THE AUSTRALASIAN REVIEW OF AFRICAN STUDIES
VOLUME 39 NUMBER 1 JUNE 2018

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EDITORIAL

Decolonising African Studies – The Politics of Publishing

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The Australasian Review of African Studies remains committed to publishing African Studies research from within the Australasia and Pacific regions, and beyond. African Studies remains a niche area of research and teaching in Australia and New Zealand, and thus caters for smaller audiences than those that exist in the mainstream and busy ‘journal markets’ of the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States. As a result, the numbers game of ‘publish or perish’ forced upon us decent academics and researchers - by their corporatized universities which accede to the corporate use of analytics, metrics and citation publishing criteria to measure their worth and success - pre-determines that an article published in this independently owned, managed and published journal, will not receive the same level of citations as a similar article published in a journal distributed by one of the major corporate publishing houses in the UK. Consequently, independent publishers like The African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) have been marginalised from mainstream analytics and data collection agencies, and our authors have not been duly recognised by their university departments. Previous attempts by AFSAAP over the last 18 years to ‘sell-out’ ARAS to a corporate publisher have failed, due to our comparatively smaller membership base. Thus, unless we increased our subscription rates ten-fold, the financial profit for said corporate publisher would not make it worth their while. Fortunately, AFSAAP’s vision is about supporting African Studies in the region, and is a not-for-profit association,
with its members central to its aims. Therefore, the ARAS editorial team has been doggedly attempting to get the journal noticed and listed as widely as possible on all the same corporate owned lists, without this corporate support, and with some success which will be described below. However, the path continues to lead to the ‘chicken and the egg’ scenario, which is often infuriating.

Without an impressive increase in the number of citations of all ARAS articles (for your convenience listed at the end of this issue, in a celebration of ARAS articles since 1979), ARAS will not be considered worthy for inclusion in some of the required ‘lists’ - such as for example, the Institute of Science Indexing (ISI). In 2013, the ARAS editorial team began the process of applying for inclusion in this particular Thomson Reuters (now Clarivate Analytics) product. Five years of correspondences later, ARAS was advised that it does “not compare favourably” in terms of citation data “with that of other, similar titles in [their] existing coverage of the discipline” (correspondence from Clarivate Analytics, 30 March 2018). Given that ARAS is the only journal of African Studies in this region, it is disappointing that we have most likely been compared to the journals and researchers of the larger European or American markets, where there are simply more Africanists, more African Studies, and more recognition of African Studies in their universities. Comparing apples with oranges!

Having said that, to their credit, Clarivate Analytics (as formerly Thomson-Reuters) has in the mean-time listed ARAS in its Web of Science Core Collection Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), although we are not sure how many universities insist their authors publish in journals listed in ESCI, nor are we sure how a journal in its 40th year and 39th volume can be considered emerging. Nonetheless, perhaps we haven’t wasted the approximately $700 in postage stamps sending two hard copies of this journal twice a year, to their Philadelphia address. Yet, it appears that unless we get listed by the ISI, many authors will be advised by their universities not to publish their articles with ARAS. Anecdotally we have heard this from potential authors in Australia, New Zealand and even South Africa, that they cannot submit their research to us because of these metric measures. So watch this space, as we continue the frustrating struggle for recognition for our authors in this corporatized metrical publishing world.

It is important to acknowledge however, that ARAS is already recognised by other abstract and indexing products/services including, for many years, ProQuest’s Sociological Abstracts and PAIS Index (although previously listed with their Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, this appears to have been cast aside in recent years without notification). We have recently also been added to the all-important European Reference Index for the
Humanities (ERIH). Yet, no matter which service provider lists ARAS, it seems the goal posts are continuously moving, as other different listings are required by the metrics obsessed universities.

Fortunately our attempts to be recognised by SCOPUS has been more rewarding. This only took two years of application, and finally in early 2018 ARAS was advised that it will be indexed with this abstract and citation database, owned by Elsevier (you know it has been a challenging process for the ARAS Editorial team when we pop the champagne and celebrate that our DOIs will now link with our authors’ ORCIDs thanks to the SCOPUS listing!).

Astute ARAS readers will have noticed the addition of Document Object Identifiers (DOIs) since volume 37, 2016 (essentially these are a hyperlink to each article). Owned by CrossRef, to which publishers pay an annual fee, an individual DOI is generated for each published article, in a tedious online process, by which the publisher completes a form, providing all sorts of detail, including the author’s name(s), the title of the(ir) article, their ORCID number, and the URL to which the article is already published on the publisher’s own website. The publisher also devises the DOI pattern. So for example, in our case, this DOI - https://doi.org/10.22160/22035184 is specific to ARAS - and links to our website URL - http://afsaap.org.au/publications/aras/ - where we upload all ARAS articles anyway. Now in order to join the metric brigade, we also have to create individualised DOIs for each article following a logical pattern of numbers or letters, such as - https://doi.org/10.22160/22035184/ARAS-2017-38-2/11-33 - which is simply a link to ARAS 2017, volume 38, number 2, pages 11-33, a fascinating article by Theo Neethling on “China’s evolving role and approach to international peacekeeping: The cases of Mali and South Sudan”. The CrossRef service provides a metrical analysis on the number of citations our articles receive, with quarterly reports telling us the top 10 articles accessed (as seen in Table 1 below).

CrossRef provides metadata to other services such as ORCID (which is ‘free’ for authors to apply for, and gives them a unique code and can even generate their own QR Code), which then enables all other metadata collection services and the general public to cross-reference you, your research and your publications. While this is not an altruistic service provided for free for the betterment of human society, it does assist in the academic’s vain attempts to get their due recognition in their respective departments, and provides a measure of their success - all publically available online!
Table 1: Top 10 ARAS DOIs (in 2017)

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Source: CrossRef 2017.

But, what is the actual cost of these metrics? In financial terms, for *ARAS*, it would be around $500 annually in fees (to the lists) and $20,000 in management costs (if we had a paid secretariat). Fortunately, the latter is provided pro bono by the *ARAS* editors, passionate about African Studies in the region. For other academics in general, perhaps the costs are in their chiropractic bills or yoga class fees, as they are forced to bend over increasingly backwards to meet these ever shifting goal posts!

In Australia, for many years a journal’s success was measured by its ranking within the *Excellence in Research for Australia* journals. Since 2009, *ARAS* has been ranked at Level C (ERA ID 18727), because it is a multidisciplinary journal, and African Studies is not recognized as a specific *Field of Research* (FoR), such as Political Science, which has its own FoR code of 1606. Unfortunately for *ARAS*, only ‘A’ ranked journals were considered worthy vestibules for an aspiring academic’s article. And so, even though in 2012 these journal rankings were removed by popular demand, their legacy remains in the academy, and academics are advised not to publish in anything but ‘A’ ranked journals, or journals listed with the commercial and corporate data and analytics businesses.

It is no longer enough for a journal such as *ARAS* to publish relevant research to its target audience; and be available in hard copy, and electronically through *Informit Databases* (owned and operated in Australia), and the AFSAAP website www.afsaap.org.au. It would seem that the academy would have us sell-out to a corporate publisher, and if that is not an option, therefore preferably not exist. We are guilty of bringing down the statistical measures of publication success, but we will not be silenced. *ARAS*
The segue here, for these tedious revelations is the controversial publication of ‘The Case for Colonialism’ written by Bruce Gilley and published in the Third World Quarterly. Apparently this article did not survive the peer review process, but was published anyway, and without consultation with its International Editorial Board, whom subsequently all resigned over this. I threw my arms up in disgust and annoyance at what appeared to me to be a tactic of the TWQ editor - to gain ‘hits’ and citations through notoriety, merely to meet those corporate analytic and metric demands. I threw my arms up again in frustration when I realized the Third World Quarterly is considered an ‘A’ ranked journal, and already had the SCOPUS indexing that we at ARAS so craved. Yes! You can call it professional jealousy! But, it is still frustrating when you try to do the right thing, but just can’t compete. Therefore, as ARAS Editor I was delighted to be able to re-circulate to my colleagues in AFSAAP, an online petition seeking to have the Gilley article withdrawn. The petition was started by Associate Professor Jenny Heijun Wills from the Department of English, and Director of the Critical Race Network, at the University of Winnipeg.\(^1\) I also specifically advised our membership not to raise the metrics of the TWQ article or journal by clicking on their DOI or URL, since this just reinforces the editor’s decision to publish, and I provided a link to read it independently of these metadata services (although that link is no longer active - see http://fooddeserts.org/images/paper0114.pdf). In hindsight, I should have taken that opportunity to remind our subscribers to click-away on all of our DOIs in their spare time to increase our metadata! Nonetheless, what I did do was remind AFSAAP members –

that as African Studies Scholars, and as subscribers to one of the few independent journals on African Studies (The Australasian Review of African Studies) we have a responsibility to uphold the intellectual rigour to ensure knowledge is shared, and research is used in a positive way. This recently published article in the TWQ, a so-called top ranked journal in development studies, just demonstrates how ridiculous the ‘citation’ pressures have become, and how they

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\(^1\) see the petition at https://www.change.org/p/editors-ofthe-third-world-quarterly-retract-the-case-for-colonialism?recruiter=409526319&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=share_petition

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[are] obviously giving voice to outrageous and shameful opinions (Lyons, 2017).

Further to this, I continued to remind members to submit their research and articles to ARAS, and be damned with the corporate demands of their respective universities. However, this is a battle that ARAS cannot win alone, and requires authors to resist the corporatized pressures placed on them – the colonization of their research communications – which is not that easy when you need that academic job.

A further outcome of these pressures on academics not to publish in anything but ‘A’ ranked journals, is that they are forced to reject any notions of publishing in anything else that is not of this so-called ‘required’ level of esteem. For example, as a result of such pressures, it was with much regret that in its 40th year, the Annual AFSAAP Conference Proceedings publication was cancelled due to the extremely low submission rate of final conference papers by conference participants. Most participants simply declared that they had written papers but had to submit them to ‘listed’ journals only, or not publish them at all (that is, if they can’t be published in a ‘listed’ journal, then it is better not to publish at all because that ‘metric’ would bring down their university’s overall metrics for so-called esteemed publications, all in the name of ‘excellence in research’).

Thus, many researchers have been advised not to publish in any conference proceedings (even with an assigned ISBN and/or E-ISBN), or in lower ranked journals, and certainly not in an independent journal such as ARAS, even though it has high standards, a respectable rejection rate, is double blind peer reviewed and has a targeted audience for such research. As I stated in that invitation to AFSAAP members,

submit your articles to ARAS, as we are proud of our tradition of publishing properly peer reviewed articles that enables AFSAAP members to share [their] fabulous research … ARAS does this on a shoestring budget and has not needed to bend over backwards for corporate publishers, or the pressures to meet all of these ridiculous metrics as measured by other corporate companies, which are buoyed by the university administrators and the over-zealous bean counters. We certainly do not approve of giving valuable publication space to such shameful views as the TWQ has done. (emphasis added: Lyons, 2017)
The response I got from this emailed invitation was understandably mixed. On one hand, some agreed and signed the petition (which now has over 7000 signatures), while on the other hand some disagreed with the process considering it to be a type of censorship – reading the efforts to retract the publication of Gilley’s article as an attempt to silence a worthwhile debate. Neither view questioned my own motivation to promote the petition – which was based mostly on my frustration that it appears that proper adherence to the peer review process with respect to academic integrity doesn’t matter, as much as belonging to the ‘lists,’ ‘ticking the boxes’, and getting the citations - all measured and reported in the corporate loop described above. We may as well just count the ‘likes’ we get or the ‘hashtags’ we generate, to determine our fates or even the success of an independent journal such as ARAS. These are the corporate gatekeepers silencing the debate: The tree still falls in the forest, even though nobody heard it. The subaltern do speak – we just need to listen. Independent journals publishing articles deemed relevant to smaller regional audiences are worthwhile and should not be silenced, nor colonized by these corporate global forces and practices.

Therefore, bringing these two themes together, I agree that a worthwhile debate is needed, and this can only be achieved with proper adherence to the peer review process, and this edition of ARAS is testament to that. Indeed, this issue of ARAS tackles the issues of colonization, re-colonisation and de-colonisation head-on. The withdrawal of the Third World Quarterly article the ‘Case for Colonialism’ written by Bruce Gilley in 2017 raises many questions that we should be dealing with in academic and public discourse.

Scott MacWilliam’s article ‘Africa’s Past Invented to Serve Development’s Uncertain Future’ provides a timely critique of the saga surrounding the publication of Bruce Gilley’s controversial article “The Case for Colonialism” in the Third World Quarterly, arguing that while Gilley’s case is somewhat flawed, silencing this question serves little purpose in academic debate. MacWilliam concludes that “The virtue of the call for the return of colonial governance is that it at least makes clear the increasingly prevalent assertion that democracy should be a lower priority than development.”

Martin Klein’s contribution to this issue ‘A Critique of Colonial Rule: A Response to Bruce Gilley,’ extends this critique of Gilley’s article, and further examines the flaws in Gilley’s central argument that Africa needs to be recolonised. Klein provides a critique of colonial rule which determines that decolonisation was a positive step and there should be no going back to a colonised future.
Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka’s article ‘Curbing Inequality Through Decolonising Knowledge Production in Higher Education in South Africa’, provides a decolonial critique of South Africa’s higher education system. In particular, Leon Mwamba Tshimpaka argues that the system based upon colonial and apartheid foundations must be transformed to address the inequalities inherent in South African society.

The ‘postcolonial hangover’ inherent in these three articles is that, despite their arguments, they are communicated here, out of necessity, through the gatekeeping format of the practices of the peer–reviewed academic journal, which gives them their double blind peer reviewed academic credentials to speak.

Kwamena Kwansah-Aidoo and Virginia Mapedzahama’s article, ‘‘There is really discrimination everywhere’: Experiences and consequences of Everyday Racism among the new black African diaspora in Australia’, is being published in this volume below, at a time when in Australian political debate, the value of spending money on Africans has been questioned. Senator Pauline Hanson (no surprises here) has criticised Australia’s first African-Australian Senator, Lucy Gichuhi whom regretfully got some facts seriously wrong when she ‘tweeted’ that there would be 10,000 Scholarships available through the Australia Awards program for African Students (see Elton-Pym, 2018). This might be the case for China’s Africa scholarships program, but here in Australia, the actual number of scholarships on offer for African students is only 474 out of a total of 4,031 scholarships for developing countries in 2018. Of these, only 155 are long term MA or PhD studies, and 319 are for short-term study periods (see DFAT, 2018; Lyons, 2012; 2013). What these figures show is that African countries are a lower priority for the Australian aid budget, but nonetheless important for both the diplomatic effect and most-likely the mining and agricultural sector, in which the majority of students will be studying. What the media debate on ‘Gichuhi’s mistake’ shows is that there are still ‘no votes in Africa’ for Australian politicians (see Lyons, 2012; 2013, p.216). The racist attitudes behind Hanson’s remarks were only matched by Senator Fraser Anning who declared that “the money would be better spent on supporting white South African farmers” enabling them to emigrate to Australia (emphasis added, see Elton-Pym, 2018). Therefore, it is timely that Kwamena Kwansah-Aidoo and Virginia Mapedzahama publish this research on ‘everyday racism’ in Australia, as it affects the lives and identities of African-Australians. Their research is profound and illustrates some disturbing trends in our democratic society. The ARAS editorial team recommend this article becomes compulsory reading for all Australian politicians.
Abay Gebrekidan’s contribution to this volume, ‘‘African-Australian’’ Identity in the Making: Analysing its Imagery and Explanatory Power in View of Young Africans in Australia’, is also a timely reminder in this region that ‘Africa is not one country’. There are indeed 55 African states or countries, and the membership of Australia’s African diaspora are derived from many different cultural, ethnic and national backgrounds. Gebrekidan’s research based on qualitative interviews demonstrates the ‘self-categorisation and self-identification’ among young African-Australians’ in relation to this broader label. What this article shows is the general ignorance and lack of knowledge in Australia to understanding the African context, and this has negative effects on the sense of belonging among African-Australian youth. If only ‘African studies’ was taken more seriously here in Australia!

Helen Ware and David Lucas in their article ‘Africa ‘Pretty Underdone’: 2017 Submissions to the DFAT White Paper and Senate Inquiry’, provide an Africanist analysis of the submissions and inquiry in preparation for this 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. The fact that they begin with the statement “Public discussion of Africa in Australia is hard to find”, should reaffirm the above cases and examples of racism and misunderstandings that journals such as ARAS, and associations such as AFSAAP, have an obligation and an important role to play in contributing to this public discourse in the Australasia and Pacific Region. Again, we must not be silenced by the current corporate demands on the academy. Ware and Lucas argue that the Senate Inquiry was not well advertised, and submissions from relevant stakeholders was thus low, thus leading to the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy, that there is very little interest in Africa in Australia’.

Hence, this issue of ARAS provides a detailed bibliography (prepared by this Editor) of all of the articles published since 1979 in this journal – 39 Volumes over 40 years, to demonstrate that there is interest in Africa, there are stakeholders interested in public discussion and informing public policy on African issues, and importantly, ARAS continues to be an important academic journal of interest to wider audiences.

References


ARTICLES

Africa’s Past Invented to Serve Development’s Uncertain Future

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Abstract

This essay examines the proposition that development, which has stalled since Independence in many African countries, can be restarted by the restoration of colonial governance. This form of rule, in place from the end of the 19th until the middle of the last century, was supposedly responsible for major improvements in a range of living conditions for colonial populations. The end of colonial governance, it is alleged, led to corruption and impoverishment for many people. Here it is argued that, as offensive as many may find the claim that colonial rule was beneficial for subject peoples, the purpose of the proposition should receive attention. The call for the return of colonial governance is placed within a wider, more influential series of proposals for how to bring development at a moment of uncertainty through a range of governance reforms. These proposals struggle with the politics of capitalist development, particularly the fraught relationship between development and democracy. The virtue of the call for the return of colonial governance is that it at least makes clear the increasingly prevalent assertion that democracy should be a lower priority than development.
Introduction

While the central thesis of Bruce Gilley’s ‘The case for colonialism’ (2017) is offensive for many, his appeal for a revitalised form of governance fits within an existing trend. Couched in language designed to produce outrage, Gilley’s argument for the re-introduction of colonial governance is located within a direction already being sketched internationally. The search for means to rescue capitalism from its current prolonged crisis of development has reached a critical point. While other academics, consultants and institutional officials have cloaked their political intentions in bland, even gentle, terms, including market reforms, good governance, transparency and accountability (see below), Gilley is at least direct: bring back (what he imagines as) the virtues of late colonial rule as the necessary impetus to drive development in specific countries and places, particularly on the African continent.

Where recently resigned World Bank chief economist Paul Romer urged the more limited establishment of ‘charter cities’, “administrative zones governed by a coalition of nations” (Romer, 2009), Gilley (2017, p. 11) wants not just areas within countries, such as Galinhas in Guinea-Bissau, but whole countries to be subject to a model he terms colonial governance. The template for Gilley’s model, according to his account, was established by western colonial powers from the 19th to the mid-20th century. This idealised state has no prior history: Gilley avoids pointing to the earlier barbarism of

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1 Finding something offensive is not, in my opinion, a satisfactory basis for some of the outrage the essay produced, whether the author intended to provoke a storm of condemnation, as seems possible, and the withdrawal of the article from Third World Quarterly, as has occurred. See for example, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2017.1369037?src=recsys; https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/10/09/pro-colonialism-article-has-been-withdrawn-over-threats-journal-editor
Not only is such censorious behaviour undesirable, it is totally ineffective, except perhaps in terms of some managerial metrics applied to academic publications worldwide. In 2018, as politicians and others are finding when they try to remove Facebook postings or Tweets, nothing disappears. Gilley’s essay is still available here: https://legalinsurrection.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Case-for-Colonialism-Third-World-Quarterly-Bruce-Gilley.pdf. My own position is that academic debate about the consequences of colonialism needs to continue, since its re-imposition is still advocated in various forms, as I document in this essay. However Gilley’s essay should not have been published in the early ‘draft’ form that appeared and there was something clearly inadequate and unsatisfactory with the Third World Quarterly review process, as the letter of October 9, 2017 from former board members emphasises https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DLtrT23XkAA4ZWI.jpg
colonial rule. When there is brutality in the exemplary phase, he justifies this by invoking a crude doctrine of necessity, made so by the savagery of revolting Kikuyu Africans. No mention here of imperial Belgium’s rule in the Congo Free State (Mertens, 2016) or of the behaviour of the European settlers displacing indigenous populations during the 19th and early-20th centuries in other colonies.

Gilley’s essay draws further, sharper attention to a direction being urged internationally. The importance of this contribution is that he lays bare what has been removed from the public gaze yet remains at the centre of governance reforms: colonial rule had a conception of development which depended upon the exercise of trusteeship or guardianship. Participatory representative democracy had a minor, if any, role. He enthusiastically resuscitates what has been buried, showing an awareness that, however it is presented, trusteeship is central to development (Cowen & Shenton, 1995). Even liberal democracy is at best now marginal for development (Asongu, 2018).

As Gilley explains “it is the intervening state, bound to act as a trustee, that has the capacity initially to choose a legitimate path forward” (2017, p. 9). According to Gilley, colonial authorities acting as agents or trustees brought important, necessary changes when local populations could not do so themselves. By implication, what is wrong with the good governance agenda is not just that trusteeship as a term has become ideologically passé, but that for the current, more fashionable form of constructed authority agency is indeterminate, uncertain in comparison to that which held under colonial governance.

This essay commences with an outline of Gilley’s argument for the need to resurrect colonial governance. Gilley’s explanation for the development crisis that followed the end of colonial rule in the 1980s and 1990s, as noted by the World Bank and others, is summarised. Emphasis is placed here on how Gilley attributes conditions in a range of countries to failures of domestic authority. There is no mention of changing international conditions or the effects of international agencies acting upon these nations (MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017). From these failures and subsequent conditions, the post-colonial ‘crisis’, Gilley draws the need for the return of colonial governance when other, earlier, good and effective governance reforms have failed or been ineffective.

Gilley dwells on the case of late-colonial and independent Kenya for empirical evidence to justify his call for the return of colonial governance. Here, Kenya is briefly examined for another purpose altogether; to show how the country’s slide from exemplar to impoverishment requires an
understanding of the multiple connections between domestic and international conditions that have produced current circumstances. These conditions include the policy reforms favoured internationally, particularly the privatisation of state agencies and assets, which have fuelled decades of grand corruption and the increasing impoverishment of large numbers of the country’s population (MacWilliam, Desaubin, & Timms, 1995; MacWilliam, 2012; MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017). Gilley’s argument is particularly weak on these connections.

Kenya is in numerous respects exemplary, for reasons examined below, and allows a major defect of Gilley’s argument to be presented in more detail. Colonial and post-colonial development should not be calculated on a territorial, colonial/national scale of reckoning, but on what is central to development itself, the unity of immanent, spontaneous development and intentional development (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). Kenya’s phases of the development of capitalism, or capitalist development, are best understood as moments when either spontaneous or intentional development was in the ascendancy. During British colonial rule in Gilley’s exemplary phase, the former—the spontaneous development of settler largeholdings—overrode the official intention to confine this advance in the name of securing the paramountcy of native interests.

Because Gilley wants to displace or supplant the prevailing governance agenda, it is necessary to outline exactly what earlier reform efforts, driven by international and national financial and aid institutions, intended as the means for constructing agency to bring development. The second section of this essay thus commences with a brief consideration of the idea of development, and the 1980s crisis of development during which the modern idea of governance originated. Governance is shown to have arisen out of the effects and failures of earlier reform agendas—in particular structural adjustment—as a prescription for Latin America and Africa. Subsequent changes, including good governance and effective governance, as well as the more territorially limited idea of charter cities, are shown to be attempts to deal with both intent—what reforms are needed—and agency—who is to have the capacity to design and implement desired reforms. Arising from the recognition of differences between regions, countries and areas within countries, a major problem for reform design was how to match proposals with circumstances.

However, as the third section of this essay argues, Gilley’s desire to return to trusteeship suggests a continuous if often unstated prioritisation of intentional development, which also strikes against much that the World Bank and other agencies mean by governance. Through the emphasis upon
trusteeship, Gilley attaches to colonial governance the primacy of intentional
development over spontaneous accumulation as a continuous condition,
where instead the central aim of good and effective governance has so far
been to find means for making (capitalist) markets work, particularly on a
national scale. Gilley brings to the fore the extent to which development
requires agents and agency that do not (necessarily) comply with popular
democratic norms. His directness on this matter prompts further
consideration as to whether and to what extent capitalism and development—
capitalist development—are compatible with democracy.

The case for colonial governance

Gilley’s first ground for resurrecting colonial governance is that:

…the colonial governance agenda explicitly affirms and
borrows from a country’s colonial past, searching for ideas and
notions of governmentality…The good governance agenda has
ignored the benefits of this past, while emphasising economic
liberalisation, political pluralism and administrative
streamlining (which) have replaced the socialist road in most
countries… Reclaiming this colonial trajectory abandoned at
independence is key to the colonial governance agenda. (p.7)

His second ground is similar:

…the colonial governance agenda recognises that the capacity
for effective self-government is lacking and cannot be conjured
out of thin air. The lack of state capacity to uphold the rule of
law and deliver public services was the central tragedy of
‘independence’ in the Third World…To reclaim ‘colonial
governance’ means increasing foreign involvement in key
sectors in business, civil society, and the public sector in order
to thus bolster this capacity. (p.7)

The effect of the re-imposition of the colonial governance agenda,
according to Gilley, will be to resurrect “the universalism of the liberal peace
and with it a shared standard of what a well-governed country looks like.
…The colonial governance agenda embraces a cosmopolitanism – a
civilising mission – often lacking in the good governance agenda” (emphasis
in original, p. 8). Despite continuous reference to the importance of
constructing arguments on “scientific empirical” evidence, Gilley does not deign to produce any details of the “liberal peace” or “the civilising mission”.

It is easy to criticise the empirical basis of Gilley’s argument piece by piece, commencing with his loose construction of various countries’ pasts and presents. The description of the establishment of Pol Pot’s murderous rule in Cambodia as a “Chinese-imposed genocidal regime” (p. 10), without drawing attention to the US government’s role in creating space for the Khmer Rouge within the country’s polity by backing a “right-wing military coup” that overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk, is typically selective (The History Place, 1999). To then describe the current 32-year-old regime headed by former Khmer Rouge apparatchik Hun Sen as “a successful semi-authoritarian polity with deep roots in the colonial past” (p. 10) is to also avoid the questions central to his case for colonial governance as a virtue: What part did these ‘roots’ play in the rise of the Khmer Rouge and the massacre of about one-quarter of the country’s population? How are these colonial ‘roots’ to be considered developmental?

If how exactly the cases of Cambodia and several other countries fit within Gilley’s first ground for the need to resurrect colonial governance is unclear, even less clear is his discussion of slavery which is presented as something indigenous to Africa, beneficently abolished by colonialism (p. 4). Yet, while slavery had a lengthy history in parts of Africa long before colonialism, as it had elsewhere around the world, to locate it solely as an indigenous practice ended by colonialism is not just selective but misses the importance of African slaves for the development of capitalism in Europe (Mintz, 1985; Understanding Slavery Initiative [USI], 2011). Further, the abolition of slavery was part of the 19th-century civilising of capitalism, described by Polanyi’s double movement (1944, p.b.1957) or what also occurred in some colonies, including New South Wales (Nairn, 1989). During this phase, trusteeship was placed at the centre of western colonial rule.

For Gilley (p. 2), the model of western colonial rule that inspires the idea of colonial governance is drawn from the early 19th to the mid-20th centuries. In selecting this timeframe, he is able to avoid the phase Karl Marx coupled with “so-called primitive accumulation”, a period when capital came into the world “dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt” (Marx, 1976, p. 926). But Gilley is hardly alone in his desire to exclude this initial phase in the history of colonialism. For another instance of this facile, ‘whitewashing’ approach to colonial history, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2013, p. 37), which includes, among numerous similar statements, the claim that at the colonial frontier of the United States, the indigenous
population were “sidelined…creating an egalitarian and dynamic economic frontier” (cf. Brown, 1970; Isenberg, 2016).

For Gilley, colonialism of the western European variety brought a wide range of benefits to the subject peoples, benefits which could only arise because colonial rule had been extended to these areas of the globe, particularly Africa. He claims that research meeting a particular form of scientific criteria has:

…found evidence for significant social, economic and political gains under colonialism: expanded education, improved public health, the abolition of slavery, widened employment opportunities, improved administration, the creation of basic infrastructure, female rights, enfranchisement of untouchable or historically excluded communities, fair taxation, access to capital, the generation of historical and cultural knowledge, and national identify formation, to mention just a few dimensions. (p. 4)

Largely dismissive of arguments to the contrary, Gilley is also clearly opposed to the end of western colonialism which he puts down to:

the pernicious effects of global anti-colonialism on domestic and international affairs since the end of World War II. Anti-colonialism ravaged countries as nationalist elites mobilised illiterate populations with appeals to destroy the market economies, pluralistic and constitutional polities, and rational policy processes of European colonisers. (p. 5)

Once more, despite his declared attachment to scientism, Gilley does no more than assert the veracity of this explanation for the end of colonialism. Neither the 18th-century, anti-colonial views of current “free market” hero Adam Smith (Winch, 1996), nor the post-World War II global struggle between the USA and the USSR for leadership of the anti-colonial cause appear in Gilley’s account. Instead, ‘nationalist elites’ who duped the masses, destroyed market economies etc. are the target of Gilley’s invective.

