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THE AUSTRALASIAN REVIEW OF AFRICAN STUDIES

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Vice President -Valentine Mukuria PhD
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THE AUSTRALASIAN REVIEW OF AFRICAN STUDIES

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Editorial

The papers in this edition of ARAS explore the complex themes of postcoloniality. The colonial era now formally over leaves more than a residue on the nations and the peoples of Africa.

Tusasiirwe and her co-authors present a wide-ranging critique of the impacts of ongoing exploitation across the continent, deploying historical and contemporary material from many sources to propose remedies, necessarily also wide-ranging. Lucas and Ware examine the career of Australia's most celebrated demographer known best for his work on HIV/AIDS, but deservedly for much more. Gross shows how environmental policies designed, it is claimed, to protect elephants in natural habitat need careful evaluation if reforms are not to disguise further exploitation. Mabeza and Hungwe present a nuanced study of women in rural Zimbabwe, challenging simplified notions of vulnerability and showing that agency can confront and overcome the legacies of the colonial era. In their different ways, each paper shows how history lives in the present but does not, or need not, foreclose restitution, autonomy, and freedom in modernity.

The first three papers were presented at a colloquium in May 2023 organised by the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP), the auspice organisation of this journal, and further papers from that colloquium may be published in later issues.

Readers wherever located might note that the annual conferences of AFSAAP will resume in 2024 after a Covid-induced pause, with both real and virtual sessions.

Further information will be found on the social media pages of the Association, for example Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/afsaap/

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Ongoing Colonisation and Neo-Colonisation of Africa: Why More Action is Required Now

Sharlotte Tusasiirwe
Western Sydney University
Samuel Okechi Okafor
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Mahamadi Ouedraogo
Western Sydney University
Diana Nabbumba
La Trobe University
Amanda Thompson Agaba
Department of Mental Health, Boston, USA
Rugare Mugumbate
University of Wollongong
Sarah Eyaa
Excelsia College

Abstract

A barrier to advocacy for decolonisation is the argument that colonisation is a thing of the past and that Africa needs to move on from blaming the past. But how can we move on when colonisation and neo-colonisation persist? We expose the ongoing colonisation and neocolonisation in and of Africa to create knowledge and consciousness about the issues and the urgent and ongoing need for true decolonisation. Our goal is to demonstrate how decolonisation is still an unfinished business since *the last* (indigenous Africans) have not yet become *the first* in their own continent. We discuss classical and settler colonialism in South Africa and the Chagos Archipelago; ecocide in Nigeria; colonial debt and tax and the CFA franc currency in West Africa; neo-colonisation by international organisations; and colonisation and neo-colonisation in research. Fixing

these issues goes beyond decolonisation of self or mind to structural decolonisation, whereby the colonisers must take responsibility to repay, return, restore, and renounce their colonisation loot.

Key words: Africa; colonisation; neocolonisation, decolonisation

Introduction

The dismissal of colonisation as a thing of the past that is outmoded is a significant barrier to decolonisation efforts in Africa and worldwide (Grosz-Ngate, 2020). People with such arguments often tell the colonised 'to move on from the past' or to stop blaming the past for whatever is happening in the present or future (Bulhan, 2015; Tusasiirwe, 2022; 2023). These claims are made even amidst our very own African Sankofa philosophy which highlights that the past, present, and future are in principle interconnected and interdependent (Kramer, 2023). There is a continued denial of ongoing colonisation and its social, economic, and political legacies still manifesting in Africa and worldwide, that erases the required responsibility and accountability to fix them (Agbakoba, 2023). This paper discusses the different expressions of ongoing colonisation that are currently manifesting in Africa with the goal of building awareness and consciousness to inform the ongoing debate on neo-colonisation and decolonisation. Decolonisation "implies the urgent need to thoroughly challenge the colonial situation" (Fanon, 2001, p.2.). We analyse manifestations of neo-colonisation in the following areas: classical and settler colonialism; ecocide in Africa; colonial debt and tax and the CFA franc currency; neo-colonisation by international organisations; colonisation and neo-colonisation in research.

In analysing ongoing colonisation in and of Africa, the discussion is influenced by Frantz Fanon's work and his urge for Africans to always be questioning the status-quo to come up with strategies and approaches that are more relevant to their culture and context. Fanon argues that decolonisation "starts from the very first day with the basic claims of the colonised" (Fanon, 2001 p.1) and the authors consider themselves as among the colonised. This paper is written by Africans who have lived most of their lives in different African countries, experienced colonisation daily in different systems such as education, health, political, social, and economic sectors. These Africans have lived in the diaspora too, where colonisation and colonialism has had its roots for several years. Therefore, the authors have a lived experience of

growing up in countries that were colonised and are living in countries with a colonisation approach.

In the words of Fanon (2001, p.4), the authors have grown up in the colonised quarters where "you are born anywhere, anyhow. You die anywhere, from anything"; and in the diaspora, the authors have seen the colonists' sector "protected by solid shoes in a sector where the streets are clean and smooth, without a pothole, without a stone". This double consciousness forces the authors to share the manifestations of ongoing colonisation to draw the attention of Africans and colonialists to these open secrets and the need to dismantle institutionalised colonisation to realise real decolonisation.

Fanon (2001) uses the words "the last shall be the first" to define what true decolonisation is about. We argue that in Africa, we still see circumstances, policies, modes of operation, agendas, systems, where the last (indigenous Africans) are not put first. Colonialism and particularly the "ism" denotes beliefs and ideology while colonisation is "the act of colonising: invading, conquering, moving in, then taking over another people's land, resources, wealth, culture, and identity" (Ife, 2016, p.185). The impetus of colonialism and colonisation is domination, subjugation, and impoverishment of the colonised at the enrichment of the colonisers.

Pure greed, self-aggrandisement and exploitation drove Western nations to scramble and partition Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1884 and these motivations have never changed and continue to drive the neocolonisation of Africa post-independence (Arukwe, 2010; Boateng, 2010; Bulhan, 2015; Gareth, 2010; Okafor, 2022; Shanguhyia & Falola, 2018; Ziltener & Kunzler, 2013). The historical Western nations that colonised African countries, notably Britain, France, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, German, among others have sustained their interventions in most African nations, appropriating minerals, crops, human labour, artifacts, cultures and other resources at the expense of African communities particularly black indigenous Africans (Okafor, 2022).

Colonialism is driven by the belief in cultural and racial superiority of the colonisers and inhumanity of the colonised, where the coloniser made the colonised to believe that they are inferior, their culture was 'primitive', they had no knowledge and had nothing to contribute to knowledge production (Mbiti, 1969). This colonisation of the mind stifles imagination and has characterised most Africa-Northern/Western nations' interactions

and relationships which are centred on inferior-superior hierarchical relations, pursuing the interests of the North/West (Hlatshwayo & Alexander, 2021, Fanon, 2001). In these colonial relations, the colonised were and are still not seen as human beings but as disposable excesses (Fanon, 2001). Neocolonialism or the return of the colonisers through the backdoor includes those "ways in which former colonizers (joined by the United States and the USSR) control behind the scenes economic, social, cultural, and political power" of the colonised (Bulhan, 2015, p.243).

Through neocolonialism, the former colonisers continue to exploit material resources of their former colonies and continue to impose policies that serve the interests of the colonisers (Agbakoba, 2023). Neocolonialism concept is said to have been pioneered by Ghanaian former president Kwame Nkrumah to denote a situation where governments are technically independent but their economic systems and therefore their political policies are influenced and controlled from outside (Nkrumah, 1965). Kwame Nkrumah emphasizes that the most common and powerful tool for neocolonial control is the use of economic or monetary means and the case studies we analyse in this paper, all demonstrate the direct and indirect way this is manifesting in Africa. We share the concern that Nkrumah raised that neocolonialism breeds exploitation and impoverishment of the colonised instead of their development and it is responsible for widening the gap between the so-called poor and rich countries of the world. The neocolonial control may be exercised by former colonisers or another country or a consortium of international financial interests who use foreign investments and financial power to impoverish the colonised. The scope of this paper is limited to exposing ongoing colonisation in Africa and highlights selected case studies. It is organised as follows. The forms of ongoing colonisation and neocolonisation are discussed in the next section, followed by a conclusion in which the implications or required strategies are discussed.

Classical and Settler Colonialism: South Africa and the Chagos Archipelago

African scholar Bulhan (2015) highlights classical colonialism, a form of colonialism that is relevant for this paper given its focus on ongoing colonisation. Classical colonialism which accelerated in Africa in the 19th century involved "the occupation of land by force of arms", thus leading to loss of land and identity that is attached to land by the colonised population (Bulhan, 2015, p.242). Loss of land plus related resources and thus denying

the African population means of production paved the way for exploitation of people (Bulhan, 2015). Subsequently indigenous Africans were used as cheap or free labour, for them to get access to food and other resources related to land. Additionally, loss of land led to a sense of identity loss given that the identity of indigenous Africans is deeply rooted in land and the seasons associated with land such as planting and harvesting (Fanon, 2001). As it unfolded in Africa, classical colonialism is about "holding the population captive in their own land, forcing them to serve the same economic, racial and self-aggrandizing motives that gave rise to and sustained the Atlantic Slave Trade" (Bulhan, 2015, p.243).

While Bulhan (2015) presents classical colonialism as seeming to have ended in Africa, particularly with independence and control of land, we argue that classical colonialism is alive and well today in African countries like South Africa and Chagos, where Europeans continue to hold captive indigenous Africans on their own land. As Boehmer (2011, p.257) notes,

> the one claim that the settler, by definition, is not able to make, is the claim to indigeneity, to ancestral belonging: to having inhabited the land from time immemorial [instead] the settler colony attempts to found its claims to the land by erasing, repressing, or fencing away those people with prior claims.

Park (2021) describes South Africa as a settler colony democratising without decolonising. South Africa has been talked about from the apartheid lens, alienated from settler colonialism yet apartheid should be "understood as an expression of settler colonialism" (Park, 2021, p.217). The colonial present of South Africa must be theorised. Settler colonialism refers to those circumstances or countries where the colonisers never left, they came to stay (Park, 2021; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Colonisers dispossessed the 'natives' of their land and exploited their labour. Land dispossession is coupled with labour exploitation, racialised impoverishment and elimination of stable communities. In South Africa, majority of land is still owned by white settlers despite them being demographically few (Park, 2021). Kirsten and Sihlobo (2022) reported that white commercial farmers own 50% of all land in South Africa, and yet white South Africans constitute well under 10% of the country's population. As Fanon (2001, p.9) highlights:

> For a colonised people, the most essential value, because it is the most meaningful, is first and foremost the land: the land, which must provide bread and, naturally, dignity. But this dignity has nothing to do with "human" dignity. The colonised subject has never heard of such an ideal. All he has seen on his land is that he can be arrested, beaten, and starved with impunity; and no sermoniser on morals, no priest has ever stepped in to bear the blows in his place or share his bread.

The negative effects of land dispossession are numerous, as the indigenous landowners continue to experience a range of injustices because of losing their land (Park, 2021). South African based writer Lindy Heinecken (2020, n.p) highlights the indirect, silent structural violence behind the direct or personal violence experienced by black South Africans, giving an example of higher education where "participation rate is just 15.6% for black South Africans, while for Indian and white people (aged 20–24) it is 49.3% and 52.8%, respectively (Heinecken, 2020). Trauma from land dispossession makes it challenging for communities to settle and experience development milestones as individuals and communities (Heinecken, 2020). The widening social and economic inequality originally arising from land dispossession fuels violent crime, protests and direct police violence and brutality. We agree with authors Tuck & Yang, that in settler colonies, "decolonization brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life; it is not a metaphor for other things we want to do to improve our societies" (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p.1).

Another example of settler colonisation is the case of Chagossians, who are still fighting for their independence from United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA), who are still colonising the island after the denial that there were any permanent or indigenous inhabitants of Chagos Island (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Chagossians are indigenous Africans who are descendants of the slaves that were forced to work in coconut plantations on the island under the French and British colonial rule. They were forcibly displaced by UK and USA governments to Mauritius or Seychelles to pave way for the military base which continues to benefit these Western countries as Chagossians are still prevented from returning to live permanently on their homeland. The right to reparations for the forced expulsion and displacement of Chagossians and the abuse from the British colonisers is yet to be fulfilled by the UK and USA governments in this era.

Ecocide in Africa: The Nigerian Case

As one of the dimensions of African existence, natural environment is an inalienable part of survival of humanity. This is particularly so for Africa's indigenous peoples whose daily life is directly connected to their natural environment that includes land, water, air, and the whole of the ecosystem within the geography of Africa (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services-IPBES, 2018; Kumar & Yashiro, 2018). As part of the ongoing colonialism and neocolonialism in Africa, the natural environment has been subjected to constant attacks and abuses resulting in ecocide by the colonialists and the neocolonialists whose interests are in the natural resources domicile in the countries within the continent (Wise, 2021; Branch & Minkova, 2023).We use ecocide here to mean the destruction of natural environment, which for the case of Africa is being spearheaded by foreign companies that plough back profits and raw materials to their home countries leaving African communities impoverished. In Nigeria in particular, the colonialists started the ecocide mission by administratively hijacking the basic natural resources outlets such as the forest reserves, liquid and solid mineral resources located in different geopolitical regions in Nigeria as well as the water ways and industrial institutions (Ujor, 2018; Hellermann, 2012; Egboh, 1985; Nwodim & Adah, 2021).

Ecocide, as a complex process of anthropogenic activities generating toxic impacts on the elements of natural environment and eliminating ecological harmony, was initiated in Nigeria by the colonialists and the neocolonialists who turned Nigeria into their backyard for their heavy carbon footprint, while making their nations the hub of consumption of the natural resources exploited from the colonial and neocolonial empires (Palarczyk, 2023; Obeng-Odoom, 2021; McIntyre-Mills et al., 2023). Evidence of this situation is visible in how the colonialists and neocolonialists through their teleguided multinational corporations applied and continue to apply environmentally unfriendly technologies and strategies in the extraction of their needed resources without considering the environmental impacts on the host communities (Brown & Okogbule, 2020; Lynch et al., 2021; Atutu, 2018). For instance, in Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the exploitation of the available oil and gas deposits by Shell BP, Agip, Elf, Chevron, ARAMCO oil, Mobil oil, etc., has resulted in the elimination of many indigenous communities whose population are now living as refugees in other communities due to loss of farmland, fishing rivers, residential areas as well

as ecological floras and faunas, which had sustained the people for centuries before colonial and neocolonial incursions (Oshienemen et al., 2018; Ordinioha & Brisibe, 2013; Babatunde, 2014).

In Northern and Western Nigeria, excavation of gold, tin, iron ore, etc by the colonialists and the neocolonialists multinational corporations such as Mines Geotechniques Nig. Ltd., an Australian firm, Northern Numero Resources Ltd. from the UK, Segilola Nigeria Ltd. from Australia, KCM Mining from Australia, etc. has rendered many communities vulnerable to countless environmentally induced health complications as well as destroying the nearby ecosystem. Nigerian forest reserves have been permanently captured as the source for the colonialists and the neocolonialist's much needed forest resources first, through the colonial administrative laws and currently uncontrollable illegal logging and similar activities, of which the products end up in the colonialists and neocolonialist's markets overseas (Adeyinka et al., 2019; Mamodu et al., 2018).

The industrial institution in Nigeria captures the policy dimension of what is produced, how it is produced, whom it is produced for and the humanitarian/environmental safety of the industrial process and activities. In Nigeria, the colonial administrative policies and the neocolonial proxy policy influence have technically made Nigeria the hub for cheap production by the colonialists and neocolonialists for the multinational corporations with its ecological implications as the activities of these industries contribute heavily to air, land, and water pollutions capable of ecological disasters. And this is the exportation of heavy carbon footprints to Africa and other developing nations where poverty and illiteracy have conditioned the population as some waste bins. Colonialism and neocolonialism in Africa are manifested in not only the land dispossession and natural resources exploitation but also direct theft of Africa's financial resources as the case is with West African French colonies.

