but also of the numerous missions in Natal. However disillusioned the missionaries may have become with regard to the evangelisation of the Zulu, however much their initial idealism gave way to an acceptance of the racist ideas prevalent in white society, they did help the Kholwa to become eminently successful peasant farmers. See N.A. Etherington, Preachers, Peasants and Politics in South East Africa 1835-1880, London 1978.

27. Quoted in S. Van der Horst, *Native Labour in South Africa 1911-1969*, London 1979, p. 120.


29. "The friends of the Natives: merchants, peasants and the political and ideological structure of liberalism in the Cape", in *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa*. 