However, for Gilley there are always exceptions, selectively chosen:

…just as the colonial era was not an unalloyed good, the independence era has not been an unalloyed bad. A few postcolonial states are in reasonable health. Those whose moral
imaginations were not shrouded by anti-colonial ideology had the most productive encounter with modernity… (p. 6)

Nevertheless, the general effect of the end of colonialism, according to Gilley, is summed up with a quote drawn from a 1996 World Bank Report Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa that:

Almost every African country has witnessed a systematic regression of capacity in the last 30 years; the majority had better capacity at independence than they now possess (World Bank, 1996, p. 5 quoted in Gilley, 2017, p. 6).

Gilley does not pursue this ‘regression’ in any detail, ‘scientific’ or otherwise, but by citing a small number of instances which are intended to support his case. Further, as will be discussed below, he does not ask to what extent international, as distinct from domestic, factors have played a part in what has occurred in all the countries that have “witnessed a systematic regression of capacity”. That is, after decrying the nationalism of anti-colonial leaders and urging an international solution, a resurgent colonialism, Gilley avoids exploring if the international efforts of the last 30 years, effected under the ‘good governance’ terms he criticises as inadequate, have played any part at all in what has occurred in the African countries listed in the 1996 World Bank Report (see various essays in Moore, 2007; MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017). Instead, Gilley provides a case for revitalised trusteeship, employing both domestic and international agents.

**Gilley’s case for recolonisation**

As already indicated, Gilley’s outright advocacy of recolonisation is to be acknowledged for its overtness given the multitude of less forthright proposals that abound. As he states:

Rather than use an ever-expanding set of euphemisms that avoid the ‘C’ word – ‘shared sovereignty’, ‘conservatorship’, ‘proxy governance’, ‘transitional administration’, ‘neo-trusteeship’, ‘cooperative intervention’ – these arrangements should be called ‘colonialism’ because it would embrace rather than evade the historical record. (p. 2)
Gilley offers three ways “to reclaim colonialism” against the bad press or “pejorative meaning” (p. 2) it has received over the last 100 years. These are by: a) replicating “as far as possible the colonial governance of their pasts – as successful countries like Singapore, Belize and Botswana did”; b) Western countries being “encouraged to hold power in specific governance areas (public finances, say, or criminal justice) in order to jump-start enduring reforms in weak states”; and c) “in some instances it may be possible to build new Western colonies from scratch” (pp. 1-2).

While noting the “immense challenges” of “making new forms of colonialism work”, Gilley directs policy-makers to three specific arenas of concern. The first is how to make colonialism acceptable to the colonised, the second “how to motivate Western countries to become colonial again”, and third “how to make colonialism achieve lasting results”, presumably what he means by “sustained development” (p. 1). It is the solution to these three challenges that makes Gilley’s argument both in line with international trends (see below) and the most controversial because at the forefront. Overt trusteeship is not only a means for surmounting the “euphemisms”, but also for placing colonial governance at the fore. For having abandoned what he terms “the myth of self-governing capacity” (p. 8), Gilley insists that it is only the intervening state, with a formal share of sovereignty, that has the capacity to chart a “legitimate path forward” (p.9), that is, to bring development or make development happen. While acceptance by the local population and the assistance of local leaders is important, “[a]s in colonial times, foreign control by a liberal state with its own robust accountability mechanisms is the closest that a people with a weak state can come to ‘local ownership’” (p. 9). Which western colonial state was liberal, and when, is left for each reader to decide.

To use just one example—of particular relevance given Gilley selects an island in the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau for his thought-experiment on the restoration of colonial governance—the early to mid-20th-century rule of Portugal in Africa would not seem to fit the description of liberal colonial governance. Indeed, Portugal’s April 1974 Carnation Revolution, which ended the worst of the authoritarianism under the longest dictatorship in 20th-century Europe, also terminated the country’s colonial rule in Africa. That is, the political change in Portugal was part of the global anti-colonialism for which Gilley provides such a simplistic explanation (see above, and Gilley, 2017, pp. 5-6). Yet without explaining why politics in early 21st-century Portugal would open any space for a reformed role by that former colonial power (cf. Finn, 2017; Martins, 2017), it is the country Gilley
assumes would be party to the task of bringing revitalised trusteeship to Galinhas, an island off the coast of West Africa, part of Guinea-Bissau.

The most obvious reason why Gilley chooses part of an ex-Portuguese colony for his proposed experiment is that it allows him to offer an extension of his poorly developed general proposition ‘colonialism good, anti-colonialism bad’. Without enquiring whether the character of Portuguese colonialism had anything to do with the specifics of the independence movements that arose in that country’s colonies, Gilley engages in a rant against African liberation movements, in particular the “anti-colonial ‘hero’ Amilcar Cabral” (p. 5). Guinea-Bissau then fits within the overall picture of another country that has gone downhill since independence (Gilley, 2017, pp. 5-6), again without any detail on its colonial condition. In such circumstances, Galinhas can be constructed as the perfect location for recolonisation, leased back to the Portuguese government and then rebuilt, not as a ‘charter city’ pace Romer (2009, see above), but as a “small European state … [grown] up on the African coast” (p. 11), courtesy of controlled, presumably compliant, labour immigration, Portuguese aid funds, trade and investment. The success of ‘recolonisation’ on Galinhas would then serve as a local as well as global model.

The fight against the pernicious doctrine of anti-colonialism and its ideologues, including Cabral, would be assisted as well. As Gilley concludes:

> At 60 square miles, Galinhas could, over time, easily accommodate the entire population of Guinea-Bissau. If successful, it would attract talent, trade and capital. The mainland parts of Guinea-Bissau would benefit from living next to an economic dynamo and learning to emulate its success, while symbolically escaping from the half-century anti-colonial nightmare of Amilcar Cabral. The same idea could be tried all over the coastlines of Africa and the Middle East if successful. Colonialism could be resurrected without the usual cries of oppression, occupation, and exploitation. A preposterous idea? Perhaps. (p. 11)

It is now necessary to turn from such a thought-experiment to the actual circumstances of a country that also features in Gilley’s diatribe against anti-colonialism and the deleterious effects of the end of colonial rule. Kenya provides Gilley with the opportunity to extend his criticism.
Colonial governance—The case of Kenya

The 1857 Indian Mutiny influenced not only the future of colonial rule in that country but also the general direction of British colonialism. After the revolt, rule by the British East India Company was replaced with the specific authority and administration of the British colonial state. Trusteeship became central. For colonial Kenya, it was the later 1923 Devonshire White Paper written by British colonial secretary Victor Cavendish, the 9th Duke of Devonshire, that signalled a specific intent for major change. In a colony where European settlers had an early dominance, the White Paper emphasised that in the struggle between the settlers and Indian/Asian commercial interests, colonial authority would attempt instead to secure the paramountcy of native interests. Rather than being an anti-colonial doctrine, the paramountcy principle emphasised the importance of trusteeship or guardianship for colonial policy.

While it was the fightback against the Devonshire declaration that is of immediate importance here, the policy intent to restrain both European largeholding settlers and Asian commercial ambitions had longer-term implications. Although European settlers and their allies in British politics as well as the local administration were able to ensure that paramountcy did not extend to the largeholding areas acquired previously outside native reserves, further expansion was initially restrained. When European settlement increased again after World War II, this occurred in conditions less favourable to largeholding agriculture, which forced reductions in labour forces: ‘squatters’, tenants and others were driven back into the already crowded, mainly Kikuyu reserves of central Kenya. More fuel was added to a smouldering fire: those with land, usually chiefs and their followers who could produce food and other goods to meet the growing post-war demand, clashed with the landless, unemployed and impoverished. While nationalism, led by educated and some chiefly Africans, was initially able to ride the growing insurgency, by the late 1940s and early 1950s this was no longer possible as the revolt known as Mau Mau enveloped much of central Kenya (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966).

Gilley reduces this period of revolt and its crushing to an empiricist debate about measurement, rather than offering any analysis of what underlay an especially brutal moment in the country’s late colonial history. Thus, for him the questions become: what would have happened if the British were not there? And how many Africans/Kikuyu were on each ‘side’? The first question has more than a tinge of the atavistic explanation for the revolt found in an early official report by Corfield (1960): that the savagery displayed,
including oath-taking by Mau Mau recruiters, was due to African primitivism.

The second question about numbers is of greater interest here as Gilley’s form of reductionism misses the crucial point about ‘the sides’ and why some subsequent post-Emergency and post-Independence Kenyans expressed appreciation for the outcome of British rule. Gilley states that:

Just as many Kenyans joined the Kikuyu Home Guard and the special prison service for the rebels as joined the insurgency, and the independent Kenyan government long applauded the historic contribution of the British in suppressing the movement. (p. 3)

Here he draws support from a hypothetical proposition by Anthony Daniels (2005) that “[h]ad the British left Kenya to the Mau (sic), there would have been anarchy and further civil war, perhaps even genocide” (Daniels, 2005, p. 26 quoted in Gilley, 2017, p. 3). Apart from not identifying which members of the independent government “applauded”, Gilley avoids enquiring why some did so. Fortunately, others have been more studious. (The detailed literature on the causes and conduct of the revolt and its subsequent suppression is too voluminous to cite here).

The revolt in Kenya came to a political-military head in October 1952 with Governor Evelyn Baring’s Emergency Declaration. Despite increasing evidence aired in the British parliament and press about the savagery of the British and local military and police, even as the Emergency ended in 1960 the British government remained committed to the security of European settlers and the aspiring African bourgeoisie. Certain types of private property had to be defended at all costs, even at the expense of the reputation of British colonialism. The British government played a major role in crushing the revolt, and then in securing the terms of the Independence (Majimbo) federal constitution and 1963 elections.

While the military and policing effort defeated the revolt, the long-term problem behind Mau Mau remained for late colonial and post-colonial governments, that of how to reduce unemployment and impoverishment, to make productive that which was unproductive or underutilised, and bring development. At the same time as soldiers and police battled insurgents, colonial officials—guided by the Swynnerton Plan (Thurston, 1987)—had commenced a major effort to further commercialise households in occupation of smallholdings.
Once the British colonial government was removed, and trusteeship increasingly seen internationally and domestically as an unwanted relic, development in Kenya continued to be subject to the vagaries of conflicting conditions, both local and international.

One major condition was African capital’s drive to increase largeholding acreages (see below). The second was that the end of colonial rule brought major changes to electoral, representative democracy, which extended the franchise to the majority indigenous population. As some of the brakes were taken off the advance of African capital with the departure of many European settlers, post-colonial Kenyan governments continued to have to deal with the importance of smallholder expansion as the main means of limiting unemployment, expanding agricultural exports and feeding the increasing population (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; MacWilliam, Desaubin, & Timms, 1998). Cowen and Shenton (1996) summarise much of the post-colonial direction:

Agrarian schemes of household production…were developed by parastatal authorities to both secure the basis for employment, as an alternative to direct wage employment, and the productive base of the economy. Central government expenditure…was biased towards agriculture, in that it absorbed four times more than what was directly allocated to manufacturing by way of state services. (p. 346)

The Kenya African National Union (KANU) victory at the 1963 pre-Independence, self-government elections ensured that a government that principally represented the ambitions of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie would hold power. The new regime’s commitment to defend and extend existing property arrangements secured international support, including funding from the World Bank.

While domestic dissatisfaction continued and led to the 1966 ‘Little General Election’ (see Gertzel, 1970), the Kenyatta government was able to oversee the process of ‘Africanising’ the White Highlands. The African, mainly Kikuyu, bourgeoisie’s ambition to become large farmers was substantially extended (Njonjo, 1977). Under the Million Acre scheme, largely funded by international loans, some of the demand for more smallholder farms was also eased. For more than a decade and a half after Independence, Kenya remained an exemplar internationally, as criticism grew domestically and in neighbouring countries at the increasing dominance of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie (Swainson, 1980). Increasing unemployment,
rural as well as urban, remained a continuous feature of the political economy, forcing the search for solutions (International Labour Organization, 1972).

**Kenya: from exemplar to model of corruption**

Gilley, along with the World Bank and other development agencies, is invariably keen to portray the post-Independence slide in former colonies, but less enthusiastic about explaining why development stalled. There is, however, sufficient material available on Kenya’s political economy to be able to remedy this defect. Upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi became President and commenced a policy of marginalising Kikuyu business people and politicians from positions of political and economic power. While it was impossible to remove Kikuyu from ownership of many of the central Kenyan assets acquired in the immediate post-Independence period, the Moi regime initially aimed to extend largeholding ownership among members of the KAMATUSA (Kalenjin-Maasai-Turkana-Samburu) alliance into other areas of Kenya (Cowen, 1986; MacWilliam, 2012). This drive occurred in parallel with the international push for structural adjustment reforms promoted by the World Bank and summarised in the *Berg Report*, officially *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa – An Agenda for Action* (World Bank, 1981).

Once the exceptional mid-1970s price boom for coffee and maize ended, to be followed by the 1979-80 drought and the second oil price shock, the regime had to deal with conditions that undercut its popular support. Kenya became a major importer of firstly maize and then wheat, which in turn fuelled demand for international borrowings (from private banks as well as bilateral and multilateral agencies). Balance of payments difficulties arising from declining government revenues from exports were however rapidly covered by the availability of funds internationally in the post-1979 ‘oil crisis’ years. External loans as a percent of GDP increased from about 12 percent in 1971 to over 50 percent 21 years later, with the most significant upward shift beginning in 1979, the year after Moi came to power (MacWilliam, Desaubin, & Timms, 1995, p. 56, Figure VII). By the early 1990s, Kenya had become a heavily indebted if not yet a poor country. This change, from exemplar of growth to major international borrower and corrupt, followed the trend described in the 1996 World Bank conclusion cited by Gilley (see above; 2017, p. 7). The regime’s initial popularity, based upon claims to represent not the ‘big fish’ of the Kenyatta period but the
‘little people’, soon declined (see Cowen, 1986; MacWilliam, Desaubin, & Timms, 1995).

If declining popular support and impoverishment linked to unemployment and underemployment was a political problem that gathered pace during the 1980s and the 1990s, there were also serious difficulties for the section of the indigenous capitalist class that Moi represented. The principal difficulty was how and where to extend its accumulation beyond the spaces in the national economy already occupied by the Kikuyu bourgeoisie. Fortunately, the international ideological shift of the 1980s—dubbed ‘free market reforms’—provided a partial answer in the fashion of privatisation, even if subsequently the means of doing so were denigrated as corruption (MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017). While there was some expansion into largeholdings producing maize, wheat and tea in areas of the Rift Valley, privatisation of state activities provided further new opportunities. Banking and financial services became a target: where Kikuyu bourgeois had previously moved into banking through the vehicle of GEMA (Gikuyu-Embu-Meru Association), partly to overcome the loss of state power that followed the ascension of Moi to the presidency, now room was created for KAMATUSA bourgeois and their allies to also open and operate banks (Cowen & MacWilliam, 1996).

During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a two-step increase in the number and activities of private banks in Kenya, encouraged by the liberalisation of financial markets (Cowen & MacWilliam, 1996). This expansion was in part due to the increasing commercialisation of households as commodity producers and consumers, but also by financiers moving into areas not occupied by development banks and other agencies, particularly in the financing of micro-enterprises.

Especially prominent in the increased number of financial institutions were what became known as the ‘political banks’, Kalenjin-owned and often Kenyan-Asian, Kenyan-European or expatriate managed. These were a subset of banks closely tied to the Moi regime, hence the appellation ‘political’, which became the focus of growing criticism of corruption. By 1993, IMF pressure forced the regime to close the most prominent of the political banks, Transnational Bank, and the Central Bank of Kenya’s role in providing funds to save these banks was strongly condemned (Cowen & MacWilliam, 1996). As the private banks were being established, the parastatal Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) was effectively ‘Kalenjinised’ in its staff so that it obeyed government directives to open rural branches. The KCB became one more instrument of the Moi regime, as did parastatal institutions, including the National Social Security Fund and Kenya Post and Telecommunications
Corporation, which deposited funds into the Kalenjin, rather than the Kikuyu, owned banks.

After the 2002 regime change to President Mwai Kibaki, a major Kikuyu land-owner from Nyeri rather than Kiambu where former-President Kenyatta’s principal political base lay, the drive to extend commercialisation extended to publicly-owned forests and range-land. Public reserves previously excised for forests, animals and water catchments were targeted, with the struggle between smallholders and indigenous bourgeois over privatised land prominent (MacWilliam, 2012). International and domestic agencies have published reports on the mechanisms by which land was ‘grabbed’, even as Transparency International down-graded corruption in Kenya from “highly acute” to “rampant” (MacWilliam, 2012, p. 123).

In summary, for much of the post-Kenyatta period, domestic political tussles reduced and undercut any capacity of successive Kenyan regimes to make productive that which had become unproductive or underutilised, especially labour. Little to no assistance was provided in advice from international agencies, which insisted on a reduced state presence in a ‘freed up market’. Increasing unemployment required an agent to bring intentional development, whether domestic or international, and an increasingly weakened national government headed by a layer of local capital had little intent or capacity to provide the necessary agency for development. While some efforts were made to continue state support for smallholder agriculture (Leonard, 1991) and urban small and medium enterprises, these invariably took second place to the drive by African capital to accumulate. In 2000, for one instance, the Kenya Tea Development Authority was privatised as the KTD Agency Limited with ownership passing from the Kenya government to over 50 firms with tea processing factories, some of them owned by leading political-business people. As much as the role of agent for development passed to international financial and aid institutions, including the World Bank, these had a limited capacity to direct required outcomes in Kenya. This account now turns to the idea of governance, at the centre of efforts for Kenya and development more widely.

**Development and the political economy of colonial governance**

Gilley lists in generalities what he would consider the desired outcomes of re-introducing colonial governance. The objectives would be to:

...(reaffirm) the primacy of human lives, universal values and shared responsibilities – the civilising mission without scare
quotes – that led to improvements in living conditions for most Third World peoples during most episodes of Western colonialism. (p. 1)

With this vagueness of objectives he largely avoids exploring the idea of development that remains central to nearly all other proposals for governance reform emanating from official agencies and other institutions. It is now appropriate to try to fill the gap and reconcile, if possible, the differences between development and colonial governance left vacant by Gilley. In short, can colonial governance be reconciled with good and effective governance over the matter of agency for development? Once more, some of the history eschewed by Gilley provides a suitable starting point.

Improvement, employed by Gilley as an objective of re-instituted colonial governance, is an idea that preceded the formation of the modern idea of development: to cite one instance, the period from the early 18th century in Scottish history, when large farms began to consolidate the holdings of displaced tenants, was one of industrial agricultural improvement (Davidson, 2005). Development is an altogether different and later description, a response to the effects of spontaneous accumulation in early capitalist industrialisation and the disorder following the Napoleonic Wars (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). As much as industrialisation could be seen as improvement and progress, these terms did not adequately cover or propose solutions for the unemployment and disorder that faced western European—particularly British and French—governments of the early to mid-19th centuries. The spontaneous advance of capitalism, covered by improvement and progress, was increasingly recognised as a unity of positive and negative forms of change. Development was formulated to deal with, and then describe, a process of change by which negative conditions could be intentionally reformed without overthrowing the positive consequences of spontaneous (capitalist) change. Development became the description to cover a unity of two processes, one immanent, spontaneous and the other intentional. However, development is also an idea of reform, accepting the external authority of capital as a permanent and desired state or condition. Simply put, development is capitalist development, or change subject to the external authority of capital.

With this understanding of the idea of development, the point of governance reforms—as proposed in the contemporary iteration of the term at the end of the 1980s, considered below—can be understood. These reforms were intended to describe a means, and provide agency and direction, for intentional development in the circumstances of what was described as a
crisis (see below). The development crisis of the 1980s had itself been preceded by reforms to ‘free up markets’, that is, to give primacy to spontaneous accumulation at a moment when it was claimed that development had stalled in industrial as well as in non-industrial countries. Structural adjustment measures, outlined in the World Bank’s *Berg Report* (1981), were aimed at the supposed excessiveness of state interventions in the economy. Reforms included privatisation, removal of currency restrictions, reductions in state employment, and reducing indebtedness. Where implemented, these policy changes hit many ‘developing countries’, including Kenya (see above), at an especially critical time, coinciding with considerable price fluctuations in international markets and declining terms of trade between primary produce and manufactured goods, as well as higher oil prices.

While first introduced to official circles at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, governance is an idea which continues to evolve. Some of the extent of the changes over the next three decades will now be shown, along with a brief timeline illustrating what Merilee Grindle (2010) has dubbed ‘the inflation of an idea’. During the 1980s it became obvious yet again that the spontaneous process of development, alias the ‘free market’, brings both positive and negative effects (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; MacWilliam & Rafferty, 2017). Governance and its first modification, good governance, was initially evoked to deal with what followed the corruption that itself flowed in part from the adoption of structural adjustment and related policies. Most importantly, governance was employed for a reform process pushed by international and some national state agencies to deal with a crisis of development (Moore, 1999 & 2007). In 1989, a World Bank report aimed at transforming a ‘crisis’ in Africa to ‘sustainable development’ described governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 1992, p. 5, cited in Larmour, 1998, p. 1). Unsurprisingly, a report from an institution bound by its charter to eschew politics did not specify either the nature of power or who would exercise it to bring what the Bank desired as development.

How to frame the agency of international financial and aid institutions continued as an objective over the next decades, even as those organisations sought to maintain the fig-leaf that the reforms being pressed were apolitical. Capitalism too did not appear, just free markets without classes of labour or capitalists (Galbraith, 1999). The 1989 World Bank description, cited above, was a case of how to advance reform, making a state-elite, without being able to resolve struggles between the national holders of power at a time when
kleptocracy, prebendal politics, (neo)patrimonialism and crony capitalism were commonplace descriptions of conditions in ‘developing countries’ (for two examples among many, see Robison, 1986 and Bayart, 1993).

Nearly 30 years later, while politics is acknowledged, the problem is now described as how to find apolitical institutions to press reforms against international and domestic politics. For the 2016 World Bank Policy Research Report Making Politics Work for Development Harnessing Transparency and Citizen Engagement, it was vital to surmount the inevitability of politics in some, but only some, arenas. This is because: “Politics is typically underplayed in development policy not only because of prohibitions on some international agencies to engage in it, but also because it is removed from the day-to-day functions of appointed bureaucrats and service delivery professionals” (World Bank, 2017b). Ah! The apolitical bureaucrats and professionals, the managerial elite - all to produce a new developmental order - talk about wheels going round and round (see Burnham, 1962).

With the partial recognition of the centrality of politics, the subsequent World Development Report 2017, titled Governance and the Law, reshapes governance even further. Since:

Policy making and policy implementation do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they take place in complex political and social settings, in which individuals and groups with unequal power interact within changing rules as they pursue conflicting interests. The process of these interactions is what this Report calls governance, and the space in which these interactions take place, the policy arena (World Bank, 2017a, p. 51).

According to the Report (World Bank, 2017a, p. 51), in order to make politics “work for development” it is necessary to “harness transparency and citizen engagement” to secure “effective governance”, a term also employed by other agencies including the Department of Foreign Affairs in Australia (DFAT, 2017). This latest form of governance is described as:

…the process through which state and nonstate actors interact to design and implement policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power. This Report defines power as the ability of groups and individuals to make others act in the interest of those groups and individuals
and to bring about specific outcomes (World Bank, 2017a, p. 3, Box O.1).

Now there is “governance for the bottom half” (World Bank, 2017b, p. 48), acknowledging the existence of elites and others who employ politics to attain their objectives, objectives which preclude development. Or in World Bank (2017b) speak:

Groups that are typically marginalized from the policy arena—such as those at the bottom of the income distribution—should have the same access to opportunities as all others. This is an essential pillar of progress in development. (p. 48)

From this “marginalization” comes the need for “apolitical organizations” to secure this access. Concludes the World Bank of its 2016 Policy Research Report: “The report distils policy lessons for how apolitical organizations can leverage their independence and technical expertise to bring about the needed changes in political behaviour for effective governance” (World Bank, 2017b). Here the drivers of change include coalitions between elites and citizens, operating within the rules that permit contestability as well as provision for top-down and bottom-up driven outcomes (World Bank, 2017a, p. 72). How organisations can be apolitical when engaged in policy contests over development is not explained, merely asserted.

By not pursuing the politics of colonial governance in any detail, Gilley avoids the issue the World Bank has slowly come to grapple with, albeit still in a limited manner. As he invokes the mythology of ‘apolitical’ colonial administrations and officials now to be returned to take up their selfless tasks, Gilley is still able to marginalise ‘the people’ who are expected to be simply grateful for the outcomes of the mainly internationally imposed authority. Neither agency nor direction have a popular democratic face: in these absences Gilley’s colonial governance has an overtly more authoritarian bent than either that proposed by the World Bank and other development agencies, or by economist Romer’s ‘charter cities’ (2009).

Romer’s charter-cities proposal tackled the missing politics of governance from another direction altogether. Charter cities are “city-scale administrative zones governed by a coalition of nations”, constructed on uninhabitable land. Romer’s TED presentation has a cute graphic showing how much of the world’s land mass is uninhabited: why this is so doesn’t seem to concern the World Bank’s former senior economist. For him, in these spaces desired outcomes could occur through aligning the choices of
governments and populations, providing the basis for rules that make development possible (Romer, 2009). That is, for Romer politics is a consensual activity but without any consideration of the means through which consensus arises. Political and class power do not appear. There is not space here to examine Romer’s argument in depth nor to show its relationship with public choice economics, the reactionary nature of which is now at the centre of considerable controversy (MacLean, 2017). Suffice it to say that while Gilley also flirts with popular support as a component of colonial governance, unlike Romer he is not averse to colonialism, or the authoritarian force associated with it.

Of more importance for the argument presented here, what Gilley brings out into the open is that, unlike Romer and others advocating good and/or effective governance, intentional development occurs without any democratic pretence. Or in Gilley’s terms:

One lesson from the colonial past is that the share of sovereignty [from within the nation to without] needs to be substantial and thorough in most cases. If external actors are constrained to work with rotten local institutions…then reforms will be difficult. Remaking a local police force may be possible without a share of sovereignty, but cleaning out a thoroughly corrupt national criminal justice system requires external control. Again, the reason to reclaim the word ‘colonialism’ is that it does not sidestep this important empirical insight. (p. 11)

As shown above in the case of Kenya, it was the British government, through colonial secretary Lord Cavendish, that saw the potential for disorder in unchecked European settler settlement and Asian/Indian commercial expansion. The paramountcy of native interests was framed against demands of settlers, then in a powerful position in the Legislative Council, by a colonial regime that could at one level override parliamentary opposition as expressed in the colony. Trusteeship, the necessary force for the form of development that deals with, even anticipates, the deleterious effects of spontaneous development, is not required to be popular or democratic. Unlike the official agencies, which struggle with this fact and over time have sought more and more to deal with how to give their plans a democratic tinge, including in the name of ‘citizen engagement’ and ‘governance for the bottom half’, Gilley openly advocates authoritarian trusteeship.

Conclusion
The extent to which capitalism is compatible with democracy is hardly a new matter for consideration (Streeck, 2014). However, it has reappeared with renewed vigour over at least the last 30 years, coinciding with and related to the end of colonialism, national independence for so many former colonies, and the conclusion of the post-war economic boom globally. The length of the global downturn, described as a crisis internationally and in so many countries, has fuelled debate and produced extensive scholarly as well as popular literature. This literature is not confined to examination of conditions in ‘developing countries’ (see for the USA, Desmond, 2016; Fraser, 2015; Packer, 2013).

One theme in this debate is the construction and centrality of non-representative institutions in removing important matters of public policy from places where elected representatives hold sway (Mair, 2013). At an international level, Mair points to the institutions of the European Union. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other development banks also fit within this rubric. At the national level, there are many instances of similar institutions, including various central and reserve banks, Fair Work Commissions and other bodies that control monetary and other policies. Streeck argues that these dimensions of what he terms the “consolidation state” represent a form of “buying time” for the “delayed crisis of democratic capitalism” (2014, pp.97-164). Gilley’s ‘colonial governance’ as well as Romer’s ‘charter cities’ fit neatly within these unrepresentative forms of the capitalist state.

Gilley is apparently unconcerned with whether development and democracy are associated: he does not see the latter as either a necessary condition for, or outcome of, the former. Colonial officials, the trustees of development admired by Gilley, were neither directly elected nor responsible to colonial legislatures where these existed. Control of colonial states rested with the colonial power, and these were not necessarily even parliamentary democracies, as in the case of Portugal. In making the point so directly Gilley has rendered an important service. Further, it is a service that should be recognised when development is advocated as a cure or even palliative for undesirable conditions in and beyond Africa.

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A Critique of Colonial Rule: A Response to Bruce Gilley

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Abstract

Bruce Gilley has done the Africanist community a favor. In defending colonial rule, he forces us to define what colonial rule was really like. The problem is that he gets his facts wrong. He is right about a few things. For example, African nationalists often did not have massive support, colonial rule ended the slave trade, and Africans participated in colonial rule. That participation was because colonial rule was weak and under-funded. That explains its reliance on African intermediaries and its brutality. The notion that colonial rule was based on universal values is contradicted by the harshness of the conquest and its treatment of dissent. It relied heavily on forced labor. Colonial rule was racist. Colonial rulers ignored famines, and actually did little for health and education. Gilley sees colonial rule as training for self-government, but in most of Africa, there was little training and reluctance until the very end to think about self-government. Gilley ends with a program for recolonization which is in the interest of neither the former colonizers or the colonized. Particularly absurd is the notion of re-engaging Portugal, the worst of the colonial powers.