Colonial Debt and Taxation: the CFA in West Africa

The historical and ongoing impoverishment and exploitation of the colonised driven by greed of the colonisers is still manifesting in West African 'former' French colonies where economic colonisation persists post-independence. France continues to openly exploit resources of its African colonies, consequently developing itself, as it impoverishes its colonies that remain characterised as least developed as the masses are consumed by

extreme poverty. France is continually forcing 14 African countries to pay it money/finances and to maintain reserves in its banks, in addition to monetary dependence. In other words, France charges a colonial tax which the countries have paid since the 1960s. A total of fourteen (14) African countries which are former French colonies annually pay a colonial tax amounting to $500 billion to France. These countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Togo, Cameroon, Senegal, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Congo, and Chad (Egbunike & Lichtenstein, 2019; Thomo, 2023; Koutonin, 2014).

Economic colonisation of these African countries continues with France appropriating over 85% of the annual income of these African countries. The countries must put 85% of their foreign reserves into France Central Bank (reserves of the 14 countries have been held since 1961). It is alleged that any refusal by an African country to pay France leads to a coup led by France or even death of the president leading (Koutonin, 2014). In addition, the countries must use the France colonial currency (the Franc), follow its education system, and use French as an official language. The other conditions include France having the right to first refusal on any raw or natural resources discovered in these countries, priority in public procurement processes and public bidding, supply of military equipment, the obligation to send France annual balance and reserve reports (Koutonin, 2014).

This same strategy of colonial debt and tax or independence debt was used by France to impoverish Haiti after the slaves won the 12-year war to defeat their French masters. Haiti was forced by France to pay over 150 million Francs (over 23 million USD) from 1804 to 1947 (Salt, 2018). It is unsurprising that Haiti is still described as the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere yet the contribution of France to its impoverishment is often mumbled or not even acknowledged at all.

We argue that CFA franc is a neocolonial instrument maintaining France as guardian of its former colonies in Africa, deliberately stifling monetary independence. The 1960s were years of hope and a positive outlook on the future for many West African countries, the years of independence and liberation from colonialism (Mokube, 2012). These times were called the 'Year of Africa' as 17 nations received independence (Mokube, 2012). It is crucial to outline the words received and not achieved here, as many people might think Africans were getting rid of colonisers, but some colonisers wanted to leave not out of goodwill but because they knew they could

remotely sustain colonisation (Harshé, 2019). Between the 1950s and 70s, the British, the Germans, the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the French were active in their discourse of retreating from African countries and allowing African people to govern themselves politically (Shanguhyia & Falola, 2018). General Charle de Gaulle, the President of France at the time, campaigned fiercely to propose independence to French African states with the conditions of limited autonomy under French supervision or complete freedom from France (Amin et al., 2022). However, the two countries, Guinea, and Mali, challenged the coloniser, showing courage and bravery by saying *NO* to General de Gaulle (Amin et al., 2022). Thus, under Ahmed Segou Toure's leadership, Guinea Conakry refused De Gaulle's proposition and decided to have their full autonomy after a referendum in September 1958 and Guinea was proclaimed independent two years earlier than most French African States. Ahmed Segou Toure famously stated, 'We prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery' (Amin et al., 2022. p. 130). Mali, also under Modiba Keita's leadership, refused de Gaulle's proposition and opted for complete autonomy, and they received their independence in June 1960 (Amin et al., 2022). Thus, one of de Gaulle's conditions for French West African independence was the currency question because all African states in the French Community used the CFA Franc (Franc of French Colonies in Africa) pre-independence (Shanguhyia & Falola, 2018).

Therefore, full autonomy meant political, social, and economic freedom from France, so Guinea and Mali created their currency, the Guinea Franc (GNF) and Malian Franc (MLF) (Amin et al., 2022). However, as was to be expected, France applied severe pressure on these countries who dared to ask for full autonomy, and Guinea showed resilience by maintaining the currency, but Mali returned to the CFA Franc in 1984 (Harshé, 2019).

The CFA Franc, *Franc des Colonies Françaises d'Afrique* (FCFA), was created in December 1945, placing France at the epicentre of any transaction between the CFA zone and the world (Taylor, 2019). France made sure to peg the CFA to the French Franc, which the Euro replaced (Nabakwe, 2002). Thus, due to the post-world war New World Order, the American dollar-dominated global trade which means any export and import by the CFA countries must be transacted in the US dollar with the French Franc acting as the intermediary (Taylor, 2019). Thus, from 1945 to the 'year of Africa' or the independence years, any export or import regarding the land of West Africa was 100% managed and controlled overtly by France

(Shanguhyia & Falola, 2018). As part of the deal, upon which General de Gaulle agreed to give independence to their African colonies despite the lucrative nature of their colonial practice, the CFA Franc was to remain unchanged (Gazeley, 2022). Thus, France will be seen as a nation of human rights principles for giving back to its colonies their humanity and dignity, but, they continued impoverishing Africa and its people through neocolonialism discourse and practice (Harshé, 2019; Mokube, 2012).

At the dawn of independence, the French community zone was divided into two areas, with different banks designed to oversee currency management (Sylla, 2021). Another evidence of colonial hegemony here is divide to conquer. The *Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (BCEAO) was established in West Africa and the *Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun* (BCEAEC) was established in Central Africa (Shanguhyia & Falola, 2018). It is necessary to mention that although these two banks have African directors and managers, France has veto power that influences any executive proceeding that impacts the banks and, consequently, the CFA Franc (Internationalist, 2022). Furthermore, on top of everything we covered regarding the neocolonial nature of France's relationship with its former colonies, the CFA Franc is printed by the Banque de France in Chamalieres in France and then distributed by the two central banks mentioned above, with France having veto power on the executive process (Amin et al., 2022). There are legitimate sovereignty questions here, as many African scholars argue that whoever has the monetary power, controls the political and developmental process (Mokube, 2012).

As the renowned Ivoirian economist Nicholas Agbohou argues, France has complete control of the CFA currency and of the countries forced to use it but unfortunately this receives insufficient interest from the international community (Nabakwe, 2002). Another African, Ndongo Samba Sylla, a Senegalese development economist, argues that CFA currency is designed to maintain Africa and African people in third-world economic conditions (Sylla, 2021). Sylla (2021), stated that the term neocolonial is outdated as the neocolonial system is now promoting a new word, Afro-liberalism; but, in essence, it is a neocolonialist method because African elites are signing trading deals with trans-multinationals against the interests of the African people. The CFA currency is the most significant pillar sustaining the neocolonial project in contemporary French Africa (Nabakwe, 2002). It is used to subjugate and exploit the global South natural resources, intellect, human resources, and cultural knowledge for their benefit and to

advance the global North's sciences and civilization (Boateng, 2010; Shanguhyia & Falola, 2018). Agbohou argues that France's total control of the CFA makes it impossible for African businesses to access credit to develop their scientific ideas and innovations and as result most African inventors die with their ideas or lend them to their white counterparts who have access to bank credits (Nabakwe, 2002). One thing is sufficiently clear: neocolonialism is perpetuated by the CFA currency and the only way to real development and self-determination for Africa and its people is to get rid of the colonial instrument- the CFA- and create a common currency owned and managed by Africans for Africans.

Neocolonisation by International Organisations

The international organisations, including the governmental and nongovernmental organisations in the earlier and current history are institutionalized colonialist and neocolonialist structures in exogenous and endogenous dispositions. Exogenously, all the United Nations allied bodies and the Bretton Woods institutions were founded and continue to operate in the upward infinitum of relating with African nations as colonial and neocolonial materials, that receive demeaning treatment in every strategic decision and execution of collective agreements (Okafor, 2020). Technically, African nations are grouped in the United Nations as the group of nations that cannot contribute to critical and strategic decision making but are the ones whose future and resources constitute the object of interests in critical and strategic decisions. They only receive abiding decisions in the areas of health, economy, culture, environment, geopolitics, etc., which covertly subjugate African human and natural resources for exploitation by the league of colonialists and neocolonialists. This is found in the logical framework of policy making in the developing nations of which the majority are found in Africa, who design their domestic socioeconomic policies following the template of the United Nations solely designed by the powerful (veto powers) league of colonialists and neocolonialists manning the institution (Okafor, 2022; Odijie, 2022; Watson, 2013; Murphy & Zhu, 2012). The African continent with her plurality (54 member nations) in the United Nations cannot access the resources contributed to in the United Nations except if the resources are spent according to the prescription of the neocolonialists who use such avenues to impose their interests on the African nations for continuous subjugation. For instance, virtually all the money borrowed from

the World Bank, IMF, Paris Club, and donations from the allied bodies of the United Nations are permanently used to condition the African nations to champion the European and American socioeconomic interest to the detriment of the African population.

Endogenously, virtually all the nongovernmental organizations originating from Europe, America, Canada, Australia, Asia, etc., and even the African regional organizations, are unconsciously metamorphosing and operating as conduit for colonial and neocolonial programs visible in the type of agenda and programs they focus on, how and where such programs are specifically carried out (Eneasato, 2020; Okafor, 2020; Segell, 2019; Ziai, 2020; Tusasiirwe, 2023). Regional organizations in Africa, beginning from the African Union, have become the mouthpiece of the colonialists and neocolonialists who find their way into the nuke and crannies of the continent via gifts, donations, loans, and vertical bilateral relations. At each stage, these organizations function effectively as tools in the hands of the colonial and neocolonial League of Nations in subjugating and subsuming the African nations into the cloud of colonial and neocolonial domination.

International agencies continue to pursue their own interests and agenda in Africa under the cover of aid and donations. Aid is disguised as an act of responsibility former colonisers are taking to address the colonial legacies of their impoverished colonies and thus aid is given with the attitude of pity and white saviour for the poor African nations. However contrary to this colonial narrative presented by neocolonialists, the truth remains that aid agencies and international institutions like IMF and World Bank thrive on creating debt cycle for the so-called least developed countries. The lucrative business of lending money explains why these international institutions give aid in terms debt cancellation but add new debts/loans for these countries (Yadav et al, 2023). In the words of Dambisa Moyo (2009) systematic aid from international agencies is dead aid for Africa but very lucrative/profitable for neocolonialists who use it as a tool of entry, control, domination, conditionalities, and exploitation of African nations. Despite decades of aid from neocolonialists, indigenous Africans continue to plunge in absolute poverty and suffering as African governments are given conditionalities to cut social spending on basic services for the masses like health care, housing, water, and sanitation.

Statistics show an increase in aid flows to Africa and Asia with former colonisers like the United Kingdom among the top ten bilateral donors

since the 1970s (OECD, 2018). It is not a coincidence that the proliferation of aid agencies in Africa coincided with African countries obtaining 'technical independence from colonisers for example Uganda joined United Nations, 16 days after its 'independence' from the British colonisers and with UK being among the nations with veto powers in the UN and Uganda does not, the power of decision making still lies in former colonisers. As Higgins (2016, p.162) argues, most of the UN conventions and protocols arise out of a limited cultural frame of reference achieved by compromises and assumptions that effectively reinforce hegemonic tendencies". With aid agencies comes a unidirectional flow of experts from the global North to the global South. It is extremely rare to find an equal flow of expatriates from the global South to the North. Some of the expatriates 'follow or come with the money'. An example is the British expatriates who oversee the Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE), a donor-led cash transfer programme targeting older people in Uganda. Despite the existing human resources in Uganda, SAGE's pilot program was led by Maxwell Stamp, a British private consulting company while its evaluation was led by a team of consultants from Oxford Policy Management. It is indeed expensive to pay these expatriates, buy them insurance, rent them first class housing, buy cars, and rent posh offices. It is unsurprising that older people, the targeted beneficiaries receive $10 dollars while the lion share of the budget goes into administrative costs of running the programme (Tusasiirwe, 2023). Thus, international aid agencies continue to make a mockery of the extreme poverty indigenous Africans are experiencing as they enrich themselves through control, domination and accumulated interests.

Ongoing Colonisation and Neocolonialism in Research

The knowledge-based economies we currently experience have been shaped by the historical process of colonisation and the intricate mechanics of modern-day global neocolonialism (Connell et al.,2017). During the colonial era, indigenous knowledge holders were killed or inducted to learn Western traditions creating a class of the learned; the teachers, priests, engineers, lawyers, and researchers drawn into the new terms of colonial society. The elite social class became the bearers of the truth, through which knowledge was transferred across generations. The colonialists-built knowledge systems based on their homelands; institutionalised, applied, reproduced, and transformed through schools, and universities. Lal (2004) noted that any conquest is prominently a conquest of knowledge and that the

effects of colonisation continue through the domination of knowledge. To the present day, the lasting impacts of colonial history affect various areas of knowledge, especially in universities where epistemologies of the South are rooted in knowledge systems and perspectives from non-European societies, thus having complex and strong connections with the epistemologies of the North (Chilisa, 2012). Connections that cannot be isolated or disconnected but deeply established over decades, characterised by tensions, and constantly evolving (Connell et al., 2017), influenced by current western powerful bodies.

International bodies like the World bank, United Nations and World Health Organisation are governed and funded by Western countries and position themselves as 'knowledge institutions' (Connell et al., 2017), fronting international research agendas. Collins and Rhoads (2010) criticised the World bank for its neocolonial influence in reproducing Western nations' hegemony through higher education policies where partnerships with the developing economies are spearheaded by western influential partners fronting their agenda. It is argued that some research paradigms overlook the contextual understanding of the African research populations and areas, fronting a one-size fits all approach in the application of epistemological paradigms and ethical guidelines, with a lack of accommodation of traditional knowledge (Nabbumba, Tusasiirwe and Kansiime, 2023). Nonetheless, with collaboration and/or sanctions imposed, the so-labelled less developed countries often engage in research delineated and funded by international organisations. Some of the research funded contributes towards world statistics rather than problem solving for the local populations. Consequently, the research paradigms and instrumentations are Eurocentric and western case studies are given more relevance compared to non-western societies (Alvares, 2011).

'Former' colonisers also continue to "support" their colonies in funding research projects to fulfil their agenda and show a sense of philanthropic gestures toward colonies. Funding African and regional research remains challenging for developing economies hence many African researchers and universities rely on external and western funding. Research is often formulated in foreign languages to align with the funders' linguistic contexts. More generally in academia, the concept of colonial heritage is evident where research findings are translated and disseminated in foreign languages to align with the official language of the colonisers, e.g., English, French, and Portuguese (Tonen-Wolyec et al., 2022). The English dominance

in academia is indisputable across the research process and in research publication.

The publication of research is influenced by journal rankings that are viewed to favour the western scholars. Journals published in non-English languages tend to not rank well by common standards. Hence top research journals and articles disproportionately represent authors from Western Europe, North America, and Oceania (Lynch et al., 2021). In their study of neocolonialism in academic journals, Murphy, and Zhu (2012) explain that Western scholars' dominance in journal leadership as journal editors consequently influences the journal's interests, the selection of special issues, networks of reviewers and journal audience and content. Where partnerships are sought out for benefits of internationalisation of higher education, these are mostly between West-West or Eurocentric and Anglo-American collaborations leading to a dominance of Anglo-American scholars in top research journals and the exclusion of most developing regions (Murphy and Zhu, 2012; Tonen-Wolyec et al., 2022). Western scholars as principal investigators on projects in the developing countries contribute to top class journals for benefits of recognition as international scholars (Keim, 2011), and African researchers are less likely to be in esteemed author positions of journal articles (Tonen-Wolyec et al., 2022).

In research on international sociology, Kiem (2011) noted that for African research to be published, it needs to follow the internationalisation, empiricalisation and standardisation prepaid out by journals using Western research concepts and frameworks that appeal to western editors. Quality African research that does not fit these standardisations is often excluded. While African scholars have made efforts to create their own journal and intellectual spaces, the journals are invariably lower ranked, hence scholars continue to question the metrics used, relevance and impact of journal ranking to international research and scholarship (Ozbilgin, 2009; Murphy and Zhu 2012; Tonen-Wolyec et al., 2022). This neocolonial dominance of intellectual production results in international inequity and the transnational power imbalances in intellectual production. Consequently, intellectual property and ownership of research outputs are still left to western entities and scholars, rather than the African scholars. In their study on authorship of COVID 19 research conducted, Tonen-Wolyec et al., (2022) explained that asymmetrical relationships persist between African and non-African partnerships in field research. In Western and African scholar partnerships,

western scholars control the data processes, management, sharing, and digital infrastructures for data production and consumption (Adebe et al., 2021).

Conclusion: A Call to Action

The contribution that this paper seeks to make is to expose ongoing colonisation and neocolonisation in and of Africa to create knowledge and consciousness of masses in Africa and worldwide so that they can strongly pursue the true decolonisation of Africa. We argue that the pity and charity approach dominating in Africa is a pretence and mockery of the continent from colonialists and neocolonialists, as the African proverb states *Enyonyi kurizikurira oburo zikareka kukushekyerera*!! (Possible translation: it is bad enough for birds to eat your millet, but they make it worse by adding 'laughing at you' for example through singing their morning songs or singing as they fly away). As a way forward, the authors call strongly for Six Rs: Responsibility; Reparations, Restoration and Return of stolen land and natural resources, Resistance by African masses, and anti-colonialists in the West; Renunciation. Regarding responsibility, most Western nations that colonised and are still neocolonising Africa have never taken responsibility for the colonial legacies and the impoverishment of African people.

We call for honesty and for governments to take responsibility for the past and colonial present characterised by land dispossession, ecocide, financial resources theft and other forms explored earlier. Taking responsibility for colonial legacy and neocolonisation requires the colonialists to start serious reparations, restoration and return of stolen land and natural resources. Reparation, restoration and return of stolen resources is the true decolonisation of Africa. Africans must continue or if not yet started embark on resistance of ongoing colonisation and neocolonisation. Africans need to know that Western Nations have never had the interests of African masses at the centre. These nation states are in Africa to exploit its natural, material, human resources to enrich themselves. Knowing the true interests of colonisers and neocolonialists should stir resistance and not admiration of their presidents and other representatives when they come to Africa. We can learn from current resistance of French colonies of Burkina-Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, calling out France and its lies. Finally, we call for Renunciation and complete stop of broad day light theft of financial resources happening in for example the French colonies still paying colonial debt since the 1960s and where the CFA Franc currency remains imposed. Renunciation involves the governments of Western countries, for instance

calling back their multinational corporations that are perpetuating ecocide and ensuring that the local communities are repaid for the impact of loss of their natural resources and sources of livelihood.

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Jack Caldwell's Contribution to African Social Science and Health

Helen Ware
University of New England
hware@une.edu.au
and
David Lucas
Australian National University

Introduction

We discuss the contribution of Professor John Caldwell (1927-2015) to African social sciences and health studies, in the decades after 1962. He was universally called Jack, often to the surprise of students from more hierarchical societies. As Professor Kofi Awusabo-Asare wrote, 'With my Ghanaian background, I could not comprehend how I could call an older person and also my professor, by his first name.' (Larson no date:1) Jack had a worldwide reputation. ln 1985, the Population Association of America presented him with its highest prize, the Irene B. Taeuber Award for excellence in demographic research. ln 1994 he began a four-year term as the elected President of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and, in 2004, he was presented with the United Nations' Population Award.

A 2009 survey of 730 members of the IUSSP ranked Caldwell as the most respected demographer of all time, ranked 1 for being the "Most important for demography as a science", narrowly beating technical demographer John Bongaarts. Thomas Malthus, the 18th century political economist, was ranked fourth (Van Dalen and Henkens 2012: Table 7).

Jack was better known in universities across Africa than in Australia. This was partly because interest in demography in Australia is strongly focused on immigration, which increasingly defines the nation. This was also because he did not interrupt his passion for research and travel by taking on higher levels of administration. In contrast, Anthony Low, another of Australia's most distinguished Africanist scholars, held various senior administrative positions before becoming the sixth Vice-Chancellor of ANU.

Jack's main pleasures were history, politics and, of course, a combination of demography and travel. He was prepared for the rigours of West Africa by teaching at the village school in Nabiac in rural New South Wales, where he and his wife Pat lived in a house without piped water or electricity. ln the early 1970s Jack, Pat and Bruce Caldwell and Helen Ware travelled by Land Rover from London to Lagos and later from Lagos via Rwanda to Dar es Salaam, crossing deserts and jungles. at a time when most roads remained innocent of any tar, but the route was at least peaceful. Their son, Bruce Caldwell (personal communication) has written

> my parents did not see travel as incidental to their research. lt was a fundamental part of it. A way of knowing and experiencing the world, and affording the opportunity for finding out more, particularly by constantly asking questions of anyone with views and experiences, not least the locals.

This distinguished Jack from many other notable demographers, who frequently were of the armchair variety, sitting in air-conditioned offices analysing data imported from developing countries. Tim Dyson (Larson, no date, p.7) noted: "Indeed it seemed that wherever I went in the world, the Caldwells were either there, or had been there, or they were expected to be there tomorrow."

Jack published 25 books,128 book chapters and 139 journal articles (Douglas, Hull, and McDonald, 2016). Many of these referred to Africa. Most of Caldwell's work within the social sciences was on the core demographic topics of fertility, mortality and morbidity, and migration. As well as high fertility in Africa he also looked at abnormally low fertility in Central Africa (Caldwell and Caldwell 1983). Jack also wrote about sexual networking, the Sahelian drought, age misstatement, female genital mutilation, and many other African topics.

In 1962, he joined the staff of the University of Ghana where he published the first of his 27 books as *Population Growth and Family Change in Africa* (Caldwell 1968). His most highly cited articles on Africa covered rural-urban migration, education and mortality decline, the cultural context of high fertility, and the social and cultural context of AIDS in Africa. Highly cited articles (over 500 citations) included the following: rural-urban migration (Caldwell 1969), education and mortality decline (Caldwell 1979),

the cultural context of high fertility (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987) and the social context of AIDS (Caldwell, Caldwell and Quiggin 1989)

Ghana 1962 to 1964

Jack's first academic appointment was at the University of Ghana which had gained full independence from the University of London in 1961. Since Caldwell's previous research had been on Southeast Asia, he was "wholly unprepared' for Africa, but was "fortunate enough to meet the pioneers of African demography in Princeton in 1961" (Caldwell 2003:159). Caldwell's facility with sample surveys was largely an African acquisition. ln Ghana he undertook eight social surveys, assisted by his wife Pat and son Peter, the first being a study of some 300 Ghanian University students which provided supplementary information for his study of the urban elite (Caldwell 1965). His elite study: *Population Growth and Family Change in Africa: The new urban elite in Ghana was* published in 1968. Kirk (1968: v-vi) was impressed that "a study on such a sensitive topic could be carried out successfully in a tropical African country". Kirk continued to confirm that Caldwell was the pioneer of studies of demographic transition in tropical Africa (Kirk 1996).

In *African Urban-Rural Migration* Caldwell's (1969) finding that rural children who received an education were more likely to migrate to towns, led some Ghanaian politicians to respond that the government should stop spending on rural primary schools. Jack learnt his lesson, even when your facts are correct, policy makers can draw the wrong conclusions. He was more successful in re-enforcing a human rights message when he advised the Nigerian government against instituting an identity card system which would have included the holder's tribal affiliation on the card and could have served to support the all too pervasive ethnic conflicts.

ln reviewing Jack's early books Ferraro (1977) commended him for his "thoroughness, meticulous attention to detail, insightfulness and concern for both methodological and policy issues'", characteristics that remained apparent throughout his career. ln research on contraception, the Caldwell led team "found that the major problem was not sensitivity about the issue but in the rural areas a difficulty in comprehending what we were talking about, and, among the academic and other elites, a deep suspicion that contraception was a practice so contrary to the African way of life as to be almost subversive" (Caldwell 2006:6-7). As Professors Awusabo-Asare and

Anarfi wrote decades later, Jack maintained his interest in Ghana and offered a standing invitation to any Ghanaian visiting Canberra.

Nigeria

The Caldwells first visited the University of Ibadan in April,1963, after the 1962 Nigerian Census had been cancelled. The highly politicized 1963 recount met with considerable antagonism, but preliminary results were published in 1968 in *The Population of Tropical Africa* by Jacks's joint editor Chukuka Okonjo. The book was based on the First African Population Conference held in Ibadan in January 1966, which coincided with "political disorders in that part of Nigeria (which) set the country on the path to civil war. Each night we watched the glow of parts of Ibadan burning" (Caldwell 2003:160).

The Changing African Family Project (CAF)

In 1971, with generous Population Council Funding, Jack established the Changing African Family Project which lasted until 1980 (Dr Ware was the Field Director). This program funded and collaborated with researchers across twelve African countries from Ghana to Sudan. They used demographic, anthropological, and sociological approaches to explore and understand the nature and trends of fertility and mortality shaping the many unique family systems across the continent. Jack's speculations on intergenerational flows of wealth and obligations fuelled debate about the likelihood of fertility decline at a time when the western world was investing heavily in family planning programs.

1976 marked Pat Caldwell's first contributions to academic journals with a joint article with Jack, Helen Ware, and Francis Okedeji on the Changing African Family Project (Okedeji *et al*., 1976). Pat's other articles with Jack in the same year in the *Journal of Biosocial Science* and in *Population Studies* respectively discussed contraceptive innovation and sexual abstinence amongst the Yoruba.

Jack's conclusion that fertility decline would be a long and slow process in Sub-Saharan Africa has been borne out by history. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are expected to contribute more than half of the global population increase which is anticipated from 2020 to 2050. Further, the projected increase in global population up to 2050 will be concentrated in just eight countries, five of which are in Africa: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. (United Nations 2022:5).

In 1993, Agnes Riedmann, an early career anthropologist from the University of Nebraska, published a revised version of her PhD *The Science that Colonizes,* attacking the three Nigerian CAF studies as being part of a Western plot to promote family planning. She did not allow Jack the courtesy of advance warning of this attack, even though he had granted her access to the CAF field papers for quite another purpose. Riedman argued that the authority of First World scientists to penetrate the Third World for research had its roots in the fifteenth century idea of a "right to invade". She aimed to popularize her idea of "World System Demography": a global, bureaucratically administered science controlled by the Western elite as agents of First World directed cultural imperialism. Essentially, she objected to the discussion of possibly limiting family size or using contraception in Africa as neo-colonial impositions. Either she made a generic assumption that all African women were not interested in controlling their fertility or she ignored those who did want access to contraception. African feminism did not score a mention. One clear finding of the CAF surveys was that many African women certainly did want to use contraception to space their births in the interest of the survival of their breastfeeding babies. Traditionally, spacing was achieved by sexual abstinence on the part of the wife, which was often facilitated by polygamy allowing the husbands access to alternative partners. As couples moved to the towns, polygamy became less practicable, and wives became interested in being able to space their births without alienating their husbands through enforced marital abstinence.

Riedmann's attack on Caldwell's research methods for being insufficiently culturally aware was ironic because he was one of the most anthropological in research style of all demographers. As Greenhaigh noted, Riedman managed to complain both that Jack was too curious because his demographic questions constituted an invasion of privacy and insufficiently curious because he did not use fully ethnographic methods (Greenhaigh 1995).

Caldwell's Contribution to Methodology

Caldwell was a pioneer in the use of mixed methods in social science research before they became fashionable in the 1980s.Caldwell played a pivotal role in the 1970s in the development of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) and contributed as a member of its Technical Committee. The WFS worked to organise comparable samples across 61 countries (Cleland and Scott 1987).

The dissatisfaction with the lack of contextual depth represented by much survey data led Caldwell to incorporate anthropological methods in the construction of small-scale demographic studies. John Cleland recalled a discussion with Jack, when visiting the WFS in London in 1979. Although somewhat sceptical about sample surveys, Jack was delighted that the draft instrument for Nigeria included questions about post-natal abstinence and sexual abstinence by grandmothers. "At the end of the discussion, he admitted that he was almost, but not quite, reconverted to the merits of large surveys." (Larson no date, p. 9). In 1987, Caldwell and Ruzicka (1987:770) recommended "new complementary research in a range of countries, less standardised than WFS, including more social and economic data, and often incorporating non-survey approaches."

In 1997, Tom Fricke, writing in a chapter on "Marriage change as moral change" stated that: "Surveying the field today, it is impossible to imagine an anthropological demography that fails to acknowledge the extraordinary impact of Jack Caldwell. In a series of watershed articles, papers and books ranging across substantive, theoretical, and methodological themes, Caldwell has helped to confer a new demographic legitimacy on the research strategies of anthropologists. Methodologically, the micro-demographic techniques formalized by him have encouraged more anthropologist to pursue demographic field-research while also drawing members of the demographic community towards new syntheses of these two traditions" (Kertzer and Fricke 1997). In theoretical work, Caldwell's modifications of demographic transition theory and his development of the wealth flows theory of fertility decline continue to motivate new studies and commentary. Substantively, his contributions to the study of fertility and family transition in multiple contexts are landmark empirical studies of the time in their settlings.

Jack believed deeply that researchers could not gain a good understanding of demographic phenomena without being steeped in the cultures where the behaviour applied. He practiced by this by meeting face-to-face with the subjects of the research in their own environments. His belief was that this experience should inform quantitative surveys, leading to the development of theoretical modelling, which was also underpinned by the experience to be gained from the historical records in the western world. Jack consistently supported the insights and careers of local researchers whether they were demographers or not.

ln a paper presented at the 2013 IUSSP international Population Conference in Busan, Miranda-Ribeiro and Simao commented on the "explosion of articles dealing with qualitative methodology" which followed the path of Caldwell, Knodel and Greenhalgh. They cited Wajman and Rios-Neto who stated that "Demography should strive to become more of an interdisciplinary science, training more 'Caldwells' and fewer pure statisticians." However, having completed a content analysis of three major peer-review journals they concluded that "the number of papers based on qualitative methods is still quite small" (p.1). One of the three journals they explored was *Demography,* the cover of which at that time contained the definition of this noun as "the statistical study of human populations". This was not Jack's favoured choice of journal: he preferred *Population Studies,* where he had a long-standing relationship with David Glass and Eugene Grebenik its co-editors since the 1940s, or the *Population and Development Review.*

Jack was certainly not a linguist. Like so many native-born Australians he was an English-speaking monoglot. However, he was extremely interested in language and issues related to the translation of concepts such as "family" and "family planning", and, more specifically, "household" in polygamous contexts. This is an area largely and wrongly neglected in demography, with most analysts ignoring possible non-sampling errors which could distort their findings.

There was also the practical question of a lack of equivalence (see Lucas and Ware 1977) of whether and how people could discuss a concept if they did not have the words to describe it. He insisted on translation and retranslations of questionnaires to ensure that meanings were indeed conveyed. This is how the CAF team discovered early on that written Yoruba often took on the Biblical tone of the first regional version of the language, created by Bible translators. Early drafts of questionnaires had asked women the equivalent of how many children they had "begotten". In another example, a pre-trial of a survey in Nigeria found that a literary style translation from English to Yoruba led to lower response rates in poorer areas than in areas that were better off (Caldwell 1974:17)

Riedmann attacked Jack for insisting that women be repeatedly encouraged to state the number of children that they wanted. He did this in partly to see whether they could imagine having any say in the matter, or this was truly "up to God". (See also Lucas & Ukaegbu 2008.) Another question asked women what they would do if they had five daughters and no sons,

again a common response was that they would accept that God intended them to have daughters. Jack would happily have been one of the first to accept that explaining each of five methods of contraception to respondents was introducing these women to a whole new world of possibilities.