Introduction

I very much regret that the Third World Quarterly has withdrawn the Bruce Gilley article The Case for Colonialism (Gilley, 2017). It is a valuable article because it raises questions we should be dealing with. We should be dealing with these questions because they are crucial parts of the divide between academic and public discourse. Many of the students who enter our classes do so with ideas similar to Gilley’s. So too do many opinion leaders, both in politics and in the media. Donald Trump’s offensive reference to
“shit-hole countries” was only an extreme variant (ABC News, 2018). In 2007, French President Nicholas Sarkozy gave a patronising speech at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, which praised colonial contributions to Africa and criticised Africans for not embracing progress (Sarkozy, 2007; Konaré, 2008). I have been told that Henry Kissinger used to end meetings by asking the Under Secretary of State for Africa to report on the latest communications from Ugandan President Idi Amin. Nothing like a little laughter to end a meeting. The Gilley article thus gives us a chance to deal with ideas that are part of public discourse.

There is a larger question here. As a scholar, who was active in civil rights, peace and liberation support movements, and was often active in local politics, I have often wrestled with the relationship between my politics, my teaching and my scholarship. Early on, while teaching in Berkeley, I accepted the notion that teachers should lay out at the beginning of a course their ideology, but I soon moved away from that. As a teacher, I tried to present diverse perspectives, to encourage debate, and to provide a receptive environment for students with unpopular views. As a scholar, I always had to question whether I was right and to ask whether my analysis was correct. Self-criticism began with the idea that I might be wrong. I have been offended over the years by efforts of the right, the left and even the timid center to censure ideas they dislike. If we wish our unpopular ideas to be taken seriously, we must be able to listen to the ideas of others. We should listen to people like Gilley and answer them.

Did Gilley get his facts right?

That being said, Gilley’s article is seriously flawed. He often does not get his facts right. He starts with the statement that “for a hundred years, colonialism has had a bad name” (2017, p.1). Anti-colonialism goes back to the late 19th century, but in Africa, the 1920’s were the high water period of colonialism. The idea that European countries had a right to rule other people certainly remained popular into the 1950s and probably has significant support even today. So is the notion that some societies are so backward or incompetent that we have an obligation to take them over. The colonial figures, whether Livingstone or Stanley marching through the jungle or the European administrator in his pith helmet were and for many still are romantic figures. Gilley makes a lot of other errors, for example, including among countries with no colonial past Libya, Haiti and Guatemala.

He is right about a few things. African nationalists did not usually have massive support (for example, Zolberg (1966) pointed out that many
nationalists had difficulties mobilising the masses or even getting them out to vote). Nationalists had to create a nation in societies where primary identities were local or ethnic. It is also true that decolonisation was often too quick. This was particularly true in the Congo where there was absolutely no preparation for independence and where many Belgians hoped that it would all fall apart. Still, it would be incorrect to say that nationalists imposed “sudden decolonization on hapless populations” (Gilley, 2017, p.2). The interesting question is why colonial regimes quit so quickly, but the answer is probably that most colonies were no longer profitable and colonial interests were weak after World War II. Gilley rightly points out that scholars have debated whether there was too much colonialism or too little. This was a constructive debate.1

Gilley is also right that many Africans participated in the colonial state. The vast majority of employees of the colonial state were Africans, but those Africans did not necessarily work for colonial rulers because of affection for them (Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts, 2006). They worked for the colonial state because they wanted to better themselves, because most saw no other option and because they could profit from their role as intermediaries.2 The colonial state was rather weak, largely because of its fragile tax base. European parliaments were reluctant to underwrite the projects of colonial proconsuls. Those proconsuls had no choice but to squeeze as much revenue as it could out of hoe-wielding farmers, who at best, worked about a hectare of land apiece. Customs was the only other major source of revenue. Only in southern Africa did mineral wealth produce significant profits. Elsewhere, returns were limited and so was investment. Most of Africa produced little profit for capitalism. The result was what Hopkins called “light administration” (Hopkins, 1973, p.189; Herbst, 2000).

Hopkins tells us that almost half of the revenue of West African regimes went to salaries, pensions, and benefits of colonial administrators (Hopkins, 1973, p.191). Some of the rest went into repayment of loans for capital improvements essential for the exploitation of Africa. The result was that there was not a lot of money for everyone else. During the conquest period, many colonial armies were made up largely of slaves, sometimes freed slaves, but often slaves bought in the market. In the French army, they were rewarded by the right to pillage defeated areas and received female slaves

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1 Phillips (1989) argued from a Marxist perspective that the failure of the British to smash traditional structures was a source of difficulty. The problem was that the colonial powers wanted their empire on the cheap. This argument is effectively made by Berry (1992).

2 The best introduction to the colonial state is Amadou Hampaté Bâ’s (1994) memoir of his years as a clerk. See also his satirical novel, The Fortunes of Wangrin (1999).
after their victories (Echenberg, 1991; Klein, 2011). Colonial regimes depended heavily on chiefs, who were usually recruited from the families of former rulers. They often received a percentage of head or hut taxes they collected, but generally had to supplement it with what they could get out of their subjects, who often had to work the chief’s fields during the growing season and to pay for the chief’s justice. The clerks, interpreters, messengers and guards who worked for every field administrator also were able to supplement their meager salaries by gifts and bribes. Corruption did not begin with decolonisation. Let me be clear that these moral compromises were the only way colonial elites could have their colonies.

Gilley is also right that colonial regimes ended the slave trade. I first interviewed in rural Senegal in the 1960s when there were still people alive who remembered the arrival of the French. Several of my informants said that the most important benefit they received from the French is that they no longer had to carry guns into the fields (Klein, 1968). In large parts of Africa, people had lived in constant fear of slave raiders. The abolition of slave-raiding and the slave trade was crucial to the development of a modern capitalist economy. Slavery was also usually abolished, though in many British colonies only in the 1930s, and in many colonies, enforcement was weak and ambiguous. There were areas where enslavement remained significant and in many places slaves and their descendants continued to have obligations to former masters.

**Gilley’s view of colonial rule**

Gilley writes that the “case for Western colonialism .... involves reaffirming the primacy of human lives, universal values and shared responsibilities” (2017, p. 1). I am not sure what this means. European armies often marched uninvited into someone else’s territories and then waited for the African force to attack. Where they could choose the battlefield, they assumed a defensive position, and when the African forces attacked, hundreds would be killed. The British massacred spear-carrying Kenyan warriors and the Portuguese were massacring demonstrators in the 1960s. When the French captured a city, their field artillery often battered a hole in the walls, and their allies were then allowed to ransack the city. Women and

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3 Most slave-raiding ended by the first years of the 20th century, but for a chief who continued into the 1920s see Hamman Yaji, in Vaughan & Kirk-Greene (1995). For another chief who took slaves and used them into the 1950s with the full knowledge of the French administration see Sehou (2013). On the stigma and the perpetuation of servile relations, see Rossi (2009; and 2015).
children were taken prisoner and then distributed, with French officers taking
the prettiest (Klein, 1998: 119-121). Lugard (1922) believed that it was
important that there be a physical conquest and an act of submission. Was
this the value they showed for human life??

Unable to tax revenues that did not exist, colonial regimes used forced
labour.4 In its most extreme version, Congolese peasants were required to go
into the forests and bring back a certain amount of rubber. Leopold’s minions
did not believe in the carrot and the stick. The stick sufficed. The death toll
has been estimated as high as 10 million, almost equal to the number of slaves
exported in the whole Atlantic trade (Hochschild, 2005). The French on the
north side of the Congo River and the Portuguese in Mozambique also gave
concession companies the right to force people to work without pay
(Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972; Amin and Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1974; Allina,
2012). Elsewhere, people had labour obligations. Large projects like
railroads were particularly costly. Two railroads were constructed from the
Atlantic coast to Malebo Pool, sites of Brazzaville and Kinshasa, each
each through difficult terrain and each at a high cost in human lives. In Guinea the
death toll was high, in part because men were not fed if they could not work.
Some change resulted when administrators complained that chiefs could no
longer recruit labour because so many were dying (Klein, 1998, p. 152; Fall,
1993).

Thomas Malthus has a lot to answer for. Droughts and famines were
common in colonial Africa. Colonial regimes generally did not feel an
obligation to provide relief, often even trying to collect taxes in hard times.
This was also true in Ireland and in India. Those who ignored suffering could
generally justify their insensitivity by arguing that it was a demographic
correction or that it was caused by laziness (Vaughan, 1987; Klein, 1998,
pps. 128-29, 174-78, 210-11). I have never seen any reason to accept the
myth of the lazy native. I have been struck by the resourcefulness of people
faced with climatic disaster, both during the colonial period and after. The
depression also brought hard times, as peasants from poor areas often found
that dry season migration did not enable them to meet their tax obligations.
In French West Africa, there was a resurgence of pawning, encouraged by
many colonial administrators, who recognised that fathers could always raise
money for taxes by pawning their daughters (Klein and Roberts, 1987).

I am not sure where Gilley sees universal values in this. To be sure, there
are humane teachings in all three Abrahamic religions. Missionaries were

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4 The idea of forced labour as a form of taxation was developed in a panel on the subject
at a recent conference of the American Historical Association (Gardner, 2018; Van
Waijenberg, 2018).
sensitive to human suffering as were some administrators and Muslim clerics. In famine years, however, missions often had difficulty feeding themselves and whatever feelings individuals had, the state was generally insensitive. What were the universal values in the appropriation of good lands in the two Rhodesias and Kenya for the benefit of small settler populations (Kennedy, 1987)? These colonies suffered from rigid forms of segregation, which actually tried to limit the participation of Africans in the government of their own countries. Lord Lugard wrote about trusteeship and many colonial theorists talked about preparing Africans for self-government, but not much was really done (Lugard, 1922). In British West African colonies, the role of Creole elites was reduced. During the 19th century, these elites played a major role in the administration of colonies, in the expansion of the colonial state, and in the development of the colonial economy, but their role was reduced when advances in medicine made it easier for Europeans to live in Africa. By the beginning of the 20th century, neither servants nor senior African civil servants could live in Freetown’s Hill Station or even stay overnight there (Spitzer, 1974). Racism was everywhere the partner of colonialism.

If Africans were being trained for self-government, why was there almost no African participation in governing? The only colony in which there was serious participation was Senegal. That participation was limited to the coastal towns called the Four Communes (Johnson, 1971). Curiously, Senegal is one of Africa’s most stable democracies. It is also a nation that respects freedom of expression and the right to dissent. Was that perhaps in part because they participated in French electoral institutions during the colonial period? It is true that colonial regimes depended heavily on African chiefs, but these chiefs were often poorly educated, were hostile to educated elites and became instruments of colonial authority. By and large, they had a commitment to neither modernisation nor to a national ideal and rarely played a role in creating post-colonial states. In French Africa, there was an experiment after World War II in African participation in the French parliament, which meant that after 1958, those who took power generally had some experience of government.

This calls into question Gilley’s notion that colonialism involved training for self-government. It is true that being a clerk provided training for many. In the Congo, when Belgian administrators left hastily, clerks just moved into the administrator’s job as some had done even under colonial rule when there was no replacement for a sick or deceased administrator. The biggest problem faced by newly independent states was not bureaucratic training, but ethnic conflict. Colonial regimes created or took advantage of divisions that
existed and rarely created integrative institutions. In the Congo, there was not anarchy, but rather, a series of ethnic wars between 1960 and 1965. The British protected northern Nigeria from southern progressives and the southern Sudan from northern Muslims. Most new nations had no sense of national identity and most nationalist leaders knew that they had to create one. When I asked Adu Boahen, the Ghanaian historian, who was a critic of Kwame Nkrumah if Nkrumah had done any good, he said that Nkrumah had created a sense of national identity. Today in Nigeria, young people often do their national service and sometimes go to university outside of their home districts. Even in the Congo, the corrupt Mobutu regime tried to force civil servants to take postings outside of their home province.

If colonial regimes were serious about training Africans for self-government, education would have been a higher priority. In British Africa, schools were largely run by missionaries. Some schooling was necessary because colonial administrations needed clerks and school teachers and wanted chiefs to be literate. Those who received higher education usually did so in the metropole, but until the late colonial period, there was often little place for them back in Africa. In British West Africa, there was more room for educated Africans. The Creole elite included ministers, lawyers, journalists, and civil servants. Until after World War II, there were only two university colleges in Africa, both attached to British universities. To the best of my knowledge, there was not a single African professional economist in Africa in 1950 and probably no engineers. Only in the late 1930’s did the British and French begin to recognise that they would have to invest in education and social welfare.

Gilley also thinks that health care was an important justification for colonial rule. Some Africans did benefit from campaigns against epidemic disease, from improved public health, and from limited access to modern medicine. The availability of medical care, particularly for pregnant women and children, was a major factor in stabilising the labour force on the

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5 In 1969, I visited Thysville, where a number of subaltern officials had moved into former colonial positions. This worked well because Thysville was solidly Bakongo and there was a locally dominant party, ABAKO. The local archives were usable and the work ethic in the office was better than in the national capital.

6 In my early research in Senegal, I was fascinated by a man named Insa Ba. Member of a Muslim clerical family, he was sent to the School for the Sons of Chiefs, where his performance led to him being sent to a lycée in Algiers. When he returned to Senegal, the French first made him a teacher and then a chief. He performed poorly in both positions, probably because neither was what he wanted. He had no other options. His son became a successful chief and his descendants include many educated professionals (Klein, 1968, pp. 211-213).
Copperbelt. There were also missionary establishments like the hospital in Lambaréné, Gabon, run by Albert Schweitzer. There were schools for medical assistants and for what the French labelled *médecins africains*, who were not authorised to treat Europeans or to practise in European countries. Hospitals, however, were generally located in capital cities and were primarily for the small European populations, though some Africans benefitted.

It is interesting that most African countries have made education and health major priorities. Though colonial regimes increased expenditures for education in the last years of colonial rule, relatively few countries were at the moment of independence educating more than 10% of their children and some had less than 5% in schools. Today, almost four fifths of African children are in school, a higher percentage among boys and in cities. More than half of adults have some level of literacy. Higher education has also expanded dramatically. When I first went to Dakar in 1963, the second university in French West Africa had only just been created. The University of Dakar had less than 5,000 students, the vast majority boys, and was the only higher education institution for almost all of French West Africa. Today, there are over 60,000 students at the Cheikh Anta Diop University and there are 12 other universities in Senegal, four of them public, seven private. At last count, Nigeria had 148 universities.

Health care saw a similar expansion, though many countries had to cut back health care expenditures when the International Monetary Fund imposed drastic funding cuts under structural adjustment programs in the 1980’s and after. The biggest problem for many sick people is not seeing a doctor, but being able to pay for medicine. A Senegalese friend told me that if he had not taken a job in the United States, he could not have paid for his mother’s heart medication. Africa has also had to deal with wars and the Aids and Ebola crises. In spite of this, there has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy all over Africa. At the time of decolonisation, life expectancy in most African countries averaged around or a little above 40 years. Today, most African countries have a life expectancy of over 60 years, often well over. There have been problems in both education and health care, but progress has been greater than under colonial rule.

**Recolonisation**

In spite of this, Gilley has proposed a program of recolonisation. It has three planks. First, he wants African and other Third World countries to replicate colonial governance. He cannot explain why some countries have
done well. He mentions Singapore, Belize and Botswana. He could mention others like Mauritius, Korea, Ghana or Senegal. These countries are all doing better than they ever did under colonial rule. Botswana had the good fortune that De Beers discovered diamonds, but it has used that bit of luck better than most oil-rich countries. It has a very professional civil service and is well administered. Countries that have done well politically or economically are not doing so because they have taken over colonial ways. They are more efficient and more dynamic than any colonial regime.

Gilley’s second proposal for recolonisation involves Third World countries inviting European states to take over political, economic or military activities. Gilley thinks that there are roles that independent African countries could turn over to Europeans, but there are few situations in which that is likely. For example, I cannot imagine, the lawyers and judges of any country consigning their justice system to benevolent Europeans if benevolent and unbiased Europeans could be found. In fact, the emergence of a legal profession has been a crucial result of decolonisation and lawyers have played a major role in democracy movements. Europeans and Americans play an important role in many African countries. The French have been particularly heavily involved in their former colonies. Their participation in the CFA franc mechanism has operated to the interests of both France and its African partners, but those partners are well aware that the French participate in their own interests. Gilley is a political scientist. He cannot be unaware that nations, groups and persons generally act to further their own interests.

Finally, Gilley suggests the Hong Kongisation of Africa. He would like Guinea-Bissau to give the island of Galinhas to Portugal in the hope that the Portuguese will manage the island in a dynamic way, attract people from the mainland and influence mainland political structures. In making the proposal, he misrepresents Hong Kong and Singapore. These were islands occupied by the British as strategic trade entrepôts. In neither case did Britain have any charitable intention toward neighboring Asian societies. People were attracted to both places because they fulfilled the economic role assigned. Galinhas has nothing in common with Singapore or Hong Kong except that it is underpopulated. Given Portugal’s record as a colonial power, I cannot imagine any African country wanting them back. Nor can I imagine Portugal having any interest in such an arrangement. They are doing better without their colonial empire than they were doing with it.

7 There are two currencies within the Communauté Financière Africaine, a West African franc serving eight countries and an Equatorial franc serving six. France is a member of both banks of issue.
Conclusion

Both leftist and nationalist writers often describe the milking of Africa’s wealth by colonial capitalism. In fact, Africa was poor. The slave trade had contributed to European economic development, but by the time the European powers divided the African pie, Africa offered little of value to those Europeans. European parliaments were not willing to underwrite African development. There was little taxable wealth in most colonies. Only mineral wealth in south and central Africa promised profits. The Congo Free State would have gone broke if the rubber boom had not saved Leopold’s enterprise. The problem was that even rubber could only be exploited through extreme brutality. The Congo, however, was an extreme version of a system that depended on different kinds of forced labour.

Administrators could not be attracted to Africa without comfortable salaries and pensions. The lack of resources meant a very thin layer of administration that ruled through a body of intermediaries culled both from the traditional ruling class and the emerging educated African class. Though administrators were often attracted to the freedom of the colonial situation, they were insecure. They depended on chiefs, clerks and guards. They therefore had to maintain social distance and to maintain the myth that they were indispensable. They could not accept the clerks as equals and they certainly could not accept the idea of incorporating Africans in senior administration. Conversely, the clerks, the teachers and the ‘been-tos’ who studied abroad could not indefinitely accept the roles to which they had been consigned. This produced many of the fundamental characteristics of colonial rule. It was authoritarian and it was racist. It was not innovative. If it prepared Africans for self-government, it was only that the clerk in the outer office knew everything that happened in the inner office.

Relations between Europeans and their African underlings were structured, hierarchical and based on social distance. They did not socialise. Europeans rarely knew or understood the Africans who worked for them, though there are exceptions. Gilley could find their stories in fiction and in memoirs. Joyce Cary’s experience as a colonial administrator produced four novels that vividly depict the colonial situation. In one, a son of the ruler returns from Oxford, better educated than most of the local colonials and speaking the King’s English. They cannot treat him the way they would treat other natives, but he is not one of them (Cary, 1949). The reformist climate of post World War II French West Africa led to a young Senegalese intellectual, Alioune Diop, being appointed chef de cabinet for the governor of Senegal. He invited Georges Balandier, then a young sociologist, to stay
with him in Dakar. Balandier claimed that the white community was very disturbed by this, but conversations at Diop’s kitchen table probably contributed to Balandier becoming the most influential Africanist social scientist in France. A third case is Jomo Kenyatta. Gilley suggests that if Britain had left Kenya to Mau Mau, the result would have been “anarchy and more civil war” (p. 4), but the real alternative was Jomo Kenyatta and a nationalist elite. Jomo Kenyatta went to England as a representative of the Kikuyu Central Association. While there, he picked up a doctorate and became well-known in the Labour Party, which was then governing Britain. When he returned to Kenya, he offered his services to Governor Philip Mitchell, who spurned him, suggesting that he get involved in his native authority. Kenyatta then became the leader of the Kenya African Union, but was jailed on trumped-up charges. The KAU was one of Africa’s more mature nationalist parties (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966). Britain had to find other interlocutors. It eventually did so, but only because Britain had no choice. Anarchy and civil war were never at issue.

A lot of unpleasant things have happened since the end of colonial rule. There have been wars and numerous authoritarian regimes. History is often messy. This should not lead us to idealise colonial regimes, which were authoritarian, racist and often stagnant. Our own histories involve wars, revolutions and misgovernment. Independence has improved the lives of many Africans. Whatever our disappointments, decolonisation has opened up opportunities for many people. If colonial rule had lasted, Kofi Annan and Wole Soyinka would probably have been clerks or school-teachers. There is no reason to go backwards. It is unlikely that many of the colonised or the colonisers would profit from doing so.

References


Curbing Inequality Through Decolonising Knowledge Production in Higher Education in South Africa

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Abstract

In South Africa, the question of whether a Western education system can lead to the achievement of equality among citizens is quite a problematic one. Thus, the question that has since the advent of the post-apartheid South Africa been a subject of contestation among scholars, is that of, how can the higher education system that was founded on colonial and apartheid white supremacy and hegemony be transformed into a transformative tool that addresses inequalities characterising South African society in the democratic era? This article seeks to provide a de-colonial perspective of how the higher education system of the post-apartheid South Africa can be transformed to address different developmental needs of a heterogeneous population. The purpose is not to dictate answers, but to create avenues of (re)thinking the knowledge production in the South African higher education sector in the quest for an equal and inclusive society. The article’s key argument is that a higher education system such as that in South Africa which was founded on colonial and apartheid ideologies, interests and agendas needs a de-colonial transformation in order to respond to the developmental needs, challenges and aspirations of its heterogeneous population. After an engagement with the myths and assumptions of a decolonised world that conceals coloniality of knowledge, this article, delves into the South African higher education system and the quest for equality that confronts the country. The need to ‘unthink’ and ‘unlearn’ present forms of imagining higher education in South Africa is emphasised.
Introduction

There is an inextricable correlation between knowledge, education and society. This is because the nature of knowledge shapes the quality of education, which inevitably determines the type of people or society. Philosopher Socrates accentuates that the only useful knowledge is that which makes society or people better (see Chotikapanich, 2008). By and large, the question of decolonizing knowledge and the education systems that underpin its production in many of the countries of the non-Western world in general, and particularly in South Africa, is quite significant. This is mainly because the manner in which knowledge production currently takes place among many of the countries of the global South, including South Africa, does not address many of the developmental aspirations, challenges and needs of their indigenous populations, but continues to sustain the very colonial power structures that were put in place during the imposition of direct and indirect forms of colonial domination. Thus, the formal higher education system which became the key instrument in the production of knowledge among the majority of countries of the South, since the imposition of colonial domination, has remained unchanged even after the demise of juridical administrative colonialism. The question that, therefore needs urgent attention is that of, whether it is possible for a higher education system that was once used for colonial domination and exploitation in the not-so-distant past, to address the developmental needs, aspirations and challenges of both the former colonizer and the formerly colonized subject in the postcolonial and post-apartheid era without being subjected to a transformation process? This question is quite important with specific reference to countries such as South Africa where, after the demise of juridical administrative colonial and apartheid systems, both the former colonizers and the formerly colonized remained together within the same cartographic and spatio-temporality known as South Africa, in search of a new inclusive national identity. At the same time, this is also quite problematic with specific reference to institutions of higher learning such as universities, because universities as academic institutions serve as places where future decision-makers, knowledge producers and leaders in all spheres of life are produced.

This article, which methodologically relies on literature study and therefore is conceptual, is a de-colonial critique on the South African higher education system. It argues that the current higher education system in South Africa can only respond to various developmental needs, challenges and aspirations of all its population when its knowledge production is
decolonized and pluriversalized rather than having only one western universal epistemic centre model (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi, 2016). However, the question of decolonizing the higher education system cannot be understood without articulating the myth and/or incompleteness of the decolonization process itself as well as the presence of coloniality in knowledge production. After exploring the myth of decolonisation, this article delves into the challenge of inequality that confronts South African society at large and the higher education system. The article concludes by suggesting the need to ‘unthink’ and ‘unlearn’ the present ways of imagining a decolonial education system in South Africa.

The myth of a decolonized world and the idea of coloniality in knowledge production

The case for decolonizing the knowledge production in Southern African higher education, like in other non-western countries in general, cannot be sustained without an understanding that the decolonization process that took place in the juridical administrative aspect of colonial domination, did not lead to the full demolition of all colonial tendencies and practices in every aspect of life, such as knowledge production, identity construction and imaginations of development, among others (Grosfoguel, 2007; Mignolo, 2011). Thus, the continuing colonial manifestations in several spheres of life other than the juridical administrative sphere among most of the countries of the South have led scholars such as Grosfoguel (2007) to decry the idea of a ‘postcolonial’ world as myth. According to Grosfoguel:

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a ‘postcolonial’ world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same ‘colonial power matrix’. With juridical administrative decolonization we moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of ‘global coloniality’. Although ‘colonial administrations’ have been entirely eradicated, and the majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European exploitation and
domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain in place and are entangled with the ‘international division of labour’ and accumulation of capital at a world-scale (2007, 219).

It is from such observations by scholars such as Grosfoguel among others, that the idea of ‘coloniality’ instead of classical juridical administrative colonialism has been developed to capture all the colonial matrices of power that underpin the construction of the present modern world. By the present ‘modern world’ I mean the world system that came into being since the ‘voyages of discovery’ by figures such as Christopher Columbus in 1492 (see Hicken, 2013). According to scholars such as Grosfoguel (2007) and Mignolo (2011) among others, the year 1492 is quite foundational to our understanding of the modern world system and the advent of Western-centred modernity because it is the year when Christopher Columbus under the auspices of the voyages of discovery reached the Americas leading to the development of the idea of the non-Western ‘Other’ (Hicken, 2013). This discovery of the non-Western ‘Other’ paved way for negative developments such as racism, imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, neo-colonialism and coloniality at large because it is the period when Europeans began to question whether a people that are different from them are also human beings (Schumpeter, 1951; Stuchtey, 2011). It was, therefore, the denial of humanity of the non-Western ‘Other’ that justified activities such as oppression, domination, conversion, exploitation, slavery, racism, genocide, neo-colonialism, coloniality and apartheid, among others because the non-Western subject was and/or is viewed not as human enough to be on par with Westerners (Koebner & Schmidt, 1965; Kiernan, 1995; Stuchtey, 2011). Thus, for instance, at the theological level, questions were and/or are still raised, on whether the non-Western subjects have souls or religion while at the secular sphere questions were and/or are still being raised whether the non-Western ‘Other’ has development or human rights (Amin, 2009).

In the context of re-thinking Western models of education in the non-Western world, it is important to question whether the higher education system as a mode of knowledge of production does not propagate the colonial tendency of domination and exploitation. This is important because a decolonized higher education system must be free from the idea that education can be something that some human beings located in a different socio-historical experience can do for and to other human beings located in a different socio-historical experience. In other words, a decolonized higher education system must be able to dismiss the idea of ‘thinking for them’ with
the contempt it deserves because a de-colonized education model must be predicated on the notion that all human beings have monopoly over their thinking, knowledge production and what constitutes progress to them (Fanon, 1968).

The idea of ‘coloniality’ instead of a singular form of colonialism can be a very useful method in questioning the appropriateness of a Western education system in the non-Western world because it enables us to evaluate whether the education models that we adopted after the demise of juridical administration is not just another form of colonialism. This is mainly because the idea of coloniality visualizes other dynamics of the colonial process which includes among them the ‘colonization of imagination’ (Quijano, 2007), the ‘colonization of the mind’ (Dascal, 2009) and the colonization of knowledge and power. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism.

It needs to be emphasized that coloniality is different from classical colonialism because in the absence of juridical administrative colonialism, other forms of colonialism survive by being invisible to the colonized subject. This means the idea of coloniality reveals those colonialisms that are hidden but continue to subjugate, exploit and dominate the non-Western subject hence coloniality needs to be explained at length. According to scholars such as Maldonado-Torres:

Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to a long-standing pattern of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day (2007, 243).

In other words, what we can understand from the above articulation by Maldonado-Torres is that the idea of coloniality can help to debunk the problem of colonial domination from a vantage point of a variety of ‘colonial situations’ that include cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and
economic oppression of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racialized/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations (Grosfoguel, 2007, 220).

The idea of coloniality cannot be fully understood outside the history of the emergence of Western modernity and the division of the world into two: The West and the non-West. Thus, the advent of Western-centred modernity is central to understanding the idea coloniality because coloniality is the darker side of Western modernity. What this means is that since the birth of Euro-American centred modernity after the year 1492, the peoples of the non-Western world have come to endure and live under what scholars such as Mignolo (2011) have described as the ‘darker side of Western modernity’ in opposition to its brighter side in the West. The darker side of Western modernity has been characterised by scholars such as Fanon (1961) and Santos (2007) among others, as the ‘Zone of Non-Being’ which is ‘hellish’, non-human and a product of a Western form of abyssal thinking which divides the world into zones of being and non-being or human and non-human. What needs to be understood in this formulation of the division of the world is that the indigenous peoples of the non-Western world live in the Zone of Non-Being, not out of their will, but through conquest, while the conquerors in the name of Westerners in Europe and North America live in the Zone of Being—the brighter side of Western-centred modernity. The question that emerges from the above understanding of how the world system is divided, therefore, is that of whether it is possible for a singular homogenous model of education to address the developmental needs, aspirations and challenges of both the subject that is found in the Zone of Being and that which is found in the Zone of Non-Being. This question is even more important because the manner in which the world system is divided is mirrored in the internal affairs of many of the countries of the non-Western world such as South Africa.

In post-apartheid South Africa, it can be noted that the former colonizers are still reaping the fruits of being on a different side of colonial difference—the dominant side, and the formerly colonized are also still bearing the pains of being on the other side of colonial difference—the dominated side. The urgent question that needs our attention when re-thinking the higher education system in South Africa, therefore, is that of whether it is possible for people who were located and/or are still located on different sides of colonial difference to tell a similar tale about their socio-historical experiences and imaginations of the future. This question is important because the moment people from different sides of colonial difference begin to tell a homogenous tale about their experiences and/or imagination of the
future, there is a possibility that one side of the different socio-historical experiences is silenced. It is from such a premise that the need to decolonize the higher education system as the instrument of re-imagining the past and imagining the future is pluriversalized in such way that it articulates the aspirations, challenges and needs of diverse people from different indigenous epistemologies and practices.