Intergenerational Wealth Flows

The grand theory for which Jack is most famous is his intergenerational wealth flow theory which he summarised as:

> The fundamental thesis is that fertility behaviour in both pre-transitional and post- transitional societies is economically rational within the context of socially determined economic goals and within bounds largely set by biological and psychological actors.
>
> Two types of society can be distinguished: one of stable high fertility, where there would be no net economic gain accruing to the family (or to those dominant within it) from lower fertility levels, and the other in which economic rationality alone would dictate zero reproduction.
>
> The former is characterised by "net wealth flows" from younger to older generations, and the latter by flows in the opposite direction. These flows are defined to embrace all economic benefits both present and anticipated over a lifetime (Caldwell 1978:553).

In the Introduction to his *Theory of Fertility Decline* (Caldwell 1980:225) proposed a "mechanism through which mass education produces changes in fertility" by reversing the intergenerational direction of wealth flows.

Willis (1982:207-8) recognised "the singular importance" of the series of papers in which Caldwell had argued that "a shift from familial to non-familial modes of production and the introduction of mass education. Both of which raise the costs of children and undermine the moral basis of intergenerational relationships within the traditional family". An element of this theory which is exceptionally important in the African context concerns the role of the eldest child, usually the eldest son. Here the parents choose to maximise their educational investment into the eldest son in the expectation that this son will earn enough to be able to make a significant contribution into the educational costs of his younger siblings.

Caldwell (1982) admitted that devising a complete range of tests for his theory had proved elusive. In 1994 Thomas Dow and colleagues argued

that wealth flowed upwards to parents in rural Kenya, but their data was limited. A 1997 study of resource flows in Ivory Coast (Stecklov 1997) was unusual in being able to use empirical data for 1.596 households from the 1986 *Living Standards Measurement Study* for the World Bank to measure intergenerational wealth flows in a very high fertility context. Contrary to Caldwell's thesis, in the Ivory Coast wealth flows were downward from parents to children and most of the life cycle was spent in debt. "The discounted sum of earnings minus consumption is less than zero for all ages until almost 50" (p. 534). Stecklov' s conclusion was that, in a society where very few could access old age pensions, high fertility could be a rational means of attempting to provide for old age security, even if, on balance, children cost more to rear than they returned to their parents in total. By 2022 the Total Fertility Rate in Ivory Coast had fallen to 4.3 births, perhaps showing that the impact of the costs of education upon wealth flows and family size takes decades to manifest itself (World Bank 2023).

Caldwell's theory continues to be debated in discussions of African fertility. As recently as 2019, Kwaghga and colleagues were "Reappraising the relevance of intergenerational wealth flow theory for fertility transition in Guma Local Government Area, Benue State", Nigeria. Basically, they found that fertility transition had yet to begin because modernisation had yet to arrive. This was a farming community where only half the population was literate Fully 90% could explain why they saw children as assets, only 10% thought that children caused economic problems or "more children, more problems". For the great majority children provided old age security, farm labour, respect for the parents, enhanced marital stability, income and protection for the family, psychological support, family continuity and befitting burials. Although 90% were Christian and 5% Muslim, the role and needs of the ancestors were still immensely important; multiple children and especially sons were vital to demonstrate respect for the ancestors. As one man explained: "All our possessions belong to the [extended] family – children, farmlands, prestige, money, and love. We have done everything possible to ensure its continuity "(p.203).

Looking at these findings by a group of Nigerian researchers committed to trying to understand their own culture on its own terms, Jack was indeed right about the many features of African life, including polygamy, which then protected and still protect high fertility. In the 2000s, 28% of the Nigerian population still lived in polygamous households (Nigerian National Population Commission 2007). Jack argued that children supported their

parents economically, a Tiv respondent in Benue put it rather differently. Marriage "helps young persons to give grandchildren to their parents while alive. For girls, it gives them the opportunity to repay their parents [with grandchildren] before they die" (Kwaghga p.202). Educated women can have numerous children and be in the paid labour force, because servants are very cheap or may be extended family members who work for free in return for board and lodging and possibly some access to education.

In 2023 Desmond Klu of the University of Health and Allied Sciences in the Volta Region of Ghana asked: "Are fertility theories still relevant in explaining fertility behaviour in traditional and contemporary societies in sub-Saharan Africa?" His systematic review covered five classic fertility theories: Child Survival, Intergenerational Flow of Wealth, Relative Income, Demand and Supply, and Value of Children. His argument is that these theories do indeed help in understanding how traditional values and institutions encourage high fertility. However, their predictions that modernity would be accompanied by lower fertility have not been significantly borne out. The reality is that "traditional values still play a vital role in fertility behaviour and are deeply entrenched in fertility decisions in the subregion" (p.11). His major criticism of Caldwell's theory was that

> members of an altruistic older generation will see offspring success as a substitute for their own and will therefore be willing to invest in offspring human capital at a higher rate than would be predicted if parents were acting solely in their own self-interest" (p.5).

Klu acknowledges that the empirical studies of the motivations of fertility behaviour of African women "were conducted in very small geographical settings [and] may not be generalisable to all of sub-Saharan Africa" (p.15). One problem with linking theory to parents' behaviour is the common assumption that parents' beliefs about facts such as the economic value of children or levels of child mortality are the same as the realities on the ground and that therefore it is enough to theorise from facts without having to deal with beliefs. Another approach by Myroniuk and Payne (2019) looks at the longitudinal dynamics of household composition and wealth in rural Malawi to see how households change and how his affects livelihoods.

African Sexuality

From 1977, much of the Caldwells' research attention shifted to South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) where he fine-tuned the micro-approach working with South Asian scholars. Visitors and students from Asia and Africa still flocked to the ANU to learn about "Caldwellian methods". Another area where Jack's research aroused lively controversy concerned the nature of African sexuality. Jack argued that there was a distinct African sexuality, others disagreed (Le Blanc *et al*. 1991, Ahlberg 1994, Heald 1999, Amfred 2004, Epprecht 2010). Undie and Benaya (2008) argued that the Caldwell's article, despite its theoretical gaps and weaknesses, was useful as a fruitful starting point for discussing African sexuality. Jack's view was that whilst Eurasia (for him stretching as far as China) attached moral and religious value to sexual activity, in contrast, sexual activity in Africa was free and had no moral value. Men had much sexual freedom in both cultures, but women were only free in Africa (Caldwell 1989, p.194 and p.197). Any such vast generalisation will always be open to criticism by researchers with specific local knowledge of particular ethnic groups. In this case there is the added complexity that there was general agreement that Christian missionaries had battled to change attitudes to female chastity (and to polygyny) but much less agreement as to the situation prior to the arrival of these missionaries. There has been far less discussion of the impact of Islam upon African sexuality, and the lower levels of HIV infection amongst Muslims as compared to Christians across 38 African countries may well be as much attributable to Muslim male circumcision and lower levels of alcohol consumption as to higher levels of female chastity.

In "The making of 'African sexuality': Early sources, current debates" Marc Epprecht (2010) pointed out that "the notion that Africans share a common sexual culture distinct from people elsewhere in the world has for many years been a staple of popular culture, health, academic, and political discourse in the West as well as in Africa." He argued that "the idea of a singular African sexuality remains an obstacle to the development of sexual rights and effective sexual health interventions" and went on to ask, "what can we learn about the making of 'African sexuality' as an idea in the past that may suggest ways to challenge its enduring, harmful impacts in the present?" Epprecht (2010: 768) described how, in modern times,

> African sexuality has been invoked to explain the high rates of HIV/AIDS in much of the [African] continent (and by implication in the diaspora). An influential article by Australian demographers Caldwell, Caldwell, and Quiggin (1989) surveyed the ethnography to conclude that Africans were less prone to feel guilt, less concerned with female virginity or fidelity, and hence more relaxed toward having multiple sex partners than Asians or Europeans.

Epprecht (p.776) stated that the claims of Caldwell and colleagues about there being a distinctive cross-African sexuality or pattern of sexual behaviour reflected in high levels of HIV/AIDS were disproved by the varying levels of seroprevalence across Africa from the heights of Southern Africa to the lows of Niger and Senegal. For example, a 2014 Map of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria (NACA 2014) shows extraordinary variations by region from more than 8% to less than 1%. These scattered variations do not appear to follow religious, cultural, or geographic patterns. Both Caldwell and Epprecht were guilty of writing Africa when they meant Black Africa or Africa South of the Sahara. Epprecht cited Ahlberg (1994) and Stillwagon (2003) as amongst those having provided effective critiques of the Caldwell African sexuality thesis and the ethnography on which it was based. The problem is that proponents on both sides of the argument were much given to cherry picking reports from anthropologists and other experts who supported their own view of African sexual constraints, or the lack thereof, especially concerning pre-marital sex and adultery for females, with both behaviours assumed to be standard for men.

Jack was the editor of *The Health Transition Review* (HTR), funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and published out of the ANU. HRT's focus was on "the cultural, social, and behavioural determinants of health" with the aim of accumulating knowledge to improve health and reduce mortality. Although it had global scope, it also had a significant role in publishing information about Africa which would otherwise have remained obscure. One problem for many African researchers is still that they have little access to the world stage which restricts their careers and. more importantly means that many generalisations are published without taking Africa into account. HTR helped correct this bias for the health sphere. HTR was published from 1991 to 1997 and all issues are available on JSTOR. The final 1997 issue contained a series of Supplements on HIV/AIDS in Africa.

HIV/AIDS in Africa

In the late 1980s Dr Aaron Fink proposed that male circumcision could prevent the spread of HIV infection in the United States. In 1989 Bongaarts and colleagues published a study on "The relationship between male circumcision and HIV infection in African populations" in the journal AIDS. Caldwell was a staunch proponent of the role of male circumcision (MC) in preventing the spread of HIV/AIDs in those areas of Africa where MC was the cultural norm. In 1996 he and Pat publicised their views in the highly influential *Scientific American.* By 2005 Auvert and colleagues were able to report on a randomised, controlled trial of MC in South Africa which showed that MC did serve to significantly reduce the risk of contracting HIV/AIDs. Further trials were carried out in Kenya and Uganda. This was a clear example of Jack's being able to use his international prestige to promote good policy for the benefit of Africans. Unfortunately, the special conditions in Africa where heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS was the norm, were ignored in the academic warfare over whether Western male babies should be circumcised to prevent HIV/AIDS transmission in a context where it was mainly associated with male-to-male sex. The Caldwells' research also helped to provoke African researchers to publish their own research on African responses to circumcision and HIV/AIDS.

Jack's Legacy

In Africa Jack worked with local collaborators, including student researchers, many of whom later used this experience to gain entrance to graduate programs in overseas universities. Furthermore, he published widely with African scholars, a prime example being Israel Olatunji 'Tunji' Orubuloye, who gained his PhD at the Australian National University in 1977 and ultimately became Vice Chancellor of Afe Babalola University, Nigeria. He first published with Jack in 1975 (Orubuloye and Calwell 1975) and many articles were co-authored with Jack and Pat in the 1990s (see list on the Afe Ba Babalola University web site, 2022).

Although Jack later worked for a long time in Asia, he was always an Africanist at heart and stressed that his formative experience of field research was African based. He was a master at encouraging African students and colleagues to become all round researchers and over the years these came to include a vice chancellor, professors, and government ministers.

The first two Nigerian PhDs in Demography graduated from the ANU in 1958, both went on to work for the United Nations. Three more

Africans gained doctorates in the 1970s, with two working on Changing African Family data. All three went on to become Professors at African Universities (Lucas 2003). Jack's international reputation was such that he was still attracting African students to the ANU well after he retired in 1995. At the Australian National University, there is a John C. Caldwell PhD Scholarship. Caldwell Scholars are to be citizens of African countries who are working in the fields of epidemiology, population health and demography. Some 80 boxes of Jack's research papers and correspondence are preserved in the Australian National University Archives (2002)

A final question remains, 'Will there ever be another Jack Caldwell?' and the answer must be in the negative. Interest in population growth flourished in the 1970's and research funds were readily available from the ANU and international donors. In the ANU's Research School of Social Sciences, 'god' Professors without teaching obligations then had the freedom to choose their research topics and to select the geographic locations to focus on.

The Authors

Helen Ware has a doctorate in the historical sociology of prostitution and the law. She was introduced to demography through editing texts on Africa. Through the 1970s she was field-director of the Changing African Family Project spending half the year in Africa and half at ANU. She has worked with the Australian Human Rights Commission; the Australian Government's aid agency AIDAB/AusAID and was Australian High Commissioner to Zambia, Malawi, and Angola in the 1980s. She has been Inaugural Professor of Peace Studies at the University of New England in Armidale, Australia, since 2002.

Between 1959 and 1973 David Lucas worked for the Governments of Basutoland/Lesotho and Kenya as a statistician and as the Population Council's Demographic Adviser at the University of Lagos. Since 1976 he has been a demographer at the Australian National University.

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Power to the People - A Review of Decolonial and Community Driven Conservation of African Elephants

Rachael B Gross
Fenner School of Environment and Society
Australian National University

Abstract

Increasing human-elephant conflict is a recurring issue and the overarching recommendation for elephant management across Africa is to invest time, finances, and planning into community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). In this paper, I outline what CBNRM currently looks like in Africa, and how it may look in the future of elephant conservation.

Introduction

Kamau and Sluytor (2018) demonstrate that colonisation fundamentally changed the relationship between humans and elephants in Kenya. By showing the relationship before, during and after colonisation they demonstrate how formerly flexible and collaborative interactions turned into a binary model of human versus elephant (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). As elephant habitat becomes more fragmented, resources deplete in response to climate change and human populations continue to grow, it is evident that a human versus elephant model is unsustainable and detrimental to both parties (Gross & Heinsohn, 2022). As with many colonised continents, the value and success of local people's natural resource management is being realised in Africa. The reintroduction of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is heralded as a new ethical phase of conservation and as pressure on elephant populations increases, it is necessary to adapt conservation policy and management in the most effective and ethical way. While CBNRM is pivoted around endorsing elephant and landscape management by local communities, it is not a clear-cut solution.

Firstly, as Kamau and Sluytor (2018) show, time and resources need to be dedicated to repairing the relationship between humans and elephants without the influence of Westerners and on the terms of local people. This relationship will be key to the successful and meaningful integration of CBNRM into

conservation of elephants in Africa. Secondly, local people must have full autonomy over the definition and implementation of CBNRM which is not necessarily the case for many protected areas claiming to use CBNRM. There is still also an inherited "us" versus "them" mentality built into CBNRM between local people and Western management (Chase et al., 2016). While Western management is analogous with colonisation and the associated trauma, there are technologies and methods that can be brought into CBNRM and work collaboratively with local knowledges and sciences. It is thus the aim of this review is to piece together the history of elephant management in modern African history and how it has changed with colonisation. I explore the strengths and weaknesses of both CBNRM and Western management to see which paths are available in the elephant management space that focus on best elephant conservation practice and the empowerment of local people on their land.

To compartmentalise elephants away from the ecology and society is antithetical to the core recommendations for this review and so, while we use elephants as a focal species, we will most commonly draw the point back to the landscape level. To follow in the footsteps of Kamau and Sluytor (2018), I have broken this review into three key components: the history of colonisation and CBNRM, the presence of colonisation in CBNRM and the future of decolonisation in CBNRM of African landscapes.

Premise

For change to be carried out, a need must be established. The need for CBNRM to become the norm in the management of elephants is mounting philosophically, ethically and in practice. In part, this is due to how African landscapes are changing dramatically and quickly because of the varying effects of climate change. In another part, this is because of colonisation becoming more apparent as African voices become louder and are heard more widely. What we know is that elephants are declining (Chase et al., 2016) and climate change is increasingly becoming a contributor to this (Gross & Heinsohn, 2022). Their role in ecology and society is critical and the way Western science perceives ecology and society as separate is inhibiting our ability to conserve elephants and their landscapes. The change being called for is founded on this information as a premise.

Elephant Decline

African elephants have experienced a 98% population decline in

200 years because of the ongoing colonisation of the African continent by several European nations (Adams & Mulligan, 2003; Chase et al., 2016). Colonisation introduced the most prominent causes of population decline: poaching ("illegal killing") for ivory, habitat fragmentation and destruction and more volatile human-elephant conflict (Adams & Mulligan, 2003; Chase et al., 2016). When there was a smaller human population, before colonisation began, there were ~20 million elephants across Africa and that number has since dropped to ~415,000 according to the 2016 census (Chase et al., 2016; Thouless et al., 2016).

Importance of Elephants

While elephants are prolifically a flagship species, they uniquely fall under all five species concepts. Most importantly, elephants are a keystone species (Haynes, 2012). Their innate behaviours in foraging, migrating and use of surface water shape the landscape around them, making them ecosystem engineers and landscape architects (Wall et al., 2013). Elephants are largely responsible for creating and maintaining savannah ecosystems which is indicative of their high, and irreplaceable, ecological value. As one of the "Big 5", elephants are also a critical part of the tourism industry and contribute significant economic value to many African countries (Spenceley & Snyman, 2017; Szott et al., 2019). Their combined ecological and economic value proposes the current case for their conservation. However, I argue that the most important value of elephants is cultural value. The primary reason is that, while largely overlooked in conservation management and policy, investment in the importance of cultural value is intrinsically linked to the success of ecological and economic values of elephants, especially in a climate change scenario.

African Ontology of Indigenous Sciences and Knowledges

To group all indigenous, First Nations, Aboriginal and local communities together across multiple continents is unethical and contributes to denying the self-determination of people/s that started during colonisation. It is not the role of the author to choose a label or delegate a term, especially to so many diverse and robust cultures within Africa. As such, I use multiple terms but use "local communities" most commonly as it is reflected most in the literature and is non-denominational and does not pre-assign a role to people. We also recognise that many of the theories and literature centre the experience and perspective of other First Nations communities and so we are

wary of drawing false equivalencies between African cultures. However, First Nations groups from across the globe face the same oppressor and oppressive systems because of colonisation and colonialism. The way to describe communities without detracting from self-determination and autonomy is not clear cut but here I aim to bring together history and ideas in this space to find the best way forward.

The history of colonisation in CBNRM

In this review, we refer to the foundations of colonisation summarised succinctly firstly by Smith (1999):

> …the colonisation of their [indigenous peoples] lands and cultures, and the denial of their sovereignty, by a colonising society that has come to dominate the shape and quality of their lives, even after it has formally pulled out.

And by Reeves (2009):

> European colonial power came to be based upon a series of separations and exclusions that cast colonised peoples and nature as being outside the 'ideals' of 'civilised' Europe and, therefore, inferior. The colonised were denied their individuality and diversity and treated as belonging to stereotyped classes: they were by marginalised by, and incorporated within, the colonial project, which was, in turn, driven by an overriding desire for order and control.

I emphasise that colonisation was not a single event but is an ongoing process of oppression and that it is an active threat against colonised nations, even if they have been 'liberated', the legacy of colonisation remains prevalent in shaping livelihoods and politics.

Enlightenment and Entitlement

The industrial and philosophical Western Enlightenment throughout Europe in the 18th Century introduced the idea of humans dominating nature (Krebber, 2011). Nature became a tool and commodity for humans to own and use for profit, and anthropocentrism became the core of Western science, lifestyle and philosophy (Krebber, 2011). As major European countries invaded and colonised other continents, where nature has

been treated as and centred around humanity, anthropocentrism also colonised the minds and spaces of Indigenous peoples. Eurocentrism and anthropocentrism created a rift between humans and nature, and all within as Western culture imposed that humans are superior to nature which has become entangled with human identity (Dressler et al., 2010a). On a deeper level, English and mathematics became the languages of science and nature in the motion of turning nature into something mechanical and easily disenchanted and has established a difficult socio-psychological barrier to overcome in the space of CBNRM (Krebber, 2011). Anthropocentrism is antithetical, on various levels and in many manifestations, to most Indigenous cultures and African cultures are no exception. The Western Enlightenment is the basis for how relationships were forced to change to accommodate Eurocentrism and how communities came to be in a philosophical and identity-entangled battle with their landscapes.

Protected Areas

The historical establishment of protected areas in Africa works on the same premise as the establishment of National Parks across the world – protecting land from humans (unless you can pay to access it) by displacing them from it. This is known as the Yellowstone Model (Wuerthner, 2015). This is more evident in some countries than others. It perpetuates the colonial notion that people are and should be separate from nature. The premise is the inherited assumption that humans have a negative impact on the landscape which justifies excluding them to protect it. In Africa, there is segregation of landscape into space for humans separate from wildlife, often reinforced by fences. While there were areas set aside for agriculture, most landscapes functioned on a more holistic and integrated approach with wildlife (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018).

For example, the pre-colonial tribes inhabiting the Maasai Mara region were partially nomadic and mobile. While this was not implicitly to coexist with wildlife, it did create a flexible relationship between humans and wildlife (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018; Ofcansky, 2007). There was also lateral violence between the tribes that meant this relationship was often changing to adapt to shifting geopolitics, but the premise of a holistically fluid relationship with the environment remained until colonisation (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). As Britain colonised Kenya, the land was claimed as property of the British Monarchy along with the inhabiting wildlife (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). Colonial administrators would only recognise land claims by agriculturists

and pastoral groups and not hunter/gatherers which favoured tribes like the Maasai and allowed the lateral violence between tribes to escalate beyond tribal warfare by allowing agricultural tribes to dominate hunter/gatherer tribes (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). This also effectively criminalised hunting, the life source of many tribes, and set the precedent for 'illegal poaching' punishable by incarceration or death which is the poaching system we know and admonish today (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018; Ofcansky, 2007). The establishment of protected areas also set the premise for habitat fragmentation as the land was set aside for conservation and cut off from other areas, such as railways opening more landscape to British settlement, that served as a hard line between elephants and access to resources outside protected areas (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018).

Criminalising hunting not only restricted cultural practice, but effectively starved hunter/gatherer tribes and made them more susceptible to lateral violence from pastoralist tribes (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). In contrast, game/trophy hunting concurrently became an active and highly sought-after sport for wealthy British tourists thus introducing a paradigm of Black poachers and White hunters (Ofcansky, 2007). As with hunting, being in 'protected areas' became criminalised (Daskin & Pringle, 2018; Frisbie, 2021b). The first act of the former military officers now in charge of protected areas was to remove all humans from the landscape they were ordered to protect (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). Since the British Monarchy had laid claim to all land and wildlife, wardens were able to 'resettle' people from protected areas (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). In Kenya, those who were not complacent were forced onto trucks, had their huts burned down, tracked and arrested or gunned down in the parks (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). This is how the relationship between humans and nature was fundamentally split into two and weaponised against each party, when the relationship became "us" and "them" where "us" is local communities and "them" is Westerners and the land/nature they took with them as they colonised.

A History of CBNRM

CBNRM did not start as a management strategy, but as a government experiment. Across Zimbabwe in the 1970s, the government experimented with the legislation of private land ownership. The government stated that if a private land holder can fence the perimeter of their property, then any wildlife that is within belongs to the landowner (Frost & Bond, 2008). In the 1980s, landholders (particularly agriculturalists) could earn more money from

the hunting and auctioning of wildlife than through livestock and agriculture (Frost & Bond, 2008). This saw a large-scale shift in land use from agriculture to wildlife conservation. Communities surrounding private land were not receiving any benefit while also losing local stocks of food supply. As a result, local districts of Zimbabwe were given the right to manage and benefit from wildlife that resided in community land (Mutandwa & Gadzirayi, 2007).

This model held a lot of benefits for the community and for independence from colonial strongholds in the conservation sector. Other countries followed suit, namely Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania. Namibia began designing and implementing CBNRM models in 1996 having had 20 years to learn from the history of the movement and has gone on to become one of the leaders in the CBNRM space. Namibia became the first country in Africa to incorporate environmental protection into its constitution. The government passed a law enabling communities to set up "conservancies", giving them the right to manage and benefit from their own natural resources. Since then, there has been a 47% increase in wildlife sightings in Namibia (since 2004), 132,000 km^2 of land is protected under community-based models and there are 59 community-led conservation areas set up to protected wildlife (WWF, 2019).

In other, more heavily colonised places such South Africa, there is still contention on land use. Where Eurocentrism and anthropocentrism is most prominent, the value of nature is still below that of humans. In the hierarchy of land use, conservation and local community occupation are both residual land uses that conflict with each other (Kepe & Hall, 2018). These places are where genuine CBNRM is needed the most for the survival of both wildlife and people, but where there is the most resistance and difficulty in implementation.

The Presence of Colonisation in CBNRM

Fortress Conservation

The Yellowstone Model focuses strongly on the assumption that protected areas and "wildernesses" are pristine and untouched by humans, which is antithetical to land-use by First Nations communities globally. A parallel model to this is Fortress Conservation. This is the idea that the best option for land and biodiversity is to be protected from human disturbance by setting up a fortress around the area and calling it protected from humans (Frisbie, 2021b). In Africa, we see this implemented through fencing under

the guise of conservation (Somers & Hayward, 2012). Fortress conservation runs on the premise that the only people who are allowed into protected areas (other than those 'protecting it') are those who can pay – tourists. This has led to conservation areas becoming recreation space for wealthier white people across Africa (Steinhart, 1989).



Fortress conservation has also introduced militarisation of conservation areas. Lunstrum (2014, 2015) described this as Green Militarisation. The militarisation draws from key colonial measures: military generals and ex-militia were the first park wardens and tasked with the construction of protected areas and brought with them military tactics to be used against locals (Lunstrum, 2014; Simlai, 2015). Further, anti-poaching units are predicated on military personnel, equipment and training (Lunstrum, 2014).

Poaching is also a side-effect of the Fortress Conservation effect as the fences and fortresses can be justified through the notion of keeping poachers out and keeping wildlife safe within them. This has allowed the militarisation of conservation efforts and in nations like South Africa has turned conservation into warfare between locals, often conflating subsistence hunting with illegal killing and associating locals with poachers (Lunstrum, 2015). Much of Green Militarisation stems from the process of colonisation

when former colonial military officers became park wardens and key strategists in establishing protected areas (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018; Lunstrum, 2015). Today, most anti-poaching units in South Africa are under the leadership and management of ex-military officials (Lunstrum, 2015). Further, many anti-poaching teams consist of locals and other Africans which is sanctioning lateral violence between locals and the teams, and the fractured relationship between locals and nature can become a complex issue of gatekeeping by the "us" in the "us" and "them" divide. It also allows the face of Green Militarisation to be Africans which, while exploitative, may make it more amenable when Africans are being paid for enforcing and, in theory, agree with the foundations of Fortress Conservation.

There has been a resurgence of Fortress Conservation in response to the resurgence in poaching, but the militarisation of conservation is politically unstable (Kelly & Ybarra, 2016), especially as the needs of the wildlife and landscape expand in response to a changing climate and dwindling resources. Fortress fences are a fallible solution that addresses a symptom and not a cause. They are a fortress of colonialism and not of protection as they are designed to appear.

Voluntourism and Ecotourism

Voluntourism and ecotourism programs have largely focused on money and not land which is often not how they are advertised. It is also a way to keep enforcing exclusionary models, like 'conservation' fencing, under the ruse of keeping wildlife in a protected area so volunteers and tourists who pay to come and see them will be able to. It does beg the question, particularly in private reserves, where the money from volunteer and tourism programs goes. Both the ecotourism and voluntourism industry relies heavily on taking advantage of the limited understanding and knowledge of Africa in the Western world (Stronza et al., 2019). Volunteers working with both people and wildlife may be under the impression of helping, when in many cases they are paying to perpetuate the "White Saviour" complex, a narrative that more civilised (white) outsiders are the only ones who can save Africans from their oppressed livelihoods because Africans are powerless and without agency to solve their own problems (Das & Chatterjee, 2015; Gatwiri, 2019; Stronza et al., 2019). Meanwhile, some countries still allow trophy hunting and canned hunting.

The idea of trophy hunting itself is controversial. The trade of wildlife and wildlife parts has been part of African cultures for millennia, and

there is the opportunity for a model to exist where communities stand to control and benefit from the hunting industry, but this is rarely the case, and the profit remains private and White (Ofcansky, 2007).

Tourism functions at very high profit and the conservation industry in Africa is deeply entangled with and dependent on tourism. While many of these companies hire local people, it is generally in lower paying roles like guides, cleaners and cooks. These staff are also only able to culturally engage with the landscape if it is for profit, like performing for tourists and wearing traditional and ceremonial clothing (Das & Chatterjee, 2015). This is not meaningful engagement or an act of reparation but exploitation of culture for profit and the white gaze, despite a long history of attempts to destroy and extinguish such culture. There appears to be a cognitive dissonance between wealthy tourists driving for hours through 'impoverished' towns and people arriving in an expensive and high-class resort style camps in a protected area.

Monopolising Science

Western conservation science is a product of colonialism that perpetuates ongoing colonial violence and facilitates neo-colonialism in African landscapes. In some cases, like that of Charles Darwin, science was a weapon of colonisation. As he travelled to places he was not invited to, he took observations and specimens without permission and published his findings without recognition of this or acknowledgment that most of his theories and observations were already recorded by Indigenous communities. He was among the first Western scientists to set this process as a precedent for oppressing knowledge and autonomy of First Nations people and set in motion the process that we now know as "Parachute Science" (Odeny & Bosurgi, 2022).

Western science, as we know it, has monopolised knowledge and how we practice science. However, the premise of science is that knowledge (and the pursuit of advancing it) is for everyone, and everyone should be able to contribute. Therefore, if Western science insists on co-opting science and knowledge there is an inherent obligation to make it accessible to everyone and open for everyone to contribute. As it stands, this scientific process does not accept (and in many cases, actively excludes) Indigenous and First Nations methodologies, languages and knowledges because they do not fit within a rigid framework (Genda et al., 2022; Odeny & Bosurgi, 2022).

The research industry is a proponent of neo-colonialism. Having monopolised science and scientific practice, Africa and its wildlife and people

have become a case study of the damage of parachute science, defined by the actions of researchers arriving in places in Africa, largely unannounced or invited by local people, extracting data and leaving. This approach to research lacks accountability and enforces the inherent extractive nature of research where the goal is perpetually getting data, regardless of the side effects. By not meaningfully engaging with the community, researchers are creating two problems with their research. Firstly, they are setting a poor precedent for collaboration and going through due ethical process to collect data (Odeny & Bosurgi, 2022). Secondly, researchers are missing the opportunity for better, historical and more robust data by not consulting and *collaborating* with local people who potentially hold intergenerational knowledge that is key for contextualising data (Genda et al., 2022). Parachute science is a disservice to the foundations of science and sets a dangerous precedent for continuing a long tradition of oppression without consequence. As one of the most studied species, elephant researchers are particularly guilty of this, especially given the cultural value of elephants and lack of procedure around studying them in a culturally sensitive manner.

Neo-colonialism in Africa – The Invention of Poaching

Neo-colonialism allows the ongoing oppression of First Nations peoples in deeply systemic ways. The most prominent way that neo-colonialism is present in the relationship between humans and elephants is poaching. The ongoing international perception of poachers is an active barrier to allowing local communities to manage elephant populations due to the "risk" of increased poaching. It is critical to highlight that 'poaching' under the Western definition conflates poaching with subsistence and cultural hunting, which has taken place (sustainably) on pre-colonial African landscapes for millennia, as did the trade of wildlife and wildlife parts (Ofcansky, 2007; Steinhart, 1989).

The elephant (and rhino) poaching crisis has been a global topic of discussion since the 1970s Green Movement when populations dropped dramatically low and began to impact tourism (Das & Chatterjee, 2015; Manrai et al., 2020). Since then, it has been sensationalised by media. The most critical point is that local communities did not have access, influence or the ability to defend themselves to these media. Consider the basis of poaching. Men from local communities break into protected areas and kill or injure elephants for their ivory to be sold on black markets, largely in China, Hong Kong and until recently, Britain (Greenfield, 2022). When news of

poaching or trophy hunting breaks, the international community mourns. A prime example of this is Cecil the lion, an infamous individual male lion who was a star of the tourism industry but killed by a trophy hunter just outside of Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe. The death of Cecil was in headlines around the world for weeks and sparked many ethical discussions about trophy hunting. To further how this was perceived, Cecil was shot outside a protected area where there were no anti-poaching patrols and locals were blamed for not protecting him, with suggestions that they had aided the trophy hunter, and bore as much blame as the hunter (Frisbie, 2021a; Greenfield, 2022).