In order to understand how the world is divided into two zones, it is important to briefly get an insight into what particularly distinguishes the Zone of Non-Being from the Zone of Being in descriptive terms. According to scholars such as Grosfoguel (2007) the people located in the Zone of Non-Being are characterized by a catalogue of deficits and a series of lacks, but those located in the Zone of Being systematically reap all the fruits of Western-centred modernity, from the sixteenth century ‘rights of people’ to the eighteenth century ‘rights of man [sic]’ and the late twentieth century ‘human rights’. Thus, in his description of how those in the Zone of Non-Being are treated by those in the Zone of Being, Grosfoguel argued that,

> We went from the sixteenth century characterization of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of ‘people without history’, to the twentieth century characterization of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty first century of ‘people without democracy’ (2007, 214).

In contrast to the characterization of people in the Zone of Non-Being who are governed through ‘appropriation/violence’, those in the Zone of Being are represented as progressive and are governed through “social regulation and social emancipation” (Santos, 2007, 46). What all the above means in the sphere of education and knowledge production is that the developmental needs, challenges and aspirations of people living in these two zones of the modern world system: The Zone of Being and the Zone of Non-Being cannot be addressed by a single model of education since the two spaces of colonial difference are informed by different socio-historical experiences such as indigenous or colonial offspring. Thus, a decolonized higher education model must not entertain the notion that there are people without education and/or without knowledge but must seek to accommodate, nurture and cultivate a variety of experience to pluriversalize the centre of knowledge production (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi, 2016).

Indeed, it needs to be noted that what typically defines the relationship between the Zone of Being and the Zone Non-Being is not only the vertical
social hierarchization of identities informed by race (i.e. that the lighter ones skin is, the more they have the ability to think) but also that the Zone of Non-Being perpetually produces subjects who are deceived and crushed by the power of the Zone of Being in the academic realm, for example. Thus, according to Fanon:

The colonial world is a world cut into two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policemen and the soldiers who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression… the policemen and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native (1961, 29).

The above reflection by Fanon clearly reveals that the life-world to which the death project has condemned the damned of the earth, remains generally hellish, but what is even more problematic is the desire of those in the Zone of Being to always dominate and colonize those in the Zone of Non-Being by any means including through the education system. It can also be noted that the relationship between the Zone of Being and Zone of Non-Being resembles what Fanon (1961) described as a Manichean structure. According to Fanon:

The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of a higher unity. … they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. … The settlers’ town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly-lit town, with the streets are covered with asphalt … The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town … the reservation, is a place of ill-fame… It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry
town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light (Fanon, 1961, 38-39).

In the context of education, we can articulate through Fanon (1961) that there is no way in which those who are bent on colonizing others can be expected to come up with an education system that will genuinely promote the developmental aspirations and agendas of the colonised. For instance, colonized peoples are denied the opportunity to know themselves. Instead, the colonizer claims to ‘know’ the colonized, but this knowledge “betrays a determination to objectify, to confine, to imprison, to harden” (Fanon, 1968, 34). In Fanon’s reading, the rich history and institutions of the indigenous population are physically and symbolically destroyed, and in their place the colonizer produces a people who deserve only to be ruled. The colonizer constructs colonized peoples as ‘lazy’ and ‘unproductive,” thereby justifying low wages or coercive systems of labour. The Colonizer also constructs them as ‘stupid,’ thereby justifying the imposition of the colonial power’s institutions and practices. Finally, the colonizer constructs them as ‘savage’ and ‘dangerous,’ thereby justifying military conquest and coercive forms of social control. The result is a people “in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality” (Fanon, 1967, 18). More than that, there is an issue of Eurocentrism and scientism at the centre of knowledge production deemed by Wallerstein as the only legitimate mode of knowledge (see Grosfoguel, 2007). For Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi this implies that scientism was coined to be the preserve of modern subjects claimed by Europe and later North America as producers of progressive scientific ideas (2016, 7). These ideas were portrayed to be disembodied, un-situated, objective, truthful and universal (Grosfoguel, 2012). Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi (2016) contend that the Euro-North America conceit, which gave birth to Eurocentrism (Amin, 2009), had far reaching consequences for the non-Western world in general and Africa in particular. Eurocentrism assumed the form of a theory of world history underpinned by a bundle of prejudices, Euro-North American-ethnocentrism, ignorance and mistrust of non-Western people, chauvism and xenophobia (Amin, 2009). To substantiate the above statement, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi illustrate that:

Despite the existence of strong archaeological evidence that indicated to Africa as a cradle of mankind [sic], Eurocentrism a discourse continued to articulate a Western-centric idea of human history and progress from Greek-Roman classical world
to Christian feudalism, to current European-centric global capitalism (2016, 7).

Since the idea of coloniality reminds us that there are many other colonialisms that survive juridical colonial administration, the question that needs to be answered in the postcolonial era among the countries of the non-Western world is how far we can trust the education models that we inherited from our colonizers without transforming them. In the context of coloniality, can we assume that there is an education system that is free of ideologies of those that once dominated and/or continue to dominate others at international and national levels? In South Africa, the problem of coloniality is exemplified by the current racial inequality in the socio-economic sphere. This even led the former South African President Thabo Mbeki to describe South Africa as ‘two worlds in one country’:

… South Africa is a country of two nations. One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure … The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor … This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure (Mbeki, 1998, 68).

Indeed, Thabo Mbeki’s observation of South African inequalities cannot be divorced from the manner in which the modern world is generally structured today, but the most compelling question is that of, whether those who live in either the Zone of Being or the Zone of Non-Being within South Africa, need a similar form of education in order to achieve their development needs and aspirations? Thus, put differently, can the people who are economically at the apex of an unequal power structure approve of an education system that equips the less powerful to take power from them? This question is critical in a country such as South Africa where the question of equality in the socio-economic sphere is central to development (Mbeki, 2009).

Indeed, the urgent question is that in light of coloniality in the education system of many of the non-Western world, what can be done in-order to undo the power structure of domination in the sphere of education? This article motivates for a de-colonial approach to the idea of education among the countries of the non-Western world with specific reference to South Africa.
Decoloniality can reveal coloniality and possibly dismantle it in the sphere of education and/or knowledge production at large, because it is a cocktail of liberatory projects of critical thought from the former colonised sites of knowledge production, that seek to make sense of the position of former colonized/or still colonized people since the fifteen century modern world, described by Mignolo (2000) for example, to be Euro-America-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, capitalist, hetero-normative, racially-hierarchized (also see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014, 91). To substantiate the above, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) borrows from Maldonado-Torres’ comments that:

By decoloniality it is meant here the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonial world (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014, 91).

In the case of South Africa, de-coloniality means that we must conceive and imagine the idea of education beyond the current rhetoric of the skills development discourse that seeks to construct other citizens as workers while others remain as natural owners of the means of production. Thus, the fact that the white population own the means of production as a result of colonialism and apartheid, and also that the black population historically constituted cheap labour, means that an education system that primarily seeks to prepare the previously disadvantaged communities for employment reinforces coloniality, rather than dismantles it, since the worker cannot be equal to an employer -the one who own the means of production. In terms of racial profiling such an education system re-constructs black identity as constituted by being a worker and/or being poor and whiteness as constituted by being rich, powerful and entitled to own resources.

**Westernised higher education in the tides of equality in South Africa**

Without delving too much into debates surrounding conceptualisation of inequality that opposes different schools of thoughts, the concept is simply viewed as the state of not being equal, especially in status, rights, and opportunities (Kuznets, 1955), depending on contingent circumstances, both personal and social (Sen, 1999, 70) that include education systems. Therefore, this article describes briefly Western Higher Education in South Africa and
the ways in which it produces inequality among citizens. The thrust for decolonizing higher education in South Africa must be seen in the context of the enormous social and economic inequalities that this country is experiencing and from the point of view that change in the conditions that control human existence is imperative to the social transformation of South African society itself (Keeton, 2014). Education thus should enact social change in an improving manner (see Mungazi & Walker, 1997). On the contrary, from British colonial education to Afrikaner education, South African higher education was designed to prolong racism, segregation and the disempowerment of the indigenous people (Kallaway, 2004). Christie (in Msila, 2007, 148) laments that British Mission education was introduced to spread the Western way of life among the ‘backward’ South Africans and to teach certain colonial work values.

Despite this, there is time to correct the historical record by presenting the African and particularly South African roots of scientific knowledge production through scientific debates. The Colonial government in South Africa, like the rest of colonised African countries, used education to attain their political goals, to make South Africans docile, tame and alienate them from their cultural practices (Msil, 2007). Politicisation of education and abuse of religious principles have been at the centre of knowledge production in South African higher education with the ultimate goal to indoctrinate and domesticate the people (Kallaway, 2004). During the apartheid era, as Gibbon and Kabaki (2004, 123) have emphasised, the entire South African higher education system served to construct and maintain the social, political and economic features of the apartheid order. One of the ways it did this was by contributing to the systematic under-qualification of the majority black population. While the Afrikaans-medium universities worked closely with the government on this, the English-medium universities at the same time played a role in maintaining segregation and oppression (Heleta, 2016). Flabbergasted by the style of colonial education in South Africa, in his speech of 13 February 1990, Nelson Mandela confirmed that:

The crisis in education that exists in South Africa demands special attention. The education crisis in black schools is a political crisis. It arises out of the fact that our people have no vote and therefore cannot make the government of the day responsive to their needs. Apartheid education is inferior and a crime against humanity. Education is an area that needs the attention of all our people, students, parents, teachers, workers and all other organised sectors of our community.
Let us build disciplined structures, Student Representative Councils, a united national teachers organisation, parent structures and parent teacher-student associations and the National Education Crisis Committee (Mandela, 1990).

The reason was, in the past, South African education reflected the fragmented society in which it was based, and it hardly created conscientious, critical citizens. Education as a means of under-democratic social control created individuals who were not only short changed but were also compartmentalised along racial and cultural lines. The education system also failed to address the truly democratic principles based on access, full participation and equity (Mungazi & Walter, 1997; Msila, 2007).

Despite being in a democratic era, tertiary students in South Africa are still being indoctrinated by a Westernised knowledge production system that inhibits most marginalised black students from fully reaping the benefits of a transformative educational system (Msilu, 2007). The 2015 student uprising in South African universities has been a striking example of student activism aimed at disrupting whiteness at universities, imposed since colonial times as a symbol of purity, at the same time defined by what it means to be civilised, modern and human (Sardar cited in Heleta, 2016). This Westernised higher education in South Africa is deemed by many decolonial scholars, such as Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013; 2016), Siphamandla Zondi (2016), Teboho Lebakeng (2016), and Savo Heleta (2016) to name a few, to be universalised and contaminated with one racial supremacy, segregated language in education and oppressed ideologies that in all reproduce inequalities among scholars and citizens at large (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi, 2016). This race supremacy is still engaged in daily open, and/or subtle racism, and the marginalisation of black people. More than that, Westernised higher education in South Africa has fashioned western supremacy, in the form of Euro-American-centric modernity, and hegemony embedded into the knowledge production and higher education philosophies of South African universities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016; Lebakeng, 2016). This white supremacy and segregation of black students continues today to fuel inequality among black and white students subjected to westernised models of knowledge production systems which undermine indigenous knowledges within westernised learning institutions.

In the case of South Africa, this Western supremacy has, on it turn, engendered two clustered higher education systems of which one is predominantly white while the rest are black dominated institutions. Consequently, young black graduates lose confidence in their qualifications,
are mostly challenged in the job market compared to their white counterparts from the westernised ranked institutions and knowledge production systems, which subsequently contributes to social and economic inequalities. Western higher education has indoctrinated students instead of liberating them (Gutek, 1974). This higher education system of post-apartheid South Africa was declared a way of maintaining the black South Africans in a permanent state of political and economic subordination fuelled by racial inequalities of apartheid and wealth disparities, largely which remain intact and benefits whites (Msila, 2007; Jacobs, 2016). It has been a means of restricting the development of the learner by distorting epistemology to ensure control over the intellect of the leaners and teachers, and propagating state propaganda, especially at the higher education level (Kallaway, 2004). Heleta (2016) augments that institutional cultures and epistemological traditions have not yet changed considerably, despite a myriad of new policies and frameworks that speak about equality, equity, transformation and change in South African universities. Mbembe (2016, 32) exclaims that it was wrong to keep, in the liberation era, the same syllabus which was designed to meet the needs of colonialism and apartheid. Apart from being an exclusive and hegemonic system, Westernised higher education in South Africa is an obvious instrument of control to protect power and privilege (Hartshorne, 1988). In summary, Westernised higher education reproduces an elite instead of creating a democratic education system that promotes equal access for all races and social classes in South African society. It does not produce or inculcate indigenous and endogenous knowledge, instead it is deeply imbricated in the reproduction of epistemic apartheid and imperially of knowledge that is compounded by ‘disciplinary decadence and intellectual historical amnesia’ (Rabaka cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016). Thus, decolonizing knowledge production in higher education in South Africa becomes of paramount importance to the quest for equality among its divided citizens, divided from epistemicides.

The South African higher educations system and the quest for equality

The South African higher education system, like that of the countries of the non-Western world in general, is a product of colonial expansion. This context needs to be unpacked because the South African higher education system like that of the rest of the global South is confronted by the question of whether it can adequately address the needs, challenges and aspirations of all those who constitute its demographic composition in the present without being subjected to a process of social transformation. This question is quite
important in a country such as South Africa after 1994. Epistemological transformation was supposed to entail a “reorientation away from the apartheid knowledge system, in which curriculum was used as a tool of exclusion, to a democratic curriculum that is inclusive of all human thought” (Department of Education, 2008, 89; Heleta, 2016, 3). A transformed knowledge production was needed to articulate the developmental priorities, agendas, challenges and aspirations of all the citizens who constitute the demographic base of the new nation. Thus, in other words, the question that remains a bone of contention among the people of South Africa is, whether the current education system prioritizes the aspirations of both the members of previously disadvantaged communities and those that colonized them prior to the advent of the so-called post-apartheid dispensation? However, the transformation efforts have not “translated into any significant shifts in the structure and content of the curriculum” (Department of Education, 2008, 89; Heleta 2016, 3).

In order to question whether the South African education system in the post-apartheid period can address the developmental imperatives, which are likely to be different from those of the colonial and apartheid period, one must be able to map out the role that colonial education played in sustaining colonial perpetrated discrimination and marginalisation, including dislocation of the centre of indigenous knowledge production. However, to adequately map-out the role that the formal education system (as an instrument of knowledge production at large) played during the colonial and apartheid systems in South Africa, it can be helpful to begin by articulating how and why education became a key instrument of colonial administration and governance in the global South in general. This is important to understand because education became an instrument of colonial governance and administration when, in the West, people began to raise questions about whether it is profitable to keep colonies without making their indigenous peoples as anything, but the pure objects of colonial state will as “nobody’s people,” coined for example by the Bismarkian state in colonial Germany (von Joeden-Forgey, 2004). Thus, the question of how to rule the colonized territories became central because, in the process, the indigenous peoples of the colonized world had to be turned into subjects that are disciplined to be subject to others - colonial subjects who would consent to be subject of the colonizers (Hall, 2008). It was, therefore, through such intentions of disciplining the people in the colonies into colonial subjects that the formal process of education was identified as one of the instruments that was to be used to turn the indigenous peoples in the colonies into new subjects that will consent to colonial domination (Fanon, 1968). As Said pointed out:
The Western European literature has for centuries portrayed the non-Western world and peoples as ‘inferior’ and ‘subordinate’; this helped ‘normalise’ racism among the colonialists and developed a notion that ‘Europe should rule, non-Europeans ruled’ (1994, 120).

Indeed, a number of formal education institutions and facilities were constructed in many parts of the non-Western world with the majority of them being established by the Christian missionaries, but this initiative backfired since it was the indigenous Christian educated elite who began to question the legitimacy of the colonial system that produced them. Illustrating from the Algerian Christianity case, Fontaine (2016) laments the dramatic transformation of Christianity from its position as the moral foundation of European imperialism to its role as a radical voice of political and social change in the era of decolonization. More than that, indigenous Christians begun to confront the consequences of racism and violence that Christianity had reinforced in European colonies. Brett (2008) contends that the Bible was deemed to be misinterpreted by colonial powers to undergird their imperial designs, which washed away indigenous rights. Across the African continent for example, the first formal attempts at European schooling were made by the Portuguese missionaries around the middle of the sixteenth century, while the more solid foundations for European education were laid in the nineteenth century by missionaries from Great Britain, France and America (White, 2010).

In South Africa, the unintended consequence of the colonial education system driven, by the Christian missionaries, was that it ended up producing some of the most ardent and fiercest anti-colonial figures. However, the attempt to produce a docile and consenting colonial subject was never abandoned leading to the promulgation of the Bantu Education Act of 1953 by the apartheid regime (Kallaway, 2004; Moore, 2015). Pietsch (2013) comments that, the colonial universities in South Africa were set up by settler elites who saw them as both symbols and disseminators of European civilisation in the colonies.

Despite different forms of transformation that South African higher education experienced in the post-apartheid era, the question of western supremacy and western hegemony in knowledge production in higher learning institutions, especially in universities, remains problematic, with specific reference to institutions of higher learning such as universities, because universities as academic institutions, serve as places where future
decision-makers, knowledge producers and leaders in all spheres of life are produced. According to Odora-Hoppers and Richards,

... a university is a place where people think. Researchers produce knowledge. Teachers communicate knowledge. Students acquire knowledge, skills, values, and professional qualifications. If all goes well everyone in the university community serves humanity. None of this could happen without thinking (2011, 1).

The question that emerges out of the above analysis of what universities are, is that of what kinds of ‘thinking’ should underpin the university in the non-Western part of the world. South African higher education, similar to others in Africa, is not a sole learning institution that exhibits epistemic colonial thinking (Lebakeng, 2016). Thus, in South Africa, the major question that faces its universities as institutions of higher learning, is whether they are ‘African’ universities, or ‘Western’ universities. This question is quite significant because the issue of the identity of the university in a space such as South Africa, has a bearing on the nature of graduates that the universities produce and therefore, on the direction that development is heading towards.

However, before we even discuss the question of identity in relation to universities as institutions of higher learning in South Africa, it is imperative to tackle first the question of why a different system of education would be needed. While it is true that, apart from the violence of Euro-American centred political and economic oppression and domination, the indigenous peoples of Africa suffered epistemological violence and colonial domination in knowledge production that left them with almost no original thinking tradition to which they can go back to, the possibility for kinds of thinking that reflect the pluriversity of historical processes outside the purviews of Western epistemology remains real (Ndlovu, 2008, 31-2). Thus, apart from domination, postcolonial theorists such as Bhabha (1994) have reminded us that the colonial encounter was characterized also by other processes that included resistance, negotiation, mimicry, hybridity and alienation. These complex and dynamic processes that characterized the colonial encounter beyond domination and hegemony categories, point to the fact that rather than overwhelmingly altering African ways of living and thinking, colonial domination left behind a patchwork of ‘geo-political’, ‘ego-political’, ‘theo-political’ and ‘body-political’ forms of knowledge(s) that may not necessarily fall within Western philosophy of what constitutes knowledge.
Thus, even though scholars such as Spivak (1994) have questioned whether the subaltern can speak, and Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) have stressed the ‘invention of traditions’, it is too simplistic to view the impact of the colonial encounter as though it was homogenous, and as if it left no stone untouched in committing ‘epistemicides’ on the part of the colonized peoples of the global South.

By and large, the impact of direct colonial domination on epistemologies of the colonised varied from place to place and time to time. Thus, according to Quijano,

The forms and the effects of that cultural coloniality have been different as regards to times and cases. In Latin America, the cultural repression and the colonization of the imaginary were accompanied by a massive and gigantic extermination of the natives, mainly by their use as expendable labor force, in addition to the violence of the conquest and the diseases brought by Europeans … The cultural repression and the massive genocide together turned the previous high cultures of America into illiterate, peasant subcultures condemned to orality; that is, deprived of their own pattern of formalised, objectivised, intellectual, and plastic or visual expression (2007, 169-70).

Quijano’s position is that Latin America became the most extreme case of cultural colonization by Europe, and thus cannot be compared with Asia, the Middle East and Africa, because:

In Asia and in the Middle East, the high cultures could never be destroyed with such intensity and profundity. But they were nevertheless placed in a subordinate relation not only in the European view but also in the eyes of their own bearers. In Africa, cultural destruction was certainly much more intense than in Asia, but less than in America. Nor did the Europeans there succeed in complete destruction of the patterns of expression, in particular of objectification and of visual formalization. What the Europeans did was to deprive Africans of legitimacy and recognition in the global cultural order dominated by European patterns (2007, 170).
What emerges from Quijano’s analysis of the impact of colonialism across the regions of the Third World is that in Africa, the process of colonial domination did not totally annihilate and exterminate indigenous African ways of thinking, knowing and patterns of expression, but merely subalternized and inferiorized them in the global cultural order. What then needs to be done to reverse the status quo is to deliberately exalt those subaltern knowledge(s) through formal education, especially in institutions of higher learning such as universities. Thus, Quijano’s analysis of the effects of colonial domination on African culture(s) and knowledge systems resonates with Odora-Hoppers and Richards when they argue that:

Two centuries of politicised and scientifed denial of the existence of the metaphysics of indigenous people has not eradicated their knowledge systems, their rituals, and their practices … at least not completely. Whenever we look deeply at African society, or indeed most indigenous societies, the empirical fact that stares back at us is a reality of life lived differently, lives constituted around very different metaphysics of economics, of law, of science, of healing, of marriage, of joy, of dying, and of co-existence. The problem before us is therefore that the academy has not adapted to its natural context, or has resisted adaptation epistemologically, cosmologically and culturally—with immense ensuing cognitive injustice to boot! (2011, 10).

Odora-Hoppers and Richards clearly indicate here that the colonial encounter did not alter everything and everybody in Africa, as scholars such as Comaroff and Comaroff (1991) would have us believe. With reference to the above scholars such as Quijano (2007), Odora-Hoppers and Richards (2011), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014, 2016), Zondi (2016), Lebakeng (2016), Heleta (2016), Mbembe (2016), to name a few on decolonising knowledge production in the global south, South Africa needs an education system that fits its context in line with African values, norms and existing indigenous systems of knowledge production, rather than that which was imposed by the colonizers. Thus, according to scholars like Gutto:

Education in Africa needs a fundamental paradigm change which entails, among other things, focusing on confronting, with a view of correcting and departing from, hegemonic knowledge and knowledge systems that are predicated on racist
paradigms that have deliberately and otherwise distorted, and continue to distort, the reality of who Africans really are (2006, 306).

In spite of the significance of the many calls from Fanon (1967, 1968), Quijano (2007), Odora-Hoppers and Richards (2011), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013; 2016), Zondi (2016), Lebakeng (2016), Heleta (2016), and Mbembe (2016) to name a few, for epistemological paradigm shifts needed to rehabilitate African education so that it serves the developmental aspirations of indigenous African communities, the biggest challenge remains the question of, whether it is possible for the colonized, Westernised educated African elite to unlearn and un-think the education system that produced them even within the African continent itself? It is possible for all African scholars including the emerging generation in the entire global South to challenge western knowledge production systems including the westernised academic traditions to present indigenous knowledge and think out of the westernised box of knowledge production that welcomes them into westernised academic debates. It is time to think how Southern knowledge should be equally presented at the same level as other northern knowledge. Scholars from the global South need to think about which dissemination tools need to be used in order to present their knowledge to the world without falling into the trap of ‘coconut scholars’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) who are western-thinking on the inside, and with an African accent on the outside. In line with this article, transforming higher education in South Africa, in order to suit the contextual needs of the African people is paramount, important and possible.

In South Africa, a number of initiatives have been trialled to transform the education system in general and more specifically within the context of higher learning, but without success (Kallaway, 2004; Moore, 2015). Generally speaking, South African education trajectory reform, including in its higher sector, is respectively constituted of British Education; the Bantu Education Act of 1953; Christian National Education (CNE); Outcomes Based Education (OBE); National Qualification Framework (NQF); National Curriculum Statement (NCS); Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) followed by the South African School Acts (SASA), General Education and Training (GET); Further Education and Training (FET); and the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS), to perpetuate awareness between social justice, human rights and inclusivity (Kallaway, 2004; Msila, 2007; Black, 2014). More than that, another important tool of transformation was the Report Commissioned by the Minister of Higher
Education and Training for the *Charter for Humanities and Social Sciences: Final Report of 30 June 2011*, that pushed for the establishment of five Virtual Schools spread across Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape, and Eastern Cape, with the mandate of dealing with issues of economy, race, culture, identity, literature, performance, creative arts, local languages and rural transformation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

Other education reform initiatives involved only cosmetic changes; the training of Black, Indian and Coloured people as teachers in higher education; the opening of universities to previously disadvantaged communities; and the revision of the curricula with the intention to diversify knowledge production (Kallaway, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016). While the initiatives to transform the higher education landscape in South Africa need to be applauded, there is a need to highlight that many of these efforts are caught-up within the spider web of coloniality, because they largely seek to transform the higher education system within its own epistemic terms that do not compromise colonial thinking (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2016).

In 2015, for example, this failure to truly decolonise the knowledge production systems as delivered at the higher education level, triggered a myriad of student protest movements across South Africa. They argued for structural changes including: curriculum change; an epistemological paradigm shift from Euro-centric knowledge to Afro-centred knowledge; a change of university cultures and systems that alienate many; and also to increase access and affordability to education in general (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Zondi, 2016, 4; Heleta, 2016).

The decolonization part of the transformation process is when the Western-centric epistemic foundations on what constitutes and does not constitute knowledge, skill and education, is not taken for granted. Thus, the lack of questioning of the Western canon, which scholars such as Maldonado-Torres (2004) argues, largely informed by some form of ‘epistemic racism’ and the ‘forgetfulness of coloniality,’ means that the very ‘black faces’ that have replaced the ‘white faces’ at the South African institutions of higher learning can also practice epistemic racism or epistemic Afro-phobia against themselves - a situation of which Balibar termed ‘racism without race’ (cited in Rossiter, 2010). At the same time, the increase of ‘black faces’ in university teaching, management, administration and students, constitutes the process of de-racialisation of the academy, and not decolonization per se that requires a deep epistemological and disciplinary transformations that reflects African identities and other imperatives (Lebakeng, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016).
Thus, without questioning the very foundations of what constitutes and does not constitute education and/or knowledge means that the discourse and practice of transformation in South African education in general is conservative, and indeed, not revolutionary enough in that it is a transformation framed within a flawed enterprise which confirms Europe is the only ‘root of authentic thinking’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2004).

Transformation in the South African higher education system, especially in universities, should not remain loyal to the Western premise of what constitutes knowledge, skill and education because the Western worldview is universalist and as such, commits epistemicides on other legitimate views. Similar to other universities in Africa, South African universities need a radical transformation through a decolonisation process that must include, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni:

… careful and deep thinking on what values should distinguish and underpin an African university; what competencies and crucial skills must distinguish its products; what psychologies, ideologies, visions, and worldviews an African university should nurture and inculcate on its students; and what teaching methodologies should an African university develop in its endeavour to produce pan-African students able to creatively, innovatively and originally respond to African development challenges (2016, 39).

Indeed, efforts such as promoting the ideas of ‘multi, inter and trans-disciplinarity’ at universities whereby disciplines and research methods are free from coloniality, should not be a solution in decolonial thinking, but ecologies of knowledge instead. Whereby knowledges from all continents worldwide should be given equal space in the academy (Santos, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2016). Thus, in other words, the ideas of inter, multi and trans-disciplinarity do not question the epistemic foundations on which all the disciplines are predicated but merely seeks to move beyond academic tribes in the practice of research and teaching in universities. This does not entail some form of post-disciplinarity that can take us beyond the idea of disciplines in the first place, but allows those indigenous knowledges that were denied voice and entry into the academy to penetrate and pluriversalize our understanding of the world.

In order to achieve a truly post-disciplinary transformation predicated on de-colonial aspirations in the South African higher education system, it will be important to begin by embracing the idea of ‘epistemic disobedience’
(Mignolo, 2009), which will lead the younger generation to question domination in the field of knowledge production. Thus, epistemic disobedience will lead us to reject the idea that all the technologies of subjectivation in knowledge production, are pre-conceived and ‘sewn up’ methodologies in research, which serve as technologies of knowing and seeing that re-inscribe the very epistemicidal Eurocentric worldview. Additionally, there is a need for Africanisation or indigenisation of knowledge production systems in the South African context by putting more emphasis on South African and African scholarship to assume a respectable and remarkable role in the knowledge production which is grounded in South African experiences, sensibilities, aspirations and reflect/articulate South African hope, wishes, experiences, dilemmas and predicaments (Lebakeng, 2016). More importantly, what needs to be rejected in crafting a truly transformed South African higher education system, is the fundamentalism of Western epistemic perspectives that refuse the possibility of ecologies of knowledges (Santos, 2007).

Conclusion

To conclude, it needs to be emphasized that to achieve a revolutionary and/subversive transformation of the higher education in South Africa or in the non-Western world in general, there is a need to synchronize the social location of the people who are the intended beneficiaries of the education system and their epistemic location. What this means is that the intended beneficiaries of the education system must re-think and or ‘un-think’ what constitutes education from their own ‘locus of enunciation’ (Grosofoguel, 2007). This is important because the impact of the hegemonic Euro-centric worldview on what constitutes higher education and knowledge production on the part of the non-Western subject is that it decouples the epistemic location of the subject that speaks from their social location. Thus, Western education through its false ideal of ‘objectivity’ led to a situation whereby the people who are located on the oppressed side of colonial difference think as though they are on the dominant side of colonial difference. This is possible because the idea of an ‘objective truth’ rather than a ‘regime of truth’ is nothing but a point of view that pretends to be without a point of view. In order to achieve a revolutionary transformation of the higher education system in a country such as South Africa, it is important to reject the notion of a neutral, ‘point-zero’, ‘god-eye view’ (Castro-Gomez, 2003) knowledge, because every knowledge is situated somewhere in terms of ‘geo-politics’, ‘ego-politics’, ‘theo-politics’ and ‘body-politics’ of knowledge production.
What this means is that we cannot continue to conceive of the idea of education from a Western epistemic location which corresponds to our social location, and as such, there is a need to shift from what Mignolo (2009) referred to as ‘the geography of reason’ - that is, reason education from where we are socially located, which is the position of being oppressed, subalternized and dominated. In order to achieve social transformation through decolonising knowledge production, curriculum, language in educations and contents in South African higher education, we need to approach higher education from an antiracist and anticolonial perspective, because, colonial and racial perspectives on South Africa, and Africa in general, have misconstrued South Africa as a country without a centre of knowledge production. Therefore, there is a need for an epistemological paradigm shift in order to perpetuate the importance of indigenous knowledge production and its implications for current and future generations hoping for an inclusive and equal South Africa.

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“There is Really Discrimination Everywhere”: Experiences and Consequences of *Everyday Racism* Among the New Black African Diaspora in Australia

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Abstract

In this article, we use Philomena Essed’s (1988) concept of ‘*Everyday Racism*’ as a theoretical framework to introduce critical perspectives for understanding experiences of contemporary racism among the new African diaspora in Australia. The concept deals with the everyday manifestations and (re)production of systemic inequality based on race and/or assumptions around race, whether intended or unintended. Our findings expose the covert, subtle and contestable forms that racism takes in Australian society and the consequences it has for black Africans. By discussing participants’ views and opinions about working and living as skilled black African migrants in Australia, this article explores how racism continues to be perpetuated in Australia, where most citizens profess a commitment to the democratic principles of justice, equality, tolerance and ‘a fair go’. We conclude that, for our black African respondents who experience racism regularly in their daily lives, the consequences are real and painful, manifesting in recurring themes such as the burden of proof; the weight of history and historicity; the ‘constriction of experience’; and a superfluous self-surveillance and self-interrogation.
Introduction

...it is supposed to be a multicultural society, but I tell you I belong on the fringe. First many of the issues I make reference to here or allude to even after here ... some of these things cannot be classified as racism because racism can be defined only by the person who is experiencing it; it cannot be defined by the person doing it to you or the system which is doing it to you. But unfortunately, the system defines racism and unless you can provide evidence of all that is happening, you have no case. So, the system doesn’t think there is racism. Some of my experience clearly is racism because we have gone past the period where you will be openly abused as a Black person or as an African. No, nobody does that any more. But there are much subtle, much more sinister ways of doing these things; there are much more devastating ways of doing these things. So, it doesn’t have to be physical. Anyway, 400 years ago it was physical; 100 years ago, it was physical but there is just as much pain in the totality of your being as there was then. So, for me I have even ceased to try to label it racism or give it any name because that – Maybe these are my own ways of dealing with the pain.... I mean let me be frank with you that is not just a perception, it is well established. (Lasisi)

We begin this article with this long quote from one of our research participants because it is poignant in the way it portrays the respondent’s views about his position and positioning in Australia, while also capturing and encapsulating what this article is all about—“the experienced reality of lived racism” (Essed, 1991, p. vii) in Australia. The research project (explained in detail later) that forms the basis of this article concerned identity and belonging among skilled ‘black’ African immigrants to Australia. However, our data analysis revealed that, without any prompting, most

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1 The target population for our research was people of African descent who migrated to Australia from Africa. We use ‘African’ here as an analytic category over other ethno-national markers on the premise that while Africa as a region has great diversity in the structure of its population, consisting of numerous people belonging to different ethnic, social and economic groups (see, for example, Ufomata, 2000), it is nevertheless a group with many commonalities of needs, interests and diasporic experiences: enough parallels to justify reference to it as a socio-analytic category.
participants talked at varying lengths about the prevalence of racism in their everyday lives—in the workplace and in society at large. Our analysis revealed that the central themes of identity and belonging did not feature as prominently as we had expected; rather, racism and racial issues took centre stage. So it is to racism or “racist practices” (Essed, 1991, p. viii) that we turn our attention in this article.

The expansion of Australia’s humanitarian policy, particularly since the 1990s, has meant that the past three decades have seen a steady stream of continental ‘black’ Africans entering Australia, resulting in a fairly significant emergent community of black African migrants. The inflow has naturally led to some attention being paid to this community, by way of research into the ‘African-Australian’ migration experience. This article follows in a similar vein, while focusing on the experiences and pervasiveness of racism in the everyday lives of this group, and how they deal with issues of ‘blackness’, ‘race’ and ‘otherness’ on a daily basis—what has been referred to as the “‘lived experience’ of being black” (see Deitch et al., 2003, p. 1301; also Essed, 1991, p. vii).

The value of this article lies in the fact that it is about the everyday lived experiences of racism by black Africans and the consequences of racism and racialisation for those living with such experiences. Such a focus ensures that this article addresses an important but often neglected and contentious topic—black African subjectivities and racial discrimination (see Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2017). Generally, in Australia, discourses around the subject of racism fall into two broad categories: (a) those that very often seek to silence racism or diminish its occurrence in society (see, for example, Augoustinos & Every, 2007 & 2010; Babacan, 2008; and Dunn, Pelleri, & Maeder-Han, 2011) and (b) those that focus on the history of racism etched into Australia’s colonial past and white racist policies, such as the White Australia Policy (see for example, Jones, 2017 and Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, n.d), pointing to it as a precursor of ongoing racism in society. Such discourses claim the Australian space as White space and, therefore, see racism as inherent in the regular functioning of a system built on racism. Racism, in this case, is not an incongruity or something that is unusual; it is a normal part of how the system functions (see, for example, Hage, 1998; Stratton, 2006; Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2014 & 2017). Of the two streams, the silencing discourses tend to dominate (Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2017), and so a major contribution of this article is to add to the literature and discussions of black African subjectivities and racial discrimination, and to serve as veritable resistance and opposition to the dominant silencing discourses.
As stated earlier, in this article we use Essed’s concept of *Everyday Racism* as a conceptual lens to deconstruct the everyday lived realities of our interviewees. *Everyday Racism* is an appealing concept for comprehending and appreciating the experiences of black, skilled migrants for multiple reasons. The first is because individuals make sense of their lives and lived experiences through what happens to them on a daily basis—their everyday lived reality. As Douglas (1974) pointed out, “we must begin all sociological understanding of human existence with an understanding of everyday life” (p. x). Second, in a country like Australia, where “most citizens express commitment to the democratic principles of justice, equality, tolerance and fairness” (Beagan, 2003, p. 853), the concept will help reveal some of the covert ways in which racial inequalities are experienced, sustained and perpetuated at the micro level of society and within workplaces (Beagan, 2003). Third, it allows us to centre the respondents’ “subjective realm; the meanings they attribute to events, their perceptions of racism and their subsequent feelings and emotions” (Herbert et al., 2008, p. 104). The *Everyday Racism* framework enables an exploration of the experiences of black migrants in an environment where the discussion of racism is often silenced.

In centring and exploring the experiences of those whose daily realities involve racist encounters, *Everyday Racism* departs from earlier theorisations of racism, which have tended to focus on perpetrators as the lens through which to understand racism. Fourth, applying the notion of *Everyday Racism* to our data allows us to interrogate the participants’ narratives and get to the concealed and symbolic instances of contemporary racism (see also Lee, 2000, p. 356). In so doing, it not only uncovers the “hidden dimensions of racism” (Leah, 1995, p. 100) but also provides a sociological tool for comprehending the manner in which subtle racisms are exhibited in the Australian context.

The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The next section discusses the issue of ‘Blacks and Blackness’, pointing out the complexities in usage and understandings of the terms within the Australian context. Then we provide more detail about the study, including research methods and data analysis procedures. Following that, we discuss the conceptual framework of *Everyday Racism*, using quotes from the data to illustrate key concepts at significant points in the discussion. The penultimate section looks at the data in more detail, discussing the consequences of everyday racism. The last section concludes this article, noting that black African migrants regularly contend with varied forms of subtle racism. It is our hope that this article helps to expose some of the complexities and negotiations of being that black
African migrants are confronted with in their daily living, and the ways in which seemingly innocuous acts of everyday racism work to cumulatively “uphold social relations of power and privilege, marginality and oppression” (Beagan, 2003, p. 853).

Of blackness and the new African diaspora in Australia

In asserting that we are writing about the experiences of everyday racism among black Africans in Australia, we are conscious of the challenges and criticisms that such a venture may attract. To begin with, Australia has a long (and troubled) history with racialised black bodies. Indigenous Australians are sometimes classified as black and so are the people of the Torres Strait Islands (see, for example, Foley, 1999 & 2001). Ample documentation exists that illustrates some historical convergence in the “experience of blackness as a constituted identity between indigenous people of Australia and other black subjects” (Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, beyond the interconnected histories of indigenous Australians and other black subjects, there are also intricacies in the conceptions of black bodies in the Australian environment, which contains an indigenous population often described as ‘Black’, and other black people, including African blacks.

Being aware of the different articulations of blackness in Australia, and the associated consequences for racial and racialised experiences, we do not seek in this article to make generalisations about the racial experiences of all blacks in the Australian context. Rather, we focus on deconstructing how everyday racism is experienced among black Africans. While Indigenous Australians and black African migrants to Australia could share similar racialised realities, we also contend that there are significant experiential and historical differences between them that warrant a specific focus on black Africans. The continental black African is both culturally and physically distinct from the aforementioned groups. Additionally, the ‘migrant’ status of the ‘new’ black (African) body creates other complexities in relation to belonging, which further complicate their experiences. This means that, in some imperceptible ways, how they experience blackness, race and racialisation would differ from Indigenous Australians (Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2017). Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2008) allude to such when they suggest that, as ‘new’ bodies in Australia, the black African body is subjected to heightened hostilities and the suspicion directed at ‘newcomers’.

We note at this point that the black African diaspora is itself not a homogeneous grouping of people; many do not necessarily share common
characteristics and/or histories, apart from black phenotypic features and a (presumed) remote ancestry. Even though some scholars have made a case for classifying all ‘blacks’ outside Africa as diasporic Africans, on the basis that, at some point, they can trace their ancestry to Africa, we still acknowledge the heterogeneity of the category ‘black’ and of ‘black’ experiences. We agree with Alabi (2005), that “black people can on the first level relate to one another in terms of their experiences in racialized societies” and that they share a common understanding of “how Black people fare in the world relative to other groups” (p. 17). We further acknowledge that these shared common experiences and understandings allow black people to collectively query their marginalisation (Alabi, 2005).

One can therefore argue that the term ‘black’ cannot appropriately describe a grouping of people (even those with dark phenotypic features who have connections with Africa), because black people are not all the same and they experience their blackness in different ways. In other words, there are multiple ‘blacknesses’ and a variety of black experiences and black subjectivities. Consequently, just as we have done elsewhere, we use the expression ‘black’—and the concomitant term ‘blackness’—in this article in explicit allusion to that “collective group of people with the same phenotypic cues (including, most significantly, dark skin colour), who, though of diverse socio-cultural and political backgrounds, come originally from continental Africa, and have migrated to Australia over the past five decades or so; as well as their descendants” (Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2017, p. 3). For simplicity, we use the term ‘black’ in this article as a metonymic stand-in for the ‘new’ black African diaspora in Australia.

The Study

The specific aim of the study was to investigate and understand the experiences of skilled ‘black’ African migrants in Australia. The focus was on first-generation black continental Africans who have immigrated to Australia since the abolition of the White Australia Policy in the early 1970s (see, for example, Jones, 2017 and Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, n.d), and have “traceable genealogical links to the continent” (Tettey & Puplampu, 2006, p. 13) and how they experience life as individuals and professionals within their communities and workplaces.

It is also worth mentioning here that our interest in the ‘new’ African diaspora in Australia has a personal genesis: as African migrants we are part of this group ourselves. Our choice of research and our analytic concerns, therefore, do not arise out of naïve curiosity. We acknowledge that, though
rooted in a sociological rationale, our choice of research topic and research methodology is not in itself neutral. Rather, it is rooted in our own experiences as black bodies in the predominantly white Australian space. It is situated in our hybrid identity; our social location as black continental African researchers reading, researching and writing in the West. We bear both similarities to and differences from the participants in our research. We have personal relationships to the experiences of blackness and racism our participants talk about, and, as such, we declare our “autobiographical investment” (Young, 2010, p. 1) and use our own experiences as black African migrant bodies as part of the tool kit and skillset we use to make sense of and interpret the data. Furthermore, like Yancy (2008), we “write out of a personal existential context” which is “a profound source of knowledge connected to [our] raced [bodies]”, and we “theorize from a place of lived embodied experience, a site of exposure” (p. 65). Thus, we claim ourselves as situated rather than detached researchers but argue that our situatedness is not a liability; rather it allows us to bring a certain depth of understanding to the analysis and interpretation process (Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2014) that ultimately refines and elucidates (Denzin, 1994) the narratives of our participants.

Interviews were conducted with a total of 24 skilled African migrants in Sydney, Adelaide and Canberra from November to December 2009, and then from October to December 2011. Participants were recruited via both official and personal networks, as well as through the use of a snowballing strategy where earlier participants were encouraged to inform other potential participants about the study and to pass on the investigators’ contact details. Participants were from wide-ranging cultural backgrounds, with many holding higher degree qualifications, including PhDs. Respondents’ professional backgrounds included academia, medicine, nursing, statistics, engineering, finance, accounting, and information and communication technologies (ICT). The participants came from varied backgrounds, including from countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria.

The age of participants ranged from 34 to 55 years and participants were predominantly male, with only three female interviewees. This gender distribution was not deliberate; rather it was a consequence of the recruitment strategy. Also, being qualitative, the study did not attempt to seek a gender representative sample. Nevertheless, age and gender distribution did not seem to have any impact on the data collection process or the data itself.2 The

2 A Note on Methodology: The average length of interviews was approximately one hour, with the longest lasting two hours and the shortest lasting 38 minutes. All interviews were
reason is that, as we have argued elsewhere (see Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2014), as skilled black African migrants ourselves, we were considered ‘insiders’ and therefore participants were very comfortable talking to us. All participants were assigned pseudonyms as part of the data de-identification process.

**Everyday racism and/in the data**

In this section we discuss the concept of *Everyday Racism* and intersperse our discussions with quotes from our data to illustrate the key points raised by respondents about their experiences of racism. The quotes also serve to justify our choice of *Everyday Racism* as our conceptual framework. Throughout this article, we discuss the participants’ perceptions of racism as non-blatant, “ambiguous and nebulous” acts of racism (Sue, et al., 2007, p. 272) which, though experienced violently “and persistently [by our respondents], are often difficult to pinpoint” (Essed, 2002, p. 204).

digitally recorded and later transcribed for analysis. Given that the core of our study was to understand the personal experiences of continental Africans in Australia, our study was grounded in (qualitative) narrative inquiry. Narrative inquiry, according to Mitchell and Egudo (2003), is informed by postmodern debates that knowledge is value-laden, and reality is based on multiple perspectives with truth grounded in everyday life involving social interactions among individuals. We therefore followed the processes of narrative inquiry and thematic analysis, engaging in “an exhaustive examination” (Manning, 1982, p. 280) of data, as suggested by proponents of analytic induction, while at the same time “staying close to the data” (Jankowski & Wester, 1993, p. 67) in accordance with aspects of narrative inquiry. Our thematic analysis process involved several key steps. Stage one involved the process of data reduction; in which key themes were identified and patterns in the data collected (identifying recurring themes and ideas from the transcribed interviews). From these we created detailed thematic notes that provided a second layer of analysis. The next stage involved allocating specific codes (single word labels) to all items on the list. These codes/labels were further sorted and grouped under “broader, higher order categories or ‘main themes’” (Ritchie, Spencer, & O’Connor, 2003, p. 221). The final stage of ‘data interpretation’ involved selecting core themes that we felt were key to the research and systematically relating them to other themes to create a “‘big picture’ story outline” (O’Dwyer, 2004, p. 394).

3 Patton (1990) suggests that “sufficient description and direct quotations should be included to allow the reader to enter into the situation and thoughts of the people represented in the report” (p. 400). In accordance with that position we have provided sample quotes, which, although lengthy, are both indicative and illustrative of the core elements of everyday racism that we discuss here, as well as the experiences of our participants.
The focal point of Essed’s theorising is upon everyday manifestations of racism and racial prejudice. Simply put, *Everyday Racism* is the familiar, often small, but nevertheless significant way in which non-white people encounter racism in the ‘normal’ ordering of day-to-day interactions with dominant white groups (Henry, 2004). Whereas racism in its extreme, overt form is easily recognised, everyday racism is overlooked, undermined, easily dismissed and, more importantly, invisible “to the perpetrator and, oftentimes the recipient” (Sue, 2005, as cited in Sue et al., 2007, p. 275).

According to Essed (1991, as cited by Beagan, 2003), *Everyday Racism* is about the “inequitable practices that infiltrate everyday life and become part of what is seen as ‘normal’ by the dominant group, even in the context of formal commitment to equality” (p. 853). The concept has two constituent parts: one part says that it is about racism and the other part says that it is about the everyday. It is about the everyday because these encounters with prejudice “are not rare instances but are familiar and recurrent patterns of being devalued in varied ways and across different contexts” (Deitch et al., 2003, p. 1301). Thus, it is about the everyday manifestations and (re)production of systemic inequality based on race and/or assumptions around race, whether intended or unintended, as illustrated in the quote below:

*Sometimes, as well, I think you come across situations where you know you are much better technically than other people but yet you see them progressing much faster than you ever hoped to. And you try to find a reason for that and there is no other reason except that probably because you are not Australian or because you are not White. Some positions basically are preserved maybe for people of certain races and not for other people and probably if you are a bit of a different race, if they present you as a front to the company … I have been in situations where I do all the work and we get all the fantastic results and then it comes to the point where we have to present this to the public and then I’m pushed to the back row that nobody will even know that I contributed to that work. And it is presented as if those achievements were gained by probably my white [boss] with no mention or any reference to me at all. (Kosoko)*

As the quote above shows, everyday racism is systemic, it is “embodied in the way we ‘normally’ conduct ourselves and our business in the everyday life,” just like other forms of discrimination, such as sexism (Ng, 1992, as
cited in Leah, 1995, p. 11). In the quote above, Kosoko talks about colleagues he is technically superior to but who progress faster, showing how black professionals are underestimated and undervalued. This is similar to experiences in the United States, which Feagin and Sikes (1994), citing their interviewees, describe as blacks in companies having jobs while their white counterparts had careers. Indeed, this theme of white colleagues progressing faster than blacks was a recurring one in the data, with some respondents even citing instances where they had to teach people who were promoted over them how to do their jobs. Walagas, who worked in the Australian Public Service, put it thus: “It’s like a pyramid; the higher you go, the whiter it becomes”. Such practices, while subtle and ambiguous, “can produce a racist effect while denying racism was the cause” (Herbert et al., 2008, p. 105). Consequently, *Everyday Racism* insists that non-whites’ lived experiences of racial prejudice and racism are theoretically relevant. The notion of ‘experience’ is at the core of Essed’s (1991) conceptualisation of *Everyday Racism*; specifically, the ‘experience’ of those who encounter racism (p. 3). As Henry and Tator (2005) point out, “racist beliefs and practices, although widespread and persistent, are frequently invisible to anyone but those who suffer from them,” (p. 1) and these groups have “sophisticated knowledge about the reproduction of racism” (Hill Collins, 1992, p. 790).

*Everyday Racism* need not be ill-intentioned all the time. Indeed, in some cases the perpetrators believe they are doing good, or at least seem unaware of the implications of their actions or inactions and the source of the thinking that leads to their decision and subsequent action/inaction. The following quote is illustrative:

> We’ve had situations where people try to offer you help even though you really don’t need their help. They try … not because they’re so generous but because they feel you’re one of those who have just come in to struggle and therefore you need help from them. We get situations where neighbours will say: “Oh, we’re throwing away these things, would you like to have them?” But these are things that we don’t need. You know, if we want them we can buy. … I mean those things get me angry but now over the years, I have learnt to live with these kinds of negative comments. (Aloma, emphasis added)

In this case, everyday racism is insidiously embedded in ostensible goodness (Yancy, 2008). It is worth noting that, historically, whiteness has
defined itself via the social role of a “white saviour” (Hughey, 2014, p. 264). Consequently, it is not surprising that the respondent’s white neighbours regard themselves as socially superior to their lowly black neighbours, who deserve to be saved and uplifted from their poor socio-economic circumstances by being given second-hand items. While one can argue that racism expressed with ill-intention and that expressed without ill-intention\(^4\) are different, the fact remains that both expressions rely on the same structures of racist thoughts and feelings (Eliasoph, 1992). In addition, they all seem to elicit the same kind of response: as the respondent noted, with ‘anger’. As Essed (1988) rightly points out, “racist discrimination should not be defined in terms of the underlying motivations, but as actions with negative implications and/or consequences for Blacks both as a group and individually” (p. 6). Our interview notes for that day show that the participant was visibly distressed as he spoke about this situation of racism embedded in supposed goodness. As a high-income earner, he found it disconcerting to be viewed in that light. This situation fits well with what Young (1990) described as:

\[T\]he vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic behavior and market mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life (p. 41).

In discussing everyday racism in Australia, Stratton (2006) calls Australia a “racialised culture” and argues that there are “attitudes and understandings” that are so embedded in the everyday life of the culture that most (white) Australians, “don’t even recognise themselves as making decisions based in a racialised history” (p. 662).

Another feature of everyday racism is its covertness: subtle discriminatory behaviour “such as avoidance of Blacks, closed and unfriendly verbal or non-verbal communication, or failure to give assistance”

\[^4\] This type of racism (which constitutes everyday racism) has been referred to by others as ‘benevolent racism’, i.e., acts intended and constructed as ‘beneficial’ (and outside the realm of ‘racism’) to the racialised group but that do in fact further cement stereotypes, further discriminate and oppress the racialised group (or are at least experienced by the group as such). See, for example, Esposito, Luigi, & Romano (2014); Ramasubriamaniam & Oliver (2007).
(Deitch et al., 2003, p. 1301), behaviours that other writers have termed acts of “micro aggression” by Whites against Blacks (Pettigrew & Martin, 1987; Deitch et al., 2003; Carbado, 2007). In the excerpt below, the respondent experiences the marginalising and excluding behaviour of the perpetrators as hurtful, and the symbolism of the refusal to acknowledge her competence and experience is not lost on her:

*I have had incidents whereby I would be standing in delivery suites at the Nurses’ Desk where the girls are working and somebody will walk in. They will just walk in and just ignore me. I will be standing there and I will be the person to talk to them. They would ignore me and look around and pace up and down and come back and forth. And then if somebody comes they will ask the person — a White person maybe, I want this and they will go “Oh, Antonia [pseudonym of female nurse] is there; I think she is the person in charge. You could ask her.” ... At times, I get a bit angry inside because I think those people are undermining my experience and expertise which can be a bit frustrating.*

(Sampana)

Tuen van Dijk (2000) alludes to the discursive, subtle and symbolic nature of the ‘new racism’, which is expressed, enacted and confirmed by text and talk in everyday conversations and actions which “appear far removed from the open violence and forceful segregation of the old racism” (p. 34). Yet, as he rightly points out, these acts may be just as effective in marginalising and excluding minorities and may be even more hurtful because of the way in which they are normalised and seen as natural by those who engage in them. The quote by Sampana is poignant in its depiction of van Dijk’s point. Needless to say, such occurrences are not one-offs for either this nurse respondent or other respondents (including medical doctors), who all reported similar situations. This illustrates the idea that *Everyday Racism*, as indicated earlier, is not only about the everyday; it is also about the fact that it occurs regularly and is cumulative. Each incident is not seen in isolation but rather as part of a series of incidents that happen over time and work together to affect victims’ selves and self-negotiation in varying ways. Thus, *Everyday Racism* is not a singular act but a multidimensional experience (McNeilly et al., 1996) and, as Essed (2002) notes, “one event triggers memories of other similar incidents, of the beliefs surrounding the event, of behavioral coping and cognitive responses” (p. 207). Each instance of everyday racism is made sense of mainly in relation to the whole complex of
relations and practices that happen within the wider framework of being and living (Essed, 2002). Again, the quote below is illustrative.

"I find out there is no point for me to go to the staffroom to sit down and eat because just the way you are sitting in the staffroom, somebody walks out. Nobody wants to talk to you.... People say all kinds of things in the name of networking and people actually exclude you. I mean let me be frank with you, that is not just a perception, it is well established.... So as hard as you may try to be part of the network, you are simply excluded. You are given a cold shoulder in different and very nice subtle ways. So, at a point you will say: “what is the point trying to network?” Because I found out really nobody genuinely wants to know the truth about who you are. Nobody genuinely wants to know because knowing about who you are, commands a proper response. So therefore, it is better [for them] to remain in their own understanding of who you are and where you need to be, than to know the truth is. ..." And of course, when you want to be included and you are not included the only non-violent thing to do is to keep living in your own world. That is the only non-violent thing to do because otherwise you will violate the laws and then that precisely justifies what they have done to you. (Lasisi, emphasis added)

The quote above is revealing in the way in which the respondent makes sense of the actions of others. As insiders who share the same standpoint as our participants, we have had comparable experiences in varied ways which have ensured that, over time, we have come to acquire similar beliefs surrounding such events and understand the behavioural coping mechanism of self-segregation (Tatum, 2003) and the cognitive responses (Essed, 2002) that go with such incidents. We can therefore identify with both the point Essed makes and the narratives of our respondents. Also, Lasisi makes an important point about white colleagues not wanting to know the truth. This is what Mills (2007) describes as willful ignorance of racism or racist behaviour.

Everyday racism also has the capacity to put victims in situations where they are unable to recognise themselves (Yancy, 2008). Victims can become strangers to themselves when they are represented in ways that contradict their self-perceptions, making them unable to reconcile their knowledge of themselves with the way they are re-presented to themselves by perpetrators. In encounters where acts of racial ‘micro-aggression’ are visited upon
victims, they are usually seen and treated in ways that baffle them and they struggle to recognise themselves in/after the encounter. The quote below from Dontier highlights this point:

*I was told how lucky I was to be the only person to be interviewed for that position...I went to the interview and the head of the panel for the whole time that he was interviewing me, he wouldn’t look at me. …He wouldn’t look at my face. Anyway, I could tell from the body language that he wasn’t interested in me, or perhaps he was disappointed. He probably didn’t know I was black because he looked at my CV and said “Oh, you did your first degree at Cape Coast University, is that in South Africa? I said, “no no no, that’s not in South Africa, that’s in Ghana”. So, he probably was expecting me to be a South African White or something like that. And so, when he saw that I was black he was completely disinterested. So, I had that interview and left with not much hope. So, it didn’t surprise me when I got my interview report and he said, I could not speak English. And I thought that it was a bit of an insult because he was fully aware that we Ghanaians have grown up with English. (Dontier)*

Dontier comes from an English-speaking background where all his education was in English, and he has also completed both a Masters and a PhD in Australia. His perception of himself was that of a fluent English-speaking professional, and yet the only ‘justification’ for not giving him the job was that ‘he could not speak English’. Thus, he could not recognise himself as the one being re-presented in the interview report. Yancy (2008) narrates a different but somewhat similar encounter (in terms of outcome/consequences) with his teacher, who, in the name of counselling, told him to be realistic and seek to become a carpenter or bricklayer instead of the pilot he was striving to become. As Yancy (2008) so eloquently put it:

*He returned me to myself as something I did not recognise… The teacher did not simply return me to myself as a carpenter or a bricklayer when all along I had this image of myself as a pilot. Rather, he returned me to myself as a fixed entity; a ‘niggerised’ Black body whose epidermal logic had already foreclosed the possibility of anything other than what befitted its lowly station (pp. 67-68).*
In the case of Dontier, he was equally returned to himself (through the interview report) as an unrecognisable body, portrayed in ways that rendered him a stranger to himself. He was returned as a distorted, inferior and ludicrous body, configured through agential White-man psychology (Braithwaite, 1992), supporting Yancy’s assertion that “the ‘Black body’s ‘racial’ experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the raced white body” (2008, p. 65).

Another staging-point for everyday racism that can be gleaned from Dontier’s quote is the politics of English and how it is used as an excuse to discriminate. Research shows that ‘whiteness’ discriminates against blacks and other non-native speakers who speak English with an ‘undesirable’ accent, or blacks who speak a variation of English that does not reinforce whiteness. Nguyen (1994) for example has noted that:

> At times, employers have used claims of ‘unintelligible English’ to deny jobs to accented, but otherwise qualified, applicants. However, these claims may be mere pretense to discrimination based on national origin (p. 117).

Indeed, research shows many immigrants in English-speaking countries encounter a “barrier of accent discrimination – a closed economic door based on national origin discrimination” (Nguyen, 1994, pp. 118-119) because they do not “speak the part” (Jackson, 2011, p. 1). Furthermore, they are considered to not speak the part because they are indexed against “‘whiteness’ as an unmarked normative order” (Hill, 1998, p. 680). Dontier’s quote provides clear insight into this practice of hiding behind accent or language to practice racial discrimination.