People, most of whom have never been to Africa, react the opposite way to the news of the death of a poacher. Celebrating the death of a poacher, for the most part, is celebration of a colonised person being colonised and yet there is no public outcry or constructive discussion about the poaching industry. The death or incarceration of a poacher is met with a standing ovation, wishes for the same fate for all poachers and the glorification of either an excruciating death or a militarised execution (Greenfield, 2022). I argue that the death of a poacher is neither environmental nor social justice. While there are exceptions, individuals or groups who poach for greed, most poachers are not in the position by choice.

Colonisation functions on the premise of exiling local people from the land they have inhabited for millennia and then forcing new systems of economics and trade on those communities designed to intentionally impoverish and disempower them. If communities are offered enough money to survive in exchange for ivory, is poaching really a choice? Further, elephants hold cultural value in all the communities they have coexisted with. For example, the Waata people of the Maasai Mara region had a mutualistic relationship with elephants, especially during times of strained resources like drought. Where elephants would dig holes for water, the Waata people then accessed it for bathing, washing and cooking (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). During colonisation, the Waata people became the primary 'poachers' being persecuted by the colonial administration and are now the smallest and most marginalised group in the Mara Region because they were hunter-gatherers and not agriculturalists (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). The choice to hunt, injure or kill a culturally significant species for non-cultural means seems rarely a choice but an ultimatum between life and death given the value of ivory and state of many African economies post-colonisation. This creates a deadly dichotomy for local people between not being able to afford food but also not

being allowed to hunt for it either.

In a framework where elephants have been framed as the enemy – eating crops, raiding villages, injuring and killing people – the real choice seems to be between life and death. The poaching industry exists for the same reason any market does - consumer demand. There is a high demand for ivory which is entirely ornamental and comes from significantly wealthier economies (Moore, 2011; Moyle et al., 2014). African governments are not innocent in this issue as many, such as those in Botswana and Kenya, introduce hunting bans and burn ivory stockpiles for clout and to appear stronger and more effective to Western media and international conservation organisation (Moyle et al., 2014).

Further to the narrative of "Black poachers, White hunters" (Ofcansky, 2007), a review of hunting bans and benefits by the Luc Hoffman Institute showed that hunting and tourism were unrivalled in terms of narrowly defined economic benefits (Roe et al., 2020). However, there is power in leveraging communities to restore carbon and wildlife friendly products by providing incentives to use agricultural products that do not rely on poaching (Roe et al., 2020).

A Note on Media and 'Global' Conservation Organisations

The reality of working with charismatic species is that international media has strong influence over policy enforcement and conservation management in Africa. Much information about the conservation situation in Africa is filtered through global 'non-profit' organisations that are largely seen as trustworthy and legitimate sources. While there are examples of communities misleading or withholding information from the media, the way elephants and African landscapes are managed should not be under the influence of Western media. It is not the role of the media to control and hold people accountable for how they manage their own land and wildlife.

Depictions of Africa are largely constructed from Hollywood movies and charity campaigns like Amnesty International. They build a picture of Africa and its people as impoverished, starving, desperate and illiterate and mostly importantly, dependent on white people for livelihood. In 'classic' and highly prized Hollywood movies, like Out of Africa, African people are low class workers and subservient to the white stars of the film. Africa itself is seen as wild, despondent and untamed wilderness, most notably free of Africans who exist only in the margins of 'the help'. Many Western media focusing on Africa tells a narrative of white people having to save Africa from

the Africans and that image is consistently still perpetuated and clings to Africa as a high level of oppression and denies Africans the agency to define themselves and their history. That notion is the premise for protected areas across Africa and the foundation of the Yellowstone Model and Fortress Conservation.

This image is further perpetuated by modern documentaries from media outlets like the BBC that depict white people exploring the African 'wilderness' with locals playing no more roles than as B-role, short interviews or as background characters to the narrative of white people in the wild. In turn, the promise of wild landscapes and wildlife is the key driver of the tourism industry. The image of the peoples of Africa is homogenised and filtered through both the film industry and the charity industry. This depiction of Africans is what has built the global image of people who do not know how to or do not have the means to manage their own elephants and other wildlife. This image informs the opinions of people who are not African yet have a loud voice in the management of elephants.

The Decolonial Future of CBNRM in African Landscapes

Community-based Management of Elephants

CBNRM is defined by natural resource and landscape management being designed and implemented by First Nations communities. Some of these programs, like CAMPFIRE, have been running for a significant time (Mutandwa & Gadzirayi, 2007). While many of these projects make movements towards returning sovereignty and autonomy to local peoples, many are also unfortunately still under the influence of Western organisations and community engagement is tokenistic and not meaningful. In places like Kenya, where the British monarchy still 'own' the wildlife, including elephants, it defies the concept of autonomy for local people. For many organisations, CBNRM can include employing local people in the protected areas and running community outreach programs to nearby villages (Dressler et al., 2010b; Turner, n.d.). In theory, to educate them about the protected areas and wildlife within. Though it begs the question about which party involved is more knowledgeable of the landscape and the nuances within.

Strengths and Weaknesses of CBNRM

CBNRM has objective strength in being able to tap into generations of environmental and ecological knowledge built around and for the

landscape that elephants inhabit, including the potential for knowing past migration and habitat use (Dyer et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2021). There is the perpetual caveat that colonisation destroyed the languages, stories and intergenerational knowledge that may hold this information and so, in many places, it may not be available. However, CBNRM also increases quality of life for local people, provides meaningful employment and gives some autonomy back to people of their traditional land (Dyer et al., 2014; Gibson Stuart & Clark, 1995; Salerno et al., 2018). CBNRM, or a variation thereof, is already being implemented across Africa with varying levels of success, as in the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe and the community conservancy model in Namibia (Ntuli et al., 2020; Shereni & Saarinen, 2020; Turpie & Letley, 2021). The core component that sets these programs apart is that local communities have full autonomy over wildlife and can treat wildlife as a financial resource. The idea of trophy hunting is becoming less palatable to some western people, but under community control, can be fully sustainable and profitable and allow communities to better integrate into a post-colonial economy and rebuild the community livelihood on their terms (Dyer et al., 2014; Salerno et al., 2018). For many communities, cultural and sustenance hunting and the wildlife trade pre-dates colonisation and was a key part of livelihoods and is not a new concept (Gibson Stuart & Clark, 1995).

CBNRM does not have a singular application or definition across countries, localities and communities. There is location-specific nuance and many CBNRM projects are marred by power and politics, and many remain under state control. For example, in Zimbabwe, despite being one of the first nations to invest in CBNRM in the 1970s, there are problems with how much money goes back to government and rural district councils instead of back to the communities (Mutandwa & Gadzirayi, 2007). The issues of power and politics are not enforced just by Westerners but also by federal and local governments who act as neo- colonial forces (Ntuli et al., 2020). The reality of human-wildlife conflict in communities is that, if people cannot benefit from wildlife, they may kill them. Wildlife, especially large species like elephants, inadvertently cause harm to communities through crop-raiding, village raids or volatile interactions so the financial and physical cost of coexisting with them can be much higher than the cultural benefit of a post-colonial relationship (Dressler et al., 2010b). CBNRM needs to be pivoted around incentivising communities to protect wildlife by providing them a direct way to profit from wildlife (Roe et al., 2000, 2020). This means that land use for wildlife must be valuable, more so than agriculture or livestock

(Roe et al., 2020) which circles back to how CBNRM projects were initiated in the first place.



True CBNRM requires investment in community control instead of state control and must become about community instead of power and politics (Roe et al., 2020). The reality is that CBNRM may not be palatable to Westerners and can include trophy hunting, wildlife trade and profiting from wildlife (Roe et al., 2000, 2020). This discomfort does not override the rights of Africans to exist in and manage their lands and wildlife, and there is no evidence to show that CBNRM leads to further wildlife population declines or unethical practices. Further, the resurgence of Green Militarisation in response to poaching is politically unstable and in the face of climate change, using wildlife can be favourable given communities have the opportunity to turn wildlife from an enemy into an asset and for wildlife conservation to be a valuable land use (Roe et al., 2020).

Importantly, dismantling the oppressive and unsustainable practices of fortress conservation and the Yellowstone Model requires philosophical reframing from an "us versus them" mentality regarding communities and Westerners to a collaborative effort working towards the same goal. This concept already exists as the concept of Ubuntu, an African philosophy and value system that is largely regarded as a core cultural value in sub-Saharan

Africa and pre-dates colonisation (Ewuoso & Hall, 2019). Ubuntu is pivoted on building and maintaining community and communal relationships rather than focusing on respect and autonomy as seen in most Western cultures (Ewuoso & Hall, 2019). While nuanced based on the location, the priority of Ubuntu is grounded in justice and mutual care and act towards a communal good (Ewuoso & Hall, 2019). The core concepts for CBNRM exist and are already entrenched in many African cultures but a lack of investment and support from governments and Westerners acts as a barrier to implementing Ubuntu in the wildlife conservation space.

To avoid exploitation and misuse of power, investment must be in grassroots organisations. We need to support and incentivise grassroots organisations that are community initiated, managed and designed. This is the key to handing power back to communities and deplatforming the power and politics at play, especially taking power from the state and reinvesting it in communities.

Three key components need to be returned to communities in full for CBNRM to be implemented sustainably, ethically and meaningfully across Africa: knowledge, rights and benefit. Investing time, planning and finances into these components of landscape and wildlife management becoming fully community controlled is a critical step towards repairing the relationship between local communities and elephants, while also ensuring that repair is happening on the terms of local communities.



While CBNRM is pivoted around endorsing elephant and landscape

management by local communities, it is not a clear-cut solution. Firstly, time and resources need to be dedicated to repairing the relationship between humans and elephants without the unsolicited influence of Westerners and federal governments and on the terms of local people (Kamau & Sluyter, 2018). This relationship will be key to the successful and meaningful integration of CBNRM into conservation of elephants in Africa. Secondly, local people must have full autonomy over the definition and implementation of CBNRM, which is not necessarily the case for many protected areas claiming to implement CBNRM strategies (Roe et al., 2000, 2020). Thirdly, there is still also an inherit "us" versus "them" mentality built into CBNRM between local people and Western management (Dressler et al., 2010b). While Western management still reflects colonisation and associated historical issues, there are technologies and methods that can be brought into CBNRM that complement local knowledge and practices.

Lastly, it is essential to understand that decolonisation is not a metaphor (Yang & Tuck, 2012). It is critical to manage elephant populations in the most sustainable, effective and ethical way which largely leads back to the integration and adaptive implementation of CBNRM. However, the theory and philosophy of CBNRM is only meaningful if it ends in the act of giving land back (Yang & Tuck, 2012). This must be achieved academically, philosophically, materially, and culturally.

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Vulnerability, Coping, Adaptation, and Accumulation among Women of Irisvale Resettlement Area in Zimbabwe's Umzingwane District

Tinos Mabeza
Sociology
Women's University in Africa, Bulawayo
tinosmabeza@gmail.com.
and
Chipo Hungwe
Community Studies, Midlands State University
hungwec@staff.msu.ac.zw
(corresponding author).

Abstract

This study of women's vulnerability, coping, adaptation, and accumulation in an agrarian setting of the Umzingwane district of Matabeleland South province explores issues that surround Irisvale women as they act and react in response to climate change and policy stimuli that focus on them. Using a qualitative case study design, the study engaged twenty women aged between 21 and 79 between May 2020 and January 2021. Findings indicate that women at Irisvale are not a homogenous group. While some are very vulnerable and hardly cope, others are living relatively comfortably by the standards of the area. The women employed strategies like growing small grains such as sorghum and millet, harvesting *Mopani worms (amacimbi),* and petty trade to ameliorate their situations depending on their capabilities. We recommend that the government and NGOs should avail more social assistance to help manage the negative effects of climate change and government policies.

Keywords: climate change; diversification; livelihoods; women; rural areas; Zimbabwe

Introduction

The World Economic Report (2021) views 2020 as one of the warmest years on record, with very intense storms, heatwaves, and floods. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) points out that a medium-high emission situation describes a mean annual surface air temperature increase of between 3 and 4 degrees by 2080. This calls for a high level of coping and adapting shortly. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2004) suggests that the frequency of droughts has also increased from one in a decade to one every three years in Zimbabwe. Khanal (2009) and Goddard (2010) point out that extreme weather patterns have affected people's activities globally, and they have had to adapt to the variations and inconsistencies of the climate to survive and in some instances, thrive. This study explores how women at Irisvale have fared within a very constraining environment to accumulate wealth and live more comfortably. According to Eele (1996) and de Loe and Kreutzwiser (2010), the understanding of adaptation moves beyond conventional notions of coping. Rather, they view adaptation as the capacity of social actors to shift livelihoods under stress and develop supporting systems that are resilient and flexible enough to absorb and respond to the impacts of climate change. Although recent scholarship on rural livelihoods tends to be sectoral and treats issues like coping and adaptation separately, this paper employs a historical view that traces Irisvale women's exploits as a continuum from vulnerability to accumulation. However, it also pays attention to the fact that the women studied are at various livelihood stages. The objective of the study is to explore livelihood strategies that women at Irisvale Resettlement Area in Umzingwane District use to cope with and adapt to adverse conditions brought about by climate change and unfriendly state policies. It also examines factors that enable women at Irisvale to accumulate wealth.

Background

Climate change has led to the redrawing and reclassification of Zimbabwe's agro-ecological regions (Manatsa et al., 2020; Mugandani et al., 2012). Umzingwane district falls under agro-ecological natural regions IV and V which are characterised by extended periods of dry spells and low agricultural potential. It is also characterised by low and erratic rainfall, between 450- 650mm per annum, making it prone to droughts and insufficient food for the locals. According to the Meteorological Office (2017), the Umzingwane district receives rains between November and April. Chronic food insecurity characterises agro-ecological regions 4 and 5, (Dube et al., 2014; Myers, Heinrich & Rusike, 2010). Besides limited crop production, villagers in the district make a living on petty and cross-border trading, livestock rearing, remittances from the diaspora, and gold mining. Umzingwane district has a population of 36 580 females, and of 36 709 males (ZIMSTAT, 2021). There are slightly more men in the district because of activities such as gold panning which bring in men from other regions of the country. Even though women are almost equal to men in numbers, they have traditionally been invisible in terms of participation in the public affairs of the community.

Before political independence in 1980, women were oppressed politically, socially, and economically. They did not have any decision-making space and were treated as minors at law (Tichagwa, 1998; Gaidzanwa, 2004; Chingarande, 2009). This changed after independence when the state pursued a conscious policy to change women's situation, in line with international and regional instruments that attempted to upgrade the status of women (National Gender Policy, 2013). While women have struggled with oppression within a patriarchal order, they have also had to face challenges presented by nature through droughts, floods, and other extreme weather changes. As Chingarande (2013: 276), citing Lambrou & Piana (2006) and UNFPA (2009), says:

> at the household level, the ability to adapt to changes in the climate depends on control over land, money, information, credit and tools, low dependency ratios, good health and personal mobility, household entitlements and food security, secure housing in safe

locations, and freedom from the violence which are not readily accessible to women.

Women have also suffered from state policies that have impacted negatively on them. They were more affected by the Economic Structural Adjustment Program than men when they had to bear the brunt of caring for their families and being involved in petty trading after men had lost their jobs through retrenchments. Generally, there are more male than female workers in the formal labour market, (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency [ZIMSTAT], 2019). Land reform programs of the 1990s and 2000s did not recognise women as individuals separate from men, thereby perpetuating a situation where women continued to be subordinate to men. These programs have left women in Irisvale very vulnerable. It is necessary to explore their livelihoods and adaptation mechanisms. This study traces changes in processes, practices, and structures that Irisvale women used to limit potential damages and to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change and livelihood diversification.