In fact, in the United States, where Civil Rights laws prohibit discrimination against people on the basis of race or national origin, the legal system recognises that employers may use the excuse of ‘Unintelligible English’ to engage in discriminatory acts. Consequently, the Act of 1964 specifically cautions against such actions, stating that:

> Accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in many cases. It would therefore be an easy refuge in this context for an employer unlawfully discriminating against someone based on national origin to state falsely that it was not the person's national origin that caused the employment or promotion problem, but the candidate's inability to measure up to the
communications skills demanded by the job. We encourage a very searching look by the district courts at such a claim. (cited in Nguyen, 1994, p. 120)

In Australia, Manns (2015, n. p.) has noted that “accent remains fair game when it comes to racism and classism” while also rightly observing that “speakers of any number of non-standard or broad accents might have the potential to be marginalized”. Viewed within such a framework, it is justifiable to put the actions of the chair of Donnier’s interview panel and the contents of the ensuing report down to racial discrimination, and thus everyday racism.

Consequences of everyday racism

The data analysis conducted for this research revealed several themes which we have grouped together and denoted as the consequences of racism for our participants. These themes are: the burden of proof; the weight of history and historicity; the ‘constriction of experience’; and a superfluous self-examination. We discuss these themes in detail below.

The burden of proof

Our data revealed that many of our respondents live with a double-sided burden: on one hand the realisation that, irrespective of their qualifications, they are deemed incompetent, and on the other hand having to constantly work extremely hard to prove themselves competent. A number of respondents spoke about having to prove their worth and abilities on a daily basis. In their workplaces, such burdens of proof constituted their subjective everyday lived experiences; condemned as guilty by an ideological frame of reference that reduced them ontologically to the level of incompetents. For many, the consequence of being declared ‘guilty until proven innocent’, is that they believe they have to continually work harder than anyone else to defy what Yancy (2008) describes as the “fixed fantasies and distorted images” (p. xxii) projected on them through the white gaze. The quote below from Kente is illustrative:

You always have to prove to them that you are not what they think you are and you are probably better than them. So, you go out of your way to work harder than others. ...And you know I work late hours, sometimes weekends. ...Probably if I was back in Ghana,
it will be more relaxing. I wouldn’t be thinking that I have to prove to anyone that I’m good. In this case you go over and beyond what you are capable of doing to produce...As long as I live in this country I’ll have to live with it forever because you always have to prove yourself. That perception will always be there. (Kente)

The excerpt above shows that Kente believes he needs to work ‘extra hard’ (as another participant, Breda, put it) to have his competence recognised. This is not an isolated assertion, in fact it was repeated by 21 out of 24 participants and therefore cannot simply be overlooked. As noted earlier, contemporary racist practices are frequently only visible to those who suffer them and who have sophisticated knowledge about how they are reproduced (Henry & Tator 2005; Hill Collins, 1992). Indeed, as has been pointed out elsewhere, understandings and responses to racial occurrences are contextual and the culmination of a multiplicity of life experiences for those on the receiving end (Derald et al., 2007; Babacan, 2013). As Babacan (2013) rightly points out:

For minorities, a particular incident may not be the first time that similar situations had occurred. What may appear as a random event to a member of the dominant culture is a familiar and repeated experience for the person from minority culture. People from dominant cultures, while making appraisals about whether a situation or event was racist do not share these multiple experiences, and they evaluate either the incident or their own behaviours in the moment through a singular event (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). Thus, they fail to see a pattern of bias and can easily deny any form of racism or discrimination (Sue, 2005, pp. 24-25).

In the quote below, Marijata recounts similar experiences, albeit in a different employment context, but expresses concerns that are analogous to those conveyed by Kente:

*I feel like you have to, coming from African aspect in spite of the fact that someone like me I actually got my PhD in Australia, I feel that sort of muted like ‘this guy has got to prove himself a little bit more.’ If you understand what I am trying to say, which I find quite fascinating because even when people that are*
professionally below your level have been asked to come and ask you for help, they are reluctant. They will go around; they’ll go around until they find out that ‘OK there is nowhere else to go’ then they come… I will give you an example, even from my own perspective, the level at which I am now I feel I should be higher but it’s hard to, like I said, it’s almost like you have to prove yourself beyond what people of the same level have to do; I think you understand. So, there is some discrimination there. (Marijata)

From the evidence provided by these respondents it is clear that black Africans in Australia are privy to experiences that influence how they think through race and racism and that they articulate their experiences using certain structured modes of thought. They consider their experiences not as separate incidents, but as a process that demands their constant vigilance, shaping their personal, professional, and psychological lives, and provoking profoundly damaging cumulative effects (Feagin & Sikes, 1994).

**The weight of history and the burden of historicity**

The data also reveals that respondents felt they were constantly being judged on the basis of events that happened in the past—historical occurrences that were either correctly or incorrectly recorded and/or presented in the West (Fanon, 1952/2008):

*I think there is a bit of a problem with people accepting, you know, black people to manage white staff. And I say this because...You’re going to find that; many blacks do not supervise staff. Many Blacks in the Australian Public Service do not have staff that answer to them. They work by themselves and answer directly to their bosses. They do not have staff that they manage... And I think the issue is: people can’t conceptualise it; they can’t handle that concept of a black person managing, you know, white people. The history of the white man and the black man has been that the black man always has to be the underdog. And his master had to be, you know, white. I think there’s still a lot of that in the system. (Dontier)*

In essence, respondents believe they are “forced into a normative space, a historically structured and structuring space through which they are seen
and judged guilty a priori” (Yancy, 2008, p. 2). According to the respondents, the practice of racial discrimination makes them, and by extension all other black African migrants in Australia, responsible for things that they have no control over— their (black) bodies, their race and their ancestors (Fanon, 1952/2008). As Fanon (1952/2008) put it, they are made to contend with things in their past and the inauthentic ways in which they have been presented—“ethnic characteristics… tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave ships” (pp. 84-85). The following quote from Kantanka elucidates this point:

In the industries, it is really different; the discrimination and racism are not subtle. For example, they employed me as a project manager, a national project manager... Most of the managers in the industry are people who go through the ranks so it makes it very difficult. They are semi-literate academically. They are not exposed though they know their job.... well they consider terrible to them for a foreigner to come in to give them orders. So, they find that difficult to swallow for a Black person ...

Few people have told me that already, face-to-face, in my face: “You Black man; you can’t just come in here and tell us what we know. As much as you were sent here by the bureaucrats in Melbourne, we are not going to give you that cooperation you want”. .... Well they are not comfortable working for me as a Black person. One put it to me that, where I belong is in the factory. (Kantanka)

As the quotes from Dontier and Kantanka show, perceiving black Africans in such inauthentic and stereotypical ways has real consequences for them in their work places and, in some cases, reduces their chances of progress and/or receiving cooperation from colleagues. Such perceptions, and the actions or inactions they engender, indeed have negative consequences for their job-related and general wellbeing (Deitch et al., 2003). Indeed, research has revealed that there is a strong link between experiencing racism on a day-to-day basis and psychological distress, and that it can have chronic adverse effects on mental and physical health (see, for example, Yip, Gee, & Takeuchi, 2008; American Psychiatric Association, 2017).
Constriction of experience

According to Fanon (1952/2008), for “as long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion… to experience his being through others” (p. 82). However, black African migrants in Australia are not among their own, and so racism forces them to experience their being not only through others, but also in a very restrictive way. The following quote demonstrates the idea being expressed:

You just see the undertones and all that… there are times that you go to let’s say a restaurant for example, and the moment you get in everyone turns around and starts looking at you. It is as if they are saying: ‘we didn’t expect you to come here’. … They wouldn’t say it for sure but you still feel there is something that is not right. Because an Australian couple will come in and nobody will look at them the same way but you get that kind of look that it is as if they are surprised to see you there. And I think sometimes it makes you wonder… It keeps on reminding you that probably you are still not the same as anybody else which is a bit unfortunate. Because you think people will accept you for who you are and all that and give you the due respect that they will give to anyone. (Kosoko, emphasis added)

As the quote indicates, Kosoko experiences a level of uncertainty and unease at times as a result of these racial acts of ‘micro-aggression’ visited upon he and his partner’s bodies; in this instance, white peoples’ reactions when they see them (as a couple) in a restaurant. Fanon (1952/2008) aptly captures the feelings expressed by this respondent when he points out that:

In the white world, the man of color [sic] encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a third person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty (p. 83).

The black body in these contexts is constantly subjected to scrutiny by the ‘white gaze’ (Yancy, 2008), and that creates a certain self-awareness and colour-consciousness, as the following quote from Aloma demonstrates:
...we were together in Ghana... [there] we see one or two, three White people. That doesn’t influence anything. I mean we’re all Africans, this is our home; there is nothing like maybe somebody short-changing you or anything. I don’t even think of colour. I don’t see colour when I’m Ghana. No, not at all! But, here, I see it every day. (Aloma)

Aloma reveals that colour is not an issue or concern when he is in his native homeland, yet in the Australian environment he thinks of colour all the time. That statement reflects how he (and several other respondents who expressed similar sentiments) construct themselves as black Africans within the Australian context, and how colour becomes important in one context but not the other. It also shows how colour influences their thinking and being within the Australian context. The excerpts from Aloma and Kosoko point to how racism is embedded within the “embodied habitual engagement” of black Africans with their social world (Yancy, 2008, p. 230), and how it works to impact their everyday routine dealings, rendering them race/colour-conscious (Carbardo, 2007).

**Superfluous self-examination**

Yancy (2008) argues that one of the consequences of racism is the creation of a “doubleness within the Black psyche, leading to a destructive process of superfluous self-surveillance and self-interrogation” (p. 68), a situation which some of our respondents alluded to.

*Most of the challenges are actually self-imposed. They’re self-imposed in the sense that you think at the back of your mind you will be discriminated against and you go according to the perception that you have. So, you feel, I’m a professional here. I need to get my work done. I need to get promoted. I need to hold this position but then I also, that is what I feel, I also ask myself even if I’m given this position, would the people allow me to perform in this position? (Sumanguru, emphasis added)*

Oh, as a migrant some of the limitations are you always need to prove yourself. Why do I say prove yourself? To start with the colour is something ... I am not racist. I don’t believe in race, but it is still there we can’t run away from it. The race is still there. You enter a room with about ten people whose colour is different.
and once that sort of ... How do I call it? You are not frightened but that difference is always there. So it can play on you somehow. You ask yourself “Will I be accepted and how will people judge me?” But I try as much as possible not to allow it to rule me too much, but it is there. We accept the fact that it is still there. (Walagas, emphasis added)

It is worth pointing out that, despite what Sumanguru says in the first quote above, these restrictions are actually not entirely self-imposed. There is a whole history of black people’s experiences in the West that confirms the participant’s suspicion he will be discriminated against. Indeed, quotes from Dontier and Katanka in the previous section of this article actually reveal that (at least some) whites in Australia are ‘not entirely happy’ to see a black person in authority. The quote below from Aloma buttresses this point:

I know from my UK experience that a White man will never think of a Black man as a smart person so even though sometimes I do things with people here they say, “oh, this is really well done; this is a bright idea,” I just thought maybe this is just lip service; maybe at the back of their mind they are just thinking of something different. ...So, I always have that at the back of my mind when I’m dealing with these people and that is pressure in its self, you know, to an African. (Aloma, emphasis added)

The feeling expressed by Aloma in the excerpt has its basis in the fact that, historically, whiteness regards blackness as primitive, backwards and incompetent and the black body’s ‘racial’ experience has always been linked to the repressive tendencies of the raced white body (Yancy, 2008). Thus, a compliment from whites can come across as condescending, patronising or as a straightforward back-handed compliment, such as the often heard: ‘your English is good for a black person’. In essence then, as reflected in the voices of the respondents, the black body/mind becomes a battleground where a war of self-examination and questioning of one’s abilities and being is constantly waged, because, as Yancy (2008) points out, the larger anti-black racist society whispers mixed messages in the ears of black people who then “struggle to think of themselves as a possibility” (p. 68). Wetherell and Potter capture the situation most poetically when they note: “conflict may rage in the hearts and minds of ordinary women and men, but, in this case, it does not originate there” (1988, cited in Eliasoph, 1999, p. 485).
Discussion and Conclusion

The findings presented in this article highlight what can be unearthed by adopting a standpoint that treats racism as subtle, and discrimination as both ambiguous and pervasive (Deitch et al., 2003). As our data has shown, for our respondents discrimination is manifested, especially at work, in the form of subtle acts of mistreatment that they unduly experience and which have negative consequences for their job-related and non-job-related wellbeing (Deitch et al., 2003). Their lived experiential reality, for the most part, is marked by racial prejudice, racial discrimination and ‘otherness’. Our analysis has shown the subtle and yet incessant ways in which racism is both embedded and reproduced in Australian society, through discrimination and the seemingly innocuous and benevolent ways and actions of everyday life enacted in the lives of the black African ‘other’. In the words of Katanka: “there is really discrimination everywhere… it [is] in the private sector and public sector and the academic community”. Our data shows that our respondents believe that racism is pervasive in Australia and proof for them is obtainable by looking into their everyday lives.

Also, our data supports Deitch et al.’s (2003) assertion that “[n]ot only may everyday racism be more prevalent than discrimination that can be characterized as blatant and major, but its consequences for victimized individuals may be equally, if not more, profound” (p. 1315). As the excerpts have shown, respondents recounted the consequences of everyday racism as real and intense, manifesting in several ways, including: having to deal with the burden of proof; contending with the weight of history (including inauthentic representations of Africans); constraints on the ways in which they experience their being; and a superfluous self-examination which needlessly creates self-doubt. Our respondents, through the data, have shown that acts of “micro-inequities” (van Dijk, 2000, p. 34) occur frequently in their lives and are very much part of their everyday lived experiences. Moreover, these reported ‘micro-inequities’ keep recurring because Australian society and its institutions are deeply marked with ‘whiteness’ (Fordham 1988; Gould 1999) and borne out of a system built on and steeped in racism (Stratton, 2006) in which most White Australians continue to be oblivious to the racial implications of their everyday decisions, conversations and activities. This upholds the view of Derald et al. (2007) that “[t]he power of racial microaggressions lies in their invisibility to the perpetrator” (p. 275). It is reasonable to conclude that the interview excerpts reproduced in this article, which highlight everyday occurrences of these ‘micro-inequities’, represent more than just the beliefs of black Africans. They also reveal to
some extent the private beliefs and structural inequality in the Australian system—expressed in ways that affect black Africans’ lives on a daily basis—while also highlighting “the situations that create the subtle, nebulous atmosphere that Philomena Essed (1991) calls ‘everyday racism’” ( Eliasoph 1990, p. 480).

In conclusion, we have shown in this article that, for black Africans in Australia, racism/racial discrimination is very much a part of their daily lived experience and it adversely affects their lives in ways that only they can comprehend from their uniquely Black African standpoint. By adopting Everyday Racism as its conceptual framework, and centring the voices of black Africans/our respondents, this article has given them an exegetical role, rendering their experiences meaningful (Yancy, 2008, p. 66) and in the process revealed the prevalence of discrimination and racism in their lives. As reflected in the title of this article—there is discrimination everywhere. It has also revealed the impact racism has on their sense of being. Through the notion of Everyday Racism, this article has thrown light on the micro-level processes through which inequities of power based on racialised differences are experienced and perpetuated (Beagan, 2003) in Australian society. This necessitates acknowledging that, although public commentary describes many Australians as professing a commitment to the democratic principles of justice, equality, tolerance and a fair go, the lived experiential reality of black Africans is that racism continues to exert a pervasive influence on interpersonal and institutional practices, processes and interactions, socioeconomic opportunities, workplace relations and relationships, and more.

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Abstract

This article explores the term ‘African-Australian’, commonly used to describe Australians of African descent as a single homogeneous group. Even though it has been used for a long time, there has been little research into whether this generic term can properly describe African migrants and/or what people of African descent say about it. This article explores young Africans’ self-categorisation and self-identification in relation to the broader label ‘African-Australian’, against the backdrop of their ethnic or national backgrounds. A qualitative inquiry was adopted, focusing on personal accounts, narratives and the perceptions of participants. Findings suggest that while there is generalised use among participants of the label ‘African-Australian’, some participants reject it and prefer to self-identify using their respective ethno-national hyphenations, such as ‘Ethiopian-Australian’. Nonetheless, the research shows that there is a new trend emerging towards embracing a globalised black African identity crafted out of essentialised attributions of ‘Africanness’ and/or ‘blackness’.

1 This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 38th Annual AFSAAP Conference and published in the proceedings (see Gebrekidan, 2016).

2 The research underpinning this publication was undertaken while completing a PhD at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria.
Introduction

This article explores the term ‘African-Australian’, widely used in public discourse to refer to African migrants and diaspora communities in Australia. The media, local community associations and academics alike use this expression to describe and refer to African-origin black people in Australia (Nsuguba-Kyobe & Dimock, 2002; Australian Human Rights Commission [AHRC], 2010). While Australian statistical recording and the identification of ethnic groups depends on characteristic information, such as the self-perceived ethnicity, birthplace, language, ancestry and religion of individuals (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2005), public and academic discourses tend to employ the generic term ‘African-Australian’.

The term is exclusively applied to refer to people from sub-Saharan African as a whole (Nsuguba-Kyobe & Dimock, 2002) and does not include non-black immigrants originating from Northern Africa. Rather, Arabic-speaking North African migrants are technically incorporated into the Middle East (ABS, 2005), because North Africans tend to be viewed as ‘not African’ on the grounds of their race and culture, while those south of the Sahara are considered somehow ‘more African’ (Jakubowicz, 2010; Nsuguba-Kyobe & Dimock, 2002). In addition, the term excludes white migrants from African countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, who become ‘colourless’ or invisible upon migration to Australia (Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2013, p. 62).

The hyphenated term ‘African-Australian’ discursively categorises all black people of African descent as a homogeneous group. However, African migrant and diaspora groups consist of individuals of a diverse mix of ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, religious and professional backgrounds. These migrants have also entered Australia under different visa categories and programs. While many Africans, particularly those from Southern African countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, have entered Australia as professionals and skilled migrants, significant numbers from the Horn of Africa region are humanitarian migrants (Jakubowicz, 2010; Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2013). Recently, the number of Africans migrating to Australia has increased rapidly. According to the ABS, in the 2006 census the estimated number of African-born people living in Australia was 248,700, which accounted for 5.6 percent of the overseas-born population (4.4 million); this figure had increased to about 338,000 by the 2011 census (ABS, 2008 & 2012). African migrants and refugees in Australia comprised extremely diverse ethnic, national, linguistic or cultural groups. Any generalised label will not only be deceptive and distort representation but will
also have the reifying and homogenising effect of constructing black African identity as the ‘other’ (Matereke, 2009; Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2013).

Some scholars have dismissed the term ‘African-Australian’ as an inadequate, misleading and simplistic label adopted for political, bureaucratic and technical convenience “without critical attention to its relevance and impact” on African migrants (Phillips, 2011, p. 57; Ndhlovu, 2014). This umbrella term has also been criticised for ignoring internal socio-political and cultural differences and lumping the diverse ethnicities, races, cultures, experiences and migration histories of Africans into a collection of stereotypes (Jakubowicz, 2010; Mapedzahama & Kwansah-Aidoo, 2013; Ndhlovu, 2014; Zwangobani, 2012). According to Jakubowicz (2010), in Australia the whole idea of ‘African’ is tarnished by a “map of stereotypes” (p. 4), such as disease, conflict, war, poverty and famine.

The existence of these negative stereotypes has been supported by empirical research. In a social representation study in a regional town of New South Wales, Hanson-Easey and Moloney (2009) examined and compared local peoples’ attitudes and thoughts when presented with terms such as ‘refugees’, ‘refugees from Africa’ and ‘refugees from Asia’. The study found that the term ‘refugee’ when conjoined with ‘Africa’ generated a higher score on negative stereotypes than when linked with another place of origin, such as Asia (Hanson-Easey & Moloney, 2009, p. 509). According to the study, in contrast to those from Asia, refugees from Africa were characteristically associated with negative images such as hunger, blackness, disease and sadness.

Further, mainstream media portrayals of youth offending and ‘African youth gangs’ are strongly condemned by multicultural groups and African migrant community agents for their biased, racist and sensationalist news reporting, and their simplistic generalisations based on single cases (Windle, 2008; Reiner, 2010). While Reiner (2010) warned that the term ‘African’ should be carefully examined, research by Windle (2008) indicated that media representations have gone to the extent of presenting the story of the entirety of African migrants as a story of one ethnic group, in which “Sudanese is often used to cover all ‘black’ refugees” (Windle, 2008, p. 554). European migrants such as the Irish, Italians, Greeks or Germans are rarely subjected to a continental designation such as ‘European-Australian’ (Phillips, 2011). Why, then, are Africans and African migrants defined and perceived in such a generalised way? Where do these generalisations originate?
One of the central problems with the generic view of Africans relates to the fundamental question of how and in what context one defines ‘Africa’ and by extension ‘African identity’. As far as collectivist interpretations are concerned, any knowledge of and information about ‘African’ people and ‘African identity’ is questionable across practical, theoretical and analytical levels. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2006) offers a compelling analysis of the ontological and epistemological limitations and problematics of defining Africa, because:

Africa is exceedingly difficult to define...the idea of “Africa” is a complex one with multiple genealogies and meanings, so that extrapolations of “African” culture, identity or nationality, in the singular or plural, any explorations of what makes “Africa” “African,” are often quite slippery as these notions tend to swing unsteadily between the poles of essentialism and contingency. (p. 14)

As stated by Zeleza, the problem of defining Africa is multifaceted and permeated with theoretical, historical, political and pragmatic considerations of what defines Africa and what makes Africans ‘African’. In the view of the western world and western scholars, the idea of being ‘African’ is characteristically framed by essentialist discourses of ‘Africa’ as referring to either the sub-Saharan African region or the black Africans inhabiting this region. This offers a racialised view of Africa, or Africa-as-biology, confined to representing sub-Saharan Africans as the pristine locus of the real Africa (Zeleza, 2006). The conflation of a geographic region with black Africans encodes racial identities into geographical representations, from which ‘African’ is interpreted through direct reference to skin colour.

In the global diaspora, it has become the conventional practice that African migrants are homogeneously identified by names such as ‘African-Americans’, ‘African-Canadians’, or ‘African-Australians’ in their respective destination countries. The primary factor used to bind all Africans together is one of biological (racial) rather than cultural or social similarity (Zeleza, 2006; Tettey & Puplampu, 2005). In most cases, ‘Africanness’ is perceived in the essentialised context of ‘Blackness’.

In the US, studies show that the term ‘African-American’ was introduced by social activist Jesse Jackson in the 1990s as an alternative to the previously used pejorative terms ‘black’, ‘negro’ and ‘people of colour’ (Martin, 1991; Smith, 1992; Neal, 2001). In the view of Martin (1991), Jackson’s introduction of the hyphenated identity was intended to renew social
solidarity among black Americans while at the same time reconnecting them to their motherland, Africa. The campaign for the use of this term was meant to increase racial consciousness by redefining ‘black’ in terms of pan-African ethnicity. Changes and developments in the lexical preferences of black Americans reflect different sociocultural and symbolic significances for Africans in and outside of the US by building a sense of solidarity with each other and connection with their motherland, Africa.

Terms such as ‘Black American’ or ‘African American’ have a historical significance that dates back to the 17th-century transatlantic slave trade. The slave trade caused not only the forced migration of millions of Africans, but also constructed racialised ‘Africa’ and the subsequent formation of an African diaspora through which ‘African’ became racialised as a collective identity (Zeleza, 2006, Espiritu, 2011). Africans migrated to America not as ‘black’ or ‘African’ but as distinct members of various ethnic populations (Espiritu, 2011). In America, in addition to their ethnic or national identities, they are identified by the pan-ethnic label African-American. Espiritu (2011) defines pan-ethnic groups as politico-cultural collectivities made up of people of several tribal or national origins. It is a macroscopic concept that contains numerous ethnic and subethnic groups and nationalities, which are internally diverse, yet externally presumed to be homogenous. Pan-ethnic labels such as African-American, Asian-American, and Latino-American etc. are products of imposed categorisation that lump together diverse peoples into an enlarged “ethnic framework” (Espiritu, 2011, p. 6).

A similar trend has appeared in Australia wherein ‘African-Australian’ is applied to describe all black African migrants. However, compared to black Americans, African migrants in Australia have completely different histories and migratory journeys. Most have come as refugees and humanitarian entrants or skilled migrants over the past three decades. As a result, it may be less appropriate to adopt a similar designation such as ‘African-Australian’. However, practical usage of the term seems to have a wide popularity in public discourse, political rhetoric, newspaper reporting and research. How do African migrants themselves react to this generic term? Is the hyphenated identity preferred by all black Africans in Australia? This article seeks to unpack the explanatory power of a pan-African ethnicity in view of Horn of Africa background youth in Australia.

Methodology

This article utilises data collected for my doctoral research, which explores sense of identity, belonging and social inclusion among Horn of
Africa background youth who were born or raised in Australia and live in Melbourne. Data for the study were collected through ethnographic observations and qualitative interviewing which focused on a range of thematic areas including knowledge of ethnic or national origins, self-identification, family connections and transnational ties. The term ‘African-Australian’ emerged as one identity category used by participants to describe themselves.

This article focuses on the interview data and investigates what the term ‘African-Australian’ means for these young people, and how they understand and react to the collective identity used to refer to all black African migrants in Australia. A total of 18 young people (male=12, female=6, aged 18 to 25)—13 from a Horn of Africa background (9 Ethiopians, 3 Eritreans, 1 Djiboutian) and five of South Sudanese origin—participated in one-on-one, in-depth interviews. Initially, potential participants were recruited through purposive sampling, with the help of key informants from the target migrant groups. Further participants were then recruited through the referral chain (snowball) method, based on the personal networks of interviewees (Bryman, 2012). In qualitative research, sampling revolves around the notion of purposive sampling, as the researcher selects participants in a strategic way so that samples are relevant to the research (Bryman, 2012). Characteristically, a majority of participants displayed a blend of ancestral cultural identities and Australian values and lifestyles.

Interviews were conducted in English in open and safe spaces arranged in agreement with participants. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim, with each recording ranging from 60 to 90 minutes. Data collection took place between May and December 2015. Thematic analysis was employed, involving a thorough reading of transcripts and the systematic coding of key ideas into themes and subthemes (Bryman, 2012). Participants’ knowledge, perceptions and acceptance or rejection of the term ‘African-Australian’ was thematically indexed into the broader African-Australian identity. To ensure confidentiality, each participant was coded as PT followed by a sequence number (for example, PT5 means participant 5). Ethics approval was obtained from the La Trobe University Human Research Ethics Committee.

### Analysis and Discussion

Analysis of the participants’ stories and narratives uncovered complex feelings around the concept of being ‘African’ and identifying and being identified as ‘African-Australian’. While participants defined and interpreted
the term in numerous ways, two competing arguments dominated the interpretations. On the one hand, participants’ views suggested that pan-African ethnicity served as an organising tool by bringing together diverse ethno-cultural groups in pursuit of a common goal. The unifying power of being ‘African’ principally stems from the essentialised interpretation of continental Africa as one based on racial similarity, and the minority position African migrants occupy as a group. Other participants challenged the logical validity of the term, arguing that though there is a sense in which Africans are racially homogeneous, African migrants as a whole are also extremely heterogeneous and encompass diverse cultural, ethnic, linguistic and national backgrounds. In the view of these participants, using the generic name is meaningless because it does not express the diversity of Africans in Australia. Those who opposed the term preferred to self-identify or identified by others in terms of the narrower ethnic or national origin of their parents. These competing views are outlined in the following sections.

‘African-Australian’: Its Meaning and Explanatory Power

As stated earlier, African refugees and migrants in the global diaspora are often collectively identified by generic labels such as African-American, or African-Canadian, in their respective destinations (Smith, 1992; Tettey & Paplampu, 2005). ‘African-Australian’ has become an equivalent designation. These kinds of umbrella names derive either from above, through bureaucratic and political practices of classification undertaken by the state, or from below, in ordinary conversations, social interactions and informal ways of naming by the dominant society.

According to participants in this study, the all-encompassing, pan-ethnic designation ‘African-Australian’ is emerging as a common descriptor for all black Africans in Australia. ‘African’ is referentially defined as a core identity that embraces all black émigrés from Africa. In this sense, the hyphenated term refers to someone who has a darker complexion, presumed to have African descent, and lives in Australia. It shows a random association between ‘black’ and ‘African’, which can be real or imagined. According to participants, the ‘African personality’ and ‘African identity’ are things automatically ascribed to all black people of African origin by mainstream Australians. Some members of African migrant communities accept this automatically ascribed ‘African-Australian’ identity and subscribe to it by using that label in their immediate self-identification. The following comments illustrate this racially invoked interpretation of the term.
To me it will probably just means someone who is dark skin and that lives in Australia that is what it is. (PT17)

So, I say I am African-Australian but when I mean African, I am Australian, you got the sense? I like to say I am global citizen if there is such a thing but you know, at the moment in Australia, I say I am African-Australian. What does that mean? You know, just somebody who is African descent that is born in Australia or lived here long enough to become citizen of the nation. So but besides that in terms of culture, you know, I am African. So I have accepted that, you know, I don’t think Australia has such a culture, like, nobody knows what Australian culture is. So we accept Australian values but it is important we keep our culture and those two together and form that African-Australian identity. (PT5)

I identify as an Oromo living in Australia even though technically my nationality is Australian. On top of that I would identify, in terms of my racialised identity as a black person living in Australia and a black person also living in the global context of diaspora but not really in my immediate identification do I use the word Australian or identify as Australian. (PT3)

The above reflections show that, as an identity category, ‘African-Australian’ is connotatively understood and interpreted as a racial category—an identity category that stems from one’s ascribed membership to the black human race. As used in everyday discourse and interactions, its meaning hinges upon the archaic equation of ‘Africanness’ with ‘blackness’, from which racialised pan-African identity is constructed (Tettey & Puplampu, 2005). Expressions such as “I would identify, in terms of my racialised identity, as a black person living in Australia” (PT3), become common ground shared by all Africans as members of the black human race. It is a common identity, a point of connection for all black Africans across the world, regardless of location, nationality or ethnicity. This racialised identity is something that binds all black Africans together as a group, and in this regard, being ‘African-Australian’ serves as a link to broader global black African identity (this will be discussed further below). This is an extrapolated identity derived from a generalised view of continental Africa based on people’s physical appearances. As Zeleza (2006) stated, equating Africa with the geographical region of sub-Saharan Africa discursively defines Africa as
biology, as the continent of black people. Racialised and essentialist understandings of ‘African identity’ give rise to the danger of encoding identity onto the biological trait of skin pigmentation, and often mistakenly conflate ‘Africanness’ and ‘blackness’.