Conceptualising Livelihoods of Women in Rural Areas

The livelihoods perspective, developed originally in the 1990s (Scoones, 2009; Tambe, 2022), is still widely recognised as offering a comprehensive framework for understanding how people in rural areas live. It was a response to overtly technical and technocratic approaches to rural development, which were concerned primarily with improving the efficiency and productivity of agricultural practices in developing countries. The perspective organises the factors that constrain or enhance livelihood opportunities and shows how they engage with each other. Serrat (2017) sees it as positioned to help plan development activities and assess the contribution that existing activities have made to sustaining livelihoods. The approach is preoccupied with differentiation among people and how and why people make the choices that they do, (Brycesson, 2002; Scoones, 2019; Serrat, 2017; Tambe, 2022). It rejects the idea that people's well-being can be understood solely on a simple technical or financial analysis of the sectors in which people earn their living, or that this would be an adequate basis for developing policies or interventions to support them. A livelihoods approach

tries to hold two perspectives that have sometimes been viewed as opposites. On the one hand, it is essentially an actor-oriented perspective and yet, on the other, it involves political economy analyses. It also sees it as necessary to embrace the diversity and complexity of people's livelihoods and so avoids the easy generalisations of some macro-economic or national development planning approaches which are least likely to be relevant to the poor, or people from different backgrounds. Using this approach, researchers can study sections of people, for example, women, as is the thrust of this paper.

Figure 1: The livelihoods framework used in the study



Source: Serrat (2017: 22)

Figure 1 shows the five pillars of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework which are interconnected and interrelated. The first concerns the vulnerability context. Irisvale is located in an arid region and is susceptible to droughts, resulting in perennial water challenges, and this affects many other areas of people's lives. The second pillar is the Asset base (Tambe, 2022) consisting of five assets, normally referred to as capitals. These capitals are not ranked in any way and the order presented is just for clarity.

Human capital consists of such essentials as stored knowledge, skills and health. Financial capital deals with issues of credit, remittances and savings. Natural capital encompasses such issues as grazing areas, water bodies and forests. Physical capital includes infrastructure, agricultural implements and household assets (Serrat, 2017). Social capital refers to social organisations, traditional norms and customs, ethnic networks, links with traditional or political leadership and other relationships of trust (Scoones, 2019). These capitals are useful in understanding the situation Irisvale women find themselves in.

The third pillar consists of policies, laws and institutions. This study analyses the policies that affect women in Irisvale showing whether they result from the state, private organisations, social institutions or the local culture. The fourth pillar concerns the livelihood strategies and what the women do to manoeuvre within their context. These strategies are determined by the first three pillars. Over the years, women in Irisvale have either chosen strategies that lean towards government and donor interventions or a total break from these. Chimhowu and Hulme (2006) point out that upon resettlement, farmers were not allowed to venture into anything other than agriculture. This was regardless of whether it rained or there was drought. However, the villagers invented other livelihood strategies in the face of continuous droughts. The fifth pillar is about the livelihood's outcomes which express people's aspirations such as improved levels of food security, income and wellbeing and a reduction of vulnerability.

Methodology

In line with Charmaz (2008), the qualitative case study approach was utilised to view the world from the perspective of Irisvale women. Riaan et al. (2010) points out that qualitative methods deploy an inductive and exploratory methodology designed to investigate complex, non-quantifiable processes and the meanings that people assign to these processes. It draws its strength from its explanatory power, the richness of data, and the depth of understanding. Therefore, as a research design, the case study claims to offer richness and in-depth information, capturing as many variables as possible and identifying how a complex set of circumstances come together to

produce a particular manifestation (Yin, 2003).

Irisvale is a resettlement area that is 82 kilometres from Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second-largest city. Map 1 below shows the location of Umzingwane within Zimbabwe.

Map 1: Study area (Umzingwane district)

Source: ZIMSTAT Cartography Section (2018)

Twenty women were purposively selected for in-depth interviews for nine months between 2020 and 2021. There were seven widowed, ten married and three divorced. Of the married women, the study discovered that most of their spouses reside in neighbouring South Africa and only visit once a year. Thus during the course of the year, married women are left to fend for

themselves and their families. The study also engaged four key informants, one from the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises, another from the Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX), a third from the ministry of mines, and a fourth from a local NGO. The study used thematic analysis to categorise and understand data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). As part of the ethical considerations and to protect the identity of participants, the study utilises pseudonyms to refer to participants. All the photographs (of cattle and other resources) were taken with the consent of the participants.

Demographic characteristics of research participants

Table 1: Participants' age categories

Age group	Number of women
21 to 30	1
31 to 40	2
41 to 50	4
51 to 60	6
61 to 70	4
71 to 80	3
Total	20

Table 1 shows that most interviewees (14 out of 20) were in the age groups 41 to 70 years of age. These were free to speak for themselves and their families and to engage in in-depth interviews as their spouses were either deceased or worked out of the country.

Table 2: Participants' highest level of education

No Schooling	1
Primary school level	12
Secondary school level	5
Tertiary education	2
Total	20

Most of the women had very limited education, the majority (12 out of 20) with primary education only. Only two of the participants had tertiary education. In terms of family sizes and the number of dependents, most participants (16 out of 20) cared for orphans whose number ranged from 1-

6. Five of the participants had 5 or more orphans, leading to heavy burdens and strain on their livelihoods. The majority had between one and two orphaned children in their care.

Findings

Women at Irisvale are not a homogenous group in terms of livelihoods but are found at various stages along the livelihood continuum. Their responses to climate change and other policies varied according to their endowments. Some aspects were found to be common to all the Irisvale women such as their being the main providers of food and care for their families. They were also instrumental in community projects and gatherings like funerals and weddings. However, despite participating in such important roles at Irisvale, the women largely remain less visible, as men continue to be perceived to be the dominant actors in the public sphere.

Figure 2: Irisvale women's livelihood strategies



Figure 2 shows that women in Irisvale simultaneously shift between livelihood options, but the most common livelihood strategies are participation in Internal savings lending clubs (ISALs) and crop agriculture. Successive droughts in the area force the women to consider other options like trading and gold mining.

While the most common livelihood strategy appears to be agriculture, figure 2 shows that most participants (70%) now depend on off-farm activities. The women argued that successive droughts due to climate change and the economic downturns have led to partial, and in some cases, a total abandonment of agriculture.

Participation in community activities

While the district has more men than women, the Irisvale community is more female than male. Most males are not at home due to migration and gold panning. There is active participation of women in all the community committees although there seems to be a gender dimension to this participation. Men participate more in committees like the Dip tank and Grazing. This is not surprising as men have interests in cattle which gives them more power and respect in the community. There is also more male participation in the ministers' fraternal, which is a group of religious leaders from different churches. This was expected in the study as the community is patriarchal. Table 3 below illustrates the main committees that women participate in within Irisvale. There are more women in such committees as the veld, water, gardens fire, school development, Village development committees (VIDCO) and Ward development committees (WADCO). VIDCO and WADCO are interestingly political and this shows the rise of Irisvale women. There is a very high level of participation of women even though they generally have lower levels of education.

Even for those committees where women formed the majority, most of the most powerful positions were held by the few men on the committees. A key informant pointed out that women occupy posts such as those of Committee members and Secretaries, which are less powerful compared to that of the Chairperson or deputy. Generally, participation has boosted women's levels of confidence. This was pointed out by one female

participant who stated that previously Irisvale was a men's area, but now women's voices are being heard. She stated:

"Iminyaka edlulileyo, omama babengabothithisi sibili, kathesi amaphimbo abo asezwakala. Inengi labafazi alilamasimu aqondane labo kodwa sokusiba ngcono kuliminyaka" (Years back women were [barking] like puppies, but now their voices are being heard. Most of the women here do not have land in their names. However, it is becoming better).

Table 3: The various committees that women participate in

Name of Committee	Males	Females
Gardens Committee	28%	72%
Veld Committee	32%	68%
Water Committee	39%	61%
School Development	40%	60%
Fire Committee	43%	57%
WADCO	45%	55%
VIDCO	48%	52%
Grazing Committee	70%	30%
Fraternity Committee	71%	29%
Dip Tank Committee	72%	28%

Vulnerability

Most women in Irisvale lack empowerment to control their lives and better manage their vulnerable contexts. They delicately balance their triple roles in the reproductive, productive, and community spheres as they struggle to be mothers, breadwinners, and caregivers. This makes their positions at Irisvale precarious. Vulnerability can also take a gendered form. At Irisvale, the distribution of financial, social, human, and physical capital resources between men and women is in favour of men even at the smallest level of the distribution of food portions within a household. As one participant said:

uma ngipheka, kumele ngisikelele inyama engaqondananga, ngoba umasengiphakulula, kumele yena athole enengi kuleyami (when I am cooking, I need to have an odd number of pieces of meat in the pot because when I dish, he should have more than me).

She went on to say:

kuleminye imisebenzi akhangele ukuthi ngizayenza njengokupheka, ukuwatshimphahla, loku thezinkuni (there are some tasks or roles that he expects me to do without question, such as cooking, washing clothes, and gathering firewood).

For her, doing these tasks alone gave men more time to engage in activities that brought them more income than women. Men also had more time to rest, refresh and refocus, something that women in Irisvale long for.

Another participant, a widow, pointed out that since her husband passed away, it has been very difficult to access credit from lenders. She mentioned that the lenders are very few because of the harsh economic situation and they prefer to lend to better-off families. These are usually male-headed families. The result has been that women like her are left out of development initiatives and benefit only on a marginal scale, whether the initiatives come through the state or private sector. To this end, she lamented, *"bayaqala bakhethane bona bodwa"* (the powerful in this area start by selecting each other). One participant pointed out that she did not get any education and had to depend for all written communications on her son who was learning at a local primary school. She pointed out how lack of education has affected her all her life. She has missed out on many opportunities, but she has also seen men with little education getting access to resources.

Households with at least one orphan were more likely to be vulnerable compared to those without. It was also found that households that reported receiving remittances and were involved in ISALs and gold panning, were likely to be less vulnerable than those that were not able to do so. Households that participated in small-scale gold mining and cross-border trading were thriving as opposed to struggling.

Coping strategies

Locals depend on firewood for their cooking and commercial purposes. However, this sets them on a confrontational path with powers outside their villages especially the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) which curbs rampant cutting down of trees for subsistence and commercial uses. In defiance, one participant ("MaSiwela") said:

Asingeke sayaliswa ukugamulinkuni. Ukubasumlilo yimvelo yethu. Lapha siyabe sinceda abangelawo amahloka, manje abeEMA bayasihlasela (no one should deny us the right to gather firewood. Making fire is our tradition. Here we will be assisting those who do not own axes, but the officials from EMA pounce on us).

The villagers now must play hide and seek with the EMA officials as they claim that without firewood from the local forests, their survival is compromised. Another woman said *"thina sasiphila ngezihlahla kusukela kudala. Kathesi sebesithi kufunekizincwadi. Ngezani lezo?"* (Since time immemorial, we pursued forest-based livelihoods, but now they want us to have letters, what for?). This has seen several locals being caught by EMA officials, having firewood confiscated, cautioned, and released. As a result, EMA is a feared entity among the peasants at Irisvale.

The villagers also depend on the harvesting of *Mopani* worms (*Gonimbrasia Belina,* known locally as *amacimbi)*. This is mostly carried out by women who must compete with people from other provinces for the delicacy. The locals argue that those who come from other places just harvest in a very unsustainable manner, not caring about the future. The picture below shows the Mopani worms which are dried and sold for US$20 per 20 kg bucket.

Figure 2: The Mopane worms that are harvested and sold

Women and adaptation

One participant ("MaDube") pointed out that the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development provides opportunities for women and young people to start small-scale businesses like goat rearing, chicken keeping, and sewing. She pointed out that they have noticed that if people depend on farming alone, they may be vulnerable to continuous droughts induced by climate change. Nine participants claimed to have benefited from such programs. The women also engaged in market gardening as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 3: The market gardening initiative

MaDube further pointed out that in 2015, there were some groups of women who owned sewing machines that they used to make children's clothes and church uniforms for the area. This not only set them up but helped the community look better as well. It was found in the study that moving into off-farming activities empowered women in the social, economic, and political aspects of life. From their discussions, most of the women are not likely to have crop agriculture as the main activity for their households. It seems the activities took the women from the private sphere and through selling and negotiating, their skills were sharpened. The businesses boost confidence and promote self-reliance in rural women who are culturally socialised to rely on men for livelihoods. A key informant pointed out that women now occupy important decision-making positions in committees (see Table 3 above), after gaining confidence:

Over the last few years, we have been seeing women occupying decision-making roles in the community, so far away from their traditional roles around the rural kitchen. They are now found in the school development committees, veld committees, water committees, garden committees, VIDCOs, and WADCOs.

Traditionally, women would stay at home while men worked mostly from outside the home. Another woman ("MaMpofu") noted that these years, weeding fields is not the first thing they do, rather after planting, they wait to see whether it is going to rain:

siyakhangela umkhathi. Eminyakeni silahlekelwe ngamandla amanengi. Siyabona abanye behlakula amasimu abo ngendlela emangalisayo, kodwa litshise ilanga, badane. Thina abanye siyagijimisa okunengi, ukuhlakula sikubone mbayimbayi (We look at the sky. Over the years, we have wasted energy. We have seen some farmers weeding their fields in a way that is amazing, but only to wilt due to the drought, and they become discouraged. Some of us run many activities and only weed later when we are sure the rains will continue).

Women at Irisvale have adapted to changes in climate and state policies in various ways. They have begun to move away from completely agricultural livelihoods and have taken up trading, harvesting and selling of indigenous fruits like *umviyo* and *umqokolo;* some harvest and sell *amacimbi* (Mopani) worms; some engage in cross-border trading; and yet others depend on remittances and gold mining among other options. Of late, households at Irisvale have been saving through substituting traditional foodstuff and at times chemicals for themselves and their livestock instead of buying from shops at steep prices. In terms of household savings, MaDube pointed out that food security is enhanced while household savings are improved because of the businesses they engage in among themselves. Several households managed to buy household furniture, pay tuition fees for their children up to the tertiary level, and provide food for their families.

Women have also resorted to the planting of drought-resistant crops, such as sorghum, *rapoko,* and millet in place of maize which requires high rainfall. They have also resorted to reducing their acreage as the grain began to fetch less in the market. This was caused by the closure of markets they could easily access and deal with like the nearby Grain Marketing Board depots at the nearby growth point, *Esigodini*. Business entities on the other hand did not make the women's situation any better as they would wantonly increase prices of inputs like fertilizers and seed thereby cutting their profitability. Many resorted to the use of organic manure and compost to capacitate the soils, especially in the years when they could not access the Presidential inputs scheme.

Another participant however explained that her household is male-headed but her husband was retrenched in 2008 at the height of the economic crisis from his work at a factory in Bulawayo. He moved from being a breadwinner to a dependent. And the woman then began to engage in cross-border trading. She pointed out that initially the husband was upset with the idea, leading to fighting when she had to spend some nights away from home. The husband could not tolerate it. The situation improved when relatives intervened to negotiate with the man on behalf of his wife. Now there is more money coming into the family than when the man was the breadwinner.

Irisvale women also reported that they had come together as a community to develop community gardens in areas where there is a water

source as an adaptation strategy. Each household member is allocated a portion of land in the garden where she grows various crops for subsistence and surplus for sale. This helps them to cope and even adapt to stressful conditions. The women have ownership and full control of their products and this helps them meet the immediate and intermediate needs of their households. Some professed to have paid school fees for their dependents as a result.