**African Identity, Commonality and the Problem of Othering**

Participants reported that the designation ‘African-Australian’ also fostered a spirit of commonality among African migrants in Australia, based on shared problems and experiences. It provides a sense of commonality, social harmony and solidarity that Africans share with each other simply because they are all from the same continent and have common problems and issues. Several participants believed that the expression ‘African-Australian’ describes the broader, macroscopic ideological constructs of pan-African ethnicity that glues together all black African migrants in Australia. For reasons of commonality, they affirmed their affiliation and allegiance to that broader naming. This idea of shared commonality is revealed in the following short discussion with female participant PT15:

*Interviewer:* African-background people are somehow identified as one group like ‘African-Australians’. Are you aware of that term? Does it make sense for you?

*PT15:* Yes, yes because the issues that Ethiopians face here are the issues that most Africans here face too. So in terms of community spirit and this kind of collective idea, yes I really like that term and probably I am very comfortable with that term because I think it encompasses a lot of the issues and a lot of the identity issues that come up with coming from migrant background. So yeah I am comfortable with that term.

Participants also pointed out that having links to two cultural worldviews—‘African’ and ‘Australian’—provided the advantage of intercultural mixing in their immediate social milieus. It implies hybrid identities in that the young people incorporate and assimilate identities based on their African heritages and Australian experiences and can mediate and negotiate between the two. This idea was echoed by PT11, who confidently claimed that the hyphenation can describe his identity as follows:

*Yeah, definitely, it describes me ‘African-Australian’, you know, just having that, and I have the mixture, so definitely yeah. I have*
also friends that are Africans but most of their identity rule is ruled by Australian, about Australian culture, so I would identify them just as Australian, but for me I have the mixture of two, I can be African-Australian... that is how I see it, having a mixture of both cultures. So being able to connect with both at whatever time you need to. So if you go to an Australian event, you will be able to fit in easily, know how to speak the language, and just know how to do the activities, the same thing with the African cultures. (PT11)

The above account indicates the great flexibility and situational variability, in which young people can identify themselves as both ‘African’ and ‘Australian’. Similarly to PT11, other participants also believed that being identified by the hyphenated term provided advantages when interacting in and navigating the different social and cultural worlds of ‘African’ and ‘Australian’. In this regard, the hyphenated term ‘African-Australian’ has the advantage of forging social solidarity, a spirit of community and cultural unity among the black African population in Australia by fostering an ‘African identity’ embedded in a shared commonality as refugees, or migrants, and Africans.

Another significant point reported by participants relates to the hierarchical nature of identity. It shows the priority one gives to her ‘African heritage’ first, with ‘Australian’ as a secondary option. In the view of the participants, the prefix ‘African’ implies the notion of having an ‘African identity’ first and ‘Australian identity’ second. For this reason, the hyphenated phrase is preferred as an alternative identity category. A comment by one interviewee, PT10, points out this reality:

*I like it, it is good, I like it because it is true we are Africans first, Australian second. Everybody should have something before Australia besides Aboriginals. The only people to be called ‘Australians’ are obviously Aboriginals because they are natives, you know. Like, yeah I like it, it is good name. I don’t mind if they call me African first, that is what I am, and then Australian second, I am Australian too because I live here now...even if, like I don’t know why they say that but it is true, I am African first, Australian second. But if they call me that, they have to call themselves something else like, England first, Australian second, England-Australian, you know what I am saying? Unless they are*
Aboriginals that is the only way I can approve right now, to be honest. (PT 10)

In part, justifications for ranking ‘African identity’ first and ‘Australian’ second relate to the contested argument around what constitutes ‘true Australian’ identity. It signals a competing mindset among young people, such as that articulated by PT10 when he stated, “if they call us ‘African-Australian’, then they have to call themselves like European-Australian”. As indicated in the above comment by PT10 and those of other interviewees, Aborigines are the only people who can be seen as ‘true Australians’. As far as these young people are concerned, all Australians except Aborigines are immigrants and thus should be identified by some form of hyphenated identity. However, participants’ narratives always referentially indicated that ‘Australianness’ had a predominant core of ‘whiteness’, notably associated with Anglo-Saxons or Europeans. All other migrant groups are implicitly relegated to hyphenated ethnic categories. ‘Who is Australian?’ has been a highly problematic question, complicated by dominant perspectives of allegiance to British heritage and, for black African migrants, how Australianness has been redefined in confrontation with the ‘African other’ (Matereke, 2009). It is perhaps for this reason that none of the young people referred to or preferred ‘Australian’ as their first identity category—although they admittedly acknowledge their national identity as ‘Australian’. The comments below by PT15 highlight the predominance of ‘whiteness’ as follows:

Interviewer: Why do you need to have an affiliation like ‘African-Australian’, why not just ‘Australian’?

PT15: Because this country makes you feel that if you are not white and blonde hair, blue eyed, you are not Australian. So papers mean nothing.

Therefore, when it comes to subjective self-identification, ‘Australian’ identity seems to be confined to citizenship status. Without further division into smaller categories (national, ethnic or subethnic levels), ‘African’ always comes first in the identity hierarchy.

The data also indicate that one of the problems associated with the hyphenated identification is the issue of social recognition and acceptance of Africans as full Australians. Some participants commented that it made them
less than being ‘fully Australian’, an idea explicitly illustrated by one of the interviewees as follows:

I guess it can describe me but at the same time it won’t make me 100 percent Australian, not 100 percent but it won’t make me accepted or whatever as to what is happening, it won’t make me fully like everybody else. So if they say ‘you are African Australian’, that is how I will be seen ‘African Australian’, not ‘Australian’, you know what I mean? So it can be good and it can be bad…for example, bad as in not seen as equal, you know what I mean? Like I am not equal as everybody else; and good as in, you know, I can still hold on my culture and my heritage. So I can have that will to say ‘yes I am African’, ‘yes I am Australian’ together (PT12)

Indeed, one of the criticisms of hyphenated identities such as ‘African-Australian’, ‘African-American’, ‘African-Canadian’, etc. relates to the problem of divided loyalty suggested by such naming. In the US, hyphenated identities such as ‘African-American’ have traditionally been regarded as symbols of divided loyalty, in which groups are seen, at best, as less than 100 percent American and, at worst, as traitors to their adoptive homeland (Thernstrom, 1980, cited in Smith, 1992, p. 508). Smith (1992) also suggested that such hyphenations may encourage white racists to urge that blacks be ‘sent back’ to Africa. Likewise, research among African-Canadians in Canada indicates that one effect of hyphenated labels resides in perpetuating the perception of the “eternal immigrant”, in which African migrants are not seen as ‘real’ Canadians by mainstream society but are rather viewed as temporary residents or “over-stayers” who ought to go back to where they came from (Tettey & Puplampu, 2005, p. 41). A similar idea is reflected in this study. Some participants highlighted that hyphenated labels are subtle and systematic reminders of one’s position in the citizenship hierarchy. PT14 poignantly illustrated this purpose of hyphenations as follows:

African-Australian? It means a second migrant, basically a second citizen, you are not the first that is what it means to me. Yes, I am proud to be African, I am proud of my ethnic group, I am proud to be black, but I know this country is not meant, you know. I am just here to dwell basically, that is how I feel, it could be different for other people. Obviously, if you are black, you are
always African-Australian. For example, we have African-Americans, they are not called Americans; they are called African-Americans why? Because they come from Africa, you know, that is how it is. (PT14)

In the long run, being defined, labelled and identified by hyphenated names such as ‘African-Australian’ contributes to systematic exclusion, marginalisation and othering. It prospectively perpetuates the problem of being seen as an “eternal immigrant” (Tettey & Puplampu, 2005, p. 41) or a second-class citizen and, thus, systematically excluded from full membership in mainstream society and discriminated against. Previous studies have shown that, in Australia, African-descent people are rarely considered to be full members of the Australian nation, by virtue of their sociocultural and racial backgrounds, and because their “blackness is associated with a refugee status and being an outsider” (Hatoss, 2012, p. 65; Ndhlovu, 2014).

“They Don’t have to Say Black”: Resistance to Racialised Labelling

Conventional representations of names and naming involve an act of political practice that holds significant power and imagery (Martin, 1991). As a racial representation, the term ‘black’ carries a controversial meaning that potentially implies positive as well as negative connotations. Not surprisingly, none of the respondents apparently viewed ‘black’ as an alternative preference, although many of them expressed pride in their skin colour. In other words, ‘black’ is generally considered by participants as an offensive, racist, obsolete and outmoded word as elaborated by PT10 below:


PT10: They call us ‘Black African’?

Interviewer: How about that kind of term? That term itself?

PT10: They don’t have to say black. If they just say ‘African-Australian’ that is cool. If they say ‘black African-Australian’ then they are trying to be racist.
In a similar vein, PT13 reiterated her comments, emphasising the underlying stereotypic meanings of both ‘black’ and ‘African-Australian’ as being the same.

_They don’t use ‘black’ now, it is considered racist; but they just say ‘African’. I think it is a way of saying ‘black’, ‘African’ is a way of saying you are ‘Black Australian’. I think that is what it means and sometimes I feel that is what they are saying but it is a lot nicer to say ‘African’ than saying ‘Black Australian’, a kind of an insult when someone says ‘Black Australian’; they shouldn’t identify them with the colour._ (PT13)

A recent study in the US found that the term ‘black’ carried more negative stereotypes than the term ‘African-American’ (Hall, Phillips, & Townsend, 2015). Being identified as ‘black’ signalled a more negative stereotype, higher discrimination and lower socioeconomic status than ‘African-American’, which reflected a comparatively better social position, fewer stereotypes and positive emotional tones.

In another instance, participants pointed out the conceptual and logical limitations of ‘African-Australian’ as designating a collective identity. Some of the participants explicitly rejected this generic name because of its flawed epistemology. They pointed out that Africa is a continent, not a country by which someone can be identified. It is meaningless to identify someone as ‘African-Australian’ because it does not denote the person’s ethnicity, race, culture, nor his or her national background and affiliations. For this reason, participants preferred more specific ethnic or nationality markers, such as ‘Ethiopian-Australian’, ‘South Sudanese-Australian’ etc., which convey their genuine social identity categories and ancestral origins. Using ethnicity-based hyphenations allows for the recognition of all the family histories, cultural norms, traditions, routine practices and systems of beliefs that define and embody their cultural identities and relationships. In the following transcripts, PT13 and PT16 plainly illustrate the meaninglessness of using the broader label ‘African-Australian’ as an identity marker.

_Interviewer: What do you feel about this term ‘African-Australian’, do you think it can describe you?_

_PT13: It doesn’t make sense to me but I don’t know, for some reason I have learned to accept that, I don’t know why because it should be like Africa is a big continent, so it is not a country_
someone should have been classified as African. I would definitely love to be identified as ‘Ethiopian-Australian’ because that is my country.

PT16: No I am not African-Australian, I am Ethiopian-Australian like Africa, as I said before, it is not a country, like yeah I am black but my culture is not African because Africa has many cultures, even Ethiopia has many cultures. So like it can describe me but it can’t really, really describe me because it is not me. I am not even like I am Australian citizen but yeah, I don’t think it can describe me, you can use it but it doesn’t describe Africans, African-Australian, it doesn’t, I don’t think.

From the above comments, we can observe that, as a collective name, ‘African-Australian’ by itself is an inadequate concept to bring together diverse ethnic groups based on some form of common identity or culture. As a universal racial identity attuned to all African migrants, ‘blackness’ has more unifying power than ‘African-Australian’. Therefore, the idea of being ‘African’ or, more broadly, ‘African-Australian’ is something arbitrarily imposed by mainstream society. This externally imposed pan-African ethnic term straddles the boundary between acceptance and rejection among the African-descent youth interviewed for this study.

Towards Institutionalising ‘Black African Culture’ in Australia

Another issue that emerged from this study relates to the idea of building ‘Black African culture’ in Australia. This idea is part of the process of and a reflection of the need to strengthen intergroup relationships and interactions among the diverse ethnic groups in African migrant communities. Some participants gave an insight into the importance of establishing ‘Black African culture’ in Australia to represent the shared life situations and experiences of Africans. Regarding this enthusiasm for forming ‘Black African culture’, PT3 provided her thoughts as follows:

Black people in Australia, Black Africans specifically in Australian, it’s gonna take a long, long time before we establish or we cultivate some kind of Black African culture that is ours, that is not something that is just middle ground between Australian and African ethnic identity but something that is substantial, like something not similar to but I guess the idea
comes from African-American, or Afro-European, or Afro-Peruvian or Afro-Latino these cultures that are actually developed over time. We haven’t been here very long to do that. (PT3)

The comments by PT3 and others highlight that the type of ‘Black African culture’ they are seeking or hoping for others to form in Australia is influenced by African migrants in the US, Europe, Canada and elsewhere. An earlier study among African-background youth in Canberra observed a similar trend of establishing a pan-African youth culture (Zwangobani, 2008). Zwangobani found that pan-Africanism, diaspora and national identities play significant roles in framing and shaping ‘African-Australian’ youth subculture. According to Zwangobani (2008) these young people aspire to create a ‘Black African subculture’ that reflects their own identity and culture in the multicultural spaces of Australia.

The impact of black American youth subcultures on the everyday lifestyles of these young people can be witnessed in their strong preferences for and selective consumption of black American musical genres. Numerous participants reported black musical genres, such as hip-hop, R&B, reggae and soul, as their favourites because these musical genres contain powerful messages that bring together and unite all Africans. The following excerpts from PT4 and PT9 illustrate this idea:

I like the old school hip-hop because of the message it has, and I love also old school soul, and old boys about 60s through to the 80s. I just like the messages that they give and the way that music was sent around to different struggles, and the way that they expressed it differently, like soul is different to rap or hip-hop. They are all kind of trying to do something with it rather than mainstream music. I feel like music serves a high purpose in things like hip-hop, and soul. (PT4)

My choice is hip-hop music, I am addicted to hip-hop music because I listen to hip-hop every day actually. Hip-hop is my everyday music. I think the reason why I am addicted to hip-hop music is that you know a lot of hip-hop music artists are black because if you are black, you follow your like background. So I think that is why I am addicted to hip-hop. (PT9)
From this we can understand that participants’ preferences for and subscription to Black American pop culture, particularly its music genres, serves as a way of appreciating, supporting and strengthening affiliations with the global ‘black African youth culture’. Part of this process of producing ‘African-Australian’ pop culture has already shown significant progress due to the work of some self-initiating young African pioneers (Zwangobani, 2008; Hendrie, 2011). Journalist Doug Hendrie (2011) wrote that African-Australian rappers and artists have emerged and gained wider recognition and popularity by bringing an African-approach to Australian hip-hop culture. Zwangobani (2008) stated that black American hip-hop culture has had a particularly large influence in shaping emerging black African culture in Australia, mentioning the Canberra-based local community arts organisation known as Kulture Break as an example of the emerging trend of ‘black African culture’ in Australia.

**Conclusion**

This article has explored the emerging terminological label ‘African-Australian’, commonly used to refer to African-background black people in Australia. Conceptual and empirical research in this article shows that the continental designation is imaginatively constructed in a way that homogenises Africa and Africans based on a presumed racial, ethnic and cultural uniformity. The everyday usage of the term implies the idea of ‘Africa as the land of black people’. Findings from this study indicate that ‘African-Australian’ has broader application, encompassing all black migrants and refugees originating from Africa. Although most of the participants interviewed for my doctoral research proudly self-identified as being black and Australian of African descent, neither the pan-African ethnic designation ‘African-Australian’ nor the more pronounced racial epithet ‘black’ is a favoured identity category for all. A majority of participants rejected the word ‘black’, stating that it entails a pejorative meaning, particularly when used by white people. There was a general use among participants of the alternative label ‘African-Australian’ in preference to ‘black’. For the immediate purpose of self-identification and categorisation, participants chose to self-identify in terms of the more informative national, ethnic, or country origin of their parents, for example as ‘Ethiopian-Australian’, ‘South Sudanese-Australian’ and so on. Proclivities toward narrower hyphenations maintain ethno-cultural, linguistic and ancestral roots and identities by bridging and assimilating these with experiences in Australia.
It was also found that a common African identity and a sense of oneness and unity among Africans has been promoted and encouraged, the manifestation of which included institutionalising ‘black African culture’ that fits the contexts of Africans in Australia. As a tool for mediating cross-cultural and transnational realities and building social solidarity and unity among minority black African migrants and refugees in Australia, participants accepted the pan-ethnic subtype ‘African-Australian’. In this context, the unifying power of being ‘African’ principally stems from essentialised understandings of continental Africa, and the disadvantaged social, cultural, economic, political positions that Africans occupy in wider Australian society. On the other hand, participants also pointed out the marginalising effects of being collectively identified as ‘African-Australian’. They pointed out the problem of ‘othering’ and being always seen as immigrants, which downgrades their status to second-class citizens. In the view of participants, it is unlikely that an African-background person would be considered a genuine ‘Australian’, which affects both their sense of belonging and acceptance as full members of the Australian society. Therefore, generalised labels have not only homogenising effects—by reconstructing, recreating and sustaining uniformity and commonality—but also the negative outcomes of marginalisation and othering.

In conclusion, the term ‘African-Australian’ is certainly an identity in the making, generally applied to refer to Australian citizens of African descent; however, in the view of this study’s participants, the explanatory power of the pan-African ethnic label straddles the boundary between acceptance and rejection. Further research is suggested, perhaps with a larger sample size and more participants from African migrant groups in order to determine the label’s appropriateness and impacts on the people being labelled.

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Africa ‘Pretty Underdone’: 2017 Submissions to the DFAT White Paper and Senate Inquiry

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Introduction

Public discussion of Africa in Australia is hard to find. This paper is devoted to examining views on Africa as reflected in published submissions to the Federal Government. It focusses on two sets of 2017 submissions: to the Foreign Policy White Paper process and to the Senate Inquiry into Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationships with the Countries of Africa. In 2015 Gai Brodtmann (Member for Canberra in the House of Representatives) represented the Opposition at the second Australia-Africa Dialogue held in Zambia. She concluded that the Dialogue highlighted the fact that, “apart from mining, the relationship between Australia and the nations of Africa is pretty underdone.” Brodtmann’s view reflected Recommendation 5.3 of the 1997 Report of Committee of Review of the Australian Overseas Aid Program: South Asia and Africa were of lower priority than Papua New Guinea, the Pacific Islands and East Asia (AusAID, 1997:14). In 1996 the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade had produced a 164 page report on Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa following some 73 submissions, and promoting 42 recommendations. Some of these were not implemented. For example, no. 26 that “Australia reaffirms its commitment to the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for official development purposes”. Another apparent non-starter, no 41, concerned the creation of a Centre for African Studies in Western Australia. A similar
recommendation for an African Studies Centre, location unspecified, in 2011 was also ignored.

A decade later in 2017 the Department of Foreign Affairs asked for public submissions for a White Paper which would “provide a roadmap for advancing and protecting Australia’s international interests and define how we engage with the world in the years ahead” and would “define our economic, security and foreign policy interests and examine global trends”. Suggested topics included which countries would be the most important to Australia over the next 10 years; what steps should be taken to maximize Australia’s trade and role in the global economy and how government could best work in this area with non-government players including business, universities, and NGOs. Over 9,200 submissions were received but they were overwhelmingly campaign submissions (submissions were treated as campaign submissions where “five or more submissions used similar Language to discuss the same issues”). Excluding the campaign submissions this left around 600 submissions which were published on the Foreign Policy White Paper website (NB - It is not possible to provide a direct link to individual submissions to this Parliamentary Inquiry. It is necessary to go to the inquiry webpage and open up the submissions list – See Commonwealth of Australia, 2017a).

The vast majority of the Campaign Submissions were from the Campaign for Australian Aid which argued for a number of humanitarian causes including more aid. The tiny remainder concerned Commonwealth freedom of movement; recognition of Macedonia and removal of aid funding for abortion. The majority of submissions were from private individuals including many academics and medical workers. There were also roughly as many submissions from peace organizations as from business groups. Using a basic word search, this paper puts these submissions into two broad categories: those which mentioned Africa and those which did not. It is revealed that around one-third of submissions contained the word ‘Africa’. However, almost all of these also contained the word ‘Asia’.

Many of the remaining two-thirds focused on the Asia-Pacific, often known as ‘our region’. Some submissions writers gave the impression that the White Paper was only to be about the Asia-Pacific Region, interestingly this was re-badged (and re-defined) in the eventual report as the Indo-Pacific. However, some organisations with strong African connections did not mention Africa in their submissions. Examples include: Amnesty International Australia which obviously has substantial interests in Africa; The Australian National University which received millions for training African students, but whose submission appears to have been written from

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the perspective of the ANU College of Asian and Pacific Studies (since other regions of the world are not as well represented in their structure); The Overseas Development Institute which received $773,000 from AusAID for research in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Apart from the ANU submission signed by the Vice-Chancellor, there was also a submission from the ANU’s Development Policy Centre which, apart from general discussions on aid, included two papers on the Pacific relating to Australia’s unique role in the region and promoting Pacific labour mobility. Submissions from other Australian universities either focused on higher education as an export industry or came from specialized areas promoting human rights or other humanitarian causes.

Some submission writers gave the impression that the White Paper was only about the Asia-Pacific region. Interestingly this was re-badged (and re-defined?) in the report as the Indo-Pacific. Although several submissions refer to ‘our region’ meaning the Asia-Pacific, the report itself uses the term Indo-Pacific defined as ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, and including India, North Asia and the United States.

In its White Paper submission the Australia Africa Chamber of Commerce “The Australia Africa Chamber of Commerce, the AACC states that it is a national organisation that is dedicated to facilitating trade with Africa, by providing the very best quality research, networking events and business matching services between Australia and Africa.” Yet it did not make a submission to the Senate Inquiry on Trade (see below). It also puts emphasis on how Australia can benefit from the African diaspora. There were a number of submissions specifically from organizations representing multiple diaspora groups. The Diaspora Learning Network argued that Australia should reengage with Africa particularly Eastern and Southern Africa whilst the Australia-Zimbabwe group put the case for involving diaspora members more generally. Joel Negin from the University of Sydney’s School of Public Health, notes the decline in Australian aid to Africa in his submission, but argues that such aid can only have limited impact. Instead he recommends a strategy based on trade and engagement.

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Opportunity, Security, Strength

Following on from these submissions, the first comprehensive review of Australia’s international engagement for fourteen years as embodied in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper barely mentions Africa. There are just 9 mentions in total, of which only 4 have any substantive content. Thus there
are two references to population growth; one to the risks associated with fragile states “in parts of the Middle East and Africa, affecting Australia’s security interests through terrorism and irregular migration” and one to the fact that Africa’s 54 countries are important to Australia’s achieving our objectives in the multilateral system (DFAT, 2017: 31, 33, 81). The longest reference is:

The Government is also working to expand and diversify commercial links with Africa. Africa’s population of 1.2 billion will double by 2050 and its growing urban middle class is creating new demands for goods and services. Africa is already a major overseas market for our mining services.

Overall the White Paper strongly gives the impression that submissions had minimal if any impact on the drafting of the White Paper which reflects the DFAT agenda to the point where one can wonder what effect a change of minister or even a change of government would have. Senator Linda Reynolds’ belief that the White Paper would be “the perfect place to start addressing a renewed relationship with countries on the African continent” through economic diplomacy was not to be proved prescient (Parliament of Australia, 2017).

As confirmed by Prime Minister Turnbull, in a joint media release with the Foreign Affairs Minister, and the Minister for Trade, the fundamental objectives of the White paper are to:

- Work to keep our Indo-Pacific region secure, open and prosperous
- Maximize opportunities for Australian businesses and workers by fighting protectionism…..
- Ensure Australians remain safe, secure and free in the face of threats like terrorism;
- Promote a world with fair rules and strong cooperation to ensure the rights of all states are respected; and
- Increased support for a more stable and prosperous Pacific” (Foreign Minister, 2017b).

In examining just how these objectives are to be achieved, ‘stepping up’ to the Pacific, including a new Australian Pacific Security College looms large as does work with ASEAN and a new strategic partnership with Vietnam. There is an entire chapter devoted to ‘A shared agenda for security and prosperity’ which covers ‘An enduring partnership with Papua New
Guinea’; ‘Stepping up our engagement in the Pacific’; ‘Bilateral and regional partnerships in the Pacific’ and ‘Supporting Timor Leste’ (DFAT, 2017: Chapter 7). Thus, despite the claim that “Australia is a regional power with global interests”, Timor Leste merits more attention than the whole African continent.

The one initiative with likely relevance to Africa is “a new civilian deployment program, ‘Australia Assists’, which will deploy over 100 humanitarian specialists each year to countries and communities affected by disasters.”

Nigeria specifically gets a brief mention in the multilateral context. “Australia will support reforms that give new and emerging powers a greater role in the international system. Some change to institutions and patterns of global cooperation is inevitable, necessary and appropriate to reflect the greater weight of countries such as China, Indonesia, India, Nigeria and Brazil.”

Overall this analysis of the submissions, together with the White Paper itself, certainly demonstrates that the relationship between Australia and Africa is still ‘pretty underdone’. The 82% cut in foreign aid to Africa in the most recent Federal Budget is a clear part of the same pattern. (One unexpected exception, which had something distinctive to say about Africa was the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network which referred to the historical failure to impose meaningful economic sanctions on Apartheid South Africa).

The Senate Inquiry into Australia’a Trade and Investment Relationships with the Countries of Africa

The White Paper process understandably attracted considerable public attention. This Senate Inquiry almost flew under the radar and several of the Canberra-based submission writers confirmed that they had only heard of the Inquiry from other submission writers. The inquiry had Terms of Reference which required particular reference to existing trade and investment relationships; emerging and possible future trends; opportunities to expand and current barriers and impediments to trade and investment; the role of government in identifying opportunities and assisting Australian companies to access existing and new markets. All of these areas really raised the question as to why the many companies which have been highly successful to date should need assistance from Australian government agencies which know less about Africa than they do. Even in the case of newcomers to the continent, they might well be better off asking companies already ensconced
there for advice. Indeed, two of the submissions to the Inquiry (2017) from Concerotel, and Windlab Ltd, appeared to be from companies which needed specialized professional advice on matters such as double taxation rather than the attention of a Senate Inquiry.

Two out of the eight Terms of References referred to the roles of Australian based companies (1) in sustainable development outcomes, and lessons that can be applied to other developing nations and (2) in promoting the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. Both of these areas would be of considerable interest to development practitioners but there appear to be very few submissions from people with appropriate expertise, possibly because they had not heard of the Inquiry.

The Minister

At the Africa Down Under Indaba in Perth in 2017 Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said: “many Australian resource projects in Africa are outposts of good government. For example, the US $1 billion contribution of Base Titanium mine to Kenya’s economy”. (Foreign Minister, 2017a) She went on to say: “The Australian Government encourages the people of Africa to see us as an open-cut mine for lessons learned, for skills, for innovation and, I would like to think, inspiration”.

In 2015 Minister Bishop inaugurated the DFAT Advisory Group on Australia-Africa Relations (AGAAR). The Group’s Chair is Dr Casta Tungaraza, the President of the African Women’s Council of Australia. Peter Coleman CEO of Woodside Energy, who spreads his geographic interests widely as he is also a member of the Australia Japan Business Co-operation Council and the Australia India CEO Forum is another member. Besides representatives of DFAT and Austrade, members also include Denis Cauchi, Director of Diaspora Action Australia; Professor John Hearn, Chairman of the Australia Africa Universities Network; Bill Repard Proprietor Paydirt Media; Henry Olongo, former Zimbabwe Test Cricketer and representatives of a number of community organizations making up gender equity and a 5/7 black/white balance (DFATa, 2017).

In July 2017 the Group issued A Strategy for Australia’s Engagement with Africa (a document clearly drafted back in 2016). This recommended that the Government should prioritize activities that: create long term and sustainable relationships across the entire continent; realise significant mutual benefits; and focus on areas where Australia is recognised as having a specialized offering in the following areas of strategic focus: Expanding trade and investment ties; building a sustainable partnership on development;
strengthening security; cooperating on global issues; strengthening the position of women; and developing closer people-to-people ties (DFATb, 2017).

**DFAT**

It is symbolic that the joint DFAT AusTRADE submission has a cover with a map in which Australia looms large but Africa does not appear at all. The whole tone of the submission could best be described as mechanical and weary.

One reason why the DFAT AusTrade approach is both unenthusiastic and misleading is that their focus is on trade not investment. Australian companies have massive investments in Africa. But these investments are largely not to source materials to bring to Australia but to produce materials to be sold on world markets with the profits being repatriated to Australia. Thus, Australia has massive interests in Africa which will never be reflected in trade figures. In a reflection of twenty-first century global realities, many Australian miners in Australia are actually competing with Australian owned companies in Africa.