Many households at Irisvale now have brick houses with more modern (asbestos) roofing. This came as a result of engaging in other income-generating activities outside farming and the move to build houses has not only beautified the homes but come with an extra benefit of roof water harvesting which has become a major adaptive strategy employed by Irisvale women. This way, the Irisvale women conserve water and avoid walking long distances in search of water. The conserved water is mainly for domestic use although at times it is used for the small livestock like chickens and goats kept by these women. Irisvale women have also benefited from the boreholes sunk by the state and NGOs that work as the main supply system of water for the villages. In recent times, due to more accumulation by the villagers, some have put up solar-powered boreholes which have changed the way water is accessed.

One of the ways in which households survive at Irisvale is the crafty way they deal with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Wednesday is the day the community rests from various heavy farming chores. The day has invariantly become the best day aspiring NGOs come to convince the community to be part of their various programs. On a typical Wednesday, when the community would have gathered what type of organisation would be visiting them, for instance a food relief organisation, many present themselves as very poor and without any source of sustenance. This way they 'enact' poverty and can 'win' assistance from the different NGOs. In this way some households at Irisvale survive and cope with stresses.

Accumulation

The study found that eight of the twenty women were venturing into high-paying activities like general dealerships and gold mining or gold

'dealing' (both legal and illegal). They have had to brave the situation. The participants pointed out that fifteen years before, no woman in the area would dare challenge men in high-paying ventures. "Initially it was very tough competing with men", MaGumpo said, "but with time men realised we are here to stay". She mentioned that some have begun to employ men as gold panners on their mining claims. The women also pointed out that some of them have begun to rear cattle. This has also been traditionally a male domain, but they said they are breaking through into the area as well. They said they are not just concerned about the numbers but the kind of breeds as well. The picture below shows some of the cattle reared by women.

Figure 4: cattle rearing by women in Irisvale

Another strategy has been participating in internal savings and lending clubs (ISALCs). MaNyathi, for example, has been involved in ISALCs for the last four years. Before that, she used to depend solely on farming. She notes that:

ngisizangapha ngangingumyanga, ngasengisibangcono, kodwa ngenxa yokwehla kwemali lendlala, ngabangumyanga onukayo. Ngehluleka ukuhambisa abantwana esikolo, bacina khonapha e primary (when I first came to this area I was poor, then we started doing well, but because of

economic problems [due to SAPs] and droughts, I became very poor and had to withdraw my children from the local primary school).

Over the years she learned to live within her means and then she was introduced to the ISALCs in the community. Joining this type of club boosted her adaptive capacity and she has been able to build an asbestos-roofed house, send her grandchildren to school, and live comfortably. MaKhumalo said that sometimes women support each other's fundraising events, where the hosting person prepares different types of foods and the rest are expected to buy these. The fundraising events are a hive of activity. This has united women as well and assisted them to adapt to changing times.

Another woman praised the Ministry of Women's Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development policies for levelling the playing field. She noted that had it not been for the Women's ministry that developed with initiatives and training for women, they would still be well behind men. Now, due to assistance from the Ministry, they can stand on their own and look after their families, including the very men who previously stressed them. She said involvement in various projects has exposed women to decision-making and now they lead the various committees in the area. Engaging in activities such as goat rearing and ISALs has removed the exclusion that women in the area have been suffering since independence.

However, some women indicated that their participation in various income-generating activities outside agriculture is still limited because their spouses do not trust them. One participant said that her spouse forbids her from taking part in a private business such as petty trading. Some women stated that they are not allowed by their spouses to attend important program meetings, workshops or events, especially those that involve travelling outside their community.

Long before the state allowed individuals to buy or sell in foreign currency, villagers at Irisvale had already adapted the monetary system. The women would sell their wares in either grain or foreign currency (especially the South African Rand) or cash, which they would quickly turn into foreign currency through the 'informal market'. This way, the villagers were cushioned from the hyperinflationary environment prevalent in the country.

As they saved in foreign currency, it meant their savings were stable and they could invest without headaches. The women in clubs would act as a 'bureau de change' to villagers who depended on remittances from family members who work in South Africa. This has made clubs very viable and helped raise the profile and visibility of women who are now involved in other sectors of society. Irisvale now has more than 25 women who are involved at various decision-making levels in politics, business, and society.

The Ministry of Women's Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development, noted above, runs several programs that provide skills and material support to women in Irisvale. Besides the Ministry, NGOs are part of the institutional structures that have been providing the necessary support. Overall, a sizeable number (12) of women are venturing into high-paying activities like general dealership, transport, and gold mining or gold 'dealing' whether legal or illegal. These are making women count in Irisvale.

One way that education services have been enhanced is through cooperation among the community members. A local newspaper, the *Chronicle* (2016), described the community as a self-reliant lot who believe they can develop their community using local resources and labour. They were also seen as determined to lock donors out of their area, as over the years, donors came with various interventions but still left them dependent. Several the respondents were very vibrant when talking about their experiences as a community. They pointed out that since 1985, although they have had four or five councillors, they did not have a proper secondary school. The councillors that were elected would always push for the secondary school to be built by the government in their village but to no avail. Finally, in 2014 they began to mobilize through some women and the local councillor who had been enlightened through a Tanzanian-influenced program dubbed the Church Community Mobilization Process (CCMP). They raised money to buy cement among themselves and they began to work. This made them visible and local cement companies came in to assist with more cement. Women were the most active in the building of the school. More women were involved in the building than men.

Figure 5: the school built by Irisvale community members in 2017

Discussion

Vulnerability

Households are viewed variously, with scholars like Finley (2010), conceptualizing households as battlefields where conflict, abuse, neglect and depression are commonplace. In Irisvale, female-headed families are fast becoming the norm as men migrate outside the country or engage in gold mining outside their villages. A ZIMVAC Assessment (2017) shows that poor households face similar challenges. Compared to men, Irisvale women have less access to credit and extension services. This could be because women in Irisvale are generally less visible than their men. Interventions, even though they are open to all, usually take a male-centred approach which relegates women to second place. The World Bank, FAO and IFAD (2009) have pointed out that generally women the world over have less access to improved technologies, which undermines their resilience to cope with stress and shocks. How poor households can cope with and mitigate the impacts of shocks and ongoing stresses depends on factors at the micro and intra-household level. IFAD (2009) also explains that women typically have lower levels of education, have less access, ownership and control of productive assets and different social networks to men, leading to lower economic

productivity and income generation, and weaker bargaining positions in the household. This was found to be true for Irisvale. In times of crisis, underlying gender biases may mean that the assets of female or female-headed households' assets are more vulnerable to stripping than those of men, and the impact may be lengthy if what has been sold cannot be replaced. Byrne and Baden (1995) also argue that in crises, women's bargaining position and entitlements may also be reduced more rapidly than those of male members of households.

Coping Capacities

Women and the Irisvale community at large have the ability to perceive climate change and this has positioned them at an advantage when it comes to adaptation. Their use of indigenous knowledge to predict weather patterns has cushioned them from the vagaries of climate change. Women at Irisvale also adapted quickly as a result of the 1990s structural adjustment programs and successive droughts over the years. Some had to move away from the mainly agricultural livelihoods they had known all their lives. This finding resonates with the views by Chaudhary, Rai, Wangdi, Mao, Rehman, Chettri & Bawa (2011) and Komba & Muchapondwa (2012) who argue that it is possible to minimize the impacts of climate change and other shocks brought about by constraining state policies and a hostile business environment. Loison (2015:1136) reiterates that "survival-led diversification is mainly driven by push factors and occurs when poorer rural households engage in low-return nonfarm activities by necessity to ensure survival, to reduce vulnerability or to avoid falling deeper into poverty". Eriksen, Brown & Kelly (2005), Ellis (1998), and Carney (1999) reveal that the notion of coping has its origins in the sustainable livelihood framework. The framework recognizes that livelihoods are derived by households who choose strategies to eke out a living depending on the balance of various forms of capital (human, social, natural, physical and financial) made available to them by institutions and entitlements, which are themselves embedded in the wider political environment.

The sustainable livelihoods approach gives us a picture of how people in areas like Irisvale modify their livelihood strategies within a context of climate change and various socioeconomic and political risks. At

Irisvale it has been shown that most households diversify from mainly agriculture and pursue different options as a strategy of coping like petty trading and *Mopani worms* harvesting. Reardon, Matlon and Delgado (1988) highlight that coping behaviour is a component of diversification. In line with arguments by Cooper et al., (2008), it can be argued that the situation at Irisvale indicates that coping is reactive. The villagers first experienced successive droughts and an economic crisis before developing an adaptive capacity. Berman, Quinn, & Paavola (2012) say that coping capacity is seen as a prerequisite for adaptive capacity.

Adaptive strategies

The women of this study reiterated their respect for the environment. Land was the main natural resource that provided for their livelihood needs. With the low level of education that they possess, it would be expected that they would find it very difficult to engage in alternative sources of livelihood requiring high levels of education. However, the study found that women are responsible for most of the food and assets in the households. They are inextricably linked to their land; hence they expressed their concern and exasperation at the inability of the natural resource to continue providing for their livelihoods. They felt limited in the process. This relationship between women and the environment is corroborated by eco-feminism theory (d'Eaubonne, 1974; Merchant, 2005) which postulates that women's relationship with the environment is inseparable (Warren, 2013). Because the relationship between women and nature is intricately intertwined, any environmental ills are likely to touch women's lives in direct and immediate ways (Warren, 2013).

Women at Irisvale employed adaptation strategies to survive the vagaries of climate change and negative policy changes from the state, along with an ever-changing business environment. The use of organic fertilizer is an adaptive strategy. Rossen and Bierman (2005) point out that organic fertilizer improves soil structure and increases the water holding capacity of coarse-textured clay soils; it provides a slow release of nutrients, reduces wind and water erosion, and promotes the growth of earthworms and other beneficial soil organisms. Some women mentioned delayed planting of crops as another adaptive strategy. While FAO (2000) holds the view that delayed

planting is an effective adaptive strategy to climate impacts, claiming that planting at the onset of the coming of rains ensures germination of the seeds, women at Irisvale seem to have done it for a different reason. They stated that they will not be sure that the rains would come or would be enough, so they use the time they normally use for planting on other activities, like petty trading and gold panning. Nyahunda and Tirivangasi (2021) argue that farming is a futile exercise in dry areas such as Umzingwane. Brycesson (1997) sees a departure from the farm towards a semi-urban environment in a de-agrarian mode. Jerie and Matanga (2011) mentioned that peasants in Mberengwa would resort to early planting, planting drought-tolerant crops, basin tillage, transhumance movement, supplementary feeding, destocking, deep welling, barter trade, selling/hired labour, and begging as ways of coping. The Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) (2013) adds commercial sex work and beer selling as other activities engaged in by rural women.

Those women who have stuck to agriculture have adapted by diversifying their crops, trying out new varieties, especially small grains, delaying planting dates, and using soil conservation methods (conservation agriculture locally known as *gatshompo*). Some members of the Irisvale community are known for using indigenous knowledge to avoid costly chemicals and pesticides. Chaudhary et al., (2011) in India, came to a similar conclusion that unique indigenous knowledge helps locals to adapt better to vagaries brought about by climatic change and negative government policies. Ericksen et al. (2011) are of the view that adaptation occurs with the influence of socio-economic, cultural, political, ecological and institutional factors that shape the human-environment interactions.

Phiri et al., (2014) point out that in response to negative climate impacts, smallholder farmers are adopting a variety of adaptation strategies. For example, some of the adaptation measures used by Zimbabwean smallholder farmers include diversifying crops, planting different crop varieties, changing planting dates, and increasing the use of irrigation and soil conservation techniques. The Zimbabwean government has initiated moves away from prioritising maize to drought-resistant crops like sorghum and pearl millet as an adaptive strategy and Irisvale women have by and large

embraced this as a strategy against both climate change and ever-rising input and commodity prices.

Accumulation

Through participation in various clubs and committees, women at Irisvale are becoming very visible and are being considered for community and political leadership. These findings corroborate Sathiabama's (2010) argument that ed that economic empowerment from microfinance and entrepreneurship can lead to the empowerment of rural entrepreneurs in many ways including socio-economic opportunity, property rights, political representation, social equality, personal rights, family development, market development, community development, and national development.

As Irisvale villagers began to diversify, their fortunes changed. They have been able to set more varieties of food on their tables and generally their tastes have changed. The study by Mutesasira and Nthenya (2014) of income-generating groups in West Nile, Uganda concluded that the lives of very low-income people were transformed in the process, as they began to save as a result. A study by Adams et al. (2018) in Ghana revealed that money-lending institutions began to view villagers in good light after they engaged in income-generating projects. There are some that became serious 'money changers' in the ward. They change to and from any form of currency and they also operate in paperless money especially via the cellular phone. Others depending on their links with "corridors of power" own gold claims and employ several gold panners in the process.

In line with findings by Chikwava (2013), villagers in Irisvale were found to have made more money through diversifying their livelihoods than from farming. Some had bought household assets like solar panels and farming implements such as ploughs and constructed asbestos-roofed houses. Chikwava (2013) found out that some villagers had graduated from owning small businesses to big businesses and were able to improve the quality of their housing. Brick moulding has also become an interesting phenomenon in the area alongside woodworking. Allen and Hobane (2004) found that the Savings and Lending program in Zimbabwe had contributed to increased levels of business and consumer assets amongst the great majority of members' households, and some improvement in the quality of housing.

In Gwanda south, Manyani (2011) also mentions major changes in the house plans and structures, which she described as resembling the common town and city houses. She also reported increased mobility from villages to towns, and improved farming techniques. Manyani's (2011) findings are in line with Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006) who concluded that there was growing class differentiation within rural communities, evident not only in income and housing, but also in the size of herds and breed of herds and, with land holdings, in the types of agricultural techniques employed and the yields achieved.

The villagers in Irisvale began to participate in income-generating activities without government assistance as the state still stuck to its position that the villagers needed to be doing what they had come to the resettlement for. There are times when Irisvale villagers just act to meet their own needs without waiting on the central or local government to lead the way. This has come out very clearly in the initiatives that the villagers have taken to build their own secondary school and to carry out road repairs on their own.

Villagers in Irisvale have not waited for the state or capital to lead the way. The women that accumulate are mostly those that move in quickly when various interventions are introduced to Irisvale. These women participate more in various committees, have strong social capital, and are involved in numerous projects such as gold panning and livestock rearing. As a result, they have greater opportunities for political offices. Those that are simply coping have links to migrant workers in South Africa, Botswana, and overseas. They depend more on remittances than their own produce. The successive droughts have incapacitated them in many ways, and they find it difficult to stand on their own.

Although thirteen of the women have no or only primary school education, their stories as shown above indicate success despite the low levels of education. This speaks to the way the women were able to make use of other forms of capital available, including social capital. The older women struggled more as they had to take care of orphans in the process. This complicated the way they eked out their living. Older women are certainly more vulnerable to the vagaries of climate change and the changing socio-economic environment. With the load of orphans in their care, they have less social capital and find it hard to negotiate through the terrain. They find

themselves struggling to cope and wait for the intervention of the state and well-wishers.

Conclusion

Women at Irisvale cannot be lumped into a single livelihood's category, but instead are heterogeneous, and found rather in four categories: those who are vulnerable, those who are coping, those adapting, and those accumulating wealth. Within each of the four categories, the women employ different livelihood strategies. The study recommends that the state give women and men title deeds to their rural land so that the land becomes bankable, and they can access loans. This way they can rely less on remittances as the women would be more empowered by title deeds to land. There is a need for government institutions like AGRITEX and EMA to mount awareness campaigns to inform and educate rural people by providing adequate coping and adaptation information, rather than being punitive, for example by effecting arrests as in the case of EMA. The state and NGOs should pool resources together to mitigate and adapt to climate change and avail more social assistance (especially for the old aged) to help manage the negative effects of climate change and government policies. The study has revealed that beyond agriculture, women now pursue other off-farm activities which have also assisted them to deal with the vagaries of climate change.

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Data Availability statement

All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this article.

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