**Business Submissions**

There were 15 business and trade submissions to the Inquiry including one from DFAT and one from the Western Australian Minister for Mines and Petrol. Five were from mining companies and their associates and the remainder from other sectors (commerce, windfarms, mining). The fact that the Australia-Africa Minerals and Energy Group (i.e. AAMEG the peak body established in 2011) made a joint submission spared most mining companies from any need to make a separate submission and so rather destroyed the purpose of the Inquiry.

**AAMEG**

AAMEG’s submission sets out the figures. There are currently more than 170 ASX-listed mining and other resource companies operating over 400 projects in some 35 African countries, 105 involving old mining. Australian listed companies control more than 90 mining operations in Africa with potential investments of up to $40 billion. Nowhere else in the world do Australian mining firms have so much invested. As the AAMEG submission reported: “About one in twenty companies listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange has an investment in Africa”. Alongside “being the voice of industry on member-driven issues” AAMEG also supports “enabling the Australian Government to leverage off the (sic) Australia’s resources industry footprint in Africa to drive Australia’s economic diplomacy initiative” and build relationships with African Governments.

**Business for Development**

Business for Development, a ten year old NGO working across Africa, Asia and the Pacific. made the case for the miners:

In addition to contributing to African development at a macro level through GDP growth, tax revenue, export earnings, and employment, Australian extractive companies have the capacity to contribute to the sustainable development of the region by enriching local communities in project impact zones. Going beyond traditional community development investments that put poor communities on a pathway to overcome poverty, these companies can drive economic empowerment through focusing on initiatives that address the aspirations of the poor for jobs and higher incomes for the long term through creating non-mine dependent economies that will exist beyond the life of the asset. Specifically, by fostering the development of inclusive agribusiness opportunities, extractive companies supported by African country governments, DFAT, communities and civil society can work together to drive inclusive growth that reduces poverty.

Such development could also meet contractual obligations to host governments to deliver community outcomes through a shared value approach.

Their specific case relates to the Kwale Agribusiness initiative in Kenya led by Australian organisations Base Titanium, the Cotton On Group and BFD. This Kwale project is supported by DFAT’s Business Partnership Platform (BPP) and is supposed to drive increased livelihoods for 10,000 smallholder farming households. It was the only African project supported by Round 1 of the BPP Round 2 had no African projects. The Kwale Project also stands out as a genuine business linked project, other BPP projects involve Oxfam, FairTrade, the Asia Foundation and even the University of Sydney (DFAT, 2017).
The Kwale Project is supported by Base Titanium, a range of Kenyan agencies, the BPP and funding from German, Dutch and British aid partners DEG, FMO and DFID. It aims to be self-sustaining within five years. It has already raised 3,682 participating households incomes by 30-100%. DFAT provided $313,000 and the private sector $1,411,500. Overall BFD’s submission to the Inquiry focuses on their development model and lays no particular stress on African conditions or needs.

Perth based Base Resources own submission understandably focuses on the Kwale Cotton Project and its links to their US $310 million Mineral Sands Project whose construction finished in 2013 with exports beginning in 2014 and now representing 60% of Kenya’s total mineral output. Base Resources has also built schools, clinics and boreholes for communities close to its mine. Alongside photographs of its good works, Base’s submission even includes a map of improvements in the multidimensional welfare index in Kwale county from 2014 to 2015.

ABCSA

The submission by the Australian Business Chamber of Commerce Southern Africa founded in 2014 and based in Johannesburg represents the comments of their members and individuals with related interests. The group noted that “there was a generic business perception of Africa in Australia as being backward, unsafe, conflict and poverty ridden and requiring humanitarian aid”. On the South African side there were visa problems in getting to Australia for trade or education and a lack of awareness of just how China-focused Australian businesses are. They felt that much greater use could be made of the South African diaspora already in Australia.

NGO Submissions

World Vision

World Vision’s submission was the responsibility of Dane Moores, their Senior Economic Policy Advisor. World Vision (WV) were somewhat hamstrung by the Terms of Reference of the Inquiry with their focus on trade and investment. Thus World Vision’s recommendations focused on Australia’s ‘aid for trade’ strategy, arguing that this strategy should target regions with the greatest need (including Africa) and that the goal should be to ensure that 50-60% of aid for trade funding should be allocated to capacity building to improve the capacity of African countries “especially small-
holder farmers, producers and micro-entrepreneurs, to engage in local, national and international trade”. World Vision used to be considered a down-to-earth supporter of practical support to the very poorest, but now the reader of this submission is left wondering whether World Vision would have done better by its poorest clients to attack the ‘aid for trade’ strategy head on rather than trying to accommodate it. At least World Vision does come out in favour of restoring the cuts to Australia’s ODA to Africa to at least 11.9% of the total aid budget as well as raising the overall total.

ActionAid Australia is a global women’s rights based organization working to achieve social justice, gender equality and poverty eradication in 45 countries including many in Africa, yet their submission was a mere three pages with minimal specific references to Africa.

In strong contrast to World Vision’s trade focus, Results International chose to focus their three-page submission on the single issue of famine and the need for Australia to provide more humanitarian aid to African countries facing famine.

**Academic Submissions**

The motivations behind the seven academic submissions to the Inquiry would appear to be highly mixed and include the desire to showcase the work of the individual and their institution; a perceived need to point DFAT to the paths of righteousness; and a fear of growing Chinese influence in Africa.

One common feature was clearly to try and avoid any impression, possibly given by geographically challenged senior administrators, that no one in Australian academia cares about Africa.

Thus, Dr Edson Ziso, a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Adelaide (and now Secretary of AFSAAP) made a brief submission based on his thesis on Chinese investment in Ethiopia. He stressed the sheer size of Chinese investment, noting that Chinese loans to Africa now exceed those made by the World Bank and that China is far more comfortable with the African pattern of a mixture of private sector/state investment than Australia is ever likely to be.

As Coordinator of the University of Western Australia’s Research Cluster, Dr David Mickler did his best to present the University’s modest contribution to African studies in a positive light. One problem faced by all universities is the difficulty of knowing who is working on Africa across disciplines. For example, it may be only as a result of an accidental encounter at the coffee shop if someone studying African politics is aware of colleagues across the campus spending their days examining African geology or
epidemiology. There is currently no Australian University which has a physical African Studies Centre as recommended by the 2011 JFADT Inquiry. Such a centre could be of significant assistance in dispelling Australian ignorance about Africa and as a focal point for queries.

One unusual academic submission was that by Dr Bergin and Ms Patel of the ANU which focusses on security issues which link Australia with Africa and especially with Kenya.

**Negative Views**

Whilst the DFAT view was simply lacking in enthusiasm, there were a scattering of submissions which took a negative view of Australian mining companies involvement in Africa (we do not know what the two confidential submissions said). From a media background, Jonathon Davidson drew the attention of the Senators to *Fatal Extraction: Australian Mining’s Damaging Push into Africa*, a series prepared by the Investigative Consortium for Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) which stressed the 380 fatalities associated with Australian listed mining companies in Africa from 2004-2015. Depending on one’s viewpoint this is sad, but unremarkable given the evidence of the uncaring nature of Australian miners. There is also the issue of allegations of Rio Tinto and others paying bribes in Guinea and elsewhere.

Margaret O’Callaghan, who has an extensive knowledge of the situation in Zambia, stresses the multiple difficulties of doing business in the mining sectors in Africa where the physical conditions, lack of infrastructure and the ‘enemy within’ (corruption of local politicians and officials) all provide sustained challenges. This is true, but certainly the larger mining companies are only too familiar with these issues. The questions that should be of concern to the Australian senate are two-fold: (1) are Australian companies engaging in corrupt practices and, if so, what should be done about it?; and (2) are local communities (especially their poorer members) and individual countries where mineral and other resources are located, benefiting from this wealth, and can Australia do anything to achieve the more equitable distribution of the benefits of resource exploitation? There are no easy answers to either of these queries and there is also a continuing asymmetry in terms of information. Companies such as BHP Billiton know far more about these issues than anyone in the Australian bureaucracy. Would DFAT funding an impartial study of the benefits and demerits of Australian mining investment in Africa be a beneficial move both for Africa and Australia? Would pursuing a multilateral route via the World Bank be more effective? The World Bank worked very hard to establish a Norwegian style sovereign
wealth fund for Chad, only to be ultimately defeated by the corruption of the Chadian government.

Dr Nikola Pijovic’s submission argues that the government should address four negative aspects of Australia’s neglectful relationship with Africa: (1) a lack of political agreement on government support for an interest in Africa; (2) an Australian diplomatic deficit in Africa; (3) a one-dimensional focus on the resources sector in the region and (4) high levels of ignorance about doing business in Africa.

ACIAR

The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research is an independent statutory agency within the foreign affairs portfolio. It is often said that, at least in terms of agriculture, Australia has much in common with dryland Africa. ACIAR spends 15% of its appropriation on projects in 11 countries in eastern and southern Africa, working in areas such as improving maize crops and biosecurity and pest management. To match DFAT’s trade focus, in Tanzania post-harvest losses in mangoes from fruit fly were reduced from 50% to less than 3% allowing for new exports to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Overall, the ACIAR submission appears somewhat contorted in trying to demonstrate how innovations which help African farmers also have commercial potential (as required by DFAT). The Chameleon Soil Water Sensor developed by ACIAR which helps small farmers to optimize fertilizer and water usage may have little financial return to offer but an unexpected but welcome outcome “has been reduced community conflict over water access”.

Conclusion

It is not clear just how organisations and individuals find out about government inquiries which are seeking submissions from the public. The White Paper Inquiry did receive a reasonable amount of publicity including on the radio. In contrast, the Senate Inquiry was nearly invisible with just a few organizations receiving informal invitations to make a submission from the Committee or DFAT. This is in part how the idea that there is very little interest in Africa in Australia becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Very few members of the African diaspora groups resident in Australia would have any idea how to make a submission to a Parliamentary committee, even if they were to find out by chance that such submissions had been called for. Yet, there are many in the diaspora such as the Somalis who are running small
export import businesses. Equally, had the Kenyans in Australia known in advance that they would figure in the White Paper as the base for a major security threat to Australia they might have been able to present a more balanced picture.

The Australia-Africa Minerals and Energy group works hard to demonstrate to the Federal Government and the general public how the Australian resources industry positively impacts upon Africa. To date this campaign has been ineffective because the Government has very little interest in Africa even as a potential source of wealth. Declining human and financial resources provided to DFAT mean that only the highest priority issues are addressed and Africa is always behind Asia in the definition of priorities. However, the report of the Senate Inquiry, due in June 2018 may possibly bring better news.

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Senate Inquiry into Australia’s Trade and Investment Relationships with the Countries of Africa (2017) *Submissions received by the Committee*. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/TradeinvestmentAfrica/Submissions
Celebrating 40 Years of the Australasian Review of African Studies: A Bibliography of Articles

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Introduction

In April 1979 the first African Studies of Australia Newsletter was published by members of the African Studies Association of Australia (AFSAA), which had just formed in 1978 at its inaugural conference. Tom Spear from La Trobe University was the first editor of this newsletter (see http://afsaap.org.au/assets/1979-no-1-April.pdf). Reading back over these back issues of the newsletter, you will discover that AFSAA membership fees were a modest $4 or $2 for students. Importantly this first newsletter included a list of some of the courses that were available at the time in Australian universities on African themes. Compared to the more recent 2017 Audit of African Studies related topics in Australian and New Zealand Universities, we can see that not much has really changed since then in relation to university offerings on Africa – and that it remains only a scattering of topics available. On this particular issue see AFSAAP (2017) “An Audit of African Studies in Australia 2017: A Snapshot of Courses and Topics available in Australian and New Zealand Universities, in addition to names of researchers working on issues related to Africa”, and also see Tanya Lyons (2017) “Trends in African Studies in Australia and New Zealand”, a paper presented at the 2017 AFSAAP Conference, and now available from the AFSAAP Archives online (see http://afsaap.org.au/resources/afsaap-archives/)

The African Studies of Australia Newsletter has gone through a number of name and format changes since the first issue in 1979. From 1980 until June 1994 it was called the African Studies Association of Australia and the Pacific Newsletter. From December 1994 until December 1996 it was the
African Studies Association of *Australia* and the Pacific *Review and Newsletter*. From June 1997 until December 2000 it was called the African Studies Association of *Australasia* and the Pacific *Review and Newsletter* (emphasis added). Then in June 2001 it became the *Australasian Review of African Studies*, and has remained so for the last 17 years. For most of these incarnations, Cherry Gertzel was ever behind the scenes editing and producing *ARAS*, creating its current format as a fully peer reviewed academic journal, and did so with dedication until her retirement in 2004. Helen Ware took on the Editorial role from 2005 – 2007, whereupon Liz Dimock guest edited the 2008 Edition. Tanya Lyons has been editing the journal since 2009. Notwithstanding the name, format and editorial changes, the fundamental objectives of *ARAS* have remained the same – promoting African Studies in this region.

*ARAS* has published many excellent articles on African Studies, with a strong focus on the African Diaspora in Australasia, African Politics, and Australia’s relations with Africa. *ARAS* has also published original research based on fieldwork conducted by scholars from the Australasia and Pacific region and beyond.

*ARAS* articles are available from most university library database subscription services, and are also open access from the AFSAAP website. Researchers would be remiss to ignore the substantial content available in these 39 Editions. Cite an *ARAS* article today in your academic publications and research. Of course this would increase the profile of *ARAS* and the work of its committed editors and authors working in African Studies in the Australasia and Pacific region, but it would also value add to your research. To assist researchers and authors of African Studies prepare their literature reviews, we have prepared a complete list of ARAS articles published since 1984, when the newsletter began publishing academic articles, and other research notes. This is the most comprehensive list of African Studies materials in Australasia, and spans the remarkable history of the postcolonial continent, and in particular Australia’s relations with the countries of Africa, from government to non-government perspectives.

The following articles are listed thematically and by the African country or region that it is relevant to. All articles are hyperlinked to their corresponding online pdf articles, so that you can easily access them (you will need to be viewing this article in electronic pdf format to enable the hyperlinks – go to https://doi.org/10.22160/22035184/ARAS-2018-39-1/144-169 or see http://afsaap.org.au/ARAS/search-articles/. We now invite you to wander through the research below and relish in the rich history of African Studies in Australia.
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ETHIOPIA
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Joan Vincent, Famine in Soroti District, Uganda, Australasian Review of African Studies, 1988, Volume 10, Number 2, pp. 8-9
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ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE


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BOOK REVIEWS


Daniel Jordan Smith writes from a social perspective about AIDS in Nigeria. Smith claims that “…moralizing discourses about the epidemic [are] powerful because they express and stand for people’s experience of, and ambivalence about, certain consequences of ongoing social changes, and…their discontent about rising levels of social inequality” (p.5). He describes Nigeria’s AIDS epidemic as the third largest in the world in absolute numbers, after South Africa and India (based on conservative 2007 survey results), and firmly contextualises HIV/AIDS as a primarily social problem, emblematic of a collective moral crisis.

Africa’s most populous country Nigeria, also boasts its largest economy. As current leader for overall GDP, it is relatively low-ranked however (16th of 54) for equitable distribution of wealth (Chigozie, 2018), and 169th of 190 countries according to the World Bank (Pham, 2017). This positioning reflects gross income inequity and out-migration of funds, as profits to wealthy overseas-based western companies. The vast majority of Nigerians remain economically marginalised; GDP provides an inadequate representation of the difficult lives most face.

Waves of economic development in Nigeria followed British colonisation, largely affecting the country’s south, with early emphasis on palm oil production, and increased economic activity since the 1970s oil boom. Nevertheless, this led to greater impoverishment, due to tax breaks awarded to oil companies, and grossly unequal distribution of resulting wealth (HDS, 2018; Smith, 2014, p.46).

In moral domains, religious denominations fall into approximately equal halves, with a marginal majority of Islamic faiths, especially in Nigeria’s north, and a sizeable minority of Christians, mainly in the south. Only few people in remote hinterland regions, now practice indigenous religions. Despite this seeming homogeneity of major religions, Nigeria has over 279 ethnic groups, speaking 370 languages; published statistics cannot adequately describe the preponderance of diverse elements of indigenous/traditional religious beliefs in Nigerian communities, which some sources claim are incredibly varied (HDS, 2018).
Pentecostal ‘born again’ Christianity has been promoted by missionaries, and continues leaching into Nigeria, and other African nations, parading wealthy modernist, puritanical, and anti-Islam values - since the 1970s rise of US Evangelism. The larger (northern) Nigerian state remains resolutely Muslim.

Female genital mutilation previously permitted by traditionalist beliefs, and affecting many Nigerian girls and women, was banned in 2015 by outgoing Christian President Goodluck Jonathan, influenced by international women’s campaigns. Jonathan was superseded by an ageing, more militarily-focused ‘Muslim’ President Muhammadu Buhari, who likely appealed to voters, due to the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency and widespread perceptions that poverty and corruption evidenced a failure of secularist (and by implication Western, including Christian) approaches to governance.

Against these challenges, the expanding HIV/AIDS epidemic is conceptualised primarily as a moral issue by Nigerians, one that engenders strong reactions and discourses of morality, and powerful stigma.

While Nigerians desire socio-economic development, Smith observes their anxiety regarding the implications of globalising processes, and the realities of increasing poverty, in large part triggered by the workings of a capitalist economy, such as increased urbanisation (including among women), consumerism, individualisation, changed family and communal life, demands of American-style evangelical Christianity, the branding of indigenous (and rural) cultures as ‘demonic’, recurrent bouts of retributive violence among religious groups, including from Boko Haram, and the glaring inequitable presence of international oil interests. Despite a 1990s adoption of Islamic law by northern Muslim sub-states, there is also a recent moderate emphasis on collaborative inter-faith harmony.

Most such changes, in addition to widespread government corruption, occurred during a period approximating the spread of HIV/AIDS. Due to its everyday presence as a health concern, Smith utilises the epidemic as a “point of entry, to explore the complex and changing social worlds of [Nigerians]” (2014, p.7). Chapter One opens with a curiosity-inducing passage about casual (paid) sexual relations between young women university students and former okada (motorcycle-taxi) riders. This ‘rumour’ contributed, along with okada riders’ self-protective, union-like gang behaviours and crime links, to their 2009 prohibition, and replacement by three-wheeled rickshaw-style auto-taxis.

Subsequent chapter cameos ethnographically explore the character of Nigerian society, and its particular anxieties and moral dilemmas, including about money, kin responsibilities, family structures and social reproduction,
and the everyday challenges of violence and societal and political corruption. These latter especially prompt popular theoretical explanations, derived from traditional notions of witchcraft, to explain ‘fantastic wealth accumulation’ among elites, occasionally triggering riots and violence against elites, but also against children, seemingly used as pawns, and women, whose provocative ‘immoral’ dress may suggest promiscuity. HIV/AIDS transmitted mainly within heterosexual relationships, is believed to result from amoral, modern social behaviours. This presents a strong theme.

Nigerian women’s increased social agency, in terms of work and educational choices, is confounded somewhat by traditional unequal gender-beliefs, including an established, contrasting tolerance of male promiscuity and extra-marital infidelities, seen to fortify masculinity. Smith notes, in these circumstances of structural constraint, a ‘deadly’ combination of poverty and gender inequality may find “…women…put in positions where risky sexual relations are one of the only means of survival” (2014, p.55). Nonetheless, although some young rural-to-urban-migrant women do resort to potentially dangerous prostitution, and bar work, provoking resentments, and further subservience, these roles also may offer a partial respite from usual moral expectations, and a heightened independence.

Strong ties to family and kin remain, however marriage norms have changed across the past half-century. Regarding men’s sexuality, traditional polygamous male views are widely considered ‘natural’, with infidelities frequent during absences. Conversely, men are expected to uphold marital and parental relationships, requiring discretion with wives and families. Yet among male peers, ‘skiting’ may culminate in rewarding of masculine prowess, within boundaries of etiquette. Conversely for both sexes, religious-based sexual abstinence provides temporary protection from HIV/AIDS. Due to stigma, HIV/AIDS’ contagiousness and prevalence contributes to the moral complexity of normative social expectations, overlain and contorted by modern pressures. This results in secrecy and unwillingness to openly acknowledge the extent and hazardousness of HIV/AIDS.

To achieve descriptive detail, Smith has outlined cultural behaviours of specific groups, and the impacts of their relative lack of wealth, and quests to obtain money and re-establish a sense of economic fairness and moral order, by any methods available. It is a thoroughly researched and fascinating text, relevant to social scientists and development theorists alike.
References


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ARAS is constantly seeking articles in the field of African studies and welcomes contributions from all over the world.

The following formats will be considered for publication:

- Scholarly articles: original, research-based articles between 1000-6000 words. Please include all relevant material such as graphs, maps and tables.
- Generalist articles, opinion pieces or debates between 1000-8000 words, relevant to African studies, African politics, society, economics, religion, literature or other relevant areas of interest to AFSAAP members.
- Field Notes of 1000-2000 words: any African fieldwork experiences or observations that would make an interesting contribution to the field of African studies. Please submit any photos that might be relevant.
- Book reviews between 300-1000 words.
- Review Essays between 1000-2000 words.
- Short notes / news / comments on reports 300-1000 words

Guidelines

Please submit 2 copies – one copy with all of your details, and one copy ‘blinded’ (ie. Please remove your name and any identifying features from the article that would suggest the author’s identity).
Send to  editor@afsaap.org.au

Book Reviews

The Australasian Review of African Studies (ARAS) aims to publish relevant and timely reviews of books dealing with various African Studies issues. However, in submitting book reviews it is important for reviewers to be aware of not only the journal’s style of citations, but also its style guidelines.

While some journals aim for publishing largely descriptive reviews which serve to inform the reader about the content of the book and its main ideas, ARAS does not.

Therefore, what we are looking for is:

- An intellectual engagement with the text which should be primarily reflective and critical, rather than a wholly descriptive book review, and
- A critical assessment of the ideas and hypotheses presented in the book

Publishing critical and inquisitive book reviews is an intellectually rewarding endeavour, and more importantly the state of academic inquiry and knowledge in general progresses through the process of discussion and argument, and not regurgitation. The journal welcomes unsolicited reviews. For all book review related queries please contact bookreviews@afsaap.org.au.

**Deadlines**

ARAS is published in June and December each year. Articles can be submitted anytime. Book reviews, news and opinion pieces should be submitted by March 15th or September 15th.


The African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) publishes the Australasian Review of African Studies (ARAS). AFSAAP strives to ensure that we only publish high quality and trusted content.

We ensure this through our rigorous double blind peer-review process and, with only two issues published per year, we allow this process the time it requires. As a result we have a relatively high rejection rate of submissions, for a journal of our size and scope.
AFSAAP also uses text matching software to screen for unoriginal material. Authors submitting to ARAS should be aware that their manuscript may be submitted to text matching software at any point during the peer review or production processes. Below, we provide our guidance for ethics for journal editors, authors and reviewers.

1. Ethical expectations

Editors’ responsibilities

- To act in a balanced, objective and fair way while carrying out their expected duties, without discrimination on grounds of gender, sexual orientation, religious or political beliefs, ethnic or geographical origin of the authors.
- To handle submissions for sponsored supplements or special issues in the same way as other submissions, so that articles are considered and accepted solely on their academic merit and without commercial influence.
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Reviewers’ responsibilities

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- Authors should ensure that any studies involving human or animal subjects conform to national, local and institutional laws and requirements and confirm that approval has been sought and obtained where appropriate. Authors should obtain express permission from human subjects and respect their privacy.
- To declare any potential conflicts of interest (e.g. where the author has a competing interest (real or apparent) that could be considered or viewed as exerting an undue influence on his or her duties at any stage during the publication process).
- To notify promptly the journal editor or publisher if a significant error in their publication is identified. To cooperate with the editor and publisher to publish an erratum, addendum, corrigendum notice, or to retract the paper, where this is deemed necessary.
- All authors submitting to the Australasian Review of African Studies are expected to follow the ARAS Ethical Guidelines at http://afsaap.org.au/ARAS/ethical-statement/ Authors must also demonstrate adherence to the legal requirements of the study country. Authors will be asked to demonstrate and confirm that all the research meets these ethical and legal requirements by completing the Ethical Statement Form supplied to authors upon acceptance of their article for publication.
2. Procedures for dealing with unethical behaviour

Identification of unethical behaviour

- Misconduct and unethical behaviour may be identified and brought to the attention of the editor and publisher at any time, by anyone.
- Misconduct and unethical behaviour may include, but need not be limited to, examples as outlined above.
- Whoever informs the editor or publisher of such conduct should provide sufficient information and evidence in order for an investigation to be initiated. All allegations should be taken seriously and treated in the same way, until a successful decision or conclusion is reached.

Investigation

- An initial decision should be taken by the editor, who should consult with or seek advice from the publisher, if appropriate.
- Evidence should be gathered, while avoiding spreading any allegations beyond those who need to know.

Minor breaches

- Minor misconduct might be dealt with without the need to consult more widely. In any event, the author should be given the opportunity to respond to any allegations.

Serious breaches

- Serious misconduct might require that the employers of the accused be notified. The editor, in consultation with AFSAAP as appropriate, should make the decision whether or not to involve the employers, either by examining the available evidence themselves or by further consultation with a limited number of experts.
Outcomes

(in increasing order of severity; may be applied separately or in conjunction)

- Informing or educating the author or reviewer where there appears to be a misunderstanding or misapplication of acceptable standards.
- A more strongly worded letter to the author or reviewer covering the misconduct and as a warning to future behaviour.
- Publication of a formal notice detailing the misconduct.
- Publication of an editorial detailing the misconduct.
- A formal letter to the head of the author’s or reviewer’s department or funding agency.
- Formal retraction or withdrawal of a publication from the journal, in conjunction with informing the head of the author or reviewer’s department, Abstracting & Indexing services and the readership of the publication.
- Imposition of a formal embargo on contributions from an individual for a defined period.
- Reporting the case and outcome to a professional organisation or higher authority for further investigation and action.
Call for Papers

Africa in Transition: Governance, Society and Culture
41st AFSAAP Annual Conference
University of New South Wales, Sydney,
November 21–23
2018

Conference Convener: Dr. Anne Bartlett UNSW (Sydney)
Contact: afsaap2018@afsaap.org.au

The African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP) calls for proposals for pre-organized panels, roundtables, thematic conversations and individual papers for its 41st annual meeting to be held at UNSW, Sydney from November 21st to November 23rd 2018.

Recent years have witnessed significant transitions in the governance of African nations. Long-standing leaders, many of whom were major figureheads in the post-colonial era, have given way to demands for change. Sometimes the transitions have been relatively peaceful such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, yet others such as Libya and Egypt have been tumultuous, leaving the nations concerned reeling from the after effects of change. In other nations, the grip of power has been tightened with attempts to do away with term limits or to interfere in the political process surrounding elections. Still others, such as South Sudan, have plunged into civil and ethnic violence which threatens the future stability of this new nation. Climate change, environmental loss and migration are influencing African societies, complicating patterns of governance.

Such changes reverberate across society with calls to rethink the nature of civil society and political participation, as well as the nature of equity and belonging. The call to rethink the way that society functions exists not only in the political sphere, but also across the whole spectrum of the arts and cultural communities as they come together from diverse backgrounds to envisage a different kind of shared future. While the deep challenges that remain must be acknowledged, it is also the case that such change can provide fertile ground for creative thinking and the exchange of ideas between academics, political actors and civil society organizations.

We therefore invite papers that engage with, but are not limited to, the theme: Africa in Transition: Governance, Society and Culture. As always,
we bring together scholars working in different disciplines. We invite participants to contribute theoretically innovative and empirically grounded papers, panels and presentations that enhance our understanding of these issues. Though the central focus will be on this broader theme, we also welcome contributions on other topics that consider Africa, or Africa/Australia/Pacific relations and Africans in the region.

Panelists may present only one paper or one other presentation in an alternative format such as a thematic conversation or roundtable. We have set this limit in order to make limited participant spaces available to as many participants as possible.

**Individual Papers:**
An abstract of maximum 250 words should be sent.

**Panels, Thematic Conversations, and Roundtables:**
For panel proposals, thematic conversations and roundtables, an overall proposal abstract of maximum 250 words should be sent together with a 250 word abstract for each paper. Please also include names of chair and participants of each panel, thematic conversation or roundtable.

**Panels**
Send an overall abstract of maximum 250 words, together with a 250 word abstract for each paper. Also include name(s) of chair and participants.

**Thematic Conversations:**
Thematic Conversations extend on-going conversations among scholars while exploring new trends and approaches. They provide an intellectual venue for like-minded scholars to continue discussions that may have started before and engage in face-to-face academic exchange in an informal structure and with the audience. These might not be formal presentations but must have a chair, participants and a topic. Send an overall abstract of maximum 250 words, together with a 250 word abstract for each paper, name(s) of chair and participants.

**Roundtables:**
Roundtables provide groups of scholars an opportunity to discuss an issue, share opinions, or just to brainstorm through informed discussion and debate within the wider or the particular fields of scholarship. The roundtable format provides an open discussion where the chair and participants engage themselves and audience in discussion. Send an overall abstract of maximum
250 words, together with a 250 word abstract for each paper, name(s) of chair and participants.

*All proposals will be peer reviewed.*

Abstracts of proposed papers, panels and roundtables should be sent by July 1st, 2018 to Dr. Anne Bartlett, International Studies, Morven Brown 230, UNSW, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia. Email: a.bartlett@unsw.edu.au

A preliminary program will be announced by August 1st, 2018. Late proposals for papers will be considered only if space is available. All proposals will be peer reviewed by the program committee. Registration and conference fees must be paid before presenters will be placed in the formal conference program.

Standard conference technology for Power Point will be available in all rooms. If you think that you may require other forms of technology please notify us ahead of time so that we are better able to accommodate you.